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The Configuration of Symbolic Boundaries against Immigrants in EuropeAuthor(s): Christopher A. BailReviewed work(s):Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Feb., 2008), pp. 37-59Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25472513.

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The Configuration ofSymbolic Boundariesagainst Immigrants in EuropeChristopherA. BailHarvard UniversityRecent studies report significant cross-national variation in the conceptual distinctionsor symbolic boundaries used by majority groups to construct notions of us and

them. Because this literature compares only a handful of countries, the macro-levelforces by which certain symbolic boundaries become more salient than others remainpoorly understood.This articleprovides thefirstpanorama of these rocesses bycomparing the relative salience or configuration ofmultiple symbolicboundaries in21 European countries. I usefuzzy-set analyses ofdatafrom the2003 European SocialSurvey to create a typology f symbolic boundary configurations.The results indicatethat thesymbolicboundaries deployed by thegeneral public do not correspond to theofficial philosophies of integration emphasized in the literature. oreover, thedatasuggest previous comparisons have focused too heavily on Western Europe, overlookingimportant variation in other regions of Europe where immigration began more recently. I

generate hypotheses to explain this newfound variation using demographic,socioeconomic, institutional, and historical data from quantitative and qualitativesources. The article concludes with examples of how these hypotheses can be combinedbyfuture studies toward a theory of boundary-work.

INTRODUCTIONAlthough

theboundaries of countries neatly divide people into social groups, the

conceptual distinctionsused toconstructnotionsof us and them are an equally importantcomponent of social identities (Barth 1969;

Direct correspondence toChristopher A. Bail, 541William James Hall, Department of Sociology,HarvardUniversity, 3Kirkland Street, ambridge,MA 02138 ([email protected]). This researchwas made possibleby fellowshipsfrom heGermanMarshall Fund and the ational Science Foundation(IGERT #98070661). I thankJasonBeckfield,EricBleich, Rogers Brubaker, Cybelle Fox, RivaKastoryano, Neil Gross, Michele Lamont, CharlesRagin, Graziella Silva,William JuliusWilson,Christopher inship, and the SR editors ndreviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions. Allerrors are uniquely my own. Previous drafts of thisarticle were presented at theASA Annual meeting inMontreal, the Council of European Studies AnnualMeeting inChicago, and the International Conferenceon Comparative Social Science inTokyo, Japan.

Douglas 1966; Jenkins 1996). Explaining crossnational variation in the relative salience ofthese symbolic boundaries is thecentralgoalof the boundary-work literature (e.g.,Kastoryano 2002; Lamont andMolnar 2002;Wimmer 2005). This literature hows that ocialidentities are not only multidimensional butalso highly mutable. While religion is anextremely salient symbolic boundary incertaincountries, it is largely irrelevant inothers anddisplaced by race, language, or culture?in different configurations?still elsewhere (e.g.,Lentin 2004; Triandafyllidou 2001; Wieviorka1994). Although a number of idiosyncraticexplanations have been provided for such variation, theyhave yet to be synthesized into atheory fboundary-work.Building on previoussmall-scale comparative studies, this articleadvances the studyof boundary-work by providing the firstpanorama of symbolic boundaries toward immigrants in 21 Europeancountries.Immigration is of natural interest o scholarsof boundary-work because itreveals the symbolic boundaries deployed when social bound

American Sociological Review, 2008, Vol. 73 (February:37-59)

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38 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEWaries are crossed.While Europeans once lookedaskance at theU.S. color line, a recent influxof non-Western immigrantshas brought tensions to thefore.The murder ofTheo Van Goghin theNetherlands in2004, the fatalbeating ofa Chinese student in Ireland in2002, and theperennial debate over laicite (secularism) inFrance exemplify the severity and variety ofsuch tensions. Today, Europe is perhaps bestdescribed as a set of diverse diversities, notonly because of variation in theethnic and culturalbackground ofminority populations acrosscountries, but also due to variation in theirunderstanding of diversity itself.Britain, forexample, practices multicultural race relations(Favell 2001), whereas theuse of racial categories isprohibited under the tenetsof republicanisme inFrance (Weil 2002). Until recently,nationhood inGermany was cast in terms ofancestry (Kastoryano 2002), while thousands ofexpatriates are denied cultural and legalmembership inGreece each year (Kiprianos, Balias,and Passas 2003). So-called Dutch tolerancerests on religious accommodation (Rath et al.2001), but Swedish multiculturalism has a distinctly ecular heritage (Runbolm 1994).These philosophies of integration (Favell2001) are central to the xenophobophelia(Stolcke 1995) ofEuropean policymakerswaryof being compared with the race-obsessedUnited States. It isyet tobe determined, however,whether these distinctions also shape theconfigurationof symbolic boundaries deployedby thegeneral public. This question is centralto numerous comparisons of old immigration countries inWestern Europe (e.g., France,Germany, andBritain)where immigration eganinthe immediatepostwar period (e.g.,Brubaker1992; Favell 2001; Kastoryano 2002). In contrast, the emerging literature on the newimmigrationcountries of Southern and EasternEurope emphasizes the bsence ofphilosophiesof integration mong these regimes (e.g., Lentin2004; Triandafyllidou 2001; Wieviorka 1994).Because these small-scale comparisons are compartmentalized by region, only idiosyncraticexplanations for theconfiguration of symbolicboundaries have been produced. Macro-levelcomparisons within and between regions ofEurope are needed not only to contextualizeprevious research,but also toexplore significantvariation in thehistorical, demographic, socioeconomic, and institutional characteristics of

immigrants and immigration regimes acrosstheContinent.I begin by developing a framework for thestudyof boundary-work at themacro level andproviding a brief overview of immigration toEurope from 1945 to2003.1 thenreview the literatureon symbolic boundaries inthreeregionsof Europe, highlighting macro-level factorswithin and between regions.Next, I develop atypologyof symbolic boundary configurationsby applying a combination of fuzzy-set techniques todata derived fromquestions about ahypothetical immigrant in the 2003 EuropeanSocial Survey.The results indicate thatthesymbolic boundaries deployed by thegeneral publicdo not correspond to theofficialphilosophiesof integration emphasized in the literature.Moreover, the data suggest previous comparisons have focused too heavily onWesternEurope, overlooking variation across otherregionswhere immigrationbeganmore recently. I develop hypotheses to explain this newfound variation using demographic,socioeconomic, institutional,nd historical datafrom a variety of quantitative and qualitativesources. The discussion and conclusion offerexamples of how thesehypotheses can be combined by future studies toward a theory ofboundary-work.

SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIESThe recent boom in boundary studies(Wimmer 2005) highlights the significance ofsocial classification across a wide variety ofcontexts. These studies show considerable variation in the boundaries developed by groupsto separate themselves from others (Abbott1995; Barth 1969; Baubock andRundell 1998;Douglas 1966; Jenkins 1996). Boundaries haveboth social and symbolic dimensions; this article examines the latter.Symbolic boundaries areconceptual distinctionsmade by social actors... [that] separate people intogroups and generate feelings of similarityand groupmembership. Conversely, social boundaries areobjectified forms of social differencesmanifested inunequal access to an unequal distribution of resources... and social opportunities(Lamont and Molnar 2002:168). To be sure,symbolic and social boundaries are closely related.While social boundaries are institutionalized,however, symbolic boundaries shift through


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SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES IN 21 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 39classification struggleswhere majority groupsattempt tomaintain theprivileges attached totheir status (Eliasoph and Lichterman 2003).Only when symbolic boundaries are widely

agreed upon can they take on a constrainingcharacter ... [and] become social boundaries(Lamont and Molnar 2002:168). Citizenshiplaws, forexample, are rigid social boundaries,but theyare predicated on the flexible distinctions of symbolic boundaries, which are needed to define such exclusion (Bryson 2006;Sackmann, Peters, and Faist 2003). In thisway,symbolicboundaries are a necessary but insufficient condition forthe creation ormodificationof social boundaries and should thereforebe viewed as equally real (Lamont 1992).To unravel thecomplex relationshipbetweensymbolic and social boundaries, studies ofboundary-work emphasize the multidimensionalityandmutability of the former.Whereassocial psychological theories of social identityrequire that groups be categorized as ingroups or out-groups (e.g.,Tajfel 1981), theboundary-work approach I propose requiresattention to the relative salience or configurationofmultiple symbolicboundaries (e.g., race,religion, language, culture, or human capital).This not only addsmuch-needed precision to theconcept of social identity ut also enables oneto ask whether the configuration of symbolicboundaries reveals the interests of groups incompetition for social resources. For example,previous researchsuggests thatsymbolicboundaries based on race?increasingly stigmatizedthrough the growth of international antiracistdiscourse?have been displaced by religion,language, culture, or even human capital(Goldberg 2006; Lamont 2000). By examiningthe entire configuration of symbolic boundaries, one can identify ow thesocial boundariespreviously protectedby race are renegotiated. Inthisway, theboundary-work literatureattemptsto explain why majority groups choose certainsymbolic boundaries, incorporating somegroupswhile excluding others. The manner inwhich symbolicboundaries are policed ormadepermeable reveals thestrategic?although oftensubconscious?interests of majority groups.

BACKGROUND: IMMIGRATION INEUROPE, 1945 TO 2003The comparative study of immigration inEurope is ideally suited to the studyofboundarywork, given major differences in thecauses, sources, and scope of interaction betweenimmigrants and natives across countries.Although a comprehensive overview of suchvariation isnot feasible here, fourmajor axes ofdifferentiation can be identified: (1) sourcesand timingofmigration, (2) the size and originof immigrantgroups and theirposition in thelabormarket, (3) citizenship and civic inclusionpolicies, and (4) philosophies of integration.Timing and Sources ofMigrationAs Table 1 shows, postwar immigrationgenerally occurred much earlier inWestern Europethan in Southern and Eastern Europe. CastlesandMiller (2003) identifythreegeneral trendsof immigration toWestern countries between1945 and 1970: (1) refugeemovements afterWorld War II, (2) guest-workermigration fromtheEuropean periphery, and (3) postcolonialmigration. Germany accepted the bulk ofrefugees in the immediatepostwar period,mostofwhom were fleeingEastern Europe. Postwarlaborrecruitment f SouthernEuropeans, Turks,and Moroccans was most prominent in France,Britain, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium,Luxembourg, theNetherlands, Sweden, andAustria. Substantial postcolonial migration fromAfrica, Asia, theCaribbean, and theMiddleEast occurred inFrance, Britain, Belgium, andtheNetherlands.After 1970, European integrationand economic restructuringltered thesources and timing of immigration flows (Brochmann 1996).Although postwar labormigration bolstered theeconomies of many Western European countries,global economic decline in the 1970s ledmany to tighten heir orders.Large-scale immigration continued, however, through familyreunification policies. By themid-1980s,countries such as France, Germany, and theNetherlands had significant second-generationimmigrantpopulations. Meanwhile, SouthernEuropean countries began to experience substantial immigration romLatinAmerica, NorthAfrica, and Eastern Europe for the first time.The collapse of the Soviet Bloc and civil unrestinAfrica and theMiddle East ushered ina new


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40 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEWTable 1. Timing ofMigration, 1960 to 2000_

Average NetMigration(Weighted byTotal Population)1960 to 1970 1970 to 1980 1980 to 1990 1990 to 2000

Austria08 .111830Belgium12 .1103 14Britain01 -.0400 .11

Czech Republic -.19 -.02 .04 .08Denmark06 .04 .09 .25Finland.37 .0109 12

France42 .12 .09 .04Germany20 .1926 41Greece.46 .28 .22 .68

Hungary01 -.02 -.16 .17Ireland.58 .33 -.58 .30Italy.18 -.02 -.02 .07

Luxembourg .48 .764295Netherlands .07 .241424Norway00 .10 .14 .23Poland.12 -.09 -.08 -.14

Portugal1.39 .42 -.21 .20Slovenia05 .34 .13 -.05Spain.22 .04 -.06 .33Sweden03 .10 .20 .23

Switzerland_.58_-^14_.39_.36Source: Eurostat.Note: Significant migration occurred between 1945 and 1960 in several of the above countries but data are notavailable for this period.

wave of refugeemigration inthemid-1990s. Atthe same time, illegal migration of nonEuropean Union (non-EU) immigrantsincreasedwhile legal obstacles preventing intraEuropean Union migration began todissolve.Characteristics of the Foreign-RornTodayVariation in the timingand sources of postwarmigration toEurope caused vast discrepanciesin the size and regional origin of foreign-bornpopulations. Table 2 describes foreign-bornpopulations as a percentage of the totalpopulation by region of origin.While the foreignborn constitute 40.10 percent of the totalpopulation inLuxembourg and 20.45 percent inSwitzerland, theymake up only 2.88 and 1.98percent of the population inHungary andPoland, respectively.Although those born intheMiddle East andNorth Africa are roughly4.40 percent of thepopulation inFrance, theyconstituteless than .03percentof thetotalCzechpopulation. Among many otherpossible exam

pies of such variation, European immigrantsfromnon-EU countriesmake up 6.83 percent oftheAustrian population but only .47percent ofthe French population. As Table 3 shows, thevaried timingand sources of immigrationhavealso led tovariation in the role of immigrantswithin European labormarkets.Citizenship and Civic InclusionEach of the bove factorsmade thedevelopmentof citizenship and civic inclusion policies morepressing in certain countries than in others.While citizenship policy iswell established inold immigrationcountries such as France andGermany, many new immigration countriessuch as Spain and Italy did not developcitizenship laws until themid-1980s. Among theold countries, there is variation in the criteriaused forcitizenship decisions and even theverydefinition of an immigrant. now classic comparison is drawn between France, where allsecond-generation immigrants are entitled tocitizenship (jus soli), andGermany,where untilrecently thosewithout blood-based ancestry


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Table.egionalriginfheoreignornsercentagefheotalopulation,002

Europeiddleastndub-Saharanatinorth

TotalaU-15Non-EU-15)orthfricaouthfricaouthsiaastsiamericamericaaribbeanceania

Austria2.12.60.83.9406143307110002Belgium0.68.8070.21.00163919180401

Britain.11.413345.27.756711394429

Czechepublic.3827.850301011701030100

Denmark.72.00.07.5842566517210204inland.5481.022214051703080101rance0.01.3047.4090125214100401ermanyb.82.32.42.7720433910150201freece0.24.58.44.1916220805320119

Hungary.8822.480401010701030000

Ireland0.19.23621660204207650221

Italy.91.23945724141839130403

Luxembourg0.104.28.755199136935310703Netherlands0.07.9869.676336.512019.7608

Norway.30.43.059653718633370303 Poland.9841.510100000100030000.02 3.38 .08 .08Spain.33.554089180513.83062401*

Sweden2.03.29.84.3655376867200304Switzerland0.451.34.66.4357506767411207

- 5*

Source: OECD (datanotavailablefor Slovenia). O

Note:oreign-bornopulationsereggregatedyegionccordingoheorldankodingcheme.ross-nationalatanheegionalriginfecond-generationmmigrant

populationsreoturrentlyvailable.

a heumfegionalercentagesoesotqualheotalecausemmigrantshoretatelessrhoseriginsnknownreothown.

b Data for Germany arefromStatistiches Bundesamt.

w


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42 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEWTable 3. Characteristics of Immigrants in the Labor Force

Percent ofTotal Labor Percent of Immigrantswith Change in Percent of TotalCountry_Force (2003)_Tertiary Education (2002) Labor Force (1998 to 2003)aAustria.2 13.7 -.8Belgium.7 22.0.4Britain.1 43.6 +1.0

Czech Republic 1.6 21.5 +1.1Denmark.5 27.5.1Finland.6 24.9.6

France.2 15.5 -1.0Germany.0 14.7.3Greece.5 17.0 ?Hungary.0 27.2.4Ireland.5 50.1 +3.1

Italy 3.8 ? +1.1Luxembourg 45.0 18.2 +4.3Netherlands 3.8 24.8 +.3

Norway.6 39.2.9Portugal.7 16.61.3

Spain.7 28.2 2.7Sweden.6 30.9.2Switzerland_2L9_2^0_+3_Source: OECD (data not available for Slovenia and Poland).aWeighted by the total population.

(jus sanguinis) were treated as foreignersregardless of their birthplace (Alba 2005;Brubaker 1992). The distinctionbetween thesecivic and ethnic citizenship regimes hasbeen applied throughout urope (Weldon 2006),although it sheavily criticizedforfailing tocapture thenuances within each category (Kuzio2Q02; Kymlicka 1999). A growing number ofstudies suggest thatmost states now fall firmlywithin thecivic side of thisdichotomy (e.g.,Brubaker 2001; Joppke 2005). Table 4 showseach country's score on theCivic Citizenshipand Inclusion Index (Geddes et al. 2005), afive-partmeasure gauging the generosity ofimmigration nd integration olicy.Again, thereisconsiderable variation along each dimension.For example, naturalization isgenerously awarded to immigrants in France regardless of theirorigin butmore tightlyrestricted inAustria,Luxembourg, andDenmark. Similarly,Finlandand Sweden have flexible family reunificationpolicies, whereas Greece and Austria do not.Finally, the index suggests immigrants havemore easily integratedinto the labormarkets ofBelgium and Spain than those inGermany,Austria, and Greece.

Philosophies of IntegrationCitizenship policies are closely related to thephilosophies of integration (Favell 2001), orpublic ideologies about exclusion and inclusion of immigrants, that are created by manyEuropean governments (see Table 4). Mostphilosophies of integrationdraw upon the legacy of nation building or colonial strategy.Forexample, French republicanisme stresses totalassimilation of immigrants,while British multicultural ace relations follows a pluralistmodelloosely based upon a similar colonial policy.Until 2000, Germany's Ausldnderpolitik (foreigner's policy) treated immigrants and theirchildren as permanent guests entitled toveryfew benefitsfrom thestate.Many Southern andEastern European countries eitherdo not havephilosophies of integration r are in theprocessofdeveloping them Carrera 2006). Those countriescurrentlydeveloping philosophies of integration are responding to increasingcallswithinthe EU to design a Common Agenda forIntegration among all member stateswherebyimmigrants btain basic knowledge of thehostsociety's language, history, and institutions(European Parliament 2005).


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Table.ivicitizenshipndexndhilosophiesfntegration

Civic CitizenshipIndex3

ReunionLong-TermResidence Labor Market Inclusion Philosophy of Integration15

93.2 4.54 93.586.73 (Variesy egion)Belgium33.5107.7711.1111.4122.45Variesyegion)

99.47102.04Multicultural Race Relations

CzechepublicInevelopment)enmark9.488.647.2903.451.63Inevelopment)inland00.829.0315.9407.4302.04Inevelopment)

France00.8213.5906.2811.416.94epublicanismeRepublicanism)

99.4791.84 Auslanderpolitik

(Foreigner'sPolicy) eg

81.5681.63 (In development) g

HungaryInevelopment)

75.686.73 Inter-Culturalism E9.03

95.49102.04 (In development) g

Luxembourg 64.03 107.7791.79

91.51

96.12 103.86113.4117.35 Gedogen (Dutch Tolerance)

Norway? ? ? iversityhroughnclusion

and Participationg

Polandonej

Portugal28.0704.8506.289.4712.24usotropicalismTolerance)

Sloveniaoneo

Spain 107.63 101.94 103.86109.42127.55 (In development)

Sweden 119.89 104.85 113.53107.43107.14 Mangkulturellt

(Multiculturalociety)

SwitzerlandVariesyegion)

Source:eddesndolleagues2005),ECD,ndualitativeourcesistednable.

aighercoresndicateorenclusivenessnacholicyomain.atareotvailableorzechepublic,orway,oland,lovenia,ndwitzerland.oretailsnheeas-

uressedoreatendiceseeeddesndolleagues2005).

b hilosophiesfntegrationaveeenreatedrodifiedneveralountriesince003.ermany'smmigrationolicyasevisedxtensivelyn000;econdeneration

immigrants can now obtain citizenship regardless ofancestry.Forn overvie


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44 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEWSYMBOLIC OUNDARIESGAINSTIMMIGRANTS IN EUROPEWestern and Northern EuropeWhile race is central todiscussions of symbolicboundaries in theUnited States, its relevanceis highly contested inWestern Europe, whererace is not defined throughhypodescent butratherthroughnation building, colonialism, andtheHolocaust. Analyses of racism inWesternEurope often focus on therelationship betweenphilosophies of integration nd public attitudes.For example, Favell (2001:226) emphasizes thecolorblind ethic offepublicanisme inFrancevis-a-vis multicultural race relations inBritain:In France, racism is public and spectacular;...in Britain ... ithas become privatized andunspoken. Still others suggest that privateracism isequally prominent inFrance, albeit disguised as republicanisme (Lapeyronnie 1993;Todd 1994;Wieviorka etal. 1992). Comparativehistorical studies of France and Germany suggest race became part of national identitythroughconflict between the twonations, longbefore the arrival of non-Western immigrants(Brubaker 1992;Weil 2002). Another strandofthe literature compares the emergence ofantiracistattitudes (Lentin 2004; Taguieff 1991)and shows amore general denunciation of racethroughoutWestern Europe.Given thewidespread stigmatization ofracism inWestern Europe, religionhas becomea primaryfocus of theboundary-work literaturein this region (Zolberg and Long 1999). Forexample, Goldberg (2006:349) argues thatWorld War II created a shift inEurope's dominantfixation of concern and resentment fromthe figure of 'the black' ... to that of 'theMuslim.' Again, however, the literature howsimportant ross-national variation in therelativesalience of religion intheconfigurationof symbolic boundaries. Kastoryano (2004) arguesthatanti-Muslim attitudes aremore public inFrance than inGermany because secularism isan integral aspect of Civic Republicanism,whereas German secularism allows religiouspluralism.While theFrench openly demand thenationalization of Islam, she argues, Germansaremore likelytoviewMuslims as Gastarbeiter(guestworkers) whose cultural differences aretobe toleratedbutnot incorporated.Comparinganti-Muslim attitudes in theNetherlands,Belgium, and Britain, Rath and colleagues

(2001) suggest the legacy of pillarisation, orreligious accommodation, has encouraged religious tolerance in theformercountries,whereas thehighly political Muslim community inBritain has provoked public backlash.Not unlikeracism, however, there is evidence thatovertIslamophobia has become stigmatized inmany Western countries as well (Cesari andMcLoughlin 2005; Kastoryano 2002).Previous studies also suggest that languageand cultureare twoof themost importantsymbolic boundaries inWestern European countries. Again, the literature focuses on thecentrality of language and culture inphiloso

phies of integration. In France, for example,governmentdemands thatimmigrants learn thelanguage and culture through e creusetfrancais(the French Melting Pot) provoked a publicbacklash that tressed la droita ladifference therighttobe different) Todd 1994).More recently,Brubaker (2001) identified a strong resurgence of assimilationist rhetoric spurred by thesuccess of the far right in France. Similar,although perhaps less virulent, debates aboutassimilation have emerged inBritain (Bleich2003; Favell 2001) andGermany (Kastoryano2002).The question of assimilation is fiercely contested inFrance, Britain, andGermany, but thedebate is less prominent among noncolonialpowers where assimilation has no historicalprecedent (Garner 2003;Wimmer 2002; Zolner2000). Zolner (2000) argues that anes use theprinciple of Grundtvigianism or boundedequality to distinguish themselves from thecolonial atrocities perpetrated by theirneighbors. Similar observations have been made oftransethnic patriotism inSwitzerland,whichstresses linguisticand culturalpluralism, albeitwithin strictEuropean limits (Wimmer 2002).A final question in the literature n symbolic boundaries inWestern Europe concerns thepossible convergence of attitudes toward immigrants at the regional level.A number of studies point to growing similarities in theimmigration olicies ofWestern European countriesnow thatmost face similar challenges ofimmigrant integration Brubaker 2001; Joppke2005). Joppke (2005), forexample, argues thatmost Western countries have shifted the criteria of citizenship decisions fromthecharacteristics of groups to the credentials andvoluntarism of individuals. Such arguments are


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SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES IN 21 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 45provoked inpart by the growing harmonization of immigrationpolicy at theEU level andan international human rights discourse thatstresses civic criteria in citizenship decisions.Although supranational pressures have beenshown toproduce convergence of governmentpolicies, it isnot yet clear whether these forceshave produced similar effects n public opinion.A number of studies describe an emergent tideof xenophobia based on thenotion of fortressEurope (e.g., Geddes and Favell 1999;Goldberg 2006; Kastoryano 2002), but it isnotyet clearwhich symbolic boundaries aremostsalient in thesedeveloping attitudes.These findingshave scarcely been testedempirically,particularlyoutsideWestern Europe.Southern EuropeThe literatureon boundary-work in SouthernEurope highlights theregion's abrupt transitionfrom emigration to immigration inrecentyears.Comparing Greece, Italy, nd Spainwith theoldimmigration countries ofWestern Europe,Triandafyllidou (2001) concludes thatsymbolicboundaries in Southern European countriesare much more unstable. Indeed, previousresearch suggests ethnicity and culture inSouthern Europe have historical antecedentsbased on theunique mixed character of theMediterranean, marked byNorth African andMiddle Eastern influences longbeforeWesternstates came into existence.1 For these reasons,previous studies have concluded that race isless salient inSouthernEurope than inWesternEurope (Medrano 2005; Triandafyllidou 2001;Wieviorka 1994). For example, Sniderman andcolleagues (2000) report no difference inItalians' attitudes toward immigrants fromAfrica and Eastern Europe. Similarly,previoussurvey analysis suggests thatGreeks are theleast likelyof all Europeans todescribe them

1For instance, race inGreece is derived from theMegali Idea (Great Idea) through hich irredentawere incorporated as ethnic Greeks based on sharedreligion and language but not ancestry(Triandafyllidou 001). Similarly, a razza italiana(the talian ace)and italianitdItalianess) o nothaveexplicit racial connotations, although there is evidenceof racist attitudes among Northern Italians towardtheir southern counterparts, who often have darkerskin(Vasta 1993).

selves as racist (Kiprianos et al. 2003). There istentative vidence, however, thatWestern-styleracism isbeing imported toSouthernEuropevia popular culture (Lentin 2004).The role of religion in the configuration ofsymbolic boundaries is also unclear, eventhoughChristianity has historically enjoyed apivotal place in nationalism in theMediterranean (Muro andQuiroga 2005). Onlyrecentlyhas the arrival of non-Christian immigrantsprovoked scholars toanalyze therole ofsymbolic boundaries based on religion (ZapataBarrero 2003). There is limited evidence that

religion is amore important symbolic boundary inGreece than in Italy (Triandafyllidou2001). The relative salience of symbolicboundaries based on language and culture has yet tobe studied indetail, although bothwere strongcomponents of colonial strategies inSpain andPortugal (Medrano 2005; Mendoza 2001).Instead,the literaturen SouthernEurope focuses primarilyon perceptions of economic threatinducedby theabrupt increase of immigrants nthe labormarket and high levels of unemployment and illegal migration (Apap 1997;Baganha 1997). Sniderman and colleagues(2000) reportthat talians have negative attitudestoward immigrantswith low human capital.Likewise, Kiprianos and colleagues' (2003)analysis ofmultiple public opinion surveys suggests thatGreeks are among themost likelyofall Europeans to blame immigrants forhighunemployment. Previous research also suggeststhat human capital is an important symbolicboundary against the largeAlbanian population in Italy (Vasta 1993) and Greece (Lazaridisand Psimmenos 2000).Eastern EuropeBecause immigrationtoEastern countriesbeganvery recently,the literature n symbolic boundaries inEastern Europe primarilyfocuses on theethnic unmixing (Brubaker 1996) of peoplebrought together under communism.Complicating these studies is themigration ofnational minorities such as the Roma(Brubaker et al. 2006). A small but growingliterature as begun to compare how these factors shape attitudes toward therapidlygrowingpopulation of new immigrants romAsia andtheMiddle East inEastern Europe (e.g.,Nyiri2003; Phalet andOrkeny 2001;Wallace 2002).


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46 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEWSeveral studies conclude that f all Europeans,those in the ast are themost hostile towardforeigners (Nyiri 2003; Wallace 2002). The common assumption is thatculturalmembership isbased on race or ancestry in these countries,although this has been challenged in recentyears (Janmaat2006; Nyiri 2003; Szoke 1992).Nevertheless, Wallace (2002) reports racism ishigher inEastern Europe than inother regions,even thoughnon-European immigrantsmake upan extremely small proportion of their totalpopulation. There is some evidence of growingracism towardAsian immigrants in theCzechRepublic and Hungary (Nyiri 2005), althoughnegative attitudes aremost frequently directedtowardAfrican andMiddle Eastern immigrants(Nyiri2003). Other studies suggest thatreligionis a more important symbolic boundary in theCzech Republic than inHungary and Poland(Wallace 2002). There isalso evidence that anguage is a strong symbolic boundary inPoland(Nowicka 2006), as is culture inHungary andtheCzech Republic (Nyiri 2003). Finally, recentstudies show thatsymbolic boundaries based onhuman capital are particularly strong throughout Eastern Europe (Nyiri 2003; Phalet andOrkeny 2001; Wallace 2002).A PANORAMA OF SYMBOLICBOUNDARIES AGAINSTIMMIGRANTS IN EUROPETable 5 lists comparative studies of symbolicboundaries toward immigrants inEurope inchronological order.This panorama reveals several patterns thathave inhibited theprogress ofthe boundary-work literature thus far. First,most studies compare only a handful of countries. his isbecause many use qualitativemethods that are not conducive to broadcross-national comparison. Second, comparisons ofWestern European countries outnumber comparisons of Southern and EasternEurope.While comparisons ofFrance, Britain,andGermany are commonplace, theamount ofvariation between these countries has yet tobeassessed in a wider European context.This isimportantnot only because of variation in thedevelopment of social boundaries betweennatives and immigrantswithin and betweenregions,but also because it imits ssessment ofthepossible convergence of symbolic boundaries inWestern countries themselves. Finally,

symbolic boundaries based on race, religion,language, culture, and human capital are analyzed in the literature t large,butmost studiesfocus only on twoor three f these dimensions.Insofaras thetheoryofboundary-work emphasizes themutability of symbolic boundaries,inattention o theentireconfigurationrisks overlooking symbolic boundaries thatdisplace others. Therefore, theprimary goal of this articleis toproduce a typology of symbolic boundaryconfigurations using data onmultiple symbolic boundaries from countries indifferentregionsofEurope.

The secondary goal of this article is to identify ewmacro-level variables that an be usedtoexplain theconfigurationof symbolicboundaries.Although explanations of variation in theconfiguration of symbolic boundaries routinelycite country-level phenomena, thecompartmentalization of theboundary-work literaturehas prohibited systematic analysis ofhistorical,demographic, socioeconomic, and institutionalvariation among countrieswithin and betweenregions. For example, most comparisons ofWestern European countriesfocus on citizenshiplaws and philosophies of integration,but theyneglect the demographic and socioeconomicfactorsemphasized in the literature n Southernand Eastern Europe. Conversely, studies ofSouthern and Eastern countries often overlookthe institutionalfactors central to the literatureonWestern Europe. Below I explore the relationshipbetweenmy typologyand the fouraxesof variation across countries identified above:(1) the sources and timingof immigration, (2)the size and origin of immigrant groups andtheirposition inthe labormarket, (3) citizenshipand civic inclusionpolicies, and (4) philosophiesof integration.2 n thisway, I provide the firstsystematic analysis of these variables in broadcross-national perspective thatcan be used byfuture tudies todevelop amore comprehensivetheoryof boundary-work.

2Part Iof the nline Supplementon the SRWebsite: http://www2.asanet.org/journals/asr/2007/toc061.html) contains analyses of 21 additionalcountry-level variables.


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SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES IN 21 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 47Table 5. Comparative Studies of Symbolic Boundaries against Immigrants in Europe

Symbolic BoundariesAuthor(s) Countries Compared3 AnalyzedbBovenkerk, Miles, and Verbunt Britain, France, Netherlands Race(1990)Brubaker (1992) France, Germany Race, Religion, Language, CultureLapeyronnie (1993) Britain, France Race, CultureWrench and Solomos (1993) France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, RaceNetherlandsIreland (1994) France, Switzerland Human Capital, RaceTodd (1994) France, Britain, Germany, (United Race, Religion, Language, Culture

States)Wieviorka et al. (1994) France, Britain, Belgium, Italy Race, Religion, CultureApap1997)taly, Spain Human Capital, Religion, RaceFavell (1998) Britain, France Race, Culture, Language

Fetzer (2000) France, Germany, (United States) Culture, Human Capital, ReligionZolner (2000) Denmark, France Culture, Race, LanguageBrubaker (2001) France, Germany Language, Culture, Race, ReligionMendoza (2001) Spain, Portugal Human Capital, Language, CulturePhalet and Orkeny (2001) Hungary, Netherlands Religion, Race, Human CapitalRath et al. (2001) Belgium, Britain, Netherlands ReligionTriandafyllidou (2001) Greece, Italy, Spain, Britain, France, Religion, Race, Culture,

GermanyKastoryano (2002) France, Germany, (United States) Religion, CultureWallace (2002) Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Human Capital, Race, Religion

Germany, Austria, (Slovakia)Bleich (2003)ritain, France Race, Language, CultureGarner (2003) Ireland, Britain, (United States) RaceNyiri (2003) Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Race, Human Capital, Culture,

Slovenia, (Romania), (Slovakia), Language(Belarus), (Russia)

Rydgren (2003) France, Sweden Race, CultureSackman et al. (2003) Germany, Netherlands, Britain Religion, Language, CultureFetzer and Soper (2004) Britain, France, Germany ReligionKoenig (2004) Britain, France, Germany ReligionLentin (2004) Britain, France, Italy, Ireland RaceCesari and McLoughlin (2005) Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Religion

Netherlands, SpainaCountries inparentheses are not included inmy study.bThe vast comparative literature on social boundaries is not described in this table (e.g., Alba 2005; Joppke 2005;Soysal 1994).

MEASURES OF SYMBOLICBOUNDARIESData for this study are from the 2002/2003round of theEuropean Social Survey (ESS), across-sectional, multistage probability sampleof social attitudes among people age 15 andolder in 21 European countries. Because thisstudy isdesigned toprobe theconfiguration ofsymbolic boundaries deployed by native populations, I drop all first-and second-generationimmigrants from the sample. In addition, Iexclude all respondentswho indicated they re

members of an ethnicminority intheircountry.3My total sample comprises 33,258 individualsin 21 countries, averaging 1,584 people percountry.I derive measures of symbolic boundariesfroma unique set of questions in theESS that

3The following two questions were used to determine minority status: (1) Are you a member of aminority group inyour country? and (2) Have youever been discriminated against on the basis of yourrace/religion/ethnicity?


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48 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEWask respondents to evaluate a hypotheticalimmigrant. Respondents were first asked:Please tellme how importantyou thinkeachof these things should be indeciding whethersomeone born, brought up and living outside[country]should be able tocome and livehere.They were then shown a card with thefollowing statements: (1) be white, (2) come from aChristian background, (3) speak [one of] theofficial languages of [country], (4) be committed to theway of life in [country], 5) have goodeducational qualifications, and (6) have workskills that [country] needs. Responses werecoded on a 10-pointLikert scale where '0' isextremely unimportant and' 10' is extremely important. referto thesix symbolicboundaries measured in these questions as race,

religion, language, culture, education, and occupation.The hypothetical immigrantmodule of theESS marks a considerable improvement overprevious cross-national surveys of attitudestoward immigrants inEurope. Whereas mostprevious surveys ask respondents to describetheirfeelings toward immigrants, immigrantsfrom outside Europe, or racial and ethnicminorities, theESS questions are designed tocapture important variations within each ofthese broad categories. By disaggregating attitudes toward immigrants intomultiple symbolic boundaries that are compared in theboundary-work literature see Table 5), theESSmeasures both the intensityand the form ofattitudes toward immigrants. It is thusparticularly ell suited to theconf igurational approachto symbolic boundaries adopted here. As withall survey-based studies,however, it ispossiblethatESS respondents produced socially desirable responses to thequestions, ratherthan theintimate convictions thatmight be revealedthroughethnography.This isparticularly relevant for thequestion on race because the literaturedemonstrates thewidespread influenceofantiracist discourse inWestern Europe. Itremains to be determined, however, preciselyhowmuch antiracismhas permeated each country Lentin 2004) and,more importantly, owsuchdevelopments have shaped the entire configurationof symbolic boundaries inresponse.Table 6 presents descriptive characteristicsforthe six symbolic boundaries in each country.Language and culture are consistently amongthemost important symbolic boundaries.

Conversely, race is least important inall countries, although in varying degrees. InLuxembourg, forexample, themean score forracial symbolic boundaries is .93,but it is4.12inHungary. Religion is relativelymore salient,averaging 3.52 across all countries and rangingas high as 5.87 inGreece. Symbolic boundaries based on human capital (education andoccupation) generally fall between themostimportant language and culture) and the leastimportant race and religion) symbolic boundaries.

FUZZY-SET METHODOLOGYTypologies are analytical tools used to compare cases?in thiscase, countries?with idealtypes not observed empirically. In practice,however,many of thequantitativemethods usedto construct typologies createmutually exclusive groups, ignoring the likelihood thatmanycountries are infact combinations ofmultipletypes (Ragin 2000). Traditional or crisp cluster analysis, for example, ignores countries inbetween typesby forcing them into the clusters theymost closely resemble.Although thisis inconsequential forstudieswith large samplesizes, failure to identifysuch cases among the21 countries inthisstudyrisksmisidentificationand misinterpretation of typical symbolicboundary configurations. I address these issuesbelow through a combination of fuzzy-settechniques. Iuse fuzzy clusteranalysis (FCA)(Dimitriadou et al. 2006) toproduce a typology of symbolic boundary configurations andexplore itsrelationship to thecountry-levelfactors above using measures of fuzzy consistency (Ragin 2006).4Crisp cluster analysis requires thatcountriesbelong to one?and only one?group. In contrast, FCA assigns countries membershipscores thatdescribe howmuch theyresemblemultiple fuzzyclustersor sets. This isaccomplished by applying a fuzzymodifier to thetraditional c-means clustering algorithm(Dimitriadou et al. 2006). Consider thematrixXy comprised of 21 countries (i) and theirmeanscores for the six symbolic boundaries above

4For a detailed comparison of these techniques andtraditional or crisp analyses see the OnlineSupplement.


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SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES IN 21 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 49Table 6. Mean Scores of Six Symbolic Boundaries against Immigrants in 21 European CountriesCountry Race Religion Language Culture Education Occupation

Austria.04 3.27 7.57 7.14 6.67.92Belgium.26 2.71 6.99 8.25 6.09.25Britain.39 3.26 7.40 7.51 6.29.87

Czech Republic 3.64 3.69 6.29 8.24 .33 7.42Denmark.84 3.57 6.41 6.88 6.28 6.39Finland.81 3.89 6.23 8.18 6.34.91

France.34 3.20 7.33 7.47 6.30 6.38Germany.52 2.49 7.77 8.00 6.77.07Greece.64 5.87 7.78 8.18 7.79.22Hungary.12 4.69 7.68 8.95 6.83.13Ireland.40 3.47 6.38 6.68 6.12.82

Italy.55 4.44 5.77 7.17 5.73.52Luxembourg .93 2.01 8.45 7.95 6.19.67

Netherlands 1.90 2.67 7.42 7.90 5.58 6.05Norway.27 3.39 6.25 6.57 5.10.89Poland.95 4.79 6.82 6.45 6.38.92Portugal.94 3.83 6.00 7.08 6.08 7.47Slovenia.95 3.45 7.50 7.98 6.32.21Spain.94 3.91 5.92 7.35 6.09.67Sweden.31 2.32 4.35 7.73 4.48.84

Switzerland.55 2.92 6.15 7.25.13 5.98Mean (all countries) 2.44 3.52 6.78 7.57.19 6.74Min93 2.01 4.35 6.45 4.48.84

Max.12 5.87 8.45 8.95 7.79.22SD_180_191_.94_.65_.65_.76

Note: 0 = extremely unimportant; 10 = extremely important.

(j).5When applied tomatrix Xtj, the fuzzy cmeans algorithm produces a matrix ofmembership scoresM for21 countries and k sets, andakx 6matrix of set cenrroids C that escribesthe configuration of symbolic boundaries ineach fuzzy set.This is accomplished byminimizing theobjective function:n k(M,C)X^fjdtjJwhere uij is themembership coefficientof country/ in setj, and dtj is theEuclidean distancebetween observation /and center j. Theresearchermust specify a value greater than 1for k andm, thefuzziness index.6The function

51 performed fuzzy clustering of the entire distribution to ssessbias from urtosis, ut it idnotyieldsubstantiallydifferent esults (available fromtheauthor).6Here a value ofm = 2 is chosen, following Bezdekand Pal (1995)who showthat alues lower han1.5and higher than 2.5 produce unstable results inmost

is constrained such thateach country'smembership cannot be negative, and the totalmembership across all sets is normalized. Thestrength fmembership scores increases from0 to 1, and the sum of each country's membership scores equals 1.Unlike factorscores,FCA membership scoresdescribe relationships between cases, not variables. Therefore, countries with strong membership ina given set axeprototypical, whereasthosewithweak membership inall sets are simply atypical. The characteristics of each set areidentifiedthrough nspectionof theclustercentroids.A country'smembership scores describehow closely its configuration of symbolicboundaries resembles theconfigurationof clustercentroids in each set.By plottingmember

applications. I used theXie-Beni index to determinethe appropriate number of sets (k). Different valuesof m and k produced very similar results (availablefrom the author). Iused the R software to conduct allanalyses.


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50 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEWship scores inmultidimensional space, one canassess how exclusive each set is.Moreover, onecan easily identify ountries inbetween sets aswell. The crisp clustering solution can bededuced for referencesimplybygrouping countriesaccording to theirstrongestmembership.The range ofmembership scores within eachcrisp set, as well as the amount of overlapbetween them,reveals the integrity f thecrispclustering solution. Inmost applications, thereis considerable variation within and betweencrisp clusters. In most cases, FCA thereforeprovidesmore precisemeasures of structureindata thancrisp cluster analysis.

Fuzzy sets cannot be analyzed in tandemwith non-fuzzy variables unless the latteraretransformed intofuzzy sets as well. I calibratethe country-level variables presented in thebackground sections into fuzzy sets using themethod proposed byRagin (forthcoming) anddetailed in theOnline Supplement. Even afterall variables are transformed into fuzzy sets,standard correlational techniques cannot beused to explore therelationship between fuzzysets (Ragin 2006). This is because correlationsdescribe the covariation of variables, whereasthe fuzzy-set approach asks whether cases aresubsetsofone another.Consider Figure 1,whichdescribes the relationship between two fuzzysets:X and Y. The figure shows thatmembership inX is almost always greater thanmembership in Y. Traditional correlationaltechniques, however,would not reveal a significant correlation between the two because thepoints in the lowerright-hand corner are considered error. In the fuzzy approach, however,a consistent subset relationship exists betweenX and Y; meaning thatmembership inX isalmost always a necessary condition for 7 Thepoints in the lower right-handcorner are simply considered cases inwhich membership inmust be explained through dditional pathwaysother thanX.

7For a discussion of the distinction between necessaryand sufficientonditionsseeRagin (2000). Icalculated only necessary conditions due to spaceconstraints, as well as the exploratory goals of thisstudy.More rigorous analysis would explore combinations of necessary and sufficient conditions as

well as their set-theoretic coverage (Ragin 2006).

As Ragin (2006) shows, theconsistencywithwhich one set isa necessary condition for nother can be calculated as follows:Consistency (Y< X) =

^(miniY.Xd)/^)This formulameasures not only thefrequencyofX being greater than , but also themagnitudeof thisdifference.Large inconsistenciesarepenalized, but near misses are also acknowledged as such. Scores .80 and higher indicateincreasingly consistent relationships. Below, Icalculate the consistency of the country-levelvariables (from thebackground sections) withthe setsproduced by FCA todevelop hypotheses to explain the configuration of symbolicboundaries at themacro level.THREE SYMBOLIC BOUNDARYCONFIGURATIONSI identified three typical symbolic boundaryconfigurations via FCA.8 Table 7 describes thevalue of each boundary forSetsA, B, andC centered around themean forall countries.SetA is characterized by: (1) stronger thanaverage racial and religious symbolic boundaries, (2)weaker thanaverage cultural and linguistic symbolic boundaries, (3) slightly eakerthan average educational symbolic boundaries,and (4) slightly stronger than average occupational symbolic boundaries.Set B is characterized by: (1) stronger thanaverage linguisticand cultural symbolic boundaries, (2) weaker than average religious andracial symbolic boundaries, (3) slightlystrongerthanaverage educational symbolic boundaries,and (4) slightlyweaker than average occupational symbolic boundaries.Set C is characterized by: (1) weaker thanaverage scores on every symbolic boundary,(2) extremelyweak racial symbolic boundaries,(3) extremelyweak education and occupationsymbolic boundaries, and (4)weaker thanaverage religious symbolic boundaries (but slightly strongerthan those inSet B).Figure 2 isa three-dimensional scatter-plot feach country'smembership scores in SetsA, B,

8For further details on cluster validity, see Part Iof theOnline Supplement.


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SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES IN 21 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 51

1.0-1

0.9

0.8

0.7

I 0.6.g? 0.5 -

g 0.40.3 - #

0.2- %

0.1- ? % %

0.0 -\-\-1-1-1-1-1-1-\-1-10.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0Membership inSet X

Figure 1. Example of a Subset Relationship

Table 7. Characteristics of Three Sets of Symbolic Boundary ConfigurationsRace Religion Language Culture Education OccupationMean (All Countries) 2.44 3.52 6.78 7.57.19 6.74

Fuzzy Sets Cluster CentroidsSetA +.43 +.42 -.68 -.37 -.16 +.16SetB -.41 -.57 +.67 +.15 +.16 -.10SetC_-.75 -.46_-M_Il57_-M_-.91

Note: Cluster centroids are centered around themean for all countries.

and C.9 The threeellipses depict thecrisp clustering solution for reference. Spain, Portugal,Italy,Finland, Poland, theCzech Republic, andIrelandmost closely resemble SetA (inorderofthe strength of theirmembership). Britain,

9 See Table S2 in theOnline Supplementforacomplete list ofmembership scores.

France, Austria, Germany, Belgium, theNetherlands, Luxembourg, and Slovenia mostclosely resemble Set B. Finally, Switzerland,Norway, Denmark, and Sweden most closelyresemble Set C. While Spain, Britain, andSwitzerland are nearly prototypical of SetsA,B, and C, respectively, countries closer to the origin of theaxes (e.g., Greece andHungary) arescarcely related to thethreesets.Most countries


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52 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

iBB_-__9____-___r: ' ^

M__^_^__i_itt___.jjJJJ^^IfBPP^

__B_H______^__^_HP^ ^^^^^i^__^^^^Hn__^_^_H__H_S-L.jJl____________P^^*

' * - ^ VH____^_BP^^'f^BBP^^ * --. .iiiiiiiii.Figure 2. Fuzzy Membership Scores in Three SetsNotes: A country's membership scores describe how closely its configuration of symbolic boundaries resembles thesets described inTable 7. Countries with high membership in a given set are prototypical; those with lowmembership are simply atypical. Ellipses depict the crisp clustering solution: themajor diameter or length describesthe range ofmembership scores within each crisp cluster whereas theminor diameter or width describes overlapbetween them.

fall somewhere inbetween, and several are bestdescribed as in-between sets.The Netherlands,for example, has significant membership inboth Set B (.56) and Set C (.28). Likewise,Ireland has significantmembership in Sets A(.51) and C (.29) and Slovenia has significantmembership in Sets B (.50) andA (.25). In sum,FCA shows significant variation within andbetween sets thatwould not be recognized bycrisp cluster analysis.EXPLORING THE CONFIGURATIONSPerhaps themost strikingfeatureof Figure 2 isthegeographic pattern of countries across thethreesets.Countries thatmost closely resembleSetA (Spain, Portugal, Italy,Finland, Poland,Czech Republic, Ireland,Greece, andHungary)are each located on theperipheryofEurope. Set

B countries (Britain,France,Austria, Germany,Belgium, theNetherlands, Luxembourg, andSlovenia) are geographically continuous in thecore ofWestern Europe?if one ignores theEnglish Channel?and all but one of the Set Ccountries (Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, andSweden) are part of Scandinavia. The inbetween countries roughlyfollow thispatternaswell. Slovenia sits between the core countriesof Set B and the peripheral countries ofSetA. Ireland sits between Sets A and C, andtheNetherlands sitsbetween Sets B and C.Because a theory fboundary-work does notyet exist, a varietyofdifferenthypotheses couldbe developed to furtherexplain theFCA results.Below I develop hypotheses by exploring theconsistency of Sets A, B, and C with the fourcountry-level factors discussed in the background sections: (1) the sources and timingof


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SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES IN 21 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 53immigration, (2) the size and origin of immigrantgroups and theirposition inthe labormarket, (3) citizenship and civic inclusion policies,and (4) philosophies of integration.Consistency CalculationsTable 8 describes theconsistency between SetsA, B, andC and the four fuzzy sets thatdescribeincreases inmigration by decade proportionalto the totalpopulation. Set C ishighly consistentwith countries that experienced high netmigration between 1960 and 1970, 1980 and1990, and 1990 to 2000. Set B is highly consistentwith high netmigration between 1960and 1970 and consistentwith high netmigrationbetween 1980 and 1990.Although consistencyincreases between SetA and netmigration bydecade, itnever reaches the .80 benchmark.

Returning toTable 1,one finds that the SetAcountries (Spain, Portugal, Italy, inland,Poland,Czech Republic, Ireland,Greece, andHungary)were all once countries of emigration and onlyrecently xperienced large-scale immigration. ncontrast,thecountries inSets B and C all experienced sizeable postcolonial or guest workermigration in thedecades afterWorld War II.Given the timingofmigration, it isnot surprising that Sets B and C are consistent withcountries thathave large immigrant opulations(proportional to the totalpopulation), while SetA isnot (see Table 8). Set B is consistent withcountries thathave large immigrant opulationsfrom theMiddle East andNorth Africa, subSaharan Africa, South and East Asia, andOceania. Set C isconsistentwith countries thathave large immigrant populations from allregions except theCaribbean andOceania. Set

Table 8. Consistency ofCountry-Level Setswith Sets A, B, and CSymbolic Boundary Configurations_SetA_SetB_Set CTiming f ImmigrationN= 21) 1960 to 1970590 .932** .938**1970to 1980 .630 .719 .684

1980tol990587 .851* .942**1990 to 2000 743 .766966**

Characteristics of Immigrant Population (N = 20)Total Immigrant Population .541 .891 .904** EU-15536 .754 896*Europe (non-EU-15) .646 .684 .946**Middle East & North Africa .566 .880*900**Sub-Saharan Africa .680 .812* .906** South Asia563 .818* .926**East Asia526 .825* .927**Latin America .704 .622 .883*North America500 .678 .929**Caribbean .500 .637 .673Oceania466 .558 .756

Immigrant Percent of Labor Force3 .592 .833*863*Tertiary Education15 .906** .557 .872*Change in Immigrant Percent of Labor Force (1998 to 2003)b .895* .641714CivicCitizenship olicies (N= 15)Antidiscrimination .851* .642 .770Naturalization .807* .756 .827*Family Reunion .689 .840* .742Long-Term Residence .759 .764 .908**Labor Market Inclusion_.873*_^44_.754aN=19

bN=18* Consistent (.80 Benchmark)** Highly Consistent (.90 Benchmark)


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54 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEWA is not consistent with countries thathavelarge immigrant populations regardless ofregion. Sets B and C are consistentwith countries inwhich immigrantsmake up a considerable part of the labormarket,while SetA isnot.Sets A and C are consistent with countries inwhich a substantial part of the immigrantpopulation holds tertiary ducation. Only SetA isconsistentwith countries thatexperienced anabrupt increase in thepercentage of immigrantsin the labor force between 1998 and 2003.Table 8 presents theconsistency of setsA, B,and C and five fuzzy sets generated fromGeddes and colleagues' (2005) CivicCitizenship Index. Because the index is notavailable for the Czech Republic, Hungary,Norway, Poland, Slovenia, or Switzerland (seeTable 4), these results should be consideredhighly tentative.SetA is consistent with countries thathave generous antidiscrimination,naturalization, and labormarket inclusionpolicies.SetB isonly consistentwith countries thathavegenerous family reunionpolicies. Set C is consistentwith countries thathave generous naturalization policies and highly consistentwithcountries that have generous long-term residence policies.Philosophies of Integration inContextSurprisingly, the results suggest that officialphilosophies of integrationdo not correspondto the configuration of symbolic boundariesdeployed by thegeneral public. France, Britain,andGermany's philosophies of integration recompared inthe literature ore often thanthoseof any othercombination of countries (seeTable5). Figure 2, however, suggests the configurationof symbolic boundaries used by thegeneral public in these three countries is nearlyidentical.All three countries are closely affiliatedwith SetB,which ischaracterizedby stronglinguisticand cultural symbolic boundaries andweak racial and religious boundaries. Whilethis configuration mirrors the emphasis onassimilation inFrench republicanism^ itrunscounter to thepluralist tenetsofBritishmulticultural race relations.The resultsare even lesscompatiblewith Germany's historical emphasison ancestry,despite amodest growth of assimilationist rhetoric in government discoursedescribed in recent studies (Brubaker 2001;

Carrera 2006). Moreover, there sno discernablepatternacross Sets A and C apartfrom the lackofphilosophies of integrationmongmost countries that resemble Set A.DISCUSSIONSet A: New Immigration Countries onthe European PeripheryCountries most closely affiliatedwith Set A(Spain, Portugal, Italy,Finland, Poland, CzechRepublic, Ireland,Greece, andHungary) sharethefollowing characteristics: (1) They are located on theperiphery of theEuropean Union. (2)They were all once sources of emigration andonly recently began receiving considerableimmigration. Nevertheless, (3) immigrantsremain a small proportion of the overall population.Therefore, (4) discourses about immigrant integration re relatively unsophisticatedcompared with those in the old immigrationcountries ofWestern andNorthern Europe.It remains tobe determined why racial andreligious symbolic boundaries are strongerthanaverage in SetA (see Table 7). One hypothesisis thatphenotype and religious dress providevisual cues about group membership thatareparticularly conspicuous in new immigrationcountries, precisely because of their homogeneity. These cues may limit positive contactbetween groups, allowing racial and religiousstereotypes togo unchallenged (Allport 1958).An abrupt increase in thevisibility of aminority opulation may also provoke perceptions ofgroup threat Blumer 1958), asmajority groupmembers come torealize that ertainprivilegesand statusare attached to theirrace or religion.These perceptions may be reinforced by economic insecurityas well, and SetA is consistent ith countries thatexperienced an influx fimmigrants into their labormarkets in recentyears.10 The resultsmight also suggest thatantiracist discourse has not yet permeated theperiphery of Europe as thoroughly as it hasEurope's core.Note that hesehypotheses arenot

10This may also explain why occupational symbolic boundaries are stronger than average in Set A.See the Online Supplement for a more comprehensive application of group threat and contact theoryfollowing uillian (1995).


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SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES IN 21 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 55mutually exclusive. For example, positive contactmay limitperceptions of group threatorfacilitate thediffusion of antiracist discourse.Nevertheless, additional research isneeded toexplore thesehypotheses indifferent ombinations and to provide alternative explanationsfor the strength f racial and religious symbolicboundaries in SetA countries.Set R: Old Immigration Countries inthe Core of Western EuropeCountries most closely affiliatedwith Set B(Britain,France,Austria,Germany, Belgium, theNetherlands, Luxembourg, and Slovenia) sharethefollowing characteristics: (1) They are located in the core of Western Europe (exceptSlovenia). (2) They received substantial immigration inthedecades afterWorld War I, eitherfromguestworker agreementswith countriesontheEuropean periphery (including Turkey andNorthAfrica) orfrom formercolonies. Becauseof this, 3) immigrants ow constitutea sizeableportion of theoverall population, and (4) public discourse about immigration has evolvedover decades and is thereforemore sophisticated than thatof thenew immigrationcountries.The emphasis on language and culture inSetB countriesmay result romnatives' acceptanceof thepermanency of immigration.As secondgenerations of nonwhite and non-Christianimmigrants come of age, racial and religiousdistinctions may not only become less conspicuous but also less politically tenable.Whilepublic discourse necessarily shifts from theaccommodation to the integration f immigrantpopulations, natives may become more concerned about the longevity f theirlinguistic ndcultural identity.Or, natives may realize thatlanguage and cultureguarantee theprivileges ofgroup statusthatwere previously protected byrace or religion. These attitudesmay be reinforced by recent reports of segmented ordownward assimilation of second-generationimmigrants (e.g., Alba 2005; Crul andVermeulen 2003; Silberman,Alba, and Fournier2007), whose difficultycrossing social boundariesmay inhibit heir symbolic integration swell. There is growing controversy, for exam

ple, about reactive ethnicity among secondgenerationTurks inGermany (Diehl and Schnell2006) and theirNorth African counterparts inFrance (Beaud and Pialoux 2003).

Regardless of the extentof second-generationdisenchantment, the integration question isperceived as a common social problem acrossmost Set B countries (e.g., Tissot 2007). Withthe exception of Slovenia, Set B countries arelong-standingparticipants indiscussions abouttheharmonization of immigrationpolicy at theEU level, and they are highly aware of eachother's integrationstrategies (Carrera 2006).nThis may have produced convergence in theconfigurationof symbolic boundaries deployedby the general public, because these discussions are constrainedwithin a universal humanrightsdiscourse that stigmatizes group-basedexclusion but sanctions individual-level exclusion based on language, culture, and humancapital (Joppke 2005). Nevertheless, additional research isneeded toexplainwhy such supranational discourse appears tohave permeatedSet B countriesmore deeply thancountries inSet A.Set C: Accommodating IsolationistsCountries most closely affiliatedwith Set C(Switzerland,Norway, Denmark, and Sweden)share the following characteristics: (1) Theyare located inScandinavia (except Switzerland).(2) They each received considerable migrationafterWorld War II, although they had nocolonies fromwhich to recruit.Because thesecountries initiallyhad relatively small populations, (3) immigrantsfroma variety of different regions constitute a relatively largeproportion of the overall population. Finally,(4) they re politically isolated from thecore ofWestern Europe, and discourse about immigrant integration has evolved independently(Runbolm 1994;Wimmer 2002).As above, theweak racial and religious symbolic boundaries characteristic of Set C countries ould be explained as resulting rom strongantiracist discourse, positive contact amongnatives and non-European immigrants,or theabsence of competition between them.None ofthesehypotheses, however, explain why raciallinguisticand cultural symbolic boundaries arefarweaker inSet C countries than inall others.Here, deeper historical analysis may be war

1xI am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for proposing thishypothesis.


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56 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEWranted.Tagil (1995), for instance, shows thatintergroupdifferenceswere accommodated inthe early history of Scandinavian countries toprovide stabilityagainst the threatof culturallyhomogenous rivals. This was also true ofSwitzerland,where geistige Landesverteidigung(spiritual defense of the country) united disparate linguisticand religious groups into single republic in the face of threats rom itsmorepowerful neighbors.12In contrast, linguisticand cultural differentiationwas central to thenation-building strategies ofmany Set B countries. Consider, forexample, theHerderian tradition inGermany(Calhoun 1993) or France's virulentAnglophobia, which Britain repaid inkind(Greenfeld 1992). Likewise, race and religionwere particularly importantdistinctions in thenation-building strategies f several countriesontheEuropean periphery thatdefined themselvesagainst the threatof non-European and nonChristian empires.This line of reasoning builds on Gellner's(1983) theoryof nationalism, which suggeststhat different components of group identitybecome salient based on threats rom externalgroups.When human chasms such as race orreligiondo not separate insiders rom outsiders,Gellner's theorypredicts thatlinguisticand cultural boundaries become theprimarymechanism of intergroup exclusion. While it is notclearwhether European publics todayare awarethat such processes might affect their ttitudestoward immigrants, the national self-understandingsproduced duringnation buildingmaybe path dependent.As manyWestern Europeancountries forced their language and culture oncolonies, Scandinavian countries, forexample,condemned themfordoing so (Z0lner 2000) andwelcomed a disproportionate number ofrefugees from those colonies.13 In thisway,Gellner's theory is not incompatible with theotherhypotheses developed above. For instance,historical emphasis on accommodating disparate groups may have encouraged positive

12Note that theNetherlands and Belgium adopted similar nation-building strategies. While they aremost closely affiliated with Set B, their second closestaffiliation swith SetC.13Part II of theOnline Supplement shows thatSetC ishighlyconsistent ith large refugee opulations.

contact between natives and immigrants orreduced perceptions of threat between them.Or thecoincidence of these national self-understandingswith international ntiracistdiscourse

may have rendered ethnocentric attitudes lesspolitically tenable than elsewhere.Again, muchadditional research is needed to explore thesehypothesesmore rigorously.Directions for Future ResearchTo be sure, the configuration of symbolicboundaries isbut one ofmany factorsthatshapethe integration of immigrants into host societies.While the socioeconomic and legal segregation of immigrants cannot be ignored,neither can the role of symbolic boundaries increating and maintaining social boundaries.Due to thecross-sectional nature of thedata, itisnot possible toestablishwhether theconfigurations of symbolic boundaries revealed aboveare theproduct or the source of social inequality.While it is likely that causality works inboth directions, longitudinaldata and historicalcase studies are needed toexploremy hypotheses ingreater detail and indifferent combinations. In addition, ethnography and in-depthqualitative research are needed to further nalyze the content of these symbolic boundariesacross different situations. For example, it ispossible that linguistic and cultural symbolicboundaries are used publicly tomask privateracism or Islamophobia.This study provides new theoretical andmethodological tools forthe studyofboundarywork. I argue thattreating immigrantsas a single out-groupneglects important ross-nationalvariation in theconceptual distinctions used bynatives to createnotions of us and them. Thetypology of symbolic boundaries presentedabove providesmuch needed context forprevious comparisons of two or threeWesternEuropean countriesand identifies ew variationsinother regions ofEurope. This discussion alsoidentifies new historical, demographic, andsocioeconomic variables that ppear tobemorepromising inexplaining the logic ofboundarywork than the philosophies of integrationemphasized in the literature.Together, thesecontributions constitute a preliminary steptowarda theoryofboundary-work thatmust beexplored more rigorously by future studies inEurope and beyond.


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SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES IN 21 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 57ChristopherA. Bail is a PhD Candidate in theDepartmentof ociology atHarvard UniversityndaDoctoral Fellow intheMultidisciplinaryProgramonInequalityndSocialPolicyat the ennedy choolofGovernment. His other research explores the connection between symbolic boundaries and collectiveviolence, theglobal diffusion of culture, and thepolitics ofantiracism in cross-national perspective. Heis an affiliate of theWeatherhead Center forInternational Affairs and theMinda de GunzburgCenter for European Studies.REFERENCESAbbott, Andrew. 1995. Things of Boundaries.Social Research 62:857-82.Alba,Richard.2005. Bright s.BlurredBoundaries:Second-Generation Assimilation and Exclusion

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