DPI415: COMPARATIVE POLITICS IN GLOBALDPI415: COMPARATIVE POLITICS IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE
Class 3: Comparative methods: Contrasts between case‐studies v. large N. approaches.
STRUCTURE
1. Recap on previous class discussion: Comparing the causes for the lack of democratization in the Middle
East. Shopping list of propositions: Methods and approaches for each? Methods and approaches for each?
2. Pros and cons about alternative comparative politics research designs King Keohane and Verba – Logic of scientific research design King, Keohane, and Verba Logic of scientific research design Brady and Collier, Mahoney, Munck and Snyder
3. Applied illustration: testing consociational theory Area studies/regional studies/ case studies. Illustration: contrasting / g / g
pathways in Benin v. Togo Pros and Cons? Large‐N quantitative econometric models: Illustration:
democratization patterns worldwidedemocratization patterns worldwide Pros and Cons?
1. RECAPDemocratization in the Middle East
1. RECAP: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES
3. Many units of analysisHigh
Level of
f f labstraction 2.A few units of analysis
1.Single unit casesLow
Scope
ow
One Many
RECAP: DISCUSSION EXERCISE
You are asked to act as an independent consultant pto explain the failure of electoral democracy to develop in the Middle East.
Your client could be: An international organization eg the UNDP, the World Bank, A government department eg the UK Foreign Office, US State dept. The non‐profit NGO eg the Soros foundation or Amnesty International The private sector seeking a risk assessment for investment eg Mobil oil
What alternative factors would you consider to be important whenanalyzing this issue and why?
Brainstorm and write down a list of factors, ranked from most to leastimportant, working in pairs for 10 minutes. We will then compare
l ti th l d id h ld l thexplanations across the class and consider how we would analyze theissue.
What method and approach would you use to analyze the evidence?
Note: The historical index of democracy is the combined Freedom House civil liberties and political rights score, 1972‐2007, standardized to 100‐pts
RECAP: THE CAUSES FOR THE LACK OF
DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.Type Rival propositions Research methods, comparative
framework, case selectionCultural Cultural traditions
Colonial legacies
Role of religion and religiosity
Weak civil society
Economic Impact of oil resources, ‘resource curse’ thesis, state‐capture and rent‐seeking
Sociological Impact of socio‐economic inequality, lack of a middle class, role of education, and gender inequality
Institutional Role of state‐structures, traditional monarchies, constitutional arrangements
IR Regional hegemonic powers/ internationalIR Regional hegemonic powers/ international pressures.
Role of international conflict
2. COMPARATIVE RESEARCH DESIGNS
Debate about the pros and cons of alternative strategies
2. DEBATE
Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba. Designing Social Inquiry 1994 (Princeton)
Logic of inference is same for qualitative and quantitative approaches, but styles of analysis are different Qualitative research uses thick description of a small number of
cases, particular events, decision, institutions, location, regime, nation.
Quantitative research uses numerical measurement abstracting Quantitative research uses numerical measurement, abstracting from particular to testable generalizations, systematic patterns, emphasizes replicability and regularities in classes/categories
Yet both use same logic– designed to make descriptive or g g pexplanatory inferences about unobserved phenomenon on the basis of empirical information about the world.
Ideally research topics should be (i) important in the real world and also (ii) make a contribution to scientific explanationalso (ii) make a contribution to scientific explanation
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS OF CASE‐STUDY APPROACHES
King, Keohane and Verba (1994)g, ( )
Selection and omitted variable bias
Selecting on the dependent variable E.g. Lijphart Patterns of Democracy 30 ‘long‐standing
democracies’
E.g. Skocpol social revolution in France, Russia and Chinag p ,
Too few cases reduces scientific testing Lack of capacity to make scientific inferences and estimate
error
CRITIQUE OF KING, KEOHANE AND VERBA
Henry Brady and David Collier Rethinking Social Inquiry y y g q y2004 (Rowman and Littlefield)
Quantitative approaches, through maximizing diverse cases, loses contextual knowledge,
relies upon statistical techniques unsuited to much data in p qpolitical science, and
underestimates statistical uncertainty and error.
Value of within case causal chains process tracing and Value of within case causal chains, process tracing, and path‐dependent relationships Fruitful for generating theories, hypotheses, and concepts
Distinct approach not reduced to statistical methods
3. ILLUSTRATING THE APPROACHES
Explaining the puzzle of democratization through case studies and large‐N analysis
CONSOCIATIONAL THEORY
Figure 5.1: The core sequential steps in consociational theoryg q p y
Proportional electoral systems
Plural
societies contain distinct ethnic
communities
with low thresholds
Strengthens democratic
consolidation and reduced ethnic conflict Positive action
mechanisms for
Facilitates the
election of representatives and parties drawn from
minority iti
Community leaders have incentives to cooperate within legislatures and
coalition governments, building trust at elite
levelcommunities mechanisms for minorities: boundary
delimination, communal rolls,
and reserved seats
communities
level
Generates support for
democracy among community members
Arend Lijphart 1999. Patterns of Democracy. Yale University Press
PAIRED CASES STUDIES
Figure 1.1: West Africa by type of regime, Freedom House, 2004
MAURITANIA
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BURKINA FASO
CHAD
GAMBIA
MALI NIGER
SENEGAL
BamakoBamakoBamakoBamakoBamakoBamakoBamakoBamakoBamakoNiameyNiameyNiameyNiameyNiameyNiameyNiameyNiameyNiamey
NouakchottNouakchottNouakchottNouakchottNouakchottNouakchottNouakchottNouakchottNouakchott
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BENIN
BURKINA FASO
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
GHANA
GUINEA
GUINEA BISSAU
IVORY COAST
LIBERIA
NIGERIASIERRA LEONE TOGO
BamakoBamakoBamako
LagosLagosLagosLagosLagosLagosLagosLagosLagos
N'djamenaN'djamenaN'djamenaN'djamenaN'djamenaN'djamenaN'djamenaN'djamenaN'djamena
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������������CAMEROON
CONGO
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE
AbidjanAbidjanAbidjanAbidjanAbidjanAbidjanAbidjanAbidjanAbidjan AccraAccraAccraAccraAccraAccraAccraAccraAccra
BanguiBanguiBanguiBanguiBanguiBanguiBanguiBanguiBanguiMalaboMalaboMalaboMalaboMalaboMalaboMalaboMalaboMalabo YaoundeYaoundeYaoundeYaoundeYaoundeYaoundeYaoundeYaoundeYaounde
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GABON
ZAIREBrazzavilleBrazzavilleBrazzavilleBrazzavilleBrazzavilleBrazzavilleBrazzavilleBrazzavilleBrazzaville
KKey
Free
Partly free
Not free
Source: Calculated from Freedom Around the World. www.freedomhouse.org
PAIRED CASES: BENIN AND TOGO7.0
South Africa
Cape Verde
6.0
5.02005
>> H
igh
Benin
S h ll
Senegal
Sao Tome & Principe
Niger
MauritiusMali
Madagascar
Lesotho
K
GhanaBotswana
4.0
eral D
emoc
racy 2
Zambia
Uganda
Tanzania
Sierra Leone
Seychelles
Nigeria
Mozambique
MalawiLiberia
Kenya
GambiaDjibouti
Congo, Republic ofComoros
Central African Republic
Burundi Burkina Faso
3.0
2.0Low
<< Li
be
TogoChad
Zimbabwe
Swaziland
Somalia
Rwanda
Mauritania
Guinea
Gabon
E t i l G i
j
Cote D'Ivoire
Congo, Democratic Republic of
Angola
7.006.005.004.003.002.001.000.00
Low <<Liberal Democracy 1970s >> High
1.0
Zimbabwe
Sudan
Equatorial Guinea
Figure 1.2: Liberal democracy in Sub‐Saharan Africa, 1970s and 2005
Note: The figures are the mean score of each country on the 7‐point Liberal Democracy scale by Freedom House.Source: Calculated from Freedom Around the World. www.freedomhouse.org
WHY THE CONTRASTS BETWEEN BENIN AND TOGO?
Individual leaders? Economic development? Natural resources?Eth i di i i ? Ethnic divisions?
Radical movements? International pressures? International pressures? Regional diffusion?
Table 1.1: Key indicators in Benin and Togo
Social and economic indicators
Area 116, 622 Sq km 56, 785 sq. km
Pop., 2003 7.9m 5.8m
GDP, 2002 $7.7bn $1.4bn
Benin Togo
GDP per capita (PPP US$), 2003 $1,115 $1,696
Life expectancy at birth, 2003 54 years 54 years
Human Development Index, 2003 0.431 0.512
Adult literacy (% of pop. 15+), 2001 33.6% 53.0%
E h i f i li i 2002 (Al i ) 787 709Ethnic fractionalization, 2002 (Alesina) .787 .709
Political indicators
Year of independence 1960 (from
France)
1960 (from
France)
Liberal Democracy Freedom House Index, 1973 7 PR/5 CL 7 PR/6 CL
7-point scale (where 1=high,7=low) (Not free) (Not free)
Liberal Democracy Freedom House Index, 2005 2 PR/ 2CL 6 PR/ 5 CL
Freedom House classification Free Not free
Control of Corruption (Kaufmann) Rank (0-100) 2004 46 15
Government effectiveness (Kaufmann) Rank (0-100)
2004
39 7
Political stability (Kaufmann) Rank (0-100) 2004 35 33
Rule of Law (Kaufmann) Rank (0-100) 2004 41 16
Voice and accountability (Kaufmann) Rank (0-100) 55 13
2004
Regulatory quality (Kaufmann) Rank (0-100) 2004 31 21
Note: See the appendix for details of these indices and sources of data.
PAIRED CASES BENIN V. TOGO
Benin adopted power‐sharing arrangements in early p p g g y1990s Check and balances
P t ti f h i ht Protection of human rights
PR elections to national parliament
Multiparty politics
Independent judiciary established
Local and municipal government
Independent media Independent media
Togo Repressive one party regime and limitary backed dictatorship
No progress in human rights
LARGE N ANALYSIS
DATA
Classify institutions Electoral systems: PR, Combined/mixed, majoritarian Federalism v. unitary states Type of executive (pres v. parl) Types of media systems
M d F i di t Measure democracy: Four indicators Freedom House: Liberal democracy Polity IV: Constitutional democracy Cheibub: Contested democracy Vanhanen: Participatory democracy Vanhanen: Participatory democracy
Test cross‐national time‐series evidence in 191 nations 1972‐2004 Paired historical case‐studies illustrate underlying process e.g.
Togo v. Benin Singapore v. South Korea – economic development India v Bangladesh – decentralization and local governance Ukraine v. Uzbekistan – role of the media UK v. New Zealand – electoral reform
CONTROLS FOR CS‐TS MODELS?
Log per capita GDP Colonial heritage (British) Region (Middle East)R i l diff i Regional diffusion
Ethnic fractionalization Population size Population size Area size
Figure 5.3: Levels of democracy by type of electoral system, 2000
65 67
7771
78
70
80
90
h
58
49
65
57
4250
60
70
ocra
cy >
> Hi
gh
35
25
32
20
30
40
Low
<<
Dem
o
0
10
FH Polity Vanhanen Cheibuby
Majoritarian Combined PR
Note: The standardized 100-point scales of democracy are described in Table 3.1. The four scales measure Liberal Democracy (Freedom House 2000), Constitutional Democracy (Polity IV 2000), y ( ) y ( y )Participatory Democracy (Vanhanen 2000), and Contested Democracy (Cheibub and Gandhi 2000). When tested by ANOVA, the difference between mean scores are significant (at the p=.001 level).Contemporary electoral systems are classified in 191 nations worldwide based on Appendix A inAndrew Reynolds, Ben Reilly and Andrew Ellis. 2005. Electoral System Design: The New InternationalIDEA Handbook. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. The type of electoral system was classified into three categories: Majoritarian/plurality (Single member plurality, 2nd Ballot, Block Vote, Alternative Vote, and Single Non-Transferable Vote), Proportional Representation (Party List and STV) and Combined (using more than one type of ballot insimultaneous elections for the same body).
Table 5 2: Electoral systems and democracy all societies worldwide
Liberal democracy Constitutional democracy Freedom House Polity IV
b (pcse) p b (pcse) p
Table 5.2: Electoral systems and democracy, all societies worldwide
b (pcse) p b (pcse) pINSTITUTIONAL RULES Majoritarian -2.33 (.454) *** -7.64 (.949) *** Proportional representation .904 (.619) N/s 3.85 (.561) *** Positive action strategies 4 13 ( 466) *** 11 41 ( 777) ***Positive action strategies 4.13 (.466) 11.41 (.777) CONTROLS Log GDP/Capita 13.90 (.832) *** 11.91 (1.01) *** Ex-British colony 12.35 (.962) *** 12.36 (1.36) *** Middle East -10.99 (1.16) *** -16.79 (1.40) *** Regional diffusion .632 (.036) *** .883 (.049) ***Ethnic fractionalization -8.45 (.878) *** -1.98 (1.56) N/s Population size .001 (.001) N/s .000 (.001) *** Area size .001 (.001) *** .001 (.001) *** Constant -21.96 -38.45 N. observations 4768 394668 39 6N. of countries 174 145 Adjusted R2 .487 .533 Note: Entries for Liberal Democracy, Constitutional Democracy and Participatory Democracy 100-point scales are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (with their panel corrected standarderrors) and the significance (p) of the coefficients for the pooled time-series cross-national analysis b i d i S ’ d Th i f C d D l i i iobtained using Stata’s xtpcse command. The entries for Contested Democracy are logistic regression.
For the measures of democracy, see Chapter 2. For the classification of the type of electoral system,see Figure 5.1. The default (comparison) is mixed electoral systems. For details of all the variables,see Technical Appendix A. Significant at * the 0.10 level, ** the 0.05 level, and *** the 0.01 level.
Table 5 3: Electoral systems and democracy plural societies only Liberal democracy Constitutional democracy Freedom House Polity IV
b (pcse) p b (pcse) p INSTITUTIONAL RULES
Table 5.3: Electoral systems and democracy, plural societies only
INSTITUTIONAL RULES Majoritarian -4.27 (.625) *** -3.30 (1.16) *** Proportional representation 4.81 (.966) *** 10.68 (.915) *** Positive action strategies 424 ( 676) N/s 13 96 (1 52) ***Positive action strategies .424 (.676) N/s 13.96 (1.52) CONTROLS Log GDP/Capita 10.21 (.519) *** 7.26 (1.21) *** Ex-British colony 8.35 (.744) *** 8.20 (1.10) *** Middle East 8 39 ( 974) *** 20 72 (3 13) ***Middle East -8.39 (.974) *** -20.72 (3.13) ***Regional diffusion .739 (.027) *** 1.04 (.055) *** Ethnic fractionalization 14.97 (3.18) *** 26.51 (4.27) *** Population size -.001 (.000) *** -.001 (.001) *** Area size .001 (.001) *** .001 (.001) *** C t t 30 9 54 9Constant -30.9 -54.9N. observations 2116 1851 N. of countries 76 66 Adjusted R2 .545 .477 Note: Entries for Liberal Democracy, Constitutional Democracy and Participatory Democracy 100-
point scales are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (with their panel corrected standardpoint scales are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (with their panel corrected standarderrors) and the significance (p) of the coefficients for the pooled time-series cross-national analysis obtained using Stata’s xtpcse command. The entries for Contested Democracy are logistic regression.For the measures of democracy, see Chapter 2. For the classification of the type of electoral system,see Figure 5.1. The default (comparison) is mixed electoral systems. For details of all the variables,see Technical Appendix A. Significant at * the 0.10 level, ** the 0.05 level, and *** the 0.01 level.
CONCLUSIONS1. Institutional choices matter1. Institutional choices matter
Power‐sharing is associated with consolidation of democracy Robust for different types of institutions Robust for different measures of democracy Cases illustrate historical processes underlying relationship
2. Yet power‐sharing regimes relatively uncommon3. How can these arrangements be promoted more widely?g p y
Policy implications for constitutional choices and reforms. Afghan electoral reform, Sudan constitutional settlement, Nepalese
constitution, Sri Lanka peace talks, Iraq and federalism,… Next research agenda: what causes countries to choose power‐sharing Next research agenda: what causes countries to choose power‐sharing
agreements? The politics of institutional change
PROS AND CONS OF EACH APPROACH?
NEXT CLASS
Nation‐states
Newton and Van Deth Ch 1
Caramani Ch 4Caramani Ch 4
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