Data Link Layer Security &Network Layer Security
Lecture 3Asst.Prof. Supakorn Kungpisdan, Ph.D.
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Roadmap
Data-link Layer Security Network Layer Security
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Task: MAC Address Spoofing
What is MAC address spoofing? What is its purpose? Suggest a way to perform an attack using MAC spoofing Explain how it works Suggest how to prevent MAC Address Spoofing
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Passive Sniffing
Monitor incoming packets Rely on a feature of network cards called promiscuous mode A network card will pass all packets on to the operating system,
rather than just those unicast or broadcast to the host It only listens to incoming packets, but not transmits any packets Does not work well in a switched network The attacker can sniff traffic within his/her VLAN
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Active Sniffing
Inject packets into the network that causes traffic that should not be sent to your system, to be sent to your system
Active wireless sniffing involves sending out multiple network probes to identify APs
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ARP Poisoning
Active or passive sniffing?
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ARP Poisoning (cont.)
By spoofing the default gateway’s IP address, all hosts on the subnet will route through the attacker’s machine Need to poison ARP cache of every host on the subnet Better if targeting a single host on the network Should not spoof the IP of another client. Why?
To perform ARP poisoning, # arp –s <victim IP> <our MAC address> pub
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ARP Flooding Aka. CAM (Content Addressable Memory) Table Overflow CAM stores information about MAC addresses available on each
physical port and their associated VLAN parameters CAM is a normal memory limited in size Flood huge ARP Request to switch The switch is too busy to enforce its port security and broadcasts all
traffic to every port in the network Thus making possible a MITM attack – the attacker can start sniffing
network traffic
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DHCP
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DHCP Starvation Attack
Consuming the IP address space allocated by a DHCP server
Attacker broadcasts a large number of DHCP requests using spoofed MAC addresses
The DHCP server will lease its IP addresses one by one to the attacker until it runs out of available IPs for new, normal clients
Lead to DoS
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Rogue DHCP Server
Set up a rogue DHCP server serving clients with false details E.g. giving them its own IP as default router Result in all the traffic passing through the attacker’s computer
Rogue DHCP server can be set up even without DHCP starvation attack, as clients accept the first DHCPOFFER they receive
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Preventing DHCP Attacks
Port security: do not allow more than X MAC addresses on one port
Rogue DHCP is more difficult to prevent “Authentication for DHCP Messages” (RFC3118) DHCP snooping filters DHCP messages from non-trusted hosts
It contains database of trusted and untrusted interfaces
DHCP Snooping
An untrusted interface : interface configured to receive messages from outside the network or firewall
A trusted interface : interface configured to receive only messages from within the network
An untrusted message is a message that is received from outside the network or firewall and that can cause traffic attacks within your network
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DHCP Snooping (cont.)
DHCP snooping acts like a firewall between untrusted hosts and DHCP servers.
DHCP snooping filters untrusted DHCP messages and by building and maintaining a DHCP snooping binding table
DHCP snooping binding table contains : MAC address, IP address, lease time, binding type, VLAN number, and interface information that corresponds to the local untrusted interfaces of a switch
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DHCP Snooping (cont.)
If the DHCPOFFER came from an untrusted interface, the switch shuts down the port
The switch trusts the interface to which the authorized DHCP server is connected (trusted interface)
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Enabling DHCP Snooping
Int GigabitEthernet 5/1 is trustedInt GigabitEthernet 2/1 is untrusted
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Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) DAI validates ARP packets in a network based on IP-to-MAC
address bindings stored in a trusted database, the DHCP snooping binding database
DAI checks IP-to-MAC binding from DHCP snooping DB It intercepts, log, and discards ARP packets with invalid IP-to-MAC
address bindings. It checks only inbound packets
How DAI Works
The switch performs these activities:1. Intercepts all ARP requests and responses on untrusted ports
2. Verifies that each of these intercepted packets has a valid IP-to-MAC address binding before updating the local ARP cache or before forwarding the packet to the appropriate destination
3. Drops invalid packets
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DAI (cont.)
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http://www.ciscopress.com/articles/article.asp?p=1181682&seqNum=8
DAI In Actions
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DAI in DHCP Environment
DAI relies on the entries in the DHCP snooping binding database to verify IP-to-MAC address bindings.
Configure each secure interface as trusted using the ip arp inspection trust interface configuration command.
The trusted interfaces bypass the ARP inspection validation checks, and all other packets are subject to inspection when they arrive on untrusted interfaces.
Switch(config)# interface GigabitEthernet1/0/1 Switch(config-if)# ip arp inspection trust
Switch(config)# ip arp inspection vlan 5-10
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DAI in non-DHCP Environment
DAI replies on user-configured ARP access control lists (ACLs) for hosts with statically configured IP addressesSwitch(config)# arp access-list arpacl
Switch(config-arp-acl)# permit ip host 10.1.1.11 mac host 0011.0011.0011
Switch(config-arp-acl)# exit
Switch(config)# ip arp inspection filter arpacl vlan 5 Switch(config)# interface GigabitEthernet1/0/2 Switch(config-if)# no ip arp inspection trust
If the ARP packet is received on a trusted interface, the switch forwards the packet without any checks
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DAI Steps
1. By default, all interfaces are untrusted2. The switch does not check ARP packets that it receives
from the other switch in the trusted interface3. For untrusted interfaces,
1. the switch intercepts all ARP requests and responses. 2. It verifies that the intercepted packets have valid IP-to-MAC
address bindings. Firstly it checks from ARP access control list If no such ACL, check from DHCP snooping database
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Routing Games
One method to ensure that all traffic on a network will pass through your host is to change the routing table of the host you wish to monitor
Sending a fake route advertisement via the RIP, declaring yourself as the default gateway
All outbound traffic will pass though your host then go to the real default gateway
But may not receive returned traffic unless you can modify the default gateway’s routing table
Network Layer Security
Supakorn Kungpisdan, [email protected]
Overview
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IP Packet Format
IP Header Length
(IPID)
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Overview
IP, ICMP, and Routing protocols IP is connectionless, subjected to DoS ICMP can be used by attackers Routing protocols are subjected to stack attacks
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IP Attacks
Spoofing Fragmentation Passive and Active Fingerprinting Port Scanning Redirection
IP Spoofing
Local Spoofing Attacker and victim are on the
same subnet Attacker begins with sniffing
traffic, find key pieces of information needed to launch an attack
Session hijacking is another spoofing technique. The attack starts at transport
layer
Blind Spoofing Attacker is not on the same
local subnet as victim Many pieces of information
needed to be successful are not available. The key parameters must be guessed
Most modern OSes use fairly random sequence numbers making the attack difficult to launch
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Fragmentation
Fragmentation is required when transmitting packets to different networks that have different MTUs
The idea is to send different data streams to each device
IP Fragmentation
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Fragmentation is required when transmitting packets to different networks that have different MTUs
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Evasion Attack
Evasion attack: sends packets to an IDS and target that will be rejected by the IDS and accepted by the target. IDS drops and does not check the packet payload
An attacker sends the first fragment to an IDS that has a fragmentation timeout of 15 s, while target system has a timeout of 30 s
Attacker waits more than 15 s but less than 30 s before sending the 2nd fragment. The IDS discards the second (inc. the first) segment because the timeout reaches However, the target system accepts the second fragment (within the timeout) Thus, the IDS will not record this attack
#2 #1
#1
15 s
#2
30 s
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Fragmentation Attacks
Overlapping fragmentation can offer an attacker a means of slipping packets past an IDS and firewall
Sending a packet passing a cisco router to a windows-based system
If receiving a duplicated packet, Cisco router prefers the last fragment, whereas Windows prefers the original fragment
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Fragmentation Attacks (cont.)
#1 #2 #3
#1 #2
#2 #3
Windows and router accepts #1 and #2
Attacker modifies #2And transmits #2 and #3
#1 #2 #3Windows keeps
#1 #2 #3Router keeps
Same size, same offset
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Fragmentation Attacks (cont.)
An attacker breaks a message into 3 fragments He sends fragment 1 and 2 to both router and windows. Both
accepts the fragments He then sends fragment 2 and 3. The retransmitted fragment 2 is of
the same size and offset as the original fragment but different payload
Windows keeps the original fragment 2 but the router keeps the retransmitted one
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Teardrop Attack
Teardrop, targa, NewTear, Nestea Bonk, Boink, TearDrop2, and SynDrop are some of the tools that can crash machines that have a vulnerability in the IP atack
There is a fragmentation bug in the IP stack implementation of some old Linux kernels (2.0), Windows NT, and Windows 95
Sending malformed packets with fragmentation offset value tweaked so that the receiving packets overlap
A reboot solved the problem until the next attack
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Fingerprinting
Fingerprinting is the act of using peculiarities of IP, TCP, UDP, and ICMP to determine the operating system
Active VS passive fingerprinting
Active fingerprinting: sends malformed (or non-RFC-compliant) packets to the target. Different OSes response to these packets differently
Nmap
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Passive Fingerprinting
Passive fingerprinting: similar concept, but not injecting traffic into the network
Looking at 4 fields TTL value Don’t Fragment bit (DF) Type of Service (TOS) Window size
TTL, DF, and TOS are found in IP header Window size is found in TCP header
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Passive Fingerprinting: TTL
A packet has its TTL reduced each time it is passed though a router or when it remains in the routers queue too long
No requirement about the suitable of TTL The attacker may assume that the value observed is less than the
original value (no more than 255)
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Passive Fingerprinting: DF and TOS
DF flag is primary method that systems use to determine the PMTUD (Path MTU Discovery) Many older OSes don’t use this feature
TOS can be analyzed to determine the OS Eventhough it is rarely used on the internet, some developers will
set it into a value other than zero to prevent this fingerprinting
PMTUD
Path MTU discovery (PMTUD) is a technique in computer networking for determining the MTU size on the network path between two hosts, usually with the goal of avoiding IP fragmentation
1. Path MTU discovery works by setting the DF (Don't Fragment) option bit in the IP headers of outgoing packets.
2. Any device along the path whose MTU is smaller than the packet will drop it, and send back an ICMP Type 3 Code 4 “Destination Unreachable (Fragmentation Needed and DF was set)" message
3. The ICMP Type 3 Code 4 message contains its MTU, allowing the source host to reduce its assumed path MTU appropriately.
4. The process repeats until the MTU is small enough to traverse the entire path without fragmentation.
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PMTUD (cont.)
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Passive Fingerprinting: Window Size
TCP Window specifies the amount of data that can be sent without having to receive an acknowledgement Window size should either be as close as possible to the MTU or
should be some multiple of this value Linux 2.0 used a value of 16,384, while version 3 of FreeBSD
used a value of 17,520 The most up-to-date passive fingerprinting tool is p0f
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Idle Scan: Open Port
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Idle Scan: Close Port
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Idle Scan: Limitations
The idle host must truly be idle Not all OSes use an incrementing IPID
Some versions of Linux set IPID to zero or generate a random IPID value
Several message passes need to be performed to validate the results
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ICMP Attacks
ICMP helps with logical errors and diagnostics ICMP does not offer authentication Payload is not checked by OS ICMP attacks include using convert channels, echo
attacks, to port scan, traffic redirection, OS fingerprinting, and DoS
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Convert Channels
Convert channels offer attackers a way to have a secure communications channel by using allowed services
Convert channels can also work by exploiting flaws or weaknesses in protocols like ICMP, esp. ping
ICMP fields used in ping include: Type, Code, Identifier, Sequence Number, Optional Data
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ICMP Format
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Convert Channels (cont.)
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Convert Channels (cont.)
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Convert Channels (cont.)
Some systems like Linux let user add data into the ping# ping –p 2b2b2b415448300 192.168.123.101
will place the modem hang up string into the ping packet Convert channel tools can use ICMP, TCP, or even IGRP. Loki, ICMP Backdoor, 007Shell, B0CK
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ICMP Echo Attacks
Flood target with ping traffic and use up all available bandwidth
Smurf exploits ICMP by sending a spoofed ping packet to the broadcast address and has the source address listed as the victim
In 2002, an attacks was launched against core DNS servers. They had ping enabled Results in a large DoS attack that slowed the operation of
primary DNS servers
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Port Scanning
ICMP can be of great use to an attacker attempting to discover what ports are open
ICMP is invaluable since there is no response like with TCP
Sending an ICMP packet to a port will get no response if the port is open and will receive an ICMP type 3 code 3 (Destination Unreachable,
Port Unreachable) packet if the port is closed
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Port Scanning (cont.)
Type 3 (Destination Unreachable)Code 3 (Port Unreachable)
ICMP Nuke Attacks
Using spoofed addresses, an attacker sends “Time Exceeded” (Type 11) or “Destination Unreachable” (ICMP Type 3) messages to communicating hosts
This results in a DoS attack Check out ICMP Types and Codes
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ICMP Redirect Attack
By sending ICMP “redirect” messages, an attacker might force a router to forward packets destined to one host to the attacker’s IP address
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Preventing ICMP Redirect Attack
With Linux, we can force the kernel not to accept redirect messages for one or all interfaces
root@router# echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/eth0/accept_redirects
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ICMP Flood
Ping Flood creates a broadcast storm of pings that overwhelm the target system
Using Linux, one can flood a host using ping –f.
root@router# ping –f 10.10.10.12 –c 1000
The above command floods the host 10.10.10.12 with 1,000 packets
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Preventing Ping Flood
Ping flood can be stopped by limiting the number of ICMP echo-request messages with IPTables:
root@router# iptables –A FORWARD –p icmp –icmp-type echo-request –m limit –limit 10/s –j ACCEPT
root@router# iptables –A FORWARD –p icmp –icmp-type echo-request –j DROP
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Ping of Death
Ping of Death crashed machines by sending ICMP “echo request” messages in IP packets with larger than the maximum legal length of 65,535 octets, causing a buffer overflow to crash the victim’s device (computer, printer, etc.)
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Routing Protocols Attacks
Distance-vector and link-state routing protocols are suffered from attacks especially DoS
RIP is unauthenticated service; it is vulnerable to DoS RIP spoofing works by making fake RIP packets and
sending them to gateways and hosts to change their routes Attacker can also modify the routing information to cause a
redirect through a network, allowing him to sniff passwords or intercept and change date
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Preventing Address Spoofing Do not allow traffic with the internal IP address as source that comes
from the internet Log the dropped packets Check out router configuration guide at
http://www.nsa.gov/snac/downloads_all.cfm RIPv1 sends update in cleartext and no authentication RIPv2 has authentication but sends authentication in cleartext Suggest to use OSPF with MD5 authentication Restrict dynamic routing when possible
Task
Research a technique to enhance security of DHCP protocol
Have a presentation on June 26, 2011. 15 minutes per group
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Question?
Next weekOSI Security #3
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