Contains
1) Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) QRA for IOCL Barauni Refinery was carried out by
by M/s Chilworth Technology (Pvt.) Ltd. QRA was carried out in June 2011. Next QRA due by June 2016.
2) Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan (ERDMP)
ERDMP of IOCL Barauni Refinery is accredited by M/s Disaster Management Institute (DMI), Bhopal.
Accreditation in Nov 2012 and is valid till Nov 2015.
1
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY
FOR
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
(Rev 1)
by Chilworth Technology (Pvt.) Ltd,
B-2, Plot-3, Muskaan Complex,
Vasant Kunj, New Delhi- 110 070
Tel: +91 11 26136979, Fax: +91 26135979
Email: [email protected]
NG C-1
2
CONTENTS
COVERING LETTER
REPORT APPROVAL FORM
ABBREVIATIONS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1 INTRODUCTION 1-1
1.1
FACILITY
1-2 1.2 WEATHER CONDITIONS 1-6 1.3 PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THE ASSIGNMENT 1-8
2
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
2-1
2.1
ENUMERATION AND SELECTION OF INCIDENTS
2-1 2.2 SELECTION 2-2 2.3 CHARACTERISING THE FAILURES 2-3
3
RISK ANALYSIS CALCULATIONS
3-1
3.1
CONSEQUENCE CALCULATIONS
3-1 3.2 DAMAGE CRITERIA 3-1 3.3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS CALCULATIONS 3-5 3.4 FIRE AND EXPLOSION MODELING 3-6
4
RISK ANALYSIS AND REDUCTION
4-1
4.1
FINDINGS
4-1 4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS: 4-10
5 RISK ASSESSMENT OF FIRE WATER TANK AND PUMP HOUSE5-1
6 REFERENCES 6-1
APPENDIX – A CONTOURS A-1
APPENDIX – B DEFINITIONS B-1
ANNEXURE – C STORAGE AND HANDLI
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
Our Ref: J0126-IOC/Barauni/RA/L-01
Date: June 6th, 2011
Indian Oil Corporation
Barauni Refinery
Dear Sir,
PROJECT: IOC BARAUNI REFINERY
SUBJECT: QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT REV 1
We are pleased to submit one softcopy of the Quantitative Risk Assessment Report
for the above captioned project. Should you have any questions or comments,
please contact the undersigned. If the report is to your complete satisfaction,
please sign and return a copy of the enclosed Report Approval Form.
We thank you for allowing us the opportunity to perform this study and if we can be of
any further assistance to you, please contact us.
Yours faithfully,
Chilworth Technology P Ltd.
Jitendra Kumar
Vice President
5
ABBREVIATIONS
ATF Aviation Turbine Fuel
AVU Atmospheric and Vacuum Distillation Unit
BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion
CBFS Carbon Black Feed Stock
CO Carbon Monoxide
CO2 Carbon Dioxide
CTPL Chilworth Technology Pvt. Ltd.
DHDT Diesel Hydrotreater
FW Fire water
HC Hydrocarbon
H2S Hydrogen Sulphide
HGO Heavy Gas Oil
HSD High Speed Diesel
HVGO Heavy Vacuum Gas Oil
Kero Kerosene
LGO Light Gas Oil
LP Low Pressure
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas
LSHS Low Sulphur Heav. Stock
LTU LPG Treating Unit
LVGO Light Vacuum Gas Oil
MS Motor Spirit
NHDT Naphtha Hydrotreater
OISD Oil Industry Safety Directorate
P&ID Piping And Instrumentation
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
RCO
Reduced Crude Oil
RFCCU
Resid Fluidised Catalytic Cracking Unit
SKO
Superior Kerosene Oil
SR
Short Residue
SRU
Sulphur Recovery Unit
VCE
Vapour Cloud Explosion
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
8
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Indian Oil Corporation Limited’s Vision is to be a world-class company known for
caring and delighting customers with quality products and innovative services. The
Corporation will be a model of excellence in meeting environmental, health and
safety norms.
Chilworth has been engaged by IOC, Barauni Refinery for carrying out Quantitative
Risk Assessment studies for the Refinery. This is the Quantitative Risk Assessment
report for the Barauni Refinery based on the design information and suitable
conservative assumptions.
Based on the Quantitative risk assessment, some recommendations are proposed
from the study and the site visit. These are listed in Section 4 of the report.
Barauni Refinery of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. at Barauni in Bihar desired to get
Comprehensive Risk Analysis (QRA) conducted for the entire refinery. The following
are the objectives of Risk Analysis study:
i) Identification of Risk and Risk Reduction Measures.
ii) To update the Onsite and Offsite Emergency Preparedness Plan with the risk
involved in new units.
iii) For acquainting and training the manpower to handle identified risk.
The computed risk is presented as:
ƒ Individual Risk ƒ F-N Curves (Societal or Group Risk) ƒ Dominant Release Scenarios
The following interpretations are derived from the Risk results of this study:
The study team identified 75 numbers of scenarios. Considering the risk contours
and FN curve for combination of all MCLS, DNV- PHAST software has been used for
the consequence calculations.
The societal risk (2.48E-05) curve is in the tolerable region of the HSE UK Societal
risk acceptance criteria (refer to fig 4.3). The contribution to societal risk due to offsite
populations is low.
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
rea.
9
In conclusion, the Individual risk (2.64 E-04) curve is in the tolerable region of the UK
HSE individual risk acceptance criteria (refer to appendix – E). The main contributors
to offsite risk are petroleum products from the tank farm areas e.g. LPG tankers,
Crude oil, LPG storage.
Jet fire:
Jet fires can arise from gas, two-phase, or liquid releases. The worst-case jet fires
are likely to be from the storage area and refining units and mainly from the LPG
Storage facility (Horton Spheres), Fuel Gas, Coker and HTU units.
The following jet fire results obtained from the DNV PHAST software are presented
below:
1. Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere which results into jet fire flame radiation
intensity of 36.56 kW/m2 (42.9 meter).
2. Leak in Fuel gas storage tank outlet line results into jet fire flame radiation
intensity 36.56KW/m2 (39.3 meters).
3. Leak from Coker- B reactor overhead line scenario, which results into jet fire
flame radiation intensity of 36.56 kW/m2 (16.7 m).
4. Leak from main fractionator C-1 of coker unit scenario, which results into jet
fire flame radiation intensity of 36.56 kW/m2 (11.5 meter).
Vapor cloud explosion:
In general catastrophic gas explosions happen when considerable quantities of
flammable material are released and dispersed with air to form an explosive vapor
cloud before ignition takes place. A vapor cloud explosion (VCE) occurs if a cloud of
flammable gas burns sufficiently quickly to generate high overpressures.
The following vapor cloud explosion results obtained from the DNV PHAST software
are presented below:
5. Leak in LPG tanker results into dispersion of flammable material in the
atmosphere; it may generate overpressure (0.2608 bar) to the distance of
179.3 meter and affecting the Loading a
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
6. Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak) will lead in to dispersion of
flammable material in the atmosphere; it may generate overpressure (0.2608
bar) to the distance of 154.1 m
BLEVE:
BLEVE can be defined as a rapid failure of a container of flammable material under
pressure during fire engulfment. Failure is followed by a fireball or major fire which
produces a powerful radiant heat flux
The following BLEVE results obtained from the DNV PHAST software are presented
below:
7. Catastrophic failure of LPG Horton sphere and tanker is a worst case
scenario which results into dispersion of flammable material in the
atmosphere; it may generate fireball radiation intensity of 36.56 kW/m2 to the
distance of 83.7m and 98.3m.
Pool fire:
Pool fires can arise from any site that handles liquid hydrocarbons. The worst case is
likely to be in the tank farm. Mostly tank farm pool fire is contained within the tank
bund itself. Oil spills on ground from the pipelines handling hydrocarbons may results
into pool fire and may affect adjacent equipment resulting into domino effects
(BLEVE).
Toxic release:
Toxic releases are measured at 100 ppm hydrogen sulphide concentration. The
Hazard distances associated with a toxic release depend upon a number of factors,
such as time to detection and isolation of the release, and the prevailing wind
conditions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Barauni Refinery is the second Public Sector Refinery of Indian Oil Corporation built
in collaboration with erstwhile USSR and limited participation of Romania. It is
located near the northern bank of river Ganga at Begusarai district town of Bihar. The
refinery strategically located on the cross roads of two very important national
highways, NH30 & NH31 and two important railways, i.e. Eastern Railway and North
Eastern Railway.
The refinery was commissioned in the year 1964. It was formally dedicated to the
nation by Prof. Humayun Kabir the then Union Minister for Petroleum & Chemicals,
Govt. of India on 15th January 1965. It was originally designed for processing 3.0
MMTPA of Assam Crude. Processing capacity of the refinery was raised to 3.3
MMTPA in 1985 on debottle necking. The processing capacity was raised to 4.2
MMTPA with the help of modifications for improving the energy efficiency as well as
yield of products in 1991. Enhancement of the capacity to 6.0 MMTPA was done by
debottle necking/revamping of the existing primary distillation units and
simultaneously providing the matching secondary processing units/facility.During the
year 2007-2008, Barauni Refinery processed 5.6 MMTPA imported crude oil(88%
low sulpher and 12% high sulpher).
The Refinery processes Imported low sulphur & High sulphur crude oil to produce:
• LPG
• Naphtha
• Motor Spirit
• Superior Kerosene Oil
• High Speed Diesel
• Light Diesel Oil
• Low Sulphur Heavy Stock
• Raw Petroleum Coke
• Sulphur
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1.1 FACILITY
Crude received from Haldia / Paradip port through PHBCPL is stored in storage
tanks in O&MS. These tanks are used for feeding the crude units. AVU’s Distillates
from crude units go as straight run products (e.g. LPG, SKO, Bitumen) or as blending
components (e.g. MS, HSD) or as feedstock to various downstream quality-
upgrading units like CRU, DHDT which in turn gives the upgraded rundown streams
for blending to various high-value products (e.g. MS, HSD). And the heavy ends from
AVU’s stored in intermediate storage tanks are used as feedstock to secondary units
like Coker and RFCCU. These secondary units are used to upgrade the heavy ends
to various high value products. Distillates from these units are either used as straight
run products (e.g. LPG, RPC) or as blending components (e.g. MS, HSD, LDO,
CBFS etc.). Blending of these materials is done in OM&S as to meet the IS
specifications or the specifications provided by the customer(s). The final products
are stored in various products storage tanks, and only after certification of these
tanks as per specifications, they are sold to end customers through marketing
terminals.
The petroleum products from the refinery are dispatched through Tank Trucks, Tank
Wagons (Rail) and Barauni-Kanpur pipeline (BKPL). The pipeline passes through
Patna, Mughalsarai and Allahabad where the products are tapped off by Marketing
Division for local distribution.
While LPG, Motor spirit, superior Kerosene and Diesel are dispatched for public
distribution through Marketing; other products are sold to the major valued customers
of Barauni Refinery.
The major process units of Barauni refinery are as follows:
ATMOSPHERIC & VACUUM UNITS (AVU-I, AVU-II & AVU-III)
This unit is termed as the mother unit of refinery. The feed to this unit is crude oil.
Barauni Refinery has three Atmospheric & Vacuum Distillation Units namely AVU-I,
AVU-II & AVU-III. The declared capacity of AVU-I/II is 1.75 MMTPA each & that of
AVU-III is 2.5 MMTPA. AVU-I/II were designed originally for processing Assam
crude. AVU-I & II are exactly similar in terms ofdesigned for processing both low ‘S’
(100% B (100% Arab Mix Crude, 50:50 Arab Heavy & Arab Light.
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
1-3
RESID FLUIDISED CATALYTIC CRACKING UNIT (RFCCU)
The FCC process Unit consists of a reactor / regenerator section, a main
fractionation section including gas concentration section.
The feed to FCC unit gets cracked in the reactor on meeting the hot regenerated
catalyst in the riser section. The cracked products are fractionated in a fractionated
in a fractionator. LPG and gasoline components are taken out from the overhead of
the fractionator and routed to gas concentration unit. Heavy Naphtha, Light Cycle Oil
(LCO) are withdrawn as side cut from main fractionating column heavy Cycle Oil
(HCO) is also withdrawn as a side cut but after exchanging its heat. It is returned to
the main column. Some HCO is recycled to the reactor. There is no net HCO
product.
DIESEL HYDRO-TREATMENT UNIT (DHDT)
DHDT is installed for upgradation of Coker Gas Oil as well as quality improvement of
few diesel components.
The feed is mixed with Hydrogen-rich recycle gas & make up Hydrogen after being
compressed in respective compressor and reheated by exchanging heat with hot
reactor effluent. The mixture is further heated to the desired reactor temperature in a
fired heater and is fed to the Hydrotreater reactor.
HYDROGEN GENERATION UNIT
To meet the make up requirement of Hydrogen for DHDT Unit, naphtha steam
reforming type Hydrogen unit has been considered where Hydrogen is produced by
steam reforming of Naphtha.
AMINE ABSORPTION UNIT (AAU)
Gases from the stripper of Hydrotreater Unit, being rich in hydrogen sulphide (formed
by reaction of hydrogen with sulphur compounds in Gas Oil), are scrubbed with
Diethanol Amine Solution (DEA) to absorb hydrogen sulphide.
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
Sour Gas containing H2S is passed through a filter for removal of liquid particies in
the gas. Sour Gas enters the bottom of the Amine Absorber Column while lean
Amine Solution is introduced from the top. As the gases move up the column, they
are washed off by a counter current stream of Amine solution which selectively
absorbs hydrogen sulphide from the upcoming gas stream. Sweet fuel gas leaves
the absorber from the top and goes to the fuel gas system through a absorber from
bottom and is then sent to Amine Regeneration Unit (ARU) after heat-exchanging
with incoming hot regenerated amine.
AMINE REGENERATION UNIT (ARU)
The Amine Regeneration Unit regenerates rich Amine Containing H2S to obtain lean
amine for reuse in AAU. Rich amine is introduced to a flash column top to remove
hydrocarbons by flashing. Hydrocarbons which get vaporized are washed with lean
amine to remove hydrogen sulphide. This gas and sweet gas will join fuel gas
system. Rich amine from the flash column bottom is fed to the Regenerator from the
top. Rich amine moves down the column and is stripped off H2S & CO2 by vapour
generated at reboiler. Overhead gases alongwith water vapour go to the overhead
condenser where water vapour condenses. Acid gases are drawn from the reflux
drum top and routed to the Sulphur Recovery Unit. Liquid from the reflux drum is
sent back to Amine Regenerator as reflux, Regenerated (lean) Amine solution is
drawn from the column bottom and recycled to the amine absorber.
SULPHUR RECOVERY UNIT (SRU)
In this Unit Sulphur is recovered from hydrogen sulphide rich gases obtained form
the Amine regeneration and sour water stripping units. Acid gases entering the unit
are measured and mixed with the required amount of air which is supplied by air
blowers. Air and gases are burnt in the main burner to convert one-third of the
hydrogen sulphide to sulphur dioxide which is then reacted with the reaining
hydrogen sulphide to produce sulphur. The unconverted gases from the thermal
oxidation stage are then processed in the Catalytic convertors for conversion of the
hydrogen sulphide and sulphur dioxide mixture to sulphur which is condensed and
drained off as molten sulphur. Unconverted gases from each stage are used as feed
to the next stage and off-gases from the last stage are sent to a tail gas treating
section in order to bring down SO2 emission. conversion efficiency of SRU shall
be 99%(min).
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SOUR WATER STRIPPER
Sour water from Hydro-desulphurisation Unit contains ammonia and hydrogen
sulphide. Sour water is received in sour water surage drum where any flashed
vapour and hydrocarbon liquid carry-over are separated. The flashed vapour is sent
to hydrocarbons flare and hydrocarbon liquid is skimmed off and sent to OWS.
LPG Treating Unit (LTU)
The LPG obtained form secondary processing units like FCCU, Cokers contains H2S
and mercaptans. These undesirable sulphur compounds are removed in the Treating
unit which includes AAU in it’s battery limit. The Treating Unit mainly consists of an
Amine absorber, a caustic prewash column, an extractor, oxidizer and a sand filter.
Gasoline Treating Unit
In this Unit, the foul smelling mercaptans in gasoline are converted to less
objectionable disulphides. The oxidation is carried out in presence of an aqueous
alkaline solution generally sodium hydroxide and a Catalyst. The disulphide formed in
the process remains in the hydrocarbon and no net reduction in total sulphur content
takes place.
COKING UNITS (COKER-A & COKER-B)
There are tow delayed coking units namely Coker-A and Coker-B in Barauni
Refinery. The feed to these units are RCO, SR and DCO from AVUs and RFCCU
units.
Coker-A
The design capacity of the unit is 2000 MTPD. This unit consists of feed preheat
section, fractionating section, Coke Chamber (Coking Section), quenching section
and Kero, CGO & CFO strippers and MP & HP steam generation section and
furnaces. There are four coke chambers & two furnaces.
Coker-B
The design capacity of the unit is 1600 MTP
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1-7
1.2 WEATHER CONDITIONS
The consequences arising out of the release of flammable chemicals are dependent
amongst other things on the prevailing meteorological conditions. This section
describes the influence of these. For this study weather conditions pertaining to
Barauni as provided by client have been considered.
1.2.1 Wind velocity
The annual mean wind velocity is taken as around 2.2 m/s. Usually, during January
to April and September to December (8 months) the wind velocity generally lies
between 1.7 to 2.1 m/s. During the four monsoon months June to September, the
average velocity is about 2.8 m/s.
1.2.2 Temperature
The annual mean temperature at Barauni is 25.3°C. The annual mean of maximum
and minimum mean daily temperature are 29.8°C and 20.8°C respectively. The
monthly mean daily maximum and mean daily minimum temperatures vary between
21-37.8°C and 10.4-28.4°C respectively.
Annual mean temperature taken for this study: 25°C
1.2.3 Stability class
Dispersion of gases or vapour largely depends upon the Stability Class. Various
stability classes that are defined as Pasquill classes are:
- A Very Unstable
- B Unstable
- C Slightly Unstable
- D Neutral
- E Stable
- F Very Stable
- Time of the Day (Day or Night)
- Cloud Cover
- Season
- Wind Speed
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Six stability classes from A to F are defined while wind speed can take any one of
numerous values. It may thus appear that a large number of outcome cases can be
formulated by considering each one of very many resulting stability class-wind speed
combinations. However in fact the number of stability class - wind speed
combinations that needs to be considered for formulating outcome cases in any
analysis is very limited. This is because, in nature, only certain combinations of
stability class and wind speed occur. Thus, for instance combinations such as A-3
m/s or B-5 m/s or F-4 m/s do not occur in nature. As a result only one or two stability
class - wind speed combinations need to be considered to ensure reasonable
completeness of Risk Analysis study. Furthermore, though wind speeds less than 1
m/s may occur in practice, none of the available dispersion models, including state-
of-art ones, can handle wind speeds below 1 m/s. Fortunately, wind speed does not
influence consequences as much as stability class and for a given stability class, the
influence of wind speed is relatively less. On the other hand consequences vary
considerably with stability class for the same speed.
Except during the monsoon months little or no cloud cover alongwith the prevailing
low wind velocities results in unstable conditions during the day (C or D) and highly
stable conditions (E or F) at night. During the four months of monsoon the wind
velocities are generally higher and cloud cover generally present. This results in
stability class of D during the day and E or F during the night. The stability class
distribution over the year roughly works out as below:
A - B - C 17% D 50% E or F 33%
The following wind velocity/stability class combinations & frequencies are used for
Quantified Risk Analysis:
B - 3 m/s 50%
E – 1 m/s 50%
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1-8
Annual mean air temperature is taken as about 25°C
Annual mean % humidity is taken as 65%.
1.3 PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THE ASSIGNMENT
Chilworth were engaged to undertake Quantitative Risk Assessment of IOC, Barauni
Refinery. The initial effort involved site visit and data collection. This included visit &
discussions on Process and hazards with design personnel, data collection for the
purpose of the study. The visit, collection of data and information required provided
familiarity with the project to the team carrying out the Risk Analysis study. The next
part comprised of the Risk Analysis calculations based on the collected data. These
essentially involve release rate and source strength calculations, dispersion modeling
and explosion and fire modeling for the selected scenarios. In addition to calculation
of consequence effects, frequency of occurrence of individual scenarios is also
estimated. Consequence effect & frequency values are used to estimate risk values.
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
ion process. An appropriate set of
eeded to satisfy the requirements of
m of incidents enumerated.
2-1
2 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
2.1 ENUMERATION AND SELECTION OF INCIDENTS
Effective management of a Risk Analysis study requires enumeration and selection
of incidents, and a formal means for tracking the incidents & Incident outcomes.
Enumeration attempts to ensure that no significant incidents are overlooked;
selection tries to reduce the incident outcome cases studied to a manageable
number; and tracking ensures that no selected incident & incident outcome is lost in
the calculation procedure.
The starting point of the analysis is to identify all the incident scenarios that need to
be addressed. These incidents can be classified under either of two categories: loss
of containment of material or loss of containment of energy. Unfortunately, there is an
infinite number of ways (incidents) by which loss of containment can occur in either
category. For example, leaks of process materials can be of any size, from a pinhole
up to a severed pipeline or ruptured vessel. An explosion can occur in either a small
container or a large container and, in each case, can range from a small "puff" to a
catastrophic detonation.
A technique commonly used to generate an incident list is to consider potential leaks
and major releases from fractures of all process pipelines and vessels. This
compilation should include all pipe work and vessels in direct communication, as
these may share a significant inventory that cannot be isolated in an emergency. The
data generated is as shown below:
• Vessel number, description, and dimensions
• Materials present
• Vessel conditions (phase, temperature, pressure)
• Inventory
• Connecting piping and piping dimensions.
The goal of selection is to limit the total number of incident outcome cases to be
studied to a manageable size, without introducing bias or losing resolution through
overlooking significant incidents or incident outcomes. The purpose of incident
selection is to construct an appropriate set of incidents for the study from the Initial
List that has been generated by the enumerat
incidents is the minimum number of incidents n
the study and adequately represent the spectru
immediately ignited on release?
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2.2 SELECTION
The goal of selection is to limit the total number of incident outcome cases to be
studied to a manageable size, without introducing bias or losing resolution through
overlooking significant incidents or incident outcomes. The purpose of incident
selection is to construct an appropriate set of incidents for the study from the Initial
List that has been generated by the enumeration process. An appropriate set of
incidents is the minimum number of incidents needed to satisfy the requirements of
the study and adequately represent the spectrum of incidents enumerated. One of
the risk analyst's jobs is to select a subset of the initial List for further analysis. This
involves several tasks, each resulting in a unique list. Throughout the selection
process, the risk analyst must exercise caution so that critical incidents, which might
substantially effect the risk estimate, are not overlooked or excluded from the study.
The Initial list of incidents is reviewed to identify those incidents that are too small to
be of concern. Removing these incidents from the Initial List produces a Revised List.
To be cost effective and to reduce the Risk Analysis calculation burden, it is essential
to compress this Revised List by combining redundant scenarios of very similar
incidents. This new list is termed the Condensed List. This list can and should be
reduced further by grouping similar incidents into subsets and where possible,
replacing each subset with a single equivalent incident. This grouping and
replacement can be accomplished by consideration of similar inventories,
compositions, discharge rates and discharge locations. Further ranking of individual
incidents within each incident class is possible. Various schemes can be devised to
rank incidents within each incident class (e.g. preliminary ranking criteria based on
the severity of hazard posed by released chemicals, release rate, and total quantity
released). A ranking procedure is important in selection of a Representative Set of
incidents if the study is to minimize bias or loss of resolution. The purpose of incident
outcome selection is to develop a set of incident outcomes that must be studied for
each incident included in the finalized incident study list. Each incident needs to be
considered separately. Using the list of incident outcomes the risk analyst needs to
determine which may result from each incident. This process is not necessarily
straightforward. While the analyst can decide whether an incident involving the loss
of a process chemical to the atmosphere needs to be examined using dispersion
analysis because of potential toxic gas effects, what happens if the same material is
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
influencing parameters are combined
2-3
2.3 CHARACTERISING THE FAILURES
Accidental release of flammable or toxic vapours can result in severe consequences.
Delayed ignition of flammable vapours can result in blast overpressures covering
large areas. This may lead to extensive loss of life and property. Toxic clouds may
cover yet larger distances due to the lower threshold values in relation to those in
case of explosive clouds (the lower explosive limits). In contrast, fires have localized
consequences. Fires can be put out or contained in most cases; there are few
mitigating actions one can take once a vapour cloud gets released. Major accident
hazards arise, therefore, consequent upon the release of flammable or toxic vapours
or BLEVE in case of pressurized liquefied gases.
In a refinery, main hazard arises due to storage and handling of hydrocarbons. To
formulate a structured approach to identification of hazards an understanding of
contributory factors is essential.
2.3.1 Blast Overpressures
Blast Overpressures depend upon the reactivity class of material and the amount of
gas between two explosive limits. The hydrocarbon that is expected to give rise to a
vapour cloud on release is pressurized gases.
2.3.2 Operating Parameters
Potential vapour release for the same material depends significantly on the operating
conditions. Propane and LPG are handled at the refinery, Propane / LPG being
handled at atmospheric temperature and in pressurized condition, these releases
have been considered for release scenario selection.
2.3.3 Inventory
Inventory Analysis is commonly used in understanding the relative hazards and short
listing of release scenarios. Inventory plays an important role in regard to the
potential hazard. Larger the inventory of a vessel or a system, larger the quantity of
potential release. A practice commonly used to generate an incident list is to consider
potential leaks and major releases from fractures of pipelines and vessels containing
sizable inventories. The potential vapour release (source strength) depends upon
the quantity of liquid release, the properties of the materials and the operating
conditions (pressure, temperature). If all these
into a matrix and vapour source strength computed for each release case, a ranking
should become a credible exercise.
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2.3.4 Loss of Containment
Plant inventory can get discharged to Environment due to Loss of Containment.
Certain features of materials to be handled at the plant need to the clearly
understood to firstly list out all significant release cases and then to short list release
scenarios for a detailed examination. The chemicals presently under consideration
are hydrocarbons.
Liquid release can be either instantaneous or continuous. Failure of a vessel leading
to an instantaneous outflow assumes the sudden appearance of such a major crack
that practically all of the contents above the crack shall be released in a very short
time.
The more likely event is the case of liquid release from a hole in a pipe connected to
the vessel. The flow rate will depend on the size of the hole as well as on the
pressure in front of the hole, prior to the accident. Such pressure is basically
dependent on the pressure in the vessel.
The vaporization of released liquid depends on the vapour pressure and weather
conditions. Such consideration and others have been kept in mind both during the
initial listing as well as during the short listing procedure. Initial listing of all significant
inventories in the process plants was carried out. This ensured no omission through
inadvertence.
Based on the methodology discussed above a set of appropriate scenarios was
generated to carry out Risk Analysis calculations, as listed below:
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
SR .NO
SCENARIOS
1. Leak in Crude Oil Storage Tank-Dyke Pool Fire 2. Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire
3. Leak in Crude oil storage tank- Dyke Pool Fire (Comparison Case)
4. Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire (Comparison Case)
5. Leak in Crude oil storage tank 501- Dyke Pool Fire
6. Crude storage tank roof failure 501 – Tank Fire
7. Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere – Jet Fire
8. Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere – Flash Fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion
9. Failure of Horton Sphere – BLEVE
10. Leak / Line Rupture in Mounded bullet outlet line – Flash fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion
11. Leak in LPG Mounded bullets storage tanks outlet line – Jet Fire
12. Leak / Line Rupture in Fuel gas – Flash fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion
13. Leak in Fuel gas storage tank outlet line – Jet Fire
14. Leak in MS / SRN Storage tank – Pool Fire
15. MS / SRN storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
16. MS / SRN storage tank roof fire – Flash fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion
17. Leak in Slope tank – Pool Fire
18. Slope tank roof fire – Tank Fire
19. Leak in SKO Storage tank – Pool Fire
20. SKO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
21. Leak in Gas oil Storage tank – Pool Fire
22. Gas oil storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
23. Leak in CBFS (Carbon Black Feed Stock)/ CLO (Clarified Oil) Storage tank – Pool Fire
24. CBFS (Carbon Black Feed Stock)/ CLO (Clarified Oil) storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
25. Leak in CFO (Coker Furl Oil) IFO (Internal Fuel Oil)/ RFO (Residual Fuel Oil) Storage tank
– Pool Fire
26. CFO (Coker Fuel Oil) IFO (Internal Fuel Oil)/ RFO (Residual Fuel Oil) storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
27. Leak in HVGO (Heavy Vacuum Gas Oil)
28. HVGO (Heavy Vacuum Gas Oil) storaget
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inlet of pretopping column
2-6
SR .NO
SCENARIOS
29. Leak in LSHS (Low Sulphur Heav Stock) Storage tank – Pool Fire
30. LSHS (Low Sulphur Heav Stock) storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
31. Leak in SR (Short Residue) Storage tank – Pool Fire
32. SR (Short Residue) storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
33. Leak in Bitumen Storage tank – Pool Fire
34. Bitumen storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
35. Leak from H2 Bullet outlet piping – Flash Fire/ VCE
Wagon Gantry Scenarios
36. Major Leak from MS Wagon – Pool Fire
37. Major Leak from MS Wagon – Flash Fire/ Vapour Cloud Explosion
38. Major Leak from HVGO (Black Oil) Wagon – Pool Fire
39. Major Leak from SKO (White Oil) Wagon – Flash Fire/ Vapour Cloud Explosion
Tanker Truck Gantry Scenarios
40. Loss of containment in CBFS tanker- Pool Fire
41. Loss of containment in HVGO (Black Oil) tanker- Pool Fire
42. Loss of containment in LPG tanker- BLEVE
43. Loss of containment in LPG tanker- Flash Fire/ Vapour Cloud Explosion
Pipelines
44. Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak size) – Pool fire
45. Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak size) – Flash Fire/ Vapour Cloud Explosion
CRUDE DISTILLATION UNIT-1
46. Leak from Crude Column (K-2) (AVU – 3)
47. Failure of Nozzle /Flange Joint in Crude Column (601-K-2) & crude starts coming out
48. 10mm leak from inlet flange of Stabilizer Column (601-K-4) – Pool Fire
49. Leak (10mm) from Furnace (F-101/F-102) tube inside the furnace /Nozzle of crude heater
& crude starts coming out (Data for tube/nozzle required)
50. Desalter overflows line Leak (10mm)
51. Nozzle / Flange joint leak (10mm) from the
VACUUM CLOUMN-1
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SR .NO
SCENARIOS
52. Leak from Vacuum Column (K-5)
53. Failure of Stripper Column K-6(1) Nozzle & hydrocarbon starts coming out (AVU -1/2)
54. Rupture of Furnace (F-101/F-102) tube inside the furnace /Nozzle of crude heater & crude
starts coming out
LPG Treatment Unit
55. Leak from LPG-Amine Absorber (08-C-101)
56. Failure of LPG Surge Vessel (08-V-104)
Naphtha Hydrotreater Unit (HTU)
57. Failure of Naphtha Splitter (01-CC-00-001) Nozzle & naphtha starts coming out
58. Leak (10mm) from Hydrotreater Reactor (02-RB-00-001)
Catalytic Reformer Unit
59. Leak (10mm) from reformer reactor (03-RB-00-001)
60. Leak (10mm) from Stabilizer column (02-CC-00-001)
DHDT
61. Failure of reactor (702-R-01)
62. H2S Leak from Stripper Gas Amine Absorber (DHDT)
COKER-A/B
63. Leak (10mm) from main fractionator C-1
64. 10mm leak from Coker – B reactor overhead line
65. 10mm leak from Coker – B reactor bottom line
RFCCU
66. Leak (10mm) from Reactor (701-R-101) inlet – Jet Fire
67. Leak (10mm) from Main Fractionator (701-C-201) top – Jet Fire
LPG Recovery unit
68. Leak (10mm) from Debutaniser column (08-C-003) top – Jet Fire
69. Leak (10mm) from Stripper (08-C-002) top – Jet Fire
HYDROGEN PLANT
70. Leak (10mm) from inlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Prereformer) R-4 – Jet Fire
71. Leak (10mm) from outlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Reformer) R-5 – Jet Fire
72. Leak (10mm) from inlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Shift Converter) R-6 – Jet Fire
NHDT
73. Leak (10mm) from NHDT Reactor (R-01)
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SR .NO
SCENARIOS
ISOM 74. Leak (10mm) from ISOM Reactor (R-01) – Jet Fire
PRIMEGPFD 75. Failure of PRIMEGPFD reactor (R-02)- Jet Fire
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3 RISK ANALYSIS CALCULATIONS
3.1 CONSEQUENCE CALCULATIONS
Accidental release of flammable or toxic vapours can result in severe consequences.
Delayed ignition of flammable vapours can result in blast overpressures covering
large areas. This may lead to extensive loss of life and property. Toxic clouds may
cover yet a larger distance due to the lower threshold values in relation to those in
case of explosive clouds (the lower explosive limits). In contrast, fires have localized
consequences. Fires can be put out or contained in most cases; there are few
mitigating actions one can take once a vapour cloud gets released.
In a refinery handling hazardous chemical such as hydrocarbons, the main hazard
arises due to storage and handling of HCs. If LPG is released into the atmosphere,
they may cause damage due to resulting BLEVE, fires or vapour cloud explosion of
the evaporated LPG. To formulate a structured approach to identification of hazards
an understanding of contributory factors is essential. These factors have been
described in detail in chapter - 2.
3.2 DAMAGE CRITERIA
In consequence analysis, use is made of a number of calculation models to estimate
the physical effects of an accident (spill of hazardous material) and to predict the
damage (lethality, injury, material destruction) of the effects. The calculations can
roughly be divided in three major groups:
a) Determination of the source strength parameters;
b) Determination of the consequential effects;
c) Determination of the damage or damage distances.
The basic physical effect models consist of the following.
3.2.1 Source Strength Parameters
• Calculation of the outflow of liquid out of a tank or pipe, in case of rupture.
• Calculation, in case of liquid outflow, of the instantaneous flash evaporation and of the dimensions of the remaining liquid pool.
• Calculation of the evaporation rate, as a function of volatility of the material, pool dimensions and wind velocity.
• Source strength equals pump capacity
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3.2.2 Consequential effects
• Dispersion of gaseous material in the atmosphere as a function of source strength, relative density of the gas, weather conditions and topographical
situation of the surrounding area.
• Intensity of heat radiation [in kW/ m2] due to a fire, as a function of the distance to the source.
• Energy of vapour cloud explosions [in N/m2], as a function of the distance to the distance of the exploding cloud.
• Concentration of gaseous material in the atmosphere, due to the dispersion of evaporated chemical. The latter can be either explosive or toxic.
It may be obvious, that the types of models that must be used in a specific risk study
strongly depend upon the type of material involved:
• Gas, vapour, liquid, solid?
• Inflammable, explosive, toxic, toxic combustion products?
• Stored at high/low temperatures or pressure?
• Controlled outflow (pump capacity) or catastrophic failure?
3.2.3 Selection of Damage Criteria
The damage criteria give the relation between extent of the physical effects
(exposure) and the percentage of the people that will be killed or injured due to those
effects. The knowledge about these relations depends strongly on the nature of the
exposure. For instance, much more is known about the damage caused by heat
radiation, than about the damage due to toxic exposure, and for these toxic effects,
the knowledge differs strongly between different materials. In Consequence Analysis
studies, in principle three types of exposure to hazardous effects are distinguished:
1. Heat radiation, from a jet, pool fire or flash fire.
2. Explosion
3. Toxic effects, from toxic materials or toxic combustion products.
Heat Radiation
The consequences caused by exposure to heat radiation is a function of:
• The radiation energy onto the human body [kW/m2];
• The exposure duration [sec];
• The protection of the skin tissue
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.
3-3
The limits for 1% of the exposed people to be killed due to heat radiation, and for
second-degree burns are given in the table below:
Damages to Human Life Due to Heat Radiation
Exposure
Duration
Radiation
energy (1%
lethality, kW/m2
Radiation energy
for 2nd degree
burns, kW/m2
Radiation energy
for first degree
burns, kW/m2
10 Sec 21.2 16 12.5
30 Sec 9.3 7.0 4.0
Since in practical situations, only the people outside will be exposed to heat radiation
in case of a fire, it is reasonable to assume the protection by clothing. It can be
assumed that people would be able to find a cover or a shield against thermal
radiation in 10-sec. time. Furthermore, 100% lethality may be assumed for all people
suffering from direct contact with flames, such as the pool fire, a flash fire or a jet
flame. The effects due to relatively lesser incident radiation intensity are given below.
Effects Due To Incident Radiation Intensity
INCIDENT RADIATION
– kW/m2
TYPE OF DAMAGE
0.7 Equivalent to Solar Radiation
1.6 No discomfort for long exposure
4.0 Sufficient to cause pain within 20 sec.
Blistering of skin (first degree burns are likely)
9.5 Pain threshold reached after 8 sec. Second
degree burns after 20 sec.
12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of
wood, melting plastic tubing etc.
18.47 Sufficient to cause damage.
37.50 Damage to process equipment or facility.
Source: Purple book from TNO, Netherlands
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The actual results would be less severe due to the various assumptions made in the
models arising out of the flame geometry, emissivity, angle of incidence, view factor
and others. Upon ignition, a spilled liquid hydrocarbon would burn in the form of a
large turbulent diffusion flame. The size of the flame would depend upon the spill
surface and the thermo-chemical properties of the spilled liquid. In particular, the
diameter of the fire (if not confined to a dyke), the visible height of the flame, the tilt
and drag of the flame due to wind can be correlated to the burning velocity of the
liquid. The radiative output of the flame would be dependent upon the fire size, extent
of mixing with air and the flame temperature. Some fraction of the radiation is
absorbed by carbon dioxide and water vapour in the intervening atmosphere. In
addition, large hydrocarbon pool fires produce thick smoke, which can significantly
obscure flame radiation. Finally the incident flux at an observer location would
depend upon the radiation view factor, which is a function of the distance from the
flame surface, the observer’s orientation and the flame geometry. Estimation of the
thermal radiation hazards from pool fires essentially involves 3 steps;
characterization of flame geometry, approximation of the radiative properties of the
fire and calculation of safe separation distances to specified levels of thermal
radiation.
Explosion
In case of vapour cloud explosion, two physical effects may occur:
• flash fire over the whole length of the explosive gas cloud;
• a blast wave, with typical peak overpressures circular around ignition source. As explained above, 100% lethality is assumed for all people who are present within
the cloud proper.
For the blast wave, the lethality criterion is based on:
• peak overpressure of 0.1 bar will cause serious damage to 10% of the housing/structures.
• Falling fragments will kill one of each eight persons in the destroyed buildings. The following damage criteria may be distinguished with respect to the peak
overpressures resulting from a blast wave:
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stic & conservative assumptions are
outcomes may look pessimistic, the
3-5
Damage Due To Overpressures
Peak Overpressure Damage Type Description
0.83 bar
0.20 bar
0.10 bar
0.03 bar
0.01 bar
Total Destruction
Heavy Damage
Moderate Damage
Significant Damage
Minor Damage
Total destruction of plant
equipment structure
Damage to plant
equipment structure
Reparable damage to
plant equipment structure
Shattering of glass
Crack in glass Source: Green book from TNO, Netherlands.
From this it may be concluded that p = 0.17 E+5 pa corresponds approximately with
1% lethality. Furthermore it is assumed that everyone inside an area in which the
peak overpressure is greater than 0.17 E+5 pa will be wounded by mechanical
damage. For the gas cloud explosion this will be inside a circle with the ignition
source as its center.
3.3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS CALCULATIONS
This section documents the consequence-distance calculations, which have been re-
computed for the same accident release scenarios as in earlier report and some added
scenarios. A Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) can be characterized as the worst
credible accident. In other words: an accident in an activity, resulting in the maximum
consequence distance that is still believed to be possible. Another aspect, in which the
pessimistic approach of MCA studies appears, is the atmospheric condition that is
used for dispersion calculations. In general, a very stable
atmosphere (Pasquill class E) and a low wind speed (1 m/s) are assumed. These
conditions result in the lowest dispersion velocity & consequently in the highest
vapour concentrations and the largest damage distances. Less pessimistic
assumptions (e.g. unstable weather, wind speed 3 m/s), which are generally the
more average conditions, result in smaller damage distances.
In Risk Analysis studies contributions from low frequency - high outcome effect as
well as high frequency - low outcome events are distinguished)- the objective of the
study is emergency planning, hence only holi
used for obvious reasons. Hence though the
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occurs within only portions of the vapor cloud
concentrations), rather than the entire cloud.
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(where mixed with air in flammable
A flash fire may burn back to the
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planning for emergency concept should be borne in mind whilst interpreting the
results. The Consequence Analysis has been done for selected scenarios. This has
been done for weather conditions B-3 m/s and for E-1 m/sec.
In Consequence Analysis, geographical location of the source of potential release
plays an important role. Consideration of a large number of scenarios in the same
geographical location serves little purpose once the dominant scenario has been
identified & duly considered.
3.4 FIRE AND EXPLOSION MODELING
3.4.1 Jet Fire
Jet fires are burning jets of gas or atomized liquid whose shape is dominated by the
momentum of the release. The consequence of the jet fire is directional depending
on the release orientation. Jet fires typically have flame temperature of 2200 deg F
and can produce high intensity thermal radiation. The jet flame stabilizes on or close
to the point of release and continues until the release is stopped. Jet fires could occur
during unloading or transfer operations when pressures are increased by
compressors. Such fires could cause severe damage but will generally affect only the
local area.
If compressed or liquefied gases are related from storage tanks or pipelines, the
materials discharging through the hole will form a gas jet that entrains and mixes with
the ambient air. If the material encounters an ignition sources while it is in the
flammable range, a jet fire may occur. Jet fires could occur during unloading
operations when pressures are increased by pumping. Such fires could cause severe
damage but will generally affect only the local area.
The effect of jet flame impingement is severe as it may cut through equipment,
pipeline or structure. The damage effect of thermal radiation is depended on both the
level of thermal radiation and duration of exposure.
3.4.2 Flash Fire
When a volatile, flammable material is released to the atmosphere, a vapor cloud
forms and disperses (mixes with air). If the resultant vapor cloud is ignited before the
cloud is diluted below its LFL, a flash fire may occur. The combustion normally
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
which can cause damage to buildings, breaking
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which can be heard as a bang and
windows and ejecting missiles over
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release point, resulting in a pool or jet fire but is unlikely to generate damaging
overpressures (explode) when unconfined
A flash fire occurs when a cloud of vapor/gas burns without generating any significant
overpressure. The cloud is typically ignited on its edge, remote from- the leak source.
The combustion zone moves through the cloud away from the ignition point. The
duration of the flash fire is relatively short but it may stabilize as a continuous jet fire
from the leak source. For flash fires, an approximate estimate for the extent of the
total effect zone is the area over which the cloud is above the LFL. It is assumed that
this area is not increased by cloud expansion during burning.
3.4.3 Fire Ball (BLEVE)
BLEVE stands for Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion. Sometimes referred to
as a fireball, a BLEVE is a combination of fire and explosion with an intense radiant
heat emission within a relatively short time interval. As implied by the term, the
phenomenon can occur within a vessel or tank in which a liquefied gas is kept above
its atmospheric boiling point.
It is the result of a liquid within a container reaching a temperature well above its
boiling point at atmospheric temperature, causing the vessel to rupture into two or
more pieces. BLEVE can be defined as a rapid failure of a container of flammable
material under pressure during fire engulfment. Failure is followed by a fireball or
major fire which produces a powerful radiant-heat flux.
BLEVE can occur when fire impinges on the tank shell at a point or points above the
liquid level of the contents of the tank. This impingement causes the metal to weaken
and fail from the internal pressure. A fireball is an intense spherical fire resulting from
a sudden release of pressurized gas which is immediately ignited, burning as it
expand forming a ball of fire, rising in the air. When this cloud is ignited, a fireball
occurs, causing enormous heat-radiation intensity within a few seconds. This heat
intensity is sufficient to cause severe skin burns and deaths at several hundred
meters from the vessel, depending on the quantity of the gas involved. When a
BLEVE occurs, debris may travel hundreds of feet, with tremendous force, and the
escaping fuel can ignite causing an expanding fireball.
3.4.4 Explosions
Explosions are characterized by a shock-wave
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ge releases, this may happen much
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distances of several hundred meters. The injuries and damage are in the first place
caused by the shock-wave of the explosion itself. People are blown over or knocked
down and buried under collapsed buildings or injured by flying glass. Although the
effects of over-pressure can directly result in deaths, this would be likely to involve
only those working in the direct vicinity of the explosion. The history of industrial
explosions shows that the indirect effects of collapsing buildings, flying glass and
debris cause far more loss of life and severe injuries.
3.4.5 Vapor Cloud Explosion
Generally catastrophic gas explosions happen when considerable quantities of
flammable material are released and dispersed with air to form an explosive vapor
cloud before ignition takes place.
A vapor cloud explosion (VCE) occurs if a cloud of flammable gas burns sufficiently
quickly to generate high overpressures (i.e. pressures in excess of ambient).
The following main types of explosion can be distinguished.
• Confined explosions where the burning gas is largely confined, typically inside a largely empty enclosed tank or building.
• Semi-confined explosions where the gas is partly confined, typically in an offshore process module therefore not considered for this study.
• Unconfined explosions where the gas cloud is largely unconfined, typically on an onshore installation, but there are sufficient obstacles to generate
turbulence and start the build-up of pressure.
3.4.6 Toxic gas release
In case of release of toxic gas, when a gas that is heavier than air is released, it
initially behaves very differently from a neutrally buoyant gas. The heavy gas will first
"slump," or sink, because it is heavier than the surrounding air. As the gas cloud
moves downwind, gravity makes it spread; this can cause some of the vapor to travel
upwind of its release point. Farther downwind, as the cloud becomes more diluted
and its density approaches that of air, it begins behaving like a neutrally buoyant gas.
This takes place when the concentration of heavy gas in the surrounding air drops
below about 1 percent (10,000 parts per million). For many small releases, this will
occur in the first few yards (meters). For lar
further downwind.
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A gas that has a molecular weight greater than that of air will form a heavy gas cloud
if enough gas is released. Gases that are lighter than air at room temperature, but
that are stored in a cryogenic (low temperature) state, can also form heavy gas
clouds. Many substances that are gases under normal pressures and temperatures
are stored under pressures high enough to liquefy them. When a tank rupture or
broken valve causes a sudden pressure loss in a tank of liquefied gas, the liquid boils
violently and the tank contents foam up, filling the tank with a mixture of gas and fine
liquid droplets (called aerosol).
Flash boiling is the term for that sudden vaporization of a liquid caused by a loss of
pressure. When the liquid and gas phases of a chemical escape together from a
ruptured tank, the release is called a two-phase flow. When a two-phase mixture
escapes from storage, the release rate can be significantly greater than that for a
release of pure gas. The two-phase mixture that escapes into the atmosphere may
behave like a heavy gas cloud. The cloud is heavy in part because it is initially cold,
and therefore denser than it would be at ambient temperatures, and also because it
consists of a two-phase mixture. The tiny aerosol droplets mixed into the cloud act to
weigh the cloud down and make it denser than a pure gas cloud, and their
evaporation cools the cloud. Toxic materials that become airborne are carried by the
wind and transported away from the spill site. While being transported downwind, the
airborne chemical(s) mix with air and disperse.
Gases and two-phase liquid-vapor mixtures are divided into three general classes:
• Positively buoyant
• Neutrally buoyant
• Negatively buoyant. These classifications are based on the density difference between the released
material and its surrounding medium (air). The classifications are influenced by
release temperature, molecular weight, presence of aerosols, ambient temperature at
release, and relative humidity.
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3-11
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CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS CALCULATIONS FOR IOCL BARAUNI REFINERY OPERATIONS
OIL Management & Storage System
Sc# 1 Major Leak in Crude oil storage tank – Pool Fire Parameters
Operating Temperature - 25°C
Operating Pressure - Atmospheric
Tank Diameter - 65m
Tank capacity - 40,000KL Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 39200KL
Exposure duration - 30 sec
Pool Diameter - 122.37m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2) Effect Distance (m)
from centre of pool
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
154.0
81.5
68.7
68.7
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E –6 per year
No. of tanks handled - 7
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1.05E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 3
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3-13
3-14
Sc# 2 Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 25°C
Operating Pressure - Atmospheric
Tank Diameter - 65 m
Tank capacity - 40,000KL Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 39,500KL
Exposure duration - 30 sec
Pool Diameter - 65 m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
138.7
70.4
57.9
57.9
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E –6 per year
No. of tanks handled - 7
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1.05E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 3
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Sc# 3 Major Leak in Crude oil storage tank – Pool Fire (Comparison
Case)
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 35°C
Operating Pressure - Atmospheric
Tank Diameter - 65m
Tank capacity - 40,000KL
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 39200KL
Exposure duration - 30 sec
Pool Diameter - 122.18m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2) Effect Distance (m)
from centre of pool
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
153.69
81.41
68.58
68.57
-
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3-17
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E –6 per year
No. of tanks handled - 7
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1.05E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 3
Sc# 4 Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire (Comparison Case)
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 35°C
Operating Pressure - Atmospheric
Tank Diameter - 65 m
Tank capacity - 40,000KL
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 39,500KL
Exposure duration - 30 sec
Pool Diameter - 65 m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
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For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
138.7
70.4
58.0
57.9
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E –6 per year
No. of tanks handled - 7
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1.05E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 3
Sc# 5 Major Leak in Crude oil storage tank 501 – Pool Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 25°C
Operating Pressure - Atmospheric
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Tank Diameter - 65m
Tank capacity - 45,000KL Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 44200KL
Exposure duration - 30 sec
Pool Diameter - 122.73m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality Thermal Load
(kw/m2) Effect Distance (m)
from centre of pool
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
154.1
81.7
68.9
68.7
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E –6 per year
No. of tanks handled - 1
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1.5E-7 per year
Personnel present in the section - 3
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Sc# 6 Crude storage tank 501 roof failure – Tank Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 25°C
Operating Pressure - Atmospheric
Tank Diameter - 65 m
Tank capacity - 45,000KL
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 44,500KL
Exposure duration - 30 sec
Pool Diameter - 65 m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
138.8
70.4
58.1
57.9
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E –6 per year
No. of tanks handled - 1
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1.5E-7 per year
Personnel present in the section - 3
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-23
Sc# 7 Leak / Line Rupture in LPG Horton Sphere – Jet Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 25°C
Operating Pressure - 8.15kg/cm2
Tank Capacity - 1500 KL
Tank Diameter - 14.5 m Dia
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 1470 KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Jet Length - 41.86m
(100 % fatality within the jet area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effective Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
73.4
59.1
55.2
50.6
42.9
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-24
3-25
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 7.0 E –7 per year
No. of tanks handled - 4
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 8.4E - 7 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
Sc# 8 Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere – Flash Fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 25°C
Operating Pressure - 8.15kg/cm2
Tank Capacity - 1500 KL
Tank Diameter - 14.5 m
Dispersion Model
Weather Conditions
Cloud Dimensions Length (m) Width (m)
B – 3 m/sec 33.4 1.5 E – 1 m/sec 38.1 1.2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-26
3-27
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage Type
B- 3 m/sec E – 1 m/sec Max (m) Max (m)
0.2 bar (Heavy) 90.5 91.7 0.1 bar (Moderate) 93.5 95.2
0.02 bar (Minor) 132.4 138.8
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 7.0 E –7 per year
No. of tanks handled annually - 4
Ignition Probability - 0.15
Accident Probability - 4.2E-07 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
Sc# 9 Failure of Horton Sphere – BLEVE
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 35°C
Operating Pressure - 8.15kg/cm2
Tank Capacity - 1500 KL
Tank Diameter - 14.5 m
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 1470KL
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-28
3-29
Exposure Duration - 10sec
Fireball Diameter - 131.84m
(100 % fatality within the fireball area)
For an exposure duration of 10 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
513.9
323.3
266.2
202.1
83.7
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 7.0 E –7 per year
No. of tanks handled annually - 4
Ignition Probability - 0.13
Accident Probability - 3.64E-07 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
Sc# 10 Leak / Line Rupture in LPG Mounded bullets – Flash Fire / Vapour Cloud
Explosion
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 35°C
Operating Pressure - 8.15kg/cm2
Tank Capacity - 1500 KL
Tank Diameter - 6.0m
Dispersion Model
Weather Conditions
Cloud Dimensions Length (m) Width (m)
B – 3 m/sec 43.0 0.84 E – 1 m/sec 46.0 0.73
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage Type
B- 3 m/sec E – 1 m/sec Max (m) Max (m)
0.2 bar (Heavy) 45.3 46.0 0.1 bar (Moderate) 46.9 47.7
0.02 bar (Minor) 66.8 70.1
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 1.0E-6 per year
No. of tanks - 6
Ignition Probability - 0.15
Accident Probability - 9.0E-7 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-32
Sc# 11 Leak in LPG Mounded bullets storage tanks outlet line – Jet Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 35°C
Operating Pressure - 8.15kg/cm2
Tank Capacity - 1500 KL
Tank Diameter - 6.0m
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 1450KL
Exposure duration - 10sec
Jet Length - 33.91m
(100 % fatality within the Jet area)
For an exposure duration of 10 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
37.1
31.1
29.3
27.2
23.6
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 1.0E-6 per year
No. of tanks - 6
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1.8E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-33
3-34
Sc# 12 Leak / Line Rupture in Fuel gas (Horton Sphere) – Flash Fire /
Vapour Cloud Explosion
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 35°C
Operating Pressure - 8.15kg/cm2
Tank Diameter - 8.3m Dia
Tank Capacity - 300 KL
Dispersion Model
Weather Conditions
Cloud Dimensions Length (m) Width (m)
B – 3 m/sec 31.9 1.8 E – 1 m/sec 38.7 1.7
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage Type
B- 3 m/sec E – 1 m/sec Max (m) Max (m)
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-35
0.2 bar (Heavy) 68.4 69.3 0.1 bar (Moderate) 70.8 72.1
0.02 bar (Minor) 102.0 106.9
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 7.0E-6 per year
No. of tanks - 2
Ignition Probability - 0.15
Accident Probability - 2.1E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
Sc# 13 Leak in Fuel gas storage tank (Horton spheres) – Jet Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 35°C
Operating Pressure - 8.15kg/cm2
Tank Diameter - 8.3m Dia
Tank Capacity - 300 KL
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 290KL
Exposure duration - 10sec
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-37
Jet Length - 38.16m
(100 % fatality within the jet area)
For an exposure duration of 10 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
64.4
53.2
49.9
46.1
39.3
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 7.0E-6 per year
No. of tanks - 2
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 4.2E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-38
Sc# 14 Leak in MS / SRN Storage tank – Pool Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 35°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric.
Tank Diameter - 22.7m
Tank Capacity - 5000KL
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 4500KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 55.4m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
54.1
30.6
23.3
17.7
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
No. of tanks - 18
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 2.7E-5 per year
Personnel present in the section - 4
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-39
3-40
Sc# 15 MS / SRN storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 35°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric.
Tank Diameter - 22.7m
Tank Capacity - 5000KL
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 1450KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 22.7m
(100 % fatality within the fire area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
80.9
38.2
29.3
29.2
-
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-41
3-42
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
No. of tanks - 18
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 2.7E-5 per year
Personnel present in the section - 4
Sc# 16 MS / SRN storage tank roof fire – Flash fire / Vapour Cloud
Explosion
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 35°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric.
Tank Diameter - 22.7m
Tank Capacity - 5000KL
Dispersion Model
Weather Conditions
Cloud Dimensions Length (m) Width (m)
B – 3 m/sec 28.5 28.9 E – 1 m/sec 110.5 110.3
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-43
3-44
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage Type
B- 3 m/sec E – 1 m/sec Max (m) Max (m)
0.2 bar (Heavy) 26.0 114.7 0.1 bar (Moderate) 27.8 119.0
0.02 bar (Minor) 50.2 188.9
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
No. of tanks - 18
Ignition Probability - 0.15
Accident Probability - 1.35E-5 per year
Personnel present in the section - 4
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-45
Sc# 17 Leak in Slop tank – Pool Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 70°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric.
Tank Diameter - 22.7M
Tank Capacity - 5000KL
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 4600KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 48.4m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
77.9
40.5
32.2
31.8
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
No. of tanks - 3
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 4.5E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-46
Sc# 18 Slop tank roof fire – Tank Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 70°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric.
Tank Diameter - 22.7M
Tank Capacity - 5000KL
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 4650KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 22.7m
(100 % fatality within the fire area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
81.9
43.6
35.3
34.9
-
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-47
3-48
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
No. of tanks - 3
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 4.5E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
Sc# 19 Leak in SKO Storage tank – Pool Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 35°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric
Tank Diameter - 22.7m.
Tank Capacity - 5000KL
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 4600KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 56.4m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-49
3-50
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
85.0
40.3
31.3
31.2
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
No. of tanks - 7
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1.05E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
Sc# 20 SKO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 35°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric
Tank Diameter - 22.7m.
Tank Capacity - 5000KL
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 4600KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-51
Pool Diameter - 22.7m
(100 % fatality within the fire area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
93.5
47.1
38.2
38.1
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
No. of tanks - 7
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1.05E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-52
3-53
Sc# 21 Leak in Gas oil Storage tank – Pool Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 35°C
Operating Pressure - atmosheric
Tank Diameter - 46.0m
Tank Capacity - 20000KL
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 19400KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 65m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
93.1
45.7
35.8
35.7
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
No. of tanks - 3
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 4.5E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-54
Sc# 22 Gas oil storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 25°C
Operating Pressure - atmosheric
Tank Diameter - 46.0m
Tank Capacity - 20000KL
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 19400KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 46m
(100 % fatality within the fire area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
107.2
51.9
41.5
41.4
-
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-55
3-56
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
No. of tanks - 3
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 4.5E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
Sc# 23 Leak in CBFS (Carbon Black Feed Stock)/ CLO (Clarified Oil)
Storage tank – Pool Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 100°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric.
Tank Diameter - 22.7m
Tank Capacity - 5000KL
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 4150KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 28.2m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-57
3-58
Percent Lethality Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
53.0
27.4
20.2
17.1
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
No. of tanks - 3
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 4.5E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 4
Sc# 24 CBFS (Carbon Black Feed Stock)/ CLO (Clarified Oil) storage tank
roof fire – Tank Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 100°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric.
Tank Diameter - 22.7m
Tank Capacity - 5000KL
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-59
3-60
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 4950KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 22.7m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
60.8
35.2
27.9
24.9
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
No. of tanks - 3
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 4.5E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 4
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-61
Sc# 25 Leak in CFO (Coker Feed Oil) IFO (Internal Fuel Oil)/ RFO
(Residual Fuel Oil) Storage tank – Pool Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 100°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric
Tank Dimensions - 22.7m
Tank Capacity - 5000KL
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 4150KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 56.4m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
81.9
40.3
31.3
31.2
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
No. of tanks - 3
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 4.5E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-62
Sc# 26 CFO (Coker Fuel Oil) IFO (Internal Fuel Oil)/ RFO (Residual Fuel
Oil) storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 100°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric
Tank Dimensions - 22.7m
Tank Capacity - 5000KL
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 4950KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 22.7m
(100 % fatality within the fire area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
89.7
48.1
39.1
39.0
-
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-63
3-64
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
No. of tanks - 3
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 4.5E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
Sc# 27 Leak in HVGO (Heavy Vacuum Gas Oil) Storage tank – Pool Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 100°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric
Tank Diameter - 50m
Tank Capacity - 30000KL
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 24900KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 56.4
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-65
3-66
Percent Lethality Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
82.9
41.3
32.4
32.2
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
No. of tanks - 3
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 4.5E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
Sc# 28 HVGO (Heavy Vacuum Gas Oil) storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 100°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric
Tank Diameter - 50m
Tank Capacity - 30000KL
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-67
3-68
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 29700KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 50m
(100 % fatality within the fire area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
80.4
43.1
35.1
34.0
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
No. of tanks - 3
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 4.5E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-69
Sc# 29 Leak in LSHS (Low Sulphur Heav Stock) Storage tank – Pool Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 100°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric.
Tank Dimensions - 22.7m
Tank Capacity - 5000KL
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 4150KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 56.4m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
81.9
40.3
31.3
31.2
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
No. of tanks - 3
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 4.5E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-70
Sc# 30 LSHS (Low Sulphur Heav Stock) storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire Parameters
Operating Temperature - 100°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric.
Tank Diameter - 22.7m
Tank Capacity - 5000KL Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 4950KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 22.7m
(100 % fatality within the fire area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
80.4
42.9
34.0
33.1
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-71
3-72
No. of tanks - 3
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 4.5E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
Sc# 31 Leak in SR (Short Residue) Storage tank – Pool Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 100°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric
Tank Diameter - 22.7m
Tank Capacity - 5000KL
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 4930KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 56.4
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-73
3-74
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
82.1
41.4
30.5
31.3
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
No. of tanks - 7
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1.05E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 4
Sc# 32 SR (Short Residue) storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 100°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric
Tank Diameter - 22.7m
Tank Capacity - 5000KL
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-75
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 4950KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 22.7m
(100 % fatality within the fire area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
80.3
43.2
35.1
34.0
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
No. of Tanks - 7
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1.05E-6 per year
Personnel Present In The Section - 4
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-76
Sc# 33 Leak in Bitumen Storage tank – Pool Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 130°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric
Tank Diameter - 8.54m
Tank Capacity - 2000KL
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 1672KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 28.2
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
53.0
27.4
20.2
17.1
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
No. of tanks - 7
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1.05E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-77
3-78
Sc# 34 Bitumen storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 130°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric
Tank Diameter - 8.54m
Tank Capacity - 2000KL
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 1980KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 8.54m
(100 % fatality within the fire area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-79
3-80
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
51.4
30.2
20.5
19.1
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
No. of tanks - 7
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1.05E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
Sc# 35 Leak / Line Rupture in Hydrogen bullet outlet piping – Flash Fire /
Vapour Cloud Explosion
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 35°C
Operating Pressure - 38 kg/cm2
Tank Capacity - 225 m3
Dispersion Model
Weather Conditions
Cloud Dimensions Length (m) Width (m)
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-81
B – 3 m/sec 17.0 17.0 E – 1 m/sec 21.4 21.3
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage Type
B- 3 m/sec E – 1 m/sec Max (m) Max (m)
0.2 bar (Heavy) 13.6 24.7 0.1 bar (Moderate) 14.6 26.1
0.02 bar (Minor) 28.0 43.5
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 1.0E-6 per year
No. of tanks - 5
Ignition Probability - 0.15
Accident Probability - 7.5E-7 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-82
WAGONS
Sc# 36 Major Leak from MS Wagon – Pool Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 35°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric
Wagon Capacity - 68 KL
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 62.6KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 83.8m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-83
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
116.5
56.8
45.8
45.8
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 1.4E-5 per tanker per year
Time required to fill one wagon - 40 min.
No. of wagons handled annually - 6500
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 2.30E-6
Personnel present in the section - 7
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-84
Sc# 37 Major Leak from MS Wagon – Flash Fire/ Vapour Cloud Explosion
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 35°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric
Wagon Capacity - 68 KL
Dispersion Model
Weather Conditions
Cloud Dimensions Length (m) Width (m)
B – 3 m/sec 78.6 78.6 E – 1 m/sec 288.9 288.8
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage Type
B- 3 m/sec E – 1 m/sec Max (m) Max (m)
0.2 bar (Heavy) 94.5 352.3 0.1 bar (Moderate) 101.7 373.5
0.02 bar (Minor) 192.7 641.1
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 1.4E-5 per tanker per year
Time required to fill one wagon - 40 min
No. of wagons handled annually - 6500
Ignition Probability - 0.15
Accident Probability - 1.15E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 7
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-85
3-86
Sc# 38 Major Leak from SKO Wagon – Pool Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 35°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric
Wagon Capacity - 68 KL
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 55.8KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 59m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-87
3-88
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
90.0
42.1
33.1
32.9
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 1.4E-5 per tanker per year
Time required to fill one wagon - 40 min
No. of wagons handled annually - 2700
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 2.3E-3 per year
Personnel present in the section - 7
Sc# 39 Major Leak from SKO Wagon – Flash Fire/ Vapour Cloud
Explosion
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 35°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric
Wagon Capacity - 68 KL
Dispersion Model
Cloud Dimensions
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-89
Weather Conditions Length (m) Width (m)
B – 3 m/sec 98.0 98.1 E – 1 m/sec 312.4 312.3
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage Type B- 3 m/sec E – 1 m/sec
Max (m) Max (m)
0.2 bar (Heavy) 118.6 388.9 0.1 bar (Moderate) 126.9 412.0
0.02 bar (Minor) 232.8 704.0
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 1.4E-5 per tanker per year
Time required to fill one wagon - 40 min
No. of wagons handled annually - 2700
Ignition Probability - 0.15
Accident Probability - 4.8E-7 per year
Personnel present in the section - 7
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-90
Sc# 40 Loss of containment in CBFS tanker- Pool Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 100°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric
Tanker Capacity - 18 tons
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 12.6tons
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 65.6m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
91.5
45.1
35.5
34.4
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 1.4E-5 per tanker per year
Time required to fill one wagon - 40 min
No. of tanks handled annually - 200
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 7.17E-8 per year
Personnel present in the section - 4
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-91
3-92
Sc# 41 Loss of containment in Black Oil tanker- Pool Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 35°C
Operating Pressure - atmospheric
Tank Capacity - 18tons
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 17.1tons
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 64.4m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-93
3-94
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
89.8
44.1
34.7
34.4
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 1.4E-5 per tanker per year
Time required to fill one wagon - 40 min
No. of tanks handled annually - 100(assumption)
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 3.58E-8 per year
Personnel present in the section - 4 (assumption)
Sc# 42 Loss of containment in LPG tanker- BLEVE
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 35°C
Operating Pressure - 15kg/cm2
Tanker Capacity - 18tons
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 17.1tons
BLEVE duration - 30sec
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-95
Fireball Diameter - 156.5m
(100 % fatality within the fireball area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
480.3
305.7
254.0
196.8
98.3
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 1.4E-5 per tanker per year
Time required to fill one wagon - 40 min
No. of tanks handled annually - 17000
Ignition Probability - 0.15
Accident Probability - 3.05E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 14
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-96
3-97
Sc# 43 Loss of containment in LPG tanker- Flash Fire/ Vapour Cloud Explosion
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 35°C
Operating Pressure - 15kg/cm2
Tanker Capacity - 18tons
Dispersion Model
Weather Conditions
Cloud Dimensions Length (m) Width (m)
B – 3 m/sec 228.2 228.2 E – 1 m/sec 138.5 138.4
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage Type B- 3 m/sec E – 1 m/sec
Max (m) Max (m)
0.2 bar (Heavy) 179.3 175.5 0.1 bar (Moderate) 214.2 212.2
0.02 bar (Minor) 660.8 676.2
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 1.4E-5 per tanker per year
No. of tanks handled annually - 17000 tankers
Ignition Probability - 0.15
Accident Probability - 3.05E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 14
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-98
PIPELINE
Sc# 44 Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak size) – Pool fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 35°C
Operating Pressure - 8kg/cm2
Flow Rate - 1300m3/hr
Pipeline Diameter - 18”
Crude Composition - Crude Oil
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 65m3
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 121.2m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-99
3-100
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
191.0
119.1
106.3
106.3
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 1.0E-7 per meter per year
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 3.0 E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 4
Sc# 45 Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak size) – Flash Fire/ Vapour Cloud
Explosion
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 35°C
Operating Pressure - 8kg/cm2
Flow Rate - 1300m3/hr
Crude Composition - Crude Oil
Pipeline Diameter - 18”
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-101
Dispersion Model
Weather Conditions
Cloud Dimensions Length (m) Width (m)
B – 3 m/sec 148.8 148.5 E – 1 m/sec 121.2 121.0
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage Type B- 3 m/sec E – 1 m/sec
Max (m) Max (m) 0.2 bar (Heavy) 154.1 132.7
0.1 bar (Moderate) 158.2 136.5 0.02 bar (Minor) 210.5 183.9
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 1.0E-7 per meter per year
Ignition Probability - 0.15
Accident Probability - 1.5E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 4
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
2
3-102
AVU
Sc# 46 Leak (100mm) from bottom of crude column (K-2)
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 360°C
Operating Pressure - 0.8 kg/cm2
Expected Inventory in the section - approx 5.5 KL
Flow Rate - 440 m3/hr (maximum)
Composition - RCO
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 2.69KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 24.8m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
64.4
40.9
34.0
29.7
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
No. of similar units - 3
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 4.5E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section -
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-103
3-104
Sc#47 Failure of Nozzle /Flange Joint in crude column (601-K-2) & crude starts
coming out
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 320°C
Operating Pressure - 0.4kg/cm2
Expected Inventory in the section - 5.5KL
Composition - Crude Oil
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 3.96KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 30.2m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2) Effect Distance (m)
from centre of pool
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-105
3-106
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
55.8
28.8
21.6
19.0
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1.5E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
Sc#48 10mm leak from inlet flange of Stabilizer Column (601-K-4) – Pool Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 100°C
Operating Pressure - 7.5 kg/cm2
Expected Inventory in the section - 26.54 m3
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 4.56KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 20.52 m
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-107
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2) Effect Distance from
centre of pool (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
47.3
24.7
17.7
11.7
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-7 per year
No. of similar units - 3
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 4.5E-7 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-108
Sc#49 Leak (10mm) from Furnace (F-101/F-102) tube inside the furnace /Nozzle
of crude heater & crude starts coming out (Data for tube/nozzle required)
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 360°C
Operating Pressure - 14.87 Kg/cm2
Expected Inventory in the section - 5.5KL
Composition - Crude
Dispersion Model
Weather Conditions
Cloud Dimensions Length (m) Width (m)
B – 3 m/sec 41.3 41.3 E – 1 m/sec 30.0 29.9
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage Type
B- 3 m/sec E – 1 m/sec Max (m) Max (m)
0.2 bar (Heavy) 47.8 70.8 0.1 bar (Moderate) 50.1 73.9
0.02 bar (Minor) 79.3 113.9
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 6.0E-06
No. of similar units - 3
Ignition Probability - 0.15
Accident Probability - 2.70E-06 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
Sc#50 Desalter overflows line Leak (10mm)
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 130°C
Operating Pressure - 8.5Kg/cm2
Expected Inventory in the section - 110 m3
Flow Rate - 400 MT/hr
Composition - Crude
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 102.3 m3
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 38.6m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-111
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
61.1
28.9
21.4
20.3
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-7 per year
No. of similar units - 3
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 4.5E-7 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-112
Sc#51 Nozzle / Flange joint leak (10mm) from the inlet of pretopping column.
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 190°C
Operating Pressure - 3.0 Kg/cm2
Expected Inventory in the section - 5 m3
Flow Rate - 400 MT/hr
Composition - crude
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 4m3
Exposure duration - 30sec
Jet Length - 3.6 m
(100 % fatality within the jet area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
3.9
3.6
3.5
3.4
2.4
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-7 per year
No. of similar units - 3
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 4.5E-7 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-113
3-114
Sc# 52 Leak from Vacuum column (K-5)
Parameter
Operating Temperature - 400°C
Operating Pressure - 700mm Hg.
Expected Inventory in the section - Approx 1.5 m3
Flow Rate - 127300 kg/hr
Composition - VR
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 0.76KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 13.2m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-115
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2) Effect Distance (m)
from centre of pool
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
42.7
31.1
25.6
19.3
14.0
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-7 per year
No. of similar units - 3
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 4.5E-7 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2 (1 shift officer & 1 operator)
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
2
3-116
Sc# 53 Failure of Stripper Column K-6(1) Nozzle & hydrocarbon starts coming
out (AVU-1/2)
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 400°C
Operating Pressure - 93 mm of Hg
Expected Inventory in the section - approx 0.5 m3
Flow Rate - 20.6 MT/hr
Composition - First Cut
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 0.4m3
Exposure duration - 30sec
Jet Length - 13.73m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
17.8
10.4
7.11
-
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-7 per year
No. of similar units - 2
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 3.0E-7 per year
Personnel present in the section -
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-117
3-118
Sc# 54 Rupture of Furnace (F-103) tube inside the Vacuum furnace /Nozzle of
vacuum heater & VR starts coming out
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 400°C
Operating Pressure - 5.086 Kg/cm2
Expected Inventory in the section - 1.5m3
Flow Rate - 127,300 T’put Kg/hr
Composition - VR
Dispersion Model
Weather Conditions
Cloud Dimensions Length (m) Width (m)
B – 3 m/sec 31.4 31.4 E – 1 m/sec 42.0 42.0
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage Type
B- 3 m/sec E – 1 m/sec Max (m) Max (m)
0.2 bar (Heavy) 35.4 47.6 0.1 bar (Moderate) 37.0 49.8
0.02 bar (Minor) 57.1 78.0
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-119
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 6.0E-06 per year
No. of similar units - 3
Ignition Probability - 0.15
Accident Probability - 2.7E-06 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-120
LPG Treatment Unit
Sc# 55 Leak from LPG-Amine Absorber (08-C-101)
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 45°C
Operating Pressure - 17.2 kg/cm2
Expected Inventory in the section - 35m3
Flow Rate - 28m3/hr (LPG)+14 m3/hr (amine)
Composition - LPG + Amine (MDEA)
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 28m3
Exposure duration - 10sec
Jet Length - 15.80m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 10 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
30.5
25.4
23.9
22.5
20.3
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1.5E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-122
Sc# 56 Leak (10mm) from LPG Surge Vessel (08-V-104)
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 40°C
Operating Pressure - 9 – 11kg/cm2a
Expected Inventory in the section - 5.1 m3
Flow Rate - 28m3/hr
Composition - LPG
Dispersion Model
Weather Conditions
Cloud Dimensions Length (m) Width (m)
B – 3 m/sec 24.8 24.7 E – 1 m/sec 29.7 29.6
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage Type
B- 3 m/sec E – 1 m/sec Max (m) Max (m)
0.2 bar (Heavy) 22.5 23.1 0.1 bar (Moderate) 23.2 23.9
0.02 bar (Minor) 32.5 35.3
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
Ignition Probability - 0.15
Accident Probability - 7.5E-7 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-123
3-124
NAPHTHA HYDROTREATER UNIT (HTU)
Sc# 57 Failure of Naphtha Splitter (01-CC-00-001) inlet Nozzle & naphtha starts
coming out
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 140°C
Operating Pressure - 1.4 kg/cm2
Expected Inventory in the section - approx. 57.20 KL
Flow Rate - 58,000kg/hr
Composition - Naphtha
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 21.16KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 69.6m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-125
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
111.7
61.7
51.8
51.7
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-7 per year
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1.5E-7 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-126
Sc# 58 Leak (10mm) from Hydrotreater Reactor (02-RB-00-001)
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 160 °C
Operating Pressure - 57.5 kg/cm2g
Expected Inventory in the section - 16.16 m3
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 3.92m3
Exposure duration - 10sec
Jet Length - 18.36m
(100 % fatality within the jet area)
For an exposure duration of 10 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
39.9
32.5
30.5
28.3
25.3
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1.5E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
2
3-128
Catalytic Reformer Unit
Sc# 59 Leak (10mm) from the inlet of reformer reactor (03-RB-00-001)
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 483°C
Operating Pressure - 12.6 Kg/cm2g
Expected Inventory in the section - 4.27 KL
Flow Rate - 37,545 Kg/hr
Composition - Heavy Naphtha
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 2.77KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Diameter - 13.79 m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
from centre of the
pool
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
17.9
12.9
11.4
9.1
4.2
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
Ignition Probability - 0.3
No. of reactors - 3
Accident Probability - 4.5E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section -
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-129
3-130
Sc# 60 Leak (10mm) from Stabilizer column (02-CC-00-001)
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 176°C
Operating Pressure - 14.1 Kg/cm2
Expected Inventory in the section - 4.27 m3
Flow Rate - 36,429 kg/hr
Composition - Naphtha
Dispersion Model
Weather Conditions
Cloud Dimensions Length (m) Width (m)
B – 3 m/sec 57.2 57.2 E – 1 m/sec 103.2 103.1
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage Type
B- 3 m/sec E – 1 m/sec Max (m) Max (m)
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-131
0.2 bar (Heavy) 58.3 115.5 0.1 bar (Moderate) 60.8 120.1
0.02 bar (Minor) 91.8 177.6
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-7 per year
Ignition Probability - 0.15
Accident Probability - 7.5E-8 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-132
DHDT
Sc# 61 Leak (10mm) from reactor DHDT (702-R-01)
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 332°C
Operating Pressure - 105.2 kg/cm2g
Expected Inventory in the section - approx. 100 m3
Composition - Gas oil
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 46.30KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Jet Length - 11.98 m
(100 % fatality within the jet area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
15.9
13.9
13.2
12.1
7.5
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
Ignition Probability - 0.3
No. of reactors - 3
Accident Probability - 4.5E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-133
3-134
Sc# 62 H2S Leak from LP Amine Absorber (702-C-04)
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 30°C
Operating Pressure - 1bar
Expected Inventory in the section - 5m3
Composition - H2S + Amine
Toxic release Model
Released Quantity - 4m3
Exposure duration - 180sec
Percent Lethality
Dispersed Cloud – E1m/s Toxic Dose Distance (m)
0
7
42
84
97
4.57E+10
7.91E+11
1.44E+13
2.18E+14
1.54E+15
125
100
75
50
25
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-135
Percent Lethality
Dispersed Cloud – B3m/s Toxic Dose Distance (m)
0
24 7.09E+08
4.46E+12 50
25
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
Accident Probability - 5.0E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-136
COKER-A/B
Sc# 63 Leak (10mm) from main fractionator (C-1) top – Jet Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 1150C
Operating Pressure - 3.3 kg/cm2a
Inventory in the section - 16 m3
Composition - Gas + LPG + Naphtha + Kero + LDO + CFO
+ RFO + Coke
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 14.4m3
Exposure duration - 10sec
Jet Length - 8.73 m
(100 % fatality within the jet area)
For an exposure duration of 10 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
18.3
14.9
14.0
13.0
11.5
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-7 per year
No. of similar units - 2
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 3.0E-7 per year
Personnel present in the section - 12
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-137
12
3-138
Sc# 64 Leak (10mm) from Coker –B reactor overhead line
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 4900C
Operating Pressure - 4.0 kg/cm2a
Expected Inventory in the section - 5.4 m3 (assuming 3 min isolation time
&20% coke)
Flow Rate - 136 m3/hr
Composition - Gas+Naphtha+Kero+HGO+CFO
+RFO+Coke
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 4.2 m3
Exposure duration - 30sec
Jet Fire - 12.58 m
(100 % fatality within the jet area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-139
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
26.7
21.8
20.4
18.9
16.7
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
No. of similar units - 2
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 3.0E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section -
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3.0E-6 per year
12
3-140
Sc# 65 Leak (10mm) from Coker –B reactor bottom – Pool Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 4900C
Operating Pressure - 4.0 kg/cm2a
Expected Inventory in the section - 5.4 m3 (assuming 3 min isolation time
&20% coke)
Flow Rate - 136 m3/hr
Composition - Gas+Naphtha+Kero+HGO+CFO
+RFO+Coke
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 4.2 m3
Exposure duration - 30sec
Pool Fire - 17.75 m
(100 % fatality within the pool area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
from the centre of
pool
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
29.4
25.7
24.7
23.3
19.7
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
No. of similar units - 2
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability -
Personnel present in the section -
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-141
3-142
RFCCU
Sc# 66 Leak (10mm) from Reactor (701-R-101) inlet – Jet Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 204°C
Operating Pressure - 12.18kg/cm2g
Expected Inventory in the section - 6m3
Flow Rate - 192m3/hr
Composition - Vacuum Gas Oil
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 4.2 m3
Exposure duration - 30sec
Jet Fire - 13.09 m
(100 % fatality within the jet area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-143
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
29.0
23.5
22.0
20.4
18.0
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1.5 E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-144
Sc# 67 Leak (10mm) from Main Fractionator (701-C-201) top – Jet Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 360°C
Operating Pressure - 12.1Kg/cm2g
Expected Inventory in the section - 6m3
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 5.2 m3
Exposure duration - 30sec
Jet Fire - 7.0 m
(100 % fatality within the jet area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
8.2
6.6
5.8
-
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-7 per year
Ignition Probability - 0.15
Accident Probability - 7.5E-8 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-145
3-146
LPG Recovery Unit
Sc# 68 Leak (10mm) from Debutaniser column (08-C-003) top – Jet Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - Top - 580C, Bottom – 1750C
Operating Pressure - 11 kg/cm2a
Expected Inventory in the section - 22 m3
Flow Rate - 80m3/hr
Composition - LPG, SRN
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 20 m3
Exposure duration - 30sec
Jet Fire - 14.88 m
(100 % fatality within the jet area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-147
Percent Lethality Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
30.5
25.1
23.5
21.9
19.5
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-7 per year
Ignition Probability - 0.15
Accident Probability - 7.5E-8 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-148
Sc# 69 Leak (10mm) from Stripper (08-C-002) top – Jet Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - Top - 800C, Bottom – 1600C
Operating Pressure - 14kg/cm2
Expected Inventory in the section - 25KL
Flow Rate - 90 m3/hr
Composition - LPG+ unstabilised naphtha+H2S
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 23.5 KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Jet Length - 17.03 m
(100 % fatality within the jet area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
37.6
30.4
28.4
26.3
23.2
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-7 per year
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1.5E-7 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-149
HYDROGEN PLANT
Sc# 70 Leak (10mm) from inlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Prereformer) R-4 –
Jet Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 490°C
Operating Pressure - 28.3 Kg/cm2g
Expected Inventory in the section - 2.53 Tonnes (Assuming 3 min
isolation time)
Flow Rate - 50678 Kg/hr
Composition - Light Naphtha, Hydrogen, Steam
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 1.9 KL
Exposure duration - 30sec
Jet Length - 8.68 m
(100 % fatality within the jet area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-151
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
10.9
9.3
8.7
-
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1.5E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section -
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-152
Sc# 71 Leak (10mm) from outlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Reformer) R-5 – Jet
Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 635°C
Operating Pressure - 27.0 Kg/cm2g
Expected Inventory in the section - 2.6 Tonnes (Assuming 3 min
isolation time)
Flow Rate - 52416 Kg/hr
Composition - Methane, Hydrogen, Steam, CO, CO2
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 2.0 tonnes
Exposure duration - 30sec
Jet Length - 7.37 m
(100 % fatality within the jet area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
7.9
6.1
-
-
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1.5E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-153
3-154
Sc# 72 Leak (10mm) from inlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Shift Converter) R-6
– Jet Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 200°C
Operating Pressure - 23.0 Kg/cm2g
Expected Inventory in the section - 2.6 Tonnes (Assuming 3 min
isolation time)
Flow Rate - 52350.96 Kg/hr
Composition - Hydrogen, Steam, CO, CO2, Methane
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 2.0 tonnes
Exposure duration - 30sec
Jet Length - 6.86 m
(100 % fatality within the jet area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-155
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
7.6
5.7
-
-
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1.5E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-156
NHDT (MSQ)
Sc# 73 Leak (10mm) from NHDT Reactor (R-01) – Jet Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 160°C
Operating Pressure - 57.5 Kg/cm2
Expected Inventory in the section - 16.16m3
Composition - HC, H2
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 15m3
Exposure duration - 30sec
Jet Length - 18.30 m
(100 % fatality within the jet area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
39.7
32.3
30.3
28.2
25.0
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
Ignition Probability - 0.15
Accident Probability - 7.5E-7 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-157
3-158
ISOM
Sc# 74 Leak (10mm) from ISOM Reactor (R-01) – Jet Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 131°C
Operating Pressure - 37 Kg/cm2a
Expected Inventory in the section - 2.45 m3
Composition - HC, H2
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 2.05 m3
Exposure duration - 30sec
Jet Length - 18.59 m
(100 % fatality within the jet area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-159
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
41.4
33.6
31.4
29.1
25.7
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
Ignition Probability - 0.15
Accident Probability - 7.5E-7 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
3-160
PRIMEGPFD
Sc# 75 Failure of PRIMEGPFD reactor (R-02)- Jet Fire
Parameters
Operating Temperature - 280°C
Operating Pressure - 21.5 Kg/cm2
Expected Inventory in the section - 15.26 m3
Composition - HC, H2
Heat Radiation Model
Released Quantity - 15.0 m3
Exposure duration - 30sec
Jet Length - 7.69 m
(100 % fatality within the jet area)
For an exposure duration of 30 sec. and protected human body the damage
distances are as follows:
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
9.4
7.7
7.3
-
-
ACCIDENT PROBABILITY
Base frequency - 5.0E-6 per year
Ignition Probability - 0.3
Accident Probability - 1.5E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section - 2
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
- 41.4 51.9 4.5E-6
- 17.1 27.4 4.5E-6
3-162
RELEASE CONSEQUENCE CALCULATIONS – SUMMARY
Table 3.1 Summary of consequence and frequency analysis
Sc# Description Damage Distance, m 99 % fatality 50% fatality 1% fatality
Probability,
per year
1. Leak in Crude oil storage tank- Dyke Pool Fire - 68.7 81.5 1.05E-6
2. Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire - 57.9 70.4 1.05E-6
3. Leak in Crude oil storage tank- Dyke Pool Fire
(Comparison case)
4. Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire(Comparison case)
- 68.7 81.4 1.05E-6 - 57.9 70.4 1.05E-6
5. Leak in Crude oil storage tank 501- Dyke Pool Fire - 68.7 81.7 1.5E-7
6. Crude storage tank roof failure 501 – Tank Fire - 57.9 70.4 1.5E-7
7. Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere – Jet Fire 42.9 50.6 59.1 4.2E-7
8. Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere – Flash Fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion
90.5 93.5 132.4 2.1E-7
9. Failure of Horton Sphere – BLEVE 83.7 202.1 323.3 2.1E-7
10. Leak / Line Rupture in Mounded bullet outlet line – Flash
fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion
11. Leak in LPG Mounded bullets storage tanks outlet line – Jet Fire
12. Leak / Line Rupture in Fuel gas– Flash fire / Vapour
Cloud Explosion
28.6 34.1 103.1 9.0E-7
- - 18.6 1.8E-6 38.4 40.8 52.0 2.1E-6
13. Leak in Fuel gas storage tank outlet line – Jet Fire 39.3 46.1 53.2 4.2E-6
14. Leak in MS / SRN Storage tank – Pool Fire - 17.7 30.6 2.7E-5
15. MS / SRN storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire - 29.2 38.2 2.7E-5
16. MS / SRN storage tank roof fire – Flash fire / Vapour
Cloud Explosion
26.0 27.8 50.2 1.35E-5
17. Leak in Slope tank – Pool Fire - 31.8 40.5 4.5E-6
18. Slope tank roof fire – Tank Fire - 36.5 43.6 4.5E-6
19. Leak in SKO Storage tank – Pool Fire - 31.2 40.3 1.05E-6
20. SKO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire - 38.1 47.1 1.05E-6
21. Leak in Gas oil Storage tank – Pool Fire - 35.7 45.7 4.5E-6
22. Gas oil storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
23. Leak in CBFS / CLO Storage tank – Pool Fire
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
of 2.4 3.4 3.6 4.5E-7
3-163
Sc# Description Damage Distance, m
99 % fatality 50% fatality 1% fatality
Probability,
per year
24. CBFS / CLO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire - 24.9 35.2 4.5E-6
25. Leak in CFO / IFO / RFO Storage tank – Pool Fire - 31.2 40.3 4.5E-6
26. CFO / IFO / RFO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire - 39.0 48.1 4.5E-6
27. Leak in HVGO Storage tank – Pool Fire - 32.2 41.3 4.5E-6
28. HVGO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire - 34.0 43.1 4.5E-6
29. Leak in LSHS Storage tank – Pool Fire - `31.2 40.3 4.5E-6
30. LSHS storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire - 33.1 42.9 4.5E-6
31. Leak in SR Storage tank – Pool Fire - 31.3 41.4 1.05E-6
32. SR storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire - 34.0 43.2 1.05E-6
33. Leak in Bitumen Storage tank – Pool Fire - 17.1 27.4 1.05E-6
34. Bitumen storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire - 19.1 30.2 1.05E-6
35. Leak from H2 Bullet outlet piping – Flash Fire/ VCE 13.6 14.6 28.0 7.5E-7
36. Major Leak from MS Wagon – Pool Fire - 45.8 56.8 2.3E-6
37. Major Leak from MS Wagon – Flash Fire/ VCE 94.5 101.7 192.7 1.15E-6
38. Major Leak from HVGO Wagon – Pool Fire - 32.9 42.1 2.3E-6
39. Major Leak from SKO Wagon – Flash Fire/ VCE 118.6 126.9 232.8 4.8E-7
40. Loss of containment in CBFS tanker- Pool Fire - 34.4 45.1 7.17E-8
41. Loss of containment in HVGO tanker- Pool Fire - 34.4 44.1 3.58E-8
42. Loss of containment in LPG tanker- BLEVE 98.3 196.8 305.7 3.05E-6
43. Leak in LPG tanker- Flash Fire/ VCE 179.3 214.2 660.8 3.05E-6
44. Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak) – Pool fire - 105.9 105.9 3.05E-6
45. Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak) – Flash Fire/ VCE
153.9 158.0 209.5 1.5E-6
46. Leak from Crude Column (601-K-2) - 29.7 40.9 4.5E-6
47. Failure of Nozzle /Flange Joint in Crude Column (601-K-
2) & crude starts coming out
48. 10mm leak from inlet flange of Stabilizer Column (601-K-
4) – Pool Fire
49. Leak (10mm) from Furnace (F-101/F-102) tube inside the furnace /Nozzle of crude heater & crude starts coming out
- 19.0 28.8 1.5E-6
- 11.7 24.7 4.5E-7 47.8 50.1 79.3 2.7E-06
50. Desalter overflows line Leak (10mm) - 20.3 28.9 4.5E-7
51. Nozzle / Flange joint leak (10mm) from the inlet pretopping column
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IOCL, Barauni Refinery
- - 7.3 1.5E-6
3-164
Sc# Description Damage Distance, m
99 % fatality 50% fatality 1% fatality
Probability,
per year
52. Leak from Vacuum Column (K-5) 14.0 19.3 31.1 4.5E-7
53. Failure of Stripper Column K-6(1) Nozzle & hydrocarbon starts coming out (AVU -1/2)
54. Rupture of Furnace (F-101/F-102) tube inside the furnace
/Nozzle of crude heater & crude starts coming out
- - 10.4 3.0E-7
35.4 37.0 57.1 2.7E-06
55. Leak from LPG-Amine Absorber (08-C-101) 5.4 43.7 85.6 1.5E-6
56. Failure of LPG Surge Vessel (08-V-104) 22.5 23.2 32.5 7.5E-7
57. Failure of Naphtha Splitter (01-CC-00-001) Nozzle &
naphtha starts coming out
- 51.7 61.7 1.5E-7
58. Leak (10mm) from Hydrotreater Reactor (02-RB-00-001) 25.3 28.3 32.5 1.5E-6
59. Leak (10mm) from inlet of reformer reactor (03-RB-00-
001)
7.9 12.2 25.7 4.5E-6
60. Leak (10mm) from Stabilizer column (02-CC-00-001) 58.3 60.8 91.8 7.5E-8
61. Leak (10mm) from reactor DHDT (702-R-01) 7.5 12.1 13.9 4.5E-6
62. H2S Leak from Stripper Gas Amine Absorber (DHDT) 25 75 125 5.0E-06
63. Leak (10mm) from main fractionator C-1 top 11.5 13.0 14.9 3.0E-7
64. Leak (10mm) from reactor (Coker –B) overhead line 16.7 18.9 21.8 3.0E-6
65. Leak (10mm) from reactor (Coker- B)bottom flange 19.7 23.3 25.7 3.0E-6
66. Leak (10mm) from Reactor (701-R-101) inlet – Jet Fire 18.0 20.4 23.5 3.0E-6
67. Leak (10mm) from Main Fractionator (701-C-201) top – Jet Fire
68. Leak (10mm) from Debutaniser column (08-C-003) top –
Jet Fire
- - 6.6 7.5E-8
19.5 21.9 25.1 7.5E-8
69. Leak (10mm) from Stripper (08-C-002) top – Jet Fire 23.2 26.3 30.4 1.5E-7
70. Leak (10mm) from inlet of Hydrogenation Reactor
(Prereformer) R-4 – Jet Fire
71. Leak (10mm) from outlet of Hydrogenation Reactor
(Reformer) R-5 – Jet Fire
72. Leak (10mm) from inlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Shift
Converter) R-6 – Jet Fire
- - 9.2 1.5E-6 - - 6.1 1.5E-6 - - 5.7 1.5E-6
73. Leak (10mm) from NHDT Reactor (R-01) – Jet Fire 25.1 28.2 32.2 1.5E-6
74. Leak (10mm) from ISOM Reactor (R-01) – Jet Fire 25.7 29.1 33.6 1.5E-6
75. Failure of PRIMEGPFD reactor (R-02)- Jet Fire
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4-1
4 RISK ANALYSIS AND REDUCTION
4.1 FINDINGS
4.1.1 Individual Risk
In the refinery, the summary of consequence analysis has been presented in the
summary table in section 3.4. Given below are the Individual risk levels as calculated
from the Quantitative risk assessment.
Fig 4.1 Individual Risk contribution from various release scenarios
Leak in C rude oil storage tank- Dy ke Pool Fire
IOC Barauni - IR per year C rude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire
Leak in C rude oil storage tank- Dy ke Pool Fire (C omparison case)
C rude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire(C omparison case)
Leak in C rude oil storage tank 501- Dy ke Pool Fire
C rude storage tank roof failure 501 – Tank Fire
Leak / Line Rupture in H orton S phere – Jet Fire
Leak / Line Rupture in H orton S phere – Flash Fire / V apour C loud Ex plosion
Failure of H orton Sphere – B LE VE
Leak / Line Rupture in M ounded bullet outlet line – Flash fire / Vapour C loud E x plosion
Leak in LPG M ounded bullets storage tanks outlet line – Jet Fire
Leak / Line Rupture in Fuel gas– Flash fire / Vapour C loud Ex plosion
Leak in Fuel gas storage tank outlet line – Jet Fire
Leak in M S / SRN Storage tank – Pool Fire
M S / S RN storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
M S / S RN storage tank roof fire – Flash fire / V apour C loud Ex plosion
Leak in Slope tank – Pool Fire
Slope tank roof fire – Tank Fire
Leak in SK O Storage tank – Pool Fire
SK O storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
Leak in Gas oil S torage tank – P ool Fire
Gas oil storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
Leak in C B FS / C LO S torage tank – P ool Fire
C B FS / C LO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
Leak in C FO / IFO / RFO S torage tank – P ool Fire
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2.27E-05 0.62% 2.26E-05 0.61% 2.17E-05 0.59%
4-2
Table 4.1 Individual Risk contribution from various release scenarios
Scenario
Individual Risk
Contribution % IR per year
Failure of Horton Sphere – BLEVE 2.24E-04 6.07% Leak in LPG tanker- Flash Fire/ VCE 3.52E-04 9.53% Leak in Crude oil storage tank- Dyke Pool Fire 4.48E-05 1.21% Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak) – Flash Fire/ VCE 2.64E-04 7.17% Loss of containment in LPG tanker- BLEVE 2.35E-04 6.37% Major Leak from SKO Wagon – Flash Fire/ VCE 2.11E-04 5.73% Crude storage tank roof failure 501 – Tank Fire 3.79E-05 1.03% Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere – Jet Fire 7.75E-05 2.10% Major Leak from MS Wagon – Flash Fire/ VCE 1.69E-04 4.58% Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere – Flash Fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion 1.56E-04 4.24% Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire 3.79E-05 1.03% Leak (10mm) from Stabilizer column (02-CC-00-001) 1.01E-04 2.75% Rupture of Furnace (F-101/F-102) tube inside the furnace /Nozzle of crude heater & crude starts coming out 9.98E-05 2.71% Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire(Comparison case) 3.79E-05 1.03% Leak (10mm) from Furnace (F-101/F-102) tube inside the furnace /Nozzle of crude heater & crude starts coming out (Data for tube/nozzle required) 8.36E-05 2.27% H2S Leak from Stripper Gas Amine Absorber (DHDT) 7.72E-05 2.09% Leak in Crude oil storage tank 501- Dyke Pool Fire 4.48E-05 1.21% Leak in Fuel gas storage tank outlet line – Jet Fire 7.08E-05 1.92% Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak) – Pool fire 6.78E-05 1.84% Leak / Line Rupture in Fuel gas– Flash fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion 6.68E-05 1.81% Failure of LPG Surge Vessel (08-V-104) 6.16E-05 1.67% Leak / Line Rupture in Mounded bullet outlet line – Flash fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion 5.59E-05 1.52% MS / SRN storage tank roof fire – Flash fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion 4.62E-05 1.25% Leak (10mm) from ISOM Reactor (R-01) – Jet Fire 4.56E-05 1.24% Leak in Crude oil storage tank- Dyke Pool Fire (Comparison case) 4.48E-05 1.21% Leak (10mm) from Hydrotreater Reactor (02-RB-00-001) 4.47E-05 1.21% Leak (10mm) from NHDT Reactor (R-01) – Jet Fire 4.44E-05 1.20% Leak (10mm) from Stripper (08-C-002) top – Jet Fire 4.12E-05 1.12% Leak from Vacuum column (K-5) 3.87E-05 1.05% Leak from LPG-Amine Absorber (08-C-101) 3.62E-05 0.98% Leak (10mm) from reactor (Coker- B)bottom flange 3.56E-05 0.96% Leak (10mm) from Debutaniser column (08-C-003) top – Jet Fire 3.45E-05 0.94% Failure of Naphtha Splitter (01-CC-00-001) Nozzle & naphtha starts coming out 3.37E-05 0.91% Leak (10mm) from Reactor (701-R-101) inlet – Jet Fire 3.20E-05 0.87% Major Leak from MS Wagon – Pool Fire 3.00E-05 0.81% Leak (10mm) from reactor (Coker –B) overhead line 2.96E-05 0.80% Gas oil storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 2.72E-05 0.74% Leak from H2 Bullet outlet piping – Flash Fire/ VCE 2.43E-05 0.66% Leak in Gas oil Storage tank – Pool Fire 2.35E-05 0.64% Loss of containment in CBFS tanker- Pool Fire Loss of containment in HVGO tanker- Pool Fire Major Leak from HVGO Wagon – Pool Fire
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4-3
Leak in HVGO Storage tank – Pool Fire 2.12E-05 0.57% Leak in Slope tank – Pool Fire 2.09E-05 0.57% Leak in SR Storage tank – Pool Fire 2.07E-05 0.56% Leak in SKO Storage tank – Pool Fire 2.06E-05 0.56% Leak in CFO / IFO / RFO Storage tank – Pool Fire 2.06E-05 0.56% Leak in LSHS Storage tank – Pool Fire 2.06E-05 0.56% Leak (10mm) from main fractionator C-1 top 2.04E-05 0.55% Leak from crude column (601-K-2) 1.97E-05 0.53% HVGO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.96E-05 0.53% CFO / IFO / RFO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.95E-05 0.53% LSHS storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.95E-05 0.53% SR storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.95E-05 0.53% SKO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.95E-05 0.53% MS / SRN storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.93E-05 0.52% Slope tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.80E-05 0.49% Leak (10mm) from inlet of reformer reactor (03-RB-00-001) 1.69E-05 0.46% Leak (10mm) from reactor DHDT (702-R-01) 1.57E-05 0.42% Desalter overflows line Leak (10mm) 1.35E-05 0.37% Failure of Nozzle /Flange Joint in crude column (601-K-2) & crude starts coming out 1.28E-05 0.35% Leak in MS / SRN Storage tank – Pool Fire 1.21E-05 0.33% Leak in CBFS / CLO Storage tank – Pool Fire 1.16E-05 0.31% Leak in Bitumen Storage tank – Pool Fire 1.16E-05 0.31% CBFS / CLO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.06E-05 0.29% Bitumen storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.05E-05 0.29% 10mm leak from inlet flange of Stabilizer Column (601-K-4) – Pool Fire 8.31E-06 0.23% Nozzle / Flange joint leak (10mm) from the inlet of pretopping column 4.69E-06 0.13% Leak in LPG Mounded bullets storage tanks outlet line – Jet Fire 1.17E-06 0.03% Failure of Stripper Column K-6(1) Nozzle & hydrocarbon starts coming out (AVU -1/2) 6.55E-07 0.02% Leak (10mm) from inlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Prereformer) R-4 – Jet Fire 5.80E-07 0.02% Failure of PRIMEGPFD reactor (R-02)- Jet Fire 4.60E-07 0.01% Leak (10mm) from Main Fractionator (701-C-201) top – Jet Fire 4.16E-07 0.01% Leak (10mm) from outlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Reformer) R-5 – Jet Fire 3.84E-07 0.01% Leak (10mm) from inlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Shift Converter) R-6 – Jet Fire 3.59E-07 0.01% Total 2.64E-04 100.00%
Based on the above, the major risk contributors to Individual risk are:
1. Leak in LPG tanker leading to vapour cloud explosion;
2. Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak) – Flash Fire/ VCE
3. Loss of containment in LPG tanker leading to BLEVE;
.
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IOCL, Barauni Refinery
3.79E-07 1.53% 3.71E-07 1.50% 3.55E-07 1.43%
4-4
4.1.2 Group Risk
Given below are the Group risk levels and contributions of various release scenarios
as calculated from the Quantitative risk assessment.
Fig 4.2 Group Risk contribution from various release scenarios
IOC Barauni - GR per year Leak in LPG tanker- Flash Fire/ VCE
Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak) – Flash Fire/ VCE
Loss of containment in LPG tanker- BLEVE
Failure of Horton Sphere – BLEVE
Major Leak from SKO Wagon – Flash Fire/ VCE
Major Leak from MS Wagon – Flash Fire/
Table 4.2 Group Risk contribution from various release scenarios
Scenario
Group Risk Contribution fatalities per % year
Failure of Horton Sphere – BLEVE 3.07E-06 12.38% Leak in LPG tanker- Flash Fire/ VCE 1.84E-06 7.44% Leak in Crude oil storage tank- Dyke Pool Fire 1.53E-06 6.18% Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak) – Flash Fire/ VCE 1.39E-06 5.59% Loss of containment in LPG tanker- BLEVE 1.23E-06 4.97% Major Leak from SKO Wagon – Flash Fire/ VCE 1.11E-06 4.47% Crude storage tank roof failure 501 – Tank Fire 1.09E-06 4.39% Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere – Jet Fire 9.69E-07 3.91% Major Leak from MS Wagon – Flash Fire/ VCE 8.86E-07 3.58% Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere – Flash Fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion 7.67E-07 3.10% Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire 6.67E-07 2.69% Leak (10mm) from Stabilizer column (02-CC-00-001) 5.32E-07 2.15% Rupture of Furnace (F-101/F-102) tube inside the furnace /Nozzle of crude heater & crude starts coming out 5.23E-07 2.11% Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire(Comparison case) 4.44E-07 1.79% Leak (10mm) from Furnace (F-101/F-102) tube inside the furnace /Nozzle of crude heater & crude starts coming out (Data for tube/nozzle required) 4.38E-07 1.77% H2S Leak from Stripper Gas Amine Absorber (DHDT) 4.04E-07 1.63% Leak in Crude oil storage tank 501- Dyke Pool Fire Leak in Fuel gas storage tank outlet line – Jet Fire Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak) – Pool fire
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IOCL, Barauni Refinery
ool Fire 4.35E-08 0.18% olumn 2.45E-08 0.10% e 6.14E-09 0.02%
4-5
Leak / Line Rupture in Fuel gas– Flash fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion 3.50E-07 1.41% Failure of LPG Surge Vessel (08-V-104) 3.23E-07 1.30% Leak / Line Rupture in Mounded bullet outlet line – Flash fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion 2.93E-07 1.18% MS / SRN storage tank roof fire – Flash fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion 2.42E-07 0.98% Leak (10mm) from ISOM Reactor (R-01) – Jet Fire 2.39E-07 0.96% Leak in Crude oil storage tank- Dyke Pool Fire (Comparison case) 2.35E-07 0.95% Leak (10mm) from Hydrotreater Reactor (02-RB-00-001) 2.34E-07 0.94% Leak (10mm) from NHDT Reactor (R-01) – Jet Fire 2.33E-07 0.94% Leak (10mm) from Stripper (08-C-002) top – Jet Fire 2.16E-07 0.87% Leak from Vacuum column (K-5) 2.03E-07 0.82% Leak from LPG-Amine Absorber (08-C-101) 1.90E-07 0.77% Leak (10mm) from reactor (Coker- B)bottom flange 1.86E-07 0.75% Leak (10mm) from Debutaniser column (08-C-003) top – Jet Fire 1.81E-07 0.73% Failure of Naphtha Splitter (01-CC-00-001) Nozzle & naphtha starts coming out 1.77E-07 0.71% Leak (10mm) from Reactor (701-R-101) inlet – Jet Fire 1.67E-07 0.68% Major Leak from MS Wagon – Pool Fire 1.57E-07 0.63% Leak (10mm) from reactor (Coker –B) overhead line 1.55E-07 0.63% Gas oil storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.42E-07 0.57% Leak from H2 Bullet outlet piping – Flash Fire/ VCE 1.27E-07 0.51% Leak in Gas oil Storage tank – Pool Fire 1.23E-07 0.50% Loss of containment in CBFS tanker- Pool Fire 1.19E-07 0.48% Loss of containment in HVGO tanker- Pool Fire 1.19E-07 0.48% Major Leak from HVGO Wagon – Pool Fire 1.13E-07 0.46% Leak in HVGO Storage tank – Pool Fire 1.11E-07 0.45% Leak in Slope tank – Pool Fire 1.10E-07 0.44% Leak in SR Storage tank – Pool Fire 1.08E-07 0.44% Leak in SKO Storage tank – Pool Fire 1.08E-07 0.43% Leak in CFO / IFO / RFO Storage tank – Pool Fire 1.08E-07 0.43% Leak in LSHS Storage tank – Pool Fire 1.08E-07 0.43% Leak (10mm) from main fractionator C-1 top 1.07E-07 0.43% Leak from crude column (601-K-2) 1.03E-07 0.42% HVGO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.03E-07 0.41% CFO / IFO / RFO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.02E-07 0.41% LSHS storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.02E-07 0.41% SR storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.02E-07 0.41% SKO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.02E-07 0.41% MS / SRN storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 1.01E-07 0.41% Slope tank roof fire – Tank Fire 9.41E-08 0.38% Leak (10mm) from inlet of reformer reactor (03-RB-00-001) 8.84E-08 0.36% Leak (10mm) from reactor DHDT (702-R-01) 8.20E-08 0.33% Desalter overflows line Leak (10mm) 7.09E-08 0.29% Failure of Nozzle /Flange Joint in crude column (601-K-2) & crude starts coming out 6.70E-08 0.27% Leak in MS / SRN Storage tank – Pool Fire 6.36E-08 0.26% Leak in CBFS / CLO Storage tank – Pool Fire 6.08E-08 0.25% Leak in Bitumen Storage tank – Pool Fire 6.08E-08 0.25% CBFS / CLO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 5.54E-08 0.22% Bitumen storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire 5.51E-08 0.22% 10mm leak from inlet flange of Stabilizer Column (601-K-4) – P Nozzle / Flange joint leak (10mm) from the inlet of pretopping c Leak in LPG Mounded bullets storage tanks outlet line – Jet Fir
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J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
4-6
Failure of Stripper Column K-6(1) Nozzle & hydrocarbon starts coming out (AVU -1/2) 3.43E-09 0.01% Leak (10mm) from inlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Prereformer) R-4 – Jet Fire 3.04E-09 0.01% Failure of PRIMEGPFD reactor (R-02)- Jet Fire 2.41E-09 0.01% Leak (10mm) from Main Fractionator (701-C-201) top – Jet Fire 2.18E-09 0.01% Leak (10mm) from outlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Reformer) R-5 – Jet Fire 2.01E-09 0.01% Leak (10mm) from inlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Shift Converter) R-6 – Jet Fire 1.88E-09 0.01% Total 2.48E-05 100.00%
Based on the above, the major risk contributors to Group risk are:
1. Loss of containment in LPG Horton sphere leading to BLEVE;
2. Leak in LPG tanker leading to Vapour cloud explosion;
3. Leak in crude oil tank.
GROUP RISK PRESENTATION:
The group risk or societal risk is presented in terms of F-N curve. FN curves are
frequency-fatality plots, showing the cumulative frequencies (F) of events involving N
or more fatalities. They are derived by sorting the frequency-fatality (FN) pairs from
each outcome of each accidental event, and summing them to form cumulative
frequency-fatality (FN) co-ordinates for the plot. The cumulative form is used to
ensure that monotonic (steadily declining) curves are obtained even when some
sizes of accident do not occur in the analysis.
FN curves are graphical measures of group risk that show the relationship between
frequency and size of the accident. Unlike the annual fatality rate, this allows a
judgment to be made on the relative importance of different sizes of event. Fig 4.3
shows typical UK HSE F-N curve.
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
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4-7
PR
OBA
BIL
ITY
Fig: 4.3 Typical criteria for acceptable risk F-N curve
Intolerable offsite risk
Intolerable onsite risk
Negligible
The Calculated F-N curve for IOCL, Barauni refinery is shown in fig 4.4.
Fig 4.4 F-N Curve for IOC, Barauni Refinery
F - N CURVE FOR IOC, Barauni Refinery
2.00E-03 1.50E-03 1.00E-03 5.00E-04
0.00E+00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
NO. OF FATALITIES (OFFSITE)
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
with air to form an explosive vapor
explosion (VCE) occurs if a cloud of
erate high overpressures.
4-8
CONCLUSION:
The study team identified 75 numbers of scenarios. Considering the risk contours
and FN curve for combination of all MCLS, DNV- PHAST software has been used for
the consequence calculations.
The societal risk curve is in the tolerable region of the HSE UK Societal risk
acceptance criteria (refer to fig 4.3). The contribution to societal risk due to offsite
populations is low.
In conclusion, the Individual risk curve is in the tolerable region of the UK HSE
individual risk acceptance criteria (refer to appendix – E). The main contributors to
offsite risk are petroleum products from the tank farm areas e.g. LPG tankers, Crude
oil, LPG storage.
Jet fire:
Jet fires can arise from gas, two-phase, or liquid releases. The worst-case jet fires
are likely to be from the storage area and refining units and mainly from the LPG
Storage facility (Horton Spheres), Fuel Gas, Coker and HTU units.
The following jet fire results obtained from the DNV PHAST software are presented
below:
8. Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere which results into jet fire flame radiation
intensity of 36.56 kW/m2 (42.9 meter).
9. Leak in Fuel gas storage tank outlet line results into jet fire flame radiation
intensity 36.56KW/m2 (39.3 meters).
10. Leak from Coker- B reactor overhead line scenario, which results into jet fire
flame radiation intensity of 36.56 kW/m2 (16.7 m).
11. Leak from main fractionator C-1 of coker unit scenario, which results into jet
fire flame radiation intensity of 36.56 kW/m2 (11.5 meter).
Vapor cloud explosion:
In general catastrophic gas explosions happen when considerable quantities of
flammable material are released and dispersed
cloud before ignition takes place. A vapor cloud
flammable gas burns sufficiently quickly to gen
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4-9
The following vapor cloud explosion results obtained from the DNV PHAST software
are presented below:
12. Leak in LPG tanker results into dispersion of flammable material in the
atmosphere; it may generate overpressure (0.2608 bar) to the distance of
179.3 meter and affecting the Loading area.
13. Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak) will lead in to dispersion of
flammable material in the atmosphere; it may generate overpressure (0.2608
bar) to the distance of 154.1 m
BLEVE:
BLEVE can be defined as a rapid failure of a container of flammable material under
pressure during fire engulfment. Failure is followed by a fireball or major fire which
produces a powerful radiant heat flux
The following BLEVE results obtained from the DNV PHAST software are presented
below:
14. Catastrophic failure of LPG Horton sphere and tanker is a worst case
scenario which results into dispersion of flammable material in the
atmosphere; it may generate fireball radiation intensity of 36.56 kW/m2 to the
distance of 83.7m and 98.3m.
Pool fire:
Pool fires can arise from any site that handles liquid hydrocarbons. The worst case is
likely to be in the tank farm. Mostly tank farm pool fire is contained within the tank
bund itself. Oil spills on ground from the pipelines handling hydrocarbons may results
into pool fire and may affect adjacent equipment resulting into domino effects
(BLEVE).
Toxic release:
Toxic releases are measured at 100 ppm hydrogen sulphide concentration. The
Hazard distances associated with a toxic release depend upon a number of factors,
such as time to detection and isolation of the release, and the prevailing wind
conditions.
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owever, such tanks may require
4-10
4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS:
The following recommendations are made to reduce risk from the dominant risk
contributors:
• BLEVE of LPG spheres also poses off-site risk. The new sphere is designed to the current best practices. Catastrophic failure frequency of the old sphere can
be reduced by incorporating some of the features as per the current design
philosophy. A checklist for storage and handling of pressurised liquefied gases
is annexed in Appendix - C. Feasibility of introducing the recommended
features not already present may be examined. Also, Barauni Refinery may
examine the reasonable practicality of alternate LPG Storage such as
Mounded Bullets in place of Horton spheres. For such storage, BLEVE is not a
credible scenario and can be ruled out.
4.2.1 Risk Reduction
The maximum damage distances are being caused due to LPG tankers. A number of
recommendations have been made for reduction of risk levels due to these release
scenarios and for proper handling of pressurized LPG tankers in refinery.
• An isolation in pump discharge lines, which should be automatically activated on low pressure detection in the pump discharge line need to be considered.
• LPG Gas detectors may be suitably placed at in the loading area.
• Proper inspection of small and bigger lines and tankers periodically.
• Ensure that combustible flammable material are not placed near the LPG tank.
• After loading static accumulating materials into large storage tanks, delay of upto 30 minutes have been suggested before hand gauging or sampling as
flammable atmosphere exist till that time period. These recommendations are
based on measurements taken in large tanks after loading which have shown
a slower decay of the field strength than would be expected by normal charge
relaxation. The slow decay probably resulted from further charge generation
due to slow settling of small charged particles of water, dirt or other materials.
• Metallic tanks not resting directly on the ground but connected to grounded piping system are usually have sufficient grounding to provide for safe
dissipation of lightening strokes. H
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
4-11
supplemental grounding to prevent foundation damage. This may be
considered.
• Small leaks could occur frequently in routine operations like pump seal failure, sample point valve or drain valve left open, flange leak etc. They should be
attended to immediately as they could escalate.
• All interlocks should be kept and maintained in working condition at all times.
• Emergency procedures should be well rehearsed and state of readiness to be achieved.
• Ventilation should be provided for pump houses and any enclosed area where hydrocarbon vapours may accumulate.
• All plant personnel should be trained in handling emergency situations and should be apprised of their role in handling emergency situation and to ensure
adequacy of the emergency procedures simulated exercise should be carried
out.
• By reducing the time required to stop the leak which in turn would reduce the quantity of spillage. The response time could be reduced by installing /
maintaining instruments, effective communication system, catch pit etc.
• All non-routine work such as gasket replacing welding etc. should be carried out under a permit system.
• Adequate number of caution boards highlighting the hazards of chemicals should be provided at critical locations. Adequate colour coding and labeling
of the pipelines should be provided for easy identification.
• Adequate number of portable fire extinguishers may be provided. These should be well maintained and easily accessible.
• In locations where flammable vapours may be present, precautions should be taken to prevent ignition by eliminating / containing source of ignition. Source
of ignition may include open flames, lightening, smoking, cutting and welding
operations, lighting / hot surfaces, frictional heat, sparks (static, electrical and
mechanical), spontaneous and radiant heat.
• The capacity of every above ground tank in the installation shall be conspicuously marked on the tank.
• Smoke thermal detectors will be placed in the false ceiling and false flooring of the Control Room.
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
5-1
5 RISK ASSESSMENT OF FIRE WATER TANK AND PUMP HOUSE
The fire water tanks and pump house are the critical items in the refinery. The
following scenario has been evaluated to see the impact on the fire water tanks and
pump house.
LRU
¾ Leak (10mm) from Stripper (08-C-002) top – Jet Fire (LRU)
COKER - B
¾ Leak (10mm) from main fractionator C-1
¾ 10mm leak from Coker – B reactor bottom line
AVU -1
¾ Leak (10mm) from Furnace (F-101/F-102) tube inside the furnace /Nozzle of
crude heater & crude starts coming out (Data for tube/nozzle required)
¾ Leak (10mm) from vacuum column
Pool Fire:
The leak (10mm) from vacuum column will result in to release of HC and that lead to
formation of hydrocarbon pool. The pool diameter is 13.2m (refer to sc#52). The
thermal radiations are reaching up to a distance of 14.0m. There will be no impact on
fire water tanks and pump house due to vacuum column pool fire.
Jet Fire:
The leak (10mm) from main fractionator of Coker unit lead to jet fire of 8.73m length
and generate thermal radiations of 36.56 Kw/m2 up to a distance of 11.5m (refer
Sc#63). Scenario # 64 leak from Coker unit reactor overhead line lead to jet fire of
12.58 m and thermal radiations 36.56 up to 16.7m. Jet fire due to leak from LPG
amine absorber reaches to 15.8 m and generates thermal radiation of 36.56 Kw/m2
up to 20.3m (refer to Sc# 55). None of the above scenario reaches to fire water tank
and pump house.
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
5-2
Flash Fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion: In case of flash fire /vapour cloud explosion
the overpressure generated due to leak from LPG surge vessel of 0.2bar is 22.5m
(refer to sc#56). Leak from furnace (F01/02) resulting in to VCE generating a
overpressure of 0.2 bar to a distance of 47.8m (refer to sc# 49). This is again not
impacting Fire water tanks and pump house.
After analysing all the above scenarios it has found that none of the above scenario
is impacting the fire water tanks and pump house. However it is suggested to have a
alternative pump house at a relatively safe location. The most suitable location as
identified by the assessment has found to be BTP area (ecological park) since there
is no off site effect due to any of the refinery facility.
It is proposed to use existing water reservoir (polishing lagoon) (capacity 56000m3)
as fire water reservoir and install a new fire water pump house there. This will provide
an additional layer of safety for BR in worst possible case of damage on the existing
fire water tanks & pump house.
IOCL, Barauni Refinery
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
6-1
6 REFERENCES
1. E&P Forum – Data base on leak frequencies for Oil and Gas equipment.
2. Standard operating procedures of all the units
3. CPR 18 E – Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment (Purple Book)
4. CPR 14 E – Methods for calculation of physical effects (Yellow Book)
5. CCPS - Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis (Second
edition)
6. Lees - Loss Prevention in the process Industry volume 2
7. Handbook of fire and explosion protection engineering principles for oil, gas,
chemical and related facilities
8. IS 15656: 2006
9. Guidelines for Process Equipment Reliability data by Center for Chemical
Process Safety
10. Layout Plan for BR- DRG.No.MTSC-AO-337.
temperature is extremely high and it causes an J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
aerosol can ignite immediately. The
ion point and a fireball occurs. Its
mportant thermal radiation.
B-2
DEFINITIONS
Acceptance Criteria:
Expresses the level of health, safety and/or environmental performance deemed
acceptable for a given period or phase of activities. They may be defined both in
quantitative and qualitative terms.
Accident:
An event or chain of events which cause, or could have caused injury, illness and/or
damage (loss) to assets, the environment or third parties
As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP):
To reduce a risk to a level which is as low as reasonably practicable involves
balancing reduction in risk against the time, trouble, difficulty and cost of achieving it.
This level represents the point, objectively assessed, at which the time, trouble,
difficulty and cost of further reduction measures become unreasonably
disproportionate to the additional risk reduction obtained.
Assessment:
The process of analyzing and evaluating hazards, it involves both causal and
consequence analysis and requires determination of likelihood and risk.
Atmospheric storage:
Storage tanks working at ambient temperature and pressure and containing a
substance in a liquid state.
Atmospheric transport equipment:
Transport equipment working at ambient temperature and pressure and containing a
substance in a liquid state.
BLEVE and possible fireball:
The BLEVE (acronym for Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion) happens when a
vessel, containing a liquid highly superheated above its normal atmospheric boiling
point, fails catastrophically. The BLEVE concerns pressure liquefied gas storage or
pressurised liquids. The first consequence of a BLEVE is a blast effect due on the
one hand to vapour expansion when the vessel fails, and on the other hand to the
explosive vaporisation of the vessel liquid content. This effect is generally followed by
missiles ejection.
If the substance is flammable, the air-substance
flame front rapidly moves away from the ignit
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
B-3
The way to take into account the BLEVE is explained in the catastrophic rupture
entry.
Catastrophic rupture:
A catastrophic rupture is the complete failure of the equipment leading to the
complete and instantaneous release of the substance. A BLEVE is also a
catastrophic rupture in particular operating conditions. Depending on the
circumstances, the catastrophic rupture can lead to overpressure generation and
missiles ejection.
Consequence Analysis:
The study of the possible extent of harmful effects of potential incidents, e.g.
calculation of the size of the flammable region of a vapour cloud following a spill.
Consequence:
Adverse effects or harm which causes the quality of human health or the
environment to be impaired.
Emergency Response Plan:
Plan detailing the response to specific incident scenarios and explaining emergency
arrangements.
Environment:
The surroundings and conditions in which a company operates or which it may affect,
including living systems (human and other) therein. Surroundings in which an
organization operates, including air, water, land, natural resources, flora, fauna,
humans, and their interrelation.
Escalation:
An increase in the consequences of a hazardous event.
Escalation Control:
Measures put in place to block or mitigate the effects of escalation factors. Types
include guards or shields (coatings, inhibitors, shutdowns), separation (time and
space), reduction in inventory, control of energy release (lower speeds, safety valves,
different fuel source) and non-physical or administrative (procedures, warnings,
training, drills).
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
bate incidents (gas, fire, and smoke
B-4
Event:
An occurrence or situation represented as a node in event and fault trees (e.g. gas
leak, status of gas detection system, status of ESD system
Explosion:
It corresponds to a change of physical state of the substance by action of a
energy/heat source or by action of a chemical source (incompatible reagent). This
change of state implies a combustion of a solid with overpressure generation (or an
explosion) due to a violent and spontaneous reaction. This critical event concerns
only mass solid storage. In case of substance stored in a closed vessel, an explosion
(or an explosive decomposition of solid) is considered as a internal cause of
overpressure leading to a loss of containment (for example catastrophic rupture or
breach on the shell). In this case, the loss of containment is the critical event
considered in the bow-tie.
Frequency:
The number of occurrences of an event per unit time
Hazard:
Any substance, physical effect, or condition with the potential to cause harm
including ill health and injury, damage to property, products or the environment;
production losses or increased liabilities.
Inherent Safety:
Design philosophy that utilizes the laws of physics and chemistry to prevent and
control incidents rather than alarms, interlocks, process trips and similar systems.
Likelihood Analysis:
The process of estimating the likelihood of an event.
Major Accident:
Major accident means an ‘Uncontrolled Occurrence’ in the operation of a site which
leads to severe or catastrophic consequences to people, assets, the environment
and/or company reputation. The consequences may be immediate or delayed and
may occur outside as well as inside the site. There will also be a high potential for
escalation.
Mitigation:
Measures taken to reduce the consequences of a potential hazardous event.
Mitigation measures include:
• 'active' systems intended to detect and a alarms, shutdowns, deluge);
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
mbient temperature and at a pressure
e, eventually with an inert gas). The
B-5
• 'passive' systems intended to guarantee the primary functions (fire and blast walls, protective coatings, drain systems); and
• 'Operational' systems intended for emergency management (contingency plans, training, drills).
Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS):
Information sheet provided by the supplier of chemical product which details HSE
risks.
Risk:
Risk is the product of the measure of the likelihood of occurrence of an undesired
event and the potential adverse consequences which this event may have upon:
¾ People – injury or harm to physical or psychological health;
¾ Assets (or Revenue) – damage to property (assets) or loss of production;
¾ Environment – water, air, soil, animals, plants and social;
¾ Reputation – employees and third parties.
Risk = Frequency x Consequences.
Severity:
The degree to which an agent hazardous to health can cause harm
Tolerability Criteria:
Expresses the level of risk deemed tolerable for a given period or phase of activities.
May be expressed qualitatively or represented quantitatively on the Risk Matrix by
shaded areas.
Fire: The fire is a process of combustion characterised by heat or smoke or flame or
any combination of these.
Jet fire: The handling of pressurised flammable liquid or gas can lead to a jet fire in
case of a leak on a pipe or on a vessel. The fluid ignition lead to form a jet flame
characterised by a high radiant energy (largely higher than pool fire radiation) and by a
noticeable kinetic energy.
Overpressure generation: A rapidly propagating pressure or shock-wave in
atmosphere with high pressure, high density and high velocity.
Pool fire: The combustion of material evaporating from a layer of liquid (a pool). The
occurrence of the layer of liquid results from the failure of an equipment item
containing a flammable liquid.
Pressure storage: Storage tanks working at a
above 1 bar (pressure exerted by the substanc
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
B-6
substance stored can be a liquefied gas under pressure (two phase equilibrium) or a
gas under pressure (one phase).
Pressure transport equipment:
Transport equipment working at ambient temperature and at a pressure above 1 bar
(pressure exerted by the substance, eventually with an inert gas). The substance
stored can be a liquefied gas under pressure (two phase equilibrium) or a gas under
pressure (one phase).
Storage unit:
Unit used for the storage of raw materials, intermediate goods, manufactured
products or waste products.
Tank fire:
The tank fire is generally the consequence of the ignition of the gaseous phase in a
vessel containing a flammable liquid.
Toxic cloud:
Mixing and spreading of toxic gases in air, which causes clouds to grow. The mixing
is the result of turbulent energy exchange, which is a function of wind and
atmospheric temperature profile.
Unloading unit:
Unit used for inlet and outlet of substances in the establishment, involving transport
equipment.
Vessel collapse:
A vessel collapse is the complete failure of the equipment leading to the complete
and instantaneous release of the substance. It is due to a decrease of the internal
pressure in the vessel leading to the collapse of the vessel under the effect of
atmospheric pressure. The vessel collapse does not lead to overpressure generation
nor missiles ejection.
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
C-2
STORAGE AND HANDLING OF PRESSURISED LIQUEFIED GASES
GENERAL SAFETY FEATURES
Some of the general safety features for the storage and handling of pressurised
liquefied gases have been discussed below :
1. Layout :-
* Adequate spacing should be provided for maintenance, operations
and fire fighting.
* There should be adequate access ways for movement of fire engines.
* Storage tank to be down wind of ignition sources
* Storage installation should be as far away as possible from the plant
boundary, public roads and populated area.
* CONFINEMENT/GRADING : Kerb wall shall be provided around sides
of the storage vessel with concrete flooring of the ground under vessel
and extending upto minimum distance of D/2 or 5M whichever is
higher and atleast 5 M(min.) from the edge of the Hortonspheres with
a slope of 1:100 (Min.). Grading of the ground underneath should be
levelled so as to direct spillage from the fourth side to a shallow sump
away from the storage vessel and kerb wall height shall be minimum
30 cm but shall not exceed 60 cm otherwise evaporation of spilled
LPG may get affected.
* SPILLS AND LEAKS : Spillage collection shallow sump shall be
located at a distance where the flames from sump fire will not impinge
on the vessel. This distance shall not be less than the diameter of the
nearest vessel or 15 M whichever is higher.
* PIPING : Only piping associated with the storage vessels shall be
located within the storage areas or between the storage area and the
manifold system.
* SURFACE DRAINAGE : In order to prevent the escape of spillage into
the main drainage system, surface water from the storage area and
from the manifold area shall be directed to the main drainage through
a water seal to avoid the spread of hydrocarbon.
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
C-3
2. Relief System :
* Relief system should be adequately designed (major fire underneath
the tank). No credit shall be taken for fire proofing on the vessel.
* A minimum of two relief valves to be provided on each tank, each
relief valve having the required design relieving capacity.
* There should be a fool proof mechanical interlocking arrangement to
ensure inadvertent closing of both the isolation valves, thus rendering
the tank unprotected. One relief valve must always be open.
* If the relief valves are not connected to the flare i.e. if they relieve to
atmosphere, steam connection should be provided.
3. Draining :
* Water drain chamber should be provided and installed away from
shadow of the tank.
* Double block valves should be provided on water draining line (quick
shut off type near the chamber and other a globe valve). The drain
valve should be antifreeze type.
* Safety instructions for water draining operations should be prominently
displayed near the drain chamber
* Draining should be carried out only during the day shift and under
constant supervision.
* Sampling points should be provided with duplicate valves.
* The area under the horton sphere should have concrete pavement
with proper slope away from the tank.
4. Instrumentation :
* Two independent level instruments (of which one should be the servo
type) should be installed for counter checking.
* High/low level alarms must be provided
* Remote operated valves on liquid outlet/inlet should be provided close
to the tank
* Excess flow valve must be provided close to the horton sphere in
liquid outlet line (tank bottom)
initiate the following :
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
h on any one of the vessels shall
C-4
* Non-return valve should be provided close to the tank in liquid/vapour
inlet lines against reverse flow in case of transfer line rupture.
* The tank bottom outlet pumps must be protected against:
1. Potential dead - heading through low flow/no flow trip
2. Cavitation or running dry through horton sphere low tank level
trip.
5. Fire Proofing :
* Horton sphere legs must be adequately fire proofed
* All connecting lines upto 15 M (min) distance from Horton sphere must
be fire proofed.
6. Safety/Security System
The features of safety/security systems for the different areas shall be as
follows:
Automatic Fire Protection System
Automatic fire protection system based on heat detection through thermal
fuses/quartz bulbs/EP detectors shall be employed. Sensors shall be installed
at all critical places described below:
* Storage Area : In storage area these detectors shall be provided
encircling each vessel, equispaced with a maximum spacing of 1
meter at an elevation of about 1.5 to 2.0 meter from bottom of vessel.
Also minimum 2 nos. detectors shall be provided at the top of the
vessel and atleast one near the liquid line ROV to take care of failure
of flanges. In case of an automatic thermal fuse based fire protection
system the instrument air supply pressure to thermal fuses shall be
maintained through a pressure control valve and a restriction orifice.
The thermal fuses shall be designed to blow at 79 deg C temperature
(max.).Instrument air will start leaking as a result of thermal fuse
blowing. The capacity of the restriction orifice is such that the
discharge of air through even one thermal fuse will depressurise the
downstream side of the restriction orifice to below set point of the
pressure switch.
The actuation of pressure switc
- Human errors
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
tributors
C-5
* an audio visual alarm at the local/main control panel and fire water
station indicating the vessel on fire.
* the Remote Operated Valve (ROV) on liquid inlet/outlet line to the
affected vessel will close.
* the ROVs on vapour balance line and liquid return line of the affected
vessel will close.
* the ROV on recirculation line of the affected vessel will close.
* transfer pump in the storage area will trip.
* the deluge valves on fire water supply lines to that vessel will open.
Additionally push buttons for initiating all the above actions shall be provided
on remote operating panel and also in field at safe location for enabling
manual actuation of a trip by operator. In the field, manual bypass valves of
fire water deluge valves shall also be provided. Arrangement to routinely test
the security system shall also be provided.
7. Transfer Pumps :
* Bottom pump must be the double mechanical seal type
* The pump should trip automatically on
- low horton sphere level
- low flow/no flow
8. Operations :
* if there is any activity which has Catastrophic potential it is the storage
and handling of liquefied gases . Even though the operations are
simple compared to the operations with process plants, such
installations must be manned by operators with the highest skill,
experience and technical background.
* They must be especially trained in the safety aspects of storage and
handling of liquefied gases.
* Each such operator should be subjected to an annual refresher
training course lasting 1 or 2 days which should include -
- What can go wrong ?
- What will the consequences be if it happens?
- Ranking of critical risk con
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
s per CCE guidelines.
C-6
- The importance of considering root causes of accidents, and
not only the immediate "visible" causes
- Common-cause errors which may cause redundant safety
systems to fail
- The economic and legal implications of major accidents etc.
- Case histories
9. Miscellaneous :-
1. Sphere bottom ROV's should be the first break flange. They should be
located outside the shadow of the sphere and shall be fire safe. The
orientation of ROV's in piping layout should be such that in the event
of leak of its flange on the storage side with the possibility of fire, the
sphere does not come in the jetflame.
2. Process line ROV's should be oriented is such a way that in case of a
gas leak and subsequent fire the sphere should not come in the line of
the jet fire.
3. All ROV's shall be operable from the control room, open/close
indications on the panel.
4. The flange joints of ROV’s shall either have spiral wound metallic
gaskets or ring joints. Plain asbestos sheet gaskets shall not be used.
5. All drains and sample point first isolation valve shall be pressure
balance plug valve type and the sample point tapping shall be taken
from the top of the piping & the drain from the bottom.
6. All connections to flare header should be from the top. Safety valve
should be located above the flare header for free draining. The
discharge of the safety valves should be hooked up to a single header
including pump vents.
7. Provide utility hose stations near pumps & spheres area.
8. All gas detector indications shall be available in the control room.
9. Suitable gas detectors shall be placed at identified critical locations
e.g. near ROV’s, pumps, sampling points, water drain (where
relevant). Audio visual alarms showing the location of gas leakage
shall be provided on the control panel.
10 A curb wall (300 mm minimum and 600 mm maximum) around the
horton sphere shall be provided a
ƒ Hydrogen embrittlement
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
D-2
LOSS OF CONTAINMENT - CAUSES IN THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
Source: Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis, CCPS, AIChE, (pp. 491-494)
Plant Inventory Discharged to Environment Due to Loss of Containment
(Note: This cannot presume to be an exhaustive list of causes.)
CONTAINMENT LOSS VIA AN “OPEN-END” ROUTE TO ATMOSPHERE
ƒ Due to genuine process relief or dumping requirements ƒ Due to maloperation of equipment in service, e.g. spurious relief valve operation
of rupture disk failure, etc.
ƒ Due to operator error, e.g. drain or vent valve left open, misrouting of materials,
tank overfilled, unit opened up under pressure, etc.
CONTAINMENT FAILURE UNDER DESIGN OPERATING CONDITIONS DUE TO
IMPERFECTIONS IN THE EQUIPMENT
ƒ Imperfections arising prior to commissioning and not detected before start-up
(due to poor inspection or testing procedures) ƒ Equipment inadequately designed for proposed duty, e.g. wrong materials
specified, pressure ratings of vessel or piping inadequate, temperature ratings
inadequate etc.
ƒ Defects arising during manufacture, e.g. wrong materials used, poor
workmanship, poor quality control etc. ƒ Defects arising during construction, e.g. welding defects, misalignment, wrong
gaskets fitted, etc.
ƒ Imperfections due to equipment deterioration in service and not detected before
the effect becomes significant (due to inadequate monitoring procedures in those
cases where deterioration is gradual)
ƒ Normal wear and tear on pump or agitator seals, valve packing, flange gaskets,
etc. ƒ Internal and/or external corrosion, including stress corrosion cracking ƒ Erosion or thinning ƒ Metal fatigue or vibration effects ƒ Previous periods of gross maloperation, e.g. furnace operation at above the
design tube skin temperature (“creep”)
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
D-3
ƒ Imperfections arising from routine maintenance or minor modifications not carried
out correctly e.g. poor workmanship, wrong materials etc.
CONTAINMENT FAILURE UNDER DESIGN OPERATING CONDITIONS DUE
TO EXTERNAL AGENCIES
ƒ Impact damage, such as by cranes, road vehicles, excavators, machinery
associated with the process, etc. ƒ Damage by confined explosions due to accumulation and ignition of flammable
mixtures arising from small process leaks, e.g. flammable gas build-up in
analyser houses, in enclosed drains, around submerged tanks. etc.
ƒ Settlement of structural supports due to geological or climatic factors or failure of
structural supports due to corrosion, etc. ƒ Damage to tank trunks, rail cars, containers, etc., during transport of materials on
or off-site.
ƒ Fire exposure ƒ Blast effects from a nearby explosion (unconfined vapour cloud explosion,
bursting vessel, etc.), such as blast overpressure, projectiles, structural damage,
etc.
ƒ Natural events (acts of God) such as windstorms, earthquakes, floods, lightning,
etc.
CONTAINMENT FAILURE DUE TO DEVIATIONS IN PLANT CONDITIONS
BEYOND THE DESIGN LIMITS
ƒ Overpressurising of equipment ƒ Due to a connected pressure source
Gas pressure source: gas breakthrough into downstream low-pressure
equipment due to failure of a pressure or level controller, isolation valve opened
by error, etc. pressurised backflow into low-pressure equipment, e.g. due to
compressor failure.
Liquid pressure source: pumping up of blocked-in gas spaces hydraulic
overpressurisation due to block-in condition down-stream excessive surge or
hammer, such as by sudden valve closure on liquid transfer line
ƒ Due to rising process temperature
s pumping out of tanks or vessels
uipment under gravity
D-4
Loss of cooling: loss of coolant flow, e.g. to a reactor cooler, to a distillation
column, to a condenser, etc. elevated coolant temperature, e.g. loss of cooling
water fans, etc. fouling of coolers, condensers, or exchangers excessive heat
input (thermal) heater control faults, such as steam or hot oil heated systems
ingress of hot extraneous materials, e.g. slopover excessive heat generation
(chemical) reactor runway, e.g. due to loss of reaction diluent, high feed rate,
high molar ratio, accumulation of unreacted reactants due to inadequate mixing
or temporary loss of reaction subsequently leading to a runaway, etc. exothermic
reaction due to ingress of catalytic impurities, e.g. backflow from ethylene oxide
consumer unit into feed tank.
exothermic due to mixing of incompatible chemicals, e.g. H2SO4 with NaOH
exothermic decomposition of thermally unstable or explosive material such as
peroxides, e.g. due to temperature rise, over concentration, or deposition on hot
surfaces.
ƒ Due to an internal explosion arising from formation and ignition of flammable gas
mixtures, mists or dust ingress of air, e.g. due to inadequate purging of
equipment at plant start-up, due to loss of nitrogen purge on flare headers,
storage tanks, centrifuge systems, dryers, etc. loss of critical inert diluent, e.g.
loss of nitrogen padding on an ethylene oxide storage tank, loss of nitrogen to the
make-up section of nitrogen/air solids conveying system failure of explosion
suppressants flammable excursion in oxidation processes, e.g. due to high air or
oxygen rates, or loss of conversion
ƒ Due to physically or mechanically induced forces or stresses expansion upon
change of state, e.g. freezing of water in pipe runs thermal expansion of blocked-
in-liquids, e.g. in heat exchangers or long pipe runs ingress of extraneous
phases, e.g. gas compressor failure due to liquid carry-through to machine
suction, condensate hammer in steam line, etc.
ƒ Underpressurising of equipment (for equipment not capable of withstanding
vacuum) ƒ By direct connection to an ejector set or to equipment normally running under
vacuum due to equipment malfunction, e.g. loss of liquid seal due to failure of a level controller causing vacuum to be applied upstream, etc. due to operator
error, e.g. isolation valve left open, etc. ƒ Due to the movement of transfer or liquid
J 0126 RA IOC Barauni Rev1
D-5
E-1
ƒ Due to cooling of gases or vapours
cooling of non condensable vapours, e.g. vessel blocked-in after steaming
cooling of non-condensable gases or vapours. e.g. storage tank by heavy rainfall
in summer.
ƒ Due to solubility effects, e.g. dissolution of gases in liquids ƒ High metal temperature (causing loss of strength) ƒ Overcooling by refrigeration units, e.g. due to control faults, wrong refrigerant,
etc.
ƒ Incomplete vaporisation and/or inadequate heating of Refrigerated material
before transfer into equipment of inadequate temperature rating, e.g. due to
control faults on a liquid of low boiling point.
ƒ Loss of system pressure on units handling liquids of low boiling point ƒ Wrong process materials or abnormal impurities (causing accelerated corrosion
chemical attack on seals or gaskets, stress corrosion cracking, embrittlement, etc.)
ƒ Variations in stream compositions outside design limits ƒ Abnormal impurities introduced with raw materials or wrong raw materials ƒ By-products or abnormal chemical reactions ƒ Oxygen, chlorides, or other impurities remaining in equipment at start-up due to
inadequate evacuation or decontamination.
ƒ Impurities entering process from atmosphere, service connections, tube leaks
etc., during operation.
INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD.
BARAUNI REFINERY
BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01
EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
1 | P a g e
EEMMEERRGGEENNCCYY RREESSPPOONNSSEE
AANNDD
DDIISSAASSTTEERR MMAANNAAGGEEMMEENNTT PPLLAANN
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (Refineries Division)
Barauni Refinery
BARAUNI REFINERY -In harmony with nature
INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD.
BARAUNI REFINERY
BR /HSE/ER_DMP/01
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Contents
(Reference: Section 5 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
Chapter No Topic Page No.
Chapter -C
Foreword 9
Executive Summary
(Reference: Section 4 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
10-13
Definitions & List of Abbreviations
(Reference: Section 2 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
14-19
Industrial Description 20-24
Chapter -1
Classification of Emergencies
(Reference: Section 6 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010) 1-1 to 1-9
Implementation Schedule
(Reference: Section 7 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010) 1-10
Chapter –2
Consequences of Defaults Or Non-Compliance
(Reference: Section 8 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010) 2-1 to 2-2
Chapter –3 Requirements under Other Statutes
(Reference: Section 9 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010) 3-1 to 3-4
Chapter –4
Pre-Emergency Planning
(Reference: Section 10 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
4-1 to 4-27
Hazard Identification 4-2
Flora & Fauna 4-2 to 4-6
Barauni Refinery and its Neighboring Details 4-7 to 4-9
Meteorological Conditions 4-10 to 4-13
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Chapter No Topic Page No.
Socio- Economic Aspects of the Villages & Population Data
4-14
Checklist-1: Hazard Identification 4-15 to 4-17
Risk analysis & Risk assessment 4-18 to 4-27
Causes of Disaster 4-27
Chapter –5
Emergency Mitigation Measures
(Reference: Section 11 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
5-1 to 5-16
Basic requirements of ERDMP (Schedule-III) 5-2
Resource Mobilization (Schedule-IV) 5-3 to 5-5
Incident Preventing Measures & Procedures 5-6 to 5-14
Check List – 2: Incident Prevention Measures 5-15 to 5-16
Chapter–6
Emergency Preparedness Measures
(Reference: Section 12 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
6-1 to 6-10
Emergency Drills & Mock Exercises 6-2 to 6-5
Check List-3: Mutual Aid / Mock Drills 6-6 to 6-7
Training 6-7 to 6-8
Mutual Aid 6-8
Photographs on Various Safety Training Programmes Conducted at BR
6-9 to 6-10
Chapter -7
Response Procedure & Measures
(Reference: Section 13 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
7-1 to 7-31
Zoning and MAPS 7-2
Layout / Flow Diagram / Manpower 7-3
Disaster Scenarios 7-4 to 7-29
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Chapter No Topic Page No.
Check-List-4: ERDMP Response Measures / Infrastructure
7-30 to 7-31
Chapter -8
Emergency Organization and Responsibilities
(Reference: Section 14 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
8-1 to 8-31
Organogram Chart 8.2 to 8-10
Organogram for Communication of Disaster 8-11
Roles & Responsibilities 8-12 to 8-27
Siren Codes 8-28
Check List-5: Review and Updation of ERDMP 8-29
Communication Flow Charts 8-30 to 8-31
Chapter –9
Infrastructure
(Reference: Section 15 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
9-1 to 9-3
Emergency control centers 9-2
Assembly Points 9-2 to 9-3
Chapter –10 Declaration of On-site & Off-site Emergencies
(Reference: Section 16 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
10-1 to 10-3
Chapter –11
Resource for Controlling Emergency
(Reference: Section 17 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
11-1 to 11-9
Fire Fighting Systems 11-2 to 11-4
Fire Fighting Appliances/ Equipment/ Chemicals / PPEs Available With BR
Communication Facilities 11-6
Evacuation & Sheltering Facilities 11-6
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Chapter No Topic Page No.
In Built Facilities And Other Emergency Safety Interlock Facilities
11-6 to 11-7
Sources of Local Assistance 11-7
Check List-6: Availability of resources (internal / external)
11-8 to 11-9
Chapter –12
Demographic Information
(Reference: Section 18 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
12-1 to 12-6
Barauni Refinery: Location & Configuration 12-2 to 12-3
Meteorological Conditions 12-4 to 12-5
Neighboring Population, Flora & Fauna 12-6
Chapter –13 Medical Facilities
(Reference: Section 19 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
13-1 to 13-4
Chapter –14 Evacuation
(Reference: Section 20 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
14-1 to 14-11
Chapter –15 Information to Public
(Reference: Section 21 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
15-1 to 15-3
Chapter –16 Roles & Responsibilities of External Agency
(Reference: Section 22 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
16-1 to 16-3
Chapter –17 Reporting of the Incident
(Reference: Section 23 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
17-1 to 17-6
Chapter –18 Action after Reporting of Incident
(Reference: Section 24 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
18-1 to 18-2
Chapter –19 Termination of Emergency
(Reference: Section 25 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
19-1 to 19-2
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Chapter No Topic Page No.
Chapter –20
Emergency Recovery Procedure
(Reference: Section 26 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
20-1 to 20-6
Check List-5: ERDMP - Recovery Measures 20-3 to 20-6
Chapter –21 ERDMP for Pipelines Carrying Petroleum Products
(Reference: Section 27 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
21-1 to 21-3
Chapter –22 ERDMP for Tank Trucks Carrying Petroleum Products
(Reference: Section 28 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
22-1 to 22-7
Chapter –23 Integration of the ERDMP with National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA)
(Reference: Section 29 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
23-1 to 23-4
Chapter –24
Security Threat Plan
(Reference: Section 30 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
24-1 to 24-36
Preventive Measures 24-3 to 24-4
Bomb Threat Assessment Committee & Responsibilities
24-5 to 24-7
Search Team 24-7 to 24-11
Evacuation of Area 24-11 to 24-13
Evaluation of the Bomb Threat 24-14 to 24-18
Procedure after Identification of Suspected Object 24-19 to 24-20
All Clear / Completion Certificate 24-20
Type of Homemade Bombs 24-21 to 24-23
Procedure for Dealing with a Bomb 24-24 to 24-25
Annexure
24-26 to 24-36
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Petroleum industry plays a crucial role in meeting the daily needs of the common
man, but also contributes significantly towards industrial and economic growth of the
nation. While working towards disaster/accident free systems, we need to understand
the characteristics of the particular process or system, so that appropriate safety
principles can be adopted. Analysis of accidents in past and corrective actions taken
could become an input for hazard mitigation plan.
OBJECTIVE
Keeping the development in view, an attempt has been made in this Emergency
Response Disaster Management Plan (ERDMP) Manual as per Emergency
Response Disaster management Plan (ERDMP) Regulation - 2010 as per PNGRB
(Petroleum & Natural Gas Regulatory Board), to explore and select factors that could
provide the means to the Barauni Refinery for enhancing the mitigation practices in
hazardous scenarios in various sects of refining activities.
SCOPE (Reference: Section 4 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
The scope covers –
(i) the identification of emergencies;
(ii) the mitigation measures that attempt to reduce and eliminate the risk or
disaster;
(iii) the preparedness that to develop plans for actions when disaster or
emergencies occur;
(iv) the responses that mobilize the necessary emergency services including
responders like fire service, police service, medical service including
ambulance, government as well as non-governmental agencies;
(v) the post disaster recovery with aim to restore the affected area to its original
conditions;
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INTENT
(Reference: Section 4.2 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
ERDMP is made concise and informative so that members of the emergency
control organization should be able to quickly refer to the action plan to determine
important functions to be carried out;
to manage an emergency and not to use ERDMP just as reference material
for training and shall be made applicable
to prevent casualties - both on-site and off-site;
to reduce damage to property, machinery, public and environment;
to develop a state of readiness for a prompt and orderly response to an
emergency and to establish a high order of preparedness (equipment,
personnel) commensurate with the risk
to provide an incident management organogram with clear missions and
lines of authority (incident command system, field supervision, unified
command);
to ensure an orderly and timely decision-making and response process
(notification, standard operating procedures)
to maintain good public relations;
In the ERDMP prepared, following are readily available for reference
concerning handling of disaster or emergency scenarios
Material Safety Datasheets of hazardous chemicals used in BR
Flora and fauna
Plantation details carried out by BR in the surrounding for the preservation
of natural resources and environment, list of plant species for development
of green belt ,ECO PARK.
Demographic details
Location of BR, population data in close vicinity of the installation & within the 5 Km
range, meteorological conditions like temperature, pressure, relative humidity, wind
speed & direction are available.
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Hazard identification & risk assessments
Identification of various risk scenarios with consequences (with contours), threats
of terrorism like bomb threat and handling procedure of such emergencies. The
mitigation measures for the identified hazard and risk scenarios like resource
mobilization (e.g. manpower available, fire fighting appliances, resources for
communication, transport, emergency drugs available etc).
Preventive and risk mitigation measures.
Safety management system for preventive measures including Safety Policy,
various committees, safety audits, work permit system & work procedure
In-built facilities like interlocks, availability of gas detectors.
Fire protection systems comprising of fire water storage, pumps, fire water network
with hydrant system details, foam system, cooling system, protection of storage
tanks, loading gantry & process units including power generation unit.
Emergency preparedness measures
Mock drills of various scenarios, schedules of testing/calibration of detectors and
automatic actuated fire fighting systems, testing of various communication modes,
training details.
Response procedure
Response procedure available for various types of risk scenarios like HC leaks,
catastrophic failure, poisonous gas leaks, fire and explosion, flood, large oil spill,
earthquake and flood scenario etc.
Graphical representation of Emergency Control center (ECC) & assembly points
inside the refinery, process layouts, fire water network and individual process flow
diagrams (PFDs) are available.
Emergency Organization
To follow the response procedure for effective mitigation of disasters well defined
Emergency Organogram with roles and responsibilities is available.
Infrastructure for emergency response
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Details of Amenities in Emergency Control Center and Assembly
Points
Resources for Control of emergency
Details of mobile and static fire fighting appliances, fire extinguishers, ambulance
facility, first aid center, PPEs available, communication facilities like fire bell, siren,
phones, walkie talkies, PA systems etc.
Contact details of external agencies for fire fighting, police administration, civil
administration, medical hospitals and doctors etc.
Evacuation procedures
Evacuation procedures for inside and outside the installation, instruction for
general public, transport facility for evacuation etc are available
Procedure for recovery
Procedure for salvage of product, record of affected manpower, information to
outside bodies, investigation, damage assessment etc are detailed.
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DEFINITIONS
(Reference: Section 2 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
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List of Abbreviations A&W : Administration & Welfare BLEVE : Boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion CCE : Chief Controller of Explosives CDU : Crude Distillation Unit CIC : Chief Incident Controller CM : Chief Manager CPCB : Central Pollution Control Board DGM : Deputy General Manager DHDT : Diesel Hydro treating Unit DMP : Disaster Management Plan ED : Executive Director EIA : Environment Impact Assessment ERV : Emergency Response Vehicle FCCU : Fluidized Catalytic Cracking Unit GM : General Manager HGU : Hydrogen Generation Unit HR : Human Resources HSD : High Speed Diesel HSE : Health, Safety & Environment IDLH : Immediate Danger to Life & Health LEL : Lower Explosive Limit LPG : Liquefied Petroleum Gas MN : Maintenance MS : Motor Spirit MSDS : Material Safety Data Sheet MSQU : Motor Spirit Quality Upgradation Unit NDMA : National Disaster Management Plan NDRF : National Disaster Response Force NG : Natural gas NHDT : Naphtha Hydro-Treater Unit OISD : Oil Industries Safety Directorate P&U : Power and Utility QRA : Quantitative Risk Analysis RC : Refinery Co-ordination SDRF : State Disaster Response Force SIC : Site Incident Controller SKO : Superior Kerosene Oil SRU : Sulfur Recovery Unit STEL : Short term exposure limit SWS : Sour Water Stripper Unit TLV : Threshold Limiting value TREM card: Transport Emergency card
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TS : Technical Services UEL : Upper Explosive limit BSPCB : Bihar State Pollution Control Board UVCE : Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion VDU : Vacuum Distillation Unit
Abbreviations for NDMA:
DDMA : District Disaster Management Authority DM : Disaster Management NCC : National Cadet Corps NCDM : National Committee on Disaster Management NDMA : National Disaster Management Authority NDMRCs : National Disaster Mitigation Resource Centers NDRF : National Disaster Response Force NEC : National Executive Committee NGOs : Non-Governmental Organizations NSS : National Service Schème NYK : Nehru Yuva Kendra SDMA : State Disaster Management Authority SEC : State Executive Committee
(1) Definitions as per ERDMP regulation 3 2010-clause, unless the context otherwise requires,-
a) “Act” means the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2006;
b) ‘‘Board” means the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board established under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Act;
c) “boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE)” means the violent rupture of a pressure vessel containing saturated liquid or vapor at a temperature well above its atmospheric boiling point and the resulting flash evaporation of a large fraction of the superheated liquid which produces a large vapor cloud which burns in the form of a large rising fireball due to ignition;
d) “Chief incident controller” means the person who assumes absolute control of the unit and determines action necessary to control the emergency;
e) “codes of practice” means the codes of practice for emergency response and disaster management plan notified by the Board;
f) “disaster” means an occurrence of such magnitude as to create a situation in which the normal patterns of life within an industrial complex are suddenly disrupted and in certain cases affecting the neighborhood seriously with the result that the people are plunged into helplessness and suffering and may need
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food, shelter, clothing, medical attention protection and other life sustaining requirements;
g) “disaster management plan“ means a well coordinated, comprehensive response plan to contain loss of life, property, environment and provide speedy and effective recovery by making the most effective use of available resources in case of a disaster and is known as On-site Emergency & Off-site Emergency Management Plan.
h) “emergency” means a situation or scenario which has the potential to cause serious danger to persons, environment or damage to property and which tends to cause disruption inside or outside the premises and may require the help of outside resources;
i) “emergency response vehicle (ERV)” means a vehicle for handling emergencies having necessary equipment meant for rescue and relief operations and ERV can be put to use within installation, outside of installation including road incident;
j) “hazard” means an event related to the property of substance or chemicals with a potential for human injury, damage to property, damage to the environment, or some combination thereof;
k) “incident” means an unplanned or unintended or intended event having potential to cause damage to life, property and environment;
l) “incident record register” means a register containing complete information pertaining to all incidents covering near miss, and all other incidents leading to Level-I, Level-II and Level-III emergencies;
m) “installation” means facilities, namely, gaseous product pipeline, liquid Product pipeline, hydrocarbons processing installation, oil and natural gas terminals and commercial storage and transportation, hydrocarbons gas bottling Installations including CNG, city gas distribution facilities and retail outlets;
n) “leak” means release or discharge of a dangerous chemicals or substances or material into the environment;
o) “Level-I emergency” means an emergency as defined under sub-ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 6 (a); (Refer Chapter – 1)
p) “Level-II emergency” means an emergency as defined under sub-ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 6 (b); (Refer Chapter – 1)
q) “Level-III emergency” means an emergency as defined under sub-ERDMP regulation 2010-clause 6 (c); (Refer Chapter – 1)
r) “Mutual aid association” means an industrial mutual aid association in which participating industries as a community shall assist each other in case of emergency. Mutual aid associations supplement a site’s emergency control plan. Services of member industries shall be requested
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only when the emergency threatens to exceed the capability of otherwise available resources;
s) "occupier” of an installation means the person who has ultimate control over the affairs of the installation;
t) “Off site emergency” means an emergency that takes place in an installation and the effects of emergency extends beyond the premises or the emergency created due to an incident, catastrophic incidents, natural calamities, etc. It no longer remains the concern of the installation management alone but also becomes a concern for the general public living outside and to deal with such eventualities shall be the responsibilities of district administration;
u) “Off site emergency plan” means a response plan to control and mitigate the effects of catastrophic incidents in above ground installation (AGI) or underground installations (UGI) or road transportation. This plan shall be prepared by the district administration based on the data provided by the installation(s), to make the most effective use of combined resources, i.e. internal as well as external to minimize loss of life, property, environment and to restore facilities at the earliest;
v) “On site emergency” means an emergency that takes place in an installation and the effects are confined to the Installation premise’s involving only the people working inside the plants and to deal with such eventualities is the responsibility of the occupier and is mandatory. It may also require help of outside resources;
w) “on site emergency plan” means a response plan to contain and minimize the effects due to emergencies within the installations which have a potential to cause damage to people and facilities within the installation premises; It is also known as Emergency Response & Disaster Management Plan (ERDMP).
x) “risk” means the chance of a specific undesired event occurring within a specified period or in specified circumstances and it may be either a frequency or a probability of a specific undesired event taking place;
y) “risk analysis” means the identification of undesired events that lead to the materialization of a hazard, the analysis of the mechanisms by which these undesired events could occur and, usually, the estimation of the extent, magnitude, and likelihood of any harmful effects;
z) “risk assessment” means the quantitative evaluation of the likelihood of undesired events and the likelihood of harm or damage being caused by them, together with the value judgments made concerning the significance of the results;
aa) “Risk management” means the programme that embraces all administrative and operational programmes that are designed to reduce the
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risk of emergencies involving acutely hazardous materials. Such programmes include, but are not limited to, ensuring the design safety of new and existing equipment, standard operating procedures, preventive maintenance, operator training, incident investigation procedures, risk assessment for unit operations, emergency planning, and internal and external procedures to ensure that these programmes are being executed as planned;
bb) “Site incident controller” means the person who goes to the scene of the emergency and supervises the actions necessary to overcome the emergency at the site of the incident;
cc) ‘Spill” means an unintended release or discharge of hydrocarbon or any other dangerous liquid into the environment;
dd) “Transport emergency (TREM) card” means a card containing details about the nature of hazards, protective devices, telephone numbers and actions related to spillage, fire, first aid and other details of national and international (UN) numbers or signage which is common in India and abroad;
ee) “Unconfined vapor cloud explosion (UVCE)” means the formation of vapor cloud due to release of significant quantity of liquefied hydrocarbons into the atmosphere and its explosion due to ignition which may cause high over pressure and low pressure that cause very heavy damage.
(2) Words and expressions used and not defined in these ERDMP regulation 2010-clause s, but defined in the Act or rules or ERDMP regulation 2010-clause s made thereunder, shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in this Act or in the rules or ERDMP regulation 2010-clause, as the case may be.
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PROCESS DESCRIPTION OF FACILITIES
INTRODUCTION
Barauni Refinery is the second Public Sector Refinery of Indian Oil
Corporation built in collaboration with erstwhile USSR and limited
participation of Romania. It is located near the northern bank of river
Ganga at Begusarai district town of Bihar. The refinery strategically located
on the cross roads of two very important national highways, NH30 &
NH31 and two important railways, i.e. Eastern Railway and North Eastern
Railway.
The refinery was commissioned in the year 1964. It was formally dedicated
to the nation by Prof. Humayun Kabir, the then Union Minister for Petroleum
& Chemicals, Govt. of India on 15th January 1965. It was originally
designed for processing 3.0 MMTPA of Assam Crude. Processing
capacity of the refinery was raised to 3.3MMTPA in 1985 on debottle
necking. The processing capacity was raised to 4.2MMTPA with the help of
modifications for improving the energy efficiency as well as yield of products
in 1991. Enhancement of the capacity to 6.0 MMTPA was done by
debottlenecking / revamping of the existing primary distillation units and
simultaneously providing the matching secondary processing units/facility.
Barauni Refinery (BR) has earned ISO-9001 as well as prestigious ISO-
14001 & OSHAS-18001 certification, which is a manifestation of its
commitment towards promoting environmental & occupational health &
safety considerations with simultaneous emphasis on qualitative
improvement in its product pattern.
The Refinery processes Imported low sulphur & High sulphur crude oil
The refined products fulfil the requirement of the eastern region by road, rail
and also a product pipeline going upto Kanpur, UP via Patna, Mughalsarai,
& Allahabad. A branch pipe line from Gowria (Near Kanpur) also supplies
product to Lucknow. The imported crude oil from Nigeria, Malaysia and
Middle East Countries is supplied to Barauni Refinery through a Paradip
,Haldia — Barauni crude oil pipeline.
• LPG
• Naphtha
• Motor Spirit
• Superior Kerosene Oil
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• High Speed Diesel
• Light Diesel Oil
• Low Sulphur Heavy Stock
• Raw Petroleum Coke
• Sulphur
1.1 FACILITY Crude received from Haldia / Paradip port through PHBCPL is stored in storage tanks in O&MS. These tanks are used for feeding the crude units. AVU’s Distillates from crude units go as straight run products (e.g. LPG, SKO, Bitumen) or as blending components (e.g. MS, HSD) or as feedstock to various downstream quality- upgrading units like CRU, DHDT which in turn gives the upgraded rundown streams for blending to various high-value products (e.g. MS, HSD). And the heavy ends from AVU’s stored in intermediate storage tanks are used as feedstock to secondary units like Coker and RFCCU. These secondary units are used to upgrade the heavy ends to various high value products. Distillates from these units are either used as straight run products (e.g. LPG, RPC) or as blending components (e.g. MS, HSD, LDO, CBFS etc.). Blending of these materials is done in OM&S as to meet the IS specifications or the specifications provided by the customer(s). The final products are stored in various products storage tanks, and only after certification of these tanks as per specifications, they are sold to end customers through marketing terminals. The petroleum products from the refinery are dispatched through Tank Trucks, Tank Wagons (Rail) and Barauni-Kanpur pipeline (BKPL). The pipeline passes through Patna, Mughalsarai and Allahabad where the products are tapped off by Marketing Division for local distribution. While LPG, Motor spirit, superior Kerosene and Diesel are dispatched for public distribution through Marketing; other products are sold to the major valued customers of Barauni Refinery.
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The major process units of Barauni refinery are as follows
UNITS OF BARAUNI REFINERY (OTHER THAN BXP UNITS)
SN UNITS CAPACITY (MMTPA)
1 AVU-I 1.75
2 AVU-II 1.75
3 AVU-III 2.5
4 COKER-A 0.60
5 COKER-B 0.50
6 CRU 0.30
BARAUNI EXPANSION UNITS (BXP UNITS)
SN UNITS CAPACITY (TPA)
1 Fluid Catalytic Cracking 1.4MMTPA
2 LPG Treating Unit 1,70,000
3 Gasoline Treating Unit 2,45,000
4 Diesel Hydro Treating Unit 2.2 MMTPA
5 Hydrogen Generation Unit 34,000
6 Sour Water Stripper Unit 1 X 60 TPH
7 Amine Absorption / Regeneration Unit / Sulphur Recovery Unit (ARU/ SRU)
2X40 TPD
MSQ UNITS
SN UNITS CAPACITY (TMTPA)
1 Naphtha Splitter unit 464
2 Hydrotreater unit 20
3 Catalytic Reformer Unit 300
4 Reformate Splitter unit 274
5 Naphtha Hydro treating unit 183
6 C5-C6 Isomerization unit 126
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7 Prime G+ 322
8 HDS 224
(Storage tank schedule) Details of chemical / products / raw material
SERVICE TANK NO NO OF NOM. CAP
TANKS (KL)
CRUDE
236 1 40000
235,237,239 2 40000
240 1 40000
238 1 40000
501 1 45000
LPG
V-3, V-4 2 1500
V-101, V-102, V-103, V-104, V-105, V-106 5 1500
SRN 1,2,3,4 4 5000
85,87 1 5000
86 1 5000
MS 75,76,90 3 1000
77,78,79,80,81,83,84 7 5000
82 1 5000
92,93 2 5000
254 1 10000
255 1 15000
SK 94,95,96,97,110,111 5 5000
241 0 5000
HSD 9,10 2 5000
220,221 2 10000
226,227,228,229,230 4 10000
231, 233 1 10000
234 1 20000
LDO CUTTER 104,105 2 5000
FO 88,89,243 2 5000
112,113 2 5000
CBFS 193,194 2 1000
289,290,291 3 2000
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24 | P a g e
BITUMEN 185,186 2 2000
187, 188, 189, 190,191, 192 5 1000
CRU FEED
242 1 5000
250,251,252,253 3 3000
DHDT FEED 401, 402,403 2 20000
232 1 10000
RFCCU FEED 801,802,803 3 33000
RCO 15,17,18, 19,20,101,102,103 8 5,000
CLO 14,16 2 5,000
IFO 98,99,100 3 5,000
THIRD PARTY ACCREDITATION HISTORY
SN Edition Accreditation Agency
Date of Accreditation
Accreditation Valid up to
1 2nd Edition, Rev 0 DMI, Bhopal Nov 22, 2012 Nov 21, 2015
REVISION HISTORY
SN Edition No. Rev No. Rev. Date Remarks 1 1 16 June 2010 Organogram updated.
2 1 17 August 2011 DMP updated as per PNGRB ERDMP regulations 2010
Organogram updated.
3 2 0 July 2012 DMP thoroughly restructured and updated as per PNGRB ERDMP regulations 2010.
DMP renamed as ERDMP.
Organogram updated.
4 3 1 August 2014 Organogram Updated.
ERDMP DISTRIBUTION LIST
Hard Copies
COPY NO. DESIGNATION OF HOLDER
1. ED
2. GM(TS)
3. GM (T)
6. CTSM (HSE)
7. CFSM
8. Crisis Control Room
Soft Copy
Available on “BRINTRANET”
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PAGE No. 1-1
EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
CHAPTER – 1
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES
(Reference: Section 6 & 7 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
Emergencies can be categorized into three broad levels on the basis of seriousness and response requirements, namely: –
(a) Level 1 : This is an emergency or an incident which
(i) can be effectively and safely managed, and contained within the site, location or installation by the available resources;
(ii) Has no impact outside the site, location or installation.
(b) Level 2 : This is an emergency or an incident which –
(i) cannot be effectively and safely managed or contained at the location or installation by available resource and additional support is alerted or required;
(ii) is having or has the potential to have an effect beyond the site, location or installation and where external support of mutual aid partner may be involved;
(iii) is likely to be danger to life, the environment or to industrial assets or reputation.
(c) Level 3: This is an emergency or an incident with off-site impact which could be catastrophic and is likely to affect the population, property and environment inside and outside the installation, and management and control is done by district administration. Although the Level-III emergency falls under the purview of District Authority but till they step in, it should be responsibility of the unit to manage the emergency.
Note: Level-I has been considered for fire drill followed with onsite emergency However Level-II shall normally be considered as onsite emergency and Level-III as off-site emergency.
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
Hazard Identification and Classification of Emergencies
A set of appropriate scenarios, likely to create emergency in Barauni Refinery, was
generated through Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study carried out in 2011.
The identified scenarios along with consequence and frequency analysis, considered
for finalising detail action plan on any on site emergency situation, are listed below
and have been classified into 3 levels of emergencies on the basis of the guidelines as
discussed above. The risk contours of critical scenarios have also been shown
on plot plan of Barauni Refinery for quick reference of the likely impact on the
surroundings.
Identified Scenarios Along With Consequence And Frequency Analysis
Sc#
Description of scenarios Damage Distance (meter)
Probability (per year)
Level of Emerge
ncy
Plot plan ref no. for risk
contours 99 % fatality
50% fatality
1% fatality
1. Leak in Crude oil storage tank- Dyke Pool Fire
- 68.7 81.5 1.05E-6 LEVEL 3 1
2. Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire
- 57.9 70.4 1.05E-6 LEVEL 3 2
3. Leak in Crude oil storage tank 501- Dyke Pool Fire
- 68.7 81.7 1.5E-7 LEVEL 2 1
4. Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere – Jet Fire
42.9 50.6 59.1 4.2E-7 LEVEL 2 1
5. Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere – Flash Fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion
90.5 93.5 132.4 2.1E-7 LEVEL 3 3
6. Failure of Horton Sphere – BLEVE
83.7 202.1 323.3 2.1E-7 LEVEL 3 4
7. Loss of containment in LPG tanker- BLEVE
98.3 196.8 305.7 3.05E-6 LEVEL 3 2
8. H2S Leak from Stripper Gas Amine Absorber (SRU)
25 75 125 5.0E-06 LEVEL 3 3
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
Storage Tanks
9. Leak in Crude oil storage tank Dyke Pool Fire (Comparison case)
- 68.7 81.4 1.05E-6 LEVEL3
10. Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire(Comparison case)
- 57.9 70.4 1.05E-6 LEVEL 1
11. Crude storage tank roof failure 501 – Tank Fire
- 57.9 70.4 1.5E-7 LEVEL 2
12. Leak / Line Rupture in Mounded bullet outlet line – Flash fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion
28.6 34.1 103.1 9.0E-7 LEVEL 1
13. Leak in LPG Mounded bullets storage tanks outlet line – Jet Fire
- - 18.6 1.8E-6 LEVEL 1
14. Leak / Line Rupture in Fuel gas– Flash fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion
38.4 40.8 52.0 2.1E-6 LEVEL 2
15. Leak in Fuel gas storage tank outlet line – Jet Fire
39.3 46.1 53.2 4.2E-6 LEVEL 2
16. Leak in MS / SRN Storage tank – Pool Fire
- 17.7 30.6 2.7E-5 LEVEL 1
17. MS / SRN storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
- 29.2 38.2 2.7E-5 LEVEL 2
18. MS / SRN storage tank roof fire – Flash fire / Vapour Cloud Explosion
26.0 27.8 50.2 1.35E-5 LEVEL 2
19. Leak in Slope tank – Pool Fire - 31.8 40.5 4.5E-6 LEVEL 2
20. Slope tank roof fire – Tank Fire - 36.5 43.6 4.5E-6 LEVEL2
21. Leak in SKO Storage tank – Pool Fire
- 31.2 40.3 1.05E-6 LEVEL 1
22. SKO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
- 38.1 47.1 1.05E-6 LEVEL 2
23. Leak in Gas oil Storage tank – Pool Fire
- 35.7 45.7 4.5E-6 LEVEL 2
24. Gas oil storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
- 41.4 51.9 4.5E-6 LEVEL 2
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
25. Leak in CBFS / CLO Storage tank – Pool Fire
- 17.1 27.4 4.5E-6 LEVEL 1
26. CBFS / CLO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
- 24.9 35.2 4.5E-6 LEVEL 1
27. Leak in CFO / IFO / RFO Storage tank – Pool Fire
- 31.2 40.3 4.5E-6 LEVEL 1
28. CFO / IFO / RFO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
- 39.0 48.1 4.5E-6 LEVEL 2
29. Leak in HVGO Storage tank – Pool Fire
- 32.2 41.3 4.5E-6 LEVEL 2
30. HVGO storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
- 34.0 43.1 4.5E-6 LEVEL 2
31. Leak in LSHS Storage tank – Pool Fire
- `31.2 40.3 4.5E-6 LEVEL2
32. LSHS storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
- 33.1 42.9 4.5E-6 LEVEL 1
33. Leak in SR Storage tank – Pool Fire
- 31.3 41.4 1.05E-6 LEVEL 2
34. SR storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
- 34.0 43.2 1.05E-6 LEVEL 1
35. Leak in Bitumen Storage tank – Pool Fire
- 17.1 27.4 1.05E-6 LEVEL 2
36. Bitumen storage tank roof fire – Tank Fire
- 19.1 30.2 1.05E-6 LEVEL1
37. Leak from H2 Bullet outlet piping – Flash Fire/ VCE
13.6 14.6 28.0 7.5E-7 LEVEL 1
Wagon Gantry
38. Major Leak from MS Wagon – Pool Fire
- 45.8 56.8 2.3E-6 LEVEL 2
39. Major Leak from MS Wagon – Flash Fire/ VCE
94.5 101.7 192.7 1.15E-6 LEVEL 2
40. Major Leak from HVGO Wagon – Pool Fire
- 32.9 42.1 2.3E-6 LEVEL 2
41. Major Leak from SKO Wagon – Flash Fire/ VCE
118.6 126.9 232.8 4.8E-7 LEVEL 1
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
Tanker Truck Gantry
42. Loss of containment in CBFS tanker- Pool Fire
- 34.4 45.1 7.17E-8 LEVEL 1
43. Loss of containment in HVGO tanker- Pool Fire
- 34.4 44.1 3.58E-8 LEVEL 2
44. Leak in LPG tanker-Flash Fire/ VCE
179.3 214.2 660.8 3.05E-6 LEVEL 3
Pipelines
45. Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak) – Pool fire
- 105.9 105.9 3.05E-6 LEVEL 1
46. Incoming Crude pipeline failure (4” leak) – Flash Fire/ VCE
153.9 158.0 209.5 1.5E-6 LEVEL 2
Atmospheric Vacuum Distillation Unit (AVU) Crude Distillation Unit-1
47. Leak from Crude Column (601-K-2)
- 29.7 40.9 4.5E-6 LEVEL 1
48. Failure of Nozzle /Flange Joint in Crude Column (601-K-2) & crude starts coming out
- 19.0 28.8 1.5E-6 LEVEL 2
49. 10mm leak from inlet flange of Stabilizer Column (601-K-4) – Pool Fire
- 11.7 24.7 4.5E-7 LEVEL 2
50. Leak (10mm) from Furnace (F-101/F-102) tube inside the furnace /Nozzle of crude heater & crude starts coming out
47.8 50.1 79.3 2.7E-06 LEVEL 2
51. Desalter overflows line Leak (10mm)
- 20.3 28.9 4.5E-7 LEVEL 2
52. Nozzle / Flange joint leak (10mm) from the inlet of pretopping column
2.4 3.4 3.6 4.5E-7 LEVEL 1
53. Leak from Vacuum Column (K-5) 14.0 19.3 31.1 4.5E-7 LEVEL 1
54. Failure of Stripper Column K-6(1) Nozzle & hydrocarbon starts coming out (AVU -1/2)
- - 10.4 3.0E-7 LEVEL 2
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
55. Rupture of Furnace (F-101/F-102) tube inside the furnace /Nozzle of crude heater & crude starts coming out
35.4 37.0 57.1 2.7E-06 LEVEL 2
LPG Treatment Unit (LTU) LPG Treatment Unit
56. Leak from LPG-Amine Absorber (08-C-101)
5.4 43.7 85.6 1.5E-6 LEVEL3
57. Failure of LPG Surge Vessel (08-V-104)
22.5 23.2 32.5 7.5E-7 LEVEL 1
Hydrotreater Unit (HTU)
58. Failure of Naphtha Splitter (01-CC-00-001) Nozzle & naphtha starts coming out
- 51.7 61.7 1.5E-7 LEVEL 2
59. Leak (10mm) from Hydrotreater Reactor (02-RB-00-001)
25.3 28.3 32.5 1.5E-6 LEVEL 2
Catalytic Reformer Unit (CRU) Catalytic Reformer Unit
60. Leak (10mm) from inlet of reformer reactor (03-RB-00-001)
7.9 12.2 25.7 4.5E-6 LEVEL 1
61. Leak (10mm) from Stabilizer column (02-CC-00-001)
58.3 60.8 91.8 7.5E-8 LEVEL 1
Diesel Hydrotreater Unit (DHDT) DHDT
62. Leak (10mm) from reactor DHDT (702-R-01)
7.5 12.1 13.9 4.5E-6 LEVEL 2
COKER-A/B COKER-A/B
63. Leak (10mm) from main fractionator C-1 Top
11.5 13.0 14.9 3.0E-7 LEVEL 2
64. Leak (10mm) from reactor (Coker –B) overhead line
16.7 18.9 21.8 3.0E-6 LEVEL 1
65. Leak (10mm) from reactor (Coker- B)bottom flange
19.7 23.3 25.7 3.0E-6 LEVEL 2
Resid Fluidized Catalytic Cracking Unit (RFCCU) RFCCU
66. Leak (10mm) from Reactor (701-R-101) inlet – Jet Fire
18.0 20.4 23.5 3.0E-6 LEVEL 2
67. Leak (10mm) from Main Fractionator (701-C-201) top – Jet Fire
- - 6.6 7.5E-8 LEVEL2
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
LPG Recovery unit (LRU) LPG Recovery unit
68. Leak (10mm) from Debutaniser column (08-C-003) top – Jet Fire
19.5 21.9 25.1 7.5E-8 LEVEL 2
69. Leak (10mm) from Stripper (08-C-002) top – Jet Fire
23.2 26.3 30.4 1.5E-7 LEVEL 2
Hydrogen Generation Unit (HGU) Hydrogen Plant
70. Leak (10mm) from inlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Prereformer) R-4 – Jet Fire
- - 9.2 1.5E-6 LEVEL 2
71. Leak (10mm) from outlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Reformer) R-5 – Jet Fire
- - 6.1 1.5E-6 LEVEL 1
72. Leak (10mm) from inlet of Hydrogenation Reactor (Shift Converter) R-6 – Jet Fire
- - 5.7 1.5E-6 LEVEL 1
Naphtha Hydrotreater Unit (NHDT) NHDT
73. Leak (10mm) from NHDT Reactor (R-01) – Jet Fire
25.1 28.2 32.2 1.5E-6 LEVEL 2
ISOM ISOM
74. Leak (10mm) from ISOM Reactor (R-01) – Jet Fire
25.7 29.1 33.6 1.5E-6 LEVEL 1
PRIME G PRIMEG
75. Failure of PRIMEGPFD reactor (R-02)- Jet Fire
- - 7.3 1.5E-6 LEVEL 1
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
IDENTIFIED DISASTER SCENARIOS
(Reference: Section 4.1 (i) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
S.N SCENERIO LEVEL
1. LPG FIRE LEVEL 3
2. TANK FIRE LEVEL 2
3. TOXIC GAS RELEASE (H2S) LEVEL3
4. OIL SPILLAGE LEVEL 1
5. NATURAL CALAMITY LEVEL 2
6. SECURITY THREAT LEVEL 2
7. FIRE / EXPLOSION IN UNIT AREA LEVEL 2
8. DOUBLE FIRE CONTIGENCY LEVEL 2
9. CO GAS LEAKAGE LEVEL 1
10. HYDROGEN GAS LEAKAGE LEVEL 1
11. PIPELINE RUPTURE LEVEL 1
12. TRANSPORTATION INCIDENT LEVEL 2
13. CYCLONE LEVEL 2
14. EARTHQUAKE LEVEL 1
15. BOILER EXPLOSION IN THERMAL POWER STATION
LEVEL 2
16. NAPHTHA LEAK IN COOLING WATER SYSTEM
LEVEL 1
17. UN-NOTICED CONTINUOUS LEAK OF LPG FROM SAMPLING / DRAINING POINTS IN THE PROCESS UNITS
LEVEL 2
*Please refer Chapter 7 for detailed action plan to manage and mitigate disaster scenarios.
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
SCHEDULE – I Schedule of implementation of Code of Practice for ERDMP (Reference: Section 7 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
S. No.
Activity
Implementation Time (from the
notification date of Codes of Practices
for ERDMP)
Status
1. On-site Emergency Plan 3 months Implemented in March 2011.
Last Updated in July 2012.
2. Off-site Emergency Plan (Submission of information to District Authority)
3 months Updated and submitted to District Authority in Oct 2010.
3, Resources in position 6 months * Complied
4. Accredited Third Party Certification of ERDMP
1 year In progress
5. Testing and Mock Drills (On-site)
3 months Conducted regularly once in a quarter.
Last conducted in Sept 2012.
6. Testing and Mock Drills (Off-site)
** 12 months Conducted regularly once in a year.
Last conducted in Sept 2012.
Note: * Long Delivery Items should be tied up with mutual aid organizations upto 12 months. ** To be coordinated with District Authority.
For ERDMP accreditation of Barauni Refinery, an offsite mock drill was conducted on 12th Sept’12 in presence of third party observer Sri Rakesh Dubey, Director, DMI, Bhopal. DM, Begusarai, Sri Manoj Kumar, IAS was the
Chief Offsite Emergency Coordinator for the occasion.
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
CHAPTER – 2
CONSEQUENCES OF DEFAULT OR
NON-COMPLIANCE
(Reference: Section 8 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
(1) There shall be a system for ensuring compliance to the provision of these regulations through developing a well defined Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan and conduction of mock drill and safety audits during the construction, commissioning and operation phase, as well as on an on-going basis. There shall also be a system of do’s and don’ts regarding safety, mock drills or real emergencies for the visitors before entering an establishment. This should be supported by written instruction sheet for the visitor and ensured that visitor is accompanied by plant representative on forward visit and return gate. - Complied
Following emergency drills being conducted in BR: i. Off site disaster drill – Yearly. ii. On site disaster drill – Quarterly. iii. Fire drill / emergency handling drill – Monthly. iv. Safety Briefing is compulsory for contract personnel at BR and gate pass is
stamped by F&S and then entry inside battery area is permitted. For visitors, Safety Information sheet is given while issuing gate pass.
(2) In case of any deviation or shortfall, in achieving the recommended standards the entities are liable to penal provisions under the provisions of the technical standards, specifications including safety standards.- Agreed
(3) Mutual Aid Association not responding as per Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) or written agreement on request of assistance shall attract penalty under these regulations as under:-
a. for first default in response, the defaulting entity with the application and its
management shall have to submit written explanation to affected mutual aid members.- Not applicable
b. for the second and successive failure, the defaulting entity shall have to pay the double of the billed amount of expenses incurred by affected mutual aid members in case of any eventuality occurs in the premises of affected mutual aid members.
Not applicable
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
CHAPTER – 3
REQUIREMENTS UNDER OTHER
STATUTES
(Reference: Section 9 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
Schedule – II (Reference: Section 9 (1) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
Relevant Statutes on Management of Hazardous Substances
Compliance of Barauni Refinery
The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (amended
1991) and Rules thereunder.
The Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986
(amended 2008)
Complied. All the legislative requirements are being met except some parameters under “Revised Emission and Effluent Standards for Petroleum Refinery (MoEF gazette notification dated 18th March, 2008). “Partly Complied” ETP modernization is in advanced stage of construction for compliance.
The Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous
Chemicals Rules, 1989 (amended, 1994 and 2004)
Complied.
The Hazardous Wastes (Management and Handling)
Rules, 2008
Complied. Authorization valid up to January 2014.
The Environment Prior Clearance Notification, 2006
Complied. EC obtained for MS Quality Upgradation, HSD Quality Up-gradation and High Sulphur Crude Maximization Project in March 2008. EC obtained for Expansion of Barauni Refinery to 6.0MMTPA with Matching Secondary Processing Facilities.
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
The Chemical Accidents (Emergency Planning,
Preparedness and Response) Rules, 1996
Followed Information forwarded to District Authorities from time to time.
Bio-medical Wastes (Management and Handling)
Rules. 1989
Complied. Authorization valid up to August 2015.
The Factories Act, 1948 (amended 1987)
State Factory Rules
Complied. Factory Licence No.: 12401/BSR has been renewed upto Dec.,2015
The Inflammable Substances Act, 1952.
Complied.
The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (amended 2001) Complied.
The Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989
(Amended 2005).
Complied.
The Public Liability Insurance Rules, 1991
(Amended 1992).
Complied.
The Public Liability Insurance Rules, 1991
(Amended 1993).
Complied.
The Petroleum Act, 1934
The Petroleum Rules, 2002
Complied.
Complied.
The Insecticide Rules, 1968 (amended 2000)
The Insecticide Rules, 1971 (amended 1999)
Complied.
Not Applicable
The National Environment Tribunal Act, 1995 Complied.
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
The Explosives Act, 1884 (amended till 1983)
The Gas Cylinder Rules, 2004
Complied. License: 1. Cl2 Cylinder Storage
License No. GC (OG) S-88/BI Dated 16/03/84.
2. UPTO 30.9.2012 3. NH3 & DA Storage
Shed License No. GC (OG) S-110/BI Dated 02/08/93 UPTO 30.9.2014
The Static and Mobile Pressure Vessels (Unfired)
Rules, 1981
(Amended 2002)
Complied. License
LPG Bulk storage license (PV (EC) S-5 /Bi dated 22/06/83: UPTO 31.3.2013
H2 storage license No. PV (EC) S-87/BI dated 21/02/97 :
UPTO 31.3.2013
N2 storage license under BXP No. PV (EC) S-143/BI/A dated 5/03/02: UPTO 31.3.2013
LPG Mounded Bullet Storage License No. PV (EC) S-5/BI dated 22/06/83. UPTO 31.3.2013
The Explosives Rules, 1983 (amended 2002) Not Applicable
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
CHAPTER – 4
PRE-EMERGENCY PLANNING (Reference: Section 10 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
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PRE-EMERGENCY PLANNING
4.1 Hazard identification (Reference: Section 10.1 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
The list of hazardous substances being handled in the Barauni Refinery is given in Annexure-5.
Information on toxological, physical & chemical properties of the substances being handled in the format of Material Safety Data Sheet is attached as Annexure-6.
The identification of potential impact on downwind air quality or downstream water quality from an incidental release and possible danger to human, flora and fauna and animal health. Flora (Reference: Section 10.1 (b) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010) VEGETATION AND CROPS The sandy alluvial soils of the study area favor wheat, maize, millets, oilseeds and pulses besides a variety of vegetables and fruits. The area, particularly Northern upland tracts has had prosperous agriculture and fruit orchards for centuries. With a shift in the course of Ganga southwards and building up of embankments, even the Southern "Diara" lands grow rich wheat, maize, oilseeds and padwal and other vegetables. TERRESTRIAL FLORA AND FAUNA
There is no natural forest in the area, however there are plantations developed by the forest department along road sides. Also there are self growing plants, vegetation and grasses. The bio-diversity of the self-growing and unprotected plant species would indicate environmental quality and hence were surveyed intensively. A survey conducted to assess the impact of pollution because of industrial/urban activities on the terrestrial fauna reveals that there is hardly any adverse effect of the pollution on the terrestrial fauna. CULTIVATED TREES In addition to the study conducted on self-growing and unprotected plants and vegetation, detailed studies were conducted on cultivated trees and agricultural crops to assess the extent of impact, if any, caused by industrial activities. Considering the economic value, species of Mango, Lichi, Banana, Guava, Lemon, Bamboo, Shisham, Palm and Jackfruit were selected for this study. List
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of fruit trees and other cultivated trees are given in Tables-3.9.1. The selected locations studied for this purpose AGRICULTURAL CROPS The land in the study area is well suited for different types of crops. In Kharif maize, Jawar, Paddy are main crops and pulses are grown at few pockets of the study area. In Rabi wheat, maize, oilseeds such as mustard, caster oil are cultivated. Besides these main crops different types of vegetables are grown. Fish Fauna Fish fauna was collected and surveyed at the fish landing centre in and around Barauni Area. List of fishes observed are depicted in Table— 3.9.5. It was observed that the maximum number was that of cat fishes, which feeds upon the carcasses and dead bodies. The aquatic organism may often serve as better indicators for subtle effects of pollution in the water body and also may provide early warning. The abundance or absence of certain organisms thus often serves as the indicator of a healthy or polluted aquatic environment. The nature and quality of such biological species in a particular environment depend on various physico-chemical characteristics of water such as pH, conductivity, nutrients, BOD etc. Bio-Productivity of River Ganga Several hydro-biological factors such as cloudy weather, current velocity, turbidity, intensity of light penetration, density of phytoplankton have significant effect on productivity. The incidence of long hours of sunshines and the higher temperature of the tropics favour the conversion of solar energy into organic matter. The primary productivity is thus the basis of whole metabolic cycle in aquatic ecosystems.
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Barauni Refinery and its Neighboring Details
Name of the factory : Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Barauni Refinery, Barauni, Bihar, 851114
Address: : Barauni Refinery, District: Begusarai, Bihar, 851114
Location: Situated 125 kilometers from Patna, about 8 kilometers away from the northern or left bank of Ganges.
Sitemap: Attached as Annexure-1.
Total Population of community within 10 kms radius: As per 2001 census, the population of the total villages within a circle of 10 kms radius with the refinery as the centre is 6,04,478 (About 6.04 Lakh).
Nature of process: Continuous (Petroleum Refining)
Brief Description of the Refinery (Site, Location, Vicinity)
Barauni Refinery (BR) is located in development block, Barauni, of District Begusarai of the state of Bihar which is about 8kms away from the northern or left bank of Ganges. It is situated 125 kilometers away from Patna. The latitude and longitude at the BR site is 25o26’N and 86o04’ E respectively. The district Headquarter town of Begusarai is about 5 km from the refinery Barauni Refinery was built in collaboration with Russia and Romania. It was commissioned in 1964 with a refining capacity of 1 Million Metric Tons per Annum (MMTPA) and it was dedicated to the Nation by the then Union Minister for Petroleum, Prof. Humayun Kabir in January 1965. After de-bottlenecking, revamping and expansion project, its capacity today is 6 MMTPA. Matching secondary processing facilities such Resid Fluidized Catalytic Cracker (RFCC), Diesel Hydrotreating (DHDT), Sulphur Recovery Unit (SRU) have been added. Theses state of the art eco-friendly technologies have enabled the refinery to produce environment- friendly green fuels complying with international standards.
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Barauni Refinery was initially designed to process low sulphur crude oil (sweet crude) of Assam. After establishment of other refineries in the Northeast, Assam crude is unavailable for Barauni. Hence, sweet crude is being sourced from African, South East Asian and Middle East countries like Nigeria, Iraq &Malaysia. The refinery receives crude oil by pipeline from Paradip on the east coast via Haldia. With various revamps and expansion projects at Barauni Refinery, capability for processing high-sulphur crude has been added — high-sulphur crude oil (sour crude) is cheaper than low-sulphur crudes — thereby increasing not only the capacity but also the profitability of the refinery.
A vicinity map indicating the Barauni Refinery site has been enclosed in
Annexure-1.
The Layout plan and block flow diagram of the Barauni Refinery are enclosed as
Annexure-3 & 4 respectively.
UNITS OF BARAUNI REFINERY (OTHER THAN BXP UNITS)
SN UNITS CAPACITY (MMTPA)
1 AVU-I 1.75
2 AVU-II 1.75
3 AVU-III 2.5
4 COKER-A 0.60
5 COKER-B 0.50
6 CRU 0.30
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BARAUNI EXPANSION UNITS (BXP UNITS)
SN UNITS CAPACITY (TPA)
1 Fluid Catalytic Cracking 1.4MMTPA
2 LPG Treating Unit 1,70,000
3 Gasoline Treating Unit 2,45,000
4 Diesel Hydro Treating Unit 2.2 MMTPA
5 Hydrogen Generation Unit 34,000
6 Sour Water Stripper Unit 1 X 60 TPH
7 Amine Absorption / Regeneration Unit /
Sulphur Recovery Unit (ARU/ SRU)
2X40 TPD
MSQ UNITS
SN UNITS CAPACITY (TMTPA)
1 Naphtha Splitter unit 464
2 Hydrotreater unit 20
3 Catalytic Reformer Unit 300
4 Reformate Splitter unit 274
5 Naphtha Hydro treating unit 183
6 C5-C6 Isomerization unit 126
7 Prime G+ 322
8 HDS 224
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Meteorological Conditions (Reference: Section 10.1 (b) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
The consequences of released toxic or flammable material are largely dependent on the prevailing weather conditions. For the assessment of major scenarios involving release of toxic or flammable materials, the most important meteorological parameters are those that affect the atmospheric dispersion of the escaping material. The crucial variables are wind direction, wind speed, atmospheric stability and temperature. Rainfall does not have any direct bearing on the results of the risk analysis; however, it can have beneficial effects by absorption / washout of released materials. Actual behavior of any release would largely depend on prevailing weather condition at the time of release.
Climate
The climate in the area is variable. From the angle of human comfort, the best seasons are during October- November and February-March. During April to May the weather changes and becomes hot while June to September experiences frequent rains. Weather becomes cold during December-January. The annual rainfall received in the area is about 1,110 mm. Of this, about 85% rainfall takes place during the months June to September. Temperature varies from a mean minimum of 11°C in January during winter to a mean maximum of 39°C in May during summer. Relative humidity is high, mean monthly RH being in the range of 43-83% for most part of the year.
Atmospheric Parameters
The Climatological data based on EIA study is summarized below in the Table:
Parameter Avg. value
Ambient temperature ,degC 31.7
Atmospheric pressure,(mmHg) 758
Relative Humidity (%) 67
*REF. EIA for MSQ project 1997,BR,TABLE 3.6.7
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Wind Speed and Wind Direction
Wind for most of the period blows either from NE-E-SE sector (during summer and monsoon) or from SW-W-NW sector (during post monsoon and winter). The average wind speed is about 6.8 km/hr. The nearest Indian Meteorological Dept (IMD) stations from Barauni Refinery are at Patna and Bhagalpur. Patna is about 125 km West of Barauni and Bhagalpur is about 150 km East of Barauni. The latitudes and altitudes for both these are very close to those for Barauni. During the period from March 2007 to June 2007, the overall (average) windspeed was 7.05km/hr.The WINDROSE DIAGRAM indicates that the most predominant wind direction for the summer season was from East/ North East.
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WIND ROSE DIAGRAM
N
Period: 1996-1997 JAN-DEC
STATION : BARAUNI REFINERY
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Water Resources and Drainage
(Reference: Section 10.1 (b) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
With the mighty Ganga forming its Southern boundary, the Ganga flood-plains (or
"diaras") constituting at least 25% of the geographical area and a reasonable
annual rainfall averaging over 1110 mm, the area is not subject to water scarcity. In
fact sub-surface water in the alluvial strata is so copious that no thought has had to
be given to collection, storage and transport of surface water for any beneficial
uses, whether irrigation, industrial, municipal or anything else. Ground water table
in the study area varies from 1-5 m below GL in monsoons to 3-10 m below GL in
peak summers. Drainage wise, the entire study area drains to the Ganga through a
number of drains. Due to the embankments built for flood protection, often
drainage channels have to flow parallel to the river course in a south-easterly
direction before they can empty into the river.
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Socio- Economic Aspects of the Villages
(Reference: Section 10.1 (b) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
IOC Barauni falls in Begusarai district of Bihar. The total 10 KM radius area from
the center of Barauni Refinery falls under the study area. The four blocks namely,
Teghra, Barauni, Matihani and Begusarai which cover 15.67, 44.92, 17.43 and
21.92% of the study area respectively. The study area includes either partly or
entirely 129 villages and 3 urban areas namely Barauni, Begusarai and IOC
Township.
Distribution of Population
As per 2001 census, the population of the total villages within a circle of 10 kms
radius with the refinery as the centre is 6, 04,478.
Socio- economic aspects of the villages falling in total corridor
IOC Barauni falls in Begusarai district of Bihar. The total 10 KM radius area from
the center of Barauni Refinery falls under the study area. The four blocks namely,
Teghra, Barauni, Matihani and Begusarai which cover 15.67, 44.92, 17.43 and
21.92% of the study area respectively. The study area includes either partly or
entirely 129 villages and 3 urban areas namely Barauni, Begusarai and IOC
Township.
TABLE - 3.10.1: DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION IN TOTAL STUDY AREA
4.1.c Hazards to the installation as Natural calamities like
Flood
Earthquake
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4.1.d Check points for hazard identification are given as per the checklist (Reference: Section 10.1 (d) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
Checklist-1
Hazard Identification
S N Check point Yes No Remark
1 Which of the following procedures or techniques for hazard identification has been used in terminal/installation
√
Hazop/Hazan √
Incident consequences & analysis √
Event tree analysis √
Fault tree analysis √
Failure modes, Effects, and Criticality analysis
√
Risk Assessment √
What if Analysis √
Other accredited practices √
Hazard identification
2 Is the terminal /installation covered under the definition of “Major incident Hazard Installation” as per the Manufacture Storage & Impart of Hazardous Chemical Rules 1989 (Amended 1994 and 2004. If yes, please specify the site notification and Safety Reports)
√
3 If yes, whether major incident hazards identified and steps taken for their prevention
√
4 Whether design deficiencies, failures or errors which can contribute to hazards and cause abnormalities leading to an incident are identified.
√
5 What are the measures undertaken to counter above deficiencies or, errors
The countermeasures as suggested by the Hazop analysis are implemented to counter the deficiencies
6 Consequences of a major incident on the workers, people on the neighbourhood and the environment are considered
√
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7 Steps envisaged for mitigation of the consequences of such incident
i. Warning ii. Impact
evaluation iii. Rescue iv. Relief v. Rehabilitation vi.
8 Does the installtion produce /handle/ use/ import/ store any hazardous chemicals as defined under MSIHC Rules 1989(Amended 1994 & 2004)
Yes
9 If Yes, whether a list of these chemicals, preferably in alphabetical order with their maximum licensed storage quantities displayed
Annexure 05
10 Are material safety data sheet (MSDS) of these chemicals are prepared /obtained in the prescribed format as per MSIHC rules and State Factory rules
Yes
11 Whether a system for disseminating information about these MSDS to concerned are existing
Displayed at the consumption site and available in the Intranet
12 Are there a system of labeling of containers / storage tanks for the chemicals / hazardous substances
Yes
13 Whether estimation of maximum possible quantity of each hazardous substances are considered including any vehicle (TT/TW) on site or within 500 mtrs of the site.
Yes
14 Whether locations, configuration and condition under which the hazardous substances are stored and handled are clearly declared
Yes
Vulnerability Analysis
15 Whether zones of influence or vulnerable zones are estimated by considering the maximum single storage of hazardous substance and maximum loss scenario
Yes
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16 Whether effects of influence on the vulnerable zones are made after considering the population , facilities and environment encompassed inside that zone
Yes
Risk Analysis
17 Whether a relative measure of probability and consequences of various possible hazardous events including worst case scenario are taken into account
Yes
18 Whether risks are calculated by multiplying the probability of occurrence of each event by the consequences of that event and then summing up the results
Yes
19 Whether all types of events possible in petroleum installations are considered including i) Storage tanks on fire ii) pool fire [burning pool of liquid fuel] iii) Flange joint leakages in pipeline iv) Fire in TT/TW gantry and v) Rupture of hoses
Yes
Risk reduction measures
20 Whether measures for reduction of identified high risks are included by reducing the consequences through hazard mitigation measures
Yes
21 Whether steps have been considered to reduce risks to the exposed population by increasing safe distances by acquiring property around the facility
Yes
Hazop Study
22 Whether the above method is applied if the location handles more than specified storage and/ or critical operations
Yes
23 Whether the study systematically identify all possible deviations from normal operations
Yes
24 Whether risk levels are established for each deviation after considering the probability and consequences of each such events
Yes
25 Whether potential means for detection of such events and preventive measures are recommended by the study
Yes
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4.2 Risk Analysis & Risk Assessment
(Reference: Section 10.2 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
a) Identification of potential failures or incidents (Including frequency).
Identification of potential failures or incidents (Major) – Please refer Risk Analysis report for detail risk scenarios, description & effect diagrams
Consequence Analysis Calculations of Likely Failure Cases for
IOCL Barauni Refinery Operations
(Reference: Section 10.1 (d) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
Sc# 1 Major Leak in Crude oil storage tank – Pool Fire
Sc# 2 Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire
Sc#3 Major Leak in Crude oil storage tank 501 – Pool Fire
Sc# 4 Leak / Line Rupture in LPG Horton Sphere – Jet Fire
Sc# 5 Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere – Flash Fire / Vapor Cloud
Sc# 6 Failure of Horton Sphere – BLEVE
Sc#7 Loss of containment in LPG tanker- BLEVE
Sc# 8 H2S Leak from LP Amine Absorber (702-C-04)
Sc# 1 Major Leak in Crude oil storage tank – Pool Fire Parameters Value
Operating Temperature 25°C
Operating Pressure Atmospheric
Tank Diameter 65m
Tank capacity 40,000KL
Released Quantity 39200KL
Exposure duration 30 sec
Pool diameter 122.37m
Base frequency 5.0E –6 per year
No. of tanks handled 7
Ignition Probability 0.3
Accident Probability 1.05E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section 3
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Percent Lethality Thermal
Load
kw/m2
Effect Distance (m)
from centre of pool
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
154.0
81.5
68.7
68.7
-
Sc# 2 Crude storage tank roof failure – Tank Fire Parameters Value
Operating Temperature 25°C
Operating Pressure Atmospheric
Tank Diameter 65m
Tank capacity 40,000KL
Released Quantity 39500KL
Exposure duration 30 sec
Pool diameter 65m
Base frequency 5.0E –6 per year
No. of tanks handled 7
Ignition Probability 0.3
Accident Probability 1.05E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section 3
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Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance
(m)
from centre of pool
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
138.7
70.4
57.9
57.9
-
Sc#3 Major Leak in Crude oil storage tank 501 – Pool Fire Parameters Value
Operating Temperature 25°C
Operating Pressure Atmospheric
Tank Diameter 65m
Tank capacity 45,000KL
Released Quantity 44200KL
Exposure duration 30 sec
Pool diameter 122.73m
Base frequency 5.0E –6 per year
No. of tanks handled 1
Ignition Probability 0.3
Accident Probability 1.05E-7 per year
Personnel present in the section 3
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Percent Lethality Thermal
Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance (m)
from centre of pool
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
154.1
81.7
68.9
68.7
-
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Sc# 4 Leak / Line Rupture in LPG Horton Sphere – Jet Fire
Parameters Value
Operating Temperature 35°C
Operating Pressure (kg/cm2g) 8.15
Tank Diameter 14.5m
Tank capacity 1500KL
Released Quantity 1470KL
Exposure duration 30 sec
Jet length 41.86m
Base frequency 7.0 E –7 per year
No. of tanks handled 4
Ignition Probability 0.3
Accident Probability 8.4E-7 per year
Personnel present in the section 2
Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance
(m)
from centre of pool
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
73.4
59.1
55.2
50.6
42.9
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3-24
Sc# 5 Leak / Line Rupture in Horton Sphere – Flash Fire / Vapor Cloud
Parameters
Value
Operating Temperature 35°C
Operating Pressure (kg/cm2g) 8.15
Tank Diameter 14.5m
Tank capacity 1500KL
Released Quantity
Exposure duration 30 sec
Jet length 41.86m
Base frequency 7.0 E –7 per year
No. of tanks handled 4
Ignition Probability 0.15
Accident Probability 4.2E-7 per year
Personnel present in the section 2
Dispersion Model
Weather
Conditions
Cloud Dimensions
Length (m) Width (m)
B – 3 m/sec 33.4 1.5
E – 1 m/sec 38.1 1.2
Vapour Cloud Explosion Model
Damage Type
B- 3 m/sec E – 1 m/sec
Max (m) Max (m)
0.2 bar (Heavy) 90.5 91.7
0.1 bar (Moderate) 93.5 95.2
0.02 bar (Minor) 132.4 138.8
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Sc# 6 Failure of Horton Sphere – BLEVE Parameters
Value
Operating Temperature 35°C
Operating Pressure (kg/cm2g) 8.15
Tank Diameter 14.5m
Tank capacity 1500KL
Released Quantity 1470kl
Exposure duration 10 sec
Fireball Diameter 131.84m
Base frequency 7.0 E –7 per year
No. of tanks handled 4
Ignition Probability 0.13
Accident Probability 3.64E-7 per year
Personnel present in the section 2
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Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m)
Effect Distance
(m)
from centre of pool
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
513.9
323.3
266.2
202.1
83.7
Sc#7 Loss of containment in LPG tanker- BLEVE Parameters
Value
Operating Temperature 35°C
Operating Pressure (kg/cm2g) 15
Tanker Capacity 18tons
Released Quantity 17.1tons
BLEVE duration 30secs
Fireball Diameter 156.5m
Base frequency 1.4E-5 per tanker per year
No. of tanks handled annually 17000
Ignition Probability 0.15
Accident Probability 3.05E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section 14
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Percent Lethality
Thermal Load
(kw/m2)
Effect Distance
(m)
from centre of pool
First Degree Burns
1
10
50
99
4.0
9.33
12.70
18.47
36.56
480.3
305.7
254.0
196.8
98.3
Sc# 8 H2S Leak from LP Amine Absorber (702-C-04) Parameters
Value
Operating Temperature 30°C
Operating Pressure (kg/cm2g) 1BAR
Expected Inventory in the section 5m3
Composition H2S + Amine
Released Quantity 4m3
Exposure duration 180sec
Base frequency 5.0E-6 per year
Accident Probability 5.0E-6 per year
Personnel present in the section 2
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Percent Lethality
Dispersed Cloud: E-1m/s
Toxic Dose Distance (m)
0
7
42
84
97
4.57E+10
7.91E+11
1.44E+13
2.18E+14
1.54E+15
125
100
75
50
25
Percent Lethality Dispersed Cloud: B-3m/s
Toxic Dose Distance (m)
0
24
7.09E+08
4.46E+12
50
25 Since the scenario leads to a major disaster, a proper Disaster Management Plan (DMP) should be available to implement as soon as the disaster happens to mitigate the consequence.
CAUSES OF DISASTER
(Reference: Section 10.3 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
The common causes for the above events are tabulated below for reference and the ERDMP prepared by the installation to deal with the following emergencies.
Man made Natural Calamities Extraneous
Heavy Leakage
Fire
Explosion
Failure of Critical Control system
Design deficiency
Unsafe acts
In-adequate maintenance
Flood
Earth Quake
Cyclone
Outbreak of Disease
Excessive Rains
Tsunami
Riots/Civil Disorder/ Mob Attack
Terrorism
Sabotage
Bomb Threat
War / Hit by missiles
Abduction
Food Poisoning/ Water Poisoning
For consequences of disasters, please refer quantitative risk analysis (QRA) report.
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CHAPTER – 5
EMERGENCY MITIGATION MEASURES
(Reference: Section 11 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
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Schedule-III
Basic Requirements of ERDMP
(Reference: Section 11.1 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
5.1 Basic Requirements of ERDMP are addressed and incorporated as mentioned below:
1. Location Plan of the Installation indicating site of the installation at neighboring details up to a distance of 2 kms from the installation in each direction: Please refer Annexure-1.
2. Site plan of the installation showing a complete layout of the installation indicating boundary walls, exit and entry gates and location of various facilities: Please refer Annexure-3.
3. Layout of Fire Water Systems and Fire Fighting Equipment details: Please refer Annexure- 24.
4. Line block diagram of manufacturing process and Process Flow Diagram (PFD) of each unit: Please refer Annexure-4.
5. Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) for all hazardous chemicals stored, handled, produced and transported in the installation: Please refer Annexure-6.
6. Internal and External Emergency contact numbers and addresses of police, fire station, hospitals, mutual aid industry, factory inspectors, Board, State Pollution Control Board, Petroleum and Explosive Safety Organization (PESO), etc.: Please refer Annexure-12 to 17.
7. Pipeline route map and details of various facilities such as sectionalizing Valve (SV), intermediate Pigging (IP) stations, intermediate pumping stations (IPS) across pipeline route: Not Applicable.
8. Addresses and Telephone Directory of Technical Support Services such as Environmental Laboratories, fire fighting chemical suppliers, public and private consultant associated with emergency handling and Aviation Medical Services, if any: Please refer Annexure-11.
9. Security threat plan is described in Chapter - 24 in detail.
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SCHEDULE – IV
Resource Mobilization (Men and Equipment)
(Reference: Section 11.2 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
5.2 Resource mobilization shall include manpower requirement, fire fighting materials, appliances or equipment, safety equipment, communication facilities, transport, list of emergency drugs and appliances, etc.
Sl. # Total Requirement Available with Installation
1 MANPOWER
Regular employees – shift-wise 1282
Security staff 297
2 FIRE FIGHTING APPLIANCES/ EQUIPMENT/ CHEMICALS
Fire Tenders/ Fire fighting engines 6
Water storage capacity 20000 KL
Fire Hoses 200
Jet/Fog/Spray Nozzles 125
Foam Branch 17
Jumbo Jet Nozzles 7
Foam Compound ( KL ) 96
3 SAFETY EQUIPMENTS
PVC Suit 115
Compressed air B.A. Set 30
Refill Cylinders for B.A. Set 35
Cascade B.A Set 2 (BA set trolley) WITH FOUR CYLINDERS IN EACH.
Fire Proximity Suit 8
4 COMMUNICATION
Walkie-Talkie AVAILABLE
Pager System with Group Paging Facility
AVAILABLE
Group SMS Facility AVAILABLE
Inter Com System AVAILABLE
Public Address System AVAILABLE
Megaphone AVAILABLE
5 TRANSPORT Jeeps
68 Cars Ambulance 02
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Trucks AVAILABLE Buses 06 Tractors AVAILABLE Mobile Cranes AVAILABLE
6 MISCELLANEOUS
Ropes AVAILABLE
Empty drums AVAILABLE
Buckets AVAILABLE
Sand bags AVAILABLE
Dewatering pump AVAILABLE
Pneumatic pump AVAILABLE
Photo Camera AVAILABLE
Video Camera AVAILABLE
7 EQUIPMENTS FOR CORPS DISPOSAL
Light Metal Stretchers AVAILABLE
Tarpauline AVAILABLE
Rope fibre AVAILABLE
Bucket AVAILABLE
Rubber gloves AVAILABLE
8 LIST OF EMERGENCY DRUGS and APPLIANCES
Canvas Stretcher AVAILABLE
Oxygen Cylinder AVAILABLE
Sterlite Bandages AVAILABLE
Cotton Sterilised AVAILABLE
Antibiotics AVAILABLE
Analgesties AVAILABLE
Sedatives AVAILABLE
Tetanus Toxoid AVAILABLE
Dressing Instruments AVAILABLE
Sterilisers AVAILABLE
Autoclave for sterlising Instruments, dressing
AVAILABLE
B.P. Apparatus AVAILABLE
Suction Apparatus AVAILABLE
I.V.Set AVAILABLE
Antishock drugs AVAILABLE
Gluco Saline Set AVAILABLE
Gluco Saline Bottle AVAILABLE
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SHIFTWISE EMPLOYEES(APPROX) NOs.
MORNING 175
EVENING 176
NIGHT 174
FIRE & SAFETY ITEMS AVAILABLE WITH BR
SN Item Qty(Nos.)
1 Foam Tenders 03
2 Foam Nurser 01
3 DCP Tender 01
4 Fire fighting hose 50
5 Fire fighting Branches 20
6 Water curtain 05
7 Suction hose 10
8 DCP Fire extinguisher 1000
9 Mega phone 01
10 Safety hand lamp 10
11 Ceiling hook 02
12 Fire proximity suit 02
13 Foam generator 03
14 Fireman axe 02
15 Safety helmet 50
16 Ear plug 50
17 Dust mask 50
18 Chemical Respirator 20
19 Splash proof goggles 50
20 PVC suit 10
21 B A SET 10
22 Gas detectors 05
23 Oil sorbent 10
24 Retractable fall arrestor (5 M & 10 M) 05
25 Portable Cutter / Spreader 02
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Incident Preventing Measures And Procedure
(Reference: Section 11.3 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
The incident prevention measures and procedures at installation or other locations shall include the following:-
- HSE policy of BR lays strong emphasis on safety implementation
- BR is having a well established Safety Management System
- Safety awareness is propagated through structured programs and various procedures are implemented to prevent incidents as mentioned below
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III. Safety Committees
A. Management Safety and Health Committee (MSHC): The Management Safety Committee has been constituted to review the performance and lapses in the safety affairs of the company. The meeting is done monthly and chaired by the Executive Director of BR. This meeting is attended by all GMs, all DGMs, all Deptt. Heads, Fire and Safety officers, and officers from HSE Department as members. The loss control action points are discussed. Mode of implementation of the recommendation is finalized. The status of previous points is reviewed.
B. Sectional Safety & Health Committee (SSHC) Sectional Safety & Health Committee Meeting conducted monthly at 09 work locations with practical demonstration of PPE and Fire Extinguisher. The SSHCM is chaired by the senior officer (HOD/ Area Manager / Sectional head) of the section, who by his position in the organization can contribute effectively to the functioning of the committee. Apart from Safety Officer, Health officer and working department, the meeting is attended by at least one representative from allied service department e.g. mechanical maint., instrumentation, civil maint., electrical maint., administration department. Equal numbers of representatives of workers are present in the meeting.
IV. Safety Audits and Inspections Safety audit through systematic checks and critical appraisal of potential hazards involving operating personnel / process plant / offsite areas etc. are very helpful in assessing effectiveness of existing safety measures in these areas. To meet this requirement, BR has established a multi-disciplinary safety audit team to assess the safety requirement specially covering the following areas:
Fire Protection system
Accident prevention / safety practices
Operating procedure
Maintenance & Inspection practices The plant safety inspection is carried out as per a checklist by senior
executives of the refinery. The recommendations are implemented and monitored by top management. Apart from correcting unsafe conditions, the use of PPEs has been ensured with this. Following different types of inspection are undertaken at Barauni Refinery so as to cover a good proportion of all unsafe actions and conditions.
Periodic inspection
Intermittent inspection
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Continuous inspection
Special inspection.
Internal safety audit is carried out at all the facilities as per a schedule by a multidisciplinary team as per as per OISD-145. All the facilities in Barauni Refinery are covered minimum once every year for the purpose of internal safety audit. The recommendations are implemented and monitored by top management.
In addition, External Safety Audits (ESA) and Surprise Safety Check (SSC)
are carried out on regular intervals by a high level multidisciplinary team constituted by the OISD / Ministry. The recommendations are liquidated and monitored up to board and ministry level. The schedule of last two ESAs and SSCs of Barauni Refinery in the following table:
Sl.No EXTERNAL AUDIT
1. ESA-7 was conducted during 4th to 8th Feb. 2008;
2. SSC-7 was conducted during 22nd to 23rd Feb. 2010
3. SSC -8 was conducted during May,2011
4. ESA -8 was conducted during 3RD to 7TH Sept 2012
The safety audit cell of Head Quarter monitors and keeps a close follow up on
the implementation of the recommendations.
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V. Work Permit System
The refinery follows a very elaborate Work Permit System as described below. This system is strictly as per OISD-105. Following work permits exist at BR:
01. Fire permit Any work, which can produce sufficient heat to ignite the combustible/ inflammable mixture in atmosphere.
02. Excavation permit For digging, cutting of the road
03. Electric Isolation and de-energisation permit
To work on any electrical line / equipment or associated facilities.
04. Vessel entry permit To entry of a man into a vessel or for any Maintenance job in a pressure vessel.
05. Vehicle entry permit For the entry of vehicles inside the battery area (Hazardous zone).
06 “Working at Height” permit To work at height
07 Radiation Permit To work with ionization radiations such as radiography.
VI. Early Warning Alarm System Following early warning alarm systems are available in the Barauni Refinery in the process units and in the vicinity of storage tanks, filling station, delivery points and along with periphery with the indication in the central control room:
a. High level / low level alarms b. High pressure / low pressure alarms c. High temp / low temp alarms d. Heat detection system e. Hydrocarbon detectors f. Hydrogen detectors g. H2S ground level monitors h. CO monitors i. CCTV cameras
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VII. Safety through Design (In Built Facilities And Other Emergency Safety Interlock Systems)
The design of process units and connected facilities has been done in accordance with National / International Codes and sound engineering practices. The process design and detailed engineering takes care of various safety aspects of plant and other equipment consideration. The layout of the plant is confirming to wind direction, wind velocity and other Meteorological parameters. The equipment layout confirms not only the design standards, but also takes scare of safety aspects like easy passage for movement for operating and maintenance personnel. The provision of Safety release valves connected to a well designed flare system confirms to design codes / standards. For safety in operation, all process units of the refinery have been provided with 100% automatic control system proven in the field of process industries. This enhances the safety aspects further. Microprocessor based Distributed Digital Control System (DDCS) has been installed in the all process units and tank farm area, replacing the conventional Pneumatic Control System. This system has inherent advantages over the earlier system as it has got analytical capability as well. The facility exists for the plant safety, in case any operating parameters go out of control, in the event of system failure. Adequate shutdown valves, trips have been provided to bring down the unit operation safely to take care of emergency situations. To take care of safety through design and in built facilities there is a well qualified group of safety engineers and process engineers in the process section. The main activities of the group are to review the existing facilities. Risk analysis study, Disaster Management Planning, Preparation of scheme, suggesting and taking measures for adoption of new technology in the field of safety. In order to avoid breakdown of the equipment leading the potential risk situation, an effective maintenance schedule covering both static and rotary equipment have been adopted in the refinery. A well defined and elaborate maintenance manual exists. All the procedures and practices and safety precaution to be observed during any maintenance are clearly laid down in the manual. During any maintenance job, work permit system is strictly adhered to, and is being closely monitored by concerned supervisor and fire & safety division. The use of necessary personal protective equipment like safety belt for working at height, face shield and hand gloves for welding, cutting, grinding, breathing apparatus set for any confined place entry etc. is strictly complied with. Advanced control system available at the time of project implementation for automatic operation of process units had been adopted in the plant. Unit wise trip system also exists for safety of the equipments.
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VIII. Fire Protection and HSE Management system
The IOCL, Barauni refinery has the following fire fighting facilities:
Fire water reservoir
Fire Pump House
Fire Hydrant and Water Monitor system
Auto water spray / deluge system
Semi Fixed Foam Pourer System
Auto Foam System
Fire Water Storage
Fire water is provided in three above ground reservoirs of capacity 7500 m3 (2
tanks) and 5000 m3 (1 tank). These tanks receive water either from fresh water
header or bio-treated water pumps. All 3 tanks are interconnected and having
suction line to all pumps. Total capacity of fire water storage tank is 20,000M3.
Fire Pump house
Fire pump house has 11 nos. of fire water pumps of 700 m3/hr capacities at a
discharge pressure of 10.8 Kg/cm2 each and two Jockey pumps of 250 m3/hr
at 12 Kg/cm2.
The main fire pump house has 6 diesel drives and 5 electrical drives.
Fire hydrant and Water Monitor system
Total refinery area has been covered with around 32 Kms long fire water
network. The main features of the fire water network include:
DH fire hydrant = 712 nos
Water monitors = 250 nos
Water cum foam monitors = 10nos
High Volume Long Range Monitor = 40 nos
Dry / Wet Riser system at Coker – A, Coker –B, TPS, ADMN building,
HGU, DHDT, RFCCU, SRU.
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.
Auto water spray / deluge system
Quartzoid bulb type automatic water sprinkler system has been installed in the
following areas,
L.P.G Bottling shed, Cylinder evacuation shed, Cylinder repair shed,
Storage vessels, Pump
House of LPG bottling plant.
LPG bulk dispatch facilities
LPG Pumps
LPG Horton spheres & LPG Mounded bullets & LPG MB P/House
H2 storage bullets in CRU
TPS Transformer area
All hydrocarbon tanks containing Class-A & Class-B petroleum are provided with
Semi fixed foam pourer system as per OISD Std.-116. Foam pourers are
provided on top of the tank shell and the foam –water solution lines are
extended up to road side for introducing foam from road side with help of Foam
Tenders.
Auto Foam System
These systems are provided for auto fire fighting in case of crude tank (238,239
& 240) fire & RFCCU feed tank (801,802,803) fire.
Adequacy of Fire Water Storage
As per OISD-116, sec 5.4.1, the effective capacity of the fire water reservoir
above the level of suction point shall be minimum 4 hours aggregate working
capacity of main pumps (excluding standby pumps).
At present, the maximum fire water demand for the plant is 3736 m3/hr and
6 main pumps with total flow rate of 4200 m3/hr are sufficient to meet the
demand. As per above guidelines, the water storage capacity should be
16800 m3 and the present capacity is 20000 m3.
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IX. Do’s and Don’ts Written Instructions for Visitors
Available and given before entry.
X. Safety MIS System and Sending Exception Reports:
It is prepared by Fire & Safety Department / HSE department and forwarded to top management and Head Quarter.
XI. Inspection And Operation Of All Standby Equipments
All standby equipments are tried and operated periodically and recorded. Similarly back up power for safety equipment and instrument is also checked periodically and observations are recorded.
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CHECK LIST - 2
(Reference: Section 11.3(xii) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
Incident Prevention Measures
Sr. # Check-point
Remarks
1 Whether Safety, Health and Environment Policy of the location is displayed
Yes
2 Whether the Safety Policy is documented and duly approved by the top management
Yes
3 Whether the Safety Policy is well structured to cover all elements of Safety, Health and Environment protection
Yes
4 Whether the layout is convenient from operation and safety aspects and meets minimum distance norms as per OISD-118
Yes
5 Whether a duly constituted Safety Committee is functioning in the location with representation from workmen/staff
Yes
8 Whether all unsafe developments and likely risks are deliberated in the meetings and appropriate steps are recommended for eliminating such risks
Yes
9 Whether compliance status of recommendations of earlier Safety Committee meetings are discussed before taking up new issues.
Yes
10 Whether performance and shortcomings observed during recent mock disaster drills form part of the discussions in safety committee meetings
Yes
11 Is the safety committee minutes are recorded and signed by all the attending members
Yes
13 Whether periodical safety audits and inspections by internal and external audit teams are conducted in defined intervals
Yes
14 Whether a system of regular monitoring of such audit compliances by controlling offices / HO are in place
Yes
15 What is the composition of external audit teams to ensure impartiality of audit findings
Multidisciplinary teams
16 Whether Work Permit System in line with OISD-105 have been implemented
Yes
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17 Whether work permits are issued for hot work, cold work, electrical work and vessel entry jobs
Yes
18 Whether the location-in-charge or his authorized nominee remain the issuer for all hot work and vessel entry permits for enhanced safety and control.
Yes
19 Whether work permits are duly closed at completion of the stipulated jobs, duly certified by the supervising officer
Yes
20 Whether heat detectors in tank sprinkler systems, high level alarms of tank farm management system are provided and checked for regular functioning
Yes
21 Whether in-built safety interlocks provided in the design of the terminal are adequately specified and checked for regular functioning
Yes
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CHAPTER – 6
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MEASURES
(Reference: Section 12 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
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6.1. Emergency Drills and Mock Exercises
(Reference: Section 12.1 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
A. Mock Drill / Table Top Exercises
Fire mock drills are carried out fortnightly. Performance of each individual connected or affected with the exercise is observed. In-addition, observations of person present at site at that time is also recorded. A report is prepared on the exercise including the observations for information and corrective actions, if any. Disaster Drills:
On-site Disaster drill shall be conducted once in every three month on different emergency scenarios to check the preparedness and know the shortcomings, if any. These are to be addressed for rectification in time bound manner. The records shall be maintained by “Fire & Safety Department”. Objectives:
After detail discussion following objectives of mock fire drills and training were established - 1. To evaluate the response time of emergency teams like fire, medical, search &
Rescue etc. It should be minimum possible as per site condition. 2. Action taken at site by emergency teams as per situation. 3. Effectiveness of emergency systems like fire fighting system, communication
system etc. 4. Response of On Site Emergency Plan Co-ordinators in case of On site
emergency drill. 5. Response of water block 6. Response of Security department - CISF 7. Training and awareness of personnel. Observers:
Observers shall be appointed prior to the mock drill. The observers shall be well experienced and knowledgeable persons of the field. They shall be briefed about the scenario of mock drill and objectives of the mock drill. They will be deputed at different locations. After completion of mock drill they will submit their observations to GM (T).
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B. Emergency Scenarios Identified Through Risk Analysis
Based on the Risk Analysis done for BR, based on the various accidents as detailed above and also Significant Risks Identified during Risks Identification activity done at departmental level as per the requirement of Occupational Health and Safety Management System (OHSAS-18001:2007), the following scenarios likely to occur in BR, have been considered for finalising detail action plan on any on site emergency situation:
First Aid:
First Aid Training is imparted to cover all the employees.
Identified Disaster Scenarios:
S.N SCENERIO LEVEL
1. LPG FIRE LEVEL 3
2. TANK FIRE LEVEL 2
3. TOXIC GAS RELEASE (H2S) LEVEL3
4. OIL SPILLAGE LEVEL 1
5. NATURAL CALAMITY LEVEL 2
6. SECURITY THREAT) LEVEL 2
7. FIRE / EXPLOSION IN UNIT AREA LEVEL 2
8. DOUBLE FIRE CONTIGENCY LEVEL 2
9. CO GAS LEAKAGE LEVEL 1
10. HYDROGEN GAS LEAKAGE LEVEL 1
11. PIPELINE RUPTURE LEVEL 1
12. TRANSPORTATION INCIDENT LEVEL 2
13. CYCLONE LEVEL 3
14. EARTHQUAKE LEVEL 1
15. BOILER EXPLOSION IN THERMAL POWER STATION
LEVEL 2
16. NAPHTHA LEAK IN COOLING WATER SYSTEM
LEVEL 1
17. UN-NOTICED CONTINUOUS LEAK OF LPG FROM SAMPLING / DRAINING POINTS IN THE PROCESS UNITS
LEVEL 2
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C. Schedule of Checking & calibration
S. No.
Activities Reference Frequency Status
1
DETECTORS : 1. Operability of
detectors 2. Calibration of
detectors by using test gas
OISD STD-116
1. Once in 3 month
2. Once in 6 month
Done as per schedule
2
Communication system: 1. Testing of fire
siren 2. Testing of Pill box 3. Testing of walkie-
talkie
OISD STD.- 116
1. Daily
2. Once in a month 3. Once in a week
Done as per
schedule
D. Participation of Outside Groups and Agencies in Disaster Drills
Annually Off-site Disaster Drill is conducted with participation of District Administration, Fire services, Police Deptt., Medical Services, Transport Deptt., Civil Defense, near by industries and other voluntary organizations.
E. Disaster Drills & Frequency
Testing and mock drills for onsite emergency plan are carried once in three months and for offsite emergency plan twelve months.
Sr No. Activities Reference Frequency Status
1 Fire Mock Drill OISD-STD- 116 Once in a month Being followed.
2 On-Site Disaster Drill MSIHC Rules 1989
Once in 6 month Being followed.
Internal Advice Once in 3 month Being followed
3 Off-Site Disaster Drill MSIHC rules 1989
Once in a year Being followed.
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F. De-Briefing Session
After, “All clear siren”, all the co-ordinators and concerned officials assemble at Crisis Control Room to obtain feedback on the effectiveness of the response, mobilization of resources etc.
In case of drills, observers are posted at key locations to register their observations and their observations are discussed during the debriefing session.
The recommendations of the observers are further discussed in the Management Safety and Health Committee meetings and remedial actions are taken.
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CHECK LIST-3
[(Reference: Section 12.1(i) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
MUTUAL AID / MOCK DRILLS
Sr.# Check-point Remarks
1 Whether mock fire / emergency response drills are held Mock drills are conducted each month
2 If yes, periodicity of emergency response drills Fire Mock Drill - Once in a month
On-Site Disaster Drill- Once in 3 month
Off-Site Disaster Drill- Once in a year
3 Mock drills cover all types of probable emergencies Yes
4 Does the location have Mutual Aid Plan No
5 If yes, the details of other members including names and contact nos. of concerned officials
NA
6 List of fire fighting equipments available with each Mutual Aid members including District Fire Service
NA
7 Compatibility of safety equipment of all Mutual Aid members including District Fire Services with said location has been tested and documented in the DMP
NA
8 Details of water storage available with Mutual Aid member including District Fire Service and mechanism to utilize the same in the said location well documented in the DMP
NA
9 Details of fire fighting foams concentrate/chemicals available with Mutual Aid members including nearest Fire Service has been incorporated
NA
10 Details of lead time for response of Mutual Aid members including District Fire Service has been documented in the DMP
NA
11 Periodicity of safety training for officers, staff, contractor workers, TT crew and security personnel mentioned in the ERDMP.
12 Mutual Aid Plans
Does the location have established Mutual Aid Plans
No
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13 Which are the Mutual Aid Team members and the assistance offered
NA
14 Does the plan clearly indicate types of possible hazards and fire fighting measures required.
Yes
15 Does the plan include expected assistance from each members
NA
16 Does the Plan spell out the communication protocol and the channels in times of emergency
Yes.
17 Periodic joint exercise and meetings for practice, familiarization and identifying and resolving compatibility issues.
NA
Strategies with other organizations for obtaining raw materials
In order to facilitate quick supply of required equipment/materials for restoration, other IOC refineries (Mathura / Haldia / Panipat / Guwahati / AOD) will be contacted.
6.2 TRAINING
(Reference: Section 12.2 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
(1) Training material and general philosophy on emergency prevention and control are kept separate from the working plan.
(2) Training is imparted to all the personnel likely to be involved directly or indirectly to the emergencies including employees, contract workers, transport crew and security personnel.
(3) Contract personnel and contract labourer is allowed to start work only after clearance of attending and passing safety training.
(4) Refresher training is conducted at regular intervals. TRAINING TO CONTRACT WORKERS:
Training to all contractor workers is mandatory before entering inside Refinery and to achieve the goal daily training is organized.
Training to contract supervisors is given as per OISD Standard - 154. The course content includes knowledge of petroleum product and their hazardous property, prevention of fire / accident and safety precaution etc.
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In addition, fire fighting safety training to contractor supervisor and workers is given at fire station and at work locations regularly.
The contractors’ work force is also given training / safety talk at work location during M&I shutdown.
In addition, fire & safety gives safety talk / demonstration of use of Personnel Protective Equipment (PPEs) before commencement of critical nature of job viz. man entry to a vessel, tank, sewage manhole etc.
TRAINING TO CISF PERSONNEL:
All CISF personnel are trained on fire and safety regularly. FIRE TRAINING GROUND:
The fire training ground is used for the training of plant personnel and others.
6.3 Mutual Aid Scheme
(Reference: Section 12.3 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
No mutual aid scheme is available.
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CHAPTER – 7
RESPONSE PROCEDURE AND MEASURES
(Reference: Section 13 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
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a) Zoning And Maps
(Reference: Section 13(a) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
The zones and maps have been prepared highlighting the Incident prone areas of the unit so that in case of an emergency it serves as a basis for taking the action. This indicates the size of the area within which human life is seriously endangered by the consequences of incident. This also indicate the location of assembly points
1. Different zones as per the risk scenarios based on the risk analysis are already mentioned in Chapter 4 and also refer Quantitative Risk Analysis Report of BR 2011.
2. Location of assembly point is shown in the figure below:
Barauni Refinery-in harmony with nature 19
Barauni Refinery
Assembly
Points
HIGH RISK ZONES & ASSEMBLY POINTS - BR
LPG Area
SRU
CRUDE TANK Farm
N
3. Wind speed and direction is mentioned in Chapter – 4.
4. Nearby areas and living populace is given in Chapter 4.
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b) Layout / Flow Diagram
(Reference: Section 13(b) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
Detailed lay out and flow diagram for different activities/process is attached as Annexure – 3 & 4.
c) MANPOWER
(Reference: Section 13(c) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
MANPOWER
Regular employees 1282
Security staff 297
Shiftwise**
Morning 175(approx)
Evening 176(approx)
Night 175(approx)
**Based on time office record
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MAJOR DISASTER SCENARIOS
1. LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS (LPG) FIRE
LPG Assumed Scenario CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF LPG HORTON SPHERE
a) LPG Storage facility for Barauni Refinery:
Horton Sphere Capacity V-3 1500 M3 V-4 1500 M3
Both the vessels are provided with following safety facilities as listed here under:
Automatic Water Sprinkler system for cooling.
Outside insulation to eliminate direct exposure to heat.
Fire hydrants and water monitors for cooling purpose surrounding the Horton Spheres.
Access way around the Horton Spheres.
Each Horton Sphere has two safety relief valves to prevent over pressurization.
ROVS to isolate the vessels as and when required from Control Room.
Each Horton Sphere is inspected and tested periodically as per SMPV rules.
Safety Relief valves are inspected yearly.
HC gas detectors for early detection of leakage, if any.
b) Disaster Scenario
The consequence of catastrophic failure of LPG Horton sphere will be explosion and subsequent fire. The damage effect of wind pressure waves will be felt up to 1.28 KM in the prevailing wind direction causing property damage and personal injury due to flying splinters.
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c) For Fire Fighting At LPG HS Area:
On getting the information, the 1st turn out fire tender along with fire crew immediately rushes to LPG HS area via Road No. 2, 7 or 2, 5, 8 as per the wind direction.
At fire station control room 2nd T/out operator sounds the fire bell, Operate ARP & instructs water block to start firewater pumps.
Parking of the FT on road no. 7, 8 & 7B according the wind direction away from the incident site.
Start Fire fighting by spraying water through water monitors and fire vehicle over the fire to extinguish and disperse the LPG.
Manual operation of water sprinkler if auto system fails.
If required, operation of DCP extinguishers to extinguish the fire.
Operations of ground water monitors to cool the affected facilities.
Operation of elevated water monitors to cool the facilities.
Operations of water sprinkler system of nearby tank
Suspension of Filling / loading operations at bulk loading area by Production personnel.
Barricading of the road by CISF.
Evacuation of the area & Rescue operation.
Calling of 2nd turn out fire tender or DCP tender as per the need.
Blowing of major fire/disaster siren.
Activation of on –site disaster management plan.
S&EP to verify various environment effects under Environment Protection Act guide lines and to coordinate with SPCB.
Ambient air monitoring at the site by SPCB –included in DMP
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2. TANK FIRE (CRUDE OIL STORAGE TANK FIRE)
a) DESCRIPTION AND LOCATION OF THE FACILITY:
Barauni Refinery processes imported crude oil. The crude oil is received by HBCPL and stored in tanks no. TK No. 501 of 45,000 KL nominal capacity having diameter of 65 meters & tank no. 235 to 240 of 40,000 KL each.The crude oil tank from is situated in the eastern part of the refinery premises.The crude tank farms are surrounded by Road No. IVA in the southern side. VIA in the northern side, XI in the eastern side, IXA in the western side and IX in between the two tank farms.
b) AVAILABLE FIRE FIGHTING FACILITIES:
The crude tanks have been provided with Semi Fixed Foam pourers. Fire hydrants have been provided along the roads in the periphery of the tank farms.
c) INCIDENT
The operator from OM&S (R) while on his routine round for tank gauging notices a thick black smoke coming out from Tank No. 237 (crude tank). On seeing the fire, the operator makes the fire call and then informs PNE OM&S (R), who in turn informs RSM. The Tank 237 is a floating roof tank and is having about 9,000 KL of freshly received crude. The tank is of 65 meters dia, and 14 meters height. Tank 235, 236 & 237 are located in the same dyke. These are situated towards the eastern boundary wall. The distance of tank 237 from Road No. VII is 387 meters and from Road No. IV-A is 37 meters. Tank 237 is 237 meters from Road No. IX-A. hydrants are located on all the above roads and spaced every 30 meters.
d) ACTION PLAN:
OBJECTIVES:
To contain and control the fire in tank no. 237 and any subsequent fire in the adjoining tanks.
To cool down the nearby storage tank.
To rescue injured persons and to arrange necessary medical aid.
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Rehabilitation of affected persons
ACTIVITY:
Water spray system on affected tank is activated.
Central foam pourer facility is activated.
Water spray system on nearby tanks is activated.
HVLRs are charged to direct foam in the tank 237.
Foam nurser/foam tenders are manured to replenish foam in the auto foam house & foam monitor facility.
The Chief coordinator reports in the spot after assessing the situation, declared “DISASTER”. (1st major fire then disaster)
The disaster siren is blown in the refinery and the Township.
The Crisis Control Room is made activate.
Disaster Management plan is activated.
CISF personnel are deployed for fighting fire and hoses drawn from hydrant.
BFS fire tenders are directed to fight fire.
OM&S suspended Crude receipt in tank no. 240 by Atmospheric Units are cut-off and units are put on hot circulation.
Injured Personnel from inside and outside the Refinery are transported to Site Dispensary/Hospital.
S&EP to verify various environment effects under Environment Protection Act guide lines and to coordinate with SPCB.
Ambient air monitoring at the site by SPCB
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3. TOXIC GAS RELEASE (H2S):
a) ARU, SWS AND SRU UNIT
ARU and SWS top line mainly contains H2S rich gas. This gas is sent to SRU for sulphur recovery through 8” / 6” line.
b) SCENARIO
The area / system operator on his routine checkup observed gasket failure of the 6”-ARU / SWS top line leading to SRU Feed Drum 705 V-01. Outcome: Toxic Vapor Cloud
c) ACTION PLAN:
Release of H2S from the failure site will affect large area in and around the refinery. He immediately rushes to Control Room and informs RSM and Fire Station about the leak alerted and people are advised not to leave their units. Emergency stop button for ARU / SWS feed pump in the control room is operated to cut off feed to ARU / SWS as early as possible. PNE / SPNE and other area operators initiate necessary actions to mitigate the hazardous consequence of such failure. Depressurize system to Flare (H2S) .CPNM to isolate the ARU unit at B/L and at individual feed product tank On-site Disaster Manual Plan is put into action. Meanwhile CISF personal are deputed for cordoning and guarding the area where gas accumulated, CISF patrol also alerted the people in the surrounding area through Megaphone about the hazard of Gas Release. District Authority is informed about the incident and they are requested to provide necessary Police/Home guard help. To stop any vehicle movement (except Fire Tender), Roadblocks are made on approaching roads to SRU.
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4. OIL SPILLAGE (OIL SPILLAGE FROM HSD TANK NO. 220)
a) LOCATION OF TANK NO. 220
HSD Tank no. 220 is situated at the southern side of road no. 6& LPG mounded bullets. Two HSD tanks, Tank no. 220 and 221 are located in the same dyke. The tank farm area containing tank no. 220 & 221 is surrounded by LPG Mounded Bullets on the north, HSD tanks nos. 226 & 228 on the south, road no. 7 on the west and road no. 9 on the east. The tank no. 220 is a fixed roof tank of capacity 10,000 M3. The tank is full with freshly received HSD. The tank-dyke is surrounded by surface drain going towards southern and western side.
b) INCIDENT
ASSUMED SCENARIO: HUGE OIL SPILL
RSM on his routine round in morning shift finds lot of oil over flowing through the oil catch pit near bioremediation site of oily sludge. Immediately he made Fire call and with the help of employees and CISF personnel, sand bags are put to block the outflow from catch pit. Meanwhile OM&S and all process unit in charges are alerted.
After about ½ an hour, the source could be identified in one of the HSD tank dyke. HSD is coming out from Tank no.220 due to rupture of gasket of outlet valve and accumulated in the dyke. Oil comes out of the dyke and led to surface drain.
On checking the tank dip, it is ascertained that about 2.000 KL of oil has been drained out of the tank and found its way into open channel, outside low lying area and burrow pit posing threat of fire hazard. Ambient air monitoring at the site by SPCB
c) SITUATION IN THE REFINERY:
All the processing units are running normal. Loading of tank wagon, LPG bulk trucks had just started. Crude tank no. 240 is receiving crude oil from HBCPL.
Crude tank no. 236 & 238 are feeding to crude distillation units.
BKPL Pipeline is in operation. In thermal power station one TG and two GT in line along with 2 nos. of boilers were generating around 37 MW Power and 170 MT /Hr steam respectively.
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On that day, there are 200 persons in the shift and 40 CISF personal on duty. Due to continuous heavy rain, arrangement for sand bags is made and kept ready near bioremediation site.
d) ACTION PLAN:
On hearing the Fire call, fire tenders rushes towards bioremediation site. Meanwhile CISF are directed to close the gate of the surface drain and block with sand bags. RSM sends a group of CISF people with a vehicle to survey the surrounding area affected by oil spill. Alarm is raised through the P.A. system to identify and isolate the source of oil spill.
Meanwhile, RSM contacted CPNM, DGM (PN), and GM (T) to appraise the situation.
GM (T) reported at site and after assessment of the situation, declares “DISASTER”.
Siren is blown accordingly and crisis control room is put into service.
On-site disaster Management Plan is put into action.
Within ½ an hour, the source is identified at tank no. 220. The tank dyke outlet is closed. Another fire tender is instructed to proceed near Tank no. 220.
On seeing the profuse leakage from outlet valve, the OM&S operators are told to pump out HSD from tank no. 220 to tank no. 221, which is having sufficient ullage.
Meanwhile CISF personal are deputed for cordoning and guarding the area where oil accumulated, CISF patrol also alerted the people in the surrounding area through Megaphone about the hazard of oil spill. To stop any vehicle movement (except Fire Tender). Roadblocks are made on road no. 7, 8 and 9. Fire Tender at bioremediation site is instructed to be stationed at burrow pit area.
e) OIL RECOVERY:
To drain oil from dyke to OWS into emergency guard basin.
To salvage oil from drains and catch pits.
To recover oil from borrow pit.
Lined up Emergency guard Basin for receiving oil from tank dyke.
With the help of contract laborers, the oil is skimmed-off from catch pit near bioremediation site and transported to nearest OWS and
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drained for recovery. The oil hold up in the open channel was also washed away and collected in the catch pit near bioremediation site
Contractor laborers are engaged for collecting the oil spill in borrow pit. (The oil is scooped in buckets and stores in empty oil drums. These drums are subsequently transported to Refinery for recovery).
Meanwhile, mobile pneumatic pump is mobilized from BKPL for recovery of oil from borrow pit.
The entire operation of recovery takes 3 days (working from morning to evening). However, round the clock patrolling is continued till the entire operation was over.
HSE to verify various environment effects under Environment Protection Act guide lines and to coordinate with SPCB.
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5. FLOOD
a) INCIDENT
ASSUMED SCENARIO: FLOOD SITUATION IN BARAUNI
REFINERY
There is incessant rain in Begusarai industrial belt. At times the rainfall was 40mm/Hr. and continued for about 2 days. The meteorological weather bulletin anticipated further rainfall during 48 hours in the Begusarai and adjoining catchment area. It is also informed that the rainfall will be accompanied by cyclone at a wind velocity of 80-100 Km/Hr. Flood control authority also raises an alarm as the level in the nearby rivers Burhi Gandak and Ganga were rising at an alarming rate.
Design rainfall intensity of Barauni Refinery is 366 mm/day (max.). Average grade level of Barauni Refinery is 42.5 M (above sea level). Storm water drains criss cross the entire refinery premises.
On the 3rd day of the rain, in the night, information is received about a breach in Gupta Bandh near Saboura village. Attempt to seal the breach with the help of District Authority is not totally successful. Meanwhile units are on emergency shutdown and arrangement for power supply from Bihar State Electricity Board is sought but within 2-3 hours the entire industrial belt plunged into darkness due to flooding at BTPS. Total communication system also fails. Due to gales and flood water, trees and light posts are uprooted at various places in and outside Refinery. The insulation sheets on Horton Sphere V-3, V-4, TK244, TK245 are ripped open due to high velocity of wind and were seen hanging precariously at different heights. Some sheets are flying off at different direction posing danger to personals.
Within 3-4 hours there is 3-4 feet of water inside the Refinery area. A thin sheet of oil was floating atop the water level in and around the Refinery posing danger of fire. Flood water also entered the site colony where rescue and evacuation start immediately.
b) SITUATION IN THE REFINERY:
All the processing units are running normal except AU-III which is under M&I shutdown. There is no activity in LPG bottling plant and tank truck loading gantry. Loading activity in Tank Wagon Loading gantry is in progress.
Crude Tank no. 236 is receiving crude oil from HBCPL and crude tank no. 227 and 228 are feeding to the Atmospheric Units.
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In the Thermal Power Station, two TGs were generating 18 MW Power. Two boilers steam generation is 170 MT/Hr. There are 300 persons in the night shift and 40 CISF personnel on duty.
c) OBJECTIVES:
Safe running of the plants with minimum manpower.
Safe emergency shutdown at appropriate time.
Catering to the basic needs of manpower in the Refinery and people in the Site Colony.
Preventing damages to the storage tanks.
Pumping out of water as the flood recedes.
Prevention of epidemics.
d) ACTIVITY:
As soon as flood control authority raised an alarm as the level in the nearby rivers (Burhi Gandak and Ganga) is rising at an alarming rate, arrangement for adequate number of Sand bags was made.
A surveillance party formed to patrol the Gupta Bandh area from Refinery to Township. Sand bags are kept at vulnerable locations along the bandh. The team kept in constant touch with the District Authorities. Flags with reflectors are posted on either sides of the approach road from the National Highway side as the Refinery Road is expected to be inundated.
All pumps in Sector-VI (ETP) are kept in serviceable condition, spare hot water and cold water motors are kept ready in a safe location. Diesel driven dewatering pumps serviced and are kept in readiness.
All operational units are prepared to take any emergency safe shutdown. Information through Public Address System is also given to the truck drivers to meet any situation arising out of flood. In OM&S tank farm, actions are taken not to keep any tank empty as a safeguard against heavy winds. Temporary scaffoldings are removed and all construction jobs are suspended. All crane booms are lowered down. Arrangement for drinking water in earther pitcher, chamois leather and military canvas bags are made. Adequate stock of food and canteen for about 400 people. Action plan chalked out for deployment of minimum number of
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people required for operational purposes during flood. Adequate number of drycell torches and portable diesel generators are kept ready to take care of emergency illumination. District Authority contacted for providing adequate nos. of boats.
As soon as information is received about the breach of
Gupta Bandh near Sabaura village, people are rushed to seal the breach with the help of District Authority but this is not totally successful. The situation is assessed by GM (T) and disaster is declared.Alarm has been raised through megaphone to alert the people in and around the refinery premises and township.Units are emergently shutdown and arrangement for power supply for Bihar State Electricity Board is made. When the entire industrial belt plunged into darkness, due to flooding at BTPS. All portable diesel generators pressed into service for illumination of vital locations (drinking water supply, Fire Station, Hospital etc.). District Authority could be contacted through wireless sets, for rendering all help.
Oil films atop the water level in hazardous areas are blanketed by foam/oil dispersant-Metaclean agent. Cranes are used to move the uprooted trees to clean the approach road. Existing First Aid centre is reinforced with more manpower, emergency drugs, and vaccines.
HSE to verify various environment effects under Environment Protection Act guide lines and to coordinate with SPCB.
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6. MAJOR FIRE / EXPLOSION IN UNIT AREA
a) INCIDENT
ASSUMED SCENARIO: FIRE / EXPLOSION in COKER A
Coker A is running normal. Operator of pump house area noticed smoke coming from 604-P-6A/B (main frac .C-1 Bottom Pump) area. He observed a jet of hot oil coming from the mechanical seal of 604-P-6A.He immediately ran to PA system to inform COKER A shift I/C. By the time he informed the SIC, a fire took place in the area which was spreading very fast in entire unit.
b) ACTION PLAN:
Actions to be taken by Plant Personnel
Shift in Charge:
To inform Fire Station and instruct Console Officer for taking Emergency Shut-Down of the Unit.
Inform Electrical Operation and de-energize P-6 from Sub-Station
Console officer:
Put emergency steam in the secondary coil of furnace and displace the coil materials into coke chamber.
Bring down COT to 350 Oc, Establish hot circulation ,Furnace operator:Isolate BFW at battery limit and individual lines to furnace.Cut off burners in coordination with console officer. Isolate and flush FO burners that were in service.Chamber operator: Depressurize the on line coke chamber to R-1/3 in a controlled rate, after isolating from the system.
Pump house operator:
Close discharge valve of P-6 whichever was in service.
Line up P-01B and establish hot circulation in coordination with console officer.
LE operator:
Stop off-gas compressor
Close suction and discharge valves.
Start nitrogen purging.
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ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN FOR FIRE FIGHTING
Coker A Shift I/C informs Fire Station through over phone that there is fire in Coker A
Fire station shift in charge rushed to the site
Fire station shift in charge shall raise the alarm to call the laboratory shift in charge and alert CISF personnel at main gate.
At main gate, CISF will display the message “Major Fire at Coker A”
Laboratory shift in charge take the charge of Fire Station.
Within 1 minute after getting information, one Foam Tender arrives at site with Fire Station Shift I/C and fire crew. Fire Station Shift I/C orders to throw foam in the affected area and instruct fire station control room to blow Major Fire Siren.
Accordingly, the Laboratory shift in charge present in fire station blow the Major Fire Siren.
2nd Foam tender reports at site.
Cooling of other tanks in the tank farm.
CISF reports at site to SIC.
CISF to cordon off the road
Laboratory shift in charge displays the message “Major Fire at Coker A on the black board at Fire station .
IC assesses the wind direction declare the danger zone.
SIC advises to keep cool the nearby Crude Oil Tanks.
Incident control coordinator assesses the wind direction and stays in cross wind direction at a safe distance and advises all the undesired personnel to leave the site immediately.
Requisition of ambulance for shifting one fire fighter and one PH operator to First aid centre.
Ambulance driver to report to SIC
Affected area in-charge arranges to close the valve from tank farm to storm water channel.
SIC informs CIC to send 100 sand bags, hey filters and one dewatering pump at site.
SIC informs CIC for emergency light
SIC requisitions additional foam for fire fighting
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Arranging diesel for fire tenders
SIC demands drinking water & refreshment at site
Transport, Welfare & Media coordinator arranges tea for manpower mobilization group and employees assembled at Refinery Club
Running DG set for back-up power
Isolation of power in MS Tank farm area
CIC asks Transport Welfare and Media coordinator to mobilize vehicles for evacuation of affected area personnel.
Blowing of all clear siren for return to normalcy
CIC advises Think Tank coordinator to inspect the area and assess the loss.
All coordinators to assemble at DCC for review.
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7. DOUBLE FIRE CONTINGENCY
a) INCIDENT
ASSUMED SCENARIO:
1. Leakage of LPG followed by vapour cloud explosion and BLEVE of a partially filled Horton Sphere causing major fires / explosions in the LPG and surrounding areas
2. Fire & Explosion in Crude Oil Tank.
b) FIRE FIGHTING AT LPG HS AREA:
Fire on LPG Horton Sphere
1. Stop all operation in the area.
2. Actuate the deluge valve or open the manual valve of the affected Sphere and also the adjacent sphere.
3. Area to be cordon off with the help of CISF
4. Inform Fire & Safety Deptt. For fury the help.
5. On getting the information, the 1st turn out fire tender along with fire crew immediately rushes to LPG HS area via Road as per the win direction.
6. At fire station control room 2nd T/out operator sounds the fire bell, Operate ARP & instructs water block to start firewater pumps.
7. Parking of the Foam tenders on road according the wind direction away from the incident site.
8. Start Fire fighting by spraying water through water monitors and fire vehicle over the fire to extinguish and disperse the LPG.
9. Manual operation of water sprinkler if auto system fails.
10. If required, operation of DCP extinguishers to extinguish the fire.
11. Operations of ground water monitors to cool the affected facilities.
12. Operation of elevated water monitors to cool the facilities.
13. Operations of water sprinkler system of nearby tank
14. Suspension of Filling / loading operations at bulk loading area by Production personnel.
15. Barricading of the road by CISF.
16. Evacuation of the area & Rescue operation.
17. Calling of 2nd turn out fire tender or DCP tender as per the need.
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c) FIRE FIGHTING AT TANK FIRE: CRUDE OIL TANK FIRE
The Scenario:
The Tk No235 (Capacity: 20000 m3, Floating roof) in the refinery was filled approximately with 20000 m3 of crude oil. The tank farm operator stationed at BR, had checked the automatic level indicator to take down the level reading at 0700 hrs in the morning. The tank was not leaking at that time.
A few hours later at about 1100 hrs, the tank farm operator noticed the huge pool of oil in the dyke. He immediately rushed to the control room and informed to the SIC in control room, who in turn informed SPNM and immediately rushed to site. By the time SIC & SPNM reached the site about 6" depth of oil had accumulated in the dyke. Fire station was informed of the huge oil accumulation in the dyke and SIC / SPNM observed that tank got overflow.
DPNM was informed of the oil accumulation and actions being taken to combat the overflow. Preparations were made to install portable pumps\ Gully sucker and temporary flexible piping to pump oil from inside the tank dyke into the nearby crude oil tank.
At about 11.30 Hr. suddenly a small vapour cloud explosion took place. The explosion made the flame to travel back to the pool of oil in the dyke. Immediately the entire oil content in the dyke caught fire and started burning. The cloud of smoke had started rising high in the sky. On hearing the sound of explosion and seeing the fire, all contract labourers a /cleaners in nearby area ran in the direction away from fire.
SIC(R) phoned fire station and told the fire station shift in-charge about an explosion and a big fire in the tank dyke area . Meanwhile, the maintenance crew in and around AVU &COKER unit rushed to the site. SIC (OMS) got the sprinklers of the neighboring tanks started, and also that of the tank No.235.
Action Plan:
On receiving the fire call from SIC, the fire station control room operator sounded the fire alarm for turn out. All HODs were informed of the fire. They rushed to the site of fire.
By that time, one foam fire tenders of BR had arrived. The crew started fighting the fire with foam spray on the pool fire. Assessing the gravity of the situation at site, CPNM (OMS) and SPNM (OMS ) informed DGM
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(PN) who in turn informed about the gravity of fire to ED, and initiated actions to set up/activate the Disaster Control Room & First Aid Centre for controlling the disaster situation. Two people received severe bums. They were shifted to BR Hospital in the ambulance, which had arrived at site. Some other minor injured people were shifted to First Aid Centre.
Meanwhile, 2nd foam fire tender from FS also arrived and joined in the fire fighting operations. At this juncture, the fire could be brought under slight control, but still some minor fire kept on occurring.
The ground surrounding the other tanks in the adjacent dyke was blanketed with foam thus preventing other tanks from becoming involved in the fire. Help from CISF Jawans were also taken active part in fire fighting. Water was used to protect and cool the tanks not immediately involved.
The fire was brought under control within 1 hour and was completely extinguished 1/2 hr. later. In all 2 foam fire tenders were used. Help, from CISF Jawans was also taken for fire fighting, traffic regulating and cordoning operations. Although AVU and COKER were asked to be ready for shutting down the units at any moment as a safety measure, the damage was confined to the tank field area of 235 only.
The damage was confined to the tank 235 only. Two people received severe burns and about 6 people received first degree burns. At about 12.30 hrs all clear sirens were sounded.
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8. CARBON MONO OXIDE GAS (CO) LEAKAGE FROM FCC UNIT
a) THE HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH CO
PROPERTIES OF CO
Carbon Monoxide (CO) is produced in the process of combustion of carbon or hydrocarbons when the supply of Oxygen / air is limited. CO is a colourless, odorless and tasteless gas. Hence, its presence in case of a leak cannot be readily detected. It is a chemical asphyxiant. At a concentration of 1.3% by vol. in air it causes unconsciousness after a few breaths. It is a powerful poison. Its reaction with chlorine produces highly poisonous phosgene gas.
2 CO + 2 Cl2 - - - - - - - 2 COCl 2 (Phosgene)
CO is slightly soluble in water, but readily soluble in HCl or concentrated ammonia caloride solution of cuprous chloride, soluble in organic solvents such as ethyl acetate, chloroform or acetic acid. Physical properties of CO are listed in Annexure 4.4.1 A.
CO is an important industrial fuel and reducing agent. It is one of the chief constituents of synthesis gas. It is an important raw material in the production of methanol and other alcohol. It is also used as an agent for oxoreaction and for making di-isocyanate and ethyl acrylate. CO released to atmosphere as a gas is nearly as dense as air. Hence, in case of a leak it spreads in air easily and homogeneously through diffusion.
Release of large quantity of CO from FCC regenerator, could lead to the following phenomena, which can result in large loss.
1. Gas Cloud Explosion 2. Release of CO with immediate ignition 3. Intoxication
GAS CLOUD EXPLOSION (DELAYED IGNITION)
In case the release of CO from regenerator continues without fire a thick CO gas cloud can gather in the area. Upon finding a source of ignition gas cloud explosion would take place. The damage due to unconfined gas cloud explosion would be by fire to people/materials inside the cloud. People inside such a cloud will have little chance of surviving. Some materials in the cloud can catch fire but the flame front will pass off quickly. A substantial part of the well ventilated structure inside the gas cloud may remain undamaged. Outside the gas cloud in unconfined
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space, no one will be killed or injured as a direct consequence of a pressure wave caused by the explosion. Explosion of a gas cloud in confined/semi-confined spaces will lead to development of a blast wave due to the effect of over pressure.
RELEASE OF CO WITH IMMEDIATE IGNITION
This is by far the least dangerous if there is no vessel nearby containing hydrocarbons. Otherwise impingement of the flame on the nearby vessel may cause damage to the vessel. Fire and explosive properties of CO are listed in Annexure 4.4.1 B.
INTOXICATION
When carbon monoxide is released and remains unburnt, toxic effects also can be expected. CO is a chemical asphyxiant. It is highly toxic by inhalation. Carbon monoxide has an affinity for hemoglobin 10 times more than that of oxygen and combining with the haemoglobin, renders the latter incapable of carrying oxygen to the tissues. The effect on the body is therefore predominantly one of asphyxia.
In addition to this action, the presence of CO in haemoglobin in the blood Interfere with the dissociation of the remaining oxyhaemoglobin, so that the tissues are further deprived of oxygen. Many fatalities from CO occur in confined spaces where ventilation is inadequate. Carbon monoxide is eliminated through the lungs when air free from CO is inhaled. Over half the CO is eliminated in the first hour, when the exposure has been moderate. Repeated exposure to low concentrations of the gas up to 100 ppm in air is generally believed to cause no signs of poisoning or permanent damage.
The toxicological properties of CO are listed in Annexure 4.4.1C.
b) RISK ANALYSIS FOR CO LEAK SCENARIO
FCC UNIT DESCRIPTION
Vacuum Gas Oils are used as feed stock for Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit for cracking into Gas, LPG and other distillate products like gasoline, diesel and around 15% remains as heavy stock called clarified oil which is blended into LSHS or Furnace Oil. The feed is heated to around 370 0 C in a process furnace and injected into the reactor riser along with hot catalyst coming from regenerator. Cracking of heavier molecules into smaller molecules takes place in the riser which operates under moderate
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pressure (2.0 kg/cm2) and temperature of around 490 0 C. Coke lay down takes place on the catalyst and spent catalyst is returned to the regenerator where the carbon deposited on the catalyst is burnt off. The regenerated catalyst is recycled with fresh feed. The hydrocarbon vapours from the riser, stripper and reactor pass on to a fractionator for separation into various distillate products. Cracked gas from the fractionators overhead is routed to Gas Concentration Unit for separation of LPG components and fuel gas. The gasoline is used for manufacture of petrol and light cycle oil for diesel.
It is in the process of regeneration of catalysts with limited quantity of air, that Carbon Monoxide is produced due to partial combustion of COKE. These CO containing flue gases from regenerator are burnt in the CO-Boiler where CO gets converted to C02.
RISK ANALYSIS
Under very stable conditions, a rupture of the regenerator gas line may give rise to lethal damage up to a considerable distance. Due to the fact that carbon monoxide is odourless, special precautions should be taken for evacuation of workers who are present downwind from the point of release. Based on the risk analysis report for Barauni Refinery by TNO, Netherlands, the toxicity distances have been worked out,
c) SCENARIO
LOCATION OF FCC UNIT
FCC unit is located in the EAST side of the Refinery Battery Area
SITUATION IN FCC UNIT
FCC unit was in operation and CO Boiler was in operation with steam generation
The weather was generally calm with the wind direction West to East. The ambient temperature was 40 deg C. The PNM (FCC) was attending the daily meeting at RSM's office. The DMPN (FCC) was in his office, the SPNE (FCC) was also in his office. Both the ‘ A’ Operators were taking readings in Control Room. The PNE (FCC) was on his routine plant round. One 'B' Operator was near furnace and another near .the caustic tank. The 'C’ Operator was in pump house topping-up the lube oil in a pump bearing housing.
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The 'CO’ Boiler Engineer along with the panel operator of ‘CO’ Boiler and MAB / WGC operator were in 'CO' Boiler control-room. The other ‘CO’ Boiler Operator was near feed water pumps.
There were two electricians in sub station. Also there were 6 technicians of Electrical & Mechanical wing working in the pump-house; 3 Instrument technicians were doing control valve repairs at Battery limit; 3 contractor labourers were topping up lube oil in WGC reservoir; 5 contractor labourers were loading catalyst; and 6 contractor labourers were below the Riser doing area-cleaning jobs.
SCENARIO (DISASTER)
All of a sudden, a loud explosion sound was heard from Reactor / Regenerator Area in FCC Unit. A big fire was noticed in the main column/exchanger area. Some small objects (like broken glass and insulation material) were also seen flying in the air. Catalyst was seen spreading all over. The cloud of smoke had started rising high in the sky.
d) Action Plan
The PNE phoned Fire station and told fire station shift in charge about an explosion and a big fire in the FCC unit. As 'CO' gas would be present in the unit and the surroundings, fire fighting crew were advised to come to FCC unit with 10 numbers each of MASKS and Breathing Appartus Sets.
The Fire Station Control Room Operator sounded the Fire Alarm On hearing the hissing sound, PNE (FCC) rushed to control room and tripped the FD fan of CO-boiler and rotated the knob for by passing the feed from the Reactor Riser.
The 'A' Operator closed both the slide valves of the stand-pipes of Regenerator and Reactor from the panel and also diverted the Regenerator flue gases to the stack by passing the CO-boiler from the panel itself.
The PNE( FCC) phoned MAB / WGC operator to trip both machines (MAB / WGC) and also phoned to sub station electrician to stop the power supply to all FCC motors.
The PNE (FCC), who was in the pump house near CO Boiler heard the explosion followed by the jet like hissing coming from the expansion bellow on the flue gas duct to ‘CO’ Boiler. He came running to the control room. He briefed the DMPN (FCC) about his observations. The DMPN (FCC) rushed from his office to the control room. He advised Shift-in-
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charge, Fire Station for arranging to rescue of the trapped persons in the plant.
The PNE (FCC) informed RSM regarding fire, explosion and expected 'CO' gas poisoning from the FCC Unit. The PNE requested RSM to arrange for stopping of feed-stock supplies to FCC , and for closing of all FCC product run down line valves at different location (i.e. LPG, OM&S, etc). The IFO and Fuel gas to and fro lines of FCC were isolated.
At the time of explosion one ' B' operator, who was near furnace , cut off gas supply to burners and rushed towards control room.
The 'CO' Boiler Engineer along with his panel operator rushed out through emergency escape stairs from behind the panel. The MAB / WGC operator tripped both machines (MAB / WGC) and followed the 'CO' Boiler Engineer. They all rushed towards main control room.
By now, fire tenders arrived in the FCC Unit near Control room, along withCap masks and Breathing apparatus. The DMPN (FCC) and the 'CO' Boiler Engineer collected 'CO' gas monitor from control room and went out with cap masks and Breathing Apparatus and checked for 'CO' gas presence in the Unit. 'The CO' Concentration was found to be high at the North East side of CO-Boiler.
The PNE (FCC) along with two 'B' operators with B.A Apparatus rushed to FCC battery limit from the side of charge heater and closed all the battery limit valves of the Unit. Thus the FCC Unit hydrocarbon piping were isolated from the rest of the refinery. There after, they opened the two block-valves of sprinklers of pump house and main column over-head fin coolers.
On hearing the sound of explosion, all the maintenance technicians and contractor labourers ran in the direction away from the unit.
The ambulance and the rescue party with breathing apparatus arrived in the unit. They entered the affected areas to search for persons trapped in the unit. The rescue party was guided by the PNE (FCC). Two firemen also followed there with a stretcher. They found one contractor labourer lying unconscious. He removed to the ambulance and then to the hospital.
The PNM (FCC) arrived in the Unit near control room along with and CPNM. They supervised and guided the fire fighting operations. The fire crew fought the fire from western and eastern side of the Unit, supported by the operating and maintenance personnel. Two fire tenders arrived from RIL and GSFC and joined in fire fighting operations.
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The Sr Manager (F&S) arranged for creating a water screen between the FCC Unit under fire and the neighbouring unit.
When hydrocarbon supply to the FCC Unit was completly stopped, the fire was brought under control and it was finally put-off. The spraying of water in the Unit was continued to cool the surrounding area and equipments. On checking by 'CO' monitor, the 'CO' gas concentration was found to be within safe limits in the FCC Unit .
One more rescue party found a contractor labourer dead near catalyst storage area. He was removed to the hospital. Some injured people were given prompt first-aid at site and others were shifted to hospital for further treatment. The relatives of two dead labourers were informed. The Police were given the identification of 2 dead and 25 injured.
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9. HYDROGEN GAS LEAK SCENARIO
a) HYDROGEN GENERATION UNIT AT BARAUNI REFINERY
There are two Hydrogen Generation Units at Barauni Refinery.
The process involves the following four steps:
Sulphur removal
Steam reforming
High temperature shift conversion
PSA purification
b) STORAGE OF HYDROGEN
The hydrogen produced in Hydrogen Generation Unit is stored in TWO hydrogen bullets . Hydrogen is stored in these bullets at ambient temperature and at a pressure of 45 Kg/cm2.
c) RISK ANALYSIS FOR HYDROGEN LEAK SCENARIOS:
Leak of pure hydrogen gas can take place from the Hydrogen Generation Unit or hydrogen storage bullets. However, in case of an accidental release of hydrogen or hydrogen bearing mixture/due to very high buoyancy the cloud will rise very fast and will either get dispersed or an immediate ignition will occur due to reverse Joule-Thomson effect/high operating temperature. No vapour cloud formation is possible and hence no vapour cloud explosion is anticipated. Hence hydrogen leak from Hydrogen Unit does not create a disaster scenario.
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10. TRANSPORTATION INCIDENT SCENARIO One oil tanker after loading Motor Spirit (MS) from BR, while driving inside parking place located in front of BR-IOCL gate, collides with another tanker coming from opposite side. Tanker containing MS overturns and MS starts gushing out of the tanker due to damage of tanker shell.
MS in large quantity flowing” catches fire. Other tankers parked in the vicinity also engulf into fire due to back flash
ACTIVATING ON-SITE DISASTER PLAN
11. PIPELINE RUPTURE
UNCONTROLLABLE HYDROCARBON LEAKAGES FROM CRITICAL LINES OF HIGH PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE
There are so many critical lines of high pressure and temperature where Fire hazard may occur because of leakages. The uncontrollable Hydrocarbon leakages may be because of – (a) Sudden Gasket rapture of flanges or valves’ bonnet (b) Welding joint failure (c) Coming out of cap from vent line of PSV because of PSV failure.
In this case it will be difficult to control the leak.
Following will be actions plan-
1. Immediately inform at control room/Fire department regarding the incident
2. Stop all activities and remove all people to safe location.
3. If it is rotary pump immediately stop the pump and isolate it.
4. If the leak from fractionating bottom pump or it’s discharge line, stop the pump immediately either from Console or Field depending on situation and follow the procedure as mentioned in Failure of bottom pump procedure.
5. If leakages from Compressor discharge area immediately stop the compressor and isolate it from other equipments as far as possible.
6. If leakages are from the Rectified absorber or De-butanizer areas immediately isolate the heating media in reboilers ,isolate the column from feed and rundown and de-pressurize it by releasing the gas to Flare .
7. If situation can not be controlled within short period go for emergency shut down as per procedure.
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12. NATURAL CALAMITIES
HIGH WINDS / STORMS / CYCLONES
All structures/buildings have been designed to withstand the cyclonic storms and hence not much of damage is anticipated. Moreover with the present meteorological forecasting facilities it is possible to get warning about Such cyclonic storms well ahead of their happenings and therefore huge losses of men and material is a remote possibility.
Action Llan
Inform GMs/DGMs/CMTM/CMO/CMFS SHRM regarding expected time of cyclone storm
Keep constant touch with local Authorities SHRM (SDO) / DM , Begusarai for latest information.
Announce the message on loud speaker regarding expected time of Cyclone etc in battery area and township,
Stop all hot jobs and heavy equipments.
Evacuate persons from damaged, unfinished buildings / structure,
In case of half constructed structures,if not properly supported, bring them down.
Stop Hydrocarbon loading operations .
EARTH QUAKES
All equipments are designed to withstand earthquakes as stipulated in IS-875. In case of any disaster due to earthquake, it can lead to:
Fall of structures / buildings - Subsequent fires / explosions – Toxic gas / chemical leaks
These can be handled as per the action plan already described
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CHECK LIST-4 (Reference: Section 13 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
ERDMP Response Measures/Infrastructure
Sr.# Check-point Remarks
Zones, maps and layouts
1 Does the Location have Emergency Zones clearly identified for Incident prone areas
Yes.
An emergency zone based on risk analysis is attached.
2 Do the Maps indicate location of Emergency Assembly Points and Emergency Control Rooms
Yes. Map locating assembly points attached.
3 Is the process Lay-out prominently displayed Yes. Lay out plan attached.
4 Does the Piping and instrument Diagram include emergency control valves, shutdown system, isolation valves, important control valves etc.
Yes. Available in DCR.
5 Does the Fire Hydrant Layout conspicuously displayed.
Yes. Fire hydrant layout attached.
Manpower
1 Is the ERDMP Organogram clearly displayed. Yes. ERDMP organ gram displayed.
2 Does the Organogram include all duties to be attended in connection with an emergency.
Yes
3 Is the organogram include key personnel by their names or, work position
Yes. Included by work position.
4 Does it have the alternate coverage to take care of the absence of a particular person [ in cases where organogram is developed basis names]
Yes. Alternate persons are nominated.
5 Does it include assignment of all key coordinators viz. the Incident Controller, Administration and Communication Controller and Safety Coordinator?
Yes
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Emergency Control Centre (ECC)
1 Is the ECC well defined and clearly marked on the displayed layout
Yes
2 Is it strategically positioned to be outside the periphery of immediate affected area.
Yes.
3 Is the centre have adequate communication channels including internal and external telephone connections, PA, paging and VHF systems
Yes. Equipped with internal & external telephones including WLL system, PA and wireless messaging system.
4 Is list of key personnel and essential telephone nos. are prominently displayed.
Yes
5 The layouts of fire fighting system, different hazardous zones, Assembly Points are prominently displayed.
Yes. Provided in the DCR.
Emergency Assembly Points
1 Are the EAPs well defined and clearly marked on the displayed layout
Yes
2 The EAPs have pre-defined in-charges during emergencies who keep in touch with the Emergency Control Centre and Administrative Controllers and updates on the roll call on people reporting.
Yes
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CHAPTER – 8
EMERGENCY ORGANISATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES
(Reference: Section 14 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
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(1) The ERDMP identifies the safe transition from normal operation to emergency operations and systematic shut down, if any, and the delegation of authority from operations personnel to emergency response personnel. For this purpose, the plan has identified an emergency response organization with appropriate lines of authority with succession planning and actuating the response management. Responsibilities for decision making are shown in an emergency organization chart. The plan has identified each responder's position, mission, duties and reporting relationship.
(2) Overall objectives of IOCL,BR is:
(a) To promptly control problems as they develop at the scene.
(b) To prevent or limit the impact on other areas and off-site.
(c) To provide emergency personnel, selecting them for duties compatible with their normal work functions wherever feasible. The duties and functions assigned to various people shall include making full use of existing organizations and service groups such as fire, safety, occupational health, medical, transportation, personnel, maintenance, and security.
(d) Employees will assume additional responsibilities as per laid down procedure of ERDMP whenever an emergency alarm sounds.
(e) In setting up the organization, the need for round-the-clock coverage shall be essential. Shift personnel must be prepared to take charge of the emergency control functions or emergency shutdown of system, if need be, until responsible personnel arrive at the site of emergency. The organization has an alternate arrangement for each function.
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Typical Organogram for Control of Emergency (Reference: Section 14.1 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
Medical Services
and Ambulance
Fire Brigade
Services
Police
Services
Off-Site Incident
Commander
(District
Magistrate) Medical Services
and Ambulance
Fire Brigade
Services
Off-Site Incident
Commander
(District
Magistrate) Medical Services
and Ambulance
Fire Brigade
Services
Off-Site Incident
Commander
(District
Magistrate)
CHIEF INCIDENT
CONTROLLER
Medical Services
and Ambulance
Fire Brigade
Services
Affected Stake
Holders and
Government
Authorities
Off-Site Incident
CONTROLLER (District
Magistrate/District
Authority)
SITE INCIDENT
CONTROLLER
Mutual Aid
Municipal transport
rescue and
rehabilitation team
Support
Services * Administration and Communication
Coordinator
Fire Safety and Fire
Team /HSE
Coordinator
Operation Team,
Technical Team,
Etc.
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* During odd hours, the Refinery Shift Manager (RSM) shall act as Incident Coordinator till Site Incident Coordinator [DGM (PN)] / Alternate Incident Coordinator (CPNM) arrives at the site.
8.1. Organogram of Barauni Refinery for Control of Emergency
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Notes:
1. The Alternate Coordinator will function as the Coordinator in absence of designated main coordinator.
2. All Coordinators / Alternate Coordinators shall report at their designated place as shown in the organogram above.
3. In case of declaration of Off-site Disaster by Chief coordinator, GM (HR) will act as Industry Coordinator for liaison with District Authorities.
4. Role and responsibilities mentioned above are applicable in case of single contingency at a time.
5. In case of two contingencies simultaneously, GM (TS & HSE) will act as chief incident controller for second contingency and alternate site coordinators shall respond for second contingency. Disaster control room and chief main coordination group shall be common for both the contingencies. In the absence of main co-coordinators, successor shall respond to first contingency and second contingency shall be attended by second line of successors as mentioned below.
6. List of Assembly Points & Escape route to be followed in case of Evacuation is tabulated below:
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8.2. Organizational Structure During On-Site Disaster
a) GM (T) will be Chief Coordinator (Chief Incident Controller) for mitigation of the emergency. In his absence, GM (TS & HSE) shall be the Chief Coordinator (Chief Incident Controller). If both are absent, officiating GM (T) shall be the Chief Coordinator.
b) GM (T) who is also designated as the Chief Co-coordinator will declare the
Disaster.
c) DGM (PN) will be Chief Coordinator (Site Incident Controller) for mitigation of the emergency. In his absence, CPNM shall be the Incident Coordinator. If both are absent, the officer who is officiating as DGM (PN) shall be the Incident Coordinator. In case the disaster occurs during odd hours, the Refinery Shift Manager (RSM) shall act as Incident Coordinator till DGM (PN) / Incident Coordinator arrives at the site.
d) The Incident Co-coordinator of the disaster will be assisted by a number of
functional Co-coordinators listed in the organization chart.
Sl. No. Assembly Point In charge
(S/Shri)
Alternate
(S/Shri)
Escape Route
1. In front of OM&S building
H. C. Verma
CMNM (CL)
H. S. Rukhaiyar
SMNMML
Through
Gate no. 10
2. Southern Side of Canteen
K. K. Majumdar
CTRM
M. Chakraborty
CMIS
Through
Gate No. 1
3. South West corner of Rd. No. 1 x 2
R. S. Prasad
SITM
Ashok Kumar
SMTM
Through
Gate no. 2
4. In front of BXP Control Room
B. K. Muduli
IPM
B.P. Sahu
MNM (CL)
Through
Gate no. 2
5. In front of RSM building
V. Nagrajan
CITM
R. C. P. Singh
MNMEL
Through
Gate no. 2
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e) In view of the possibility that when disaster strikes, the Incident Co-coordinator or the Functional Co-coordinator may get injured, or may not be able to report for work on account of sickness etc. or be out of station, a succession chart (Alternate Co-coordinators) has been prepared so that the organizational plan remains continuously effective. When the function Co-coordinator or one of the successors is performing the Co-coordinating duties, the successors down the line will be assisting him.
Common Organizational Structure
A single organizational structure has been created and the same will be applicable in case a disaster strikes during normal working hours.
Designated chief Coordinator, GM (T) / GM (TS & HSE) shall take position in Crisis Control Room after assessment of situation at site and declaring the disaster. He will co-ordinate from Crisis Control Room (CCR) as per the requirements to mitigate the disaster.
Coordination during general shift hours
The officer present at the site of occurrence will initiate necessary action for remedial measures and also communicate to RSM, Incident and Chief Coordinators.
Coordinator beyond general shift hours/Holiday/Off day
The Officer present at the site of occurrence will initiate necessary action for remedial measures and inform RSM who will function as Incident Coordinator till designated Incident Coordinator arrives at Site.
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8.3. ORGANOGRAM CHART WITH PHONE NUMBERS (Main cum Successor Coordinator for On Site Emergency Preparedness Plan)
ADVISERS TO CHIEF COORDINATOR
Refinery operation related issues
Repair, modification & maintenance issues
Environment & safety related issues
Deputy General Manager (TS) Tel (O): 5401 240279 (BSNL) (R): 4401
240265 (BSNL)
Alternate
Deputy General Manager (TS) Tel (O): 5216 240116 (BSNL) (R): 4216 240216 (BSNL)
Chief Inspection Manager Tel (O): 5931 240143 (BSNL) (R): 4931 240243 (BSNL)
Alternate
Chief Engineering Services Manager Tel (O): 5431 240119 (BSNL) (R): 5431 240219 (BSNL)
Deputy General Manager (HSE) Tel (O): 5212 240112 (BSNL) (R): 4212
240212 (BSNL)
Alternate
Chief Manager (HSE) Tel (O): 5402 240128 (BSNL) (R): 4402 240228 (BSNL )
DISASTER CONTROL ROOM Intercom Ph. No.: 345/5979/5997
BSNL Land Line No.: 240127
CHIEF INCIDENT CONTROLLER (CHIEF COORDINATOR)
GM (Technical) Tel: (O) 5202 / 240102 (BSNL) Tel: (R) 4202 / 240202 (BSNL)
Alternate: General Manager (Tech. Services & HSE)
Tel: (O) 5203 / 240103 (BSNL) Tel: (R) 4203 / 240203 (BSNL)
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Main Coordinators of On Site Emergency Preparedness Plan
Site Incident Controller
(Plant Coordinator) Fire & Safety Coordinator
Dy General Manager (PN)
Tel : (O) 5213, 240113 (BSNL)
(R) 4213, 240223 (BSNL)
Alternate
CPNM
Tel : (O) 5501, 240123 (BSNL)
(R) 4501, 240223 (BSNL)
Senior Fire & Safety Manager
Tel : (O) 5981, 240146 (BSNL)
(R) 4981, 240246 (BSNL)
Alternate
Manager (Fire & Safety)
Tel : (O) 5982
(R) 4982
Repair & Maint. Coordinator Power & Utilities Coordinator
Dy General Manager (MN)
Tel : (O) 5208, 240108 (BSNL)
(R) 4208, 240208 (BSNL)
Alternate
Chief Maintenance Manager
Tel : (O) 5601, 240125 (BSNL)
(R) 4601, 240225 (BSNL)
Chief Power & Utility Manager
Tel : (O) 5741, 240129 (BSNL)
(R) 4741, 240229 (BSNL)
Alternate
Power & Utility Manager
Tel : (O) 5746
(R) 4746, 245804 (BSNL)
Communication & Elect. Maint. Coordinator
Security & Traffic Control Coordinator
Chief Electrical Maintenance Manager
Tel : (O) 5701, 240149 (BSNL)
(R) 4701, 240249 (BSNL)
Alternate
Senior Electrical Maint. Manager
Tel : (O) 5702
(R) 4702
Dy. Commandant - CISF
Tel : (O) 5851, 240158 (BSNL)
(R) 4851, 240258 (BSNL)
Alternate
Asst. Commandant - CISF
Tel: (O) 5852
(R) 4852
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Rescue & Evacuation Coordinator Human Resource, Welfare & Media
Coordinator
Dy General Manager (PJ)
(Shri A D Prasad)
Tel : (O) 5204, 240104 (BSNL)
(R) 4204, 240204 (BSNL)
Alternate
Dy General Manager (PJ)
(Shri R S Yadav)
Tel : (O) 5212, 240112 (BSNL)
(R) 4212, 240212 (BSNL)
General Manager (HR)
Tel : (O) 5210, 240110 (BSNL)
(R) 4210, 240210 (BSNL)
Alternate
Chief Human Resource Manager
Tel : (O) 5222, 240151 (BSNL)
(R) 4222, 2402219 (BSNL)
Materials Coordinator Finance Coordinator
Dy. General Manager (Materials)
Tel : (O) 5215, 240115 (BSNL)
(R) 4215, 240215 (BSNL)
Alternate
Senior Materials Manager
Tel : (O) 5384, 240145 (BSNL)
(R) 4384
Dy. General Manager (Finance)
Tel : (O) 7218, 240122 (BSNL)
(R) 4218, 240222 (BSNL)
Alternate
Senior Finance Manager (I/C)
Tel: (O) 5301, 240157
(R) 4301
Transport Coordinator Medical Coordinator
Chief Manager (A&W)
Tel : (O) 5220, 240135 (BSNL)
(R) 4220, 240235 (BSNL)
Alternate
Senior Manager (A&W)
Tel : (O) 5223, 240172 (BSNL)
(R) 4223
ACMO (I/C) (Medical)
Tel: (O) 4351, 240138 (BSNL)
(R) 4352
Alternate
JCMO
Tel: (O) 4353
(R) 4354
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8.4. ORGANOGRAM FOR COMMUNICATION OF DISASTER (ROLE OF UNIT HEAD)
Notes: 1. Above communication will be done over telephone.
2. Scenario of drill is to be indicated in the communication.
3. Apart from above, DGM (HSE) / CM (HSE) will also communicate about the disaster to the following:
Name & Designation Phone No.
Rakesh Kumar, Member Secretary, BSPCB, Patna
0612-2281250 0612-2282265
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
Tel (O): 5201,
240101(BSNL)
Tel (R): 4201,
240201 (BSNL)
Director (Refineries)
Tel (O): 011-26260001/ 26260002
Tel (R): 011-24361364 / 26361938
ED (HSE), RHQ
Tel (O): 011-24364661 / 24365336
Tel (R): 011-26261250
GM (HSE), RHQ
Tel (O): 011- 24362574
Tel (R): 0120-2400430
Chief Secretary, Govt. of Bihar, Patna
Tel (O): 0612-2215804
Mobile: 94731-91193
CHIEF INCIDENT CONTROLLER
(CHIEF COORDINATOR)
GM (T) / GM (TS & HSE)
TOP EXECUTIVES
of HQ &
OISD
DM (BEGUSARAI)
Tel (O): 06243-222285
Tel (R): 06234-230584
Mobile: 94731-91412
NODAL OFFICER OF
MoPNG
CRISIS MANAGEMENT
GROUP
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8.5. Objectives of an Emergency Control Organization
Overall objectives of an emergency control organization shall be:
To promptly control problems as they develop at the scene.
To prevent or limit the impact on other areas and off-site.
To provide emergency personnel, selecting them for duties compatible with their normal work functions wherever feasible. The duties and functions assigned to various people shall include making full use of existing organizations and service groups such as fire, safety, occupational health, medical, transportation, personnel, maintenance, and security.
To assume additional responsibilities by the employees as per laid down procedure of ERDMP whenever an emergency alarm sounds.
In setting up the organization, the need for round-the-clock coverage shall be essential. Shift personnel must be prepared to take charge of the emergency control functions or emergency shutdown of system, if need be, until responsible personnel arrive at the site of emergency. The organization should have an alternate arrangement for each function.
8.6. Roles & Responsibilities of Various Coordinators
(Reference: Section 14.2 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
On-site Emergency plan of refinery involves all the disciplines required for effective control of the situation. Petroleum Refinery is a complex and multi-departmental organization. Accordingly, the activities like control of the incidence at site, plan of co-ordination with external authorities and other neighboring agencies, rescue and relief operations, making the emergency known to internal and external public have been developed Coordinator-wise, and the action plan of various Coordinators have been detailed. There is an alternate Coordinator for each function to ensure uninterrupted implementation of the plan in the event, if first line of command is absent or not available due to other engagements
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8.6.1. Unit Head (Executive Director)
Unit Head in refineries will perform the advisory role during any Onsite disaster as per necessity as given below.
1. Decision of declaring Onsite disaster by Chief Coordinator should be intimated to Unit Head.
2. Unit Head will receive necessary inputs from Chief Coordinator / Disaster Control Room from time to time and guide Chief Coordinator, as desired.
3. In addition to normal communication channels, Unit Head will communicate with Top level Management at Head Quarters of Refinery, Pipeline & Marketing as necessary.
4. Unit Head will facilitate co-coordinating with Higher Government authorities for seeking any help required.
5. Unit head will inform the DM, Chief Secretary, Director (Refineries) / CEO of the company as per the modified Crisis Management Plan in respect of MoPNG vides Clause no.5 (111) in the event of fire, natural calamity or terrorist attack. Director (Refineries) / CEO shall communicate the same `to the nodal officer of the Ministry who will pass on this information to the Crisis Management Group.
6. Any information to Press or, to any outside Agency should be cleared by Unit Head.
7. Unit Head will facilitate getting assistance from Mutual aid Partners.
8. Unit Head should be kept informed about casualties and he will ensure that necessary medical attention is given to casualties in time.
9. In case disaster is beyond control and which may convert to Offsite disaster, Unit Head should be consulted by the Chief Coordinator before communicating District Authority.
10. Unit Head will conduct Close out meeting with all Coordinators after control of disaster.
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8.6.2. Chief Incident Controller (Chief Coordinator)
General Manager (T) / Alternate: General Manager (TS & HSE)
The Chief Incident Controller (CIC) shall have overall responsibility to protect personnel, site facilities, and the public before, during, and after an emergency or disaster. The CIC shall be present at the main emergency control centre for counsel and overall guidance. Responsibilities of the Chief Incident Controller shall include the following:-
1. Ensure that ERDMP is prepared, reviewed and updated as per Check List-5 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010 (Filled Checklist is given in the last of this Chapter on page no. 8-29).
2. Maintain and establish emergency control center, organize and equip the organization with ERDMP and ensure the training of the personnel.
3. Assess the situation and declare onsite emergency.
4. Activate Emergency Control Centre (Disaster Control Room). Mobilize the main coordinators and key personnel.
5. Ensure that appropriate local and national government authorities are notified.
6. Ensure the preparation of media statements, obtaining approval from the CIC and releasing such statements once approval received.
7. Ensure that the response to the incidents or the emergencies, as the case may be, is in line with established procedures. Coordinate process continuity or recovery plan from the incident.
8. Coordinate if any specialist support is required for the above purpose. Take decision on seeking assistance from mutual aid members and external agencies like Police, Fire Brigade, and Hospitals etc.
9. Review continuously of situation and decide on appropriate response strategy.
10. Take stock of casualties and ensure timely medical attention.
11. Ensure correct accounting and position of personnel after the emergency.
12. Ensure the proper communication about the emergency in the neighboring village / public to avoid panic.
13. Order evacuation of personnel as and when necessary.
14. Take decision in consultation with District Magistrate when an Off-site emergency is to be declared.
15. Declare state of normalcy. In case of Off-site emergency, clearance from District Magistrate is to be taken before declaring state of normalcy.
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8.6.3. Site Incident Controller (Incident Coordinator)
Dy General Manager (PN) / Alternate: Chief Production Manger (Units)
Refinery Shift Manager (RSM) takes the charge of Site Incident Controller (SIC) at the scene of the incident till the arrival of SIC.
The Site Incident Controller (SIC) shall report directly to the Chief Incident Controller and be the in-charge of the situation at site. He shall be present at the main emergency site. Responsibilities of the SIC shall include the following:
1. Overall in-charge of the emergency situation at site and positions himself at site.
2. Establish communication with Disaster Control Room (DCR) and emergency site so that CIC can coordinate activities among groups / other functional disaster coordinators.
3. Take commands & control of functionaries reported at site. Liaise with the Functional Co-coordinators / DCR regarding resources required at site for mitigation of emergency / disaster situation or for the relief of personnel and casualties.
4. Take priority and quick decisions on:
a) Isolation of facilities / equipments
b) Shutdown of plants, equipments as per requirement.
c) Strategy for deployment of resources of fire fighting/rescue inside the refinery
d) Evacuation of personnel from affected zone to a safer area
e) Through put (Feed) regulation / product routings
f) Product storage and dispatch operations
g) Crude oil receipts
5. Assess periodically of actual disaster zone & resources requirement / deployment and communicates accordingly to Disaster Control Room.
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8.6.4. Technical Advisors to Chief Incident Controller (CIC)
Refinery operation related issues: DGM (TS) / Alternate: CTSM (Process)
Repair, modification & maintenance issues: CMNM (Civil) / Alternate: CESM
Environment & safety related issues: DGM (HSE) / Alternate: CM (HSE)
Technical advisors shall report to Chief Incident Controller (CIC) at Disaster Control Room (DCR). Responsibilities of the Technical advisors shall include the following:
1. Activate the Disaster Control Room (DCR) immediately after declaration of On-site Disaster.
2. Prepare the incident report.
3. Keep records related to the incident site ready, namely Operating Manuals, P&IDS, MSDS, and Plot Plan etc.
4. Send information to HO after approval of Chief Coordinator.
5. Deploy officer from QC Laboratory to report at Main Fire Station Control Room for additional manning / extending help in communication & co-ordination activities during disaster.
6. Deploy additional manpower required for manning of Disaster Control Room on round the-clock basis, in case of prolonged operation of DCR.
7. Liaise with all the functional coordinators & update status of incident as well as refinery operations, inventory of products/crude.
8. Technical Advisors to Chief Incident Controller on “Refinery operation related issues” will also be responsible for the role of Recorder as described below:
(a) To maintain a log book for keeping an accurate time record of key information received from the incident or emergency location and of the actions initiated by the CIC.
(b) To record key incident events/actions on incident status board/display.
(c) To maintain essential equipment checklist status.
(d) To ensure all status and information is up to date and correctly displayed.
(e) To ensure the shifting of all necessary recorded material to the alternate Disaster Control Room (DCR) in the event of emergency in main DCR.
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8.6.5. Fire & Safety Coordinator
Senior Fire & Safety Manager / Alternate: Manager (Fire & Safety)
Fire & Safety Coordinator shall report to Chief Incident Controller (CIC) and be present at the main emergency site. Responsibilities of the Fire and Safety Coordinator shall include the following:
1. Activate emergency sirens as per the practiced codes. The disaster siren for declaring onsite emergency is to be blown after receiving the directive from Chief Incident Controller (CIC).
2. Take charge of all fire fighting and rescue operations and safety matters.
3. Ensure that key personnel are called in and to release crew of fire fighting operations as per emergency procedure.
4. Assess functioning of his team and communicate with the CIC and or administrative controller for any replenishment or, replacement of manpower or firefighting equipment.
5. Direct the fire brigade personnel and mutual aid members to their desired roles as also proper positioning of the manpower and equipment.
6. Decide the requirement of mutual aid and instruct fire station, who, in turn will contact mutual aid members.
7. Coordinate with outside fire brigades for properly coordinated fire fighting operation.
8. Ensure that casualties are promptly sent to first aid centre / hospital.
9. Arrange requirement of additional fire fighting resources including help from mutual aid partners.
10. Ensure empty and loaded trucks are removed to safer area to the extent possible so as not to affect emergency handling operations.
11. Continually liaise with the SIC and CIC and implement the emergency combat strategies as communicated by him.
12. Ensure adequate hydrant pressure in the mains and monitor water level in the reservoir.
Note: Fire chief shall wear identification jackets at the site of disaster so that he is clearly distinguished among fire fighting personnel and is visible from a distance.
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8.6.6. Repair & Maint. Coordinator
Dy General Manager (Maint.) / Alternate: Chief Maintenance Manager
Repair & Maint. Coordinator shall report to Chief Incident Controller (CIC) and be present at the main emergency site. He shall ensure deployment of sub Coordinators to report to Site Incident Controller (SIC) at emergency site to arrange resources and meet requirements. Responsibilities of the Repair & Maint. Coordinator shall include the following:
1. Ensure mobilization of teams from all disciplines of Maintenance (excluding electrical maintenance) and provide all Engineering Services as required by plants or other Coordinators. The Engineering Services include :
a) Workshops
b) Instrument jobs
c) Mechanical jobs
d) Civil Jobs
e) Urgent fabrication.
f) Use of gas cutting for rescue work.
g) Operation of cranes, hydras, towing services etc., and all other Engineering equipment & services.
2. Ensure promptly arrangement for renting / hiring equipment and men to meet emergency requirement.
3. Arrange to keep a liaison with power & utilities coordinator for smooth running of fire pumps.
4. Provide all engineering and maintenance help (excluding electrical maintenance) needed by fire & safety section, civil defense and other civic / govt. Agencies on the request of CIC / SIC / other coordinators.
5. Ensure arrangement of urgent fabrication jobs from outside agencies if the need arises.
6. Apprise promptly the CIC about the issues requiring his attention.
7. Liaise with SIC and other coordinators for their engineering and maintenance needs.
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8.6.7. Power And Utilities Coordinator
Dy. General Manager (P&U) Alternate: Chief Power & Utilities Manager
Power And Utilities Coordinator shall report to Chief Incident Controller (CIC) at Disaster Control Room (DCR). Responsibilities of the Power and Utilities Coordinator shall include the following:
1. Ensure smooth operation of Captive Power Plant and supply of Utilities.
2. Ensure uninterrupted water supply and smooth operation of fire water pump in order to maintain required fire water header pressure in assistance with Repair & Maint. Coordinator.
3. Ensure that diesel tanks of individual fire pumps are kept topped during the running of the pumps in assistance with Materials Coordinator.
4. Liaise with other coordinators for their power and utilities needs.
5. Apprise promptly the CIC and Repair & Maint. Coordinator about the issues requiring their attention.
6. Ensure that TPS air supply does not get any interruption.
7. Arrange power from State Electricity Board if refinery captive power plant fails.
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8.6.8. Communication & Electrical Maintenance Coordinator
Chief Electrical Maintenance Manager
Alternate: Senior Electrical Maintenance Manager
Communication & Electrical Maintenance Coordinator shall report to Chief Incident Controller (CIC) at Disaster Control Room (DCR). Responsibilities of the Communication & Electrical Maintenance Coordinator shall include the following:
1. Keep the entire communication system alive and functional.
2. Ensure mobilization of the team from electrical maintenance department and provide all Electrical Maintenance / Engineering Services as required by plants or other Coordinators. The Electrical Maintenance / Engineering Services include :
a) Electrical Jobs
b) Electrical Workshop
c) Electrical isolation of equipment
d) Provision of temporary lighting, temporary connection etc.
3. Ensure promptly arrangement for renting / hiring equipment and men to meet emergency requirement for Communication & Electrical Maintenance / Engineering jobs.
4. Provide all electrical maintenance and engineering help needed by fire & safety section, civil defense and other civic / govt. Agencies on the request of CIC / SIC / other coordinators
5. Apprise promptly the CIC about the issues requiring his attention.
6. Liaise with SIC and other coordinators for their communication and electrical maintenance / engineering needs.
7. Liaise / Coordination with BSNL, Begusarai to meet any communication need.
8. Ensure the availability of Communications Systems as following:
(a) Ensure that the Disaster Control Room (DCR) communication equipments and systems are maintained to a high standard and remain functional throughout the emergency.
(b) Ensure that a back-up communication system is available in the event of the Disaster Control Room (DCR) is not available.
(c) Provide quality and diverse communication systems for use in routine and emergency situations.
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8.6.9. Security & Traffic Control Coordinator
Dy. Commandant – CISF / Alternate: Asst. Commandant - CISF
Security & Traffic Control Coordinator shall report to Chief Incident Controller (CIC) and be present at the main emergency site. He shall be responsible for security of the installation during any incident or emergency situation. Responsibilities of the Security & Traffic Control Coordinator shall include the following:
1. Ensure arrangement of strict security at refinery gates to prevent entry of unauthorized personnel. Regulate traffic and restrict the movement of persons at Gate.
2. Ensure traffic control at the incident site. Cordon the emergency site and to facilitate movement of the fire brigade, ambulances, rescue vehicles, and staff on emergency duty etc.
3. Keep the refinery gates and roads within the refinery / around the refinery clear of traffic & crowd for easy movement of fire brigade, ambulances, rescue vehicles, and staff on emergency duty etc.
4. Allow the vehicles to go out of the refinery gate if required for safety and security of the transport.
5. Arrange CISF assistance for fire fighting, rescue and other operations at emergency site in consultation with SIC / Fire & Safety coordinator.
6. Mobilize CISF personnel from CISF Township / Refinery Township to refinery main gate for further instructions / deployment.
7. Maintain security of the office in the event of an office evacuation.
8. Provide office security and assist authorities in the event of civil unrest or when required organize additional security at the emergency site.
9. Obtain an approved visitor list from the security department or reception for ensuring that personnel on the list are escorted to reception by security staff.
10. Obtain initial briefing from Chief Incident Controller and provide security information / status reports to CIC & SIC during the emergency.
11. Assume responsibility for any task delegated by Chief Incident Controller. Assess the emergency, identify security specific problems and recommend solutions to Chief Incident Controller.
12. Maintain close liaison with local Police and Intelligence.
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8.6.10. Rescue & Evacuation Coordinator
Dy. General Manager (PJ) / Alternate: Chief Manager (CPJM)
Rescue & Evacuation Coordinator shall report to Chief Incident Controller (CIC) and be present at the main emergency site. Responsibilities of the Rescue & Evacuation Coordinator shall include the following:
1. Coordinate with area in-charge, fire-fighting crew, SIC and CISF personnel for the rescue of the trapped personnel, if any.
2. Carry out search & rescue.
3. Liaise / Coordinate with Medical Coordinator for the evacuation of the injured rescued persons to First Aid Centre / Refinery Hospital / Other Hospitals.
4. Apprise the CIC about the stock of casualties and other issues requiring his attention.
5. Ensure the evacuation of personnel in case of a major emergency from affected area and as a precautionary measure to the “Assembly Points”.
6. Ensure head counts at assembly points.
7. Carry out the evacuation operation as directed by the CIC and in coordination with the civil authorities.
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8.6.11. Human Resource, Welfare and Media Coordinator
General Manager (HR) Alternate: Chief Human Resource Manager
Human Resource, Welfare and Media Coordinator shall report to Chief Incident Controller (CIC) at Disaster Control Room (DCR). He shall be overall responsible for welfare of employees & disaster control crew, establishing interface with media and other administrative activities during any incident or emergency. Responsibilities of the Human Resource, Welfare and Media Coordinator shall include the following:
1. Overall responsible for community relation.
2. Liaise / coordinate with public bodies like Govt. bodies, District Administration, Police, Civil authorities, Civil Defense and Hospitals etc.
3. Liaise with various Press Medias and handle media interviews. Prepare media / press statements in consultation with CIC and ensure their release after approval of Unit Head.
4. Arrange drinking water, soft drinks, snacks and food etc. as required at the site of emergency and at Disaster Control Room for firefighting crew, medical teams, personnel on plant emergency duties etc. The requirement of food would depend on the situation. However, arrangement shall be made in advance to have enough provisions and manpower in canteen to provide additional meals, if required.
5. Assess and provide linen, bedding, clothing etc. as needed in the refinery during and after the emergency.
6. Liaise with transport coordinator for transporting of the victims to hospitals.
7. Arrange to inform the families of staff who are injured.
8. Arrange, in consultation with CIC, for the proper communication about the emergency in the township and neighboring villages / public to avoid panic
9. Ensure distribution of Dos’ and Don’ts’ for nearby community.
10. Ensure that employees are well informed about the incident and what is expected from them.
11. Ensure arrangement for photography / videography of the incident.
12. Liaise with CISF for gate entry of outsiders, VIPs and make arrangements of their visits.
13. Direct external agencies on their arrival to respective coordinators at desired locations.
14. Apprise CIC about the visit of outsiders and other issues requiring his attention.
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8.6.12. Material Coordinator
Dy General Manager (Materials) / Alternate: Chief Materials Manager
Material Coordinator shall report to Chief Incident Controller (CIC) at Disaster Control Room (DCR) and ensure deployment of sub Coordinators to report to SIC at emergency site to meet requirements. He shall be the overall in-charge for procurement, receipt and issue of urgent materials during the emergency. Responsibilities of the Material Coordinator shall include the following:
1. Ensure positioning of staff at Central stores and purchase office for emergency issue, receipt or procurement of materials.
2. Procure any equipment, chemical, medicine, safety related or any other item as required by CIC, SIC or other disaster coordinators.
3. Review the stock of Diesel available at Stores and make arrangement for augmentation of stock.
4. Apprise CIC regarding material procurement and other issues requiring his attention.
5. Liaise with SIC and other coordinators for their materials and purchase needs.
6. Coordinate material procurement from other refineries.
7. Ensure assistance from Head Quarters in connection with material procurement or any other requirements.
8. Liaise / coordinate with contact surrounding agencies and nearby markets for assistance regarding material procurement.
8.6.13. Finance Coordinator
Dy. General Manager (Finance) Alternate: Chief Finance Manager
Finance Coordinator shall report to Chief Incident Controller (CIC) at Disaster Control Room (DCR). He shall be the overall in-charge for arrangement of required finance during the emergency. Responsibilities of the Finance Coordinator shall include the following:
1. Ensure arrangement of finance for the Coordinators for emergency purchase.
2. Ensure care of insurance formalities.
3. Provide other financial help if any required.
4. Liaise with SIC and other coordinators for their financial needs.
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8.6.14. Transport Coordinator
Chief Manager (A&W) / Alternate: Senior Manager (Admin & Welfare)
Transport Coordinator shall report to Chief Incident Controller (CIC) at Disaster Control Room (DCR). He shall be the overall in-charge for arrangement of required transportation services during the emergency. Responsibilities of the Transport Coordinator shall include the following:
1. Ensure mobilization of all available vehicles and transport for emergency use, including renting of vehicles as needed.
2. Ensure transport to medical Coordinator for transporting the victims to the hospital.
3. Liaise with local transport authorities.
4. Liaise with the Coordinators of ‘Assembly Points’ for mobilization of vehicles for evacuation of personnel gathered at Assembly Points.
5. Apprise CIC regarding issues requiring his attention.
6. Liaise with SIC and other coordinators for their transport needs.
8.6.15. Medical Coordinator
Asst. Chief Medical Officer (I/C) / Alternate: Joint Chief Medical Officer
Medical Coordinator shall report to Chief Incident Controller (CIC) and be present at the Township Hospital. He shall be the overall in-charge for providing medical aid & casualty management during the emergency. Responsibilities of the Medical Coordinator shall include the following:
1. Activate First Aid Centre and Township hospital. Mobilize medical and Para medical team internally for prompt medical attention to casualties.
2. Mobilize ambulances to transfer casualties to First Aid Centre & Hospital.
3. Maintain casualties register, type of injury, number, hospitalization etc.
4. Liaise with external hospitals for assistance and treatment, as needed.
5. Liaise with Material Coordinator for procurement of required drugs / medical equipments.
6. Liaise with Transport Coordinator for arrangement of additional vehicles, as needed, for transportation of the casualties.
7. Apprise CIC regarding issues requiring his attention.
8. Coordinate with police for completing the formalities in case of fatalities.
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8.6.16. Maintenance of ERDMP Records
ERDMP records shall be maintained for all kind of emergencies covering near Miss, Level-I, Level-II and Level-III. An Incident Record Register Organization shall be maintained for the above purpose and post–disaster documentation like resources deployed, relief, rehabilitation measures and lesson learned to avoid re-occurrence of any such emergency. Head of Fire & Safety Department shall be responsible for maintenance of such records.
8.6.17. Public Relations and Media Program
A good public relations program is extremely important in an emergency situation. Inquiries will normally be received from the media, government agencies, local organizations and the general public during the emergency.
Human Resource, Welfare and Media Coordinator shall identify and deploy a sub Coordinator (a Communication Officer) that is well-equipped and trained in media relations for implementation of a public relations or media plan, as needed, during the emergency.
Local media and television stations will also be utilized for periodic announcements during an emergency in order to assist in reducing rumours and speculation.
Initial releases shall be restricted to statements of facts such as the name of the installation involved, type and quantity of spill, time of spill, and countermeasure actions being taken. All facts must be stated clearly and consistently to everyone.
8.6.18. Recorder
The Recorder responsibility will be to maintain an accurate time record of key information received from the incident or emergency location and to record the actions initiated by the CIC and for implementing the emergency response actions below:
(f) To record key incident events/actions on incident status board/display.
(g) To maintain essential equipment checklist status.
(h) To ensure all status and information is up to date and correctly displayed.
(i) To ensure the shifting of all necessary recorded material to the alternate Disaster Control Room (DCR) in the event of emergency in main DCR.
(j) To maintain a log book.
Technical Advisors to Chief Incident Controller on “Refinery operation related issues” [DGM (TS) / Alternate: CTSM (Process)] will be responsible for the role of Recorder during the emergency.
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8.6.19. Communications Services
The Communication & Elect. Maint. Coordinator shall ensure the following actions:
(d) Ensure that the Disaster Control Room (DCR) communication equipments and systems are maintained to a high standard and remain functional throughout the emergency.
(e) Ensure that a back-up communication system is available in the event of the Disaster Control Room (DCR) is not available.
(f) Provide quality and diverse communication systems for use in routine and emergency situations.
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8.6.20. Fire Siren
9 nos. of 5 H.P. (range 8 Km) fire sirens have been installed. 7 Nos. fire sirens are installed in refinery area and 2 nos. in township. The locations of fire siren are as follows:
1. Fire Station
2. Administrative Building
3. OM&S Old building
4. Sector – 6
5. Crude tank area
6. HBCPL
7. Substation no. 27
8. Guest House (Township)
9. Water Tank(Township)
In case of fire, these sirens are sounded as per the siren codes as given below. Every day testing of all these sirens is carried out at 07.00 AM by blowing the siren for one minute.
8.6.21. Fire Siren Codes
For Small Fires No siren will be sounded.
For Major Fires Walling type continuously for two minutes.
For Disaster Repetition of major fire siren 3 times with a gap of 2minutes in each major fire siren
For All Clear Signal Straight sound for two minutes.
For Simultaneous Fire No siren unless it is a major fire.
Testing of Fire Sirens Straight sound for one minute. It is tested every day at 07.00 Hrs. from Fire Station.
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CHECK LIST-5
[Refer Regulation 14.2.1 (a)]
Review and Updation of ERDMP
Sr.# Check-point
1 Frequency of mock-drills for practice, refinement and updation
Onsite Disaster Mock Drill: Once in every quarter
Offsite Disaster Mock Drill: Once in every Year
2 Are the records for periodic Mock drills maintained in a well defined format.
Yes
3 After each drill, whether assembly meetings involving all staff and contract personnel are conducted to share experience of the event as also to identify the shortcomings and scopes for further improvement in procedures. Whether the issues are discussed and the plan modified suitably.
Yes
4 Does the review ensures efficiency of the plan particularly w.r.t. response, communication and coordination aspects.
Yes
5 Do the Mutual Aid members participate in the drills and based on the actual response and difficulties experienced, corrective actions initiated for refinement of the plan.
No Mutual Aid Members
6 Does a procedure exist in incorporating the findings/ learnings of the actual disaster management handling, if any so that the plan can be revised accordingly.
Yes
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Communication Flow Chart for Notification Of Emergency
Note: Wherever communication exists for any level of emergency, it automatically implies that the communication exists for all higher levels of emergencies.
EMERGENCY CONTROL
CENTRE
CHIEF INCIDENT CONTROLLER
Executive Director
Employee/
Security
Fire safety / HSE Coordinator and fire
team
CRISIS MGMT
GROUP
Mutual Aid
Members Info. to Fire
Brigade, Police, Medical and Government
Authorities
First Responder
Fire and gas detection system /
SCADA System
Police
Public
District Administration
and Central Govt. agencies
Note: Level I Level II
Level III
Site Incidence Controller and
Others Disaster Coordinators
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Chief Incident Controller
Chairman of Fire Control
Committee
Chairman of Health & Welfare
Committee
Chairman of Transportation
& Traffic Arrangement Committee
Chairman of Communication
Committee
Chairman of Law & Order
Committee
Off-Site Incident Controller
District Magistrate Begusarai
FIRE & Safety Coordinator
Site Incident Controller
(Incident Coordinator)
Medical Coordinator
Engineering Services
Repair & Maint. Coordinator
Power & Utilities Coordinator
Communication & Elect. Maint. Coordinator
Support & Auxiliary Services
Hr, Welfare And Media Coordinator
Transport Coordinator
Security Coordinator
Finance Coordinator
Materials Coordinator
Communication Flow Chart for Control of Emergency
Rescue & Evacuation
Coordinator
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CHAPTER – 9
INFRASTRUCTURE
(Reference: Section 15 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
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9.1. CRISIS CONTROL ROOM (DISASTER CONTROL ROOM)
(Reference: Section 15.1 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010):
All communication related to emergency shall be routed to crisis control room which is situated on first floor of Fire Station Building.
The Crisis Control Room is equipped with communication systems (Telephones, Walki-Talkies, ), Operating Manuals, Disaster Management Plans (On-Site/Off-Site), Refinery Lay out Plan, Display of names & telephone nos. of all coordinators etc. Organogram of On-Site Disaster Management Plan is also displayed. The crisis control room shall be activated when the disaster siren is sounded and shall be headed by GM (T) and in his absence by GM (TS)
9.2. ASSEMBLY POINTS
(Reference: Section 15.2 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
The people working in refinery battery area will assemble in the following area during any emergency:
Sl. No. Area / Location
1. In front of DCS-III (OM&S) Control Room
2. Southern Side of Canteen
3. South West corner of Rd. No. 1 x 2
4. Around smoking booth near DHDT Field control room
5. Near old Maintenance Planning Building.
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9.3. EVACUATION OF PEOPLE
The evacuation of people shall be decided by incident coordinator based on situation at site. This may include partial evacuation or total evacuation from the site of incident or from the nearby areas of the Refinery.
The communication about evacuation shall be announced on Central P.A. System or P. A. System of Process Unit area or through hand held Megaphones.
Route of evacuation will be through main roads across the wind and specifically depending upon the individual case.
No short cut will be adopted unless communicated so by Fire Chief depending upon the situation.
All available modes at site shall be used for evacuation of persons from the site of incident to assembly/ Muster points at safe location.
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CHAPTER – 10
DECLARATION OF ON-SITE AND OFF-SITE EMERGENCIES
(Reference: Section 16 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
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(1) An emergency starts as a small incident which may become a major incident with passage of time. At the initial stages, the emergency organisation chart shall be put into action. If the incident goes beyond control, the on-site emergency plan will be actuated by the Chief Incident Controller at the appropriate stage as considered necessary.
(2) During idle shift or holidays, the security & Fire & Safety personnel will combat
the incident as per the ERDMP organization chart and at the same time inform various emergency coordinators for guidance and control of the situation.
(3) When emergency becomes catastrophic and evacuation beyond the plant
premises is considered necessary by the Chief Incident Controller, the situation will be handed over to district authority for implementing the off-site emergency plan.
(4) The management of emergency henceforth has to be controlled by the district
crisis management group under the supervision of the District Collector/DDMA. (5) In addition to preparation of on-site emergency plan, relevant information to the
district authorities for the preparation of off-site emergency plan has been furnished as a part of the statutory responsibilities of the occupier of every industry handling hazardous substance.
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Communication Flow Chart for Notification Of Emergency
Note: Wherever communication exists for any level of emergency, it automatically implies that the communication exists for all higher levels of emergencies.
EMERGENCY CONTROL
CENTRE
CHIEF INCIDENT CONTROLLER
Executive Director
Employee/
Security
Fire safety / HSE Coordinator and fire
team
CRISIS MGMT
GROUP
Mutual Aid
Members Info. to Fire
Brigade, Police, Medical and Government
Authorities
First Responder
Fire and gas detection system /
SCADA System
Police
Public
District Administration
and Central Govt. agencies
Note: Level I Level II
Level III
Site Incidence Controller and
Others Disaster
Coordinators
Chairman of Health & Welfare
Committee
Chairman of Transportation
& Traffic Arrangement Committee
Chairman of Law & Order
Committee
Communication Flow Chart for Control of Emergency
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Chief Incident Controller
Chairman of Fire Control
Committee
Chairman of Communication
Committee
FIRE & Safety Coordinator
Site Incident Controller
(Incident Coordinator)
Medical Coordinator
Engineering Services
Repair & Maint. Coordinator
Power & Utilities Coordinator
Communication & Elect. Maint. Coordinator
Support & Auxiliary Services
Hr, Welfare And Media Coordinator
Transport Coordinator
Security Coordinator
Finance Coordinator
Materials Coordinator
Rescue & Evacuation
Coordinator
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CHAPTER – 11
RESOURCE FOR CONTROLLING EMERGENCY
(Reference: Section 17 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
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Fire Fighting Facilities IOCL, Barauni refinery has the following fire fighting facilities:
Fire water reservoir
Fire Pump House
Fire Hydrant and Water Monitor system
HVLRM’s
Auto water spray / deluge system
Semi Fixed Foam Pourer System
Auto Foam System 11.1. Fire Water
Fire water is provided in three above ground reservoirs of capacity 7500 m3 – 2 tanks and 5000 m3 – 1 tank. These tanks receive water either from fresh water header or bio-treated water pumps. All 3 tanks are interconnected and having suction line to all pumps. Total capacity of fire water storage tank is 20,000 M3.
11.2. Fire Pump house
Fire pump house has 11 nos. of fire water pumps of 700 m3/hr capacities at a discharge pressure of 10.8 Kg/cm2 each and two Jockey pumps of 250 m3/hr at 12 Kg/cm2.
The main fire pump house has 6 diesel drives and 5 electrical drives.
11.3. Fire hydrant and Water Monitor system
Total refinery area has been covered with around 32 Kms long fire water network. The main features of the fire water network include:
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DH fire hydrant = 712 nos
Water monitors = 250 nos
High Volume Long Range Monitor = 45 nos
Dry / Wet Riser system at Coker – A, Coker –B, TPS, ADMN building, HGU, DHDT, RFCCU, SRU.
11.4. Auto water spray / deluge system
Quartzoid bulb type automatic water sprinkler system has been installed in the following areas,
Storage vessels,
LPG bulk dispatch facilities
LPG Pumps
LPG Horton spheres & LPG Mounded bullets & LPG MB P/House
H2 storage bullets in CRU
TPS Transformer area
11.5. Semi fixed foam pourer
All hydrocarbon tanks containing Class-A & Class-B petroleum are provided with Semi fixed foam pourer system as per OISD Std.-116. Foam pourers are provided on top of the tank shell and the foam –water solution lines are extended up to road side for introducing foam from road side with help of Foam Tenders.
11.6. Auto Foam System
These systems are provided for auto fire fighting in case of crude tank (238,239 & 240) fire & RFCCU feed tank (801,802,803) fire.
FIRE FIGHTING APPLIANCES/ EQUIPMENT/ CHEMICALS / PPEs AVAILABLE WITH BR
SN Item Qty (Nos.)
1 Foam Tenders 04
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2 Foam Nurser 01
3 DCP Tender 01
4 Hydraulic Platform 01
5 Fire fighting hose 50
6 Fire fighting Branches 20
7 Water curtain 05
8 Suction hose 10
9 DCP Fire extinguisher 1000
10 Mega phone 02
11 Safety hand lamp 10
12 Ceiling hook 05
13 Fire proximity suit 08
14 Foam generator 03
15 Fireman axe 05
16 Safety helmet 50
17 Ear plug 100
18 Dust mask 100
19 Chemical Respirator 20
20 Splash proof goggles 100
21 PVC suit 10
22 B A SET 10
23 Gas detectors 10
24 Oil sorbent 10
25 Retractable fall arrestor (5 M & 10 M) 05
26 Portable Cutter / Spreader 02
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Fire and Gas Detection System
Latest gas detection equipment is available in the refinery to monitor the environment on continuous basis as well as on grab sampling method. We are also planning to install Hydrocarbon gas detectors in the various operating areas.
Hydrocarbon detectors
AVU-1, AVU-2, AVU-3, CRU, TPS, DHDT, HGU-1, HGU-2, RFCCU,SRU, MSQ, OM&S Offsite, Coker A & B, LRU
Hydrogen detectors
HGU-1, HGU-2
H2S ground level detectors
SRU, DHDT
Smoke detectors All Control Rooms of Process Units, OM&S, Sub Stations, TPS, Cable Gallery, QC lab, Admn. Building, Project Building
CO Analyzers RFCCU
Dragger tube for H2S, CO & SO2
Tubes for taking sample of confined space / area. These have been kept at different locations.
Environmental Monitoring
Monitoring of the environment is being done on regular basis through an external agency and a record of the same is kept by HSE department.
Medical Facilities Medical facilities available at Barauni Refinery are described in details in chapter-13 and in Annexure- 7 & 8. Medical Facilities Available Outside, Please refer Annexure- 12, 13 & 14.
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Communication Facilities
Communication Facilities Available at BR
SN Item Qty (Nos.)
1 Walkie-Talkie AVAILABLE
2 Pager System with Group Paging Facility AVAILABLE
3 Group SMS Facility AVAILABLE
4 Inter Com System AVAILABLE
5 Public Address System AVAILABLE
6 Megaphone AVAILABLE
7 Intercom AVAILABLE
8 Pager System with Group Paging Facility AVAILABLE
Evacuation & Sheltering Facilities Please refer Chapter- 14.
In Built Facilities And Other Emergency Safety Interlock Facilities The design of process units and connected facilities has been done in accordance with National / International Codes and sound engineering practices. The process design and detailed engineering takes care of various safety aspects of plant and other equipment consideration. The layout of the plant is confirming to wind direction, wind velocity and other Meteorological parameters. The equipment layout confirms not only the design standards, but also takes scare of safety aspects like easy passage for movement for operating and maintenance personnel. The provision of Safety release valves connected to a well designed flare system confirms to design codes / standards. For safety in operation, all process units of the refinery have been provided with 100% automatic control system proven in the field of process industries. This enhances the safety aspects further. Microprocessor based Distributed Digital Control System (DDCS) has been installed in the all process units and tank farm area, replacing the conventional Pneumatic Control System. This system has inherent advantages over the earlier system as it has got analytical capability as well. The facility exists for the plant safety, in case any operating parameters go out of control, in the event of system failure. Adequate
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shutdown valves, trips have been provided to bring down the unit operation safely to take care of emergency situations. To take care of safety through design and in built facilities there is a well qualified group of safety engineers and process engineers in the process section. The main activities of the group are to review the existing facilities. Risk analysis study, Disaster Management Planning, Preparation of scheme, suggesting and taking measures for adoption of new technology in the field of safety. In order to avoid breakdown of the equipment leading the potential risk situation, an effective maintenance schedule covering both static and rotary equipment have been adopted in the refinery. A well defined and elaborate maintenance manual exists. All the procedures and practices and safety precaution to be observed during any maintenance are clearly laid down in the manual. During any maintenance job, work permit system is strictly adhered to, and is being closely monitored by concerned supervisor and fire & safety division. The use of necessary personal protective equipment like safety belt for working at height, face shield and hand gloves for welding, cutting, grinding, breathing apparatus set for any confined place entry etc. is strictly complied with. Advanced control system available at the time of project implementation for automatic operation of process units had been adopted in the plant. Unit wise trip system also exists for safety of the equipments.
Sources of Local Assistance Please refer Annexure- 12 to 17.
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CHECK LIST-6
[Refer Regulation 17.0 (5)]
Availability of resources [ internal / external ]
Sr.# Check-point Remarks
1 Details of firefighting equipment of the location is incorporated in the DMP
Yes
2 Information on critical resources like no. of fire hydrants, water monitors, fire fighting pumps, static water storage, portable firefighting equipment and foam systems are included
Yes
3 Available resources as per Schedule-IV Yes
4 Location has storage of water for 4 hours fire fighting. In case water availability is less, a plan for replacement from nearby sources
Yes
5 Details of drainage system including Oil Water Separator is available in DMP, wherever applicable.
Yes
6 Requirement and availability of Personal Protective Equipment
Yes
7 Whether manpower available during regular as well as idle shift hours including security personnel clearly indicated in the plan.
Yes
External and Internal Resources for combating Emergency
8 Does the plan enumerate the following resources available internally with the location as also from external agencies including Mutual Aid Members and
Yes
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govt agencies like fire brigade, police, municipal authorities etc. :
a. Water – from static reservoir as also mobile water tankers
b. Fire Hoses
c. Specialized nozzles e.g. fog, jet, triple purpose etc.
d. Mobile water monitors
e. Fire Extinguishers – type and capacity
f. Water Gel Blankets
g. Foam Compounds
h. First Aid material, Medicines, Stretchers
i. Mobile / fixed ladders
j. Vehicles available
Trained manpower for combating emergency
Yes
9. Any other resources considered necessary No
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CHAPTER – 12
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
(Reference: Section 18 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
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12.1. Brief Description Of The Refinery (Site, Location, Vicinity)
Barauni Refinery (BR) is located in Development block, Barauni, of District Begusarai of the state of Bihar about 8kms away from the northern or left bank of Ganges. Situated 125 kilometers from Patna, the latitude and longitude at the BR site is 25o26’N and 86o04’ E respectively. The district Headquarter town of Begusarai is about 5 km from the refinery
The refinery was built in collaboration with Russia and Romania. it was commissioned in 1964 with a refining capacity of 1 Million Metric Tons per Annum (MMTPA) and it was dedicated to the Nation by the then Union Minister for Petroleum, Prof. Humayun Kabir in January 1965. After de-bottlenecking, revamping and expansion project, its capacity today is 6 MMTPA. Matching secondary processing facilities such Resid Fluidized Catalytic Cracker (RFCC), Diesel Hydrotreating (DHDT), Sulphur Recovery Unit (SRU) have been added. Theses state of the art eco-friendly technologies have enabled the refinery to produce environment- friendly green fuels complying with international standards. Barauni Refinery was initially designed to process low sulphur crude oil (sweet crude) of Assam. After establishment of other refineries in the Northeast, Assam crude is unavailable for Barauni. Hence, sweet crude is being sourced from African, South East Asian and Middle East countries like Nigeria, Iraq&Malaysia. The refinery receives crude oil by pipeline from Paradip on the east coast via Haldia. With various revamps and expansion projects at Barauni Refinery, capability for processing high-sulphur crude has been added — high-sulphur crude oil (sour crude) is cheaper than low-sulphur crudes — thereby increasing not only the capacity but also the profitability of the refinery.
The plant is located in Begusarai district of Bihar. The site is located about 8 km of the river Ganga.
A vicinity map indicating the refinery site has been enclosed in Annexure-1.
12.2. Configuration of Barauni Refinery
The block flow diagram and Layout plan of the refinery are enclosed as Annexure-3 and Annexure-4.
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UNITS OF BARAUNI REFINERY (OTHER THAN BXP UNITS)
SN UNITS CAPACITY (MMTPA)
1 AVU-I 1.75
2 AVU-II 1.75
3 AVU-III 2.5
4 COKER-A 0.60
5 COKER-B 0.50
6 CRU 0.30
BARAUNI EXPANSION UNITS (BXP UNITS)
SN UNITS CAPACITY (TPA)
1 Fluid Catalytic Cracking 1.4MMTPA
2 LPG Treating Unit 1,70,000
3 Gasoline Treating Unit 2,45,000
4 Diesel Hydro Treating Unit 2.2 MMTPA
5 Hydrogen Generation Unit 34,000
6 Sour Water Stripper Unit 1 X 60 TPH
7 Amine Absorption / Regeneration Unit / Sulphur Recovery Unit (ARU/ SRU)
2X40 TPD
MSQ UNITS
SN UNITS CAPACITY (TMTPA)
1 Naphtha Splitter unit 464
2 Hydrotreater unit 20
3 Catalytic Reformer Unit 300
4 Reformate Splitter unit 274
5 Naphtha Hydro treating unit 183
6 C5-C6 Isomerization unit 126
7 Prime G+ 322
8 HDS 224
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12.3. Meteorological Conditions
The consequences of released toxic or flammable material are largely dependent on the prevailing weather conditions. For the assessment of major scenarios involving release of toxic or flammable materials, the most important meteorological parameters are those that affect the atmospheric dispersion of the escaping material. The crucial variables are wind direction, wind speed, atmospheric stability and temperature. Rainfall does not have any direct bearing on the results of the risk analysis; however, it can have beneficial effects by absorption / washout of released materials. Actual behavior of any release would largely depend on prevailing weather condition at the time of release.
ATMOSPHERIC PARAMETERS The Climatological data based on EIA study is summarized below in the Table:
Parameter Avg. value
Ambient temperature ,degC 31.7
Atmospheric pressure,(mmHg) 758
Relative Humidity (%) 67
*REF. EIA for MSQ project 1997,BR,TABLE 3.6.7 WIND SPEED AND WIND DIRECTION During the period from March 2007 to June 2007, the overall (average) windspeed was 7.05km/hr.The WINDROSE DIAGRAM indicates that the most predominant wind direction for the summer season was from East/ North East.
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WIND ROSE DIAGRAM
N
Period:1996-1997 JAN-DEC
STATION : BARAUNI REFINERY
*Please refer Chapter-4 for further details.
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12.4. Neighboring Population
Please refer Chapter-4 for further details.
12.5. Flora And Fauna
12.6. Please refer Chapter-4 for further details.
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CHAPTER – 13
MEDICAL FACILITIES
(Reference: Section 19 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
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Details of The Medical Facilities
Provided at Barauni Refinery
(A) First Aid Centre:
There is a fully fledged round the clock manned First Aid Centre inside the refinery near the main gate. The location of First Aid Centre is prominent and known to all.
(B) Arrangement and Facilities
i) At First Aid Centre
a) Equipments
Oxygen Cylinder
Suction apparatus
Ambu resuscitator
Stretcher
Dressing materials
2 bed observation room
b) Emergency medicine
Emergency life saving drugs for treatment of minor Injuries
Comprehensive medicines for Disaster Management are available at Refinery Hospital.
c) Decontamination facilities
Decontamination facilities are available with Civil Maintenance Department.
d) Ambulance Vans
There is one Ambulance Van, which remains available round the clock.
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ii) At Township Hospital (6 km from the refinery)
A full fledged 49 bed hospital is in the refinery township which is about 7 km away from refinery site.
a) Equipments
Stretcher and wheel chair
Oxygen cylinder/ concentrator
ECG machine
Defibrillator
Pulse oxymeter
Ambu bag
Endotracheal intubation set
b) Emergency Medicines
All the required medicines to deal with any emergency are available
c) Ambulance Vans
There is one ambulance van, which remain available round the clock.
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(C) Hospital Facilities
1. Refinery Hospital
Main Township Hospital : Capacity 49 Beds and 10 Doctors (04 Nos. Regular & 06 Nos. Adhoc CDMO)
Site Hospital (For Emergency) : Capacity 2 Beds
2. Hospitals in The Vicinity
Sl. No.
Name Of The Hospital Distance From Refinery
1. NAZERATH 25 KMS.
2. BEGUSARAI CIVIL HOSPITAL 12 KMS.
4. RAILWAY HOSPITAL, GARHARA 20 KMS.
3. Private Nursing Homes / Medical Specialists
SL. NO.
NURSING HOMES TELEPHONE NUMBERS
1. DR. A.K.ARORA 243013
2. DR. A.K.JAISWAL 222617
3. DR. A.K.JHA 222476
4. DR. A. RAI 220242
5. DR. A.P.SAH 224164
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CHAPTER – 14
EVACUATION
(Reference: Section 20 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
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14.1. Evacuation Of People
The evacuation of people shall be decided by incident coordinator based on situation at site. This may include partial evacuation or total evacuation from the site of incident or from the nearby areas of the Refinery.
The communication about evacuation shall be announced on Central P.A. System or P. A. System of Process Unit area or through hand held Megaphones.
Route of evacuation will be through main roads across the wind and specifically depending upon the individual case.
No short cut will be adopted unless communicated so by Fire Chief depending upon the situation.
All available modes at site shall be used for evacuation of persons from the site of incident to assembly/ Muster points at safe location.
14.2. Assembly Points
The people working in refinery battery area will assemble in the following area
during any emergency:
Note: On assembly, the respective HOD’s shall ensure that all the employees working in his department have assembled by Head counts.
Sl. No. Area / Location
1. In front of DCS-III (OM&S) Control Room
2. Southern Side of Canteen
3. South West corner of Rd. No. 1 x 2
4. Around smoking booth near DHDT Field control room
5. Near Maintenance Planning Building.
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14.3. Shutdown & Emergency Procedure And Access Control:
Please refer the Work Instruction Manual of various departments.
14.4. Facilities For Protection From Hazardous Materials
The facilities for protection from hazardous materials such as crude oil, petroleum products, fuels, chemicals and gases in the event of an emergency are provided:
Provisions of foam pourer and water sprinkler.
A well knit network of pressurized fire water line with requisite no. of hydrants and monitors.
Insulation of the Spheres from outside to eliminate direct exposure to heat.
Provision of Safety relief valves.
Adherence to SMPV and other statutory rules for periodic inspection & testing.
Provision of Hydrocarbon gas detector/H2S gas detector /H2 detector
Round the clock coverage of fire fighting crew well equipped with latest fire fighting equipments.
Dyke in all storage tanks.
The Procedure to be followed during emergencies is enclosed as Annexure –12.
14.5. Protection Of Vital Equipments And Materials
Vital materials like crude oil and product tanks, LPG & Hydrogen storage vessels are protected by providing appropriate fire protection system as per OSID standard-116. This includes: automatic detection and water spray system for LPG storage, Hydrogen, Semi fixed foam system for crude / product tanks.
Vital equipments like turbo generators & GTs in CPP is protected by means of automatic fixed carbon dioxide system.
CPP cable gallery is totally protected by means of automatic smoke detection and water spray system.
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Generating transformers are protected by means of automatic high velocity water spray system.
Inside the units all light hydrocarbon and hot pumps have been protected by means of manually operated water spray system.
Hydrocarbon gas detectors have been provided at strategic locations to detect hydrocarbon release at its incipient stage so that corrective action can be taken before hand.
Vital equipment/places like process control room and substations have been provided with automatic heat / smoke detectors for early detection of any fire situation and its alarm has been provided in the local control rooms.
Vital documents of HR deptt. have been protected by means of keeping the documents inside the fire proof cabinet.
In the information system deptt. the computer room being a vital room has been provided with smoke detectors.
All the files in servers of IS deptt. is protected by means of duplicate system.
For early communication of emergency situation 244 nos. of manual call points have been provided inside old refinery area. An intelligent addressable fire alarm system has been provided in BXP area.
In addition CCTV has been installed inside the plant to monitor critical units/area especially during odd hours.
Vitals light hydrocarbon pumps have been provided with double seal to prevent leakage.
Special firefighting equipment like Imported Fire Proximity suit has been kept at fire station, which can be used to rescue or for isolation of critical valves during emergency.
High volume long-range monitors have been provided around crude oil tanks and on the top of fire tenders as special firefighting equipment.
Firewater monitors have been provided at elevated strategic locations, which are normally difficult to approach for effective control of fire.
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14.6. Crisis Control Room (Disaster Control Room)
All communication related to emergency shall be routed to Crisis Control Room which is situated on first floor of Fire Station Building.
The Crisis Control Room is equipped with communication systems (Telephones, Walki-Talkies, ), Operating Manuals, Disater Management Plans (On-Site/Off-Site), Refinery Lay out Plan, Display of names & telephone nos. of all co-coordinators etc. Organogram of On-Site Disaster Management Plan is also displayed. The crisis control room shall be activated when the disaster siren is sounded and shall be headed by GM (T) and in his absence by GM (TS)
14.7. Search & Rescue Plan
Overall in charge: Site Incident Controller (Incident Coordinator)
DGM (PN) / Alt: CPNM (Units)
Rescue & Evacuation Coordinator
DGM (PJ), Shri A. D. Prasad / Alt: DGM (PJ), Shri R. S. Yadav
During on site emergency / disaster situation search & rescue will be carried out by the rescue team under the control of Rescue & Evacuation Coordinator. He in turn will give feed back to the Chief Incident Controller (CIC).
Team Members of Search & Rescue Team
Search & Rescue coordinator will coordinate with CMNM in case of requirement for heavy equipment. CPUM will be contacted for arranging temporary lights, if required during search / rescue operation. After rescue the victims may be sent to First Aid Center / Hospital for medical treatment, if required.
Knowledge on Special Risk
SFSM will guide the team regarding the presence of special risk from hazardous chemicals during rescue operation. Accordingly the team will use suitable protective equipment.
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Control of Non-Essential Personnel during Search & Rescue Operation
In order to ensure smooth and effective search and rescue operation during emergency control of non-essential personnel also plays a vital part.
CISF will ensure removal of non-essential personnel from the site for the above job.
Search and Rescue Operation During Off Site Emergency
During off site disaster, rescue and search operation will be carried out under the
guidance of Dy. Superintendent of Police, Begusarai as per off site emergency plan
approved by DM.
14.8. Control of Visitors and Contractors
During major emergency / disaster refinery, main gate will be kept closed and entry will be controlled by CISF.
No visitors will be allowed to enter in the refinery during the emergency time. Only the mutual aid partners / govt. agencies will be allowed to come inside for rendering assistance.
On hearing disaster sirens all visitors and contractors workers will come out of the affected areas and will assemble at the Assembly point for evacuation.
14.9. Safety Of Visitors
Visitors & vendors etc. shall follow the safety guidelines printed at the back of visitor’s Gate Pass. No visitors/contractors shall be allowed to enter the refinery premises during the emergency.
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14.10. All Clear & Re-Entry Procedure
The Chief Incident Controller (CIC) of Onsite Disaster Management Plan is authorized to initiate the “All Clear” siren after satisfying himself that the emergency is kept under control (such as source of fire/leak is checked or stopped) and affected person(s), if any, are shifted for medical aid.
14.11. Display of Contact Nos. of Essential Services
The telephone Nos./Contact Nos. of all essential services like First Aid Centre, Fire & Safety, CISF and RSM are prominently displayed at all control rooms and also in the following areas:
Crisis Control Room.
First Aid Centre.
CISF Control Room.
Administration Building
These numbers are updated as and when there is a change.
14.12. Evacuation & Rehabilitation
If a major industrial accident does occur, the general public in surrounding areas will have very little time to react and save themselves. The local population will have to be warned in a very short period.
Time available to population for a safe escape and threatened by the accident will depend on the nature of accident.
A fire will give more time to escape and generally area affected will be small. Effects of a fire on population will be injuries due to thermal radiation.
An explosion will give little time to warn population and area affected may be much larger than that in case of a fire. Effects of an explosion on the
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population will be injuries caused by shock wave, flying debris collapsing structures as well as exposure to thermal radiation.
A toxic gas release will generally threaten a much larger area and people will be exposed to drifting cloud of toxic gas / vapours. Time available for warning population will depend on the point of release, air direction and air velocity.
14.13. Periodic Assessment Inside Battery Area
Chief Incident Controller (CIC) will carry out periodic assessment of the actual disaster zone and resources deployment and status report of the same will be given to ED. This has already been covered under the function of Chief Incident Controller (CIC).
14.14. Actions By General Population
On being warned of a major industrial accident of gas leak general public should take the following actions:
Immediately go indoors
Shut all doors, windows, and ventilators. Block all the gaps with wet cloth and draw curtains.
Switch off fans, exhaust fans, air conditioners
Extinguish all flames
Keep torches handy. Store water for emergency use
Do not jam emergency phone lines by calling emergency services.
Covering nose / mouth with wet cloth will help
Wait for further instructions from emergency services before moving out.
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14.15. Evacuation
In major disaster, it may become necessary to evacuate people from and around the area likely to be affected by accident. Sometimes, the evacuation may have to be made to safe places within the complex area itself. At other times, however, especially in cases of catastrophic disaster, it will be necessary to shift the entire population outside the complex area to certain pre-designated places fixed in advance. The task may be difficult as there will be no notice or very short notice of a calamity, there may be failure of electricity, there may be shortage of manpower resources etc.
1.0 The entire area to be evacuated should be divided into convenient sectors and each sector should be placed in charge of a senior officer, whose duty it would be to ensure that all persons from this sector are compulsorily shifted. Help of security / police staff should also be taken in achieving this task, if considered necessary.
Repeated announcements should be made over mobile-vans, fined with mikes, directing people to evacuate immediately and board buses / trucks at pick – up points. Staff who would be employed for supervising arrangements at pick – up points should be earmarked in advance. The routes by which evacuation will be made from different areas will be fixed in advance. The drivers of buses / trucks will be informed about their routes and also about their destinations where the residents are to be off-loaded. In the case of shifting to Barauni city, the Chairman of Barauni Municipality should be informed for keeping the places of accommodation ready to receive evacuated persons and also to make other arrangements.
2.0 In case of power failure, which is quite likely, the evacuation work, will be totally disorganized unless battery of diesel-operated flood-lights are fixed at strategic points to enable people to move from their houses to pick up points. A large number of torches etc. will also be required.
3.0 In addition, the following requirements will also be taken care of:
(a) Monitoring the shelter camps and villages till such a time that normalcy is restored.
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(b) Ensure proper care of the evacuated people in shelter relief camps and provide them adequate facilities such as food, drinking water and medical services.
(c) Ensure security arrangement for protection of the evacuated people’s property in their areas till such time they are safely brought back to their villages from the shelter camps.
14.16. EDUCATION
Educating general public about the potential hazards associated with refinery and actions to be taken in case of accident, will one of the key areas of disaster management plan. For this purpose, the following actions are proposed:
Pamphlets / booklets regarding industrial hazards will be prepared and distributed to general public of the concerned area.
Notice boards will be put up in strategic places giving the above information.
Help of voluntary organizations and local schools will be taken to conduct educational sessions to make people aware of the actions that the general public should take in case of any major emergency.
Periodic meetings with the village heads to educate them.
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Chief Incident
Controller
Chairman of Fire Control
Committee
Chairman of Health & Welfare
Committee
Chairman of Transportation
& Traffic Arrangement Committee
Chairman of Communication
Committee
Chairman of Law & Order
Committee
Off-Site Incident Controller
District magistrate
Begusarai
FIRE & Safety Coordinator
Site Incident Controller
(Incident Coordinator)
Medical Coordinator
Engineering Services
Repair & Maint. Coordinator
Power & Utilities Coordinator
Communication & Elect. Maint. Coordinator
Support & Auxiliary Services
Hr, Welfare And Media Coordinator
Transport Coordinator
Security Coordinator
Finance Coordinator
Materials Coordinator
Communication Flow Chart for Control of Emergency
Rescue & Evacuation
Coordinator
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CHAPTER – 15
INFORMATION TO PUBLIC
(Reference: Section 21 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
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15.1. Assessing the Situation at Site & Making Emergency Known to People
Whosoever will notice any situation as per the scenarios discussed in Chapter-2, he will immediately inform to Fire Station Control Room / nearest Control Room / supervisor by means of telephone or nearest alarm point or personally. Officer of Fire Station, after seeing the magnitude of the situation, will instruct Fire Station Control Room operator to blow Major Fire Siren. Accordingly a Wailing Siren for Two minutes will be blown by Fire Station Control Room operator and turnouts will be taken by Fire Fighting Crew along with officers of Fire & Safety Department to combat the situation.
If the turnouts taken by Fire Fighting crew are not capable of controlling the situation, after assessing the situation, the General Manager (Technical) of the refinery will declare the disaster. The information about declaring the disaster will be conveyed to Fire Station Control Room by any Officer of Fire & Safety Division.
Fire Station Control Room operator will blow Three wailing sirens of 2 minutes each with a time lag of 10 seconds between each siren to make the disaster known to the key personnel and employees of the refinery as well.
The information about the disaster to key personnel will also be given on telephone by Fire Station Control Room operator and also by PA system.
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15.2. External Public: Public Awareness System
For disclosure of information to the public the refinery has developed ‘Meet the people’ programme through our Public Relations Department, where the ‘MUKHIYAS’ of nearby villages are called and the informations related to refinery are given to them. They are briefed about our preparedness and measures taken to face any disaster situation. They are also explained about the Disaster Warning Signals and measures to be taken by the nearby villagers in case of any disaster in the refinery like toxic gas released and any possible chemical emergency. The same is being given to them in the form of a brief write up for further propagation in their villages. A visit to refinery is also being conducted for them. Villagers of nearby villages are also being given information about the same during any of our HRD activity like family planning Camp, Medical Camp etc.
Apart from the above, various competitions are also organized by the refinery for the safety awareness among the family members of the employees and nearby villagers, and good prizes are also being given.
For disclosure of the information, particularly during the disaster situation, the Public announcements are being done by MR Corporate Communication Department. To avoid any panic, it is been considered that the necessary announcement will be made in nearby villages releasing the information to the tune of requirement only.
The Welfare & Media Coordinator of the refinery is the only authorized person for giving the information to public & to serve as the Laision Officer.
The Use Of Electronic Media
For bringing the awareness among the external public at large, the use of electronic media like TV, Air & Press coverage is used. The Welfare & Media Coordinator of the refinery prepares the Press release to the issued for the local press & other important dailies.
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CHAPTER – 16
ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES OF STAKEHOLDERS
INCLUDING EXTERNAL AGENCIES
(Reference: Section 22 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
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Schedule – V (Refer Regulation 22.0)
The important Roles and Responsibilities of Various Stakeholders
a) Oil and Gas Installations and Areas (Mentioned in Regulation 3)
Barauni Refinery as mentioned Installation in Regulation 3 should provide necessary information to Mutual Aid Association, District Authority, Police and Fire Services.
a) List of Hazardous Chemical and Systems which have potential to
cause danger to Human, Environment and Property.
b) On-Site Emergency Plan and Periodic Mock Drill.
Barauni Refinery will support authorities in mitigation, rescue and rehabilitation, with resources identified and agreed with the authorities in advance as included in Off-Site Emergency Plan.
b) The district authority is responsible for the Off-Site emergency plan and it
shall be equipped with up-to-date Major Accident Hazard units, website,
control room etc., with provisions for monitoring the level of preparedness at
all times. Regular meetings of various stakeholders of Chemical Disaster
Management will be conducted by district administration/District Disaster
Management Authority to review the preparedness of Chemical Disaster
Management.
c) The police will be an important component of all disaster management plans
as they will be associated with investigation of incident s/disasters. Police
take overall charge of the Off-Site situation until the arrival of the district
collector or its representative at the scene.
d) The fire services are one of the first responders and shall be adequately
trained and equipped to handle chemical emergencies. Fire services are to
acquire a thorough knowledge of likely hazards at the incident site and the
emergency control measures required to contain it.
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e) In a chemical emergency, the revenue department shall coordinate with
other agencies for evacuation, establishment of shelters and provision of
food, etc.
f) When required for evacuation purposes in a chemical emergency, the
department of transport should made transport promptly available.
g) The role of civil society and private sector in the Off-Site plan shall be
defined.
h) The health department needs to assure that all victims get immediate
medical attention on the site as well as at the hospitals/health-care facility
where they are shifted. In addition, the department needs to network all the
health-care facilities available in the vicinity for effective management and also
take effective measures to prevent the occurrence of any epidemic.
i) Pollution control boards need to ascertain the developing severity of the
emergency in accordance with responsive measures by constant monitoring of
the environment. If and when an area is fit for entry will depend upon the
results of the monitoring. A decontamination operation would be required to be
carried out with the help of other agencies and industries.
j) The NDRF and SDRF are the specialised forces to manage these disasters in
a longer run according to the severity and nature of the disaster. Their
specialised training is an effective measure that needs to be built up and
maintained with time for achieving a higher standard of preparedness. They
need to coordinate with other local agencies such as the Central Industrial
Security Force that may be responsible for security at the industrial site.
* Role of above External Agencies have been defined in Annexure – E of National Disaster Management Guidelines Chemical Disasters, April, 2007
NDRF: National Disaster Response Force SDRF: State Disaster Response Force
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CHAPTER – 17
REPORTING OF THE INCIDENT
(Reference: Section 23 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
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1) All incidents covered under Level-I should be maintained by the entity for inspection whenever called for inspection and Level-II and Level-III shall be reported to the Board in the format specified and placed at Schedule-VI including near miss incident. The above report should be submitted within 48 hours after occurrence of the incidents or any other reason triggering major incident.
2) Investigation report of all major incidents shall be submitted to the Board. An incident shall be treated as Major if any of the following occurs:
(a) fire for more than 15 minutes
(b) explosion / blowout
(c) Fatal incident.
(d) loss above Rs. 10.0 Lac
(e) Cumulative man hours lost more than 500 hrs.
(f) plant shutdown / outage due to the incident
(g) Level-III incident
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SCHEDULE – VI (Reference: Section 23 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
INCIDENT REPORTING FORMAT
1. Organization 2. Sector
3. Location 4. Incident Sr. No.
5. Date of Incident
6. Time of Incident
7. Major / Minor / Near miss
8. Report - Preliminary / Final
9. Fire / Incident 10. Duration of fire - Hrs / Min
11. Type of Incident with loss of life / injury, Fire, Explosion, Blowout, Electrocution, Fall from Height, Inhalation of Gas, Driving, Slip / Trip, Others, NA
12. Location of Incident ( Name of Plant / Unit / Area / Facility / Tank farm / Gantry / Road / Parking area etc )
13. Whether plant shutdown / caused outage of the facility? Yes / No
14. Fatalities nos.
a) Employees = b) Contractor = c) Others =
15. Injuries nos. a) Employees = b) Contractor = c) Others =
16. Man - hours Lost
a) Employees = b) Contractor = c) Others =
17. Direct Loss due to the incident (Rs. In Lac). Loss to equipment / Machinery as per Insurance claim etc.
18. Indirect Losses: Through put / Production Loss, etc.
19. Status of the Facility: Construction / Commissioning / Operation / Shutting down / Turn around, Maintenance / Start up / Any other.
20. Brief Description of the Incident including post incident measures. ( Attach details in separate sheet )
21. Whether similar Incident has occurred in past at the same location, If yes, give brief description of the incident
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and attach details in separate sheet.
22. Whether Internal Investigation has been completed. If no, likely date by which it will be completed.
23. Whether internal investigation report (Major Incident) has been submitted to PNGRB. If no, likely date by which it will be submitted.
24. Cause of the Incident ( Tick the most relevant cause preferably one, maximum two )
A) Deviation from Procedure I) Not using the PPE
B) Lack of Job Knowledge J) Equipment failure
C) Lack of supervision K) Poor design / Layout etc.
D) Improper Inspection L) Inadequate facility
E) Improper Maintenance. ( Mech. / Elec. / Inst )
M) Poor House Keeping
F) Improper material handling N) Natural Calamity
G) Negligent Driving O) Pilferage / Sabotage
H) Careless walking / climbing etc. P) Any other (give details)
25. Cause of leakage - Oil, Gas or Chemical ( Tick one only )
A) Weld leak from equipment / lines E) Leakage due to improper operation
B) Leak from flange, gland etc. F) Leak due to improper maintenance
C) Leak from rotary equipment G) Normal operation - Venting / draining
D) Metallurgical failure H) Any other
26. Cause of Ignition leading to fire ( Tick only one cause )
A) Near to hot work F) Static Electricity
B) Near to Furnace / Flare etc. G) Hammering / Fall of object
C) Auto - ignition H) Heat due to Friction
D) Loose electrical connection I) Lightning
E) Near to hot surface J) Any other ( pyrophoric etc )
27. Was the incident Avoidable? ( Yes / No
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)
28. The incident could have been avoided by the use of / or by ; ( Tick the most relevant point preferably one, maximum two )
A) Better supervision F) Personal Protective Equipment
B) Adhering to specified operating procedure
G) Better equipment
C) Imparting Training H) Management Control
D) Giving adequate time to do the activity through proper planning.
I) Adhering to specified maintenance procedure
E) Adhering to the work permit system
J) Adhering to specified Inspection / Testing procedures.
K) Any other information;
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Guidelines for Filling the Incident Report 1. All Major, Minor and Near miss incidents shall be reported in the quarterly report.
2. Incident Reporting form shall be filled up for all Major, Minor and Near miss Incidents.
3. Summary report shall be enclosed with every quarterly report.
4. Investigations shall be carried out for all Major, Minor and Near miss Incidents.
5. Investigation report of all Major incidents shall be submitted to PNGRB. An incident shall be treated as Major if any of the following occurs;
- Fire for more than 15 minutes
- Explosion / Blowout
- Fatal Incident.
- Loss above Rs. 5.0 Lac.
- Cumulative man hours lost more than 500 hrs.
- Plant Shutdown / Outage due to the incident
6. Loss time Incident shall be monitored till the affected person joins duty. In case the affected person is yet to join the duty, then the status of report submitted will be preliminary. Final report against the same incident shall be sent once he joins duty and the man - hours lost are known.
7. All columns must be filled up.
8. For any additional information use separate sheets as required.
9. Quarterly report shall be sent to PNGRB within 15 to 30 days of end of quarter.
10. Immediate reporting of incident through fax/telephone shall continue as per the prevailing system.
Signature Name
Designation of the Occupier/Manager
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CHAPTER – 18
ACTION AFTER REPORTING OF THE INCIDENT BY THE
ENTITY
(Reference: Section 24 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
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After reporting of the incidents to Board, Nodal officer of the Board (head of
Technical Standards the specifications and safety group) shall have
responsibility of informing all the Members of the Board and shall coordinate
with appropriate level in National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) till
normalization of the situation.
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CHAPTER – 19
TERMINATION OF EMERGENCY
(Reference: Section 25 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
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Termination of Emergency
The General Manager (Technical) after assessing the situation will declare the cessation of emergency.
Accordingly SFSM will give All Clear signal to the Fire Station Control Room.
After receiving All Signal from SFSM, A continuous Siren for Two Minutes will be blown by Fire Station Control Room operator for termination of emergency.
Corporate Communication (CC)
CC Deptt. will make the announcement to the nearby villages to avoid any panic. CC Deptt. will also release press note, information to media like T.V. radio with the approval of Chief Incident Coordinator (CIC).
CC Deptt. will co-ordinate for plant visit of visiting teams / authorities.
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CHAPTER – 20
EMERGENCY RECOVERY PROCEDURES
(Reference: Section 26 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
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(1) After the emergency, the following activities need to be carried out in detail.
a) Information to statutory authorities.
b) Incident investigation.
c) Damage assessment.
d) Salvage of products, de-contamination, clean-up and restoration.
e) A detailed report shall be prepared based on the entire experience of the incident, including restorations, limitations and lessons learnt.
f) Ambient air monitoring at the site as well as 5 km radius of the installation by state pollution control board to determine the contamination level affecting health.
g) Check points on ERDMP recovery measures are given below at Check list-7.
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CHECK LIST-7 (Reference: Section 26(2) of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
ERDMP - Recovery Measures
Sr.# Check-point Remarks
Post Emergency Recovery
Salvage of product
1 Check that spilled / accumulated product contents are transferred to the OWS or collected in drums.
COMPLIED
2 Check whether the quality and quantity estimation of the product extracted from OWS has been done for further disposal in line with standing QC guidelines by either transferring to service tanks or to nearest refinery for blending / reprocessing or not.
COMPLIED
3 Check that correct stock accounting of spilled product as loss has been completed in accounting system.
COMPLIED
4 Check that affected area has been completely cleaned and dried after evacuation of spilled product.
COMPLIED
5 Declare that affected area after salvage operations is fully clean and safe for movement of the working personnel.
COMPLIED
6 Check that all drains are not having any residual oil and are thoroughly cleaned and dried.
COMPLIED
7 Check that all control valves on product lines and OWS lines outside dyke area and drains are completely closed after removal of the spilled product.
COMPLIED
8 Check that interlocking system of tanks / gantry has been re-activated for normal operations.
COMPLIED
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9 Check whether the soil testing of the affected area, if required, has been done to assess the soil contamination level to meet the Environmental – SPCB norms / requirements.
COMPLIED
Taking care of affected manpower
10 Whether physical accounting of all personnel on duty during and after the incident are ascertained by the Site Incident Controller and reconciled immediately
COMPLIED
11 Whether the first-aid treatment and post-incident health check of the affected personnel has been undertaken in time
COMPLIED
12 Whether these personnel are declared fully physically fit before allowing them to resume their normal duties
COMPLIED
13 Whether the records for such first aid and treatment of the affected personnel are maintained in a well defined format
COMPLIED
Addressing media and outside bodies
17 Whether the incident was appropriately informed to the local media in line with the respective company’s Press and Media Policy
COMPLIED
18 Whether the role of neighbouring population during the drill / disaster is suitably informed to the population during subsequent meetings with local administration / panchayat etc. for necessary improvements
COMPLIED
19 Whether the awareness and preparedness on disaster is regularly assimilated / shared with nearby public / societies and stake holders.
COMPLIED
Reporting
20 Check whether that disaster incident report was communicated to respective controlling office / HQ promptly in a standard format.
COMPLIED
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21 Whether the incident reports are also sent to concerned State Level Industry Coordinator on time.
COMPLIED
22 Check that detailed report on disaster in proper format was communicated to PNGRB/ Factory inspector / Labour inspector / SPCB / District Magistrate /PESO.
COMPLIED
Investigation
23 Whether investigation teams are constituted as per respective company policies COMPLIED
24 Whether RCA (Root Cause Analysis) of the disaster is conducted by the investigating team
COMPLIED
25 Whether detailed investigation into effective functioning of interlocks, detection devices, automation controls and applicable norms are carried out to find out possible improvements in design / construction / operations / maintenance and training aspects etc.
COMPLIED
26 Whether a system of initiating appropriate corrective measures including suitable revisions to the Disaster Management Plan are adopted based on findings of the investigation
COMPLIED
Damage Assessment – Monetary and Physical
27 Check the valuation / cost of product loss / down gradation on account of contamination, if any / Property / Structures / damaged assets – equipments.
COMPLIED
28 Whether repairs and maintenance cost of property, assets and equipment are assessed.
COMPLIED
29 Whether any penalty by statutory authorities like SPCB / Factory Inspector and Labour Commissioner are assessed.
COMPLIED
30 Whether possible impact on environment are also assessed and appropriate measures are taken
COMPLIED
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31 Whether damage assessment also include potential erosion of reputation – from company, industry and national perspectives
COMPLIED
Clean up and Restoration
32 Whether the affected area has been fully cleaned and cleared after due clearance from investigation team
COMPLIED
33 Check whether heat detectors, high level alarms, in built safety systems (NRV, TSV etc.) are fully functional after the disaster incident.
COMPLIED
34 Check whether all fire fighting equipments like – hoses / nozzles / Fire Extinguishers etc. have been put back at designated places and are fully ready for reuse
COMPLIED
35 Whether clear procedures are in place to allow resumption of normal operations
COMPLIED
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CHAPTER – 21
ERDMP FOR PIPELINES CARRYING PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AND RETAIL
OUTLETS
(Reference: Section 27 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
Not Applicable to Refineries
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1) ERDMP for pipelines carrying petroleum products should follow modern methods of surveillance of Pipeline and take guidance from all the aspects of Disaster Management Plan mentioned in the ERDMP. Schedule–VII should be referred, which is in line with Chemical Disaster by National Disaster Management Authority.
2) ERDMP for retail outlets should take care of all aspects mentioned in ERDMP
and shall also refer to OISD STD– 225.
Schedule –VII (Reference: Section 26 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
ERDMP for pipelines carrying petroleum products
Pipelines are assuming importance as a means of transport of hazardous substances. Crude oil, its derivatives and natural gas are among the main substances transported by pipelines. The Guidelines, therefore, comprise: i) Creation and maintaining an administrative framework to facilitate the
development of a safe and environmentally sound transportation infrastructure, including pipelines for hazardous substances.
ii) The pipeline operator has the primary responsibility for the safety of the systems and for taking measures to prevent incident s and to limit their consequences for human health and the environment.
iii) Pipelines for the transport of hazardous substances will be designed and operated so as to prevent any uncontrolled release into the environment.
iv) Risk assessment methods should be used in evaluating pipeline integrity and impact on human health and the environment.
v) Land-use planning considerations will be taken into account both in the routing of new pipelines (e.g. to limit proximity to populated areas and water catchment areas to the extent possible), and in decisions concerning proposals for new developments/building in the vicinity of existing pipelines.
vi) Pipeline operators and the authorities responsible for pipelines shall review and, if necessary, develop and implement systems to reduce third-party interference, which is a cause of incident including their effects.
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vii) National legislation shall be clear, enforceable and consistent to facilitate safe transport and international cooperation.
viii) Competent authorities should ensure that pipeline operators:
(a) Draw up emergency plans.
(b) Provide the authorities designated for that purpose with the necessary information to enable them to draw up Off-Site emergency plans.
(c) Emergency plans shall be coordinated between pipeline operators and competent authorities, as well as with fire brigades and other disaster control units.
ix) Pipelines shall be designed, constructed and operated in accordance with recognized national and international codes, standards and guidelines, notified by the Board.
x) Consideration will be given to the impact on the safety of a pipeline such as design and stress factors, quality of material, wall thickness, and depth of burial, external impact protection, markings, route selection and monitoring.
xi) The safety of the pipelines shall be demonstrated through a suitable risk assessment procedure including the worst case scenario and including breakdowns and external additional loads.
xii) The pipeline operator shall draw up a Pipeline Management System (PMS) to ensure that it is properly implemented. The PMS shall be designed to guarantee a high level of protection of human health and the environment. The following issues shall be addressed by the safety management system.
(a) The pipeline will be inspected and maintained regularly. Only reliable trained staff or qualified contractors may carry our maintenance work on a pipeline. Third party conformatory assessment bodies should inspect the pipeline at regular intervals as far as required by the Board. These inspections are to cover in particular the proper condition of the pipeline and the functioning of the equipment ensuring pipeline safety.
(b) Organization ability, roles and responsibilities, identification and evaluation of hazards, operational control, and management of change, planning for emergencies, monitoring performance, audit and review shall be duly addressed in the Pipeline Management System.
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CHAPTER – 22
ERDMP FOR ROAD TRANSPORTATION
(Reference: Section 28 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
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The road transport of Petroleum product has significant presence and needs special attention. Complete details of treatment for handling emergency arising out of road transportations have been provided below:
22.1. Resource Mobilization for Road Transport Emergency (Reference: Section 28.1 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010) Resource mobilization for road transport emergency shall be as per the Schedule-VIII as given below.
(a) In order to handle Emergencies, which may arise due to incident involving Petroleum Product Transportation, it is required that a comprehensive Emergency Management Plan is readily available with the industry as well as with other related authorities all along the routes. The ERDMP should be clearly understood by its users so that the emergencies can be handled in a systematic manner with minimum response time in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
(b) Copies of the ERDMP shall be made available by the Industry to all the field
locations i.e. Installations, POL Depots, Terminals / Installations, Refineries, Gas Processing Plants, Dispatch units of etc., the concerned District Administration, Police Stations and Fire Brigades en-route and within vicinity of specified tank truck routes, oil industry sales personnel of concerned area as may be required.
(c) Location specific availability of Emergency Response Vehicle shall be
mentioned in the ERDMP.
Note: ERDMP for Road Transportation is not applicable to Barauni Refinery as Barauni Refinery is not in the business of the road transport of Petroleum products.
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Schedule –VII (Reference: Section 28.1 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
Resource Mobilization for Road Transportation Emergencies
A. In-Plant Resources Following items should be available at the Plant in adequate quantity / nos. Mechanical Equipment: 1. Gaskets (Carbon Asbestos Filled) 2. Studs and bolts. 3. Teflon tapes. 4. ½” / ¾” crowbar (1 m long) 5. Spade / blind flange 6. Rope (Manila / Jute) 7. Spark arrestors. 8. 1” tapered wooden pegs. 9. Chopper 10. Spare fan belt for tank lorry with P.T.O. unit 11. Wind sock 12. M-Seal / epoxy-base cold-welding compound. 13. Wooden slippers 14. Teflon-taped spanners, wrenches 15. Spark-proof wrenches, hammer and tools. 16. Barricading masts and ropes / tapes 17. hoses 18. Chain pulley blocks and stay pipes 19. Small valve keys for operating valves in the tank truck Electrical Equipment : 1. Gas Explosi-meter 2. Flame-proof torches 3. Earthing wires (10 m long) with crocodile clips
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Personnel Protective Equipment: 1. Gloves: i) Rubber gloves ii) Low Temperature Gloves iii) Industrial gloves (with leather lining) iv) Canvas gloves 2. Face shields 3. Ear muff / ear plugs Other Safety Items: 1. 1 roll of gunny / hessian cloth (about 10 mts. long) 2. First aid box (containing water gel compounds) 3. Soap 4. Blanket. 5. Water Gel Blanket 6. Breathing Apparatus (With spare filled cylinder and Canister gas masks) 7. Fire proximity suit
Fire Fighting Equipment : 1. Portable Dry Chemical Powder Fire Extinguishers 2. Fire-water Hoses 3. Triple Purpose diffuser nozzle for use with fire hoses. Communication Equipment : 1. Hand operated sirens 2. Whistles 3. Megaphone, Mobile Phones, VHF sets. Traffic Control Equipment : 1. Red lights (Battery operated) - for traffic diversion 2. Area maps 3. Diversion Boards
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External Resources:
Particulars Name Address
Ph. No. Any Other Info.
1. Fire Station
2. Ambulance
3. Hospitals
4. Police Station
5. Drug Stores
6.District Administration / Collector
7. Availability of Cranes
8. Local PWD / CPWD water supplies, sand, morum, vehicles etc.
9. Local Army, Navy, Air Force authorities
10. Any major industry nearby
C. Identification of Communication Resources: Particulars
Name Address Ph. No. Any Other
Info.
1.Public Address System
2. Retail Outlets
3. Railway Station
4. Power Houses
5. Civil Authorities
6. Voluntary Agencies
7. Local All India Radio / Doordarshan/ other channels
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22.2. Truck / Vehicle Dispersal Plan
1 Introduction
The Truck / Vehicle dispersal plan has been developed for quick and safe dispersal of Truck / Vehicle for effective control of emergencies. While developing this plan the following points have been taken into consideration:
Maximum numbers of Truck / Vehicle available at a time inside refinery,
Safe route of Truck / Vehicle for dispersal,
Adequate parking space in safe areas,
Route for Fire tenders and imaginary emergency scenarios, which may necessitate the dispersal of Truck / Vehicle etc.
2 General Procedure for Truck / Vehicles Dispersal
1. No loaded/ unloaded truck will be allowed to move outside refinery premises in
case of any emergency, unless specifically directed by Chief Coordinator, On-site disaster plan in special circumstances.
2. All Trucks / Vehicles shall move during above emergency scenarios as per
Trucks / Vehicles dispersal plan. In case of above emergency scenarios the drivers will not wait for any siren and start dispersing Trucks / Vehicles as per plan.
3. In case of major fire siren/ disaster siren raised due to above emergency
scenarios the dispersal of Trucks / Vehicles will automatically start on hearing the siren. However the dispersal will not take place in case of any other major fire/ disaster inside refinery, unless specifically instructed by area in-charge to do so. Such instruction may be passed to area in-charges by Plant Coordinator or Fire & Safety coordinator or Marketing coordinator (as referred in On-site emergency preparedness Plan).
4. The route of Trucks / Vehicles dispersal and parking shall be categorically
marked on road sides for guidance and mock rehearsal shall be carried out time to time to make the drivers and others conversant with the plan.
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5. The CISF at those spots shall regulate the traffic and ensure the smooth dispersal of Trucks / Vehicles.
6. The Trucks / Vehicles will be back to work places on “All Clear” siren. When no siren is blown and Trucks / Vehicles were disperse because of emergency at unloading site, the area in-charge will inform the Trucks / Vehicles drivers for return to work place when emergency is over.
7. This plan shall be reviewed at least once in a year or whenever there are major changes at site, which may affect the existing plan.
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CHAPTER – 23
INTEGRATION OF THE ERDMP WITH THE NATIONAL
DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN (NDMP)
(Reference: Section 29 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
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23.1 NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN (NDMP)
(1) On 23 December 2005, the Government of India took a definite step towards NDMP by enacting the NDMP ACT, 2005. The NDMP Act, 2005 is a Paradigm Shift from a response and relief-centric approach to a proactive and comprehensive mindset towards NDMP covering all aspects from prevention, mitigation, preparedness to rehabilitation, reconstruction and recovery.
(2) Similar to National Authority at the Centre, the State Government is to
establish a State Disaster Management Authority for the State. The State Authority is to be headed by the Chief Minister of the State as the Chairperson. Every State Government, in turn, is to establish a District Disaster Management Authority for every district in the State with the District Collector as the Chairperson.
(3) The Central Government is empowered to take further measures as it
deems fit for the purpose of disaster management like deployment of naval, military and air forces, other armed forces of the Union or any other civilian personnel as may be required for the purposes of this NDMP Act. Government of India is empowered to establish institutions for research, training, and developmental programmes in the field of disaster management as per this Act.
(4) The national vision is to build a safer and disaster resilient India by
developing a holistic, proactive, multi-disaster and technology driven strategy for NDMP. This will be achieved through a culture of prevention, mitigation and preparedness to reduce the impact of disasters on people. The entire process will centre stage the community and will be provided momentum and sustenance through the collective efforts of all government agencies supported by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).
(5) National Disaster management Structure showing the interactive linkage among various agencies for synergised management of disaster is given below;
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Note: Since PNGRB has been constituted by PNGRB Act, 2006, it should be identified under Ministries / Departments of Govt. of India.
Abbreviations for NDMA:
NDMA : National Disaster Management Authority NEC : National Executive Committee DM : Disaster Management NCC : National Cadet Corps NCDM : National Committee on Disaster Management NDMRCs : National Disaster Mitigation Resource Centres NDRF : National Disaster Response Force NSS : National Service Scheme NYK : Nehru Yuva Kendra NGOs : Non-Governmental Organisations SDMA : State Disaster Management Authority SEC : State Executive Committee DDMA : District Disaster Management Authority 23.2 Integration of ERDMP with NDMP This ERDMP document has been developed taking into account all possible inputs on the subjects from various stake holders. Efforts have also been made to synergize this with the document on National Disaster Management Guide (Chemical Disasters) Industrial brought out by National Disaster Management Authority.
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
CHAPTER - 24
SECURITY THREAT PLAN
(Reference: Section 30 of PNGRB (ERDMP) Regulation, 2010)
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CONTINGENCY PLAN TO DEAL WITH BOMB THREAT
1. Introduction:
Security is a continuous commitment for the safety of the Refinery and its utilities and the people working therein, both from external and internal threats. Of late, militant activities have increased manifold. The vital oil sector is a tempting target for terrorist groups. With the addition of modern weapons and explosives to the terrorist arsenal, the threat has increased manifold. A contingency plan to deal with such threat to our company’s assets is given below.
2. Objective:
The objective of this plan is to prevent, detect and neutralize any attempt to blast its installation by planting any explosive device in the Plant premises.
3. Preventive Measures:
For security of Refinery, we have CISF personnel (covering all the shifts round the clock) equipped with sniffer dog squad, Handheld metal detectors, door frame metal detectors and under carriage trolley mirror for preventive checking of explosive from entering the plant.
i. All employees are required to wear and display their identity cards inside the installation premises.
ii. Good housekeeping in and around Installation is ensured to reduce the opportunity for planting of any device.
iii. Only authorized vehicles (cars, scooters/motor-cycles, etc.) are allowed to park at the designated parking place.
iv. Intelligence Cell of CISF & in-house intelligence cell keeps a watch over undesirable activities/behavior of employees and contractors’ workers.
v. Perimeter security receives special attention.
vi. Gate number one (Main Gate) is monitored by CISF round the clock
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vii. Staff members will be advised to keep close watch on unusual activity or suspicious items. The staff will be encouraged to report matters of security concern.
Training will be provided at regular intervals to all concerned to execute the BTCP successfully. The same will be rehearsed through mock-drills. The above guidelines are general in nature. The management may issue additional guidelines to meet any eventuality.
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4. Bomb Threat Assessment Committee (BTAC): The following Committee will start functioning in the event of receipt of any bomb threat, either in the form of verbal or written communication:
S. No Committee Members
1. General Manager (Tech), Barauni Refinery Coordinator
2. General Manager (TS) Barauni Refinery
Alternate Coordinator
3. Dy General Manager (HSE) Barauni Refinery Member
4. Dy General Manager(HR), Barauni Refinery
Member
5. Dy. General Manager (Prod.), Barauni Refinery
Member
6. Dy. Commandant, C.I.S.F., Barauni Refinery
Member
7. Senior Manager (Fire & Safety) Barauni Refinery
Member
8. District Magistrate, Begusarai Member
9. Sr. Supdt. Of Police, Begusarai Member
10. Police Control Room, Begusarai Member
11. Bomb Disposal Squad, Begusarai
Immediately on receipt of Bomb Threat, the above committee members shall assemble in Disaster Control Room The BTAC shall act immediately without waiting for any specific member or all members because evaluation of the threat and taking of appropriate action cannot be delayed.
5. Responsibilities:
Coordinator :
As soon as the message is received, the same shall be conveyed to the members. Further, the Coordinator will –
(a) Inform the Police Control Room, medical officer, fire station, Bomb Squad, concerned State/Regional office and Corporate Security.
(b) Inform all the members of BTAC and other External Agencies.
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(c) Start of arrivals of all the members of the BTAC.
(d) Collect ‘Information Form’ (Annexure-A) from the receiver of the bomb threat call. Analyze the call as per Annexure-B. If receiver is available at the unit, ask him to remain present to assist the BTAC in analyzing the call.
(e) Request the concerned to be on duty even after dismissal time, to maintain continuity.
(f) Keep adequate number of sand bags ready.
(g) Submit report to RHQ & Corporate Security.
(h) Bomb Threat Drill Procedure to be followed as per Annexure-A.
Alternate Coordinator:
In the absence of the Coordinator, the Alternative Coordinator will function as the Coordinator. When the coordinator is available in station, he will be assisted by Alternate coordinator.
Members:
They will assemble immediately and help the Coordinator to take appropriate action in respect of the crisis.
Role of Shift-in-Charge / RSM:
He will assist the Coordinator in evacuating the area
Close down the facility/Concerned unit (if required) to avoid damage
Help the search team in searching the suspected area(s)
Assist Security personnel/Police Personnel.
Ensure minimum movement of personal vehicle / support vehicles near the threatened site.
Cordon off the area with unit security.
Assist local police.
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Role of CISF:
CISF will:
Cordon off the affected area
Arrange evacuation of premises in consultation with co-ordinator.
Restrict movement of vehicles
Assist search team in searching the area and later on help the explosive experts.
Collect intelligence through local contacts.
6. Search Team:
The following will be the members of search team:
M(A&W) - Security
AC, CISF
INSPECTOR, CISF
RSM/LOCATION INCHARGE OF AREA TO ASSIST THE TEAM
The Committee will mobilize the following equipment:
A. Bomb Detector.
B. Bomb Separation Blanket, Bomb Circle.
C. Hook and line set.
D. Metal Detector.
E. Search Mirror.
F. Emergency Lights.
G. Flash Lights.
H. Stethoscopes.
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I. Metallic & Non-Metallic probe.
J. Screwdriver set.
K. Chalks or Lime powder for marking searched areas.
All other implements required will be brought by the BDDS team.
The team will not make a move to handle the suspicious object or attempt to dispose it. If possible the object will be covered by bomb blanket or sand bags would be kept around it. The basic idea is to find the suspicious object and isolate the area till experts arrive to take charge.
7. Search Rules:
The search team will follow the following search rules.
(a) Never use more searchers then absolutely necessary.
(b) Use searchers in alternate rooms to minimize injuries.
(c) Never assume that only one device has been planted. Continue the search till the whole area is cleared.
(d) Clearly mark the area, which is searched to avoid duplication.
(e) Trust nothing and assume nothing is safe.
(f) Do not accept anything on face value
(g) Take rest during search process if needed.
(h) Clearly mark areas, which are suspected to be hazardous and inform the coordinator of Bomb Threat Committee immediately.
(i) Mark the area in bold letters “DANGER – BOMB”.
(j) Detonation of an explosive device may be caused by alteration of the changing environment i.e., temperature variations, the presence of an electric current, etc. Therefore, those who conduct the search should never cause any change in the environment. They should not put on electric lights in dark rooms and should not change the settings of thermostats, etc. In dark rooms, flashlight should not be used.
(k) Medical personnel should be kept close at hand during the search.
(l) Fire brigade personnel should remain on the alert.
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8. What to Look for:
The search team should look for the items listed below:
(a) Ground appearing to have been recently disturbed.
(b) Tin foil
(c) Disturbed carpet
(d) Scratch mark or new paint
(e) Fresh plaster or cement
(f) Greasy paper wrapping
(g) Brick dust/sand dust
(h) Partly opened windows/doors / drawers
(i) Unusual or out of place objects.
(j) Loose switch board, floor boards and paneling
(k) Loose electrical fittings
(l) Packing / wrapping material
(m) Disturbed vegetation
(n) Safety fuses
(o) Dirty rope
(p) Batteries
(q) Loose wires or pieces of insulation
(r) New brick work
The Above list is only indicative, not exhaustive.
The search team will examine all suspicious objects.
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9. Where to Look: Depending upon the location, the following area may also be looked.
(a) Rest rooms for workers
(b) Under stair cases, if any.
(c) Waste baskets- in each room.
(d) Flower pots- in open spaces and in buildings
(e) Bushes/ shrubs-in parking area and nursery in front of store
(f) Vehicle parking area
(g) Drains, sewage, manholes, etc.
(h) Telephones, air– conditioners, coolers
(i) Store room
(j) Toilets, water supply systems
(k) False Ceilings
(l) Public addressing system
10. Search Techniques:
(a) Open area: The open area will be visually scanned from a safe distance for any suspected objects: (i) In case, no suspicious object is found on visual search then
equipment like explosive detector, metal detector, etc. shall be used.
(ii) Sniffer dogs will also be used. (b) Room/Area Search: The entire room/area will be divided into four levels for the convenience
of searching.
(a) First Level - up to waist level (b) Second level - from waist level to head level
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(c) Third level - from head level to ceiling level (d) Forth level - false ceiling area/roof
Before starting the search, the team comprising two persons will stand attentively near the door and try to pick up any ticking sound of a timing mechanism. The members thereafter will stand back to back at a particular place and simultaneously start searching the room starting from up to waist level stage. After completion of search, the team will mark clearly with chalk that the room has been searched.
11. Evacuation of Area:
The BTAC after considering all pros and cons shall decide on evacuation and search. Executive Director will be the in charge for Communication. The exit route and assembly area shall be decided and communicated as soon as the decision for evacuation is taken. The Location In-Charge and Shift In-Charge shall guide the people with the help of the Fire and Safety In-Charge. CM(F&S) shall make an announcement over the public address system about the threat and advise the employees to vacate the area peacefully via the prescribed evacuation route and assemble at the specified holding area. During evacuation, all safety and security measures shall be observed. For effective and smooth evacuation (a) The holding area should be earmarked in advance. (b) An evacuation signal and evacuation route should be pre-arranged. (c) The entire evacuation shall be supervised by the in-charge.
12. Evacuation:
The main purpose of evacuation is to move people to a safe area from the danger area. The bomb threat assessment committee after considering all pros and cons may take any of the following decisions:
a. Search without evacuation.
b. Evacuate partially and search.
c. Evacuate and search simultaneously.
d. Evacuate fully and then search.
e. Evacuate fully but desist from searching search.
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13. Evacuation Plan:
(a) Executive Director will be responsible for effective communication.
(b) Wireless / Walkie – talkie, Public Address System, Page Phone, Land line Telephone will be used for uninterrupted communication.
(c) Apart from the main gate, the Emergency Gate is the other designated route for emergency exit.
(d) Training to the employees, with particular responsibilities mentioned above, will be imparted from time to time.
(e) CISF personnel will work as guides during evacuation.
(f) Board reading “Assembly Point” has been displayed at various locations.
SPOT SPECIFIC EVACUATION ROUTE Area being substantially large, evacuation route would very as per the spot. Evacuation route for assembly point vis-a- vis the spots are as under:
ASSEMBLY POINTS
(a) Time Office
(b) Project / Admn. Building
(c) Ecological Park
(d) MJPL Pipeline Office
14. Evacuation Procedures:
Once the Bomb Threat Assessment Committee recommends evacuation, the designated member would announce the decision over the public address system in a manner calculated to cause minimum panic and confusion. The announcer should keep his calm and should not show any anxiety. He should specify the evacuation route and names of officials who would guide the employees to the assembly area. He would also state the importance of remaining in the assembly area till further instruction.
During evacuation the employees should follow the guidelines stated below:-
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(a) Remain calm.
(b) Walk out of the building quietly and orderly manner.
(c) Avoid running or jostling.
(d) Follow the evacuation route.
(e) Follow instruction from guides regarding the route to be followed.
(f) Do not indulge in speculation about the nature of the emergency, thereby causing loss of time.
(g) Do not obstruct the evacuation process in any way.
(h) Do not leave behind any personal belongings.
(i) Switch off the plant machinery and power supply, if required before leaving the area.
(j) Help ladies and old people to reach the safe area.
(k) Remain quietly in the assembly area until further instruction.
(l) Do not spread rumours.
(m) Check if all the employees have reached the assembly area. If anybody is missing, the matter should be immediately reported to the coordinator of the Bomb Threat Committee.
(n) Follow the rule “DO NOT TAKE THE BOMB AWAY FROM THE PUBLIC. TAKE THE PEOPLE AWAY FROM THE BOMB.
15. Signal for Evacuation:
Walkie -Talkie sets will be used to direct the employees in the affected area to evacuate. The specific code signal for evacuation will be “ALL EMLOYEES SHOULD COME NEAR CONTROL ROOM FOR MEETING CALLED BY ED, ALL OTHER PERSONS like contractor workers, visitors if any, SHALL ALSO BE BROUGHT THERE.”
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16. Evaluation of the Bomb Threat:
BOMB THREAT: The bomb threat may be received either on telephone or through written message. The threat may be genuine or false. Evaluating the bomb threat message correctly is an important task of the Bomb Threat Assessment Committee. Even a seemingly hoax call would have to be properly assessed before reaching a conclusion.
GENUINE MESSAGE It is possible to form an idea as to whether a bomb threat call is genuine or not from the way the caller talks and gives information about the bomb. A genuine bomb threat caller would be able to describe the bomb in detail, as also the location of the bomb, time set for explosion, type of bomb, reason for planting the bomb, who is responsible for planting bomb, etc. Genuine bomb threat caller is
(a) The person who planted the bomb
(b) Who knows about the placement of bomb
The genuine bomb threat caller would be very confident in passing on the message and replying to queries about the bomb.
HOAX MESSAGE The hoax calls can be identified from the following:
(a) The caller’s voice shakes while giving details about the bomb.
(b) He is unable to give full details of the bomb.
(c) On being questioned the caller drops the telephone abruptly
ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN ON RECEIPT OF A BOMB THREAT
Whenever a bomb threat is received the message receiver must remain calm and try to extract as much information as possible so that the genuineness of the threat can be assessed.
A set of questions that may be posed to the caller, are given below: (a) What is your name?
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(b) What is your address?
(c) What is your telephone number?
(d) Where are you speaking from?
(e) Where is the bomb right now?
(f) When is it going to explode?
(g) What kind of bomb is it ?
(h) What does it look like?
(i) How to get rid of the bomb ?
(j) What will cause it to explode?
(k) Who placed the bomb? How do you know about it?
(l) Why has the bomb been placed ?
ADDITIONAL DATA:
During the conversation with the bomb threat caller, the receiver of the call should also note:
(a) The language of the caller
(b) Mix of languages if any
(c) Manner (calm, emotional, angry, vulgar, threatening, laughing, serious, jovial, etc.)
(d) Voice (soft, loud, intoxicated, etc.)
(e) Speech (slow, fast, nasal, etc.)
(f) Whether the voice sounds familiar?
(g) Background noises, like street sounds, house noises, animal noises, crockery, motor, music, train, factory machinery, office machinery, aircraft, traffic, etc.
The additional information will help to identify the genuineness of the threat and trace the caller.
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17. Evaluation of Bomb Threat Message:
Once the bomb threat call is received and the conversation is over, the person receiving the message will complete the “bomb threat information from” and forward it to the Coordinator of the bomb threat assessment committee.
The Bomb Threat Assessment Committee will immediately assemble at the designated control room. While evaluating the bomb threat the committee will consider the exact message received, number of hoax calls received in last 3-4 months, recent incidents of bomb explosion in and around the plant in last one year, loss of production if the operation is discontinued, dangers involved to public, employees, properties and installation.
The Committee should be very careful in evaluating the bomb threat message because of its serious implications.
Bomb Threat Message Evaluation Method:
As soon as the Coordinator of the Assessment Committee is informed of the bomb threat evaluation, he should convene a meeting of the committee in the designated control room. It will not be desirable to wait for all the members to assemble to evaluate the bomb threat message for further necessary action. The Committee will start functioning on the arrival of two or three members.
The Part-A (Bomb Warning Assessment Form – BWAF) will be completed in all respect by the Coordinator immediately. Part – A, will help to fix the details of bomb and its location.
From the detailed report submitted by the bomb threat message receiver the Part-B will be filled, which will be helpful in identifying the exact place or location where the bomb has been planted.
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Part-C of the evaluation form indicates the exact type of device, likely time of explosion, the person or organization responsible, technical description of the device, etc.
One or more ticks in Part B and Part C of the evaluation form will lead to the bomb threat call as “RED” or SPECIFIC”. In that case, the following actions should be considered.
(a) Whole Area of Unit to be evacuated.
(b) Thorough search by Search Team of whole unit, starting with suspect area, till the bomb detection and disposal squad arrives. The bomb detection and disposal squad will thereafter search the whole area, with the assistance of employees of the organization.
(c) All safety measures will be adopted. Station firefighting equipment should be moved near the threatened area.
(d) Hospital to be alerted.
(e) Local police to be informed for cordoning the unit from outside, moving people away and dispatching bomb squad to the site.
(f) Vehicular traffic to be diverted away from roads adjoining the unit.
(g) Power supply to threatened unit to be cut off.
In case the Part B or C of the evaluation form does not have sufficient information to categorize the bomb threat call as “RED” or “ SPECIFIC”, the information provided in Part-D of the evaluation form should be analyzed. Part D contains back ground data, such as history of bomb warnings and state of internal security, status of industrial relations at the time, etc. The details of part D will suggest the nature of precautionary measures to be adopted.
In case part B and Part C do not have sufficient information to merit classification of the message as “RED” or “SPECIFIC” but part D has information which indicates need for taking certain precautionary measures, the call will be classified as “Amber”. In the case of “Amber” threats following steps are indicated:
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1. Police Control Room, Bomb Detection and Disposal Squad, Superintendent of Police and District Magistrate to be informed.
2. Security arrangements to be augmented in the area.
3. Search team to start searching without affecting normal functioning of unit.
4. Station Firefighting equipment be put on alert.
5. Specific area threatened to be evacuated and declared out-of-control for everyone.
If Part-A, Part B, Part C and Part D contain no information indicating that the call is genuine, it will be termed as “Green”, in which case normal functioning will be continue, while the target area is searched for suspicious objects. Hence, the bomb threat call will be labeled “RED” or “SPECIFIC” “AMBER” OR “GREEN” as per information available in Part A, Part B, Part C and Part-D. Note: In case of difference of opinion amongst the members about the nature of the threat, it would be advisable to err on the side of caution.
The decision of the committee will be recorded in the bomb threat evaluation proforma and signed by all the members.
The evaluation of bomb threat will be done as quickly as possible as time lost may prove costly.
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18. Procedure to Be Followed after Identification of Suspected Object:
Actions to be taken:
A. In case, any suspicious object is located during search, the area is to be
cordoned off and a sign reading “DANGER - BOMB” is displayed in the Area.
B. The Coordinator of the Bomb Threat Assessment Committee is to be informed about the finding of the suspicious object.
C. The Coordinator in turn will inform all the members of the Committee, Bomb Disposal Squad, Police, Fire Brigade, Medical Authorities and Civil Authorities.
D. The BTAC considering all the factors shall decide the extent of the evacuation required.
E. The designated officer shall order the evacuation of the area. The safe distance for evacuation shall also depend on the size, nature and location of the explosive device.
F. It is advisable to evacuate the employees to an assembly area, which is at least 300 meter away from the suspected object.
G. The evacuation route and the assembly area should be checked for any bombs or IEDs.
H. The object should be delicately covered with bomb blanket and then a 3 ft. high wall of sand bags should be built around it. A minimum of 100/200 sandbags may be kept at each location for this purpose.
I. In the absence of Bomb blankets, mattresses or cushions can be used to reduce the blast effect.
J. The bomb separation ring consisting of a pre-cast concrete structure with adequate wall thickness can also be used in place of sandbags. An efficient method for quickly transporting the concrete structure should be worked out.
K. If the suspected object is found in a office building or in any room, the windows and doors should be opened to minimize the extent of the bomb blast damage.
L. In case, the suspected object is located adjacent to very important rooms like control room, MCR and Power House Control room or compressor and
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generator room, etc., wall buttressing can be done by stacking sandbags along the wall of the adjacent room to minimize the damage from blast and shock effect.
M. In a confined room the bomb blast wave will travel all round in case the room is big enough. But if there are any outlets, the blast wave will try to escape first through these outlets. This will lead to severe damage around the outlets. Therefore, no employee should be allowed to move or assemble in such areas.
N. The evacuated employees should not be permitted to re-enter the building, or the affected area, until the bomb squad clear the bomb, declare the area safe and final clearance certificate is issued by the Bomb Threat Assessment Committee.
19. All clear/Completion Certificate: The all clear signal/message is to be communicated to the employees and people of the affected area after the bomb threat search procedure is completed. We have decided to announce over PA/PAGING and Walkie Talkie“MEETING WITH ED IS OVER, ALL ARE REQUESTED TO GO TO THEIR RESPECTIVE WORK PLACES”. The Bomb Threat Committee coordinator shall prepare the Bomb Threat Search Completion Certificate which will be signed by all the members. Copies of the certificate will be forwarded to the higher authorities for information and record. If the bomb Search has been carried out by Army/Police Bomb Disposal Squad then they shall issue a clearance certificate and same will be counter signed either by the SP or his representative available at the Command Centre/Control Room. After completion of all the above exercises the BATC will ensure that normalcy is restored and all the agencies are informed accordingly. The PR Section (Corporate Communication) will ensure that the press releases are issued only in consultation with the Unit Head. 20. Important:
The list of DO’s and DON’Ts (Annexure-D) for handling suspicious objects shall be circulated to all the Employees and displayed prominently at some place where it will receive maximum exposure.
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21. Damage Caused by a Bomb: A bomb causes damage both by blast effect and by flying shrapnel, which are scattered over a fairly wide area but cause damage only to points, struck with sufficient force. 22. Appearance and Size Of Home-Made Bomb: Homemade bombs are not manufactured to any fixed standards. Therefore, their materials of construction, shape, size explosive charge, finish and workmanship vary widely. A homemade bomb may look like anything from a ball of jute yarn to well-finished service type ammunition. Bamboo tubes, cigarette, tins, glass bottles, coconut shells, earthen capsules, metal pipes and shells of various types have been and are used in making homemade bombs. 23. Apparent Difference between Service (Military Bombs) and Home Made
Bombs: All service bombs have very good finish of a manufactured article and bear markings in the form of letters, figures or monograms. Homemade bombs generally have a crude finish and do not bear markings, even if the finish is good. 24. Different Types of Home Made Bombs: Homemade bombs may be classified as under: -
(a) Bomb, which explodes at a preset time.
(b) Bomb, which explodes when its position is disturbed.
(c) Bomb, which explodes on impact.
(d) Bomb initiated by the action of sulfuric acid.
(e) Bomb initiated mechanically.
(f) Bomb fitted with fuse, which has to be lighted.
(g) Booby trap bomb.
(h) Letter bomb.
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Time Bomb :
A time bomb may have one of the following timing arrangements:-
(a) A time piece or watch acting as a time switching device in an electrical circuit consisting of a flash light battery with a filament of resistance (torch light bulb with its glass globe broken).
(b) Corrosive acid or chemical in a corrodible capsule.
(c) A special alloy which fatigues at a specified rate when under tension.
(d) A long length of safety fuse or a slow burning fuse.
(e) A time pencil which triggers the explosion at a preset time.
WARNING:
The timing device is usually concealed in the bomb. It is rarely possible to identify a Time Bomb or to ascertain the set time. There is therefore a measure of risk in dealing with a Time Bomb.
Letter Bomb: All letter bombs contain a charge of explosive and a suitable initiating device. The weight of explosive in a letter bomb is not very great. Neither need a letter bomb be too bulky. A LETTER BOMB CAN KILL A PERSON WHO OPENS IT. Letter bombs can also be made with explosive charge which is sufficiently sensitive to rough handling and does not need any special initiating arrangement. Such a bomb may be expected to be delivered only through a messenger and not by post as it may result in premature explosion. However, such sensitive letter bombs may also be sent by post as in the Patiala Post Office blast case. Pocket / Parcel / Book Bomb: A packet/parcel/book bomb contains a charge of explosive with a suitable initiating device. The weight of a bomb of this type will be much more than that of a letter bomb. In general, the effects of explosion of this type of bomb will be far more serious than that of a letter bomb.
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In the case of packet/parcel/book bomb delivered through messenger, the initiating device may be modified to make it work when the packet/parcel/book is upturned.
DOS AND DON’TS FOR EXAMINING LETTERS/PACKET/ PARCELS/ BOOKS
Don’t bend or press hard. Don’t open a closed cover, which is more than 3 mm thick until you have examined it according to the instructions given. Don’t hastily pull out contents of closed cover without examination. Don’t pull out contents of a closed cover if it does not come out smoothly. Don’t invert suspicious parcels delivered by messengers.
Do examine all closed covers, thin or bulky, against a source of a strong light, if cover is not uniformly translucent, suspect, mischief.
Do handle object gently, carefully and cautiously. Do be particularly careful about letters over 3mm in thickness and closed packets/parcels which are marked, “Personal and Confidential” or are dispatched from Post offices in the European continent Do seek assistance in case of doubt.
Detection of Letter Bombs, Packet /Parcel/Book Bombs:
The following pointers should be looked for in determining a suspected letter/packet/parcel/book bomb.
i Over stamped but unregistered
ii Unevenly balanced
iii It has a bulge
iv Too heavy for its size
v There is a small pinhole in one corner
vi Thin wire protrudes out of it
vii It has grease marks
viii It gives off odour of almond
ix It has springiness on top, bottom or sides. Don’t press or bend.
x If shaken gently, there is noise of loose metal inside
xi It gives the feeling of containing a cardboard or a stiff liner.
xii NOTE : A letter bomb may, be marked “Personal” or “Confidential” to make sure that it gets to the intended victim.
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Procedure for Dealing With A Bomb
1. EQUIPMENT/ MATERIALS REQUIRED FOR DEALING BOMBS
The following materials should be kept ready at all times as a kit for dealing with bombs:
a) Strong, smooth string of well twisted cotton yarn or plastic yarn approximately, 3mm in diameter and 30 meter long.
b) 2 meters long pole of bamboo or wood (long police lathi)
c) A bucket or tin can with its top open
d) A sharp knife or a pair of scissors
2. PRECAUTIONS WHICH MUST BE FOLLOWED IN ALL CASES :
a) Be careful about entering into a room in which or next to which an explosion has occurred to bring you there. It may be a ruse to trap you.
b) Do not open a closed room / door /window / almirah / cupboard/ box in the normal way, open with a long pole or in any other improvised manner.
c) Do not switch on any electric line if the room is dark use hand torch for illumination.
d) Do not touch, lift, drag, kick, hit or move the suspected object,
e) Do not try to defuse a suspected bomb. Leave the task to experts.
f) Isolate or cover with bomb blanket, if available.
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Procedure for Dealing with Suspected Objects / Bombs –
Brief description And Method of handling the suspected object
S.No. Description Method Of Handling
a. It has a Metal shell of GOOD FINISH AND BEARS MARKINGS OF letters figures or monogram. It is not fitted with a wick of fuse.
Possibly service ammunition. Leave it at site and surround with sand bags. Request Inspector of Explosives concerned to come and examine object on site. If possible, contact nearest military establishment for help in identification and removal of object.
b. It HAS A METAL SHELL of good or bad finish and is FITTED externally WITH A SPRING LOADED HAMMER or PLUNGER; secured by a pin or string (spring may not be visible).
Possibly a mechanically operated grenade. DO NOT meddle with the spring-loaded hammer/ plunger mechanism.
c. Object looks like a BALL of JUTE YARN OR COTTON YARN OR STRIPS OF CLOTH. It is NOT fitted with a wick or fuse. Size less than 50 mm in diameter.
Take a bucket GENTLY place object in the bucket. DOES NOT press object between fingers while picking it up.
d. Object looks like BALL OF JUTE YARN. It is fitted WITH A WICK. Diameter not more than 25 mm. It may or may not have attractive finish.
Possibly a cracker. Send in a padded box or carton to the concerned Inspector of Explosives.
e. Object looks like a bulky Book. Could be a book-bomb, DON’T OPEN DON’T UPTURN OR TILT.
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ANNEXURES A. - BOMB THREAT MESSAGE FORM
B. - BOMB WARNING ASSESSMENT FORM
C. - BOMB THREAT DRILL PROCEDURE
D. - LIST OF DO’S AND DON’TS
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ANNEXURE-A
BOMB THREAT MESSAGE FORM UNIT LOCATION TIME DATE Forwarded to --------------------------------------------------------------- Exact wording of the threat: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Where is the bomb right now? ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. When is it going to explode? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. What does it look like? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4. What kind of bomb is it? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5. What will cause it to explode? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6. Did you place the bomb? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7. Why are you doing this? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8. Who are you?
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9. What is your name? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10. What is your address? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11.What is your telephone number? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12.Where are you now? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13. Origin of call. Public phone Private phone Internal Long call 14.Specific number dialed by the caller --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15. Sex -------------------------------------------------------------- 16. Approximate age --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17. Call received: Time--------Completed----------Duration-------- 18. Nationality ---------------------------------------------------------- 19. Threat Language: A. Well Spoken B. Irrational C. Taped D. Foul E. Incoherent F. Message read by threat maker 20. Voice characteristics: A. Loud B. Pitched C. Rasping D. Intoxicated E. Soft F. Deep
G. Pleasant
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21. Callers voice:
A. Calm B. Crying C. Excited D. Stutter E. Rapid F. Deep G. Disguised H. Familiar I. Clearing throat J. Angry K. Slow L. Fast M. Laughter N. Nasal O. Lisp P. Hoarse Q. Slowered 22. Accent: Local Not local Foreigner Regional Language used by the caller ---------------------------------- 23. Back ground sound: Quite Mixed Street Noises Music Crockery House Noises Motor Voice Animal Noises PA system Booth Factory Machinery Children Traffic Office Machinery Train Buses Airport Activities Party Atmosphere Others 24. Did the caller appear familiar with the area by his description of the bomb location ? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 25. If the voice sound familiar, whose did at sound like? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 26. Command of language: Excellent Good Fair Poor Remarks:
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Name of the person who received the bomb threat: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Designation Department Phone Message passed on to (Name) Designation Department Phone
Date Time Signature
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ANNEXURE-B
BOMB WARNING ASSESSMENT FORM
Indian Oil Corporation Limited
PART-A
Message received by: Name
Designation Telephone no. Time of receipt
Exact wording of threat call: --------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------- Additional information: Location of bomb: Anticipated time of Explosion: Description of bomb: Name & Organisation of the caller: Telephone no. of the caller: Whether the message is taped: Yes/No Any other information:
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PART-B Caller specified the name of the building? Caller specified any room no.? Where the bomb is kept? Caller informed any specific location?
PART-C
Exact construction of device specified. Detailed technical description of device specified. Means of concealment of bomb explained. Extortion or political demand made. Identification of a person with his address and description. The type of bomb or device. Expected time of explosion Terrorist or other organisation made or code word given. Any other information
PART-D Background data: History of bomb warning and state of internal security: History of activities of terrorist in last three months:
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Any term used indicating call to be genuine or spurious: Influence of current events: Additional security measures taken recently: State of industrial relation: Anti social elements activities: Intention to disrupt / create tension or violence in the locality: Any other information to decide the call as Genuine or false:
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ANNEXURE - C
BOMB THREAT DRILL PROCEDURE
1. Receipt of bomb threat. 2. Immediately inform Co-ordinator and Police control room. 3. Inform Local Civil authorities and Police authorities and apprise them of bomb
threat. 4. Also inform Fire services of threat received at Terminal. 5. Evaluation of the repercussions of the bomb explosion based on the threats
received. 6. Decision to search or evacuate the area. 7. In case of evacuation, premises are cleared off in order to minimise the loss of
bomb explosion. 8. Search the bomb:
a. Bomb located - i. Fire fighting system checked for readiness. ii. All precautionary actions to minimise or making the
bomb inactive. iii. Disposal of bomb with the help of local authorities and
bomb disposal squad. iv. Investigate the bomb threat thoroughly. v. Declaration that area is safe. vi. Order re entry of employee.
b. Bomb not located -
i. Call off all the activities of the Terminal. ii. Declaration that area is safe. iii. Order re entry of employee.
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ANNEXURE-D
DO’S AND DON’T
a) Do not touch or remove the suspected object unless you are duty bound to do so.
b) Do not open the package with hand or other materials.
c) Do not puncture the package, object or device.
d) Do not submerge the suspected object in water, as there are some bombs,
which get activated in water.
e) Do not cut the strings or wire attached to the object. Some bombs designed to get activated once the string or wire is cut.
f) Do not accept the identification marks on the package on its face value.
g) Do not pass any metallic object over the package, as some bombs are
designed metal sensitive.
h) Do not attempt to open the baggage by hand or any other unapproved methods. Use always-remote entry technique only.
i) Do not focus any flashlight directly over the suspected object as some bombs
explode on exposure to light source.
j) Do not allow anybody to re-entry in the affected area until the danger is cleared for safe and advised for re-entry.
k) Do not take bomb away from public. Take public away from bomb.
l) Do not bring suspected object in the control room.
m) Do not transport the suspected object through congested area.
n) Once the bomb is located evacuate the employees immediately to the
assembly area, which is notified at a safer distance.
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o) Open all the doors and windows to minimize the extent of damage due to
blast or shock effect. p) Inform the Bomb Threat Committee Co-ordinator.
q) Inform bomb disposal squad.
r) Inform civil authorities, police, fire brigade, hospital and ambulance.
s) Handle the suspected item only if you are trained and duty bound to handle
it.
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CHAPTER - 25
ANNEXURES
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LOCATION OF MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARD UNITS, DISTRICT CRISIS CONTROL ROOM AND DISTRICT FIRE STATION
Keshawe
Rachiyahi
Annexure-1
(Barauni Refinery Layout)
District
Crisis C/R
District Fire
Station
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Annexure – 03 PLOT PLAN
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Annexure - 4
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
CR
UD
E
AVU
I /
II /
III
Fuel Gas
LPG
CRU Motor
Sprit
Naphtha
KeroseneH2
PLANT
DHDT
COKER
– A /B
FCCU
HSD (High
Speed
Diesel)
LRU
LSHS
Petroleum
Coke
ARU/SRU SULPHUR
LPG MERICHEM
GASOLINE MERICHEM
BLOCK FLOW DIAGRAM OF BARAUNI REFINERY
MSQ
Barauni Refinery BLOCK FLOW DIAGRAM
Annexure - 5
List Of Hazardous Chemicals Under the Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical Rules, 1989.
SR. NO. NAME OF CHEMICAL
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Chief Co-Ordinator
DM, Begusarai
Security S P ,Begusarai
Fire Service DFO,Begusarai
Medical Services Civil Surgeon
Transport DTO, Begusarai
Media & Welfare Director Accts,Begusarai
Communication TDM, Begusarai
Chief Co-Ordinator
ADM,Begusarai
Security Dy. SP, Begusarai
Fire Service A/c AFO. Begusarai
Medical Service ACMO . Begusarai
Transport NDC,Begusarai
Media & Welfare DPRO,Begusarai
Communication DET. Begusarai
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Annexure-19
GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR THE PEOPLE RESIDING SURROUDNINGS OF REFINERY IN CASE OF EMERGENCY SITUATION AT BARAUNI REFINERY.
DO’S
Don’t be panic, keep cool.
If any gas leakage is reported, move either side perpendicular to wind direction towards a safe place.
Keep wet cloth on the nose and breathe normally.
Immediately extinguish the fire in chulah with water in and around the house.
Immediately put off any open flame like candle, lantern, heater etc.
If evacuation is called for, lock the house and be ready.
Free the domestic animals.
Help Fire Fighting team and emergency staff to keep the situation under control.
Listen carefully the announcements in your area and follow the instructions.
DON’T’S Do not put ‘ON’ or ‘OFF’ any electric switch. If any electric switch is ‘ON’,
keep it in ‘ON’ position only.
Do not smoke and do not allow anybody to smoke.
Do not pay any attention towards rumors and do no spread any rumor also.
Do not use any personal vehicle.
Do not block any public road.
During any emergency situation, do not unnecessarily talk on phone
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Annexure-20
DISASTER TALK BACK CONSOLE OPERATING PROCEDURE
Before using the system, kindly ensure that on main console “Power Led” is ON
1. TO TALK WITH F&S CONTROL ROOM
2.TO TALK WITH DISASTER CONTROL ROOM
DISASTER ANNOUNCEMENT SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE AT F&S CONTROL ROOM
TO COMMUNICATE WITH – 1. F&S Control Room(MFS) :
2. Plant Talk Back Console ( Unit Control Rooms)
3. For Conference Mode
4. For All Call Mode
5. For Entire Plant Announcement
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Annexure-21
Role of SDRF
While the NDRF is being trained, re-trained and equipped as a specialist force for level three disasters, it is equally important to ensure capacity building of state police personnel who are invariably the first responders in any natural or man-made disasters. To ensure this, a two-pronged strategy is being suggested to the states: firstly, to train state police personnel in the basics of disaster management and secondly, to train at least one battalion equivalent out of their state armed police units as State Disaster Response Force (SDRF) on lines of the NDRF. In addition to police personnel, the SDRFs may be constituted from existing resources of the Fire Services, Home Guards and Civil Defence. NDRF Bns and their training institutions will assist the States/UTs in this effort. The State/ UTs will also be encouraged to set up DM training facilities in their respective Police Training Colleges and include this subject in their basic and in-service courses.
FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE STATE DISASTER MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY
(i) All the duties, powers, function and rights, what so ever, consequent and incidental to the carrying of the objectives of the Society shall only be exercised or performed by the Governing Body.
(ii) In particular and without prejudge to the generality of the foregoing provision, the Governing Body of SDMA may:
(a) make, amend, or repeal any bye laws or rules relating to administration and management of the affairs of the Society subject to the observance of the provisions contained in the Act and the Uttar Pradesh Disaster Management Act, 2005;
(b) consider the annual budget and the annual action plan, its subsequent alternations placed before it by the Secretary/Convener from time to time and to pass it with such modification as the Governing Body may think fit;
(c) accept donations and endowments or give grants upon such terms as it thinks fit;
(d) delegate its powers, other than those of making rules to the Chairman, Secretary/Convener or other authorities as it may deem fit;
(e) appoint committee, sub-committees and Boards etc. for such purpose and on such terms as it may deem fit, and to remove any of them;
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
(f) recruit and appoint all the key administrative and technical staff of the
Society;
(g) set policy for the Secretariat of the Society;
(h) monitor the financial position of the Secretariat of the Society in order to ensure smooth income flow and to review annual audited accounts;
(i) do generally all such acts and things as may be necessary or incidental to carrying out the objectives of the Society or any of them.
Provided that nothing herein contained shall authorise the Governing Body to do any act or to pass any byelaws which may be repugnant to the provisions hereof, to the powers hereby conferred on the Governing Body and other authorities, or which may be inconsistent with the objectives of the Society.
Role of NDRF
The Concept. The Disaster Management Act has mandated the constitution of a Specialist Response Force to a threatening disaster situation or a disaster. This Force will function under the National Disaster Management Authority which has been vested with its control, direction and general superintendence. This will be a multi-disciplinary, multi-skilled, high-tech force for all types of disasters capable of insertion by air, sea and land. All the eight battalions are to be equipped and trained for all natural disasters including four battalions in combating nuclear, biological and chemical disasters.
Present Organization. Presently this Force is constituted of eight battalions, two each from the BSF, CRPF, CISF and ITBP. Each battalion will provide 18 self-contained specialist search and rescue teams of 45 personnel each including engineers, technicians, electricians, dog squads and medical/paramedics. The total strength of each battalion will be approximately 1,158.
Deployment. These NDRF battalions are located at nine different locations in the country based on the vulnerability profile to cut down the response time for their deployment. During the preparedness period/in a threatening disaster situation, proactive deployment of these forces will be carried out by the NDMA in consultation with state authorities.
Functional Parameters - Regular and intensive training, familiarization with the area of responsibility, carrying out mock drills and joint exercises with the various stakeholders will form the key functional parameter of this Force. Four training centres will be set up in Kolkata, Latur, Bhanu and NISA (Hyderabad) by respective paramilitary forces to train personnel from NDRF battalions of respective forces. The NDRF units will impart basic training to the State Disaster Response Forces (SDRF) in their respective locations. Further, one national-level Disaster Management Academy will be set up at Nagpur to provide training for trainers and to meet other national and international commitments.
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
FUNCTIONS OF THE (NDRF) AUTHORITY
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Authority shall be primarily responsible for promoting an integrated and coordinated system ofdisaster management including prevention or mitigation of disaster by the State, local authorities, stake holders and communities,
(2) The Authority shall-
(a) act as the central planning, coordinating and monitoring body for disaster management and post-disaster reconstruction, rehabilitation, evaluation, and assessment;
(b) assist the State Government in formulation of policy relating to emergency relief notwithstanding that the implementation of emergency relief shall be the responsibility of the Revenue Department and other departments of the Government;
(c) inform the State Government and departments of Government on progress and problems in disaster management;
(d) promote general education and awareness on disaster management, emergency planning and response;
(e) and matters incidental thereto.
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
Contact Details Of NDRF Officers
NDRF Head Quarter
Name Designation Address Tele. Fax. Mobile E-mail.
Shri Rajiv ,IPS
DG Directorate General , National Disaster
Response Force (NDRF) Sector-1 R K
Puram, New Delhi -66
011-26712851
011-26161442
011-26105912.
09818916161 [email protected]
Shri Mukul Goel
IG Directorate General , National Disaster
Response Force (NDRF) Sector-1 R K
Puram, New Delhi -66
011-26160252
011-26113014
011-26105912.
09871115726 -
Shri Rakesh Ranjan
Dy Commandant
(Proc)
Directorate General , National Disaster
Response Force (NDRF) Sector-1 R K
Puram,
011-26107921
011-26105912.
08860136649 [email protected]
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
New Delhi -66
Shri Om Parkash
Inspector Control Room
Directorate General , National Disaster
Response Force (NDRF) Sector-1 R K
Puram, New Delhi -66
011-26107953
011-26105912.
08010072169
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
NDRF BNS
Name Designation Address Tele. Fax. Mobile E-mail.
Sh. A.K.Singh Commandant 1st BN NDRF, Patgaon PO-
Azara,Guwahati
0361-2840027
0361-2840284
09435545951 [email protected] [email protected]
Sh. Sukhdev Raj
Commandant 2nd BN NDRF Digberia Camp, PO-Badu Road,
Madhyamgram,Barasat Kolkata-700128
033-25264302,
033-25264394
033-25263077
09434742836 [email protected], [email protected],
Sh. Arun Kumar
Sr.Commandant 3rd BN NDRF, PO-Mundali,
Cuttack-Odisha
09437964571 09937186222
0671-2879710
09868744560 [email protected], [email protected]
Sh.S.Neduc Hezhian
Sr.Commandant 4th Bn NDRF, PO-Suraksha Campus,
Arrakonam,Distt. Vellore,
Tamilnadu
04177-246269
04177-246594
09442105069, 09442105169
Sh.Alok Avasthy
Commandant 5th Bn NDRF, PO-
Vishnupuri,Telegaon, Pune(Maharashtra)
02114-231245
02114-231509
09423506765 [email protected]
Sh.R.S Joon Commandant 6th Bn NDRF, Chilora Road, Gandhinagar, Pin-382042
079-23202540
079-23201551
09428826445 [email protected]
Sh.R.K.Verma Commandant 7th Bn NDRF, Bibiwala Road,
Bhatinda(Punjab)
0164-2246030
0164-2246570
09417802032 [email protected], [email protected]
Sh.Jaipal Yadav
Commandant 8th Bn NDRF, Greater
Noida,Distt.G.B.Nagar, UP
0120-2351101,
0120-2351087
0120-2351105
09968610011 [email protected], [email protected]
Sh.S.S.Guleria Commandant 9th Bn NDRF, Bihata Patna,
Bihar
06115-253942
06115-253939
08986909490 [email protected], ndrfpatna@yah
oo.com
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
Sh.Parshant Dhar
Commandant 10th Bn NDRF, Malkangiri,
Vijaywara(AP)
09419217790 01955-252646
09419217790 [email protected]
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
Annexure-22
OFF-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN OF BARAUNI
1.1 PREAMBLE History has shown, for many times that several small and large industrial accidents in lack of proper planning and control measures have transformed in major losses and destruction and thus causing the disaster. Many times losses rise exponentially just because of improper planning and coordination among various facilities available with industries and government/ administration for control and mitigation, besides this lack of improper coordination have drastic repercussions on past accident scenario.
To establish proper co-ordination between industrial facilities and facilities available with the local administration and government setup for control and abatement of emergency arising out of industrial accident, Ministry of environment has laid down provisions for preparation of an OFF- SITE EMERGENCY PLAN, under Rule -14 of “The Manufacture, storage and import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989” (as amended to date). According to the rule preparation of an OFF SITE - EMERGENCY PLAN, by district administration having “Major Accidents Hazard units” (MAH Units) [as defined under Rule 2j (a) of “The Manufacture, Storage and import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989”] in its jurisdiction.
The District Magistrate, Administration BARAUNI has prepared ‘OFF SITE EMERGENCY PLAN’ of Dist. BARAUNI.
1.2 CHEMICAL EMERGENCY
Chemical emergency in industry may be defined as one or emergencies which can affect several or all plants/ departments can cause serious injury to personnel and can result in extensive damage to property and loss of life and disruption of whole working scenario. It requires the effective handling of the resources.
Emergencies, which can be encountered in any industry, are of two types- A .Manmade:
1. Fire
2. Gas leak/gas cloud ,(flammable)
3. Poisoning
4. Explosion
5. Those arising out of abnormalities in operation, maintenance, shutdown, failure
of equipment and use of substandard or wrong materials.
6. Civil commotion and armed conflicts , liquid and/or chemical poisoning
B. Natural:
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ORIGINAL JULY’12 (UPDATED AUGUST’14)
1. Flood, drought
2. Lightning
3. Cyclone
4. Earthquake
5. Falling of meteor etc.
Fire, explosion and the release of toxic gases can cause death and injuries to workers and the evacuation of communities and adversely affect the environment as a whole. Chemical emergencies that have come to be known as “Basel” , “Bhopal” , “Flixborough” , “Mexico city” and “Seveso” gave rise to terms “Major Hazards” and “Major Hazard Control” the prevention and control of major hazards have subsequently become a pressing issue in all parts of the world.
The rapid growth in the use of hazardous chemicals in industry and trade has brought about a very significant increase in the number of people, both workers and members of the general public, whose life could be endangered at any one time by an accident involving these chemicals. The rapid pace of progress in modern technology allows no scope for learning by trial and error, making it increasingly necessary to get design and operating procedure right the first time. However, safeguards in the chemical industry are not limited to factory floor alone. Public concern at multiple injuries and deaths from spectacular events such as major explosion invariably leads to calls for additional controls at national and international levels. It is therefore important, particularly for projects involving the storage and use of hazardous chemicals, to address both on-site and off-site safety when deciding on the safety measures to be applied.
1.3 Legal-Backup and need for off-site emergency plan
In India “Off-site Emergency Planning and preparedness” at District level and frame work for emergency planning and preparedness along with their related aspects are covered by two acts viz.:-
(i) The Environment Protection Act, 1986 through
Manufacture Storage & Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989
-Under Rule – 13 for on-site emergency planning at industry level - Under Rule – 14 for off-site emergency Planning at District level
Chemical accidents (emergency planning , preparedness and response) rules , 1996
- Under rule – 8,9,10 &13(for district &local crisis group)
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