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Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order

Michael N. BarnettColumbia University Press

Fall 1998Bibliographic Data

PrefaceA Narrative of Arab Politics

Which Dialogues Among Which Arab States?n Organization of the Bookn

1.

The Game of Arab Politics

The Structure of Arab Politicsn Symbolic Exchangesn The Changing Game of Arab Politicsn

2.

The Creation of Arab Politics, 19201945

Arab Nationalismn Arab Nationalism and Independencen Arab Nationalism and Palestinen Arab Nationalism and Unificationn

3.

Securing Arabism, 19451955

Palestine and Israeln Arab Nationalism and Sovereigntyn

4.

Arab Nationalism and the Westn

The Ascent and Descent of Arabism, 19561967

Suez, Arabism, and the Westn Arabism and the Rise and Decline of Unificationn The Debate About Israeln

5.

Sovereignty and Statism, 19671990

Khartoum and the Consecration of Sovereigntyn The War of Ramadan, the Peace Process, and Constricted Arabismn Fragmentation in Arab Politicsn

6.

The End of the Arab States System?

Arab Politics Since the Gulf Warn The Gulf Warn The Reorganization of ArabIsraeli Politicsn The Changing Security Ordern The Future Arab Ordern

7.

The Making and Unmaking of Arab Politics

The Game of Arab Politicsn The Pattern of Strategic Interactionn A Narrative of Arab Politicsn

8.

Bibliography


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AUTHOR: Barnett, Michael N.TITLE: Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order

SUBJECT: 1. Panarabism. 2. Nationalism Arab countries. 3. Arab countries Politics and government. 4. Arab countries Foreign relations.

PUBLISHED: New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. ISBN 0231109180 (cloth). ISBN 0231109199 (pbk)

ON-LINE ED.: Columbia International Affairs Online, Transcribed, proofread, andmarked-up in HTML, October 1998.




Fall 1998

Preface

Albert Hourani, the distinguished historian of the Middle East, once observed that any book ontwentieth-century Arab politics must express a dialectic of unity and variety. Local interests andgeopolitical imperatives pull Arab-speaking peoples apart, while the persistence of inherited traits,historic memories, and the attempt to address certain shared problems of identity bring them closertogether. 1 Hourani was not alone among historians of Arab politics to note how the tension betweentransnational bonds and territorial divides has produced a rich mixture of conflict and cooperation amongArab states. For many observers, inter-Arab politics can be defined by the search for integration amongArab states and peoples, inspired by the belief that they are members of the Arab nation, only to beundermined by the existence of latent mistrust and manifested conflict. Such antagonisms, however,never fully extinguish the promise of integration, for the Arab states almost always return to solidarityafter such conflict. Inter-Arab politics exhibits an inescapable rhythm of conflict and cooperation, itself aproduct of the dialectic of unity nurtured by the existence of transnational bonds and of the varietygenerated by rivalries that are part and parcel of territorial possessiveness and personal jealousies.Scholars of international relations have another way of characterizing inter-Arab politics.Quintessentially realist. Perhaps with good reason. Arab politics has seen more than its share of wars,conflicts, and unfriendly acts. The region boasts of a number of strategically skilled and savvy leaderswho are noted for their acumen at exploiting the political environment and regional ideology in order topursue their goals of state power. Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt. Hafiz al-Asad of Syria. King Hussein ofJordan. These and other Arab leaders have a well-earned reputation for their survival skills, derived inpart from an appreciation of the international and regional forces and the direction in which the wind isblowing, and the flexibility to adjust their policies accordingly. Because security dominates all otherconcerns, given the prominence and persistence of inter-Arab conflict, transnational loyalties and unityslogans do not have any appreciable effect on interstate patterns.

Realisms view that Arabist sentiments fold in the face of anarchy contrasts decidedly with Houranisinsistence that Arabism animates the very texture of inter-Arab politics. A consequence of these obversestarting points is that observations of the region and explanations for those observations sometimes arestartlingly different. Where Hourani finds an inescapable rhythm to the region that is generated by a

dialectic of diversity and unity, realists note cycles of power whose origins reside in anarchy and theself-help behavior that it generates. Where Hourani implies that inter-Arab conflict derives in part fromArabism, realists respond that such conflict is a predictable manifestation of anarchy and power politics.Where Hourani and other seasoned observers of the region imply that what makes Arab politics Arab isArabism, realist-inspired interpretations usually dismiss the claims that Arabism is causallyconsequential and that Arab politics has a social or cultural foundation, and instead advance theexplanatory power of anarchy and the distribution of power. These substantial differences have led todivergent conversations and, at the extreme, to mutual dismissal: those concerned with theory tend totreat closely observed historical narratives as interesting but ultimately idiographic, and students of theregion frequently indict theoretically generated interpretations as offering some important insights butultimately contorting history. Any effort to narrow these differences must recognize that Arab politicshas a social foundation that is culturally distinctive yet theoretically recognizable. This is my startingpoint. The claim is that doing so can generate an historically intuitive and theoretically inspired accountof inter-Arab politics. My reinterpretation of the history of inter-Arab politics aspires to approach thatlofty goal.

I view Arab politics as a series of dialogues between Arab states regarding the desired regional ordertheongoing debate by Arab states about the norms of Arab politics and the relationship of those norms totheir Arab identities. Since the beginning of the Arab states system, Arab states and societies have beennegotiating the norms of Arabism. Can Arab states conclude strategic alliances with the West? Are theyexpected to work for unification? Is it permissible for them to negotiate or have relations with Israel?Arab states have addressed and debated what the norms of Arabism should be as they have responded tothe important events of the day, and as they have done so they have asserted that certain norms areexpected or proscribed because of their shared Arab identity. By organizing Arab politics according tothe debates about the desired regional order, I am offering a decided alternative to how we typically tendto think about Arab politicsor international relations, for that matter.

Arab states have had strikingly different views of the desired norms. Although such differences might beattributed to principled beliefs, the more prominent reason was regime interests, beginning with but notexhausted by survival and domestic stability. As a consequence, over the years Arab leaders have vied todraw a line between the regimes interests, the norms of Arabism, and the events of the day. Theyattempted to do so through symbolic technologies. A defining feature of these moments of normativecontestation was that Arab states competed through symbolic means to control the foreign policies oftheir rivals and determine the norms of Arabism. Nassers ability to define the agenda and to rally thepeople in the streets in Damascus and Amman in his favor came not from the barrel of a gun but from hisability to deftly deploy the symbols of Arabism. Although students of international relations willprobably receive this observation warily because of their tendency to assume that military and economicinstruments define the technologies of influence, scholars of the region will quickly recognize thisfeature of Arab politics. And once the norm of Arabism was stabilized, few Arab leaders possessed thebrazenness or recklessness required to defy them. Indeed, the rivalry and sometimes vicious name callingthat marked the period of normative contestation usually yielded, however awkwardly, to speeches ofsolidarity and a general coordination of their policies. The conflicts between Arab governments haveconcerned the norms of Arabism and not the balance of power; their weapons of influence and controlhave derived from the symbols of Arabism; and they have impressively demonstrated their solidarityover the years because of their desire for social approval, which comes from being associated with theArab consensus. To recognize these fundamental features of Arab politics requires an appreciation of the

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power of Arabism and its capacity to invite both conflict and cooperation among Arab governments,which possess a keen sense of self-preservation.

But Arab politics is not what it used to be. The unity that was defined by the presence of Arabismappears increasingly elusive, and the diversity defined by acreting statism appears increasinglyprominent. The postGulf War debate in Arab politics about whether some version of MiddleEasternism is supplanting Arabism exemplifies how Arab states are orienting themselves in newdirections and identifying new interests that are enabled by the decline of Arab nationalism. Althoughscholars are in general agreement that a revolution in the organization of the Arab states system hasoccurred, the debate about its causes is considerable. I argue that how Arab states conducted themselvesduring these dialogues goes a long way toward explaining the map of the Arab world today. This is aworld of their own making and unmaking. Of course, major transformations in regional systems are aproduct of many different forces and factors, including wars and, most important here, changes instate-society relations. But, surprisingly, inter-Arab interactions have not been given their due.

This book examines the ongoing debates about the desired regional order, how Arab states repaired orrevised the norms of Arabism through symbolic exchanges, and how the legacy of those exchanges is thefragmentation that currently defines the Arab states system. I begin the exploration of these themes in1920 with the establishment of the mandate system and continue through today. Rather than treat thehistory of the Arab states system as one uninterrupted story, however, I identify five periods defined bydifferent conversations about the desired regional order: from 1920 to the establishment of the League ofArab States in 1945; from 1945 through the debate about the Baghdad Pact in 1955; from the 1956 SuezWar through the 1967 ArabIsraeli War; from the 1967 war through the 1990 Gulf War; and thepostGulf War period. The content of these dialogues has changed considerably over time, whichsuggests nothing less than a change in the underlying structure of Arab politics; by tracing thesedialogues since 1920, we can follow the dynamics that have defined, shaped, and transformed the Arabstates system.

This narrative is informed by sociological theory and contributes to the growing constructivistscholarship on international politics. Arab politics is generally viewed as realist terrain. But theprominence of identity politics, certainly familiar to even the most casual observer of the region,demands that we move beyond realism to consider other approaches that better recognize thefundamentally social character of global politics. The challenge, however, is to acknowledge this socialcharacter without forgetting that actors are frequently strategic and manipulative. Indeed, they could notbe strategic and manipulative if there were no social foundations and normative expectations to exploitand use for ulterior purposes. I draw from a reservoir of sociological theorizing, most prominently fromthe work of Erving Goffman, to explore this relationship between the normative and the strategic as itpertains to the debate about the desired regional order in Arab politics. In this fundamental way,international orders are an ongoing accomplishment and subject to continuing negotiations, which aredefined by the strategic and symbolic interactions that are the factory of new environments. Structurethrough process.

This book goes beyond simply redescribing what scholars of Arab politics already know. Many excellenttreatments of Arab politics are available, and I rely heavily on them. But resituating the facts of Arabhistory in an alternative narrative generates a different way of understanding these facts and of providinga systematic way of thinking about Arab politics. This narrative invites us to pull back from the details ofthe events and reflect on the more enduring processes that have defined how Arab states have conducted



their relations, to consider how they have debated and revised the norms of Arabism. It therefore allowsus to untangle the meaning of Arabism, to recognize its conceptual elasticity and the social and politicalforces that are responsible for its changed meaning. We also become more attentive to the ways in whichthe current climate in Arab politics is a product of the Arab states own handiwork; if statism nowovershadows Arabism, this is largely because of how Arab states conducted themselves during theheyday of Arabism. These concerns and claims are enduring controversies in Arab historiography, andthe focus on inter-Arab interactions and the debate about the desired regional order, I claim, address eachof them. The dialectic of unity and diversity that is widely noted by seasoned observers of the regionrequires a greater understanding of how that rhythm is generated through the strategic and symbolicinteractions among Arab leaders that occur within a social context defined by Arabismand how thoseinteractions did not necessarily return Arab states to the starting point of unity but rather helped toredefine the meaning of unity and, ultimately, generated a path toward greater diversity.

This book also contributes to the emerging dialogue between international relations theory and the studyof the Middle East. Scholars of the region write accounts that look idiographic to theorists ofinternational politics, and theorists of international politics frequently compress the history of the regionto the point that it looks exotic to scholars of the region. But it need not be that way. By drawing oninternational relations theory and by listening carefully to the politics of the region, I am attempting tocraft an account of inter-Arab politics that is both theoretically informed and historically intuitive.Although scholars of international relations have been somewhat late to recognize that internationalrelations transpire within a social environment, the idea that relations between states are affected bytransnational norms is no surprise to students of the Middle East. Although scholars of the Middle Eastsometimes suggest that theirs is a region that is unique, international relations theory can help usrecognize what is distinctive and what is generalizable. International relations theory can learn muchfrom the politics of the Middle East, and Middle Eastern politics can be fruitfully informed byinternational relations theory.

I have accumulated many debts during the last few years and imposed myself on many colleagues; a realpleasure is being able to acknowledge their assistance and guidance. Alex Wendt and Emanuel Adlerhave read more versions of some chapters than either I or they probably want to recall. Greg Gause was apatient and generous reader and friend. Marc Lynch, Malik Mufti, and Bruce MaddyWeitzman read themanuscript in its entirety and offered important correctives to my interpretation of Middle Easternpolitics. Marty Finnemore, Andrew Grossman, Roger Haydon, Steve Heydemann, Ron Jepperson, PeterKatzenstein, Baghat Korany, Keith Krause, Jack Levy, Yagil Levy, Joel Migdal, Craig Murphy, CharlesTilly, and Marco Verweij read various portions of the manuscript. Gehad Auda, Laurie Brand, BudDuvall, Dana Eyre, Ellis Goldberg, Robert McCalla, Avraham Sela, Ellie Podeh, and Mark Tessleroffered advice and suggestions along the way. Kate Wittenberg expertly shepherded the manuscriptthrough the various states of the process. Polly Kummel had the unenviable task of copyediting my proseand rose to the challenge.

I delivered portions of this argument in various places over the years: conferences sponsored by theSocial Science Research Council (SSRC) at Brown University, the University of Minnesota, andStanford University, as well as at other events at Rutgers University, the University of Washington, theUniversity of North Carolina, Cairo University, Ain Shams University, and the Al-Ahram Press Institute.I have benefited from the criticisms and comments that I received in various corridors, forums, ande-mails.



The book was partially supported by the MacArthur FoundationSSRCs International Peace andSecurity Fellowship. This unique program provided research support and the opportunity to read widelyin other disciplines. I spent a year at the New School for Social Research, where Charles Tilly graciouslyhosted my stay and patiently answered my many questions about sociological theory. The SSRCFellows conferences provided another venue in which I was challenged by others from outside mydiscipline; I thank those who listened to my presentations in the bars and at the formal panels. I also wantto thank the research assistance of Michael Malley in Madison, Wisconsin, Avi Muallan and Dina Cohenin Tel Aviv, and Ashshraf Rady in Cairo.

I immensely enjoyed my abbreviated time in the field because of the good friends who hosted my stayand pointed a khawaga in the right direction. In Tel Aviv the Dayan Center for Middle East Studiesprovided both tremendous resources and infinite hospitality. In Amman I was taken care of by severalfriends, including Khalid Mufti. In Cairo Jocelyn Dejong and Tariq Tall generously opened their home tome; I received a home away from home and a trenchant critic in Tariq. At each locale I knocked on thedoor of many policy makers and scholars. I learned much from them, and I thank them for submittingthemselves to my interviews and many questions. I dedicate this book to Victoria. She has offeredsupport, relief, humor, and comfort in various places, through various phases, and in various ways. Thejoy of her conversation and her many qualities deserve a better return. But this is the book I wrote, andwith all its flaws it is Victorias.

EndotesNote 1: Albert Hourani, How Should We Write the History of the Middle East? International Journalof Middle Eastern Studies 23, no. 1 (February 1991): 133. Back.





Fall 1998

1. A Narrative of Arab Politics

Many of the best-known accounts of Arab politics are informed by a realist narrative. Realisms definingand cyclical narrativethe ongoing pursuit of states to provide for their security in an environment thatis uncertain and dangerous because of the condition of anarchy, conflict as a way of life, and war as everpresent or loomingseems to capture Arab politics. 1 Arab politics is renowned for its contending bidsby Arab states for leadership, shifting alliances, steady stream of crises, occasional war, and ongoingpursuit of security and survival in a very rough neighborhood. If Arab politics has any distinguishingtraits, it is the dramatic relief of the supposed existence of a community and shared identity against theharsh reality of anarchy and rivalry. Arab states ranked their survival and security ahead of Arabsentiments, and when they pledged their devotion to Arabism, the pledge usually came with emptyrhetoric and false promises, a manipulative attempt to shore up a domestic situation, or an effort tobludgeon and embarrass an opponent. 2 Realist imagery dominates our understanding of Arab politics,and Arab politics best fits the realist view of international politics for good reasons. 3

But realism has a difficult time addressing some fundamental features of Arab politics. Considerrealisms reliance on hegemonies, balances of power, and alliances for understanding internationalstability. Realists would expect that in such a high-threat environment Arab states would attempt toincrease their security against each other by accumulating arms and forming military alliances. Butwhere are the arms races? Curiously, Arab states have shunned any noticeable effort to enhance theirsecurity by amassing weapons. 4 That they have refrained from this classic security-building option is notbecause they lack the wherewithal, for they certainly have raced with their non-Arab rivals, or becausethey have forged arms-control agreements, for there were none. Much of the history of Arab politicsshows few recorded instances of an Arab governments taking cover or trying to bolster its securityagainst an Arab rival through military accumulation. Exceptions to this observation exist, but suchexceptions only animate the anomaly.

Perhaps Arab states chose not to develop their military arsenals but to increase their security throughalliances. But a neorealist student of the region concluded his exhaustive survey by noting with somecuriosity that a different form of balancing has occurred in inter-Arab relations as Arab states allied to

protect their image and not in response to shifts in military power. 5 Security, in other words, was not tiedto material power but to presentational politics. The unification of Syria and Egypt in 1958 is a case inpoint. The establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR) sent shivers of insecurity throughout theHashemite palaces in Iraq and Jordan, but Iraqi and Jordanian leaders did not fear the military power ofthe UAR; rather, they were concerned about their image as conservative states amid a tidal wave ofsupport for pan-Arabism and unification. They responded as would any leader seeking survival undersuch circumstances: they unified their statesin other words, they did not construct a securityalliancein the hope of answering their domestic and regional critics. The case of the UAR is not alonein the annals of Arab politics; few alliances among Arab states were a response to shifts in militarypower, and many more were efforts at impression management.

The relative absence of arms races and security alliances is tied to another feature of Arab politics thatappears peculiar from a realist view: Arab leaders were more practiced in the ways of symbolic politicsthan they were in the ways of military politics. More often than not Arab leaders deployed symbolicpower, not military power, to enhance their security and to control each others foreign policies. Simplyput, Arab politics was symbolic politics. Arab leaders frequently took to the airwaves to portray theiradversaries as outside the Arab consensus as a result of policies they had recently enacted or proposed.They took such charges seriously, expended tremendous energy pleading innocent of such crimes, andoften adjusted their policies to avoid the appearance of impropriety, because they knew that to beperceived as violating a norm of Arabism could easily summon regional censure and, moreconsequentially, domestic turmoil. A defining feature of Nassers foreign policy was his masterful use ofthe Voice of the Arabs radio broadcasts to accuse his rivals of threatening the Arab nation. In countlessinstances he mobilized people in the streets of Amman in his favor and made life difficult for KingHussein by portraying him as forsaking the Arab nation. Nasser did this not because it was good sportbut because it was a highly effective way to control Husseins foreign policy. Nasser was not unusualamong Arab leaders in his use of symbolic tools, just more expert. In Arab politics sticks and stones hadlittle effect, but words could really hurt.

Or consider the events leading up to the 1967 ArabIsraeli War. We have little evidence that militaryconsiderations drove Nasser to undertake a series of provocative actions toward Israel that pushed theregion closer to war. Rather, he knowingly risked an unwanted war with Israel to preserve his image asthe leader of Arab nationalism. Nasser was not alone in deciding to sacrifice state power for impressionmanagement; King Hussein calculated that if he went to war with Israel the worst that would happen wasthat he would lose Jerusalem and the West Bank, but if he stood on the sidelines an unforgivingJordanian public would demand his crown. The king later reflected that the Arab mobilization for warwas merely propaganda, radio speeches, and talk. 6 If ideologies such as Arab nationalism are simplyinstruments of state power, as realists contend, why would Arab leaders sacrifice state power on the altarof Arab nationalism?

Finally, a widely observed transformation has occurred in Arab politics during the last few decades. Tocapture such changes scholars and politicians speak of the new realism, the maturation of the system,the return to geography, the end of pan-Arabism, the fragmentation of the Arab world, MiddleEasternism, and the shift from the language of qawmiyya [national identity] to wataniyya [stateidentities]. 7 These different labels represent different ways of describing normative fragmentation inArab politics: whereas Arab states once were oriented toward each other because they presumed thattheir shared Arab identity generated shared interests, Arab states now are suspected of having state

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identities with separate interests that potentially orient them in distinct directions.

To explain this outcome realists elevate shifts in the distribution of power, notably the decline of thepower of Egypt, Arab nationalisms champion, and the rise of the conservative oil states. But even whenthe shifts are judged on the realists evaluative criteria, this view wilts: changes in the regionaldistribution of power do not correlate with the decline of pan-Arabism. Indeed, different accountsidentify radically different moments for Arab nationalisms passing: one identifies the failed unity talksof 1963 between Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, another elevates the 1967 ArabIsraeli War, and still anotherargues for the swing in power from Egypt to Saudi Arabia in the mid-1970s. 8 Shifts in the distribution ofpower are a poor predictor of this fundamental change in Arab politics. 9

Realisms inability to explain regional stability, the strategic interactions between Arab states, and thefragmentation in Arab politics are not simply inconvenient omissions but severe theoretical deficiencies.Perhaps realism is not the problemmaybe it is the region; after all, a long-standing tradition treats theregion as irrational and therefore inexplicable using the theories that explain the histories of otherregions. But we have no reason to presume that the region is unique and impervious to theorizing. Only apoor social scientist blames the subject for a faulty instrument.That said, the scholarship on Arab politics lends implicit and explicit support to realism in several ways.The analytical frameworks offered almost always derive from realism. Few frameworks explicitlyattempt to construct an alternative approach to Arab politics; the result is that realism maintains aprivileged theoretical place. 10 Moreover, many historical accounts implicitly accept realist categories;shifting alliances, bids for leadership, and the onset of war generally mark historical time and thusimplicitly lend support to a realist narrative that organizes history in much the same way. Furthermore,an unstated assumption is that the mere existence of conflict and the actors attempt to maintain theirsecurity are properties of realism alone. But conflict is part of all social relationships and can have asource other than anarchy, few social theories presume that actors are not protective of their security, andwe have no reason to assume that a shared identity necessarily and always leads to harmonious relations.

It is unfortunate that the scholarship on Arab politics is usually associated with realism because historicalaccounts of Arab politics depart significantly from how realism understands international life. Fewnarratives of Arab politics look to anarchy and the distribution of power to understand the states foreignpolicy; most begin with Arab nationalism and discuss how it constrained and shaped the Arab statesforeign policy. Few accounts of Arab politics argue that the states interests stemmed from anarchy; mostdiscuss Arab national interests that derived from their shared Arab identity. Most accounts of Arabpolitics highlight those rare moments when an Arab state used military means of influence and treat as amatter of course how Arab states routinely used symbolic technologies to embarrass their opponents intosubmission. In general, scholars of international relations write that Arab politics is realist politics, eventhough these scholars are unable to account for some gaping omissions. And scholars of Arab politicswrite narratives of the region that defy realist categories, even though they are generally read andadvanced as supporting a realist imagery.

This book advances a narrative of Arab politics that is theoretically distinctive and historicallyinstinctive. Beginning in 1920 with the period of the establishment of the mandate system and continuingthrough the contemporary era, I examine the dialogues among Arab states concerning the desiredregional order, that is, the rival imaginings about the relationship between the desired regional order, the



norms of Arabism, and their identities as Arab states. These dialogues have been an enduring feature ofArab politics. The creation of the Arab League, the 1955 Baghdad Pact, Egypts path to CampDavidthese and other events triggered a hailstorm of debate among Arab states and societies about thenorms of Arab nationalism. Does Arab nationalism demand political unification? Under what conditionscan Arab states ally with the West? How should Arab states organize their activities to confront theZionist threat? Arab states had rival opinions of what these norms should be, and a defining feature ofthese dialogues is that the Arab states competed through symbolic means to determine the norms ofArabism. But the legacy of these dialogues has been normative fragmentation in Arab politics. Tounderstand the fragmentation that defines contemporary Arab politics requires a detailed understandingof how Arab leaders have related and competed over the years. By following these dialogues we arepositioned to understand the dynamics that have defined, shaped, and transformed the Arab statessystem.

This narrative is informed by a constructivist approach to international relations theory. Building onvarious strands of sociological theory, constructivism posits that the actions of states, like individuals,take on meaning and shape within a normative context, that their interactions construct and transformtheir normative arrangements, that these norms can in turn shape their identity and interests, and that theproblem of order is usually solved through social negotiations and a mixture of coercion andconsent. 11 By adopting a constructivist approach, we are able to reconceptualize the history ofinter-Arab politics, approach the debate over the desired regional order as Arab states and societies did,understand why Arab states competed through symbolic means to establish the norms of Arabism, andrecognize how and why those ongoing struggles over the desired regional order caused the fragmentationin the Arab states system.

Dialogues and Regional OrderI organize Arab politics according to the ongoing negotiations about the desired regional order. Statescan be understood as engaged in a never-ending process of negotiating the norms that are to govern theirrelations. All groups of actors, including states, have norms that regulate their relations, govern theirconduct in public life, and delimit the types of behaviors and actions that are permissible, prohibited, anddesirable. Regional order, in this view, emerges not only because of a stable correlation of military forcesbut also because of stable expectations and shared norms. 12 But such normative arrangements are notgivens; they are the result of political contestations and social interactions. 13 An additional feature ofthese struggles frequently goes unappreciated by scholars of international politics: states implicate theiridentities as they defend or advance a regional order. Norms, in short, might be not only regulative oftheir interests but also expressive of their identities. As is evident in the postcold war shuffle, states aresorting out their future arrangements by asking who they are and what the ties that bind should be.

Arab states and societies have been involved in a continuous negotiation about the desired regional order,the norms of Arabism, and the Arab states identity. Since the creation of the mandate system Arab stateshave been actively debating how they should organize their relations to achieve their shared concerns,which have largely revolved around the desire to protect the Arab nation from the West, confrontZionism, and strengthen the political community. Although Arab states defined these three issues as theconsummate Arab interests, they had a more difficult time determining the appropriate means to further



those goals. Should Arab states be allowed to negotiate separately with Israel? Can they concludestrategic alliances with the West? Must they work for integration to strengthen the Arab politicalcommunity, or can they cooperate as sovereign states? As Arab states debated the answer to thesequestions, they usually claimed that some policies were proper for and expressive of their identitieswhereas others were not.

These debates about the desired regional order are most evident during a dialogue, an event that triggersan intensified discussion among group members about the norms that are to guide their relations. 14 Atsuch moments states become fixated on the norms that define the regional order and how those norms arerelated to their identity. Arab politics has had many such instances. The creation of the League of ArabStates in 1945, rumors that Jordan was considering relations with Israel in 1950, the 1955 Baghdad Pactthat established an alliance between Iraq and Turkey, the Arab unity experiments of 1958 to 1963, theArab summits of the mid-1960s, the Khartoum meeting after the 1967 ArabIsraeli War, the contest overthe Camp David accords, the tremors from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990these and other eventsunleashed a dialogue about the desired regional order, which norms should organize their relations, andhow those norms related to their identity as Arab states.

The Game of Arab Politics

A defining feature of these dialogues was that Arab states fought about the norms that should governtheir relations. Understanding the creation, repair, and transformation of the norms of Arabism requires adetailed exploration of the interactions between Arab states. Social processes, not social structures,produce norms. 15 Norms do not operate behind the backs of actors; rather, actors determine what thenorms are. Actors struggle to determine these norms because they have differences of opinion that stemfrom divergent principled beliefs and from opposing political calculations. But scholars are justified inlooking first to instrumental reasons. After all, the norm that is advantageous to one actor can bedetrimental and constraining to another. Arab leaders vied to promote a definition of the situation and torepair or reform the norms of Arabism that were connected to the desired regional order, because doingso could further their various interests and control the foreign policies of their rivals.

Defining the norms of Arabism was an exercise of power and a mechanism of social control. Someinternational relations scholars have an unfortunate tendency to portray norms as married to cooperation.Indeed, Arab leaders frequently claimed that these norms were intended to allow them to further thecollective aspirations of the Arab nation. But frequently lurking beneath the lofty expressions ofcooperation was the more base desire to determine the norms of Arabism because doing so wouldestablish the parameters of what constituted legitimate action and thus represented an act of power.Nassers power derived not from Egypts military capabilities but from his ability to impose a meaningon the events of his time, to establish the norms of Arabism, and to weave a compelling image of thefuture. Arab leaders did not compete to increase their relative gains, as measured in terms of militaryor economic power, but they did compete to establish the meaning of events and to define the norms ofArabism. A corollary was that the threat was not from the barrel of a gun but from the establishment ofa norm or vision of political life that was contrary to the regimes interests. Jordan and Iraq did not viewthe creation of the UAR in 1958 as a threat because of Syria and Egypts newly combined military powerbut because the UAR offered a powerful vision of how Arab politics should be governed, and this hadimmediate implications for domestic stability.

A central ambition of this book is to explore how Arab states competed to define the norms of Arabism.



To do so we must examine the social and strategic interactions between Arab states. 16 What makes theseinteractions social is that Arab leaders were in a structural condition of mutual dependence: because oftheir shared Arab identity they determined the norms of Arabism collectively and could hardly declare asovereign prerogative over such matters, were expected to honor those norms, and generally did sobecause of their desire for social approval and the recognition that they were Arab leaders in goodstanding. What makes these interactions strategic is that Arab governments recognized that achievingtheir goals depended on the norms that were established and the actions of other Arab leaders, and theymanipulated information and images in order to increase the likelihood that their preferred definition ofthe situation was accepted and that their desired norm was stabilized.

These social and strategic interactions inform what I call the game of Arab politics. The concept of agame, which dominates international relations scholarship and informs most analytically driven analysesof Arab politics, recognizes that states are in a social situation defined by the distribution of power; itassumes that states attempt to maximize security, survival, or power because of anarchy; and it attemptsto determine the logic of their choices and the pattern of their interactions as prescribed by theirpreferences and identified constraints. 17 Many scholars of international politics have implicitly adoptedthis approach to organize their reading of Arab politics. 18 In this view Arab states were attempting tofoster their security and survival, which depended on their assessment of the goals and determinations ofother Arab leaders and on the distribution of power.

An alternative understanding of games, however, is that they are normative structures, that is, theycontain the socially determined norms that restrict and guide what is considered acceptable. Thisapproach suggests that the social situation contains norms that constrain the behavior of states; the socialsituation not only constrains these self-interested and faceless states but also is a source of identity andinterests; and the logic of their choices and the pattern of their interactions is shaped by the normativestructure that constitutes their identities and constrains their behavior. By embedding state action within anormative structure, I am attempting to blend homo economicus with homo sociologicus; if economichumans are calculating, utility-maximizing agents, sociological humansthough still calculating andpursuing interestsdefine their interests and modify their behavior within a normative context.

Arab leaders were embedded in a structure defined by Arabism and sovereignty that shaped theiridentities, interests, presentation of self, survival-seeking strategies, and strategic interactions. It allbegins with Arabism. International relations theory has a penchant for treating the social fabric of globalpolitics as either an instrument in the hands of self-interested actors or as a constraint on their behavior,but in both cases it gives priority to the material foundations of the environment. But the structure ofinternational politics is comprised of normative and material elements, and that structure might notsimply constrain but also constitute the identity and interests of states. Arabism was why Arab stateswere expected to pursue Arab national interests and act in concert to achieve their shared goals. In thisway Arab leaders were regarded as representatives of the Arab nation and not only of the territorial stateand were expected to be agents of the Arab political community and not only of their citizens.

Yet these were Arab leaders who frequently demonstrated a greater concern for their survival than forArab nationalism. The observed gap between theory and practice has encouraged scholars of the regionto conclude that Arab leaders proclaimed their commitment to Arab nationalism but through their actionsdemonstrated a greater commitment to themselves. 19 From such observations come realist conclusions.But ample historical evidence exists that Arab nationalism shaped the foreign policies of Arab states in



consequential ways. So how should we conceptualize the relationship between the norms of Arabism andthe actions of Arab officials who honored, exploited, and ignored these norms?

I draw from the work of Erving Goffman and others to claim that although Arab leaders occupied socialroles that derived from the Arab nation as they interacted on a regional stage, they also maintained someautonomy from their roles that allowed them to be creative occupants and cynical manipulators. I assumethat Arab leaders were deeply committed to their own survival. Recognize that at issue here was not thesurvival of the state that dwelled in anarchy but the survival of the Arab leader who dwelled in Arabism.20 But because their legitimacy, popularity, and sometimes even survival depended on whether they wereviewed as adhering to the norms of Arabism, Arab leaders expended considerable energy conveying theimage that they were genuine disciples of Arab nationalism. 21 Such a perspective begins to answer theenduring theoretical mystery in Arab politics regarding how to conceptualize the relationship betweenthe apparently strategic and self-interested behavior of Arab leaders and the demands placed on them byArab nationalism. Norms can be a source of the actors interests, and actors are likely to use societysnorms for ulterior purposes; the issue is not one of norms versus interests but of the relationship betweenthe two.

A defining feature of this game was that Arab leaders selected their technologies of power from acultural tool kit as they competed to define the situation and the norms of Arabism. 22 Building onvarious sociological and anthropological statements that consider how collective mobilization and eventdefinition are facilitated by the manufacture, manipulation, and deployment of symbols, I claim that Arableaders competed for the hearts and minds of Arab populations at home and abroad and attempted todefine the norms of Arabism in two central ways. First, Arab governments framed the events of the day,that is, offered a schema for interpretation that would help to organize experience. Because events do nothave an objective meaning outside of how they are framed, because the norms of Arabism werecontested and debated in relationship to the events of the day, because Arab leaders often had rivalinterpretations of the content of those norms, and because those rival interpretations were generallyrelated to the regimes interests, Arab governments battled to offer the winning interpretation.

Second, Arab governments manipulated and deployed symbols that derived from their shared culturalfoundations to, first, persuade their audience that their definition of events and proposed response wasappropriate, legitimate, and consistent with Arabism and, second, control the foreign policies of theirrivals. Symbolic exchanges defined the strategic interactions between Arab leaders. Arab leaderscompeted on the regional stage with the symbols of Arabism, many of which derived from importanthistorical events that suggested injustice and weakness, to mobilize sentiment on their behalf and tocreate a set of norms consistent with their interests. Arab officials often portrayed their rivals as strayingfrom the Arab consensusand did so in the most colorful languageto mobilize a target statespopulation and to ridicule its leadership. This was Nassers forte, the real source of his power, and whyArab leaders viewed him as a threat. Symbolic politics, in short, is no less related to issues of power,domination, and social control than is military politics. Arab politics is rightly renowned for its conflict.But this conflict derived not from anarchy and the desire to preserve the balance of power but fromArabism and the desire to define the norms of Arabism. The tools of conflict did not came from amilitary arsenal. They came from a cultural storehouse.

A remarkable feature of Arab politics is that amid this pervasive conflict were solidarity and cooperationon several outstanding issues over the years. To explain this outcome most international relations



scholars would suggest that Arab states either established a set of norms to overcome collective actionproblems or had a hegemon that had the carrots and the sticks necessary for such sustained cooperation.23 But the norms of Arabism encouraged cooperation in two additional ways. First, Arabism shaped thedefinition of the interests of Arab states and the means that they could use to pursue those interests.Therefore, in contrast to utilitarian and rational choice theories that assume a randomness to ends,Arabism was a source of identity and interests and caused Arab states to orient themselves toward eachother and in the same direction. Second, that Arabism shoved and pushed Arab leaders toward consensusand solidarity is attributable not only to their self-understandings but also to their keen sense ofself-preservation. Arab leaders who disregarded or blatantly manipulated the tenets of Arab nationalismsoon would have their credentials and character questioned. Arab leaders therefore had to practice whatthey preached. Indeed, at various moments they followed a course of action in order to salvage theirreputation, even though they privately feared that doing so might jeopardize state power. All this wouldbe familiar to Erving Goffman, who understood that actors who appropriate societys norms for ulteriormotives might be compelled to make good on their talk in order to save face. Although I allow for thepossibility that Arab leaders were genuine Arab nationalists, I analytically and historically favor theclaim that Arab leaders were nudged toward mutual orientation by their desire for social approval thatwas critical for regime survival.

In sum, dialogues represent moments when Arab leaders were debating the norms of Arabism and howthose norms were expressive of their Arab identities. To understand the social and strategic interactionsthat ensue at such moments, that is, the game that is played and how it is played, requires recognizinghow: 1) Arabism constituted their identities and interests as Arab states and therefore shaped theirbehavior; 2) Arab leaders honored and manipulated those norms because of self-image andself-preservation; 3) Arab leaders vied to draw a line between the regimes interests, the events of theday, and the norms of Arabism through symbolic technologies; and 4) Arab leaders were likely to honorstabilized norms because of a sense of self and a sense of survival.

Normative Fragmentation

How Arab leaders played the game of Arab politics had the potential to transform that game. By focusingon dialogues as sites of norm creation and historical change, I am highlighting how their interactionsgenerated a map of potential roles and worlds. In this respect events can be moments of change, boundedperiods of time when a transformation of thought, experiences, and social relations occurs. 24Recognizing that events can be transformative moments shifts our attention away from structuralexplanations to the microprocesses upon which structures are built and transformed, away from thelanguage of structural determination and to that of social negotiation. This event-centered andprocess-oriented approach is generally consistent with many previous studies of Arab politics. Theseaccounts have produced detailed considerations of the idiosyncrasies, diplomatic intrigues, and nuancesof various events, which typically are selected because they are understood as turning points in Arabhistory. The creation of the Arab League, the Baghdad Pact, the rise and demise of the UAR, the 1967war, the Camp David accords, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwaitthese and other events are frequentlyforwarded as moments of rapid change when Arab leaders reconsidered the meaning of Arabism andtheir relationship to one another.

I hope to contribute to our understanding of these events in two ways. First, by focusing on themechanisms that produced the observed outcomes, I am suggesting how these individual dynamics are



indicative of more enduring and fundamental processes. Second, many studies implicitly or explicitlyfavor a realist explanation even though they concentrate less on how the regional balance of powershapes interstate interactions and more on how social processes shape regional structures. Therefore myreading of the historiography of Arab politics is that it is more consistent with constructivism than withrealism. The focus on the social interactions between Arab states as a source of change provides a moreconsistent and compelling understanding of how and why these were transformative events in Arabhistory.

To chart the changes in the norms of Arabism is to consider the different meanings of Arab nationalismand to uncover why Arab nationalism underwent the conceptual transformation that it did. Scholars ofArab politics have implicitly recognized that Arab nationalism has demonstrated tremendous conceptualelasticity and has always been a work in progress, but surprisingly few studies have traced the changes inits meaning and its political implications. Much early work on the emergence of Arab nationalism hasbeen generally attentive to its socially constructed nature, carefully considering the social and politicalprocesses, and the external challenges and intellectual movements, that were responsible for itsemergence. But the debate over the end of Arab nationalism has been rather polemic and has had anessentializing tone that revolves around Arabism as unification or as nothing at all. I hope to offer amodest corrective to that debate. By examining the sinews of Arab nationalism as it has evolved duringthe debates about Zionism, the West, and Arab unity, I am attempting to provide a more nuancedunderstanding of the influence of Arab nationalism on inter-Arab dynamics and how the strategicinteractions between Arab states were responsible for Arab nationalisms changing and recentlydeclining fortunes. In general, by detailing and following the debate about the norms of Arabnationalism, I am allowing for the possibility of collective mobilization for political projects short ofpolitical unification, recognizing that various norms have been associated with Arab nationalism over theyears, exploring how these changing norms had varying effects on state behavior and regional politics,and isolating how these norms were sustained or transformed as a consequence of inter-Arabinteractions.

Scholars generally agree that Arab politics is not what it used to be. Whereas Arab states once wereactively considering how to strengthen their ties and to integrate their polities at all levels, the definingtheme of the past few decades has been normative fragmentation to the extent that Arab states are nolonger as pressed toward mutual orientation because of underlying shared identities and interests. Iobserve two analytically distinct but historically related issues. Some rules of the game that haveemerged revolve around sovereignty and its norms. A dramatic development in Arab politics is thegreater agreement among Arab states that regional order should be premised on the norms of sovereignty.And the emergence of sovereignty in this instance is descriptively and analytically connected to the riseof statist identities that are better able to compete with an Arabism that generates alternativeexpectations. Indeed, the features that once defined Arab politics and Arabismconfronting Israel,shunning strategic alliances with the West, and territorial unificationhave declined in prominence andhave left many wondering what is distinctive about Arab politics.

The debate has been considerable among scholars of Arab politics regarding how to explain thisfragmentation. Whereas some look to systemic politics and the shift in the distribution of power, andothers look to domestic politics and state formation processes, I argue that the fragmentation was a resultof how Arab leaders played the game of Arab politics. The strategic and symbolic exchanges thatoccurred between Arab leaders during a dialogue led to differentiation and fragmentation. Whereas Arabstates professed an eternal devotion to the cause of Arab unity, their mutual suspicions and symbolic



competition led to the creation of separate identities, roles, interests that encouraged Arab leaders toadhere to the norms of sovereignty and to privilege the discourse of state interests over Arab nationalinterests. The strategic interactions between Arab leaders were largely responsible for the fraying fabricof Arab politics.

The claim that strategic and symbolic interactions were responsible for this normative fragmentationchallenges the most compelling alternative: that state formation processes created a more realistenvironment. 25 Simply stated, this literature claims that the softer the state is, the more it will gravitatetoward transnational ideologies to bolster its domestic and regional standing; the harder the state is, theeasier it finds the forwarding of its interests. Conversely, that societal actors are no longer responding tothe prospect of unification in the same way or demanding that their governments be associated with thenorms of Arabism suggests a transformation in state-society relations and relatively successful stateformation projects. 26 In general, this literature properly notes that Arab states were more likely to leanon transnational forces if their societies perceived these states as artificial, that Arab leaders attempted toreduce their vulnerability to the dictates and demands of other Arab leaders by encouraging their citizensto identify with the capital city and the regime in power through state formation processes, and that as ageneral rule the search for integration at the local level correlated with the increased fragmentation anddecreased sense of collective obligation at the regional level. 27 State formation processes are connectedto the changes that have taken place in the Arab states system for good reasons.

But this second-image approach suffers from two limitations that point to the necessity of examining theinteractions between Arab states to understand the cause of this normative fragmentation. First, thisliterature nearly assumes that stateness must be theoretically and logically linked with a particular setof practices tantamount to realism and realpolitik. Yet stateness can be related to a host of practices.Nasser, who presided over the Arab worlds only national state, was Arab nationalisms most articulateand forceful spokesman. Although the European states rank high on indexes of legitimacy and capacity,they exhibit a pattern of politics that is far from the realist model now forwarded by some students ofArab politics. Indeed, the same European states that have high levels of stateness have beenintegratingthat is, in the exact opposite manner of Arab states. Second, state formation processes aredecades-long developments and do not correspond directly with many of the important events usuallyidentified as having transformed Arab politics. In a subtle recognition of this gap many explanations thatcenter on domestic politics first examine how domestic politics shapes the states foreign policy but thenquickly shift attention to interstate interactions to understand the outcome. Domestic structures are notthe wellspring of international norms; rather, they emerge from interstate interactions. The quality ofinter-Arab interactions was what contributed to the differentiation among Arab states and not tosuccessful state formation alone.

In sum, Arab politics can be understood as a series of dialogues concerning the relationship betweenidentity, norms, and regional order, and by tracing these dialogues over time we are in a position tounderstand the fabric of Arab politics. Dialogues represent a moment when Arab leaders think aloudabout the norms that should govern their relations; during these dialogues Arab states act strategicallyand deploy symbols to repair, stabilize, or transform the norms of Arabism that are consistent with theirvarious interests; and these exchanges led to the widely observed fragmentation in Arab politics. Thesedialogues about the regional order animated Arab politics for years, and by tracking them through timewe are positioned to follow the debates and dynamics that defined, shaped, and transformed the Arabstates system.



Which Dialogues Among Which Arab States?I am offering a narrative of Arab politics as the ongoing debate about the desired regional order. Briefly,a narrative concerns a story that is joined by a plot. 28 All theories of international politics have animplicit narrative. In realism that narrative is associated with the states struggle for survival, balancingbehavior and the ever-present threat and preparation for war; history, in this sense, is cyclical, and eventsare logically and causally connected by virtue of the story that realism tells. In this fundamental respectmy approach is no different than realism; a narrative provides a way of approaching and organizinghistory, and realism represents one such approach.

Whether my narrative is more convincing, however, depends on the evidence that I bring to bear andhow compellingly I connect these events causally and theoretically. I am not uncovering new facts, but Iam generating an alternative interpretation and understanding of these events by situating them within analternative narrative. For instance, if the Baghdad Pact receives relatively little attention in StephenWalts realist interpretation of Arab politics because it has little demonstrable influence on the balance ofpower, its standing is elevated once it is connected to the debate about the desired regional order. Theseevents, moreover, are causally connected to the changes that follow in the debate about the desiredregional order. The Baghdad Pact reestablished the parameters of Arab politics as it inaugurated theradical Arab agenda. That is, its causal consequence is not tied to the balance of power but to a change inthe desired regional order. Although the narrative might be distinct, the social science methods that I useto provide theoretical leverage over these individual events and to causally and theoretical connect themin an intelligible way are quite familiar.

Thankfully, I do not have to examine all the dialogues among all the Arab states in order to gauge thechanging content and nature of the debate about regional order. Although the League of Arab States hastwenty-three members, I limit my investigation of the dialogues about regional order to Egypt, Lebanon,Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia for both practical and theoretical reasons. On the practicallevel these countries, the original members of the League of Arab States, were at the forefront of anddefined the debate about regional order. On occasion other Arab states entered the discussions, includingthe Persian Gulf and the North African states by the late 1960s, but by and large these seven Arab statesprovide a fairly good if not exhaustive representation of Arab politics over the decades. The otherprincipal contributor to this debate was the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Before the creationof the PLO in 1964, various leaders from the Palestinian community were important to this debate,particularly as it pertained to the confrontation with Zionism; however, Arab states largely vied for theclaim to represent the Palestinians. The emergence of the PLO, however, gave the Palestinians anorganization recognized by other Arab states, and eventually by non-Arab states as well, as their sole andlegitimate representative. Beginning in 1964, therefore, the PLO played an increasingly prominent role inshaping inter-Arab dynamics and the debate about the desired regional order. These eight actorssevenstates and one nonstate actorwere most important in shaping the dynamics that I observe. In thisrespect my goal is not to tell the complete and definitive history of Arab politics but to understand oneimportant featuretheir dialogues about regional order. To do so convincingly does not require acomplete survey and accounting of the positions and foreign policies of all Arab states but rather astructured and selective slice.



My exploration of the ongoing negotiation of Arab states about regional order through dialogues hasthree layers. First, I examine the Arab states system from the beginning of the mandatory period in 1920through today in order to trace the debate about regional order both at a particular moment and itshistorical development. Rather than treat the history of the Arab states system as one uninterrupted story,however, I divide it into periods according to the dominant debate about the desired regional order.Different periods have a different theme to their conversation. I have identified five distinct periods: fromthe mandate period up to the establishment of the League of Arab States in 1945; from 1945 through thedebate about the Baghdad Pact in 1955; from the Suez War through the 1967 ArabIsraeli War; 1967through the Gulf War; and the postGulf War period. Thus the content of these dialogues has changedover time, which suggests nothing less than a change in the underlying structure of Arab politics; tracingthese dialogues provides something of a magnetic resonance device for examining the texture of Arabpolitics.

Second, within each period I examine three defining issuesthe Arab states relationship to unification,the West, and confrontation with Zionismas a way of gauging the debate about the desired regionalorder and the goals and the socially acceptable means to pursue those ends. A celebrated and infamouspoint of contention is Arab nationalisms relationship to state sovereignty and whether Arab states wereexpected to work to bring the national identity and political authority into correspondence. Far fromhonoring the correspondence between statehood and sovereignty, a central debate in Arab politicsinvolved whether its fundamental organization should rest on Westphalia, a gift from the West, or analternative arrangement of the Arabs devising.

Another enduring issue concerns whether and under what conditions Arab states could enter intostrategic arrangements with the West. Western intrusions, interventions, and imperialism gave Arabnationalism a kickstart, and consequently a defining concern was how to increase the Arab states powerand security vis--vis the West. Beginning in the mandate period with anticolonialism, picking up steamin the mid-1950s (thanks to Nasser and his concept of positive neutrality), an article of faith among Arableaders became they should shun strategic alliances with the West and practice the art of Arabself-reliance. Consequently, if realism assumes that states can enter into any alliance as they see fit, anemerging property of Arabism cautioned against alliances with the West not simply because it mightreduce the states autonomy but because it might jeopardize the security of the entire Arab nation.And then there is the ArabIsraeli conflict. That Israel represents a threat to the Arab nation is derivedfrom the Arab identity, and over the years the Arab states have established a series of norms that not onlyhelped to overcome collective action problems but also served to define the meaning of Arabism.Regardless of how Arab states calculated their strategic or material interests, what Mohamed Heikaldescribed as the taboo in Arab politics left unquestioned (until recently) the assumption that relationswith Israel or a separate peace could never happen. 29

Unity, the West, and Zionism have been salient, defining, and identity-expressive issues in Arab politicsfor several reasons. These were not simply foreign policy issues; they also were domestic issues, and inthis respect they were not simply about domestic politics but also about identity politics. Because Arableaders depended on Arabism to authenticate and support their rule of citizens who saw themselves asArab nationals, the leaders domestic legitimacy depended on how they conducted, presented, and carriedthemselves on these matters. Moreover, because these were Arab issues, they properly belonged toandshould be decided collectively byall Arab states. A central feature here was that an Arab leader couldhardly insist on his right to act unilaterally because of state sovereignty. It was bad form to act



unilaterally on these issues, and other Arab states were quick to remind the would-be renegade that it alsowas bad politics. Finally, Arab leaders were forced to take a stand on these matters and judgedaccordingly, and through their collective positions and interactions on these issues they waged, defined,and transformed the debates about the desired regional order. Because these issues provided a litmus testfor an Arab states attitude toward Arabism, they also presented a moment when historicaltransformation was possible.

Third, rather than survey all the events that might be covered by, say, the relationship between the Arabstates and Israel in the 19561967 period, I examine those that were decidedly salient and causallyconsequential for the future path of Arab politics. In other words, although I examine some events thatled to the repair of a norm, most of those I examine were consequential for understanding the path anddevelopment of Arab politics. I want to understand events theoretically and causally, and instead oftreating them as mere data points, I dissect them to understand how they represented moments at whichnorms were established, debated, and potentially transformed and when new historical roads opened upand others became more difficult. I emphasize the importance of path dependencethat when thingshappened and how they happened matter for what follows and what is subsequently possible or unlikely.30 Therefore within each period I examine specific regional crises and events to observe both the natureof the dialogue and to consider whether and how its dynamics led to the creation of new normativearrangements and shifts in the desired regional order. Understanding the contemporary map of Arabpolitics requires following the trail of the states interactions, the historical turning points at which Arabstates reconsidered their relations, and how those turning points became consequential, given thesubjective understanding of those moments in relation to earlier turning points.

Organization of the BookChapter 2 presents my framework for conceptualizing the dialogues in Arab politics as Arab statesdebated the norms of Arabism. The central concern here is to consider how the normative structure ofArab politics, constituted largely by Arabism and sovereignty, shaped the strategic, symbolic, and socialinteractions that ensued between Arab states in this encounter. Specifically, while Arab leadersmaintained a strong interest in regime survival, Arabism and not anarchy provides leverage over the Arabgovernments central objectives, presentation of self, and strategies; the technologies of power that theyused as they debated the norms that were to govern their relations; and why their interactions repaired orreformed a norm and contributed to normative fragmentation in Arab politics.

The five periods categorized by the debate about the desired regional order comprise chapters 3 through7. Chapter 3 examines the historical evolution of the Arab states system and the events leading up to theestablishment of the League of Arab States. The breakdown of the old ordera consequence of thedemise of the Ottoman Empire, the emergence of nationalism, and the spread of the worldeconomyand the fight for the Ottoman succession caused the regions inhabitants to consider howthe Middle East should be organized and orderedwho constituted the political community.Anticolonial and Arab nationalist movements emerged in this context, and their meaning cannot bedivorced from how individuals responded to and attempted to make sense of these fundamentaltransformations. These forces offered different visions of the future and had different prospects forsuccess, given their relationship to institutionalized power and the state. In many respects this is thegenesis of the Arab states system, when Arab nationalisms defining issues are crystallized: the Wests



segmentation of the Arab nation into separate mandates and territories, thus creating the fledglingdemand for territorial unification; Britains and Frances hold over these states, establishing an Arabnationalism that became associated with anticolonialism and independence; and the increasingly strongZionist presence, particularly the Great Palestinian Revolt of 1936, which placed Palestine on the map asan Arab issue. The defining and closing event of this period is the debate about the League of ArabStates. Arab leaders gathered in Cairo to considerand then rejectedan institutional architecture thatwould be more favorable to the idea of territorial unification; indeed, an inescapable feature of theLeagues charter was its nod toward sovereignty and nearly possessive statism.

Chapter 4 examines the period from the establishment of the League of Arab States through the yearlongdebate about the Baghdad Pact in 1955. I examine three issues. The first, revolving around therelationship between Arab nationalism and Zionism, had two defining moments: the decision by the Arabstates to invade Palestine upon the termination of the mandate in May 1948, and the subsequent decisionby the League of Arab States to prohibit a separate peace with Israel in April 1950. What is strikingabout both cases is that the embryonic norms of Arabism and symbolic accumulation led Arab states toalter their policies in decided and highly consequential ways. Although Arab leaders expressed an arrayof attitudes toward Zionismincluding moderate hostility, indifference, and seeing a potential politicalallythe desire to be associated with the norms of Arabism, the use of symbolic sanctions against oneanother, and symbolic competition led them down the path of prohibition.

The second issue concerns the relationship between Arab nationalism and unification. Although Egypt,Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon hoped that the League of Arab States would place an institutional blanket onthis possibility, leaders of the Fertile Crescent circulated various proposals to this end for more than adecade. The most important motion occurred in the fall of 1949 when Iraq and Syria seriouslycontemplated unification. Egypt derailed a primary motivation for Syrias unification drive, security andfear of Israel, by ingeniously proposing a collective security pact. This proposal led to the 1950 ArabCollective Security Pact and the first glimmer that Arab states might coordinate their foreign and securitypolicies in a much more forthright manner. But it also put a momentary end to unification bids. The thirdissue concerns the relationship between Arab nationalism and strategic relations with the West. TheBaghdad Pact represented a turning point in Arab politics; until that moment the dynastic rulers hadlargely kept the lid on radical Arabism. Iraqs decision to ally with Turkey and the West, however,stoked the embers of Arabism, catalyzed a regional debate about the relationship between the Arab worldand the West, led to the norm prohibiting alliances with the West, marked the passage to a more radicalversion of Arab nationalism, and crowned Nasser as the unchallenged leader of Arab nationalism.

Chapter 5 examines the third period, which is framed by the 1956 Suez and 1967 wars and defined by theclash between state and nation, which is symbolized by the rise and decline of unification on the politicalagenda. The Suez Wars principal effect was to institutionalize tendencies that were already present inthe system, namely, the eclipse of the British Empire and the West and the undermining of all Arableaders who were their political allies. During this period Arabism became synonymous with positiveneutrality and self-reliance among the Arab states. The emergence of radical forces, however, alsoproduced a greater interest among some societal forces and state elites for territorial unification. Theshining moment was the creation of the UAR by Egypt and Syria in 1958, which completely altered theregions political debate. Its ignoble demise in 1961 notwithstanding, the demand for unification retainedsome force and underwrote the tripartite talks of 1963 involving Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. These talks,which began with much fanfare and ended in wicked acrimony, had two consequences. The first was ageneral decline in the belief that unification was possible in the near future or even desirable. In short, the



legacy of these failed experiments was greater suspicion of pan-Arabism and a growing acceptance ofsovereignty. The second consequence was the elevation of Israel on the Arab agenda, symbolized by theera of summitry. Beginning with the Cairo summit in January 1964, the Arab states temporarilyovercame their differences to convene a series of meetings intended to forge a collective Arab responseto the Israeli challenge. The era of summitry soon descended into regional acrimony in 1966, and by lateDecember and continuing through June 1967 Arab states engaged in symbolic competition intended todemonstrate their allegiance to Arabism through their strident actions toward Israel; the dance ofsymbolic competition, however, sashayed into symbolic entrapment and the 1967 ArabIsraeli war.

Chapter 6 examines the post-1967 period. What is striking is that the issues of the West and unificationbegan to disappear from dialogues about the desired regional order. For the most part, the ArabIsraeliconflict took center stage and became, for all intents and purposes, how Arab leaders defined anddemonstrated their credentials and the symbols of Arabism that they sought to accumulate; indeed, atroughly the same moment that they were converging on the norms of sovereignty, they entered into amore divisive and open-ended debate about how to organize the ArabIsraeli conflict. I begin with theaftermath of the 1967 war and the events leading up to and resulting from the Khartoum conference ofSeptember 1967; the significance of Khartoum was that it signaled Nassers withdrawal from radicalpolitics and a further step toward sovereignty. The Jordanian Civil War of 1970 further institutionalizedsovereignty; placed in the difficult position of either allowing King Hussein to bludgeon the PLO, thenew symbol of Arabism, or intervening and perhaps undermining the principle of sovereignty, Nasserand other Arab leaders supported Hussein. For the next several years the defining events revolved aroundthe ArabIsraeli conflict. Although the Arab states responded to their defeat in the 1967 war with asemblance of solidarity, the victory of 1973 stirred them toward the opposite direction as Anwar Sadatsthinly veiled unilateralismbeginning with the 1975 EgyptIsrael disengagement agreement andcontinuing through the 1977 flight to Jerusalem, the 1978 Camp David accords, and the 1979 peacetreatystarkly challenged the norms of Arabism. Although the Arab states responded by ostracizingEgypt for its heresy, for the next decade they failed to act proactively to Egypts challenge, becauseLibya, the PLO, Syria, and Algeria (collectively known as the Steadfastness States) held virtual vetopower and blocked anything other than the status quo. No other Arab state dared to venture publiclyoutside this consensus. Still, the emergence of statist identities and acceptance of the norms ofsovereignty to organize regional politics were related to a growing disagreement among Arab states overboth broad principles and short-term strategies concerning the ArabIsraeli conflict. Two otherdevelopments suggest a growing fragmentation of Arab politics. The first is the emergence ofsubregionalism, which first appeared with the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981.The second is a continuing effort to develop some common norms of interaction, although these normsare increasingly indistinguishable from those of international society. These post-1967 events, in short,signal the emergence of statist identities, a centrist definition of Arab nationalism that is consistent withsovereignty, and acceptance of sovereignty as the basis for regional order.

Beginning in the 1970s political Islam became part of the mix of political challenges confronted bymodernizing and religious states alike. 31 But I will pay relatively little attention to political Islambecause Islams principal challenge has been to domestic governance rather than regional governance. Iam not denying that Islam has a transnational component. Westphalian sovereignty rests on a territoriallogic that is denied by Islamists who assert that the authority of the state derives from religious principlesand practices that know no territorial boundaries. Islamic movements also have strong ideas about howthe state should conduct its foreign policy, particularly on the question of Israel and the West as a



religious and cultural threat rather than as a nationalist threat. There is the Organization of IslamicCountries, and Saudi Arabia has sponsored various Islam-based interstate organizations to act as acounterweight to Arab-based organizations. And Islamic movements have received financial backingfrom outside and constructed cross-state organizations. But Islamic movements in contemporary practicehave targeted their energies at state-society rather than interstate relations, demanding domestic ratherthan regional reforms. 32 Simply put, if the divide in regional politics is statism versus Arabism, indomestic politics it is Islam versus secularism.

Chapter 7 considers the question of whether the end of the Arab states system is at hand. The Gulf Warunleashed a flood of discussion about the Arab regional order and what, if any, sorts of exclusivearrangements should be constructed in the ashes of Arabism. Whereas the decades-long debate about thedesired regional order revolved around the premise that as Arab states they shared certain fundamentalobjectives that should be properly handled collectively, the Gulf Warcoming on the heels of risingstatism, sovereignty, a centrist definition of Arab nationalism, and political Islamundermined theseassumptions. Indeed, the postGulf War debates question whether an Arab states system is disappearing,for Arabism is no longer the defining principle of regional politics; the marker to differentiatemembership in the group and its associated organizations; or able to make the same claims on or have thesame force regarding the practices of Arab governments. The postcold war debate about the concept ofMiddle Easternism and the readiness to acknowledge Israels legitimate place in the region and potentialinclusion in regional institutions and organizations speaks to these issues.

In sum, these five periods are defined not simply by a change in the debate about regional order but,more specifically, by a changing relationship between the Arab states and the underlying structure ofregional politics. My goal is to demonstrate how and why these fundamental changes have occurred inthe underlying structure of Arab politics and the norms that guide and define the Arab states system andto show that such changes point to a shift in the game of Arab politics and the desired regional order.This transformation occurred through dialogues among Arab states and state formation processes. Bothprocesses led to the relative salience of state-national identities over alternative political loyalties; agrowing differentiation between Arab states; a growing interest by Arab leaders in presenting themselvesin ways that are statist and more consistent with the demands of sovereignty; and a willingness by Arableaders to more consistently occupy the roles and norms associated with sovereignty. But my centralconcern is to demonstrate the causal contribution of interstate interactions to these very developments.Such developments do not imply a termination of this debate over the desired regional order. Far from it.

Chapter 8 identifies several themes that suggest how constructivism helps us recognize what makesinter-Arab politics distinctive and familiar. To examine inter-Arab politics with a constructivist spirit isto reacquaint international relations theory and the study of the Middle East. Various features ofinter-Arab politics have remained inexplicable from a realist perspective but intelligible from aconstructivist perspective, including the prominence of symbolic exchanges, the character and quality ofalliances and institutions, and the social processes responsible for transforming the character of Arabpolitics. But this study of inter-Arab politics also contributes to international relations theory in variousways and elevates several themes likely to be as present in other regions as they are in Arab politics.



EndotesNote 1: See, for instance, John Mearsheimer The False Promise of Institutions, International Security19, no. 3 (1995): 549; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.:AddisonWesley, 1979); David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1993); Benjamin Frankel, Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction, in B. Frankel,ed., Realism: Restatements and Renewal, pp. 314 (New York: Frank Cass, 1997). Back.Note 2: See Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987);Shibley Telhami, Power and Leadership in International Bargaining: The Path to the Camp DavidAccords (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Yair Evron and Yaacov BarSimanTov,Coalitions in the Arab World, Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1 (Winter 1975): 71108;Alan Taylor, The Arab Balance of Power System (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1982);Roger Owen, State, Power, and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York:Routledge, 1992), pp. 9092; P. J. Vatikiotis, Conflict in the Middle East (London: Allen and Unwin,1971), pp. 1822, 92, and Arab and Regional Politics in the Middle East (New York: St. Martins, 1984);Ellie Kedourie, The Chatham House Version, in E. Kedourie, The Chatham House Version and OtherMiddle Eastern Studies, pp. 35194 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970). Back.Note 3: Joseph Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (NewYork: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 147. Back.Note 4: See Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, Arms Transfers to the Third World, 197185(Oxford, England: Oxford University Press for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,1987). Back.Note 5: Walt, Origins of Alliances, p. 149. Back.

Note 6: Associated Press, Jordans King, in Frank Speech, Calls 67 War a Major Blunder, New YorkTimes, June 6, 1997, p. A6. Back.

Note 7: For the new realism see Bernard Lewis Rethinking the Middle East, Foreign Affairs 71, no.4 (1992): 99119; for maturation see Gabriel BenDor, State and Conflict in the Middle East (NewYork: Praeger, 1983); for geography see Ghassan Salame, Inter-Arab Politics: The Return toGeography, in W. Quandt, ed., The Middle East: Ten Years After Camp David, pp. 31956(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1988); for pan-Arabism see Fouad Ajami, The End ofPan-Arabism, Foreign Affairs 57, no. 5 (Winter 197778): 35573; for fragmentation see George Corm,Fragmentation of the Middle East: The Last Thirty Years (London: Hutchinson, 1983); for MiddleEasternism see Mohammed SidAhmed, The Arab League and the Arab State, Al-Ahram Weekly,April 612, 1995, p. 8; and for qawmiyya see Ghassan Salame, Strong and Weak States: AQualified Return to the Muqaddimah, in G. Luciani, ed., The Arab State, pp. 2964 (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1990). Back.Note 8: Regarding the failed unity talks see Walt, Origins of Alliances, p. 87; Vatikiotis elevates the1967 ArabIsraeli War in Conflict in the Middle East, chap. 5;