> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 1
U.S. EPR Pre-Application Review Meeting:Electrical Systems, Fire Protection and
Train Separation Requirements Overview
AREVA NP Inc. and the NRCJune 20, 2006
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 22
Introduction
Sandra M. SloanManager, Regulatory Affairs
New Plants Deployment
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 3
Meeting ObjectivesElectrical Systems Overview
> Describe the approach for the design of electrical systems for the U.S. EPR
> Provide an overview of U.S. EPR electrical design
> Obtain early NRC feedback concerning the electrical system design strategy
> Discuss upcoming activities associated with the U.S. EPR electrical design
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 4
Meeting ObjectivesFire Protection & Train Separation
> Provide an overview of the U.S. EPR design features to meet NRC requirements for Fire Protection
> Describe the defense-in-depth design for Fire Protection
> Provide an overview of the inherent safe shutdown design features
> Obtain early NRC feedback associated with the U.S. EPR Fire Protection strategy
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 5
Outline
> U.S. EPR status update (Mathews)
> U.S. EPR electrical systems overview (Grundman)
> U.S. EPR fire protection and train separation (Redmond)
> Next steps (Sloan)
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 66
Status Update
Toney MathewsProject Manager, EPR
New Plants Deployment
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 7
Current Activities> OL3 reference plant
Under construction in Finland2009 commercial operationDesign freeze on electrical load listCable penetration and cable tray specification issuedMain generator rotor has been fabricated
> U.S. EPR deploymentDCD development for December 2007 submittalCOLA development for June 2008 submittalDesign continuum developmentElectrical licensing and design basis reconciliationElectrical global competence team oversight
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 8
Planned Activities
> Electrical Design ProcessPhase 1 – Conceptual Design Phase 2 – Basic DesignPhase 3 – Detailed DesignPhase 4 – Manufacturing/Testing/Installation
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 9
Planned Activities - TimelineQ1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
EPR Design Certification
DC Application Preparation & Review DCA Prep, NRC Interactions NRC Review DC Rule
Electrical Conceptual Design
COL Licensing
COL Application Preparation & Review COLA Prep, NRC Interactions NRC COLA Reviews COLA
Electrical Basic Design
Project Execution
"Construction-Ready" Design Detailed engineering for construction
Electrical Basic Design
Electrical Detailed Design
Plant Construction Early Site Work Plant Construction, Start-up Testing
Electrical Manufacturing/Installation/Testing
2013 2014 2015Activity
2005 2006 2007 20122008 2009 2010 2011
AnticipatedFDA IssuenceDC Application
Submitted
ITAAC Complete
AnticipatedFSER Issuance
COL Application Submitted
Anticipated Issuance of
COL
Anticipated Issuance of
DC
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 3
Phase 4
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 10
Dan GrundmanElectrical and I&C Deputy Manager
New Plants Engineering
U.S. EPR Electrical Systems Overview
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 11
U.S. EPR Electrical SystemsTopics
> Electrical – goals and objectives> Electrical design approach> Major differences between OL3 and U.S. EPR> Conceptual single line diagram> Offsite power system> Onsite AC power system (Non-Class 1E)> Onsite AC power system (Class 1E)> Onsite UPS power system (Non-Class 1E)> Onsite UPS power system (Class 1E)> ETAP® analysis
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 12
U.S. EPR Electrical SystemsGoals and Objectives
> Support advanced plant PRA goals
> Support advanced plant staffing goals
> World-wide standardization to maximum extent possible
> Acceptance by international regulatory authorities
Improved Electrical Safety, Performance and Reliability
> Improved safety/reliabilityEnsure preferred power source is available to support safety system operationEnsure emergency power sources are available when neededMinimize single point vulnerabilities which could cause unit trip or loss of preferred power source
> Improved maintainabilityOn-line testing and diagnosticsOn-line maintenance
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 13
EPR Electrical SystemsDesign Approach
> OL3 comprises the base plant design
> Systematic process is being applied to prepare the design for U.S. deployment
Conversion to U.S. design codes & standardsCompliance with NRC regulations and QA requirements
> Industry operating experience addressed in the design certification process
> Use of global competence team to develop and implement worldwide EPR electrical design concepts
> Recent EPR electrical design experience is factored into the U.S. EPR with the implementation of a rotational electrical engineering position
Standardization is a design goal
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 14
EPR Design Conversion
U.S. Licensing BasisDCD
OL3OL3
U.S.QA
Codes & Standards
Design Control
Approved Methods
U.S. EPR Design
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 15
Major Differences between OL3 and U.S. EPR Electrical Design
Regulatory Guidance/Standards
Frequency
Voltage
IEEE, NRCIEC, STUK
60 Hz50 Hz
13.8kV, 4.16kV, 480V10kV, 690VU.S. EPROL3
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 16
Standard Review Plan (NUREG 0800) Correlation with U.S. EPR Electrical Systems
1) SBO Diesel Generators (SBDG)Section 8.4 “Station Blackout (Future)”
1) Class 1E UPS (EUPS)Section 8.3.2 “DC Power Systems (Onsite)”
1) Emergency Power Supply System (EPSS)2) Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG)3) SBO Diesel Generators (SBDG)
Section 8.3.1 “AC Power Systems (Onsite)”
1) Preferred Power Supply (PPS)2) Switchyard (SWYD)
Section 8.2 “Offsite Power System”
U.S. EPR Electrical SystemStandard Review Plan
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 17
EPR General Plant Layout
Office Building
Safeguard Building 4
Fuel Building
Nuclear Auxiliary Building
Access Building Turbine Building
Safeguard Building 2+3
Safeguard Building 1
Reactor Building
Switchgear BuildingTurbine Island
Waste Building
Emergency Diesel Division 1Emergency Diesel Division 2SBO Diesel Division 1
Emergency Diesel Division 3Emergency Diesel Division 4SBO Diesel Division 4
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 18
Conceptual Single Line Diagram
N0BBT01 N0BBT02 N0BBT03 N0BBT04
Division 4Division 2 Division 3Division 1
N1BBA13.8kV
N1BBB13.8kV
N1BDA13.8kV
N2BBA13.8kV
N2BDA13.8kV
N3BBA13.8kV
N3BDA13.8kV
N4BBA13.8kV
N4BBB13.8kV
N4BDA
13.8kV
N1BDG4160V
N1BDH4160V
N2BDG4160V
N2BDH4160V
N3BDG4160V
N3BDH4160V
N4BDG4160V
N4BDH4160V
N1BBC13.8kV
To Reactor Coolant Pump
N2BBC
To Reactor Coolant Pump
N3BBC13.8kV
To Reactor Coolant Pump
N4BBC13.8kV
To Reactor Coolant Pump
2 55 441 1
13.8kV
EDG EDG EDG EDG
SBO DG
SBO DG
N2BBH
4160V
N4BBH4160V
N3BBH4160V
N1BBH
4160V
To Switchyard
To Switchyard
To Switchyard
To Switchyard
2
G
SWYD
Main
Generator
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 19
Offsite Power System
> The offsite system is comprised of two physically independent circuits (in accordance with GDC-17) connecting the transmission network (grid) to the onsite distribution system
> Each redundant safety division is supplied directly from both offsite power sources with no intervening non-safety buses
> The U.S. EPR electrical design group is actively involved in the industry issues involved with grid reliability including NRC GL 2006-02 “Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the Operability of Offsite Power ”
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 20
Typical U.S. Switchyard ConfigurationBreaker and ½ Scheme
PCB
PCB
PCB
TL2TL1
PCB PCBPCB
PCB
PCB
PCBPCB
PCB
PCB
PCB
MSUN0BBT01 N0BBT02 N0BBT03 N0BBT04
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 21
Offsite Power Interface SLD
N0BBT01 N0BBT02 N0BBT03 N0BBT04
Division 4Division 2 Division 3Division 1
N1BBA
13.8 kV
N1BDA
13.8 kV
N2BBA
13.8 kV
N2BDA
13.8 kV
N3BBA
13.8 kV
N3BDA
13.8 kV
N4BBA
13.8 kV
N4BDA
13.8 kV
255 4
41
1
EDG EDG
To Switchyard
To Switchyard
To Switchyard
To Switchyard
2
EDG EDG
Non-Class 1E Power
Class 1E Power
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 22
Offsite Connection Reliability
N0BBT01 N0BBT02 N0BBT03 N0BBT04
Division 4Division 2 Division 3Division 1
N1BDA1E 13.8kV
N2BDA1E 13.8kV
N3BDA1E 13.8kV
N4BDA1E 13.8kV
N1BDG
1E 4160V
N1BDH1E 4160V
N2BDG1E 4160V
N2BDH1E 4160V
N3BDG1E 4160V
N3BDH1E 4160V
N4BDG1E 4160V
N4BDH1E 4160V
22 55
44
11
EDG EDG EDG EDG
To Switchyard
To Switchyard
To Switchyard
To Switchyard
Loss of Auxiliary Transformer (N0BBT04)
SBO DG
SBO DG
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 23
Onsite AC Power (Non-Class 1E)Normal Power Supply System (NPSS)
> Four train bus concept with two maintenance buses capable of being supplied from two sources
> Turbine generator capable of a load rejection (grid) and still maintain house load operation (island mode)
> Largest electrical loads consists of reactor coolant pumps, feedwater pumps, condensate pumps
> Investment protection power supply for a backup power source to supply critical loads (turbine lube oil, UPS, etc) during a loss of offsite power
> No bus transfers required at plant startup or shutdown
Significantly improved reliability
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 24
Onsite AC Power (Non-Class 1E) SLDNPSS
N0BBT01 N0BBT02 N0BBT03 N0BBT04
Division 4Division 2 Division 3Division 1
N1BBA13.8kV
N1BBB13.8kV
N2BBA13.8kV
N3BBA13.8kV
N4BBA13.8kV
N4BBB
To Reactor Coolant Pump
2
2 5
35 44 63
11
6
M
N1BFE480V
N1BFT05
N1BBC13.8kV
N1BDT08
N1BBH4.16kV
N2BBC13.8kV
MTo Reactor
Coolant Pump
N2BBH4.16kV
N2BDT08
N2BBC13.8kV
MTo Reactor
Coolant Pump
N2BBH4.16kV
N4BBC13.8kV
MTo Reactor
Coolant Pump
N4BBH4.16kV
N4BFE480V
N4BFT05
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 25
Onsite AC Power (Class 1E)Emergency Power Supply System (EPSS)
> Four division concept with four redundant emergency diesel generators
> Four 480V fast regulating transformers for voltage sensitive loads, i.e. containment isolation valves
> Divisional electrical cross connects are used to enhance the flexibility and reliability of performing on-line maintenance and outage maintenance
Increased flexibility, reliability and design margin
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 26
13.8 kV
480 V
21
480 V
G
∼-
∼-
N1BMA
N1BNA01 480 V 480 VN1BND
23
N1BRA
N1BMC
N1BTP01
N1BRU01
N1BTD01
N1BDA
XKA10
XKA50N1BDT08N1BMT01
N1BNT04N1BNC 480 V
20
Fuel Pool Cooling
from N0BT03
20
21
23
MaintenanceCross Connects
EDG
SBO
UPS
Division 1 or 4
N1BMT03
N1BDG 4160 V
EPSSElectrical Distribution
Systems
N1BDH
G N1BDT07
480 V
4160 V
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 27
13.8 kV
480 V
21
480 V
G
∼-
∼-
N2BMA
N2BNA01 480 V 480 VN2BND
23
N2BRA
N2BMC
N2BTP01
N2BRU01
N2BTD01
N2BDA
XKA20
N2BDT08N2BMT01
N2BNT0420
from N0BBT04
20
21
23
MaintenanceCross Connects
EDG
UPS
N2BMT03
N2BDG 4160 V
EPSS Electrical Distribution
Systems
N2BDH
N2BDT07
Division 2 or 3
480 V
4160 V
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 28
Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP)
N0BBT01 N0BBT02 N0BBT03 N0BBT04
Division 4Division 2 Division 3Division 1
N1BDA1E 13.8kV
N2BDA1E 13.8kV
N3BDA
1E 13.8kV
N4BDA1E 13.8kV
N1BDG1E 4160V
N1BDH1E 4160V
N2BDG1E 4160V
N2BDH1E 4160V
N3BDG1E 4160V
N3BDH1E 4160V
N4BDG1E 4160V
N4BDH1E 4160V
22 55
44
11
NO NO NO NO
EDG EDG EDG EDG
SBO DG
SBO DG
To Switchyard
To Switchyard
To Switchyard
To Switchyard
Auto Start of All Four EDG’s on Loss of Offsite Power (~20 seconds)
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 29
Station Blackout (SBO)
> Two SBO Non-Class 1E diesel generators (division 1 & 4) which are credited as Alternate AC sources (AAS) for station blackout event
> SBO diesel generators can be started and controlled either from the control room or locally
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 30
Station Blackout
N0BBT01 N0BBT02 N0BBT03 N0BBT04
Division 4Division 2 Division 3Division 1
N1BDA
1E 13.8kV
N2BDA1E 13.8kV
N3BDA1E 13.8kV
N4BDA1E 13.8kV
N1BDG
1E 4160V
N1BDH1E 4160V
N2BDG1E 4160V
N2BDH1E 4160V
N3BDG1E 4160V
N3BDH1E 4160V
N4BDG1E 4160V
N4BDH1E 4160V
22 55
44
11
NO NO NO NO
EDG EDG EDG EDG
SBO DG
SBO DG
To Switchyard
To Switchyard
To Switchyard
To Switchyard
Manual Start of Both SBO Diesel Generators (Remote or Local)
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 31
Onsite DC Power (Class 1E UPS)
> DC/UPS system is an evolutionary design feature:Motor operated valve loads are AC loads fed from the bus on the output of the 480VAC inverter, which is supplied from the batteryDC loads (I&C, switchgear control power, etc) are supplied downstream of UPS inverters by multiple 480VAC/250VDC and 480VAC/24VDC converters
> Advantages vs conventional DC system:Better reliability• A backup source of power is available to safety significant loads
from the 480VAC fast regulating transformers in the event of a failure of the normal inverter, battery or charger
• Safety significant loads are fed from a regulated power source vs. one in which voltage decays as the battery is discharged
Four fewer battery systems (24VDC)24VDC converters located close to the loads minimizes large diameter DC cabling runs
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 32
Onsite Class 1E DC/UPS SLDDivision 1
N1BMC 480VAC
Battery BatteryCharger Charger
NO NC NON1BRA 480VAC
24VDC 250VDCI&C loads Circuit Breaker
Feeders
N1BND 480VAC
Inverter CROSS CONNECT
ES
- ~
~ - ~ -
~ -~ -
Division 2
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 33
Non-Class 1E – UPS
> Two 250 VDC batteries, each supported by two 100% battery chargers
> 24 VDC I&C power is supplied from dual converters
> Power supply for the CRDM’s> Power supply for critical non-safety loads for
asset protection (turbine generator lube oil pumps, etc)
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 34
Non-Class 1E Uninterruptible Power Supply Electrical Distribution Systems
N1BFA 480 V
N1BFX 480 V
G
Asset ProtectionPower Supply
N1BUM 250 VDC N2BUN 250 VDC
∼-
∼-
24 V DC for I&C
--
--
N1BRJ 480 VAC
∼- ∼-
N2BRK 480 VAC
Nuclear Island
Con
trol
rod
driv
es
Con
trol
rod
driv
es
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 35
Electrical Systems Analysis
> ETAP® studies will be developed to verify the adequacy of the conceptual design
> Load flow, short circuit and dynamic analyses of the electrical system will be developed to:
Verify the adequacy of the diesel generator size and diesel generator loadingDevelop equipment specifications for transformers, switchgear, circuit breakers and MCCsDynamic transfer analyses to validate transfers to back up sources of power on a loss of a normal sourceDetermine requirements needed to assure off-site power system voltage adequacy
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 36
Summary
> The U.S. EPR electrical systems design uses insights gained from the design of OL3 and incorporates world-wide operating experience
> The U.S. EPR electrical systems are being designed to meet applicable NRC requirements
> AREVA NP Inc. will provide sufficient information in the DCD and supporting documentation to allow the NRC to make the necessary finding with regard to safety
Robust, reliable electrical design
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 37
Joe RedmondManager, Electrical & Fire Protection
Design and Analysis
Fire Protection and Separation Requirements
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 38
Meeting ObjectivesFire Protection and Separation
> Provide an overview of the U.S. EPR design features to meet NRC requirements for Fire Protection
> Describe the defense-in-depth design for Fire Protection
> Provide an overview of the inherent safe shutdown design features
> Obtain early NRC feedback associated with the U.S. EPR Fire Protection strategy
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 39
Topics
> Fire Protection Defense-in-Depth > Applicable Regulatory Requirements for U.S. EPR> Planned Approach for U.S. EPR> Elements of the Fire Protection Program> Fire Protection Design Approach> Fire Protection Systems and Design Features> Safety Train Separation> Multiple Redundancy of Safety Systems> Control Room Considerations> Containment Considerations
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 40
Fire Protection Defense-in-Depth
> Minimize the potential for fires and explosions> Rapidly detect, control, and extinguish fires> Ensure that fire will not prevent the performance of
necessary safe shutdown functions and will not significantly increase the risk of radioactive releases to the environment
> Failure or inadvertent operation of fire protection systems will not adversely impact the ability of SSC important to safety to perform their safety functions
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 41
U.S. EPR Fire Protection Criteria
> NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan 9.5.1Appendix B addresses supplemental review criteria for Advanced ReactorsAppendix D addresses review criteria for fire PRAs
> SECY-90-016 and SECY-93-087
> 10CFR52.47(a)(1)(v)
> Regulatory Guide 1.189
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 42
Fire Protection Regulatory Environment
> NFPA 804Applicable to new reactorsDeterministicAppendix B of NUREG 0800 cites NFPA 804Not endorsed by rulemaking
> NFPA 805Applicable to existing reactorsNot applicable to new reactorsNRC approved new risk-informed performance-based option -10CFR50.48(c)
> NFPA 806 is under developmentApplicable to new reactorsRisk informed / performance basedScheduled for approval in fall of 2007NRC endorsement unknown
AREVA is monitoring latest fire protectionregulatory developments
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 43
Planned Approach for U.S. EPR
> U.S. EPR will use existing deterministic guidance (NUREG-0800, SECY 90-016 and SECY 93-087) to demonstrate compliance with NRC requirements, including Regulatory Guide 1.189
> Any deviations from existing deterministic guidance for fire protection will be based on risk-informed, performance-based analysis methods following guidance provided in NFPA 806
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 44
Elements of the U.S. EPR Fire Protection Program (FPP)
> Comprehensive identification and analysis of fire and explosion hazards
> Organization and staff positions responsible for FPP management and implementation
> Fire prevention program> Automatic detection and suppression systems> Manual fire suppression capability> Building design features minimize the threat of fires> Safe shutdown analysis demonstrates that the plant can
achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire> Probabilistic risk/safety analysis (PRA) specific to the U.S.
EPR design that identifies relative fire risks and vulnerabilities
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 45
U.S. EPR Fire Protection Design Approach
> OL3 comprises the base plant design> Systematic process is being applied to prepare design for
U.S. deploymentConversion to U.S. design codes and standardsCompliance with NRC regulations and QA requirements
> Insights gained through operating experience will be incorporated into the U.S. EPR fire protection design
> U.S. based employees assigned to support OL3 to develop and implement standardization in worldwide EPR fire protection design concepts
Standardization is a design goal
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 46
U.S. EPR Fire Protection Systems and Design Features: Fire Detection and Alarm
> Fire detection systems will be installed in all areas of the plant that contain or present an exposure fire hazard to SSCs important to safety.
Fire Detection and Alarm Systems will comply with the applicable requirements established by NFPA 72 (National Fire Alarm Code)
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 47
U.S. EPR Fire Protection Systems and Design Features: Water Supply Systems
> Fire pumps, water supply and fire mains will be sized and arranged to ensure that:
100% capacity will be available assuming a single active failure of a fire pump or a water supply or line break with the fire mainU.S. EPR water supply systems will comply with applicable NFPA codes of record: • NFPA 20 (fire pumps)• NFPA 22 (water tanks)• NFPA 24 (fire mains)
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 48
U.S. EPR Fire Protection Systems and Design Features: Automatic Fire Suppression
> Automatic fire suppression systems will be installed as specified to:
Fire Hazards Analysis Provide protection of redundant systems or components necessary for safe shutdown
> U.S. EPR automatic fire suppression systems will comply with applicable NFPA codes of record:
NFPA 13 (sprinkler systems)NFPA 15 (water spray systems)NFPA 2001 (clean agent systems)
Due to spatial separation and four train shutdown design, the U.S. EPR is expected to require less
automatic suppression than existing plants
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 49
U.S. EPR Fire Protection Systems and Design Features: Manual Fire Suppression
> Manual firefighting capability will be provided throughout the plant to limit the extent of fire damage
Standpipes and hose stations will be able to reach any location that contains, or could present, a fire exposure hazardto equipment important to safetyOutside hydrants will provide effective hose stream protection for any onsite location where fixed or transient combustibles could jeopardize equipment important to safety
> U.S. EPR will comply with the applicable codes of record for manual fire suppression systems:
NFPA 10 (fire extinguishers)NFPA 14 (Standpipes and hose systems)NFPA 24 (fire hydrants)
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 50
U.S. EPR Fire Protection Systems and Design Features: Building Design
> Building layoutSSCs important to safety will be designed and located to minimize the probability and effect of fires and explosions by utilizing passive fire barriers to subdivide the plant into separate fire areas or zonesStructural fire barrier designs will be based on NFPA 251/ASTME 119 fire endurance test protocolFire door designs will be in accordance with NFPA 80
> Materials of constructionNoncombustible and heat resistant materials will be used wherever practical throughout the plantNFPA 221 will be used as guidance for specifying requirements for the design and construction of fire walls and fire barrier walls
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 51
U.S. EPR Fire Protection Systems and Design Features: Other Building Systems
> Electrical cable and raceway constructionCables will meet the flame test criteria of IEEE 383 or 1202Cables will be routed in metal raceways and will be separated so that a fire cannot damage redundant systems
> HVAC systems will be designed to:Limit the consequences of a fire by preventing the spread of the products of combustion to opposite/adjacent division areas Provide a means to ventilate, exhaust, or isolate fire areas as required and consideration will be given to the consequences of failure of ventilation systems caused by fire, causing loss of control for ventilating, exhausting, or isolating a given fire area
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 52
U.S. EPR Fire Protection Systems and Design Features: Other Building Systems
> Emergency lighting will be provided as necessary to support:
manual fire-fightingsafe shutdown operationsemergency egress during a fire event
> The communication system design will ensure effective communication capability between plant personnel to support fire-fighting efforts and safe shutdown of the plant
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 53
EPR General Plant Layout
Diesel Building 3+4
Office Building
Safeguard Building 4
Fuel Building
Nuclear Auxiliary Building
Access Building Turbine Building
Safeguard Building 2+3
Diesel Building 1+2
Safeguard Building 1
Reactor Building
Electrical Building
Waste Building
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 54
Redundancy of Safety Systems
Four train safety concept> 1 train is in maintenance> 1 train may be affected by a fire> Remaining train(s) required for safe shutdown
will be available
U.S. EPR redundant safety systemsexceed regulatory requirements
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 55
Safety SystemsFour Separate Buildings
Each safety train is independent and located within a physically separate building
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 56
Control Room Considerations
> Separation of redundant trains in the control room is not practical
For a fire in the control room, an independent alternative safe shutdown capability is provided that is physically separated and electrically independent of the control room
> Remote shutdown stationMeets RG 1.189 requirements for Alternate Shutdown
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 57
Containment Considerations
> Containment fire area contains redundant train cables
Train separation will be demonstrated by a combination of spatial separation and physical barriersFire protection for redundant divisions will be provided to ensure that at least one shutdown division will be free of fire damageFire protection design features will be provided for fire hazards in containmentAutomatic fire detection throughout containment and automatic suppression for the reactor coolant pumps will be provided
> U.S. EPR will meet the requirements of RG 1.189
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 58
Summary
> U.S. EPR fire protection approach will be based on standard NRC guidance and requirements
Any deviations will be based on risk-informed, performance-based analysis methods (per NFPA 806)
> U.S. EPR is a robust design with increased safety margin with respect to fire safe shutdown capability
> U.S. EPR fire protection design will use insights gained from the design of OL3
> The U.S. EPR fire protection design will incorporate insights gained from operating experience
> AREVA NP Inc. will provide sufficient information in the DCD and supporting documentation to allow the NRC to make the necessary finding with regard to safety
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 59
Next Steps
Sandra M. SloanManager, Regulatory Affairs
New Plants Deployment
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 60
Next Steps
> Next meetings
July 25, 2006: U.S. EPR Severe Accident Mitigation Testing, Design and Analysis
August, 2006: Pre-submittal meeting for U.S. EPR Transient and Accident Analysis Code Applicability Topical Report
I&C Safety System & Operational Architecture
Handouts
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 62
U.S. EPR Electrical Systems
> AC Power Systems (Onsite)Class 1E Emergency Power Supply System (EPSS)Emergency Diesel Generator Set (EDG)Class 1E UPS System (EUPS)Non-Class 1E Normal Power Supply System (NPSS)Non-Class 1E Diesel Generator Set (NDG)Non-Class 1E UPS System (NUPS)SBO Diesel Generator Set (SBDG)Power Transmission (GEN)Lighting and Small Power System (LGT))
> DC Power Systems (Onsite)Control Rod Drive Power supply System (CRD)Non-Class 1E DC Power System (NDC)
> Offsite Power SystemSwitchyard and Preferred Power System (SWYD)
> Generic Electrical SystemsCables and Cabling Concept Description (CABL)Lightning and Grounding System (GRD)Protection and Coordination Concept (PC)
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 63
KKS Electrical Designators
480V Class 1E Load CentersBM
480V Non-Class 1E Motor Control CentersBH
Batteries and Battery ChargersBT
DC Class 1E EquipmentBV, BW
DC Non-Class 1E EquipmentBUUPS Related EquipmentBR
480V Class 1E Motor Control CentersBN
480V Non-Class 1E Load CentersBF
13.8kV and 4160V Class 1E EquipmentBD
13.8kV and 4160V Non-Class 1E EquipmentBB
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 64
Electrical AcronymsAAS: Alternate AC Sources
CRDM: Control Rod Drive Mechanism
DCD: Design Control Document
EDG: Emergency Diesel Generator
EPSS: Emergency Power Supply System
ETAP: Electrical Transients Analysis Program
EUPS: Emergency Uninterruptible Power Supply
MCC: Motor Control Center
MSU: Main Start Up
NI: Nuclear Island
NPSS: Normal Power Supply System
PCB: Power Circuit Breaker
PPS: Preferred Power Supply
SBO: Station Blackout
SLD: Single Line Diagram
SWYD: Switchyard
TG: Turbine Generator
TI: Turbine Island
UPS: Uninterruptible Power Supply
> NRC Meeting – June 20, 2006AREVA NP Inc. 65
Fire Protection Acronyms
FHA: Fire Hazard AnalysisFPP: Fire Protection ProgramPRA: Probabilistic Risk/Safety AnalysisSSC: Structures, Systems and Components
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