ASSESSING PARTY FRAGMENTATION
IN PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS
by
GARRETH L. CADA, B.S.
A THESIS
IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
Approved
Accepted
May, 1994
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION .
II. LITERATURE REVIEW .
Importance of Political
4£ .L 91./~7
v~ ?/!Jj':/
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v
. . Vll
1
6
Parties to Democracy . 8
Historical Origins of Political Parties and Party Systems . 9
Approaches to Studying Fragmentation . 24
No~s. 28
III. RESEARCH DESIGN . 29
Dependent Variable . 31
Aggregation Indices . 32
Hypothesis . 36
Notes. 42
IV. DATAANALYSIS. 43
Party System Fragmentation 44
Country by Country Analysis 49
.. 11
Synopsis of Findings .
Notes.
V. CONCLUSION .
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY .
APPENDIX: Irish and Canadian Election Results .
111
88
93
94
99
107
LIST OF TABLES
3.1 Aggregation Indices 1965-1973 37
4.1 Aggregation Indices 1977-1989 45
4.2 Combined Aggregation Indices 47
. IV
LIST OF FIGURES
3.1 Countries Studied . 40
4.1 Austrian Election Results 1965-1992 51
4.2 Belgian Election Results 1985-1992 54
4.3 Danish Election Results 1965-1992. 57
4.4 Finnish Election Results 1965-1992 59
4.5 French Election Results 1965-1988. 61
4.6 German Election Results 1965-1992 63
4.7 Icelandic Election Results 1965-1992 . 65
4.8 Indian Election Results 1965-1992 . 67
4.9 Israeli Election Results 1965-1992 . 69
4.10 Italian Election Results 1965-1992 . 71
4.11 Japanese Election Results 1965-1992 73
4.12 Luxembourg Election Results 1965-1992 75
4.13 Dutch Election Results 1965-1992 . 78
4.14 Norwegian Election Results 1965-1992 80
4.15 Swedish Election Results 1965-1992 82
4.16 Swiss Election Results 1965-1992 . 85
4.17 Turkish Election Results 1965-1992 87
A.l Abbreviations for Canada and Ireland . 109
v
Austria
FPO GAL . KPO . OVP SPO
Belgium
Agalev CVP . Ecolo . FDF 0
FN. PRL 0
PS. PSC . PVV . SP. Vlaams . vu
Denmark
CD. CrPP. CsPP. LIB PP. RLP . SDP . SPP .
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
POLITICAL PARTIES
Freedom Party of Austria The Green Alternative Communist Party of Austria Austrian People's Party Social-Democratic Party of Austria
Ecologist Party-- Dutch Speaking Christian Socialist Party-- Dutch Speaking Ecologist Party-- French Speaking French-speaking Democratic Front Front National Liberal Party-- French Speaking Socialist Party-- French Speaking Christian Socialist Party-- French Speaking Liberal Party-- Dutch Speaking Socialist Party-- Flemish Wing Flemish Nationalist Party People's Union
Center Democrats Christian People's Party Conservative People's Party Liberal Party Progress Party Radical Liberal Party Social Democratic Party Socialist People's Party
. . Vll
Finland
FCP . FCU . FRP . FSPD GU LPP . LWA. NCP . SwPP
France
FN. MRG PCF . PS. PS-affl RPR . UDF URC
Germany
CDU. csu . FDP . Grn/Est . Grn/Wst . PDS . RepP SPD .
Finnish Center Party Finnish Christian Union Finnish Rural Party Finnish Social Democratic Party Green Union Liberal People's Party Left-Wing Alliance National Coalition Party Swedish People's Party
National Front Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche French Communist Party Socialist Party Socialist Party affiliates Rassemblement pour la Republique
. . Union of the Democratic Front Right-wing Coalition
Christian Democratic Union Christian Social Union Free Democratic Party The Greens (West) Alliance 90/The Greens (East) Party of Democratic Socialism Republican Party Social Democratic Party
Vlll
Iceland
CitP . IP PA pp SDP . WA
India
AGP AIADMK BJP . CPI CPI-m DMK. IND/OTR JaKNC JNP . NOM. RSP . SJD TD
Israel
ADP . NRP . PLfP . UTJ .
Citizen's party Independence Party People's Alliance Progressive Party Social Democratic Party Women's Alliance
Assam People's Council All-India Anna Dravidian Progress Movement Bhara tiya J ana ta Party Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (Marxists) Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Independents and Others Jammu and Kashmir National Conference J a nata Party Nominated to fill vacancy Revolutionary Socialist Party Samjwadi Janata Dal Telegu Desam
Arab Democratic Party National Religious Party Progressive List for Peace United Torah Judaism
. IX
Italy
FdV . LR/MD . LL/LN LP MSIDN . PDC . PdRC PDS PLI PRI PSDI . PSI sv
Japan
DSP . Ind. JCP JSP LDP . Prog .. SDF .
Luxembourg
CdA 5/6 DGA . GLEI. PCL . PCS . PD POSL.
Green Party The Network Northern League/Lombard League Supporters of Marco Pannella Italian Social Movement-National Right Christian Democratic Party Communist Re-establishment Party Democratic Party of the Left Liberal Party Republican Party Social Democratic Party Socialist Party South Tyrol People's Party
Democratic Socialist Party Independents Japanese Communist Party Japan Socialist Party Liberal-Democratic Party Progressive Party Social Democratic Federation
Five-sixths Action Committee Green Alternative Party Green List Ecological Initiative Communist Party Christian Socialist Party Democratic Party Socialist Workers' Party
X
Netherlands
CDA D'66 . GL GPV . LJ/C . PvdA. RPF . SGP VVD .
Norway
DnA . FfF FMS . FP. KrF . MdG . PP. SI. SP sv
Sweden
CP. FP. KdS . MpG. MS ND SDAP VP.
Christian Democratic Appeal Democrats 1966 Green Links Reformed Political Association Center Democrats Labor Party Evangelical Political Federation Political Reformed Party People's Party for Freedom and DemocracyNetherlands Liberal Party
Norwegian Labor Party Future for Finnmark Candidates for the Environment and Solidarity Progress Party Christian Democratic Party Green Environmental Party Pensioners' Party Stop Immigration Center Party Socialist Left Party
Center Party Liberal Party Christian Democratic Party Green Party Moderate Party New Democracy Social Democratic Labor Party Left Party
. XI
•
Switzerland
AP CDPP EPP . GPS . lA LP RDP . SDP . SPP . SwD WP
Turkey
ANAP DSP . DYP HEP . MCP . RP. SHP .
Automobile Party Christian-Democratic People's Party Evangelical People's Party Green Party of Switzerland Independent Alliance Liberal Party Radical-Democratic Party Social-Democratic Party Swiss People's Party Swiss Democrats Workers Party
Motherland Party Democratic Left Party True Path Party People's Labor Party Nationalist Labor Party Welfare Party Social Democratic Populist Party
. . xu
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In his 1966 study titled "The Transformation of the Western
European Party System," Otto Kirchheimer asserted that party systems
were evolving into a "catch-all model" (184). He argued that party
systems were undergoing a period of aggregation out of which fewer
parties would emerge, each with a greater proportion of the seats in the
legislature. Consistent with Lipset's (1964) end of ideology thesis,
Kirchheimer suggests that in the post World War II period political
parties became more interested in broad based support and immediate
electoral success versus effectiveness at the individual level. This change
in party focus was a result of the blurring of class lines and the perceived
declining salience of ideology in westernized democracies. In sum,
parties weakened their links with society and began to operate one level
removed. Unfortunately, Kirchheimer's assertion that party systems
were becoming more aggregated is highly impressionistic. In addition,
Kirchheimer does not offer any means by which to test his "catch-all"
thesis. Hence, as Dittrich (1987) concurs, it is problematic whether
Kirchheimer's model of aggregated party systems is valid. Therefore, it is
the intention of this study to examine the level of party system
aggregation within seventeen countries utilizing proportional
representation electoral systems.
Within this thesis it will be argued that party systems are not
aggregating, but conversely are fragmenting. Even when some parties
1
still maintain a majority status in their respective countries, that position
is no longer as secure as it once was. Increasingly, these parties are
finding themselves involved in coalition style governments and forced
into the unfamiliar position of making concessions in order to maintain
long-term governmental control. The downside of these concessions is a
decreased ability to pass ideologically consistent policies, a trait
associated with majority party status. Secondly, new parties are
emerging as the traditional parties are unable to address the dynamic
and varied array of new issues facing the government. Kirchheimer's
depiction of party systems is thus rendered insufficient as the assertions
his theory are based upon become dubious.
Kirchheimer initially suggests that ideology limited the scope of
party appeal and thus had to be shed in order for parties to maintain
power and attract greater numbers of supporters. Hence, in an effort to
achieve greater levels of support, parties become more centrist in nature
(when placed upon an ideological continuum). However, this approach
appears to have backfired for those parties which attempted it.
First, as parties became more centrist, their ideological stances on
issues became more opaque. In response to this, voters were unable to
draw distinctions between parties ideologically. Voters found themselves
de facto dealigned from the parties, or more assertively, alienated from
the parties. No longer feeling associated with these centrist parties,
voters were henceforth unwilling to support them: exactly the opposite of
what Kirchheimer asserts should have happened.
2
Second, in some European countries no party has ever emerged as
the majority party, a necessity before a catch-all party can emerge
according to Kirchheimer. Therefore, the following question must be
asked: if the premises upon which Kirchheimer frames his catch-all
party thesis cannot be found to exist, is it reasonable to expect that party
system aggregation has occurred?
The focus of this paper, therefore, concerns the aggregation of
party systems in westernized democracies. More specifically, are party
systems fragmenting or aggregating? It is my contention that party
systems are fragmenting. Though in some countries there still remain
majority parties, their influence is waning; no longer can such parties be
assured of sufficient votes to secure control of the government.
Increasingly, coalition governments are becoming the norm and not the
exception in European politics. While the 1950s and 1960s witnessed
increased levels of support for these "centrist" parties, it is not conclusive
if this is in response to the deideologization of the party. However, as
issue saliency changed and more controversial issues entered the policy
arena, e.g., legalization of narcotics, restricting immigration, and
maintaining a level of cultural distinctiveness, no longer could parties
afford to hedge their stances. Voters look to parties for cues, however, in
a catch-all system, parties are unable to lend these cues. Subsequently,
new parties must emerge that can address these issues and articulate the
interests of the voters; be these parties internal splinter groups from the
original parties, or be they external in origin.
3
While in some countries there exists a dominant party of one type
or another, overall it will be demonstrated that party systems are
fragmenting and greater numbers of parties are becoming active
members in government.
In order to examine whether party systems are fragmenting or
aggregating, some quantifiable measure is necessary. However, as
already mentioned, Kirchheimer himself does not assert an empirically
measurable method for assessing party system aggregation. Rae (1968)
and Mayer (1980) each addressed this short-coming in Kirchheimer's
treatise. Both studies employed a model utilizing parliamentary
representation as their basis for analysis. A question as to the validity of
only using such data arises, however, when considering Downs' (1957)
rational actor model. The same question is applicable when considering
electoral laws, i.e., minimum percentages of votes necessary to achieve
representation in parliament. In short, some parties which are garnering
electoral support may not necessarily be gaining representation in the
government. Accepting this assertion, any measurement of aggregation
solely utilizing the above methodology would be underreported. In order
to rectify such a problem data for the actual number of votes received by
each party needs to be analyzed in conjunction with any model
encompassing aggregate analysis.
When originally writing over a decade ago, Mayer and Rae were
able to make only speculations about the future aggregation of party
systems. With close to fifteen years of new data, speculation now can
give way to knowledge. Utilizing Mayer's aggregation index and
4
descriptive analysis of the popular vote for each country, this study tests
the hypothesis that party system aggregation has decreased from the
levels reported by Mayer in 1980. This thesis will show that aggregation
has become fragmentation. Moreover, this fragmentation of the party
system has increased in the last fifteen years. The breakdown of party
system aggregation will be shown to have taken place in two waves. The
first wave was characterized by the growth of parties espousing concern
for such issues as the environment and social justice-- what have come to
be known as post-materialist values (Inglehart 1977; Mtiller-Rommel
1989). The second (and present) wave is characterized by the emergence
of parties concerned with protecting cultural homogeneity or
geographical issues. These concerns have been classified as ethnological
(Krejci and Velimsky 1981).
When studying the relative aggregation or fragmentation of party
systems, it is apparent that two dimensions of party systems are being
addressed: first, the number and relative size of each party within the
system; second, the ideological basis of each party's appeal. By
ideological appeal it is meant where these parties place themselves on a
left-right continuum. The relative size and number of parties is
represented by the support each party receives from the general
electorate. In the chapters that follow the analysis will focus upon these
two dimensions of party systems.
5
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
With the emergence of mass liberal democracy, i.e., a shift in power
away from the elites, political parties became the locus in the struggle for
governmental control. As Milnor (1969, p. 5) states, "It was the emergence
of mass democracy that both allowed and necessitated the development of
the highly sophisticated structures we today call political parties."
Moreover, Macridis (1967, p. 1) added, "It is generally taken as axiomatic
that no political system can exist without political parties." Concomitant
with the shift in power from the elites to the parties was the development of
party systems: arenas in which the parties interacted and competed for the
control of the government.
Throughout the years, political parties and party systems have
undergone numerous transformations. Mair (1990) recognizes three distinct
periods. During the first period, party systems were characterized by the
existence of mass parties or mass parties of integration (Weber 1946;
Duverger 1954). The second period is distinguished vis-a-vis the catch-all
party model (Kirchheimer 1966). Synonymous with the rise of catch-all
parties was a period of party system stability (Sartori 1968; Daalder 1966;
Rokkan 1977). At the present time, party systems are considered to be
experiencing a breakdown of the catch-all party model, or what scholars are
terming the destabilization of the catch-all party system (Dalton and
Flanagan 1990; Mair and Smith 1990; Mair 1990; Wolinetz 1990; Lijphart
1981; lnglehart 1977).
6
Before continuing it is prudent, as well as necessary, to distinguish
between a party system change and a party change. A party change is any
transformation that occurs intraparty. A party simply altering its name
would be an example of a party change. A party system change, on the other
hand, is any shift in the rules of governing whereby the number of parties,
their relative size, and the ideological distance which separates them shift.
In other words, a change whereby the defining properties of that system are
transformed. Mair (1990, p. 129) states, "A party system changes when that
which is transformed is of systemic relevance, thus necessitating are
classification of that system." An example of such a change would be the
emergence of a third or fourth party into government in a country long
dominated by only two parties.
Destabilization within the party system is important for a variety of
reasons. Typified by a fragmentation of the party system, destabilization of
the party system it has been suggested, relates to dealignment and cabinet
instability (Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984; Mayer 1980; Taylor and
Herman 1971). Concomitant with threatening cabinet stability, is the effect
of fragmentation upon the ability to govern in countries utilizing
parliamentary governmental models, i.e., loosely defined: democracy.
Bille (1990) argues that party system fragmentation strains
democracy by making interparty cooperation difficult, if not impossible. In
other words, as party systems fragment party strength increasingly
decreases and countries come under rule by minority governments. Thus,
fragmentation necessitates coalition style governments-- governments of
compromise and cooperation. However, coalition governments are
7
constantly under attack from bi-polar opposition, i.e., opposition from both
inside and outside of the coalition. In the worst-case scenario coalition '
governments find themselves unable to mount significant challenges to the
current paradigms or implement drastic policy changes in fear of disrupting
the coalition; government becomes paralyzed. This paralysis leads to the
exact outcome that these parties initially were trying to avoid by not passing
drastic policy initiatives: a crisis of legitimacy and the possible failure of the
government.
Given the above assertions, if party systems are fragmenting and as a
result stable mass-led democratic government is becoming a problematic
occurrence, then the validity of party democracy at the aggregate level is
questionable. This would appear to contradict Milnor's and Macridis'
statements regarding the emergence of parties. To fully assess this query, it
is necessary to explore the historical origins of parties and their importance
to democracy.
Importance of Political Parties to Democracy
Political parties are the sine quo non of any mass participatory
democracy. As suffrage was extended, the need to coordinate and organize
voters became necessary (Milnor 1969; LaPalombara and Weiner 1966;
Duverger 1954). The necessity for an agent to act as an intermediary
between the government and the citizenry arose: this agent was the political
party. It is vis-a-vis this function of linking the individual to the system that
political efficacy is created and the system gains legitimacy. As Wildenmann
(1986, p. 6) notes, "party government is the crucial agency of institutional
8
legitimacy." In other words, without political parties the survival of mass
led participatory democracy itself is questionable.
Concomitant with institutional legitimacy vis-a-vis the at large
populace, parties are important to democracy in that they are the vehicles by
which "democratic ideals" are carried out (Macridis 1967). It is the political
parties that nominate candidates that run in regular competitive elections.
It is the political parties that hold each other accountable for policies and
programs. It is the political parties that call for elections in some European
countries. In sum, without political parties, the core tenets of mass led
democratic could not be realized.
Historical Origins of Political Parties and Party Systems
Accepting the operational definition of parties as the list of functions
described above, political parties have primarily come into existence in only
the last century (LaPalombara and Weiner 1966). To assert otherwise fails
to take into account the function of parties as the mobilizing force between
the individual and the political system described by King and Macridis.
Furthermore, as explained by LaPalombara and Weiner (p. 9), "The real
impetus for the creation of some form of party organization at the local level
in the West is generally thought to be the extension of the suffrage."
In most westernized democratic countries, political parties formed in
response to either internal or external events. The formation of parties in
response to internal patterns highlights most of the European countries
studied here. An internally created political party is one that emerges
gradually from the activities of the legislators themselves in an attempt to
9
maintain power. Returning to the above statement by LaPalombara and
Weiner, as suffrage was extended, the ruling elites understood that it was
necessary to woo the masses if they wished to remain in power; as such,
these elites formed local election committees in order to enfranchise the
masses into supporting their party. In other words, the struggle for political
power which was once limited to the aristocracies and small groups of elites,
became of central concern and involved all segments of the populace. The
United Kingdom serves as an excellent example of internal factors
influencing the emergence of political parties. When looking at the electoral
reforms of 1832, 1867, and 1894, the formation and transformation of
political parties can be found to mirror these legislative shifts.
External patterns of party formation began to occur near the end of
the nineteenth century. Duverger (1955) associates this period with the
growth of anti-parliamentary parties. Prior to this time, it had been argued
that political parties emerged as a means by which elites gained support for
government. However, in this time period, the impetus for organization
comes from sources other than the representatives in parliament. Macridis
(1967, p. 12) posits:
... from persons who are not only uninterested in Parliament, but who desire to stay out of Parliament and even to do away with it. Their [political parties] appeal is directed to a specific class-- mostly to the
working class. . . . Membership is widely solicited and a member pays dues, participates, agitates, and activates. The party emerges as a disciplined movement with a vision and mass support.
LaPalombara and Weiner (1966, p. 10) described the emergence of parties
external the system as follows:
10
Externally created parties are those that emerge outside the legislature and invariably involve some challenges to the ruling group and a demand for representation. Such parties are more recent phenomena; they are invariably associated with an expanded suffrage, strongly articulated secular or religious ideologies, and, in most of the developing areas, nationalistic and anti-colonial movements. Such parties may receive their original impetus from such varied sources as trade unions, cooperatives, university students, intellectuals, religious organizations, veteran associations, and so on.
Parties that have their roots external to the political system tend to be
characterized by greater ideological cohesion and discipline among the
members than parties created internally. Moreover, and largely as a result
of the means by which they arose, externally created parties, frequently have
not developed in the existing political order and institutions. This being the
case, these types of parties can strain the system and bring about a crisis of
legitimacy or at least introduce an amount of chaos into the party system.
Mass Integration Parties
The primordial relatives of contemporary mass parties, cadre parties
and caucuses, offered segments of the mass electorate their first venue for
"meaningful" political participation. Caucuses were the archaic form of the
political party structure. However, due to the existence of property
requirements to voting, cadre parties only gave the pretense of enrolling the
mass populace as active participants in the electoral system. Not until
suffrage truly became universal was the establishment of mass parties
possible.
11
Rising out of the framework of cadre parties and parties of individual
representation, parties of integration gained a foothold in the post World
War I electorate through the espousal of socialist norms and ideals. Parties
of integration were often chided for their attempt at appealing to all
segments of the populace. Sigmund Newmann (1956, p. 396) described this
as:
Their [mass parties] organization has been jokingly characterized as extending from the cradle to the grave, from the workers' infant-care association to the atheists' cremation society.
When looking at mass parties circumspectly, though, one can see the
beginnings of a catch-all type system, i.e., as parties try to incorporate
greater numbers of voters within their ranks, they must become more
centrist in nature (a core tenet of catch-all party status). Furthermore, mass
parties served an important role in the system in that by being composed of
individuals who normally eschew the political system, demands are placed
upon the system for things which initially were not part of the role of
government, e.g., issues of social justice and socio-economic inequality. In
other words, the rise of mass parties is congruent with the rise of the
modern welfare state.
Over time, however, the state slowly took on the role of social
adjudicator. Concomitant with the state's acceptance of this role was the
expansion of the welfare state. This attempt at egalitarianism on behalf of
the state, while in theory beneficial to the population, was detrimental to
mass integration parties. In other words, the state slowly co-opted the
platforms and functions carried out by mass integration parties.
12
Catch-All Parties
In an attempt to limit their decline, mass parties of integration shed
no longer relevant ideological baggage. This deideologization gave rise to a
party system in which parties turned more fully to the electoral scene.
parties abandoned attempts at the intellectual and moral encadrement of the
masses, trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and
more immediate success.
Given the above scenario in congruence with Lipset's (1963) end of
ideology thesis, catch-all parties began to emerge onto the electoral arena.
Otto Kirchheimer (1966, p. 179) stated:
Following the Second World War, the old-style bourgeois party of individual representation became the exception. . . . By the same token, the mass integration party, product of an age with harder class lines and more sharply protruding denominational structures, is transforming itself into a catch-all "people's" party. Abandoning attempts at the intellectual and moral encadrement of the masses, it is turning more fully to the electoral scene, trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate electoral success.
This shift of focus was an attempt by the major parties in a system to move
beyond their original clientele and include new clienteles within the party
system.
The Kirchheimer thesis is bound by a set of parameters. First catch
all parties reflect the existence of competition in a party system. Second,
only major parties can become successful catch-all parties. Kirchheimer
(1966, p. 187) concluded:
13
A small, strictly regional party such as the South Tyrol ian People's Party; nor a party built around the espousal of harsh limited claims, such as the German Refugees; or a specific professional category's claims, such as the Swedish Agrarians; or a limited action program, such as the Danish single-tax Justice Party can aspire to a catch-all performance.
Third, catch-all status is not sought among the majority of larger parties in
small democracies, e.g., Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.
Kirchheimer continues his discussion of catch-all parties by listing
five consequences or characteristics of catch-all parties: (1) a drastic
reduction of the party's ideological baggage; (2) a further strengthening of
top leadership groups whose actions and omissions are now judged from the
viewpoint of their contribution to the efficiency of the entire social system
rather than identification with the goals of their particular organization; (3)
a downgrading of the role of the individual party member (the opposite of
the role of the individual in parties of individual representation), due to its
being considered a historic relic; ( 4) de-emphasis of the classe gardee, specific
social-class or denominational clientele, in favor of recruiting voters among
the population at large; and (5) securing access to a variety of interest
groups. Mair (1990, p. 6) suggests:
Kirchheimer depicts a party which has sundered its close links with the mass electorate and has become essentially remote from the everyday life of the citizen ... (in essence) the catch-all party is an organizational phenomenon.
Wolinetz (1979) broke these five points down into a series of
postulates, which are summarized here: (1) voters in affluent consumer
societies are now less motivated by ideology than before; (2) parties have
14
recognized this change; (3) the party response has been to de-emphasizes
ideology and to search for issues and themes that can appeal to the
electorate as a whole rather than to specific groups or classes; (4) these
changes alter the relationship between a party and its supporters; (5) when
one catch-all party succeeds, others imitate it, thus realigning the party
system as a whole.
Turning attention away from the definition of catch-all parties, two
points require further elucidation, first, how did catch-all parties come into
existence, and more importantly, what do they mean for the future of
democracy? Mair (1990) concludes three areas of change that have
expedited the growth of catch-all party systems. First, institutional changes
such as public financing of political parties and the technological growth of
the media occurred. These changes allowed parties to appeal directly to the
voters instead of through traditional organizational structures. Moreover,
given the exponential growth in the electronic media, these parties no longer
had to spend time preparing newspapers and information bulletins.
Second, social change occurred whereby the electorate became more
knowledgeable, well-informed, and competent: Allardt's (1968) cognitive
mobilization thesis. Mair (1990) suggests the cognitive mobilization thesis,
taken in accordance with the increased atomization of society, has
undermined the sense of collective solidarity present in mass integration
parties. Third, and what may seem a bit far-fetched, in addressing the work
of Pizzorno (1981), Mair (1990, p. 10) posits the possibility that social
scientist have been, "approaching the problem from the wrong end." In
15
short, Mair claims posthumously that catch-all parties are the norm and not
the exception in party systems
The formation of the catch-all party was looked upon with deep regret
by scholars (Dittrich 1987; Kirchheimer 1966; LaPalombara 1966). Dittrich
(1987, p. 257) notes, "He [Kirchheimer] expressed dismay at the emergence
of the catch-all party." Kirchheimer (1966, p. 200) himself stated, " ... we
may yet come to regret the passing-- even if it was inevitable-- of the class
mass party and the denominational party, as we already regret the passing
of other features in yesterday's stage of Western civilization." Hence, the
meaning of LaPalombara (1966, p. 6) becomes quite clear when he stated, "it
is abundantly clear that those who write about ideology's decline, with few
exceptions, intend a pejorative denotation and consideration of the term." In
sum, the genesis of catch-all parties is not parallel with the tenets of mass
based democracy. It is not clear, however, in which direction these scholars
were suggesting party systems would turn, i.e., become strong one-party
authoritarian states, or voters would become totally dealigned from the
system and no longer participate (thus posing the question of a crisis of
legitimacy). One normative conclusion, though, is that the formation of
catch-all parties will have or has had dour consequences for party based
democracy. As has been stated, catch-all parties weaken their links to
society and operate at one level removed. Voters, sensing this shift shed
their partisan beliefs and begin to make choices based upon factors other
then party identification. In short, as Mair (1990, p. 184) suggests, "their
[voters'] horizons widened, their options increased, and in general, they
became more volatile." Accordingly, this increased voter volatility brings
16
about a decline in voter predictability-- a system attribute synonymous with
stability. Hence, the possibility exists that a crisis of legitimacy for
democracy will arise.
Before asserting a dour chord for party-based democracy, however, the
success or failure of the catch-all thesis should be empirically tested. This is
a difficult proposition, though. As Mayer (1980, p. 516) recognized:
Kirchheimer does not assert a statistically measurable party system aggregation as a general principle, even in western democracies. Rather he confines himself to an assertion of a tendency of unspecified scope buttressed by the discussion of a few illustrative examples. It is one of those impressionistic claims impossible to falsify in any definitive sense.
Dittrich (1987) attempted such a study and found no significant evidence to
support the claim that party system were indeed aggregating. It is
important to note, that Dittrich does not measure party system aggregation.
Rather, he provides a limited set of case studies. Findings such as these
lend support for the traditional Rokkanian tenets of the "frozen" cleavage
structure (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1070). Further analysis of
Kirchheimer's thesis can be accomplished using the five summary points
presented on pages 14-15.
Addressing the first point, if ideology is in decline, it is expected that
voters and parties are no longer as strongly linked as they once were. If this
is the case, then a greater percentage of the electorate should classify itself
as independent. However, reaching such a conclusion would require panel
and wave data from multiple elections. Lacking such data, the trends in
vote for individual parties can be studied, as exemplified by Rose and Urwin
17
(1970) and Maguire (1987). We can also study changes in the
fractionalization index (Rae 1968; Wolinetz 1979; Mayer 1980).
Further, while it has been suggested that voters have become less
concerned with "old" ideologies than before, this does not preclude the
emergence of "new" ideologies. 1 As Dittrich (1987, p. 260) concludes:
Though possibly not comparable with the "old" ideologies, these new phenomena may also involve a coherent and consistent set of ideas capable of guiding political behavior and, perhaps, of leading to the creation of new parties.
Lastly, if catch-all parties are emerging, the electorates of the parties
should more closely resemble each other in that they will appeal to a greater
array of voters; in sum taking on a more heterogeneous nature. It was
exactly this thesis that Rose and Urwin tested in 1969. They found,
however, only a few parties that could be classified as catch-all using this
methodology. Subsequently, Zuckerman and Lichbach (1977) found
concurring results when applying the same scale to West Germany, Sweden,
and Great Britain. 2
The next point is a bit harder with which to contend. How is an
empirical analysis of a party's recognition of the motivation of voters to be
carried out? Besides the problems of surveying members, the question as to
causal order must be addressed. 3 As Sartori (1968, p. 23) so aptly noticed,
"there can be no customers without political entrepreneurs, just like there
cannot be political entrepreneurs without customers."
Next, what is meant by a "de-emphasis of ideology?" Himmelstrand
attempted to answer this question as early as 1970. The best he has so far
18
come up with, is that a de-emphasis of ideology is similar to a
"depoliticization" of the parties, which he defines as, " ... a transformation of
political ideologies into a set of more or less distinct administrative
technologies based upon a widespread consensus based upon what kind of
goals one should try to attain" (p. 65).
This notion of parties de-emphasizing ideology also assumes that
ideology is declining in relevance, something which has already been
suggested not to be occurring. Last, if parties are de-emphasizing ideology,
then an ostensible change should be noticeable in the types of goals parties
pursue as well as the rhetoric they embrace: a feat which stretches the
bounds of realism if attempted for more then one country.
The fundamental problem that must resolved when addressing
Wolinetz' fifth point, involves party systems. In short, dominant systems
may be more inclined towards catch-allism then systems with a high number
of parties. Furthermore, given that "catch-all" status is ideological by
definition, what about parties that maintain their level of support across
time while others lose or gain support? Could a party undergo a
transformation into a catch-all party and not lose or gain support?
Additionally, could not a party in becoming a catch-all party still remain
hostile towards other parties in the system? Finally, the fallacy that all
parties behave as vote-maximization parties must be addressed. Central to
the argument of catch-all status is the assertion that parties want to gain
hegemonic control of government. However, this negates a large portion of
the universe of parties discussed by Sartori (1976, p. 327), which includes,
19
"witness parties," "ideological parties," and "responsible parties," none of
which it can be said are trained on vote maximization.
Heretofore discussed, the existence of catch-all parties is problematic
at best. Mayer (1980) suggests just this point when discussing the
implications of party system fragmentation upon cabinet instability.
Furthermore, Wolinetz (1979) posited the same conclusions about catch-all
parties. Rose and Urwin (1970) also found no significant support for the
existence of catch-all parties when asserting heterogeneity as the
operationalization of the concept.
Party System Fragmentation
While it is now suggested that the emergence of catch -all parties is a
dubious prospect, party systems have been undergoing a transformation.
Electoral systems are becoming marred by increasing degrees of volatility
and undergoing (Ignazi 1992; Mair 1989a, 1989b, 1984; Dalton 1988;
Wolinetz 1988; Crew and Denver 1985; Dalton et al. 1984; Daalder and Mair
1983). Because of an increasing level of volatility, that does not appear to be
subsiding, intraparty conflict in the 1980s has pushed the party system into
a state of flux (Mair 1989b). Dalton (1988) has shown an accelerated
decomposition of established party ties. Moreover, the decline of party
identification, the number of party members and the degree of partisan
involvement all indicate that the previous enduring links between the
electorate and established parties are progressively fading (Mair 1984,
1989a; Reider 1989). Out of these party system changes are emerging new
20
parties and/or new political actors for the articulation and aggregation of
demands.
In the last twenty years, it seems clear that the linkage between
historically derived identity and contemporary political appeal is more likely
to be accorded those parties which emerged from the pre-industrial cleavage
structure, e.g., religious, territorial, or cultural divides. While these parties
have persisted, they appear to have achieved as much as they could have
expected. In short, the issues they were oriented towards for the most part
have been addressed in the legislative arena. The prime examples of this
being the agrarian parties becoming more centrist in nature and the merger
of the denominational Christian parties into single political units in
response to the declining salience of issues addressing morality. It must be
noted, however, that outside of the 1993 election in Canada where the
Conservatives were completely removed from parliament, most of these
parties have continued on, only in an increasingly diminished role. Thus the
possibility exists for these parties to re-emerge as dominant in their
respective party systems. However, when looking at contemporary issue
cleavages and the policy initiatives being established by parliaments around
Europe, while the importance of traditional parties can be seen regarding
partisan predisposition, traditional identities bear little resemblance to
contemporary competitive appeals (Mair 1990).
In response to the foregoing discussion, it is suggested that parties are
fragmenting in response to a new issue dimension, i.e., a "new politics"
cleavage. The two dimensions of this scale being the "new right" and the
"new left." The "new right" is characterized by a shift in support from both
21
the old left and right towards a more authoritarian set of views· most '
ostensibly the rise of parties of cultural defense, i.e., parties primarily
concerned with passing legislation protecting and espousing cultural
distinctiveness and autonomy. The "new left" is marked by a shift of voters
from the old left and concerned with post-materialist values (Inglehart
1977). While a discussion of the "new left" and "new right" cleavage
structure would be germane at this point, due to the dynamic nature and
highly impressionistic nature of this cleavage structure, it would take
another thesis to discuss this concept.
Parties of Cultural Defense
The political parties that have been entering the system along the
"new right" cleavage tend towards a more authoritarian set of views. One
dimension of this cleavage involves parties of cultural defense. Drawing
upon the work of Krejci and Velimsky (1981) and Hall (1979) parties of
cultural defense are defined as, any political party that contends elections
upon the sole platform of protecting a unique linguistic, religious, or cultural
identity among its supporters. In order to protect the above unique values,
however, these parties have a tendency to reject imposed social and political
arrangements that place them in disadvantaged positions. In other words,
these groups attempt to seek autonomy from the state. Thus parties of
cultural defense are also defined vis-a-vis behavior oriented towards the
establishment of ethnic autonomy. Hall (1979, p. xxi) suggests, "Behavior
oriented to the establishment of ethnic autonomy may be regarded as a
22
collective effort to create political and social arrangements based on the
ethnic groups' own traditions, values, and Weltanschauungen."
Realignment and Dealignment as Party System Fragmentation
In conjunction with changing levels of support for old and new parties
is the question as to how much of this change is a realignment along the new
politics cleavage and how much is simply dealignment. Given the paucity of
empirical research, any claims would be highly problematic. However, on
face validity alone, any decline in support for the traditional parties in a
system is synonymous with a dealignment. Ostensibly any study of party
systems asserting shifting influence and interparty relations involves some
concept of realignment. Defined as "a durable and significant redistribution
of party support" (Campbell and Trilling 1980, p. 6), this suggests any stable
increase in party system fragmentation is representative of realignment. At
first blush, when discussing realignment in conjunction with fragmentation,
it might appear that a "sectoral" realignment is occurring, i.e., a
redistribution of power among already existing parties (Flanagan 1984).
However, when looking at the number of new parties that have entered
these systems and the dynamic nature of the social groups supporting these
emerging parties, fragmentation more closely mirrors an "ecological"
realignment (Flanagan 1984).
The theory of realignment, while initially designed for application to
studies of the American electorate, does have its uses with regards to
studying party systems in Europe. However, due to the plurality system
used in the United States, such dealignments and realignments are easier to
23
measure. While not the intention of this thesis to study realignment within
the European context, due to parties being formed along more pragmatic
lines, any study of realignment would necessitate the use of indirect
measures, i.e., fragmentation and fractionalization indices or measurements
of variance in party support over time.
Approaches to Studying Aggregation
Prior to 1980, while it had been suggested that party systems were not
aggregating, only of Rae (1968) and Mayer (1980) had attempted to measure
the validity of this claim. Rose and Urwin (1970) focused not on aggregation
per se as much as party volatility from election cycle to election cycle.
Pederson (1979) also concerned himself primarily with the variance in
support accorded the parties within a country between elections. Sartori's
(1976) oft cited one, two, and multiparty typology relied mostly upon formal
modeling. Extensive literature exists studying many aspects of party
systems. Rae (1971) focused on different electoral systems. Cabinet stability
was studied by Daalder (1971) and by Taylor and Herman (1971). The
viability of coalition governments was the focus of research by DeSwaan
(1973), Taylor and Laver (1973), and Franklin and Mackie (1978), . Until
recently, though (Smith and Mair 1990), at the national level studies on the
aggregation of party systems has been studied more in terms of realignment
and dealignment (Dalton et al. 1984).
24
Rae's Aggregation Index
Douglas Rae (1968) operationalizes party fractionalization in terms of
a continuous variable. While this avoids the pitfalls and simplicity of a
simple typology such as Sartori's, Rae makes no distinctions between the
fragmentation of the government and that of the opposition. As will be
addressed in the following chapter, this allows for the possibility of
erroneous findings.
Rae's formula turns on the summation of a simple probability function
measuring chance meetings between members of opposing parties. In other
words, his formula measures the antonym of fragmentation, i.e.,
aggregation. Moreover, Rae only incorporates the relative size of the parties
into his formula and does not consider the number of parties to be of major
importance; hence, parties with only a few representatives would fail to
register on Rae's index. Subsequently, as this study is interested in these
minor and emerging parties, Rae's index would not be a suitable measure for
assessing the suspected trend of increasing party system fragmentation. 4
Mayer's Aggregation Index
Writing in 1980, Mayer was concerned not only with party system
fragmentation, but with cabinet stability as well. Thus, his index is bi
dimensional and includes measurements for the number of parties in a
system and one measuring the relative strength of the largest party.
Through the incorporation of this second measurement, Mayer gains a check
for stability as well as a level of face validity over Rae. Accordingly, as
Mayer's index is concerned with both the relative size of the parties in the
25
legislature as well as the numbers of parties, his index is better able to
reflect an over time trend of increasing numbers of parties gaining
representation in parliaments. Additionally, the overall decline in support
for once dominant parties can be traced via Mayer's index. Mayer's index,
like Rae's, conceptualizes party system fragmentation as a continuous
variable running from aggregated to fragmented.
When originally written in 1980 Mayer based his assertion of party
fragmentation upon the theoretical position that ideology was still
important, that countries utilizing proportional representation electoral
systems were ideal for fostering fragmented party systems, the rise in
periphery parties of cultural defense, and the notion that the major parties
of the day were unable to adequately address the problems of society.
In the subsequent years, a plethora of studies citing new reasons has
emerged further justifying Mayer's original claim: a continuing dealignment
(Luther 1990; Machin 1990); a breakdown in the organizational structures of
parties (Deschouwer 1990; Bille 1990; Machin 1990); a decline in relevance
of the traditional roles and functions of parties (Mair 1990); an erosion of
the ideologies of the core parties and the concomitant configuration of
persisting ideologies (Deschouwer 190; Machin 1990; Tromp 1990); the rise
of linguistic cleavages (Deschouwer 1990); the rise of anti-party parties (Bille
1990); the rise in saliency of environmental and alternative lifestyle issues
(Roberts 1990; Muller-Rommel 1989); a rise in global unemployment (Luther
1990). Each of these transformations has become associated with
fragmentation and party system destabilization. Essentially, each of these
26
new issue arenas represents an inability on the part of the core parties
within a system to adapt.
In further support of Mayer's thesis is a growing body of literature on
party system change regarding the rise of ethno-political nations. Scholars
such as Mair and Smith (1990), Flanagan and Dalton (1984), and Krejci and
Velimsky have all concluded that a strong dealignment is occurring within
the electorate, and new parties based upon cultural and ethnic cleavages are
forming. As Luther (1990, p. 8) noted in his study on the Austrian party
system:
Reductions in the major parties' domination of the electoral arenas has been the subject of much comment in the recent literature on Austrian politics, where it has been explained as being a consequence of attitudinal change in the electorate, with a substantial and continuing decline in partisan attachment and in the capacity of socio-cultural variables to predict party choice.
The preceding chapter presented an extensive array of scholars who
agree that party systems are fragmenting. However, little agreement can be
found as how to best empirically test this phenomena. Having now laid the
groundwork, this study addresses the task of testing the proposition that
party systems are fragmenting as opposed to aggregating.
27
Notes
1The work of Inglehart (1977) on the materialist/post materialist cleavage, as well as that of Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck (1984) on the "new politics" dimension are examples of such research.
2In presenting these findings it would appear that the end of ideology in an impressionistic claim.
3The same question as to causal order must be asked when addressing the fourth point made by Wolinetz as well.
4Further methodological concerns will be addressed in Chapter III.
28
CHAPTER III
RESEARCH DESIGN
In their seminal empirical work addressing party systems and
governmental stability, Taylor and Herman (1971, p. 28) invoked the
political convention of A. Lawrence Lowell (1896), who posited that
governments based upon the parliamentary system must consist of, "two
parties, and two parties only ... in order that the parliamentary form of
government should permanently produce good results." By contrast, Arian
and Barnes (197 4) found a high level of stability in systems where there
existed a dominant party. The ensuing question which must be asked is how
many dominant party and/or highly aggregated party systems exist? A
related question is to what extent are party systems fragmented or
fragmenting?
Assuming that dominant party systems are frequent by-products of
developing countries where the combination of low levels of mobilization and
independence movements have resulted in parties that dominate the
political arena within the framework of democratic procedures, it is
plausible that one will not find a dominant party or two-party only, i.e.,
aggregated, system in present day advanced industrial democratic states.
Secondly, aggregated systems rely upon the ability of dominant parties to
avoid strict ideological stances; they [dominant parties] must be able to shift
and moderate views in accordance with maintaining a centrist position,
which Arian and Barnes (1971) cite as essential to maintaining a position of
dominance. This policy, however, is in direct opposition to those needs of
present day and emerging regional and single-issue parties, i.e., parties of
29
cultural defense. As Arian and Barns (1971, p. 597) conclude, "The
dominant party must adjust to changes in the society, and the greater the
fragmentation of the society the greater the difficulty it experiences in doing
so." This is due in part to the dominant party policy of differential
mobilization. What Arian and Barns (1971) describe as the propensity of
dominant parties to focus upon groups that make fewer demands than
others and will produce a greater political payoff with minimal effort.
Though the scope of this paper will not allow for an examination of the
dynamics of internal party policy, i.e., the process of differential
mobilization, general conclusions as to what groups are being excluded or co
opted can be drawn vis-a-vis descriptive analysis of the parties emerging on
the political scene and their roles in either the government or opposition.
In this study it is hypothesized that party systems are fragmenting. A
few random studies exist demonstrating a rise in fragmentation for
individual countries (Daalder's 1987 book which provides five such studies
for the Scandinavian countries is a prime example). Outside of Rae (1968)
and Mayer (1980), however, no scholar has tested system-wide for the
existence of party system aggregation (Wolinetz 1979 did a study
approximating that of Rae, but not as extensive). In addition to Daalder's
book, a growing body of literature (as discussed in Chapter II) demonstrating
a wide array of reasons (in addition to those initially discussed by Mayer) for
a suspected increase in party system fragmentation has come to light in the
recent years. These studies have concluded such things as a continuing
dealignment; a rise in global unemployment; a breakdown in the
organizational structures of parties; a decline in relevance of the traditional
30
roles and functions of parties; the rise of linguistic cleavages; and the rise in
saliency of environmental and alternative lifestyle issues to name a few ' '
have brought about a transformation in the party systems of countries that
has been associated with fragmentation.
It is asserted that party system fragmentation has increased over the
last twenty years. Questions remain, however, as to how much and in which
countries it is more prevalent. While not suggested in the literature, it does
not seem improbable to suspect that strong traditional two-party systems,
e.g., Great Britain, will undergo a lesser amount of fragmentation-- the 1993
elections in Canada and Japan, and the 1991 election in Sweden being three
obvious notable exceptions to this assertion.
Dependent Variable
Party systems will be measured as a continuous variable with
aggregation and fragmentation representing the two poles. Conceptually,
classification of systems as two-party and multiparty are too vague and are
unable to reliably group specific party systems where the similarities within
a category and differences between categories emerge as significant.
Leslie Lipson's (1953) often cited study provides an excellent example
in the difficulties encountered when trying to apply such a typology.
According to Lipson, for a system to be a two-party system it must meet the
following criteria: 1) not more than two parties at any one time have a
genuine chance to gain power; 2) one of these is able to win the requisite
majority to stay in office without help from a third party; 3) over a number
31
of decades, two parties alternate power (1953, p. 338). As Mayer (1980, p.
336) contends, however:
By this formula, Australia would not qualify as having a twoparty system. During most of the post-World War II era, Australia had been governed by an apparently indissoluble coalition of the Liberal and Country parties with the Labour party, holding a plurality, in opposition. It is unclear whether Lipson's phrase "gain power" encompasses participation in a governing coalition; nevertheless, Australia clearly did not meet his second criterion. yet it is manifestly clear that the Australian party system operates with greater similarity to the two-party model of Great Britain than to the multiparty models of the Third and Fourth French Republics. . . . Thus one must go through intellectual contortions to construct a definition of a two party system that will include those systems that essentially behave like the classic two-party model-- that is, where two stable and relatively cohesive forces alternate in and out of power.
A further contention with Lipson, Mayer notes, can be taken with regards to
his phrase "gain power." Canada, for example, a country which up until
1993 was controlled by one of two parties, has experienced periods of rule by
minority governments. Furthermore, in the recent election of 1993, three
parties had a realistic chance of becoming the legitimate opposition party.
Moreover, the Progressive Conservatives came in fifth place, and only
managed to retain two seats in parliament. To the point, is "gain power" a
term that applies only to the ruling party? Additionally, is majority status a
pre-requisite for "gaining power"? In Israel, for example, while governed by
a stable Labour coalition until 1977, it was not uncommon for minor parties
to join with the coalition and hence "gain power." Surely such parties do not
adhere to any of Lipson's three criteria. In sum, there are both conceptual
and operational difficulties with Lipson's term "gain power."
32
Additionally, the wide variance of systems represented by the term
multiparty renders the term absurd and virtually meaningless. Ostensibly,
the five party system present in 1986 West Germany is not the same as the
twenty-two party system found in the Netherlands in 1978, or the twenty
party system found in the Israeli parliament in 1986. Given these examples,
it makes more sense to conceptualize party systems as a continuous variable
that as a dichotomous typology.
Rae's Aggregation Index
Douglas Rae (1968) addresses party fractionalization vis-a-vis a
continuous variable. While this avoids the pitfalls and simplicity of a two
and multiparty categorization, he makes no distinction between the
fragmentation of the government and that of the opposition. This allows for
the possibility of erroneous findings. For example, using Rae's formula,
Israel measures a high level of fractionalization; however, due to the
dominance of the Labour party until 1977, Israel was afforded a high level of
stability. Additionally, if applying Rae's index to a study of India, which will
be discussed presently, a similar conclusion will be reached.
Rae's formula, which is nothing more than the summation of a simple
probability function of chance meetings between members of opposing
parties, measures the antonym of fragmentation, i.e., aggregation.
Furthermore, as it is only sensitive to the relative size of parties in the
legislature and not the number of parties, those parties with only a few
representatives in the legislature would fail to register on Rae's index.
Subsequently, as this study is interested in these minor and emerging
33
parties, Rae's index would not be a viable measure for assessing the
suspected trend of increasing party system fragmentation; in sum, Rae's
index actually underreports party system fragmentation.
Mayer's Aggregation Index
Writing in 1980, Mayer was concerned not only with party system
aggregation, but with cabinet stability as well. As such, his index includes
two dimensions, one measuring the number of parties in the system, and a
second measuring the relative strength of the largest party. As discussed
previously, the relative size of the majority needs to be accounted for in
order to assess cabinet stability and as a check for fractionalization. Errant
conclusions as to how aggregated a system is could arise if one was to study
only the number of parties. In India, for example, a great number of parties
are represented in government (in excess of twenty in some years), however,
before 1989, either the JNP or Congress party were always able to secure a
majority in the Lok Sabha and thereby able to govern effectively and
minimize instability. In this example, however, if only the number of parties
was studied, it would be concluded that India has a highly fractionalized
system. But, when taking into account the size of the largest party, it is
apparent that India is actually reasonably stable and only moderately
fragmented. A converse example of this being Switzerland, where a large
number of parties are represented in parliament, and where the perception
is of a stable and non-fragmented system; however, no single party has been
able to secure sufficient electoral support to accord it majority status and
govern outside of a coalition since before 1965.
34
Mayer calculated his index of party aggregation using the following
formula:
A = 100(8/L)/P.
Where A is the aggregation index, S is the number of seats held by the
largest party in the government coalition, Lis the total number of seats in
the lower house of the legislature, and P the number of parties holding at
least one seat in the lower house. The higher the score the more aggregated
the system (1980, pp. 338-339).
Mayer's index, like Rae's, conceptualizes party system aggregation as
a continuous variable running from aggregated to fragmented, which again
like Rae, avoids the pitfalls of the "oversimplified artificiality" of the two
and multiparty categorization. Mayer's index, however, gains a level of face
validity over Rae's by accounting for the size of the largest party in
government. Sweden provides a prime example of where the use of Rae's
index yields biased results. During the time period from 1955 through 1991,
Sweden was characterized by a relatively stable two-party dominant system.
Also during this entire period the SDP held continuous power. However,
Rae's index reports a moderate to approaching high level of fractionalization
as early as 1965 and 1973. Mayer's index on the other hand, shows a
relatively low level of fractionalization-- a finding more closely mirroring
reality when studying the Swedish electoral system over the last thirty
years. Accordingly, as Mayer's index is concerned with both the relative size
of the parties in the legislature as well as the numbers of parties, his index
is better able to reflect an over time trend of increasing numbers of parties
gaining representation in parliaments. Additionally, the overall decline in
35
hegemony for majority and dominant parties can be traced through the use
of Mayer's index, i.e., as party system fragmentation increases, hegemony of
the majority party decreases. Table 3.1, reporting Mayer's original findings
is presented here.
When originally written over a decade ago, Mayer's fragmentation
thesis for the most part appears to have been ignored. Apparently, the
possibility of the existence of structural instability that could lead to a crisis
in institutional legitimacy for westernized democracies was not the clarion
call comparative scholars envisioned during the heights of the Cold War. In
the past decade, however, many system-level changes have ensued:
governments have collapsed; countries have been born, reunited, or claimed
independence; and Communism (as practiced by the Soviet Bloc) has proven
ineffective, to name a few. Subsequently, the need has arisen to re-assess
the validity of Mayer's fragmentation thesis.
Hypothesis
Are party systems becoming more unstable? In order to answer this
question, this study tests the following hypothesis: (H1) party system
aggregation has decreased from the levels measured by Mayer in 1965 and
1973. It is expected that countries with electoral systems that allow for the
proliferation of political parties, i.e., countries with proportional
representation electoral systems, will subsequently experience a high level of
party system fragmentation. In keeping with Mayer's original thesis, this
36
Table 3.1: Aggregation Indices
COUNTRY 1965 1973
Austria 16.3 16.9 Belgium 7.4 3.9 Denmark 7.2 2.6
Finland 4.8 3.4 France 7.1 3.7 West Germany 16.4 15.4
Iceland 10.0 7.3 India 13.7 6.2
Israel 5.1 4.7
Italy 5.2 4.7
Japan 15.7 9.2
Luxembourg 10.2 9.4
Netherlands 3.3 2.4
Norway 7.5 4.8
Sweden 9.8 8.9
Switzerland 3.3 2.4
Turkey 8.9 5.1
MEAN 9.33 6.81
VARIANCE 20.17 18.13
T-VALUE* 1.73
* p < .05 Source: Mayer, Lawrence C. 1980. "A Note on the Aggregation of Party Systems," Western European Party Systems. Merkl (Ed). New York:
Free Press. p. 518.
37
study adopts his fragmentation equation as is; accordingly, the same set of
countries is also tested. The data consist of the number of parties holding at
least one seat in the lower house of their respective legislatures measured at
two points in time, 1977 and 1989.
Contemporary Analysis
While Mayer and Rae both address the aggregation of party systems,
they do it within the context of parties actually represented in the
parliament. However, in an era of ever increasing political complexity and
technological advancement, i.e., increased access to the media by fringe
political groups, aggregation may be overreported if only measured as a
function of parties represented within the government. Second legal
barriers restricting access to elected government may exist, e.g., the German
system requiring a party to achieve at least five percent of the popular vote
before they are granted representation in parliament and the British system
which has outlawed Sinn Fein altogether, or the Turkish system, which until
1991, required a party to receive ten percent of the popular vote before it
gained representation in parliament. Regional parties and parties of
cultural defense are most affected by laws such as these. Third, compromise
among elites can slow segmentation, as was the case in Belgium for a long
period of time (Deschouwer 1990). In reality however, these above
mentioned barriers to entry into the political system have and will only
serve to slow fragmentation of parties and the concomitant party systems.
In an effort to correct for these barriers, tables, charts and graphs will
be presented showing the percentage of the popular vote received by the
38
individual parties. Figures will also be presented detailing the number of
seats held by each party. These will be presented for those time periods
originally studied by Mayer in addition to those newly addressed by this
study. As will be shown a larger number of parties actually receive votes
then are represented in parliament, thus supporting the claim that party
system fragmentation is underreported. This brings to bear a possible area
for future research, i.e., a re-conceptualization of the formula for measuring
party fragmentation, one which includes some measure of the total number
of parties receiving votes or takes into account electoral laws. Such items
would probably need to be scaled or assigned arbitrary values; however, it is
obvious that any such scale would possess a high degree of normative value
judgment and subject to criticism.
The data are for the years 1965, 1973, and 1977 are from the
Encyclopedia Britannica Book of the Year. The data for the 1980s and
1990s are from The Europa World Yearbook 1993 and Political Parties of
the World, 3rd Edition. The data consist of the number of parties in each
country holding at least one seat in the lower houses of their respective
legislatures measured at two points in time. The countries studied are listed
in Figure 3.1. Fragmentation indices will be created for 1977 and 1989.
These indices will be interpreted in conjunction with Mayer's original
findings. The measure of fragmentation reported reflects that of the
national election closest in time but not occurring after 1977 or 1989. For
certain countries, a judgment regarding "other parties" and "independents"
had to be made. In these instances, if it could be corroborated by secondary
39
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France
West Germany Iceland India Israel
Figure 3.1: List of Countries Studied
40
Italy Japan Luxembourg Netherlands Norway
Sweden Switzerland Turkey
sources, "independents" were treated as single-member parties.
Additionally, where available, the exact number of parties was coded for
"other parties." Lastly, in countries where vacancies in parliament were
filled via governmental appointment, these individuals will be excluded from
the index. This is done in response to these individuals not having had to
demonstrate support from any one party in order to gain office, i.e., lacking
the information as to which parties these people are members of, it is not
possible to measure their impact upon fragmentation as operationalized. 1
The subsequent graphs and figures, while presenting data for all four
years under study, will also include data (where available) from the most
recent election, those held after 1989. Two sets of figures are presented, one
representing the actual number of seats held by each party in the
legislature, and a second set reporting the percentage of the popular vote
received by each party. The gaining level of importance for emerging parties
can be discerned more clearly from these figures, as well as the concomitant
declining support for the traditional parties. Moreover, inferences as to the
effects of electoral laws upon legislative systems can be drawn when
comparing the percentage of the popular vote received by each party. In
Italy in 1991, for example, La Rete/Movimento per la Democrazia (the anti
mafia party) only received 1.9% of the popular vote, this translated into
twelve seats in parliament. In Norway, however, the Venstre party which
received in excess of 3.0% of the popular vote, gained no representation in
parliament.
Having discussed the theoretical and operational groundwork of party
system fragmentation, attention is now focused on the findings.
41
Notes
1The only country where this methodology was necessary was India and only with data for the year 1991.
42
CHAPTER IV
DATA ANALYSIS
In this study the level and nature of party system aggregation is being
explored. A sample of seventeen democratic countries that have electoral
systems that allow for the proliferation of political parties are studied. The
data analysis will include data from 1965 through 1989. The data for 1965
and 1973 are taken from Mayer's original study and as listed in Table 3.1.
New data collected for the purpose of this thesis will be presented for the
years 1977 and 1989-- a few recent elections such as those held in Italy and
Israel in 1992, as well as the 1991 Swedish and Icelandic will also be
included. The inclusion of hese recent elections allows the conclusions to be
as currently valid as possible.
Where available the percentage of the popular vote received by each
party are provided to supplement the fragmentation indices. These figures
are extremely important to fully explore party system fragmentation in
countries with proportional representation systems and accordingly electoral
laws that prohibit representation unless a party receives greater then a
certain percentage of the national vote. In sum, this allows for the study of
regional parties, e.g., the Bloc Quebecois, the Volksunie and the
Francophones, in the seventeen countries.
The data analysis will consist of three sections. In the first section
the overall fragmentation indices for all the countries being studied will be
presented and discussed. In section two, case study analysis will be done on
the seventeen countries being studied. Part three will consist on an effort to
more fully decipher the level to which party systems are either aggregating
43
or fragmenting. Within these case studies such things as the types of parties
that are emerging and the ones that are losing support will be discussed.
Hopefully, this multi-level approach will give scholars a better
understanding of party system fragmentation, or at least fragmentation
within the countries studied here. Lastly, conclusions as to whether or not
these individual countries are undergoing a transformation so radical that it
will bring about cabinet instability and the subsequent failure of democratic
government can be drawn.
Party System Fragmentation
Table 4.1 shows the aggregation indices for the years 1977 and 1889.
In fifteen of the seventeen countries studied the aggregation index decreased
between the two time periods (symbolic of an increase in party system
fragmentation). In agreement with the conclusion reached by Mayer (1980,
p. 5127), these results, "seem to refute any reasonable interpretation of the
Kirchheimer thesis." The t-value of 6.290 is significant at p < .005. These
data also support Mayer's prognostication that fragmentation would be more
prevalent if studied for elections in the 1980s. These findings support the
conclusion that the countries of Europe are experiencing a period of party
system destabilization. In sum, party system fragmentation appears to be
the more normal trend instead of aggregation for the countries under study.
While only showing a 0.79 decline in the aggregate variance from
1973 to 1977, the variance dropped almost a full seven points between 1977
and 1989. Part of the lack of decline in variance for the data between 1973
44
Table 4.1: Aggregation Indices 1977-1989
COUNTRY 1977 1989
Austria 16.9 7.3 Belgium 6.3 1.8 Denmark 3.4 3.9
Finland 3.0 2.8 France 3.7 2.3 West Germany 8.6 7.5
Iceland 8.3 7.5 India 5.5 4.1 Israel 3.6 1.4
Italy 3.8 2.2 Japan 6.1 5.4 Luxembourg 6.1 5.2
Netherlands 3.2 3.3 Norway 8.1 5.5 Sweden 8.5 7.4
Switzerland 2.5 1.7 Turkey 4.7 2.2
Mean 6.02 3.89 Variance 11.49 4.21 T-Value * 6.29
* p < .005
45
and 1977 could be due to some countries not yet holding elections within this
time period, Austria and France being two examples where this occurred.
Concomitant was a shift from a mean score of 6.02 in 1977 to a mean score
of 3.89, a significant shift downward. These findings support the hypothesis
that fragmentation has increased from the levels measured by Mayer in
1965 and 1973.
Table 4.2 presents the collapsed results of Tables 3.1 and 4.1 It is
very clear when looking at Table 4.2 that fragmentation appears to be a
general trend affecting the party systems of the countries included in this
study. From 1965 to 1989 the overall mean score dropped from 9.33 to 3.89.
Furthermore, in every country except the Netherlands the fragmentation
index lowered; again supporting the claim that fragmentation appears to be
a general trend affecting party systems. The greatest change experienced by
any one country was that of India, where an excess of a twelve point decline
was recorded. However, one might argue that Turkey actually suffered the
greatest change in that a coup occurred in 1980 whereby the existing
political parties were outlawed and a new electoral system was instituted.
Two of the more interesting sets of findings, and while these will be
addressed in more detail on an individual basis in the next section, are those
for Denmark and Norway. Denmark, while initially displaying a tendency
towards fragmentation, i.e., a decrease between the years 1965 and 1973,
from 1973 to 1989 the index increased-- thus suggesting aggregation.
However, the 1989 figure is lower than the one measured in 1965, suggesting
that overall the party system in Denmark has fragmented. In Norway the
question as to whether or not the party system is fragmenting is more
46
Table 4.2: Combined Aggregation Indices 1965-1989
COUNTRY 1965 1973 1979 1989
Austria 16.3 16.9 16.9 7.3 Belgium 7.4 3.9 6.3 1.8 Denmark 7.2 2.6 3.4 3.9
Finland 4.8 3.4 3.0 2.8 France 7.1 3.7 3.7 2.3 West Germany 16.4 15.4 8.6 7.5
Iceland 10.0 7.3 8.3 4.1 India 13.7 6.2 5.5 1.4 Israel 5.1 4.7 3.6 2.2
Italy 5.2 4.7 3.8 2.2 Japan 15.7 9.2 6.1 5.4 Luxembourg 10.2 9.4 6.1 5.2
Netherlands 3.3 2.4 3.2 3.3 Norway 7.5 4.8 8.1 ......
0.0
Sweden 9.8 8.9 8.5 7.4
Switzerland 3.3 2.4 2.5 1.7 Turkey 8.9 5.1 4.7 2.2
Mean 9.33 6.81 6.02 3.89 Variance 20.17 18.13 11.49 4.21
47
problematic. The findings show a reoccurring cycle of periods of aggregation
followed by periods of fragmentation. Ironically, these variations are pretty
stable. For example from 1965 to 1973 fragmentation in the system
increased by 2. 7 points; from 1979 to 1989 fragmentation increased by 2.6
points. This could possibly indicate when new issues enter the policy arena
and the coinciding relative success of the major parties at co-opting these
issues. In other words, a period of increased fragmentation represents the
emergence of a new set of policy issues, while a subsequent decline in
fragmentation represents the success of the established parties at co-opting
these issues. While leaving this point for the moment, it will be addressed
further.
Overall, these findings show strong support for Mayer's fragmentation
thesis. However, the possibility exists that these findings represent a slight
bias. It is posited that fragmentation is being underreported. As discussed
above, most countries have election laws mandating a party receive above a
certain percentage of the popular vote before they are awarded
representation in parliament. In most of the countries in this study a
greater number of parties did receive votes then received representation,
e.g., in Turkey where only three parties are represented in the general
assembly, at least eight received votes in the last election.
Party systems, in accordance with these data appear to be
fragmenting. New parties are entering the political arena all the time.
Parties such as the Bloc Quebecois and the Reform Party in Canada, the
Volksunie in Flanders, the Resemblement Wallon in Wallonia, and the Lega
Nord/Lega Lombarda are examples of these new parties. However, these
48
parties are not the traditional parties formed along economic or mass
interest platforms. Instead these parties are pursing highly exclusive ideas,
i.e., platforms based upon narrow particularized beliefs and norms. For a
further understanding of these cleavages and policy platforms, it is
necessary to study each of these countries.
Country by Country Analysis
In this section, for the seventeen countries studied, percentages of
popular vote received as well as the exact number of seats held in the lower
house of parliament by each party will be presented. From these figures a
better understanding of party system fragmentation can be gained. In most
cases data were available for all four time points studied, where it is not
available, information from secondary sources such as newspapers and
magazines will be used in an attempt to provide further narration of
fragmentation in these countries. The abbreviations used correspond to
those discussed in the List of Abbreviations at the beginning of the study.
As noted previously, a greater number of parties received votes then
received representation in parliament. Additionally, over time a change in
support for minor parties can be witnessed, i.e., Communist parties which
established strong support in some countries in the sixties and early
seventies can be seen to wane in the eighties, so much so as to become non
existent in some countries by 1989. Conclusions as to the types of parties
entering the system can be drawn as well; i.e., is there a propensity for
parties to emerge on the left or the right of the ideological spectrum, green
parties or parties of cultural defense?
49
Austria
Long considered as having a two-party system, no longer is that claim
valid in Austria. As shown in Table 4.2, up until the eighties the party
system in Austria was highly aggregated. Mter 1945, Austria underwent a
period where the Austrian People's Party (OVP) and the Social-Democratic
Party (SPO) alternated as the majority party. Figure 4.1 shows that these
two parties as well as the Freedom Party (FPO) dominated the scene in the
immediate post-war period; likewise is the case today. However, no longer
do the SPO and the OVP enjoy the margin of support they once did.
Traditionally receiving in excess of ninety percent of the popular vote, in the
1992 election, combined, these parties accounted for only seventy-five
percent of the vote-- the lowest level of support ever recorded for these
parties since before 1930. Coupled with this decline in support for the two
major parties has been increasing support for minor and emerging parties.
For example, the FPO which traditionally averaged approximately six
percent of the popular vote has recently seen a rise in its support. So
dramatic has this increase been, that in 1992 the FPO gained record levels
of representation when they attained a party high of 16.64% of the popular
vote. However, not only the FPO is gaining in support. Parties formed
around alternative issues, i.e., post-materialist or authoritarian values, are
beginning to emerge. In Austria, the United Green Party of Austria (VGO)
and Die Grune are two such examples of parties pursuing post-materialist
values, i.e., environmental, peace, and social justice issues. Both parties
entered the Austrian political scene in the 1980s pursuing the advancement
of environmental issues
50
p e
c e n t
g e
s e a t s
100
40
20
0 1992
60
1992
Parliamentary Support
1986
• SPO GAL
1979
Year
• OVP • KPO
1971
D FPO
Percentage of Popular Vote Received
1986
• SPO GAL
1979
Year
OVP IIIII KPO
1971
D FPO
Figure 4.1: Austrian Election Results 1965-1992
51
1965
1965
However, as indicated by Figure 4.1, these parties were forced to merge in
the late eighties in an effort to obtain even minimal representation in
parliament.
What is behind this change in the Austrian party system? As
reported in Table 4.2, in 1989 the Austrian party system experienced a
decline in aggregation from the levels measured the previous twenty years.
However is this fragmentation and subsequently cabinet instability? To
answer these questions, one must look at other countries. Belgium, a
country with a relatively competitive system until the party fragmentation of
the late 1960s, provides a prime example. During the 1960s, Belgium was
characterized by a system whereby three or four prime parties contested
power with all participating in some level of governance. It appears that
Austria has moved to this point in the 1980s and 1990s. No longer
dominated by two parties, Austria now possesses a competitive party system.
Unlike Belgium, though, Austria is a very homogeneous country with
practically no ethnic differences (Steiner 1972; Gerlich 1987). Almost the
same holds true for religion: more than 90 percent of the population are
Roman Catholic. The one cleavage that does persist in Austria is that of
social class. The party positions on this issue, while fairly explicit, are
however becoming increasingly ambiguous. This is due in part to what
Steiner (1972) and Gerlich and Muller (1983) have termed the emergence of
a "new middle class," which does not easily ally itself with either of the two
traditional parties.
In summary, while no longer a highly aggregated system, future
fragmentation of the party system in Austria appears unlikely. The two
52
traditional parties have moved towards a Downsian middle-of-the-road
position, which has brought about decreased conflict between them and
made cooperation easier. However, possibilities exist for new parties to
enter the system along the materialist-post-materialist value cleavage. New
issues such as environmentalism have arisen which are of special concern to
the "new middle class" and which seem to cut across traditional party lines.
This prospect is problematic, however, as two ecology parties already exist in
the Austrian system. The only likelihood for future party system
fragmentation would be an internal splintering of the traditional parties or
the rise of highly authoritarian parties concerned with cultural
homogeneity-- something long associated with Austrian culture.
Belgium
The data in Table 4.2 clearly indicates increased fragmentation within
the Belgian political system. This fragmentation and subsequent weakening
of the party system (Dewachter 1987) has come about due to an inability of
the ruling parties to solve the ethno-linguistic cleavage. In sum, the attempt
at reconciling this single area led to the fragmenting of the dominant
parties, thus doubling the number of parties as well as increasing the
difficulties for parties to form cabinets. When comparing the data in Figure
4.2, it is obvious that the major impetus to fragmentation was not ideological
but ethno-linguistic. The data reveal both Dutch and French speaking
branches of the same party, e.g., the CVP and PSC, the SP and PS, and the
PVV and PLP.
53
s e a t 8
p e r c e n t a g e
Parliamentary Support
PW PRL PSC Vlaams VU Ecolo Agalev Rosse FDF FN Others
• 1991 1971
Party
. 1985 11111965
D 1978
Percentage of Popular Vote Received
CVP PS SP PW PRL PSC Vlaams VU Ecolo Agalev Rosse FDF FN Others
• 1991 D 1971
Party
1986 1965
mm 1978
Figure 4.2: Belgian 992--------------------~
54
Moreover, Dewachter (1987, p. 301) concludes, "New parties have
successfully joined the system at a rate of one per decade, thus reducing,
sometimes quite considerably, the electoral and parliamentary size of the
traditional parties." These parties have formed around a variety of issues
and cleavages. The most notable of these being parties representing the
post-materialist, i.e., environmental issues. However, in recent years parties
such as the Front National (FN) representing the authoritarian cleavage,
i.e., cultural defense, have made significant advances in the electoral arena.
The data and literature suggest that fragmentation within the Belgian
party system will continue. Furthermore, the gains made by the extreme
right in 1991 suggest a further weakening of the traditional and centrist
parties. Lacking any strong national parties, i.e., parties where the support
base transcends the ethno-linguistic cleavage, the possibility of future
governments being formed without the necessity for a coalition is remote.
Concomitant is the reality that at least fourteen different parties have a
legitimate chance at being part of the government.
Belgian politics and society are very complex. One only need look at
the merger of the Christian parties that took place in the seventies and the
subsequent splintering into French and Dutch blocks for an example of this
complexity. The fragmenting of the party system has led to the development
of a federal system within Belgium. There are two political systems, each
with their own party structures and so on. This has allowed for greater
fragmentation to occur within the system and has benefited weaker parties
that otherwise might have failed. In short, fragmentation within the
55
Belgian system is very great and shows no signs of decreasing in the near
future.
Denmark
Long considered a model of party system stability, the ability to
govern Denmark effectively became problematic with the election of 1973.
Figure 4.3 shows how the "electoral earthquake" (Sartori 1976, p. 150)
changed the landscape of the Danish political system from that of a stable
three party system ruled by majority governments to that of one ruled by
minority coalitions encompassing the views of anywhere from three to six
parties. Before passing judgment upon Denmark as a dysfunctional
democracy, though, another look at Table 4.2 and Figure 4.3 is necessary.
The fragmentation figures for Denmark reveal an increase in
fragmentation between the years of 1965 and 1973; however, since 1973 the
system has been again slowly aggregating (a process that was occurring
before the election of 1973). As shown in Figure 4.3, fragmentation in
Denmark appears to occur in cycles. However, in the elections since 1973,
when the Social Democratic Party (SDP) loses support in one election, they
regain a high percentage of the lost support in the following election; the
main opposition parties do not. It is the minor and regional parties that
gain this lost support. Outcomes such as this question the ability of the
traditional parties to maintain an active role in government and to
marginalize extreme parties-- be they left or right. In sum, the future for
Denmark could possibly be like that of Canada, i.e., where the main
opposition party is one pursuing ethnic or regional issues.
56
Parliamentary Support 80
s e
t s
SDP CsPP SPP LIB RLP Party
CD pp CrPP Other
p e r c e n t a g e
50
SDP CsPP
Figure 4.3: Danis
• 1990 • 1973
1987 1965
D 1979
Percentage of Popular Vote Received
SPP LIB
• 1990 1973
ection
RLP Party
1987 ~ 1965
57
CD pp
D 1979
CrPP Other
The party system of Denmark is fragmented; however at the present
time, this fragmentation has not become system challenging to the extent
that democratic rule will be replaced with authoritarianism. If however,
another "election earthquake" like the one in 1973 occurs, the chances are
very good that the Danish system could follow the path of Belgium and
become as fragmented and dispersed as the many islands comprising the
country itself.
Finland
Experiencing only a two-point decline in overall fragmentation
between the years of 1965 and 1989, the Finnish system while fragmented is
not unstable. Comprised of three strong parties and a host of successful
minority parties, elections are characterized by a high degree of competition.
With no party normally able to garner in excess of twenty-five percent of the
popular vote, traditional left or right coalition governments are the norm in
Finnish politics. As support changes from party to party over the years, and
as indicted by Figure 4.4, a majority of this shift occurs between the FCP,
FSPD, NCP, and LWA. The minor parties do not appear to be gaining in
support; thus the question becomes to what extent are regional issues and
issues of cultural autonomy important to the Finnish electorate?
Outside of the Swedish People's Party and the Finnish Rural Party,
Finnish politics are not dominated by regional and cultural cleavages.
Traditional conflicts revolve around socio-economic concerns and the
general welfare of the country. Of important note is the Green Union in
Finland: with regards to support in parliament the GU is one of the
58
s e
t s
p e r c e n t a g e
60
Parliamentary Support
FCP FSPD NCP LWA GU SwPP FRP FCU LPP Others
• 1991 1972
Party
• 1987 • 1965
D 1979
Percentage of Popular Vote Received
FCP FSPD NCP LWA
• 1991 5S 1972
GU SwPP FRP FCU
Party
1987 1965
D 1979
LPP Others
Figure 4.4: Finnish Election Results 1965-1992
59
strongest green parties in Europe. In sum, to date Finland has not seen the
rise of extreme authoritarian parties such as the National Front. The
system is characterized by a level of fragmentation indicative of a high level
of competition between the parties, i.e., a high level of equality among the
parties. While in some countries, those with active extremist political
organizations, this parity among the parties would result in a high level of
competition and subsequently destabilization, in Finland this is not the case.
In the foreseeable future, though, as indicated by a majority of the countries
studied in this thesis, as economic issues are resolved, fragmentation, will
probably increase.
France
With data only available for the years 1973 through 1988 (see Figure
4.5), the findings for France are unclear. It is apparent that fragmentation
of the system has occurred. Furthermore, a majority of this fragmentation
has occurred among the right-wing parties. Groups such as the National
Front with charismatic leader Jean Marie LePen have shown steady
increases in both popular and electoral support, which has translated into
parliamentary representation. Additionally, while not reported here, in the
last round of elections the entire political system shifted to the right as the
socialist government was turned out in favor of one led by the conservative
political parties.
In accordance with the data reported in Table 4.2, the party system in
France has become highly fragmented. Given the present economic
conditions as well as the increased anti-immigrant sentiment that is
60
300
250
200 s e a 150 t s
p e r c e n t a g e
100
50
0
40
PS
Figure 4.5:
Parliamentary Support
MRG PS-affl UDF
• 1988
RPR
Party
• 1978
PCF URC
D 1973
Percentage of Popular Vote Received
Party
• 1988 1978 D 1973
61
FN Others
sweeping the country, fragmentation is likely to continue with parties
espousing extreme-right sentiments, e.g., cultural homogeneity, gaining
support while traditional parties such as the PS wane in relevance.
However, total system wide instability does not seem a plausible outcome in
light of these findings. In sum, the French system, like that of Denmark
could be slowly proceeding towards a federal system with regional parties.
Germany
Prior to the late 1970s, the German party system was characterized by
a high level of aggregation. The CDU/CSU coalition and the SPD being the
two alternating powers in the party system during this time period. Starting
in the 1980s, though, as indicated by the data presented in Figure 4.6, the
German system started to become more competitive and hence the party
system more fragmented. This trend has continued and even gained
momentum to a certain extent due to the reunification of Germany in
November of 1990.
The transformation in the party system of the early eighties consisted
of the emergence of parties espousing post-materialist ideology, e.g., Petra
Kelly's Green Party. This movement, however, appears to have died the
symbolic death of Kelly herself-- in the 1990s the Greens failed to garner
enough support for even one representative in the Bundestag. Recently,
though, the German system has undergone a second transitional wave with
the emergence of ultra-nationalistic and authoritarian parties-- parties the
popular media has termed "neo-nazi" and "fascist." In the election of 1990,
while the Republican party failed to received sufficient support to earn a
62
s e a t s
p e r c e n t a g e
300
250
200
150
100
50
0 CDU SPD
Parliamentary Support
FDP CSU Grn/W st PDS RepP Grn/Est Other
• 1990 1972
Party
1987 ~ 1965
D 1976
Percentage of Popular Vote Received
.1990 1972
Party
1987 • 1965
D 1976
Figure 4.6: German Election Results 1965- 992
63
seat in the Bundestag, recent polls report that in the next election the
Republicans will garner enough support to gain representation. In short, the
challenge to the party system and the subsequent level of aggregation is
presently from the right.
It is unclear whether the German system will continue to fragment or,
like the Austrian system, it has entered a period of true party competition.
If, however, the parties on the extreme right continue to gain support it is
very likely that fragmentation will increase and the party system will begin
to resemble that of Belgium, with political parties becoming regional interest
groups. It must be noted that the aggregation index for Germany may in
actuality be underreported. With the reunification of Germany in 1990, one
time amendments to the electoral laws were made to give new parties a
better chance of obtaining membership in the Bundestag. Thus, parties
which may have only regional bases of support attained representation in
the Bundestag. Parties that given the traditional election laws would not
have entered parliament.
Iceland
Unlike Denmark or Belgium, party system fragmentation is easier to
interpret in the case of Iceland. While initially a highly aggregated party
system (see Table 4.2 and Figure 4. 7), as aggregate economic conditions have
improved issue venues have changed as well. New parties have entered the
system and challenged the traditional parties for control of the government.
In the election of 1991, at least four parties had legitimate chances at
becoming the recognized opposition party. In short, another party system
64
s e a t s
p e r c e n t a g e
IP
IP
pp
Parliamentary Support
SDP
• 1991 1971
PA
Party
• 1987 ~ 1965
WA
D 1978
Percentage of Popular Vote Received
pp SDP
• 1991 1971
PA
Party
• 1987 ~ 1965
WA
D 1978
Figure 4. 7: Icelandic Election Results 1965-1992
65
CitP Other
CitP Other
one characterized by two dominant parties is now a prime example of a
relatively fragmented party system. Due to the relative homogeneity of the
people of Iceland and its relative geographic isolation, it seems unlikely that
further fragmentation, while it might occur, will result in governmental
instability.
India
The party system of India has long been considered a one-party
dominant system. The Congress party, outside of a short time period during
the late seventies and early eighties, has dominated the reigns of power.
However, as Table 4.2 indicates, holding the reigns of power and the ability
to govern are two separate skills. The party system in India is the most
highly fragmented in this study-- more so than Belgium. Unlike Belgium,
where the cleavages are based upon ethno-linguistic lines, the cleavages in
India are based along the lines of class and regional people's parties.
Another difference between Belgium and India is the amount of civil unrest.
In Belgium, while elections may occur every two years due to the inability of
coalitions to maintain majority status, political assassinations are not as
commonplace as they are in India. The Indian case, then is one of high
fragmentation and high instability.
Due to the high level of instability present in the Indian system, data
is highly speculative and in some cases not available. Figure 4.8 reports the
number of seats held be each party in parliament. It is important to note
the number of parties in the category of "other"; at least six parties are
included here that were not represented before 1991. Also in 1991 a shift
66
s e a t 8
400
aro
Congress JNP CPI-m TD BJP
Parliamentary Support
SJD DMK AGP AIADMK CPI RSP JaKNC INDICYl'R NOM VACANT
Party
• 1991 § 1971
• 1985 • 1965
D 1977
Figure 4.8: Indian Election Results 1965-1992
67
occurred with regards to the mail opposition party, long the role of the JNP.
In 1991 it switched to the BJP-- a party which in 1985 held only two seats in
parliament. Volatile outcomes such as this are indicative of a highly
unstable party system; traditional parties cannot rely upon the electorate to
support them from election to election. While not discussed here these '
results mirror those of Canada in 1993. In that election, the Bloc Quebecois
and the Reform Party, both almost nonexistent in the 1980s moved into the
position of opposition party.
With the electoral gap between the Congress Party and the other
Indian parties closing, it is highly unlikely that one-party dominant
governments in India will continue for much longer. In other words, soon
the Indian party system will be characterized by coalition style governments,
and given the electoral history of India, severe instability.
Israel
The Israeli party system, as mentioned previous, was characterized by
a high level of fragmentation until the late 1970s. However, with either the
Labour or Likud coalition able to establish a sufficient majority to form a
government, Israeli politics could be considered a two-party system. In the
1980s while Labour and Likud were still the key players in Israeli politics, '
new groups of parties entered the party arena. Fragmentation within the
party system in Israel gained significant momentum with the election of
1984 when parties representing extreme Arab interests, and parties
representing extreme Zionist sentiments succeeded in gaining representation
in the Knesset.
68
8 e
• t
•
60
Parliamentary Support
Labour Lilrud Meretz Tzomet Shas NRP UTJ Hadash Moledet ADP Tehi,ya Kach Agudat Omeu PUP
Party
• 1992 11m 1973
• 1984 196~
D 1977
Figure 4.9: Israeli Election Results 1965-1992
69
Traditionally a highly competitive party system, at present time with
the emergence of new parties, the future of the Israeli party system favors
increased competition. As shown in Figure 4.9, it appears this competitive
system will have a right-wing slant to it. If future elections mirror the
recent success of Tzomet, Shas, and Moledet (all right-wing parties
espousing zero-tolerance for a peaceful settlement with the PLO and Arabs),
it suggests a dour tone for present peace efforts. Increased fragmentation
within the Israeli party system may not have a destabilizing influence upon
the government of Israel, but it could affect the already tenuous political
environment in the entire region.
Italy
As reported in Table 4.2, party system fragmentation has been
steadily increasing over the past twenty-five years in Italy. While the PDC
(at least up until March 28, 1994) still maintained control of parliament, its
support shows a steady decrease from 1965 forward (see Figure 4.10).
Rising support is shown for numerous parties, the most notable of these
being the Northern League (LN/LL in Figure 4.10) and the Communist Re
establishment Party (PRC). What is so amazing about the rising support for
these two parties is the fact that both of these parties were formed only
three years ago in 1991. If one is to hope to argue in favor of the catch-all
model, these data for Italy do not support such a conclusion. Furthermore,
one must also consider Italy a highly fragmented system due to the actuality
of numerous parties having a legitimate chance at gaining sufficient support
to form a government.
70
8 e a t
•
P. e r c e n t a g e
300
45
PDC
Figure 4.10:
PDS
Parliamentary Support
PSI LN/LL PdRC MSI-DN PRI PLI
• 1992 1972
Party
• 1987 • 196:S
FdV
D 1976
PSDI LR/MplD LP
Percentage of Popular Vote Received
PSI LN/LL PdRC MSIDN PRI PU FdV PSDI LRIMD LP Party
• 1992 • 1987 D 1976
• 1972 1965
ect1on
71
sv au-.
sv Others
The Italian system has been traditionally distinguished by its
ideological patterning, the number of parties and the central paradox of its
having combined a hyper-polticised polity with an apparently stable
electorate. Given the election results of March 1994 this characterization '
still seems valid. Whether or not the replacement of the PDC with the MSI
DN, i.e., replacing the center-right with the right, is more indicative of mass
disgust with the corruption of the PDC then that of a shift to the right, will
be discerned within the near future. However, given the over time declining
support for the catch-all parties within the Italian system (PDC and PDS),
coupled with the continued increasing support for the Northern League, it
seems problema tic that these catch -all parties will return to power.
Japan
The Japanese party system, while initially one of the most aggregated
(ranking only behind Austria and West Germany in 1965) is quickly
becoming highly fragmented. While not presented here, the 1993 election
saw the Japanese electorate replace over thirty-plus years of one-party
dominant government by the LDP with a seven-party coalition government.
As seen in Figure 4.11, while remaining the dominant party the LDP has
been experiencing a decline in its overall level of support. Centrist and
reform parties such as Komeito and the Progressive party also have
experienced varying levels support in the last thirty years.
Due to the relative cultural homogeneity of the population of Japan, it
appears that fragmentation is occurring in response to the electorate's
dissatisfaction with the corruption-laden LDP and its numerous
72
s e a t s
p e r c e n t a g e
350
LDP
Figure 4.11:
Parliamentary Support
............ ······· ................ .
•••• • •••••••••• • • ··-·· ••••••••••••• •••• ••••••••••••• •••••••••••••••• 0 •••
.. ............... ...... .................... ····················· .............................. .. .
. . .. . ...................... . . . . . ......... •••••••••• •••• •••••••••• ••••••••••••••••••• 0 •••• 0 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 0 ••
JSP Komeito JCP
• 1990 § 1972
DSP
Party
• 1986 • 1965
SDF Prog. Others
D 1976
Percentage of Popular Vote Received
.. .. ... ... ......... . .. . . ••••• • • • ••••• . . ..... . ........ .. ........ . .. . ........... . .... . ....... . ....... ··-·· ••••• 0 •••••••••••
Ind.
· ·· · ·· · ············· · ······-········-·· •••••••••••••••••••••••••• ··-···· ••.••• 0 •••••.••.••••••••••••••••••••
JSP Komeito JCP DSP SDF Prog. Others Ind.
Party
• 1990 1986 D 1976 §I 1972 • 1965
73
scandals, as well as in response to a legitimate dealignment, with new
parties entering the system espousing strong ideological stances. Given the
election results of 1993, while a coalition government was established based
upon reformist parties, for the most part these parties were splinter groups
of the LDP, in short, it appears the LDP has been replaced with a
fragmented version of its former self. The next round of elections in Japan
will most probably answer this question. If one party is returned to
government, then only a realignment has occurred with the LDP as the
major loser. If, however, a coalition government is again returned to power,
it stands to reason that the Japanese party system has entered the same era
as that of Austria, Denmark and Iceland: the era of party system
competition.
Luxembourg
Table 4.2 shows steadily increasing fragmentation within the party
system of Luxembourg. The traditional centrist parties, the Christian Social
Party (PCS) and the Socialist Workers' Party (POSL), while remaining in
power, are shown to be losing support (Figure 4.12). Unlike most of the
other countries included in this study, however, this shift in support away
from, the centrist parties has taken place in conjunction with a rise in
support for left oriented parties as opposed to rightist. The most successful
of these parties being the Five-sixths Action Committee, which campaigns to
secure improved pension rights for private sector employees, and those
parties representing ecological values, i.e., green parties. Throughout the
74
s e a t s
p
r c e n t a
25
5
0
35
g 1 e
PCS POSL
Parliamentary Support
·········· .. ····· .......................... .
• 1989 § 1974
Party
• 1984 ~ 1965
D 1979
Percentage of Popular Vote Received
PD
········-·····-·· •·••·••···-······· .......................... .
CdA5/6
Party
• 1989 D 1979
1984 § 1974
Figure 4.12: Luxembourg Election Results 1965-1992
75
PCL Others
time period under study, the Communist party of Luxembourg has managed
to remain active, though, it too is suffering from declining levels of support.
Due to the relative cultural homogeneity and its small size (population
of approximately 400,000) it does not seem reasonable to suggest that the
party system in Luxembourg will undergo much radical transformation in
the future. Again, however, as witnessed in the other countries studied, the
once dominant parties (the ones Kirchheimer would suggest as representing
his catch-all model) are seen to be losing the strong support they are
accustomed to. New parties pursuing only a handful of issues and following
strict ideological patterns are showing increasing success. In conclusion,
party system fragmentation in Luxembourg appears to be following that of a
majority of countries in this study. The system is becoming more
fragmented, and accordingly legitimate competition among parties is
emerging.
Netherlands
While fragmentation within the Dutch party system has fluctuated
over the last twenty years, this fluctuation has been a by-product of
declining support for the traditional parties more so than due to an
explosion of new parties into the electorate. For the most part, the problems
that existed in the in the Dutch electoral system twenty years ago still
persist today, and to that point party system fragmentation has not varied
much either. Concomitantly, neither has the problem of unstable coalitions
prone to collapse been solved. In writing about the time period from 1966-
1986, Bart Tromp (1990, p. 96) concluded:
76
The changes in the Dutch party system after twenty years have been unmistakable, if also unimpressive. The number of parties has not changed considerably. Small parties survive to the left and to the right, but their relevance has declined since 1966. The decline of the religious vote has resulted in stronger progressive parties (the PvdA and D'66) and a stronger conservative-liberal party (the VVD), and most importantly, has led to the emergence of the CDA as the dominant center party of Dutch politics. This dominance now rests on some one-third of the vote, however, rather than a majority, as was the case from 1918 to 1963. . . A distinctive (and attractive) ideological identity is also increasingly necessary given that stable electoral attachments have given way to increased volatility, and given that the issues on which the original partisan identities have been built have faded a way and/ or are being replaced by new concerns.
Turning to Figure 4.13, the drastic decline in support for the CDA can
be more fully understood. Able at one time to command over fifty percent of
the popular vote (the 1950s and early 1960s) the CDA was barely able to
covet half of that total in the late seventies.l Formed as a coalition between
the three religious parties (the ARP, CHU, and KVP) in the late seventies in
an attempt to stop the hemorrhage of voter support, the CDA was forced to
abandon its Christian ideology in an attempt to remain a viable option for
the electorate and prevent a mass shift of the electorate to the left or right.
Initially, this "shift" in ideology only managed to add legitimacy to the
burgeoning progressive, reform-oriented movements of the PvdA and D'66.
Surprisingly, throughout this "period of volatility" was the relative stability
in support maintained by the GLand SPG parties-- possibly due to these
parties having a regional influence only. The rise of extreme right parties,
77
s e a t s
80
70
60
50
45
p 40
e r c e n t a g e
Parliamentary Support
CDA PvdA VVD D'66 GL SGP GPV RPF LJ/C Other
• 1991 1972
Party
• 1986 • 1965
D 1979
Percentage of Popular Vote Received
CDA PvdA VVD
• 1991 § 1972
Party
1986 • 1965
GPV RPF LJ/C Other
D 1979
Figure .
78
for the most part has not happened within the Dutch party system. There
have, however, be instances of populist parties emerging for an election cycle
or two. These parties, though, had short lived existences as they were
unable to expand beyond their regional bases of support.
Norway
The data presented in Table 4.2 provide inconclusive evidence about
the general trend of fragmentation within the Norwegian party system.
Experiencing both periods of aggregation and fragmentation, initially one
might draw comparisons to Iceland when looking for answers to this
paradox. Ceteris paribus this analogy seems to hold: both countries ruled by
stable one-party majority governments for the preponderance of the period
under study; traditional parties suffering a decline in overall support; the
emergence of new parties, some more successful then others, but with some
viable enough to challenge for the role as the recognized opposition party or
as members of a coalition government; and approximately three to six
parties gaining representation within parliament at any one time. One
might push this symmetry so far as to say that Knut Heidar (1990, p. 143)
writing about the Norwegian party system was in actuality discussing
Iceland when he commented:
The comparative reference to the party politics of Norway has rarely been described in terms of strife, feud, crisis, or breakdown. The terms have rather been frozen cleavages, stability, consensual, and as Dankert Rustow described it in terms expected to provoke surprise in the 1950s, a working multi-party system.
79
s e a t s
p e r c e n t a g e
45
40
DnA Hoyer FP
DnA Hoyer FP
Figure 4.14:
sv
Parliamentary Support
KrF
• 1989 ~ 1973
SP FfF Venstre FMS MdG
Party
• 1985 .1965
D 1977
Percentage of Popular Vote Received
sv KrF
• 1989 ~ 1973
SP FfF Venstre FMS MdG
Party
. 1985
.1965
80
D 1977
SI PP Others
SI PP Others
Moving beyond this superficial comparison, however, it is possible to
ascertain just how dissimilar these two countries are. Unlike the island
nation of Iceland segments of the Norwegian populace have perceived a
threat to their level of cultural homogeneity vis-a-vis refugees and
immigrants from developing countries. Hence, and as Heidar concurs, there
has been a swing to the right in party ideologies causing a sea change in the
party system. Moreover, as indicated by Figure 4.14, extreme right parties
such as Stopp Innvandringen (SI), which espouses the complete closing of
the Norwegian boarders to immigrants, have entered the system and seen
steady increases in support-- to almost one-half of one percent in 1989 alone.
In retrospect, no longer is the Rokkanian thesis of a "frozen" cleavage
structure valid, nor is Sartori's "predominant party" label applicable.
Furthermore, given the rising importance of the Progressive Party (FP) and
(as supported by the data in Figure 4.14) coupled with the deterioration of
the political cohesion within the non-socialist group of parties, the party
system is appearing increasingly fragmented. The fragmentation of the
party system in Norway has the added dimension of being typified by
alternative parties lacking in reliable parliamentary majorities. It is this set
of circumstances that cause the Norwegian party system thus to more closely
mirror that of Denmark then Iceland in final analysis.
Sweden
Reminiscent of the 1976 "coup" the non-socialist parties again took the
reigns of power from the Social Democrats in 1991 and forced them into the
81
s e a t s
p e r c e n t a g e
160
SDAP MS
SDAP MS
Parliamentary Support
FP
• 1991 § 1973
CP KdS
Party
• 1985 • 1965
ND VP
D 1979
Percentage of Popular Vote Received
FP ND VP
Party
• 1991 1985 D 1979 § 1973 • 1965
Figure 4.15: Swedish Election Results 1965-1992
82
MpG Others
MpG Others
role of opposition party for only the second time in fifty-five years. Relating
to a decline in the fragmentation index of only 1.1 points it is highly unlikely
that this shift in power represents a sea change in the Swedish political
landscape of a stable shift to the right. While support for the SDAP did
decrease almost ten percent in 1991, this was not matched by a coincidental
rise in support for the MS, FP, and CP, i.e., the ruling coalition. What did
occur was a rise in support for the newly formed parties of the ND and MpG.
The MpG, while not attaining sufficient support to warrant representation in
the Riksdag, did, however, post is best electoral showing in gaining 3.4
percent of the popular vote. The ND, a populist right-wing party, entered
parliament for the first time gaining twenty-five seats, placing it almost on
par with such traditional parties as the FP and CP.
The rise of parties such as the MpG and ND coincide with a rise in
support among the electorate for post-materialist and ethno-linguistic
(cultural defense) issues. It is difficult to claim, however, that the
emergence of these parties are symbolic of a rise of the "new politics"
cleavage as it was only in 1991 that these parties first contested elections.
While the center-right parties at present time do appear to be gaining
strength, not to mention control the government, it is premature to conclude
that this is due to a fundamental shift in core beliefs and not reflective of a
punishment of the SDAP for its recent poor handling of the economy and
leviathan welfare structure.
83
Switzerland
The data in Table 4.2 confirm the oft-stated axiom of the Swiss party
system being highly fragmented. As the data indicate, in 1989 only India
had a more highly fragmented party system. The subsequent question being,
how unstable is the Swiss party system. Given the minority nature of the
party system, the answer to the question of instability lies with the level of
fractionalization of the different party alliances. Assuming traditional party
cleavages and alliance structures, the Swiss party system appears to be
highly destabilized. However, the fluid nature of party alliances renders
ideology and issue stances relatively void of explanatory power. As Kerr
(1987, p. 121) explained:
The structure of party alliances is not fixed but fluid, as both government and opposition parties constantly shift their alignments across this ideological space in response to the nature of the issues.
In other words, the multipolarized, fragmented party system is held together
vis-a-vis the fractionalization of party alliances.
Figure 4.16 displays the results from the four time periods under
consideration. As can be seen, the proliferation of parties on the Swiss
political landscape is as prodigious as the most fragmented systems of
continental Europe. Parties representing all facets of the ideological
spectrum exist to some degree. This proliferation of political parties has
been helped by the existence of multiple cleavages running along class,
religious, regional, and linguistic lines. Due to the fluid nature of party
stances, it is not practical to classify the emerging parties in Switzerland as
fundamentally rightist or leftist in nature; however, in the past year
84
s e a t s
p e r
55
c 15 e n t a g
e 5
0
Parliamentary Support
RDP SDP CDPP SPP GPS LP AP lA SwD EPP WP Others
RDP
Party
• 1991 s 1971
• 1987 ~ 1965
D 1979
Percentage of Popular Vote Received
SDP CDPP SPP GPS LP AP lA
Party
• 1987 D 1971
1979 § 1965
SwD EPP WP Others
Figure 4.16: Swiss Election
85
Switzerland witnessed its share of hate crimes against immigrants and the
establishment of its first totally anti-immigrant party.
How do all these conclusions affect the party system in Switzerland?
While not appearing to be underreported, due to the already discussed fluid
nature of the political alliances, the high level of party system fragmentation
in Switzerland is misleading. Given the relative success of the government
at maintaining high prosperity, low inflation, virtually no unemployment,
good industrial relations, and a fair income distribution, it would suggest
that the high level of fragmentation has no impact upon the ability to govern
effectively and make policy. In sum, the government in Switzerland, not
having to address the complex economic, national security, and foreign
policy issues of advanced industrial democracies, manages to violate every
rule of effective government.
Turkey
Party system fragmentation in Turkey represents the "what might
happen" category. In short, a coup in 1980 occurred whereby the existing
political parties were outlawed and a new electoral system was instituted.
This coup it has been suggested happened in response to the inability of the
existing political parties to govern effectively. Oddly enough, the installation
of a new electoral system has not decreased fragmentation (as reported in
Table 4.2). In 1989 with the repeal of the 1980 electoral law mandating a
party receive in excess of ten percent of the national vote, a greater number
of parties entered parliament and now realistically challenge for the reigns
of power.
86
300
250
s e a 150 t s
100
50
DYP
Figure 4.17:
ANAP
Parliamentary Support
SHP
D 1991
RP Party
87
DSP
• 1986
HEP MCP
Lacking sufficient data from the 1960s through the late 1970s, it is
not possible to ascertain over time trends in party formation or party system
transformation outside of that already offered. However, data are available
for the years 1991 and 1986. As can be seen in Figure 4.17, the RP, DSP,
and MCP were all adversely affected by the 1980 "ten percent minimum"
election law. These findings suggest that party system fragmentation within
Turkey is somewhat underreported. These figures further indicate that
party system fragmentation is once again increasing in Turkey. It remains
to be seen whether this will lead to the dour consequences of another coup,
however.
Synopsis of Findings
Up until this point the analysis has focused on the overall level of
fragmentation for all the countries studied and a series of case studies. In
the following section a series of generalizations and conclusions about the
party systems studied will be drawn. Secondly, aggregate level inferences as
to the impact of party fragmentation upon the individual countries studied
will be made and discussed. Lastly, speculations as to the immediate future
of party system fragmentation will be attempted.
For the most part, fifteen out of seventeen countries, the level of party
system fragmentation did increase in the countries studied. Based upon the
numerous figures presented, it has been demonstrated that fragmentation
took place in two waves. The initial wave of the late sixties and seventies
was characterized by a decline in support for the traditional centrist parties,
e.g., Christian and social democratic parties, coupled with an increase in
88
support for parties espousing post-materialist values, i.e., ecological
concerns, the furthering of peace, and the pursuit of social justice. The
second wave beginning in the 1980s and continuing so far through the 1990s
has been characterized by rising levels of support for right-wing and extreme
right-wing parties. This rise, for the most part, has occurred within the
context of continued declining support for the centrist parties, but has also
to a certain extent been to the detriment of the post-materialist parties that
emerged during the first wave of fragmentation. This raises a question as to
the co-optability and level of issue saliency upon which these emerging
parties initially formed. The data presented here suggest that the "new
politics" issues, as they have been defined, are not co-optable by the old
centrist parties. Moreover, the data indicate that post-materialist values are
no longer as germane to the electorate. This outcome suggests that not only
are post-materialist values not co-optable, but they are ephemeral as well.
Party system fragmentation, as characterized by a decline in support
for the traditional parties and increasing support for emerging parties,
occurred at both ends of the ideological spectrum. On the left, parties
emerged pursuing policy stances protecting the environment. These parties
have gained the generic term "green parties". Initially, as many as three or
four different green parties could be found in numerous countries. However,
after this inaugural period, many of these parties found it necessary to form
coalitions in order to maintain representation in their respective
parliaments. From the right, parties extolling the importance of
maintaining cultural homogeneity and the curtailing of immigration have
arisen. A large body of literature discussing the ease with which these
89
parties have formed and garnered support is quickly coming to the forefront
(Betz 1993; Brechon and Mitra 1993; Husbands 1992, 1992a; Knight 1992;
Fysh and Wolfreys 1992; Furlong 1992; Arter 1992; Ellwood 1992; Gallagher
1992; Ignazi and Ysmal 1992; Ignazi 1992; Voerma and Lucardie 1992;
Minkenberg 1992). The most flamboyant of these parties being the National
Front in France with its charismatic leader Jean Marie LePen. In other
words, these findings suggest it is easier to preach intolerance then the
protection of the environment. For the most part, these right-wing parties
have been more successful at maintaining a base of support and affecting
national policy then parties of the left.
Given the existence of these new parties, to what extent are they
impacting the party system and subsequently the government? Outside of
Turkey and India, the emergence of new parties into the system has had the
effect of bringing about greater competition within the party system. In
sum, where there once were one-party dominant and two-party dominant
systems, i.e., highly aggregated, there now exist fragmented systems with a
manageable level of active, viable political parties. In Turkey and India, it is
suggested that the emergence of new parties has a destabilizing effect upon
the party system, so much so, they regularly cause the collapse of democratic
governments. There are two notable exceptions to the above assertion of
increased party system competition: Switzerland and the Netherlands.
Both of these countries had extremely fragmented party systems prior to the
period studied here, i.e., the party systems within these countries were
already typified by a high level of competition.
90
At this point, the argument that increased competition in turn means
increased coalition government, which in turn increases the likelihood of
collapse, i.e., governmental instability and a crisis of legitimacy for
democratic regimes could be logically made. This argument, while enjoyable,
relies largely upon the "what-ir' game, as it is not the purpose of this thesis
to engage in the "what-ir' game, this discussion shall be dropped here. More
to the point, what impact will increased competition have upon the party
systems of these countries? It appears, and albeit that these assertions are
purely speculative and open to much debate, that increased party system
competition has not detrimentally impacted the governmental stability of the
countries studied. For the most part, parties have become more responsive
in accordance with this increased competition. A reversal in the catch-all
trend, so feared by Kirchheimer, appears to be underway; parties are
returning to their origins as links between the electorate and the
government.
What does party system fragmentation mean for the future of
westernized democratic nations? Furthermore, what is the immediate
future of countries that are experiencing fragmentation of the party system?
It is highly unlikely that simple fragmentation within the party system of
democratic nations will sound the death knell for such governments;
however, it does not seem improbable that countries experiencing high levels
of fragmentation will be forced into holding elections at shorter time
intervals due to the inability of coalition governments to maintain stable
majorities. In the immediate future, countries experiencing party system
fragmentation will probably continue to do so in accordance with a shift in
91
the electorate to either the left or the right. In short, the traditional catch
all parties such as the social democrats and Christian unions will continue
to lose support and slowly be phased out of the system or be relegated to
minority status in the new era.
92
CHAPTERV
CONCLUSION
This thesis has measured the level of fragmentation in the party
systems of seventeen countries utilizing parliamentary models of
government for the time period 1979-1992. In addition, the relative level of
cabinet and governmental stability within each country was assessed vis-a
vis these measurements.
Prior to this study, only two substantive efforts at measuring party
system fragmentation had been undertaken: one by Rae in 1968, and by
Mayer in 1980. While Rae's index has seen some use in scholarship of the
Scandinavian region of Europe (see Daalder 1987), for the most part these
indices have been ignored.
In the past three years, however, a growing body of literature has
emerged making the clarion call that the catch-all party system has ended
and that an era of party system fragmentation is occurring (Mair and Smith
1990; Mair 1990). If such a claim is to be accepted, then it should be
empirically verifiable. However, for the most part, the literature is devoid of
such tests. At best, a few authors report descriptive statistics of the
percentage of popular vote received for the parties within a country~ at worst
simple normative descriptions are offered.
The concept of party system fragmentation, while not vague in
meaning, may be a bit difficult to quantify or algebraically define. David
Rae's (1968) study is an example. For sake of brevity, the fragmentation
index designed by Rae fails to distinguish between fragmentation of the
94
government and the opposition, in failing to make this distinction Rae's
index becomes an unsuitable explicant of cabinet instability. Mayer's (1980)
index on the other hand was designed for the stated purpose of inferring the
impact fragmentation would have upon cabinet stability. Thus, in borrowing
heavily from Mayer, this study provides analysis of party system
fragmentation from 1979-1992 and suggests the implications the level of
fragmentation will have upon government stability. The contribution of this
thesis is largely in bringing the analysis of the fragmentation problematique
up to date. This allows the application of this work to the new emerging
forces of fragmentation such as cultural defense; forces that could only be
speculated in the original presentation of this material by Mayer.
The data presented in this study reveal a breakdown in the
aggregation of party systems. For the sample studied, in 1965 the mean
level of aggregation was 9.33 (suggesting a high level of aggregation);
however, the mean dropped almost six points to 3.89 (indicative of moderate
to high fragmentation) in 1989.
These findings suggest that party systems have moved into the era of
fragmentation. This new era differs from its predecessor, the catch-all era,
in two important aspects. First, and most importantly, no longer is any
single party assured of achieving an electoral majority through the election
process, i.e., a system of minority governments is emerging. The traditional
catch-all parties, i.e., the Christian democratic parties, or the social
democratic parties have lost their dominant status. The 1994 defeat of the
Italian Christian Democrats and the 1993 defeat of the Canadian
Progressive Conservatives are very recent cases in point. Second, minor
95
parties have a realistic chance at entering government and affecting policy
changes. Two examples illustrating this point being the Bloc Quebecois and
the Populist Reform Party in Canada in 1993. Numerous other differences
exist as well, for example, the emergence of new parties into the system
pursuing post-materialist (environmental) values or authoritarian (cultural
homogeneity) values has occurred.
These findings are supported through the percentage of the popular
vote received by each party as reported throughout Chapter IV. Minor
parties can be seen to be gaining in influence and representation, while the
traditional catch-all parties appear to be waning in influence. The
implications this has for future cabinet instability are unclear. Outside of
Turkey, where a military coup in 1980 caused the entire party structure to
be replaced, no governments have violently collapsed or been forced to resign
by the military. However, in some countries elections every two years are
becoming commonplace (an occurrence not very conducive to stable coherent
rule).
In Chapter I, it was posited that party system fragmentation has
taken place in two waves. The first wave was characterized by the
emergence of parties espousing post-materialist values. The second (and
most recent) wave is characterized by the rise in parties pursuing cultural
and ethnocentric beliefs. The data presented in Chapter IV support this
contention. While these emerging parties have seen increased success in the
recent past, however, their total impact upon the system has not yet been
realized.
96
It has been suggested that fragmentation may only be indicative of a
dealignment of the electorate away from the catch-all parties, with a
realignment towards parties with strong ideological platforms soon to follow.
While not discounting this possibility, in keeping with the data presented
here, it is apparent that any realignment that might occur will manifest
itself in party systems with a greater number of viable parties, with all
enjoying relatively equal levels of electoral support.
It is the position of this researcher that party systems in the process
of becoming more fragmented have also become more competitive-- a positive
for democracy. No longer are voters forced to choose between only two
parties if they wish their vote to be meaningful, i.e., secure representation
within parliament.
Over the course of this thesis party system fragmentation has been
studied. This analysis has focused on the system level and been
accomplished through the use of aggregate data. When looking at the
results obtained in this study many avenues of future research become
apparent. First, while this study focuses primarily on post-industrial
societies, a study of party system fragmentation within the countries of
Latin America and Mrica seems prudent. The only draw back to such
studies being the availability of data. Second, further research needs to be
done into the emerging parties and the cleavage structures upon which they
are forming. An example of such a study would look at the demographic and
socio-economic breakdowns of individuals supporting these emerging parties.
Last, studies more closely focusing on the regional aspects of these emerging
parties need to be carried out in order to fully assess the impact these
97
parties will have upon the party system and the functioning of government.
When addressing these areas of future research, it becomes apparent that
this thesis offers just the beginning witness of the phenomena to be
discovered in this area.
98
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
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106
The countries of Canada and Ireland, while not part of Mayer's
original study in 1980, have been referred to throughout the chapters of this
thesis. The following figures present the election results for Canada and
Ireland up to 1992. Ironically, fragmentation of the Canadian party system
appears to have reached it highest point in 1993, a period for which data
was not easily obtainable. In this election the Bloc Quebecois, a strictly
regional separatist party, shifted from minor party status and became the
recognized opposition party. This occurred in the wake of the complete
removal of the Progressive Conservative Party from parliament, one of the
traditional catch-all parties.
In the case of Ireland, the percentage of the popular vote received by
each party should be noticed. For the time period studied the two
traditional parties, Fianna Fail (Soldiers of Destiny--The Republican Party)
and Fine Gael (United Ireland Party) are each shown to suffer decreasing
levels of popular support. Figure A.1 lists the abbreviations used in Figures
A.2 and A.3.
108
Canada
PCP
LP NDP BCSCP
Ireland
Progressive Conservative Party Liberal Party New Democratic Party British Columbia Social Credit Party
FF Fianna Fail FG Fine Gael PgD Progressive Democrats DL Democratic Left DSP Democratic Socialist
Party
Figure A.l: List of Abbreviations for Canada and Ireland
109
s e a t s
225
1991
Parliamentary Support
1984
• PCP ~ BCSCP
1979
Year
• LP m Others
Figure A.2: Canadian Election
110
1972 1965
D NDP
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