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Commentary on Epictetus' Enchiridion
(Chapters 32-34)
by Simpliciu s (c. early sixth centu ry)
Chapter. XXXII.
It is possible, you observe some other person more caressed than yourself; invited to
entertainments, w hen you are left out; saluted before are tak en any notice of; thought more
proper to advise with, and his counsel followed rather than yours. But are these respects
paid him good things, or are they evil? If they deserve to be esteemed good, this ought to
be a matter of joy to you, that that person is happy in them: but if they be evil, how
unreasonable it is to be troubled, that they have not fallen to your own share? Besides,
consider, I pray, that i t is not possible, you should have those civilities paid to you in the
same degree that others have; because the profession you have taken upon you, will not
suffer y ou to do the same things to deserve them that others do. And how can it be
should have the same interest, w ith one that constantly pays his morning devotions there?
Or he, that only minds his own business, with another that is eternally cringing, and
commend him; with a parasite, that is ever blowing him up with his own praise, indulging
all h is vices, and admir ing his follies and h is nonsense. At this rate, you are a very unjust,
and a most unreasonable man; for you expect to receive that grat is, which is really s et to
sale, and cannot be obtained w ithout pay ing the price. For instance now, and to use a very
familiar one, you inquire in the market, how lettuce go and are told, they are a half -penny
apiece. Suppose now, another person bids, and pays, and takes them; and you w ill
neither bid, nor pay, and go without them: is there any wrong done? Or hath the buyer a
better bargain than y ou? He parted w ith his money, and hath the salad; y ou have no
salad indeed, but you have kept your money. Just so it is in the case before us. You were
Pay the price, and you may have it; but that pr ice, is commendation and flattery. If
therefore you think the thing for your advantage, it is set to sale, and you know the market
rates. But if you expect it should come wi thout mak ing payments, you are very
unreasonable. And if it be thought too dear, then sure you have no reason to complain; for,
e something as good in the room of
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it; for you have the satisfaction of keeping the price in your own hand still; that is, of not
commending a man against truth and conscience.
Comment.
This discourse seems to be a continuation of the former; proceeding to obviate some
objections sti ll behind, su ch as seem all t o arise from the same habit and disposit ion of
min d. For, when a man hath tu rned all h is thoughts and care upon his own
improvement, and hath disengaged h imself from the world, and it s encumbr ances; when
he hath arrived to that largeness and sufficiency of soul, as to despise riches, and honor,
and popular it y; when he th inks it un becomin g his character, to cour t t he count enance of
great persons, by all the means art s and obsequious att endance of slaves and
sycophants; th ere will, in all lik elih ood, follow th is inconvenience upon it , that he shall
be slighted and disregarded him self, m any of hi s equals and inferiors shall be invited
home to entert ainments, shall be more part icul arly addressed to in pu bli c places, and
receive all outward marks of respect; nay many less capable of advising than he, shall be
admit ted into the secretes of families, and consu lted in all t heir affairs of import ance,
while this person, so much their superior in worth and wisdom, is in dustr iously
neglected.
Now all t he seeming hardshi p, th at appears in such u sage, Epictetus m ight, i f he had
thought fit, have taken off in one word, by remitting us to his usual distinction, of the
th ings that are, and th at are not, with in the compass of our own choice: for, i f those
th ings that condu ce to our r eal happiness be at our own disposal, and the th ings here
mentioned are not so; then ought we not t o suppose our happiness at all to consist i n
them. Bu t t hi s solut ion of the difficult y he takes no notice of here; partl y because it is
general, and applicable to many other cases as well as this, and partly, as presuming it
abundantly enlarged upon, and t hat h is reader was su fficient ly perfect in it before. That
therefore, which he chooses to in sist u pon, is someth ing, th at comes up closer to the
matter in hand; and proves, that the inconveniences here alleged minister an occasion of
much greater advantage, to those, who have the wisdom to make a right use of them.
To th is pur pose, he tells us, th at the instances in wh ich men of inferior quali fications
have the preference and respect, before those, who have made a stri ct ph ilosophical l ife
their choice, must be either good or evil. If you please, to make the division perfect, I will
take the confidence to add, or indi fferent; for i n t ru th , there are a great many t hin gs of
th is middle sort. Bu t t hen it mu st be confessed too, th at th ose which are indifferent , can
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neither be called honorable nor dishonorable. And for th at r eason, the aut hor seems n ot
to have thought th is branch wort h any r oom in his division. Well, we will say then,
according to him, that they are all in one of the extremes, either good or evil: now if they
be good, (says he) this ought by no means be a matter of discontent to you. But quite
cont rary, it should add to your joy and satisfaction, that another person is happy in
them. For this calls for the exercise of a very exalted and philosophical virtue; that of
wishin g well t o all m ank ind, and rejoicing in t he prosperi ty of others.
And h ere we shall do well to observe, what a mighty good he makes this seeming evil to
contain, and how prodigious an honor t his disrespect derives upon u s. For th is indeed is
the very quali ty of the min d, which br ings us to th e tr uest and nearest r esemblance of
God, which is the greatest happiness, any of his creatures can possibly attain to. For
God is himself of absolute and unbounded power, being indeed the only source of all the
lim ited powers commu nicated to any other beings. And as his power is in fini tely great,
so his will is in fini tely good. For hence it comes to pass, that he wou ld h ave all th ings
good, and n ot anything evil, so far as that can be. And because his wil l can i ntend
noth ing bu t what his power is able to accompl ish, t herefore he does really make all
th ings good; and t his he does not n iggardly and grudgingly, bu t comm unicates to every
creature of his own goodness, in as large proportions, as the condition of each creature
is capable of enjoying it .
ot resemble God, in i nfin ite and uncontr ollable
power, for t his is a perfection of the divine natu re, which ou r consti tu tion cannot receive;
and besides, there are many degrees of intermediate beings, which, though much
in feri or to God, are yet much superior t o us in point of power. Bu t sti ll i n t he other par t
of his excellence, he hath condescended to make us like himself, and given us the honor
of a will free and u nboun ded, a wil l capable of extending it s good wishes, and k ind
inclinat ions to all the world, provided we have bu t the grace to make this good use of it .
It is therefore an instance of his wonderful wisdom, and adorable goodness, that he hath
made this to be his image and simi lit ude in our soul s; because th is is th e true and
proper principle of all operation and action. And though the soul cannot punctually
make all things good, as God can, and does; yet it goes as far as it can in making them
so; and for t he rest, i t does it part , by wishing that good, which i t cannot give them. For
th at is perfect and t ru e volit ion, when th e person wil lin g, exert s his whole str ength, and
all t he facult ies assist and concur wit h i t; for we have the absolute disposal of ou r own
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minds, and so the wishing well t o all m ank ind, is what any man m ay do, if he please.
And in deed a tr ul y good man goes farther than all th is; he wishes the prosperi ty of all
men whatsoever; and he stops not there, but extends his kindness to creatures of
different species, to bru tes, to plant s, to even i nanimate th ings; in a word, t o all th at
make those wishes effectual to all, because as I said, the willing is a perfection given us
by natur e, bu t t he power of effecting it i s not. For th is requir es the cooperation of many
other causes, the perm ission of the gods, and th e concurr ence of several agent s, which
we cannot comm and. And hence it is, that all our virt ue consists in our will ; the merit of
all our actions is measured by th at; and th at all t he happiness and misery of ou r l ives is
made to depend upon the good or ill use of it. And thus you have the force of this
argument, proceeding upon a supposition that t hese thin gs are good.
Bu t i f on th e other hand, the respects denied to the phil osopher, and paid to others, be
evil; here can be no ground of dissatisfaction, but a fresh occasion of joy: not upon his
account indeed who hath them, but upon your own, who have them not. At this rate, the
good man can never be melancholy at the want of these thin gs, nor l ook upon it as any
disparagement t o his person, or dim inut ion of his happiness, but is sur e to be pleased,
let the event be what it will; that is, either for the good success of others, if it be good; or
for hi s own escape, if it be evil. And t hu s all angry r esent ments are taken off, in point of
interest and advantage; for though we allow these things to conduce to our happiness,
yet it is a much greater happiness, to aspire after a resemblance of the divine
perfections, which the missing of th em gives men an opportu nit y to do; and if t hey
rath er t end t o make us miserable, then the being wit hout them is not so properl y a
want , as a deliverance.
After th is he proceeds to two other t opics, the possibil it y of obtain ing them, and the
reasonableness of expecting them. From the former of these he argues thus. It is not to
be imagined, that one who never makes his court, should have the same privileges, with
one who is eternally laboring to ingrati ate him self. This labor mu st consist of all t he
ceremonious fopperies, and servile submissions imaginable; the waiting at the great
and al l p laces of publ ic concourse; th e commending all he does, though never so base,
and admiring all he says though never so senseless. And therefore, for a philosopher,
and a man of honor and tr ut h, who cannot subm it to these un worthy methods of
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insinu ating himself, to meet wi th the same count enance, and mark s of ki ndness, which
th ose who prostit u te themselves at th is rate for them; is, as the world goes, absolutely
impossible.
Nay, it i s not only un reasonable upon that accoun t t o expect th em, bu t in point of
just ice too. I t argues a m an greedy and insat iable, when he expects h is meal, and yet wi ll
not consen
yourself, what he hath already bought and paid for: for t hough he left no money under
his plate, yet h e gave that pu rchase, which you would have thought mu ch too dear. And
consequent ly (as he shows by that instance of the lett uce,) you who went without the
dinner, have as good a bargain at least, as he that was admit ted to it : he had t he
varieties indeed, bu t then you have your liberty; you did not enslave yourself so far, as to
nor bear the affected coldness of his welcome, nor the tedious attendance in his anti-
chamber. In short, you were not t he subject of h is haughty n egligence, and st iff
form alit y, nor t he jest of his saucy servants. Now all th is you must have been content
with, t o have dined with his greatness. If you expect i t upon easier terms, you are
mistaken, for it will come no cheaper; and if you expect it , wit hout paying as others do, it
argues you greedy, and an u nfair tr adesman. And t his character is not consistent wi th
th at of a good man; so that you must change your temper, and be more moderate in
your expectances of this k ind .
Chapter. XXXIII.
We cannot be at a loss, what the condi tion of things is by nature, what her law s and
methods, nor how men ought to deport themselves, with regard to them: for these are
things so plain, that al l the w orld, at one time or other, are universally agreed about them.
For instance, if a neig
is a very common accident. Now the application fit to be made from hence is, that, when
one of our own happens to be broken, we should no more think it extraordinary , nor suffer
it to gi
trivial example, should prepare us for bearing casualties of greater consequence, with the
like temper. When any of our acquaintances buries a child , or a w ife, everybody is ready
to mitigate the loss, with the reflection, that all men are mortal , and this is w hat a ll men
have therefore reason to expect. But w hen the misfortune comes home to ourselves, then
we give a loose to our passions, and indu lge our lamentations and bitter complaints. Now
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these things ought quite otherwise to awaken the same considerations; and i t is bu t
reasonable, that what we thought a good argument to moderate the resentments of other
people should be applied with the same efficacy, to restrain the excesses of our own.
Comment.
There are some notions concern ing the natur e of thin gs, in wh ich all mank ind consent ;
and not any one considering person ever pretended to contest or contradict them. Such
are these that follow: th at wh atever is good; is profitable, and wh atever is t ru ly
profitable, is good: that all t hings are carr ied by a natu ral p ropensit y to the desire of
good; th at equal th ings are neither less nor m ore than one another: that twi ce two
makes fou r; and t hese notions are such as right reason hath recommended and ri veted
in to our minds, such as long experience hath confir med, and such as carry an exact
agreement with the tru th and natu re of th ings.
Bu t wh en we descend from t hese general t ru th s, to the part icul ar ideas and doctrines of
single persons, t here we very often find our selves mi staken. And these erroneous
opin ions are of di fferent sorts. Some of them deceive us, by t oo credulous a dependence
upon the report of our senses, as when we pronounce the circumference of the moon, to
be as large as that of the sun, because it appears so to the nak ed eye. Some we are
prepossessed in favor of, by in clining too much t o our sensual in clinat ions; as when we
say, that all pleasure is good. Some are owing to the admitting of arguments before they
are well weighed; as those, which advance th e belief of the worl d being made by two
principles, and that the soul is corporeal. Now these are what men argue differently
upon, and t hey are so far from being always tru e, that many t imes the tru th lies on the
contrary side of the question. And it can never be safe for us to depend upon such
parti cular assumptions, for the kn owledge of th at tr ue state of th ings, which Epictetus
means here, by the condit ion, the laws, and the meth ods of natur e.
Bu t n othing can be a more pregnant proof, how exceedingly fickle and u nfaith ful
parti cular opinions are, and how firm and u nalterable those general and acknowledged
ones, th an t he variety of behavior , in one and th e same case. For let any accident
quit e another person, tr ansport ed wi th the vehemence
of his concern, and all his reason proves too feeble to support it. But when the very same
misfort une happens to another, th ere is none of this disorder; he then looks upon i t as it
really i s, considers it calmly and coolly, without passion or preju dice, and passes the
same judgement u pon i t wit h t he rest of the world who have no part ial affection, or
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parti cular concern to pervert them; but regard only t ru th , and the clear reason of the
thing.
This he illust rates by a very t ri vial instance, th at of breaking a glass: which when done
exceedingly common t his is: th at i t is what happens every day; that, considering how
lit tle a thing th rows a child down, how often they let t hin gs drop out of their hands, and
withal, of how exceedingly brittle the matter of the vessel is made, that the least blow in
the world dashes it to pieces, it is rather t o be wondered, that such th in gs happen no
oftener: thus we say, when our discourse is sober and dispassionate. But when one of
our own is broken, t hen we rage and storm, as if some new thing had happened to us.
And yet in all reason, the same consideration of the accident being so usual, ought to
offer it self t o our minds, then too, and wi th the same success.
Now th is (says he) you may, if you please apply to matters of greater im portance: when
any of our acquain tances buries his wife or h is chil d, who is there, that does not
presently
reflection, from the common principles in their own minds, and the plain constant
course of nature, which they find agreeable to them. For to die, there is a necessity
unavoida
fate, would imply a contr adiction. And yet for all th is, when such a loss happens in a
ext ravagances of passion do immediately follow? Nay, how hard is it to persuade men
th at there is not a justifiable cause for all t his, or t hat any other person l iving ever
suffered such an affliction before? Now, why should not such a one recollect how he felt
himself affected, when he saw his neighbor in such excesses, and how wisely h e cou ld
tell hi m t hen, that he mistook h is own case? That death was inevitable, and nothin g
more frequent; and t hat t here was nothi ng in the accident i tself, whi ch coul d create all
th is disorder, bu t i t was owing ent irely to his own mi staken apprehensions and t he
violent passions of his own m ind, which showed him t he thing in a false light?
Now indeed there are two reasons why we should be thus partial and passionate in our
own case: one is, th e exceedin g fondness, and tender sympath y, between th e rational
soul , and the mortal body; which considerin g that th is part m ust die, is mu ch more
close and moving, than in reason it ought t o be. The other is, th at though we know and
are satisfied, that die we must, yet we do not care to think of it; and so these two dear
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friends live together, as if they we never to part. Now there is nothing that gives man so
mu ch distu rbance and confusion, as the being surpri sed wit h any accident ; for,
whatever we have foreseen, and m ade fami liar t o ou r th oughts by long expectat ion, n ever
gives us those violent disturbances.
This I take to be sufficiently plain, from what we see in our behavior afterwards. For even
th ose th at are most i ntemperate in th eir grief, yet wi th in a lit tle whi le, when they come to
be used to the being without what they lament t he loss of, retur n to th emselves and th eir
reason again, and all is quiet and easy, as if no such misfortune had ever happened.
Then t hey can suggest to their own composed thoughts, what at fi rst they cou ld n ot
endu re to hear, th at t his is no m ore than we see daily come to pass; th at other people
are liable to it , and have born i t as well as they; that th e condi tion of our natu re is
mort al, and most absurd it is to suppose any man can be exempt from t he common fate
of his natu re; that our friends are only gone a lit tle way before, in t he beaten road, which
all our forefathers have tr odden, and in which we ourselves shall short ly follow them.
Now if thi s separation, when a li tt le time and custom hath rendered it fami liar , becomes
so very supportable, after the thin g hath h appened; I would fain kn ow, what reason can
be alleged, why the making such a separation familiar to us beforehand, by frequent
th ought s, and perpetual expectations of it, should n ot enable us to bear it with great
evenness of temper, whenever it shall happen. For surely the true cause of all
immoderate concern upon these occasions, is that we do not represent these things to
our own thoughts, nor accustom ourselves to them so effectually, as we might and ought
to do. And t he reason of th is again seems to be, th at t he generali ty of people have th eir
minds fastened down t o their fortunes; and all t heir imaginations form ed, according to
the model of th eir present condi tion. Hence it is, th at t he prosperous m an is always gay
and big, as depending upon the continuance of his happiness, and never dreaming of
any possible change in h is affair s. And t hu s people also un der un happy cir cumstances,
are as comm only dispir ited and diffident, and can entert ain li tt le thought of a
deliverance, and bett er days. Bu t another cause, which cont ribu tes to th is fault as much
as the former, is the unreasonable fondness of these things, which men lament the loss
of so tenderly: they perfectly dote upon them, while they have them; and cannot
therefore admi t any thought so uneasy as that of part ing wit h them; for n o man alive
cares to dwell l ong upon m editations which are troub lesome and afflicti ng to him . This
fondness is the thing we should guard ourselves against , as least cu t off all the excesses
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of it, by reflecting seriously what we are ourselves, and what that is, which we so
passionately admi re. We should consider, t hat it is what we cannot call our own; and
th at, th ough we cou ld, yet i t is so imperfect a bli ss, as to cloy and weary u s with l ong
enjoyment . Our ki ndness therefore shou ld be reduced, and brought wi th in such
proporti ons as are consistent wit h decency and m oderati on: and in all our conversation,
it will be great prudence to abstain from all expressions and discourse, and especially
from all such actions in our behavior, as tend to endear t hese thin gs the more, and serve
in truth for no other end, than to cherish our own folly, and make our passions more
exorbit ant and u ngovern able.
Chapter. XXXIII.
As no man sets up a mark , w ith a design to shoot beside it: so neither hath the Maker of
the World formed in it any such real being, as evil.
Comment.
The disputes, whi ch are wont t o arise concern ing the natu re and origin of evil, have by
being unskillfully managed, proved occasion of grievous impiety towards God, subverted
the very foun dation of vir tu e and good manners, and perplexed many unwary persons,
with several dangerous scru ples and inextr icable difficul ties.
First , as to that opinion, which makes evil a first pr inciple, and will h ave two common
principles, a good and a bad one, from whence all things whatsoever derive their being, it
is attended with a thousand pr odigious absurdi ties. For, whence should t his power of
being a prin ciple, which is one, and is imparted to both t hese cont rar ies in comm on,
whence I say, should it come? Or how should one and the same cause give it to them
both? And how is it possible, that these two should be cont rar ies un less they be rank ed
under one common genu s. For we mu st dist ingui sh between d iversit y and contrariety;
that which is white, cannot be termed contrary to that which is hot or cold; but
cont rar ies are properly those th ings that are most di stant from one another, yet still
under the same common genus. White then and black, are contraries, because both bear
relation t o the genu s of color; for th ey are both colors alike. And hot and cold are
cont rar ies, for t hey likewise meet under t he genu s of tacti le qualiti es. And this is reason
enough t o show, that cont rar ies cannot possibly be first pri nciples, because there mu st
have been some common genus antecedent to them, or they could not be contraries: and
fart her, because one mu st n eeds have a being, before many; for each of t hose man y
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beings mu st subsist , by virt ue of its essence, comm un icated from that fir st being,
otherwise nothing could ever have been at all.
Again, some single ori ginal bein g there must needs have been, which m ust have been a
foundation for part icular propert ies, and from wh ich t hose propert ies mu st have been
distr ibu ted among the many. For, from th e divine original good, all good things
whatsoever p roceed; and in lik e manner all tr u th , from the same divine fount ain of
tr u th . So that, though there be several pri nciples of several propert ies, yet still these all
are comprehended in , and r esolved in to, one pri nciple at last; and t hat, not some
subordin ate and part icul ar one, as these are in their own kind only; bu t a pri nciple from
whence all t he rest spri ng. One that t ranscends, connects, cont ains th em all, and
comm un icates to each of them it s causal and productive power, wit h such limi tations
and abatements, as their respective natures require. So exceedingly irrational and
absurd it is, to th ink of advancing two principles of all things, or to suppose it possible
th at th ere should be more than one.
Besides, they that wil l h ave this u niverse to proceed from two prin ciples, are driven by
their own tenets into a thousand wild inconsistencies. They tell us, one of th ese
principles is good, and the other evil; they call the good one God, but yet at the same
time, they do not allow him to be the un iversal cause: they cannot worship h im as
almighty, for indeed they have clipped the wings of his omnipotence, and are so far from
ascribing all power to him, t hat they divide it i nt o halves, or to speak more properly th ey
call him the source of goodness, and spring of light, and yet deny, that all things receive
light and goodness from him.
Now what horri d blasphemies, what opprobrious reflections does th is doctrine cast u pon
th e majesty of God? They represent hi m as a feeble and a fear fu l being, uneasy with
cont inual apprehensions, th at evil will invade his terr itories. And, to ease himself of
these fears, and buy off hi s enemy, cont rary to all j ustice, and honor, and in terest,
casting some souls away, (which are so many parts and parcels of himself, and never
merited by any offence of theirs to be thus delivered up,) that so, by parting with these,
he may compound for the rest of the good ones with him. Like some general in distress,
who, when t he enemy attacks him, sacrifices one part of his arm y, to gain an
opport un ity of bri nging off the other. For t he sense of what th ey say amounts to th us
much, though it be not expressed in the very same words. Now he that delivered up
these sou ls, or commanded th em t o be delivered up i n t hi s barbarous mann er, h ad su re
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forgot, or at least did n ot du ly consider, what m iseries those wretched spiri ts must
endu re, when i n t he hands of that evil p rinciple. For (according to them) they are burnt ,
and fried, and tormented all manner of ways; and t his too, notwit hstand ing they were
never guil ty of any faul t, bu t are sti ll parts of God himself. And at last th ey tell u s, that,
if any such souls happen to apostat ize, and degenerate into sin, t hey never recover
themselves; nor are from thencefort h in any possibili ty of retu rn ing to good, bu t
cont inue inseparably u nit ed to evil forever. (Only here it is fit we take notice what sou ls
these are, and h ow they thu s degenerate; for they do not admi t their crim es to be
adult ery or mu rder, or any of th e grossest and m ost flagit ious enorm it ies of a dissolu te
and wicked conversation, but only the denying of two principles, an evil and a good one.)
In the meanwhi le, this God, it seems is left maimed and imperfect, by the loss of so
many of his parts; he is stupid and senseless too, (in their hypothesis I mean, so far be it
from m e to entert ain so irreverent a thought) for h e un derstands nothing at all, either of
his own i nterest, or t he natu re of evil: if he did; what dread could he be under, or how
should evil enter int o any part of that province which good possesses; since th eir natu res
are so very distant and i rr econcilable, that t hey cannot run in to each other, bu t t heir
bounds are fixed, and immovable barriers set between th em from all eterni ty?
For th is th ey say too. Bu t who, in the name of wonder, set these bounds and barr iers?
Did chance? Then it seems they make chance a common principle too. Did any other
being which had aut hori ty over both these, and prescri bed to th em as it self th ought fit ?
Then i t seems that had a subsistence, before they made the world. Bu t how coul d t hat
be done before the creation? For t he division they make is li ke th is upon Earth; t hey
assign the eastern, western, and northern regions to good, and reserve only the south for
evil.
Afterwards they go on, and fancy, th at evil hath five apart ments, li ke so many dens or
cavern s; and here they tell u s of woods, and all mann er of animals, such as frequent
both sea and land; t hat t hese are at eternal war wit h one another; and t hough they are
said to be imm ortal, as being originally good, yet they pretend at the same time, th at
they are devoured by their five-formed monster.
Now then, since these dist inct r egions have been set out , as you see, from th e beginn in g
of the world at least; and each assigned and accommodated to its pecul iar inhabit ant; I
would fain be satisfied, whi ch way evil should m ake an incursion in to the dominions of
good. Or, if we should suppose this possible, yet could it be done however, and still these
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two remain cont rary to one another? May we not as well say, that wh ite may be black ,
and yet retain its whiteness still; and that light can admit darkness, and still be light, as
that perfect evil can make approaches to perfect good, and still continue perfect evil?
And, if th is im possibili ty be evident and u navoidable, what occasion is there to descri be
God as they do, comm it ting an act of so much u nnecessary fear, and folly, and in ju stice,
as is the casting away souls to evil for his own security, and ever since, laboring to no
pu rpose (for so th ey wil l n eeds have it too) to redeem th ese sou ls fr om misery? A design
never to be effected, because, as I observed before, some of them have lapsed, and so
must abide under the dominion of evil to all eternity: and all this they will not allow the
good to have had any knowledge or foresight of, though with the same breath they
pretend, t hat t he evil pri nciple knew perfectly well what n umber of souls would fall int o
his hands, and l aid his stratagems accordingly.
Their scheme certainly had been much better contrived, had they represented the good
principle, as always employed and t aken u p wit h the contemplation of itself, and n ot
engaged it in perpetual war, with an enemy never to be vanquished or destroyed. For
they make evil t o be no less eternal and immortal, than good. And th is in deed is a
considerable objection, and a just reproach to their whole system, that eternal existence,
and in corr uptible duration, no beginning, and n o end, are allowed to evil, as well as to
good. And wh en these glorious attr ibu tes are given to that which we cannot bu t detest,
what difference is th ere left, or wh at can we say more in honor of that, which we cannot
bu t l ove and admir e?
Let u s now proceed, if you please, to t ake a shor t view of th e account th ey give,
concern ing the creation of th e world. Pill ars then there are, th ey tell u s, not l ike those of
th e poet,
Which t his vast globe of Eart h and Heaven sustain ,
(for they scorn , th at any poetical fictions, or th e least fabulous cir cumstance, should be
allowed a place in their philosophy;) but (as one of their greatest masters hath informed
us) of solid unhewn stone, and twelve windows, one of which is constantly opened every
hour.
Bu t t heir marvelous wisdom is not more emin ent ly seen in any one instance, than the
accoun t they pretend t o give of eclipses. They tell u s, that when in framing of the world
the evils th at were in conjuncti on together gave great distu rbance, by t heir jostling and
disorderl y motions, the lum inaries drew certain veils before them, t o shelter them from
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the ill in fluences of that di sorder; and, t hat eclipses are noth ing else, bu t the sun and
moon hi ding themselves stil l behind those veils, u pon some extr aordi nary and
th reatening emergencies.
Then again, how odd and unaccount able is it , th at, of so many heavenly bodies which
give light to t he world, th ey should hold only the two great ones in veneration, and
condemn all the rest; assigning the Sun and Moon t o the good pr inciple, bu t pu tt ing all
the stars into the possession of the evil, and deriving them from a bad cause?
The light of the moon t hey do not agree to be borrowed from t he Sun , bu t t hink it a
collection or constellati on of souls, wh ich she draws up, li ke so many vapors from the
Earth , between change and fu ll; and t hen t ranslates them by degrees in to the sun, from
the ful l t o the next New Moon.
In short, they have a world of extravagant fancies, which do not so much as deserve to
be reckoned among fables. And yet th ey are by no means content to have them looked
upon as fabulous, nor do they use them as figures or hieroglyphics, so as to signify
someth ing else of more substan ti al goodness, bu t w il l needs have th em believed to be
str ictl y and li terally t ru e. Thus t he image they give us of evil, is a monster, compounded
of five several creatures; a lion, a fish, an eagle, and some oth er two th ings, I do not well
remember what; but all these, together, are supposed to make a very ravenous and
form idable composition.
Such abominable impiety against God are th ese notions and pr inciples chargeable with ;
and yet (which is still more amazing) the persons, who advance them, profess to take
sanctu ary in these opinions, out of a more than common r espect, and a profounder
reverence to the divine perfections, than the rest of the world (as they think) express.
They cou ld n ot bear th e impu ting any evil t o God; and, t o avoid th is in convenience, th ey
have foun d out a part icular pr inciple and cause of all evil; a principle equal in honor and
power to th e good, or rather indeed superior and more potent than He. For in all t he
attempts m ade hi thert o, to corru pt t he world, and render it miserable, evil seems plain ly
to have got the better. For they represent evil upon all occasions taking advantage
against good, and contr iving all mann er of ways not t o let it go. This i s constant ly the
bold and daring aggressor; while good, in the meanwhile, gives way to, and mingles itself
with evil, would fain compound the matter, and, for anything that yet appears, hath
discovered nothing in it s whole management, bu t fear, and folly, and i nju stice. Thus,
whi le they abhor to call God th e cause of evil, th ey make him noth ing bu t evil i n t he
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most exquisite degree; and (according to that vulgar proverb) leap out of the frying pan
into the fire.
But, besides these vile profanations of the majesty of God, this system of philosophy
does, as mu ch as in it lies, tears u p th e very roots of all virt ue and moral instr uction, by
destroying and ut terly tak ing away all that liberty of choice, which God and natu re hath
given us. For, besides those att ri but es of eterni ty and imm ortalit y, it does also ascribe to
th is pr inciple of evil a compu lsive power over our will s; and that, so very absolute and
strong, that it is not only out of ou r own di sposal, whether we will commi t wi ckedness or
not, bu t such as even God h imself i s not able to cont rol or overpower. In the meanwhil e
it mu st be confessed, th at this is a very i dle and extr avagant imagination: for, i f our
soul s are violently th ru st and born down in to mu rder or adultery, or any other th at are
reputed the most grievous crim es, and commit these, merely by th e impu lse of some
stronger power, wi thout any consent or volunt ary concurr ence of their own, t hen are
they clear of all guil t. And th is is a mat ter so evident and acknowledged, th at all laws
both divine and human, acquit persons in cases of violence, and such a force as they
cou ld not resist, and wh ere it i s plain t hey acted against t heir wi ll . And indeed th ere is
not, nor can be any sin at all in such actions, where the min ds of men are supposed to
have no concern , bu t to proceed u pon necessit y and constr aint , and su ch as cou ld n ot
be resisted by them.
Now if th ese wise phi losophers, whi le they were at a loss, where to fix th e tru e cause of
these things, considered as evils, bethought themselves of this remedy, and set up such
a principle of evil, as you have heard, to resolve the difficulty; they have done their own
business effectually, and, by a very pleasant blunder, overturned their whole scheme at
once. For, i f it follows likewise, (upon the supposal of such a constr aint put upon the
will s of men by t hat principle) that nothin g they do is any longer evil, then observe, how
pleasant a conclu sion they have brought their matt ers to: for t he consequence lies
plain ly th us, if th eir be such a th ing as a principle of evil, th en t here is no such th ing as
evil in the world; and if t here be no such th ing as evil, then th ere cannot possibly be any
such th ing as a pri nciple of evil; and so upon the whole matter, they have left themselves
neither a pr inciple of evil, nor any evil at all.
Since therefore this is discovered to be but a rotten foundation; if any, conscious of its
weakness, shall presume to affirm, that God is the author of evil as well as good, the
falsehood and im piety of th is assert ion wil l ask bu t l it tle tim e and pains to evince it . For
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how in deed can we suppose it possible, th at that opinion shou ld be true, which casts
such unworthy aspersions upon him , who is the author and giver of all tr ut h?
And fi rst , wh ich way can one conceive, that God, whose very essence is perfect and
immutable goodness, should produce evil out of himself? For, since evil and good are
contrary to each other, as our adversaries themselves grant, how can we imagine one
cont rary to be the product ion of another?
Besides, he that produces anything out of himself, does it, by being the cause of its
existing, by having the cause within h imself, and by having some lik eness to it in his
own natu re; and so, if you respect h im as the cause, th e producing, and the produced,
are in some degree the same. So th at t he promoters of thi s opinion seem not to have
attended to the mani fest dishonor t hey pu t u pon God, by making him not only the cause
and author of evil, bu t t o be the first and original evil in his own natu re.
Since therefore there is no such thing as a common principle of evil, and since God is
not t he au thor and cause of it, what account shall we give of its coming int o the world?
For it is im possible anything should h ave a beginning, without a cause. And the best
course we can take for th is wil l be, first to explain what we mean by evil, and t hen to
inquire into its origin; for the causes of things will very hardly be found, till their natures
are first k nown.
Now as to that evil, which they suppose, who profess to believe a common principle of
evil, and m any of those who dispu te thi s question u nderstand, we may be bold to
pronounce, that there is no such thing in nature. For they pretend, that this evil hath a
positive subsistence of its own, as good hath; that it hath a power equal to good, and
cont rary to it ; that it s essence is incompat ible with th at of good, and wil l no more endu re
any mixtu re with it, t han whit e will wit h black, or h ot with cold. But if there were any
such r eal and substantial evil, li ke the substance of a man, or a horse, or any other
species, which really and actually subsists; it must needs have some sort of perfection in
proporti on t o its natur e; and a part icular form, whi ch makes it what it is, and
distinguishes it from all other beings. Now every form, considered as such, is good and
not evil, because it is endu ed wi th the perfections peculi ar t o its n atur e. And i ndeed t hey
are so sensible of thi s, as to make th at evil of their s desire good, and embrace and cour t
it, and receive advantage by it, and love to partake of it, and use all possible diligence
not to part from i t. And how very r idiculous an attempt is it, t o impose upon u s a thing
which does all t his, for a being simp ly and absolu tely evil?
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Bu t t hen, if we consider in the next p lace, that evil, by the commission whereof men are
dominated wicked, and are pun ished by God and man for contr acting the gui lt of it ; thi s
is pu rely accident al, and hath no real essence of it s own: for we find that i t both is, and
ceases to be, wit hout the destru ction of the subject, which is th e very d istinguishing
character of an accident ; and l ikewise, it never subsists, bu t by inheritance in some
subject: for, wh at evil of th is ki nd was there ever i n t he abstract, wi thout being the evil,
th at is, the crime, of some person who commi tt ed it ? And so in lik e manner, moral good,
which is the true opposite of evil, in this sense is merely an accident too.
Only herein t hey differ, t hat good is that qualit y of it s subject, by whi ch it is rendered
agreeable to natur e, and at tains it s proper perfection. Bu t evil i s the depravation or
indisposit ion of its subject, by wh ich i t swerves and depart s from natu re, and loses or
falls short of its natu ral perfection, t hat i s, of good. For, i f evil were the right di sposition,
and natu ral perfection of the form t o which it belongs, then would i t by this means
change its name and its nature, and commence good. So that from hence we may
conclu de against any pr imary natu re and posit ive subsistence of evil; for i t i s not in
natu re as good is, bu t i s only an additi onal th ing superindu ced upon good, the pri vation
of, and fall from it .
Ju st t hu s we may conceive sickness, wit h regard t o health ; and t he vices of the mind,
with r espect to virt ue. And as the walki ng strong and u pright is the designed and
primary acti on of an ani mal, and t he end wh ich i t pr oposes to itself when i t m oves; but
stumbl ing or h altin g is an accident beside the purpose, and happens thr ough some
agreeable to her operations; directly so we may affirm of evil, when compared to its
opposite good. And, though these be contraries, as white and black are, yet no man can
main tain , th at they do equally subsist, or are equipollent t o one another, as whi te and
black are in a physical consideration. For t hese do both subsist alik e, and neither of
them can pretend to a greater perfection in natu re, than th e other; and consequent ly,
one is not the mere privation of th e other. For, a pr ivation i s properly a defect or k ind of
false step in natu re, whereby the original form is not fu lly come up to, as limping is in a
h i ts form entir e, and as mu ch of what
nature intended should belong to it, as its contrary. Whereas, in the case before us, one
of the extr emes is agreeable to natu re, and the other cont rary to it ; and t hat which is
cont rary to natu re, is an accident al additi on to that part which is agreeable to it ; for
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good was first, and then evil; not evil first, and afterwards good. As no man can say, that
missing the mark was antecedent to the hi tt ing of it; nor sickness before health ; but
quit e otherwise. For it was
purpose th at he might do so. Thu s also it was the original int ent of natu re, to give us
sound health , and a good constitut ion; for, th e preservation and cont inuance of the
creature, was the very end she proposed to herself in forming it. And, in general terms,
whatever any action i s directed to, that is the proper end of it. Bu t n ow the missing the
mark happens afterwards by accident, when the operation does not succeed as it ought,
nor att ain t he end at first proposed, but hi ts upon something else, some disappointm ent
instead of it . Now th en t his disappoint ment, wh ich comes in afterwards and by the by,
may very t ru ly be said to be additional, and accident al to the original pu rpose of hitt ing
the mark ; bu t that pu rpose can w ith n o good propriety of speech be called so, with
If th en all th ings natu rall y desire good, and every t hing of any k ind , acts wi th a prospect
of, or in order to, some real, or some seeming good; it is manifest, that the obtaining
some good is the pri mary end of all operations whatsoever. Sometim es indeed i t
happens, that evil steps in between; when the desire is fixed upon some object not really
and truly good, but such in outward appearance only, and which hath an allay and
mixtu re of evil wit h i t. Thu s when a man in pur suit of pleasur es, or greedy of wealth ,
tu rn s a robber, or a pir ate; his desire, in th is case, is principally fixed upon t he seeming
good; and t hat is th e spri ng, upon wh ich all these actions move; but , as matters stand,
he is forced t o take th e good and t he bad togeth er. For no man alive was yet so
unnatu rall y profligate, as to be gui lt y of lewdness for lewdness sake; or to rob any m an
merely for the sake of stealing; or indeed, disposed to any manner of evil, purely for the
satisfaction of doing evil. Because it is past all doubt, that evil, considered and
were the
principal and ori ginal cause of those th ings which p roceed from i t, t hen would i t be the
end of all such things: as an end it would be desirable to them, as good. For good and
desirable are term s reciprocal and convert ible; and consequent ly, at th is rate, it wou ld
become good, and cease to be evil.
advantage; not all, t heir tr ue and real advantage indeed; bu t all their seeming benefit,
and such as they at t hat t ime take for the true, and best. For no man is wil lin gly
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deceived; no man chooses a falsehood before tr u th , nor shadows before substances, who
knows and is sensible of the difference between them, when he does it. But this
misfort une happens generally, from a bli nd admir ation of some apparent good, wh ich so
dazzles our eyes, that either we do not at all discover the evil it is attended with, or if we
do discern that, yet we see the thing through false optics, such as magnify the good, and
lessen the evil to the eye. Now it is a frequent and a reasonable choice, when we are
content to take a greater good with the encumbrance of a less evil: as for instance, when
we su ffer an in cision, or a cuppin g, and account the evil of these pains much too litt le, to
counterbalance the good there is, in that health which they restore to us.
Once more yet. That all t hin gs desire good, is fart her plain fr om hence; th at, supposing
evil to have a real being, and a power of acting, whatever it did, would be for its own
advantage, th at is, in other words, for it s own good. And thus m uch they who ascri be a
being and operati on to i t confess; for they pretend, that it pu rsues after good, would fain
detain it, and uses all possible endeavors not to let it go. And if evil be the object of no
desire, then it is not any pr imary and designed natu re. But, sin ce the condi tion of it is,
in all part iculars, according to the descript ion here given of it; it is most tr ul y said, to be
an accident al and additi onal th ing, superindu ced to something th at did su bsist before,
bu t to have no subsistence of its own.
Well (says the objector) I allow what you say. We wil l su ppose, th at evil is only an
accident , a defect, a pr ivation of good, and an addit ional disappointm ent of the first and
original intent of natu re. And what of all th is? How are we advanced in the question
before us? For let this be what, or after what mann er you please, stil l i t mu st have some
cause: otherwise, how, in the name of wonder, di d it ever find the way into the world?
How then will you get out of this maze? You allow God to be the cause of all things; you
mu st grant that evil hath some cause; and yet you tell me, that god is infin itely good,
and so cannot be that cause.
This objection hath been already considered, and spoken to, both at the beginning of the
power; and also in the comment upon the XII chapter, upon occasion of th ose words,
trouble not yourself with wishing, that things may be just as you would have them, &c.
But however I will speak to it once more here too, and that briefly, as follows.
God, who is the source and original cause of all goodness, did not only produce the
highest and most excellent things, such as are good in themselves; nor only those that
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are of a rank somethin g inferior to these, and of a middle natur e; but the extr emes too,
such as are capable of falling, and apt to be perverted from that which is agreeable to
natu re, to that which we call evil. Thus; as, after those incorr uptible bodies, which are
always regul ar in their motions, and immu tably good, others were created subject t o
change and decay; so likewise it was with sou ls. The same order was observed wi th th ese
too; for after them which were unalt erably fixed in good, others were produced l iable to
be seduced from it . And this was done, both for th e greater ill ustrati on of the wise and
producing good things of all sorts, as many as were capable of subsisting; and also, that
the un iverse might be full and perfect, when beings of all k inds, and all proportions,
were cont ained in i t. (For th is is a perfection, to want noth ing of any k ind.) And li kewise,
to vindicate the highest and the middle sort , whi ch never decline or deviate from t heir
goodness, from t hat contempt , whi ch always falls u pon th e lowest of any sort; and such
these had been, i f the corr uptible and mort al th ings had not been created, and
supported the othe
And corr up tib le they mu st be. For i t could never be, that wh ile the fir st, and the middle
sort of bodies cont inu ed as they are; some imm utable, both as to their n atu re and their
operation; others immutable indeed, as to their substance, but mutable in their motion;
it could not be, I say, that th e lowest and sub lunary bodies should ever h old ou t, wh ile
the violent revolutions of the heavenly ones were perpetually changing their substance,
and putt ing them in to unnatur al disorders.
For these reasons cert ainly, and perhaps for a great m any others more important th an
these, which are secrets too dark and deep for us, these sublunary bodies were made,
and t his region of mortali ty, wh ere the pervert ible good hath it s residence. For t here was
a necessity, that the lowest sort of good should have a being too; and such is that, which
is liable to change and depravation. Hence also, there is no such thing as evil in the
regions above us; for the natu re of evil, being nothing else but a corr upti on of the
meanest and most feeble good, can only subsist, where that mean and mutable good
resides. For this reason the soul, which, considered by herself, is a generous and
immu table being, is tain ted with no evil, whi le alone in a state of separation. Bu t being
so cont ri ved by natu re, as to dwell i n this lower world, and being in timately uni ted to
mortal bodies, (for so the good providence of our great father and creator hath ordered it,
making these souls a link to tie the spiritual and material world together, joining the
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extremes by the common brands of life,) it seems to bear a part in all those distempers
and decays, which evil subjects our bodies to, by distu rbi ng their natu ral habit and
frame. Though indeed I cannot t hink th is to be evil, str ictl y speakin g, bu t r ather good;
since the effect of it is so: for thus, the simple elements, of which these bodies are
compounded, come to be set free from a great confinement , and severed from other part s
of matter of a different constit u tion, with wh ich t hey were interwoven and entangled
before; and so, getting loose from the perpetual combat between contrary qualities, are
restored to their proper places, and th eir primi ti ve mass again, in order to acqui re new
life and vigor.
And if this proceeding be the occasion of perpetual change, yet neither is that evil;
because everything is resolved at last, into what it was at the beginning. For water,
th ough evaporated int o air , yet i s by degrees congealed i nt o water again; and so, even
parti cular beings lose noth ing by those vicissitudes.
Bu t t hat, wh ich ought t o be a consideration of greater m oment , is, that the dissolu tion of
compoun d bodies, and th e mutu al change of simple ones in to each other, cont ribu tes to
the advantage of the un iverse in general, by m akin g the corr uption of one thi ng to
become the rise and birth of another. By this perpetual round it is, that matter and
motion have been sustained all th is wh ile. Now it is obvious to any observing man, that
both nature and art, (as was urged heretofore,) do frequently neglect a singe part, when
the detr iment of that in part icul ar, may conduce to the good of the whole. The form er
does it, as often as our rh eums, and u lcerous hu mors, are thr own off from the vit als,
and tu rn ed in to sores or swelli ngs in any of the extreme part s; and art im it ates thi s
method of nature, as often as a limb is seared, or lopped off, for the preservation of the
body: so that upon the whole matter, these shocks and corruptions of bodies deserve
rather to be esteemed good th an evil; and t he cause of them, the cause of good and not
evil event s. For th ose sub lunary bodies, which are simples, suffer no in ju ry, because
they are subject to no decay or destr uct ion: and for the evil wh ich t he parts seem to
undergo, this hath been shown to have more good than evil in it , both in simples and
compoun ds, even when considered in it self; bu t, i f taken with respect t o the benefit
which other creatur es reap by it , then i t i s mani festly good. So that the distempers and
decays of bodies, take them which way you will, are not evil, but produce great good.
But if any one shall be scrupulous upon this occasion, and quarrel with our calling that
good, which is confessed to be no better than a perverting of the course of nature; let not
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th is ni ce caviler take upon h im however to call i t evil, in th e gross sense, and common
acceptati on of the word; by wh ich we understand someth ing, ut terly repugnant and
ir reconcilable to good. But let him call rath er i t a necessit y or hardship ; as not desirable
for i ts own sake, but having some tendency, and contr ibu ting, to that wh ich is so: for,
were it simply and absolu tely evil, i t coul d never be an instru ment of good t o us. Now
th at whi ch I mean by necessary, though it have not charms enough of its own to
recommend it, yet does it deserve to be accounted good, for leading us to that which is
good; and that which can become a proper object of our choice, under any circumstance,
is so far forth good. Thus we choose incisions, and bu rn ings, and amputati ons; nay, we
are content to pay dear for them, and acknowledge ourselves obliged, both by the
prescript ion, and t he pain ful operati on; all whi ch were most r idiculous t o be done, if we
th ought these th ings evil. And yet I own, t his is bu t a qualified and in feri or good, not
str ictly and pr operly so, bu t only in a second and subord inate sense: yet so, th at th e
creator of th ese th ings is by n o means t he cause of evil, but a necessary and m eaner
good, though a good still; for such we ought to esteem it, since it is derived from the
same universal fountain of goodness, though embased with some allays and abatements.
And thus much, I hope, may be thought sufficient, in vindication of the nature and
cause of that evil, which bodies are concerned in.
Nothing indeed can so tr u ly be called evil, as the lapses and vices of the sou l of man.
And of these too, much hath been said before; but however we will resume the discourse
on th is occasion, and in quir e afresh, both i nto the natu re and cause of them.
And here we shall do well t o take notice, th at the soul s of a more excellent natu re, which
dwell in the regions above us, are immutably fixed in goodness, and wholly
unacquainted with any evil. There are also the souls of brutes, of a baser alloy than
ours, and standing in the middle as it were, between the vegetative souls of plants, and
our rational ones. These, so far forth as they are corporeal, are liable to that evil, to
which bodies are subject; bu t so far as concern s their appeti tes and i nclin ations, they
bear some resemblance to the human. And the evil, they are in this respect obnoxious
to, is in proportion the same; so that one of these will be su fficient ly explained, by giving
an account of the other.
Now the human soul is in a middle station, between the souls above, and those below. It
partak es of the qualit ies of both ; of those more excellent ones, in the sublim ity of its
natu re, and the excellence of its understandin g: of the bru tal and in ferior ones, by its
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str ict affini ty to the body and animal life. Of both these it is the common band, by it s
vital u nion with the body; and by it s habitu al freedom, it assimil ates itself sometimes to
th e one sor t, and sometimes to the other of th ese natures. So long as it dwells above,
and entertains it self wi th noble and divine speculati ons, it preserves it s inn ocence, and
is fixed in goodness; bu t when it begins to flag and dr oop, when it sink s down from t hat
blissful l ife, and grovels in t he filt h of the world, which by natu re it is equally apt t o do,
then it falls int o all m anner of evil. So that it s own volun tary depression of itself in to th is
region of corru ption and mortalit y, is the tr ue beginning, and p roper cause, of all it s
misery and mischief. For, t hough the soul be of an amph ibious disposition, yet it is not
forced either upwards or downwards; but acts purely by an in ternal pr inciple of it s own,
and is in perfect l iberty. Nor ought th is to seem incredible, in an agent which natu re
hath made free; since even those bru tes that are amph ibious, dwell sometimes in the
water and sometimes upon dry groun d, without being determined to eith er, any
otherwise than by t heir own inclination.
Now when t he soul debases herself t o the world, and enters int o a near in timacy with the
corr uptible body, and esteems th is to be the other consti tu ent of hu man natu re; then it
leads the life of brutes, and exerts itself in such operations only, as they are capable of.
Its intellectual part degenerates into sense and imagination, and its affections into anger
and concupiscence. By t hese the wretched mortal attains t o kn owledge, ju st of t he same
pit ch with t hat of other animals; such as puts him upon seeking fresh suppl ies for a
body contin ually wastin g, and upon contin uing the world by posterit y, to fill th e place of
one who mu st short ly leave it ; and u pon mak ing the best pr ovision he can, for h is own
preservation and defense in the meanwhile. For these cares are what no mortal would
have, were he not endued wit h sensual facu lti es and passions. For what m an, who i s
anyth ing ni ce and considering, wou ld endur e to spend so many days and years u pon th e
support of this body, (when th e burden of the whole matter comes to no more, than
always fill ing, and always empt ying) if sensual in clinat ions did n ot whet h is appeti te? Or
who could undergo the tedious fatigue by which succession is kept up, if vehement
desires did not perpetuall y k ind le new flames, and the prospect of posterit y makes us
more easy to warm ed by th em? These argument s have been in some measure insist ed on
before, and I t ake them to be abundantly clear in th is point; t hat, though our passions
and appeti tes be the cause of moral evil , yet t hey are ext remely beneficial to the
creatu res, in which natu re hath implanted them; as being necessary to their
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constitution, and giving a relish to some of the most indispensable actions of life. Upon
all wh ich accoun ts, even these cannot wi th any ju stice be called evil; n or God who
infused them, the cause of evil.
But the tru th of the matter is thi s: the soul is by natur e superior t o this body, and t his
animal life, and hath a comm anding power over t hem pu t int o her hands. This digni ty
and power so long as she preserves, keeping her subjects under, and at their due
distance; whil e she uses the body as her instr ument, and convert s all it s functions to
her own use and benefit, so long all is well, and there is no danger of evil. But when once
she forgets, that the divine image is stamped upon her; when she lays by the ensigns of
government, and gives away the reins out of her own hands; when she sinks down in to
the dregs of flesh and sense, (by preferring the impetuous temptations of pleasure,
before the mi ld and gent le persuasions of reason,) and enters int o a str ict un ion wi th the
bru ti sh part ; then reason acts against its own pr inciples, divest it self of it s despotic
power, and basely submi ts t o be govern ed by i ts slave. And t his confu sion in the soul i s
the root of all evil; an evil, n ot owing to the more excellent and rational part , whi le it
maintains its own station; nor to the inferior or sensual, while that keeps within it s due
bounds; bu t t o the invert ing of these, the violent usu rpati on of the one, and t he tame
submission of the other; that is, the perverse choice of degenerating into body and
matt er, r ather t han formin g oneself after the sim ili tu de of the excellent spir it s above us.
But still all th is, as I said, is choice, and not constraint ; it is still liberty, t hough libert y
abused.
to give, why choice and volition must needs be
motion of ou rs, and n ot the effect of any compu lsion from without . I have already u rged
the clearness of th is tr u th at large, and th at the soul only i s concerned, and acts purely
upon the principles of her own native freedom, in the choice of the worse, no less than of
the bett er part . Thus mu ch I apprehend to have been plainl y proved, from th e example of
Almighty God hi mself; the determinations of all wise laws, and well consti tu ted
governments, and the judgement of sober and k nowing men; who all agree in th is, th at
the merits of men are to be measured not by the fact itself, or the events of things, but
by the will and in tention of the person. And accordingly their r ewards and punishments,
their censures and their commendations, are all pr oport ioned to the intent ion; because
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be accountable for. From hence it comes to pass, that whatever is done by constraint
and irresistible force, though the crime be never so grievous, is yet pardoned or
acquitt ed, and t he guil t impu ted, not to the part y that did it , but to the person t hat
forced him t o the doing of it . For he who used th at force, did it volu ntaril y; but he who
was born down by it , had no will of his own concern ed in the fact, bu t became the mere
instrument of effecting it, against the inclination of his own mind.
voluntary act, owing to no manner of compulsion, but its own internal motion, what can
we charge evil upon, so justly as upon the soul? But yet, though the soul be the cause of
evil, i t is not the cause of it , considered as evil; for nothing ever is, or can be chosen,
under that notion. Bu t evil di sgui ses it self, and deludes us with an appearance of good;
and when we choose th at seeming good, we take at th e same time th e real evil concealed
under it . And thu s mu ch in effect was said before too.
And now, having thu s discovered the tru e origin of evil, it is fit we proclaim to all the
world, that God is not chargeable with any sin ; because it is not he, but the soul which
produces evil, and t hat freely and wi llingly too: for, were the soul u nder any constrain t t o
do amiss, then, I allow, there would be a colorable pretence to lay the blame on God,
who had suffered her to lie under so fatal a necessity and had not left her free to rescue
and save herself: (Though, in truth, upon this presumption, nothing that the soul was
forced to do, could be strictly evil.) But now, since the soul is left to herself, and acts
purely by her own free choice, she must be content to bear all the blame.
If it shall be fart her objected, th at all t his does not yet acquit Almighty God; for t hat it is
stil l h is act, to allow men this liberty, and leave th em to themselves; and th at he ought
not to permit them in the choice of evil. Then we are to consider, that one of these two
things must have been the consequence of such a proceeding: either first, that, after he
had given man a rat ional soul, capable of choosing sometimes good, and sometimes evil,
he must have chained up h is will , and made it im possible for hi m t o choose anyth ing but
good; or else, that the soul ought never to have had this indifference at all, but to have
been so framed at first, that the choice of evil should have been naturally impossible.
One of th ese two t hin gs the objector m ust say, or he says nothing at all t o the pu rpose.
Now th e former of these is manifestly absur d; for to what pu rpose was the will left free
and u ndeterm ined either way, if t he determining itself one way, was afterwards to be
debarred it? This would have been utterly to take away the power of choosing; for choice
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and necessit y are things inconsistent ; and where the mind i s so tied up, t hat i t can
choose but one thing, there (properly speaking) it can choose nothing.
As to the latt er, it mu st be remembered in the fir st place, th at no evil i s ever chosen,
when th e mind apprehends i t t o be evil: bu t t he objector seems to think , it were very
convenient to have this freedom of the will, wh ich i s so absolu te in the determining of
itself sometimes to real good, and sometimes to that which deceives it with a false
appearance of being so, quit e taken away: imagin ing it t o be no good, to be sure, and
perhaps some great evil: but alas! he does not consider, how many things there are in
th e worl d, account ed exceedin gly good, wh ich yet are not r eally i n any degree
comparable to th is freedom of the wil l. For in t ru th , there is no thing, no privilege, in t his
lower world, so desirable. And t here is nobody so stu pid and lost, as to wish, th at he
were a bru te, or a plant, rath er th an a man. And th erefore, since God displayed the
abundance of his goodness and power, in giving perfections inferior to this; how
inconsistent woul d it have been wi th that boun ty of his, not to have bestowed this most
excellent pri vilege upon mank ind?
Besides, (as hath been in timated formerly,) take away t his un determined propension of
the soul , by which it inclines itself to good or evil, and you u ndermine the very
foundation of all virt ue, and in effect destr oy the natu re of man. For i f you suppose it
impossible to be perverted to vice, you have no longer any such thing as justice, or
temperance, or any other vir tu e, left in the observin g moral du ties. This state of pu ri ty
may be the excellence of an angel, or a God; bu t impeccable and indefectible goodness
can never be the virtue of a man. From whence it is plain, that there was a necessity of
leaving the soul in a capacity, of being corru pted, and of commi tt ing all t hat evil
consequent to such depravation, because otherwise a gap would have been left in the
creation. There cou ld h ave been n o medium between t he blessed spir it s above, and
bru tes below; no such thing as human n ature, or h um an virtu e in t he world.
So then we allow, th at t his self-determ in ing power, by which m en are depraved, is a
th is is to t he order and beauty of the un iverse, and how many good effects it hath . In
other respects, we can by no means admit, that God should be traduced as the cause
and aut hor of evil u pon th is account . When a su rgeon lays on a drawing plaster to ripen
a swelling, or cu ts or sears any part of ou r bodies, or lops off a limb, n o man thin ks he
takes these methods to make his patient worse, but better; because reason tells us, that
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men, in such cir cumstances, are never to be cured by less painfu l applications. Thu s the
divine ju stice, in hi s deserved vengeance, suffers t he passions of the soul to rage and
swell so high, because he knows the condit ion of ou r distemper; and th at the smarti ng
sometimes un der the wild suggestions of our own fu rious appetit es, is th e only way to
br ing us to a bett er sense of our ext ravagance, and to recover us of ou r frenzy.
playing with fi re. And for the same reasons, many wise educators of you th , do not th ink
themselves obliged t o be always thwart ing t he inclinati ons of those under their charge;
bu t sometimes connive at th eir follies, and give them a loose: th ere being no way so
effectual for the purging of these passions, as to let them sometimes be indulged, that so
th e persons may be cloyed, and nau seate, and grow sick of them. And in th ese cases, it
cannot be said, t hat eith er those parents and govern ors, or the justice of God, is the
cause of evil, bu t rath er of good, because all t his is done with a virt uous in tent. For
whatever t ends to the reformation of mann ers, or confir min g the habits of virt ue, may be
as reasonably called virtuous, as those thing that are done, in order to the recovery and
cont inuance of health , may be called wholesome. For actions do principally take their
denomin ation and quality, from the end t o which t hey are directed. So that, although
God were in some measure the cause of thi s necessity we are in, of deviatin g from
goodness; yet moral evil cannot be justly laid at h is door. Bu t h ow far he is really t he
cause of ou r r eflection from our du ty, I shall n ow think , it becomes me to inqu ire.
God does not by any power, or immediate act of his own, cause that aversion from good,
which th e soul is gui lt y of, when it sins; but he only gave her such a power, t hat she
might turn herself to evil; that so such a species of free agents might fill a void space in
the universe, and m any good effects mi ght follow, wh ich, wi thout such an aversion,
cou ld never have been b rought abou t. God indeed is t ru ly and properly the cau se of thi s
liberty of our will s; but then t his is a happiness and a pr ivilege, infin itely to be preferr ed
above whatever else the world thinks most valuable; and the operation of it consists in
receiving impressions, and determinin g it self thereupon, not fr om any constr aint , but by
its own mere pleasure.
Now, that a nature thus qualified is good, I cannot suppose there needs any proof; we
have the confession of our adversar ies themselves to str engthen u s in th e belief of it . For
even they, who set up a principle of evil, declare they do it, because they cannot think
God the author of evil; and these very men do not only acknowledge the soul to be of his
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form ing, bu t they talk big, and pretend th at it is a part of his very essence; and yet,
notwit hstand ing all t his, they own i t capable of being vit iated, but so as to be vitiated by
it self only. For th is is t he mani fest consequence of their other tenets; t hat it depends
upon our own choice, whether we will overcome evil, or be overcome by it; that the
vanqu ished in t his combat are very justly pu nished, and th e victors largely and
deservedly rewarded. Now the trut h i s, when t hey talk at this rate, they do not well
consider, how dir ectly t hese notions contradict t hat ir resistible necessity to sin, which
they elsewhere make the soul to lie under. But however, whether the soul be depraved
by it s own foolish choice, or wheth er by some fatal violence upon it from wi thout , still
the being naturally capable of such depravation, is agreed on all hands; for both sides
confess it t o be actually depraved, which it could never be, without a natu ral capacit y of
being so. Therefore they tell us, the first original good is never tainted with evil, because
his natu re is above it , and i nconsistent with any such defect; as are also the other
goodnesses, in the next degree of perfection to him, such as in their cant are called the
Moth er of Life, the Creator, and t he Aeones. So then t hese men acknowledge the
depravable condition of the soul; they profess God to be the maker of it, and to have set
it in this condition: and yet it is plain they think the nature of the soul depravable, as it
is good, and not evil; because at the same time that they ascribe this freedom of the will
to God, they are yet supersti tiously fearful of ascribin g any evil to him . And th is I th ink
may very well suffice, for the natu re and origin of evil.
Let us now apply ou rselves to consider the passage before us, and observe, how
arti ficially Epictetus hath compr ised in a very few words, th e substance of those
arguments, wh ich we have here drawn out to so great a length. For in regard t he choice
of good, and the refusing of evil, are the object and groun d of all m oral in structions
whatsoever, i t was proper for him to show, that the natu re of evil was something very
odd, and ou t of course. In some sense it h as a being, and in some sense it i s denied to
have any; it has no existence of its own, and yet it is a sort of supernumerary, and a very
untoward addition to nature. In the meanwhile, this shows, that we ought not to make it
our choice, because natu re never made it h ers; and whenever it got in to th e world, it was
never brought in by design, but came in by chance. No man ever proposed it, as the end
of any action; no artificer ever drew his model for it: the mason proposes the house he is
bu ilding, and t he carpenter t he door he is plainin g, for h is end; bu t n either th e one, nor
the other, ever work s, only that he may work ill .
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mark : for what n atu re hath given a real and a designed existence to is the mark ; and th e
compassing of that, is the hi tt ing of the mark . Now, if what natur e really m ade and
designed, be not t he missing of the mark , (as it is not, bu t t he hit ting it i ndeed) and if
evil be the missing of the mark, then i t is plain th at evil can be none of those th ings,
which have a real and a designed existence.
Now, th at evil is pr operl y the missing of the mark , is plain , from wh at hath been spoken
to th is point already. For, su ppose a man makes pleasure his mark, h e aims at i t as a
good and desirable th ing; he lets fly accordingly, hi s imaginations I mean, which indeed
fly swifter t han any arrow ou t of a bow. But if he does not att ain t he good he desires, bu t
shoots wide, or
again, t hat somethin g, to wh ich natu re designed and gave a being, is constantl y the
mark every man aims at, and the obtaining those things, the hitting of his mark, is no
less evident from th e instances I gave, of the mason and the carpent er.
Now, when the aut hor says there is no such real being as evil in the world; you are to
understand, th at natur e never formed or designed any such th ing: and th en, i f you
please, you may take his minor proposition singly by it self, wh ich consists of those
words, As no man sets up a mark wit h a design to shoot beside it. (for th is in timates that
pri ncipal design, and real work of natu re, is never t he missing, bu t t he hit ting of the
mark ; and so add the conclu sion, wh ich i s th is, therefore evil is none of the prin cipal
designs, or real works of natu re.
It m ay likewise be put all t ogether i nt o one single hypothetical proposit ion thu s: If no
man sets u p a mark on pu rpose to shoot beside it , th en there is no such r eal being as
evil in the world. For if there were such a th ing, then i t wou ld be proposed, as the end or
product of action. Bu t evil i s never proposed as a th ing to be produced or obtained, bu t
as a thing to be declined; for evil is always the object of our refusal and aversion. So that
at th is rate, it would follow, that there is a mark set u p, only t hat it may not be hit ;
which is contrary to comm on sense, and the practice of all mank ind. And therefore there
can be no such thing in nature as evil, because evil is not capable of being the end of
any action i n n ature.
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