Chapter 11
AL QAEDA AND JIHADIST NETWORKS
Describe the rise of religious terrorism and its relationship to the Soviet-Afghan War.
Summarize the important roles of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri.
Outline the early history of al Qaeda. Explain the structure and operations of al
Qaeda until September 11, 2001. Summarize al Qaeda’s political theology.
LEARNING OBJECTIVES: CHAPTER 11
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Describe al Qaeda’s current franchise-style structure and current operational capabilities.
Outline the operations of franchises including AQAP, AQIM, and al Shabab.
Describe other forms of terrorism in Pakistan.
Summarize operations in other parts of Asia and the Pacific.
LEARNING OBJECTIVES: CHAPTER 11
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Saudi Arabia deemed to be an important ally to the US during the Cold War The central focus was a country’s stance
against the Soviet Union
The foundation of modern jihadist power grew from the Cold War Militant Islamic reformers used by Western
allies against communist countries
COLD WAR ORIGINS
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Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan State Department encouraged Arab and
other Islamic allies to send money and religious puritans (mujahedeen)
The US formed an alliance with Pakistan began to train and equip the mujahedeen
The mujahedeen were not united at the end of the Soviet-Afghan War
THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR
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bin Laden’s reputation began to grow as the mujahedeen searched for a continuing jihad
bin Laden was influenced by Sayyid Qutb’s thought (militant Islam)
Inspired by the mujahedeen of Afghanistan, bin Laden dropped out of college to join the Soviet-Afghan War
THE RISE OF OSAMA BIN LADEN
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bin Laden fell under the influence of Abdullah Azzam, a doctor of Islamic law
Azzam believed it was time for all Muslims to rise up and strike Satan
bin Laden financed mujahedeen operations and taught the guerrillas how to build field fortifications
bin Laden became a battlefield hero
BIN LADEN AND ABDULLAH AZZAM
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Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri was born into a prominent Egyptian family in 1951 He fell under the influence of violent religious
philosophy in high school after being exposed to militant interpretations of Islam
When Sadat signed a peace treaty with Israel, Zawahiri threw himself into the resistance
AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI
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bin Laden took advantage of America’s inattention and Azzam’s waning power bin Laden began to recruit the mujahedeen al Zawahiri organized training camps & cells
bin Laden’s first cause was the Saudi government and its “corrupt” royal family
Saudi government allowed U.S. troops to be stationed in Saudi Arabia
EARLY HISTORY OF AL QAEDA
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fNEIY2bhhgo
Discussion: How would you describe bin Laden’s ability to hide
in the open, so to speak? bin Laden was considered, according to the video, to
be an integral part of a number of terrorist activities since 9/11 – would you say his death will curb future terrorist activities?
What do you think about the comments from some Pakistanis that US violated Pakistan sovereignty and that an unarmed man was shot?
THE DEATH OF BIN LADEN
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Three interrelated factors were prevalent in the rise of Islamic Group (IG): The 1981 assassination of Anwar Sadat The failure of Arab nationalism The decline of Arab socialism
The IG was connected with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman
THE EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC GROUP
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The EIJ targeted the Egyptian government Zawahiri believed that the government
represented the near enemy The united jihadists could focus on the far
enemy: Israel, the U.S., and the West
The Egyptian government cracked down, and few people stepped forward to take up EIJ’s version of jihad
EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD
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bin Laden’s entrepreneurial efforts gave him the freedom to finance and command the al Qaeda terrorist network
U.S. intelligence linked the bomb attack in Yemen to bin Laden
bin Laden claimed that he trained and supported the troops that struck the U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter
BIN LADEN RETURNS TO AFGHANISTAN
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Seated in front of a camera, bin Laden declared war on the United States in 1996
In August 1998, bin Laden’s terrorists bombed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
Khalid Sheik Mohammed planned 9/11 and put the people in place to carry it out
DECLARING WAR ON THE U.S.
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Leadership connections are intact and dangerous.
Sageman’s theory of terrorist networks does not match the scholarly and applied literature about the subject.
Sageman has ignored important data. Sageman focused on individual behavior
instead of the way terrorist groups behave.
THE SAGEMAN-HOFFMAN DEBATE
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Hoffman misrepresented information in Leaderless Jihad.
The threat of terrorism is evolving. He reviews the literature on terrorism and
his methodology is correct. Leaderless Jihad focuses on groups, not
individuals.
THE SAGEMAN-HOFFMAN DEBATE
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Al Qaeda has become a franchise Central leadership operates in the tribal
areas of Pakistan The Haqqani network runs its own militias,
shadow governments, protection rackets, legitimate businesses, and terrorist groups
A significant number of al Qaeda operatives killed by the drones
DEGRADED LEADERSHIP AND THE AL QAEDA FRANCHISE
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The female jihad involves supporting male relatives, educating children in the ideology, providing support for operations, and assisting with financing
Bin Laden’s latest documents have called for women to actively join the jihad
Al Qaeda created a women’s suicide division in 2003
THE ROLE OF WOMEN
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BIN LADEN DOCUMENTS ONLINE
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http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/05/03/151925766/coming-up-bin-laden-documents-to-go-online?ps=rs
Communications are central to the al Qaeda strategy; over half the battle is being waged in the media
al Qaeda runs a global marketing campaign in an attempt to capture the imagination and support of Muslims
al Qaeda is quick to exploit local issues and surround them with its own theology
THE VIRTUAL WAR
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Yemen’s conflicts: Struggle for control of the central government Rebellious southern region Growing presence of AQAP in the Marib
AQAP’s purpose is to unite Saudi Arabia and Yemen in one religious government
AQAP claimed responsibility for the attempted downing of a Northwest airliner outside Detroit on Christmas 2009
ARABIAN PENINSULA (AQAP)
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AQIM operates primarily along the coastal region outside of Algiers and in the Sahel desert area bordering Mali and Algeria The desert provides a vast area to recruit and
train potential operatives
AQIM claims loyalty and unity to al Qaeda; yet, in practice it does not take direction from Afghanistan or Pakistan
AL QAEDA IN THE MAGHREB (AQIM)
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Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) Detects and disrupts terrorist activities before
the terrorists can commit violence Relies heavily on military force and national
security intelligence Close relationship with indigenous forces will
build a long-term partnership with governments in the Horn
THE HORN OF AFRICA
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During the Cold War, the U.S. used Somalia as a base against communism
Somalia served as a base for some of the al Qaeda operatives
Somalia became a quagmire of violent political chaos
al Shabab began an offensive in central and southern Somalia for the purpose of imposing its narrow brand of Islamic law on Somalia
THE HORN OF AFRICA
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VuKPR3ukGUg
Discussion: Have US War on terror policies contributed to
the deadly crisis in Somalia? This question was posed on the Website – did
you find the video to answer this question? Provide examples.
How much of a role did poverty play in this conflict? Support your position.
THE HORN OF AFRICA
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Islam teaches universal human love, submission to God’s will, & life of morality preparing for the final judgment of God Jihadists are doomed to failure because their
theology of violence does not convey the meaning of Islam
Confusion about mainstream Islam complicates attempts to understand jihadists
AL QAEDA’S POLITICAL THEOLOGY
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Pakistan became a country in 1947 Two international issues dominate
Pakistan: nuclear weapons and relations with the United States
Some Pakistani leaders support terrorism; others want to fight the jihadists
There is tension between Pakistan and India especially in the area of Jammu and Kashmir
PAKISTAN
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LeT is best known for its attacks in India It rejects all forms of Islam except its own
interpretation Pakistan officially banned the LeT in 2002
It operates under a series of different names
The LeT traditionally defined its operations around the Jammu and Kashmir conflict
LASHKAR-E-TAYIBBA (LET)
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Taliban seized control of Kandahar in 1994 and controlled 95% by 1997
As the Pakistani Taliban expanded the influence of the United States waned
The struggle to limit jihadist networks has shifted from American military and intelligence efforts to diplomacy
THE PAKISTANI TALIBAN
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Bangladesh The ports of Bangladesh have become centers
for international crime; the country has a strong internal jihadist movement
Thailand The Barisan Revolusi Nasional, Coordinate
(BRN-C), is leading the insurgency and carries a jihadist agenda
OTHER NETWORKS IN ASIA
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Indonesia The political situation in Indonesia provided a
climate for the growth of jihadist groups
The Philippines’ three terrorist groups: Moro National Liberation Front Moro Islamic Liberation Abu Sayyuf
OTHER NETWORKS IN ASIA
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The jihadist terror network al Qaeda was spawned in the late stages of the Soviet-Afghan War.
Osama bin Laden, the founder of the group, joined Egyptian Ayman al Zawahiri to expand the group in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan in 1996.
Al Qaeda quickly evolved into an international umbrella group, conducting large-scale attacks throughout the world.
CHAPTER TAKE AWAYS
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A Western military offensive in the wake of 9-11 changed the nature of al Qaeda’s structure resulting in differing leadership hubs and a more decentralized organization.
Although some operations were tightly structured and controlled, the nature of al Qaeda changed.
CHAPTER TAKE AWAYS
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Different regional groups formed in various parts of the world under the al Qaeda franchise.
Many of al Qaeda’s leaders, including bin Laden, have been killed by American attacks in Pakistan.
The group remains active mainly due to its franchised network and an alliance among Pakistani and Afghan allies.
CHAPTER TAKE AWAYS
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