SUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2018ME81Docket: Som-17-352Argued: March7,2018Decided: June19,2018Panel: ALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.Majority: MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.Dissent: ALEXANDER.J.
AVISRENTACARSYSTEM,LLCv.
DARRONBURRILLHUMPHREY,J.
[¶1] DarronBurrillappealsfromapartialsummaryjudgmententered
infavorofAvisRentACarSystem,LLC,onAvis’sclaimforbreachofcontract
in theDistrict Court (Skowhegan).1 Burrill challenges the court’s (Fowle, J.)
determination,issuedasapartialsummaryjudgment,thatheisliabletoAvis
for breach of contract and the court’s (E.Walker, J.) determinations of
damages and attorney fees, awarded after an evidentiary hearing. Avis
cross-appeals, challenging the court’s failure to award it pre- and
post-judgment interest. We affirm the partial summary judgment as to
1 The caption of the court’s order on Avis’s motion for partial summary judgment lists the
DistrictCourtlocationasAugustawhilethetextoftheorderstatesthatthehearingonthemotionwasheldattheDistrictCourt inSkowhegan. Because thismatterwasdocketedasaSkowhegancase,weassumethatthereferencetoAugustawasaclericalerror.
2
liability forbreachofcontractbutvacate theawardofdamagesandremand
forfurtherproceedings.
I.BACKGROUND
[¶2]Thefollowingfactsrelatingtoliabilityaretakenfromtheparties’
statementsofmaterialfactandreflecttherecordasviewedinthelightmost
favorabletoBurrillasthenonprevailingparty.SeeOceanicInn,Inc.v.Sloan’s
Cove,LLC,2016ME34,¶25,133A.3d1021. Factsrelating toAvis’salleged
damagesareasfoundbythecourt.
[¶3] OnNovember 20, 2012,Burrill, aMaine resident, rented a2012
FordMustangfromanAvislocationinLasVegas,Nevada.Burrillexecuteda
Rental Agreement and Addendum and declined the loss damage waiver
protection that was offered to him. By declining the loss damage waiver,
Burrillagreedtoberesponsiblefor“alllossofordamagetothecarregardless
ofcause,orwho,orwhatcausedit.”Thatsameday,thevehiclewasdamaged
whenitwasinvolvedinanaccidentinLasVegas.
[¶4] According to Avis, the accident caused damages to the vehicle
totaling$15,342.57.AvissentdemandsforpaymenttoBurrillonJanuary16,
2013,April3,2013,andAugust14,2014,butBurrillfailedorrefusedtopay.
3
[¶5] Avis filed a complaint against Burrill in the District Court on
July20,2015, alleging breach of contract and negligence and seeking
damages.OnMarch31,2016,afterdiscoverywasconcluded,Avismovedfor
partial summary judgment to establish liability on the claim for breach of
contract. The court (Fowle,J.) held oral argument on the motion on
September29,2016.
[¶6]InitsordergrantingAvis’smotionforpartialsummaryjudgment,
thecourtnoted theparties’agreement that thecase iscontrolledbyNevada
substantivelawandMaineprocedural law.2 Thecourtthendeterminedthat
therewerenogenuineissuesofmaterialfactthat(1)thepartiesenteredinto
avalidandenforceablerentalcontract;(2)Burrillbreachedthatcontract;and
(3) “although the parties do dispute the extent of the damages sustained
duringthecourseoftheaccident. . .damagesdidindeedoccur.”Asaresult,
the court concluded that therewerenogenuine issuesofmaterial fact as to
theelementsoftheclaimforbreachofcontractandthatAviswasentitledto
partial summary judgment on the issue of liability as amatter of law. The
2 The rental agreement did not include a choice-of-law provision, but because the rental
agreementwasexecutedinNevadaandtheaccidenttookplaceinNevada,Nevadasubstantivelawapplied. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188 (Am. Law Inst. 1971); see alsoStateFarmMut.AutoIns.Co.v.Koshy,2010ME44,¶46,995A.2d651.
4
court granted the motion on October 5, 2016, and ordered a hearing on
damages.3
[¶7]IndisputeatthedamageshearingonMay18,2017,waswhether
the affidavit of damages executed by an Avis claims examiner included
inadmissiblehearsay. Severaldocumentswere attached to theaffidavit: the
rentalagreement;avehiclevaluationreportprepared forAvisby J.D.Power
and Associates; a bill for towing the damaged vehicle; and a record of the
vehicle’s salvage value. Burrill objected to the admissionof the affidavit on
theground that, other than the rental agreement, the attachmentswere not
“businessrecords”pursuanttothehearsayexceptioninM.R.Evid.803(6).At
thehearing,thecourt(E.Walker,J.)acceptedtheaffidavitwithitsattachments
debeneanddidnotthenruleonitsadmissibility.Avisthencalledawitnessto
testifyabouttheamountofdamages,butBurrillobjectedbecausetheidentity
ofthetestifyingwitnesshadnotbeendisclosedpriortothehearing.Because
thewitnessAvishadpreviouslyidentifiedtoBurrillwasunabletoattend,Avis
broughtadifferentwitness to thehearing. Thecourtdeclined toaccept the
testimonyofthewitnesspresent.Beforethehearingconcluded,Avisoffereda
repair estimate as evidence of damages if the court determined that the
3 Thedaybefore thedamageshearing,Avismovedtodismiss itsnegligenceclaim. Thecourtgrantedthemotionatthehearing.
5
attachments to theaffidavit—specifically thevehicle valuationreport—were
inadmissible. Again, Burrill objected on the basis of hearsay, and again the
courttookthesubmissiondebene,reservingitsrulingonitsadmissibility.
[¶8] In its order on damages, the court determined that the
attachments to the affidavit, although containing hearsay, satisfied the
businessrecordsexception. Thecourtdevotedmostof itsdiscussion to the
vehicle valuation report.4 The report was not prepared by the affiant, but
instead by a third party, J.D. Power and Associates. The valuation report
purported to provide the market value of the vehicle prior to the loss by
taking into account the value of comparable vehicles with similar mileage
locatedinasimilargeographicarea,aswellasanydamagetothevehicleprior
totheloss.Theaffiantcertifiedthatthereportwaskeptintheregularcourse
ofAvis’sbusiness,thattheaffiantmaintainedthereportaspartofherduties
asaclaimsexaminerforAvis,andthatitwasmadereasonablysoonafterthe
incident. The court determined that therewas sufficient foundation for the
admissibilityoftheaffidavitandalloftheattachments.
4Therentalagreementstatedthatintheeventofdamage,therenterofthevehicle“willpayour
estimated repair cost, or if, in our sole discretion, we determine to sell the car in its damagedcondition, you will pay the difference between the car’s retail fair market value before it wasdamagedandthesaleproceeds.”
6
[¶9]Basedontheinformationintheaffidavit,thecourtconcludedthat
thedamagesand fees claimedbyAviswere reasonable andgrantedAvis its
requestedamountof $15,342.57. It also grantedAvis attorney fees totaling
$5,985.00andcosts in theamountof $433.24. Thecourtdeclined toaward
Avispre-orpost-judgmentinterest.
[¶10] Burrillappealed,challengingboththegrantofAvis’smotionfor
partial summary judgment and theawardofdamages. Avis cross-appealed,
challengingthecourt’s failuretoaward it interestandcosts intheamountit
requested.
II.DISCUSSION
A. BreachofContract
[¶11] Burrill first challenges the court’s grant of partial summary
judgmentontheissueofbreachofcontract. “Wereviewatrialcourt’sgrant
of a summary judgmentdenovo, considering theevidence in the lightmost
favorabletothenonprevailingparty.Summaryjudgmentisproperlygranted
if the record reflects that there is no genuine issue ofmaterial fact and the
movantisentitledtoajudgmentasamatteroflaw.”OceanicInn,2016ME34,
¶25,133A.3d1021(citationomitted)(quotationmarksomitted).
7
[¶12]Inorderforaplaintifftosucceedinaclaimforbreachofcontract,
Nevadalawrequiresaplaintifftoshow“(1)theexistenceofavalidcontract,
(2)abreachbythedefendant,and(3)damageasaresultofthebreach.”Saini
v. Int’l Game Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919-20 (D. Nev. 2006) (citing
Richardsonv.Jones,1Nev.405,408(1865)).
[¶13] The parties agreed on the following material facts: (1) Burrill
rentedacar fromAvisonNovember20,2012; (2) thevehiclewasdamaged
on November 20, 2012, when it was involved in an accident in Las Vegas;
(3)in the rental agreement, Burrill had waived the loss damage protection
andthereforeagreedtobe“responsible...foralllossofordamagetothecar
regardlessof cause, orwho, orwhatcaused it”; (4)Avis sentBurrill several
demands for payment of the alleged damages prior to the lawsuit; and (5)
Burrill failed or refused to pay the amount demanded. Because Burrill
admittedthatthecarwasdamagedinanaccidentwhile itwasrentedunder
his name in a contractual arrangement that made him responsible for any
damage to the car, and acknowledged that he refused to pay the amount
demanded by Avis, there was no genuine issue of material fact that Burrill
8
breached the rental agreement by failing to pay Avis after the car was
damaged.5
[¶14] Because there were no genuine issues of material fact as to
(1)theexistenceofavalidcontract;(2)breachofthatcontract;and(3)some
amount of damage as a result of the breach, we affirm the grant of Avis’s
motionforpartialsummaryjudgmentastoliability.SeeM.R.Civ.P.56(c)(“A
summaryjudgment,interlocutoryincharacter,mayberenderedontheissue
of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of
damages.”).
B. Damages
[¶15]Althoughtherewasnogenuineissueofmaterialfactthatdamage
did indeedoccur, thepartiesdisputed theextentof thedamages,prompting
the court to order a hearing to determine the specific amount of damages.
Burrillarguesthatthecourterredandabuseditsdiscretionwhenitadmitted,
pursuanttothebusinessrecordsexceptiontothehearsayrule,theaffidavitof
5 The trial court’s analysis of thebreach element focused largelyon thequestionofwhetherBurrill’sgirlfriend,whothepartiesagreewasdrivingthevehicleatthetimeoftheaccident,wasanunauthorizeddriveraccording to the termsof therentalagreement. The court rejectedBurrill’scontention that a conversation he allegedly had with an Avis clerk prior to renting the vehiclecreated genuine issues of material fact on the ground that evidence regarding the allegedconversationwouldbebarredbytheparolevidencerule.SeeKlabackav.Nelson,394P.3d940,949(Nev.2017).ThisremainsBurrill’smainargumentonappeal.Itisaredherring,however.EvenifBurrill’sgirlfriendwasanauthorizeddriver,heisstillcontractuallyresponsibleforthedamagetothecar.ByfailingtopayforthedamageafterAvissentdemandsforpayment,Burrillbreachedthecontract.
9
anAvisrepresentativeanditsattachments6asthesoleevidenceoftheamount
ofdamages.SeeM.R.Evid.803(6).7
[¶16] “When admission of evidence under the business records
exception to the hearsay rule is challenged, we review a trial court’s
foundationalfindingstosupportadmissibilityforclearerroranditsultimate
determination of admissibility for an abuse of discretion.” JPMorgan Chase
Bank,N.A.v.Lowell,2017ME32,¶8,156A.3d727(quotationmarksomitted).
“Business records are hearsay and therefore inadmissible pursuant to M.R.
Evid. 802 unless they meet the requirements of the business records
exception in M.R. Evid. 803(6).” KeyBank Nat’l Ass’n v. Estate of Quint,
2017ME 237, ¶ 14, 176 A.3d 717 (quotation marks omitted). Rule 803(6)
providesfortheadmissibilityofabusinessrecordif
(A) The record was made at or near the time by—or frominformationtransmittedby—someonewithknowledge;(B) The recordwas kept in the courseof a regularly conductedactivityofabusiness,organization,occupation,orcalling,whetherornotforprofit;
6Burrilldidnotobjecttotheadmissionoftherentalagreementasabusinessrecord.
7 AlthoughweapplyNevadacontract law in thiscase, the local lawof the forumgoverns theadmissibilityofevidence. SeeRestatement(Second)ofConflictofLaws§138;seealsoBeaulieuv.Beaulieu,265A.2d610,612(Me.1970);Holyokev.EstateofHolyoke,110Me.469,477,87A.40,45(Me. 1913). We therefore apply the Maine Rules of Evidence when determining whether thebusinessrecordsexceptionappliestotheattachmentstotheaffidavit.
10
(C)Makingtherecordwasaregularpracticeofthatactivity;(D) All these conditions are shown by the testimony of thecustodian or another qualifiedwitness, or by a certification thatcomplies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12) or with a statutepermittingcertification;and(E) Neither the source of information nor the method orcircumstancesofpreparationindicatealackoftrustworthiness.[¶17] Here, the affiant sought to certify the business records by
affidavit pursuant to Rules 803(6)(D) and 902(11). “[S]ubdivision 11 of
Rule902 makes it possible to lay the foundation for domestic business
records without the need to call a live witness.”8 Field & Murray, Maine
Evidence§902.11at554(6thed.2007).
[¶18] Aperson certifying the records pursuant toRule902(11)must
stillbeaqualifiedwitness,however. SeeM.R.Evid.803(6),902(11). Aswe
have previously explained, “[a] qualifiedwitness is onewhowas intimately
8 M.R.Evid.902(11)requires thatthepartyseeking tocertifybusinessrecords inaccordance
withtherulemust,beforethetrialorhearing,providetheadversepartywithreasonablewrittennotice of the intent to offer the record andmustmake the record and certification available forinspection. Thepurposeofthenoticerequirementistoensurethattheadverseparty“hasafairopportunity to object to the authenticity of the record or on the basis of hearsay.” SeeM.R.Evid.902(11).Thereisnoindicationintherecordwhethernoticewasprovided,butattheoutsetof thehearing,BurrillappearedtohavebeenawareofAvis’splantouse theaffidavitasproofofdamages.NeitheratthehearingortoushasBurrillobjectedtotheaffidavitbasedonlackofnoticepursuanttoM.R.902(11);hisobjectionswereandaretotheattachmentstotheaffidavit.Theruleprovides that, “[i]n the event of an adverse party’s objection to a record offered under thisparagraph, the courtmay in the interests of justice refuse to accept the certification under thisparagraphand require thepartyoffering the record toprovide appropriate foundationbyotherevidence.”M.R.Evid.902(11).Thecourtdidnotdosoatthehearing,andonappeal,Burrilldoesnotchallengethecourt’sfailuretodoso.
11
involvedinthedailyoperationofthebusinessandwhosetestimonyshowed
thefirsthandnatureofhisknowledge”butwho“neednotbeanemployeeof
the record’s creator.” Estate of Quint, 2017 ME 237, ¶ 15, 176 A.3d 717
(quotationmarksomitted). Whererecordsarecreatedbyonebusiness and
then transmitted toanother, therecordswillbeadmissiblepursuant toM.R.
Evid.803(6) “if the foundational evidence from the receiving entity’s
employee is adequate to demonstrate that the employee had sufficient
knowledgeofbothbusinesses’regularpracticestodemonstratethereliability
andtrustworthinessoftheinformation.”BeneficialMe.Inc.v.Carter,2011ME
77, ¶13, 25 A.3d 96. In order to satisfy the requirements for the business
records exception in the circumstances of this case, the witness must
demonstrateknowledgethat
• theproduceroftherecordatissueemployedregularbusinesspractices for creating andmaintaining the records that weresufficiently accepted by the receiving business to allowrelianceontherecordsbythereceivingbusiness;
• theproduceroftherecordatissueemployedregularbusinesspracticesfortransmittingthemtothereceivingbusiness;
• by manual or electronic processes, the receiving businessintegrated the records into its own records and maintainedthemthroughregularbusinessprocesses;
• therecordatissuewas,infact,amongthereceivingbusiness’sownrecords;and
12
• thereceivingbusinessreliedontheserecordsinitsday-to-dayoperations.
EstateofQuint,2017ME237,¶16,176A.3d717(quotationmarksomitted).
[¶19]Here,thecertificationoftheAvisrepresentativefailedtoprovide
the foundational predicate necessary for admission in evidence of the
attachedvehiclevaluationreport.SeeDeutscheBankNat’lTrustCo.v.Eddins,
2018 ME 47, ¶13, 182 A.3d 1241. The affiant certified that the vehicle
valuationreportwas(1)abusinessrecordkeptwithinAvis’sclaimfileforthe
incident; (2)maintained aspartofher duties as a claimsexaminer forAvis;
(3) kept in the regular course of Avis’sbusiness and as part of its regularly
conducted activity; and (4) made reasonably soon after the incident.
However,becausetheaffiantdidnotcertifythatshehadanyknowledgeofJ.D.
PowerandAssociates’s regularbusinesspractices,she failed to layaproper
foundation for the reportpursuant toRule803(6), and the court abused its
discretion by admitting the document in evidence. See id.¶14. For these
same reasons, the affiant failed to lay a proper foundation for the towing
invoiceandsalvageproceedsdocumentation9aswell.10
9AsBurrillpointsout,evenifthesalvageproceedsdocumentationwereadmissible,thatrecord
ismeaninglesswithoutthemarketvalueofthevehicleprovidedinthevehiclevaluationreport.
13
[¶20] Further, the affidavit was used to accomplish more than is
contemplated by Rule 902(11). In addition to Avis’s attempt to lay the
foundationfortheadmissionoftheattachmentspursuanttoRule803(6),the
affidavitset forth thebasis forotherportionsof thedamagesawardaswell.
Notonlydid the affiantprovide theamountallegedlydue for thedamage to
the vehicle itself and the towing fee, she also listed a loss-of-use fee of
$1,238.79, title and license fees in the amount of $101.80, and an
administrativefeeof$150.00.Althoughtherentalagreementstatedthatthe
signatorytotheagreementwouldberequiredtopayforsuchfeesintheevent
ofdamagetothevehicle,noneoftheotherattachmentspurportedtoprovide
a basis for the specific amounts of those fees. A certification submitted
pursuanttoRule902(11)canonlylaythefoundationforabusinessrecord;it
is not a device to provide a basis for damages that are not included in the
attachedbusinessrecords.11 SeeField&Murray,MaineEvidence§902.11at
10 Theaffiantproperlycertifiedtherentalagreement,however. Therentalagreement,unlike
the vehicle valuation report, the towing invoice, and the salvage proceeds documentation, waspreparedbyAvisandmeets the requirementsofRules803(6)and902(11). Because itwasnotprepared by a third party and because the affiant laid the proper foundation pursuant to Rule902(11), the rental agreementwouldbe admissible. Although the rental agreement informs thesignatoryofthetypesoffeesandcostsheorshewillincurintheeventofdamagetoorlossofthevehicle, it does not provide the specific amountsof those fees and costs. The rental agreementalonethereforecannotprovideabasisforthedamagesawardsoughtbyAvis.
11 Therefore,paragraphs3and4oftheaffidavit—whichprovidethetotalamountofdamagessufferedbyAvisandalistoffeesandcoststhatcomprisethattotal—arenotcertificationspursuanttoRule902(11)andarethusinadmissiblehearsay.SeeM.R.Evid.801(c),802.
14
554. Because Avis presented no admissible evidence12 as to the amount of
damages,itfailedtoproveitwasentitledtothedamagesawardedtoit.
[¶21] According to Nevada contract law, when a plaintiff has
established liability on behalf of the defendant in a claim for breach of
contractbuthas failed to provideproof for the specific amountofdamages,
theplaintiffisentitledonlytonominaldamages.13SeeGramanzv.T-Shirts&
Souvenirs, 894 P.2d 342, 347 (Nev. 1995); Commercial Cabinet Co. v. Mort
Wallin of Lake Tahoe, 737P.2d 515, 517 (Nev. 1987) (explaining that “[a]
plaintiffwhoprovesarighttodamageswithoutprovingtheamountaswellis
only entitled tonominaldamages”);Richardson, 1Nev. at408.BecauseAvis
established liability on behalf of Burrill but failed to prove the amount of
actual damages, we vacate the court’s award of damages and remand with
instructionsforthecourttoawardAvisnominaldamagesinaccordancewith
Nevada law. Further, given that Avis will be entitled to an award of only
12Avisalsoofferedarepairestimateattheconclusionofthedamageshearing“ifthefairmarket
value report were to be rejected.” The repair estimate, like the fair market value report, wasprepared by a third party. There was no reference to the repair estimate in the affidavit ofdamages,nordidanAvisrepresentativetestifytoanypersonalknowledgeofthebusinesspracticesofthecompanythatpreparedtherepairestimate.Therefore,therepairestimatewouldlikelyhavebeen inadmissible hearsay as well. See Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Eddins, 2018 ME 47,¶14,182A.3d1241.
13 Nominaldamagesaredefinedas “[a] triflingsum”andare“awarded for the infractionofalegal right,where theextentofthe loss isnotshown.” NominalDamages,Black’sLawDictionary(10thed.2014)(quotationmarksomitted).“Theobtainingofnominaldamageswillalso,inmanycases,entitleaplaintifftocosts.”Id.(quotationmarksomitted).
15
nominaldamages,wevacate the awardof attorney fees toAvis to allow the
courtonremandtodeterminewhetherandtowhatextentattorneyfeesare
properinthiscasepursuanttotherentalagreement.
[¶22] Finally, we reach the issue raised in Avis’s cross-appeal of
whether the court erredwhen it failed to award it interest pursuant to the
expresstermsoftherentalagreement.BecauseNevadacontractlawapplies
inthiscase,Nevadalawalsogovernstherecoveryofinterest.SeeRoc-Century
Assocs.v.Giunta,665A.2d220,221(Me.1995);seealsoRestatement(Second)
of Conflict of Laws § 207 & cmt. e (Am. Law Inst.1971). On remand, we
instruct the court to apply Nevada law to determine whether and to what
extentinterestshouldbeawardedtoAvis.
Theentryis:
Partial summary judgment affirmed. Awardofdamages vacated. Remanded for furtherproceedingsconsistentwiththisopinion.
ALEXANDER,J.,dissenting. [¶23]IconcurintheCourt’sholdingaffirmingthetrialcourt’sgrantof
partialsummaryjudgmentdeterminingthatDarronBurrillisliableforbreach
of contract as a result of his allowing an unauthorized driver to damage a
16
vehicle owned by Avis Rent a Car System, LLC. With liability decided, the
Courtrecognizes that therearenogenuine issuesofmaterial fact that there
was“someamountofdamageasaresultofthebreach.”Court’sOpinion¶14.
[¶24] The amount of damage, including some amounts that do not
appear to be disputed, is established by the affidavit submitted by the Avis
claims representative. The Court references M.R. Evid. 902(11) to suggest
that Avis may have given insufficient notice of its intention to rely on the
affidavit to prove a point without calling a live witness. Court’s Opinion
¶17n.8. As theCourt’s opinion recognizes,Aviswasprepared topresent a
live witness to support its damages evidence, but the live witness was,
erroneouslyinmyview,excludedbythetrialcourt.Court’sOpinion¶7.
[¶25] The Court approves the use of the affidavit, recognizing that,
pursuant to M.R. Evid. 902(11), it is possible to lay the foundation for
admission of a business record, M.R. Evid. 803(6), without a live witness.
Court’s Opinion ¶20. I respectfully dissent from that part of the Court’s
opinionholdingthatportionsoftheaffidavitandsupportingexhibitsprovided
bytheAvisclaimsrepresentative,whowasassignedtovaluetheclaimandbe
a custodian of the records related to the claim, do not qualify as business
17
recordspursuanttoM.R.Evid.803(6),andthusmaynotsupportawardofany
damagesinthismatter.
[¶26] “Business records are hearsay and therefore inadmissible
pursuanttoM.R.Evid.802unlesstheymeettherequirementsofthebusiness
recordsexceptioninM.R.Evid.803(6).”KeyBankNat’lAss’nv.EstateofQuint,
2017ME237,¶14,176A.3d717.Whenadmissionofevidenceasabusiness
record is challenged, we review the trial court’s foundational findings to
support admissibility for clear error and its ultimate determination of
admissibilityforanabuseofdiscretion. JPMorganChaseBank,N.A.v.Lowell,
2017ME32,¶8,156A.3d727;MidlandFundingLLCv.Walton,2017ME24,
¶18,155A.3d864.
[¶27]M.R.Evid.Rule803(6)authorizestheadmissibilityofabusiness
recordif
(A) The record was made at or near the time by—or frominformationtransmittedby—someonewithknowledge;(B) The recordwas kept in the courseof a regularly conductedactivityofabusiness,organization,occupation,orcalling,whetherornotforprofit;(C)Makingtherecordwasaregularpracticeofthatactivity;(D) All these conditions are shown by the testimony of thecustodian or another qualifiedwitness, or by a certification that
18
complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12) or with a statutepermittingcertification;and(E) Neither the source of information nor the method orcircumstancesofpreparationindicatealackoftrustworthiness.[¶28] The purpose of the business records exception is “to allow the
consideration of a business record, without requiring firsthand testimony
regarding the recorded facts, by supplying a witness whose knowledge of
businesspractices forproductionand retentionof the record is sufficient to
ensurethereliabilityandtrustworthinessoftherecord.”BeneficialMe.Inc.v.
Carter,2011ME77,¶12,25A.3d96. Important for thiscase, “[t]heaffiant
whose statements are offered to establish the admissibility of a business
record...neednotbeanemployeeoftherecord’screator.”Id.¶13.Thus,“if
the records,” in this case vehicle valuation records, “were received and
integrated into another business’s records and were relied upon in that
business’sday-to-dayoperations,anemployeeofthereceivingbusinessmay
beaqualifiedwitness.”Id.
[¶29] A qualified witness must demonstrate knowledge that the
producerof the recordused regularbusinesspractices to create the record;
the receiving business integrated the record into its own records and
maintained them through regular business processes; and the receiving
19
businessreliedon theserecords in itsday-to-dayoperation. See id.¶14. If
theaffiantdemonstratestherequisiteknowledge,recordscreatedbyanother
source,applying its regularbusinesspractice,willbeadmissiblepursuant to
M.R.Evid.803(6).Id.
[¶30] The Avis representative’s affidavit of damages bases its
informationonseveralsources, not just the J.D.Powerreport focusedonby
the Court. There is no dispute that the Avis representative assembled and
possessedthebusinessrecordsandthatshe,herself,calculatedthedamages
amountsassertedbyAvisandfoundbythetrialcourt.
[¶31]TheAvisrecordsincludeacopyofaninvoicefor$155fortowing
chargesincurredbyAvis. Acopyofthat invoiceis includedintheappendix.
Other than a generalized hearsay objection, there is no dispute indicated in
the record that the towing chargewas incurred, thatAviswasbilled for the
charge, that the bill was paid, or that the bill was made a part of Avis’s
business records in the regular course of Avis’s business. Accordingly, the
towing charge being part of Avis’s business records, therewas no apparent
basistoobjecttothetrialcourt’suseofthe$155towingchargeincalculating
thetotaldamagesamount.
20
[¶32] Therealsoappearstobenodisputeaboutthecalculationofthe
salvageproceedsforthevehicleintheamountof$6,905.
[¶33]Theprimarydisputerelatestothecalculationofthefairmarket
value of the vehicle at the time of the loss,which the claims representative
assertedwas$20,601.98.ThisclaimisbasedonaJ.D.Power/MitchellVehicle
ValuationReport attachedasExhibitB to theAvis representative’s affidavit.
This report demonstrates that it is based on a review of documentary
evidence, including vehicle valuations for comparable vehicles available for
saleintheLasVegasarea.ThesevaluationsaredrawnfromAutoTrader.com,
Cars.com and other sources, including dealer contacts. Most of the report
appears to reflect document-based reviews, necessary considering the very
fast time forpreparationof thevaluationreportprovided to theAvisclaims
representative.
[¶34] The trial court found that the Avis representative reasonably
relied on the J.D. Power report in reaching her conclusions regarding the
vehiclevaluationandthatthevehiclevaluationreportwasadmissibleaspart
of theAvis business records pursuant toM.R. 803(6) after finding that “the
Affidavit provide[d] a sufficient foundation for the reliability and
trustworthinessofthereport.”Thecourtbasedthatfindingonthefollowing
21
observations: thevehicle valuation reportwasmadewithin two daysof the
accident;preparingandmaintaining sucha reportwouldbe in theordinary
courseofbusinessforaclaimsrepresentativeatacar-rentalcompany,whose
jobit istocreateacompleteandreliablerecordofthedamagetoacar;and
nothing indicated that the report was prepared in an unusual or
untrustworthyway. The court also referenced the inclusion of J.D. Power’s
valuationmethodologyinthereport,whichthecourtfoundtobe“rigorously
objective and mathematical, and transparent about its sources of
information.”
[¶35] In reality it appears that thevaluation reportdamagesnumber
wasdeterminedlargelybysubtractingtheundisputedsalvageproceedsfrom
thevaluationsof comparablevehiclesoffered for sale in theLasVegas area,
identifiedbyaninternetreview.
[¶36]Burrillhasnotdemonstratedthatthetrialcourtclearlyerredin
its findings. TheAvis representative certified that the valuation reportwas
“prepared at the request of and on behalf of Avis” and that the reportwas
“keptwithintheclaimfileforthisincident;maintainedaspartof[her]duties
as a Claims Examiner for Avis; kept in the regular course of Avis’s business
andpartofitsregularlyconductedactivity;thatitwasmadeatorreasonably
22
soonaftertheincident;andthatthecopyisanexactduplicateoftheoriginal.”
Becausethetrialcourtdidnoterr,andbecausethevaluationreportfitswithin
this Court’s articulation of the purpose of the business records exception to
thehearsayrule, itwaswithinthecourt’sdiscretiontoadmittheaffidavit in
itsentirety.SeeMidlandFundingLLC,2017ME24,¶18,155A.3d864.
[¶37]Asthetrialcourtstated:“Avismaynotbeinthevehiclevaluation
business,butitscarrentalactivitiesrequirereliablemeansofvaluatingcars,”
especiallyininstanceswhereitsrentalcarssustaindamage.TheAvisclaims
examiner appropriately requested a third party in the vehicle valuation
businesstocreateareportonthevehicle’svaluationpriortodamagefroman
accident. Thereportwas“keptwithin theclaim file for [each] incident”and
“kept in the regular course of Avis’s business and part of its regularly
conductedactivity.”Althoughlitigationmaybepossibleinsomeinstancesof
damage to Avis’s rental cars, a vehicle valuation report commissioned
immediatelyafteravehiclehasbeendamagedcannotbeconsidered tohave
been“prepared inanticipationof litigation”byanadvocate in thesameway
thataforensicreportpreparedbyanexpertadvocatingforonepartywould
be.SeeStatev.Tomah,1999ME109,¶10,736A.2d1047.
23
[¶38] The Court’s application of the business records exception to
reject all of Avis’s claimed damages and direct an award of only nominal
damages disregards the damages not addressed in the J.D. Power report,
including the apparently undisputed $155 towing charge. Court’s Opinion
¶41. Thus, rather than nominal damages, damages of at least $155 are
established without regard to the propriety, or impropriety, of the claims
representative’sutilizingtheJ.D.Powerreportinmakinghercalculations.
[¶39] As to that report, the trial court correctly found that the Avis
representative properly utilized that valuation report, with its method of
calculation explicitly documented and based largely on documentary
informationavailableinbusinessrecords,vehiclevaluationreports,oronthe
internet through websites such as AutoTrader.com and Cars.com—material
thatappears toberegularlyandwidelyutilized incalculatingcarvaluations
andcarappraisalsintoday’sinternetage.
[¶40] Burrill does not challenge the amountofdamages awarded; he
only challenges the admission of the claims representative’s affidavit in its
entiretyasabasisfortheaward.Becausethetrialcourtdidnoterrorabuse
its discretion in determining that the affidavit and its attachments satisfied
M.R. Evid. 803(6), this Court should affirm the award of damages in the
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amountof$15,342.57,oralesseramountthatincludestheundisputedtowing
charge,and theundisputedsalvageproceedsdeducted fromthecomparable
vehiclevaluationbasedonapparentlyundisputeddocumentreviews.
[¶41]Burrillalsochallengesthecourt’sawardofattorneyfeestoAvis.
Hedoesnotchallenge theamountof theawardbutargues thatbecause this
Court should determine that the court erred in granting Avis’s motion for
partial summary judgment, it should also vacate the attorney fees award as
well.BecausethisCourtshouldaffirmthegrantofpartialsummaryjudgment
and the award of damages, it should also affirm the award of attorney fees.
See Estate of Gagnon, 2016 ME 129, ¶¶ 15-16, 147A.3d356. The rental
contractprovidedforattorneyfeesintheeventofabreach.Avissubmittedan
attorney fee affidavit outlining the charges. It was within the trial court’s
discretion to grant the attorney fees in the amount included in the attorney
feesaffidavit.
Walter F. McKee, Esq., and Henry E.M. Beck, Esq. (orally), McKee Law, P.A., Augusta, for appellant Darron Burrill Cheryl J. Cutliffe, Esq. (orally), Basham & Scott, LLC, Brunswick, for appellee Avis Rent A Car System, LLC Skowhegan District Court docket number CV-2015-152 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY
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