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Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
5.1 Introduction
Project overview
This chapter presents the results of the ex post evaluation and review of the ex
ante CBA for the Agios Konstantinos Bypass project in Greece. This project is
covered by the following EU application for assistance from the Cohesion Fund:
2000 GR/16/C/PT/007 PATHE section: AGIOS KONSTANTINOS by-
pass - KAMENA VOURLA by-pass.
The Agios Konstantinos Bypass project forms part of a wider package of
improvements (most of which have already been implemented) to modernise the
route on the PATHE (Patras, Athens, Thessaloniki, Evzoni) transport axis.
Location
The Agios Konstantinos Bypass is located between the two largest cities in
Greece: Athens and Thessaloniki, on what is known locally as the PATHE
highway (or Highway 1). This also forms the European E75 route, part of the
TEN-T Priority Motorway Axis 7 (Igoumenista – Patras – Athens – Sofia –
Budapest). The location of the Agios Konstantinos Bypass in relation to the
major settlements in Greece is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Location of the Agios Konstantinos Bypass in its National Context
Source: Openstreetmap.org
Description
The Agios Konstantinos Bypass project involved the construction of a dual 2-
lane highway bypassing the towns of Agios Konstantinos and Kamena Vourla,
which are located on the former main route. It should be noted, however, that
Kamena Vourla already had a single carriageway bypass which opened in the
1980’s. The Agios Konstantinos Bypass project also upgraded the existing
Kamena Vourla Bypass to a dual two lane highway. The key timescales for this
project are summarised as follows:
construction start – 2001;
open for traffic – October 2008;
completion of ancillary works – May 2009; and,
transfer of operator from PATHE to Ionia Odos (concessionaire) –
October 2009.
The old road through Agios Konstantinos is contained within a narrow corridor
between the sea and the town (with many properties and businesses facing onto
the route in places). Therefore there was little scope to undertake any significant
improvements of the existing road. The narrow cross section of the road did not
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Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
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allow safe overtaking. Severe congestion events were commonplace particularly
in the summer months when traffic volumes were at their highest. Agios
Konstantinos is also one of the main ferry gateways from the Greek mainland to
the island of the Skiathos. The ferry pier is located adjacent to the road (to the
east of the town) and exacerbated the congestion during loading and unloading
periods (at least once per day).
The route through the Agios Konstantinos area is one of the last sections of the
E75 between Athens and Thessaloniki to be upgraded to highway standard due
to the challenging topographical conditions in the area. In order to overcome the
difficulties posed by the mountainous terrain, the following complex structures
were required:
3 tunnels (total length 3.2km);
3 cut and cover tunnels (total length 0.85km); and,
1 single cut and cover tunnel (length 0.4km)
Figure 2 shows a comparison between the Agios Konstantinos bypass, and the
former main route through Agios Konstantinos..
Figure 2. National Road 1 and ferry pier (left) and Agios Konstantinos Bypass (right)
Source: Site visit photos by evaluation team (July 2010)
The speed limit on the newly constructed section is lower than the Greek
national speed limit for highways (120km/h) and ranges from 100km/h to
80km/h through the tunnels. This is because the route still has a number of
sharp bends and changes in elevation despite the use of tunnels. The speed limits
are enforced through the use of electronic variable message signs located at
regular intervals along the entire length of the project.
The E75 is in part a toll motorway (the nearest toll station is located at Tragana
which is 25km to the south-east of the project). However, the project section
itself is currently not tolled. The location of the project in its local context is
shown in Figure 3.
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Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
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Figure 3. Location of the Agios Konstantinos Bypass in its Local Context
Source: Openstreetmap.org
The total cost of the project was €317.8m (2000 prices, including VAT). 37% of
the funding was from the Cohesion Fund, and the remainder was financed by
national funding. The high cost of the project for such a short section of highway
is clearly due to the complex structures required to overcome the difficulties of
the mountainous terrain.
5.1.1 Context
Socio-economic context
The location of Greece, at the south-eastern point of the European Union,
means that good transport connections to the rest of the EU are essential to
ensure economic development is promoted and maintained, and that it is not
constrained by Greece’s relatively peripheral location. High quality transport links
between neighbouring Member States (including Italy, Central Europe and the
Balkans) are therefore vital for Greece’s economic and social wellbeing.
The Cohesion Fund has been instrumental in facilitating improvements to the
transport infrastructure in Greece, including the PATHE axis (considered in
more detail later in this section), and the Egnatia Odos highway running east-
west in the north of the country.
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Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
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Figure 4 shows that the change in GDP since 2000 for Greece as a whole, and
also for the Prefecture which contains the Agios Konstantinos bypass project.
Although there is no data available from 2007 onwards, the data shows that GDP
growth in the Agios Konstantinos area has consistently lagged behind the
National GDP.
Figure 4. National vs. Prefecture GDP growth since 2000
Source: Prepared from Eurostat data
Figure 5 shows the change in employment levels compared to the year 2000.
Again data is only available until 2007. However, it does show that in since 2005
in particular, the prefecture of Fthiotida has not experienced the same levels of
employment growth experienced in the rest of Greece.
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
% c
han
ge in
Eu
ro p
er
inh
abit
ant
bas
ed
on
20
00
leve
ls
Greece (National) Fthiotida (Prefecture)
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Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
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Figure 5. National vs. Prefecture change in employment since 2000
Source: prepared from Eurostat data
Although the bypass is a relatively localised development, it has provided a
significant improvement on the main road transport axis through the Prefecture.
Moreover, this complex project has kept a number of people employed during
the long construction period (and beyond), thereby facilitating employment and
economic growth in the area. The ex ante CBA forecast that 10,080 person years
would be required during construction and 115 employees would be required
once the project is open.
Strategic policy context
The PATHE highway is one of the most important road corridors in Greece. It
serves 6 regions, 11 prefectures, 16 cities, 9 ports and 6 airports. This axis has
been improved to highway standards in a number of locations over recent years.
The main objectives of the PATHE improvements (as specified in EU
Directorate-General Energy and Transport; 'TEN-T priority axes and projects 2005')
were the following:
reduced in journey times;
accelerated economic and regional development;
improved freight connections to central Europe and the rest of the EU;
increased tourism and trade; and,
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
% c
han
ge i
n e
mp
loym
en
t ra
te (
fro
m 2
00
0 le
vels
)
Greece (National) Fthiotida (Prefecture)
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Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
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fewer road accidents.
The specific objectives of the Agios Konstantinos Bypass project were listed in
the Application for Funding and are summarised below:
to increase average speeds on the motorway;
to improve safety on the motorway;
to improve road connections between Greece and the European Union;
to reduce load/capacity ratio;
to increase motorway capacity;
to reduce accidents; and,
to reduce journey times.
It can be seen that the project-specific objectives are clearly aligned with the
wider objectives of the whole PATHE axis.
5.1.2 Sources
We have used a number of different data sources for this review which can be
grouped into three categories, as follows:
stakeholder workshops/meetings;
project documentation; and,
primary and secondary data.
Stakeholder workshops
In July 2010 we organised a stakeholder workshop with representatives present
from the following institutions:
Ministry of National Economy;
Ministry of Public Works;
PATHE (Beneficiary); and,
TRADEMCO (the consultants responsible for preparing the ex ante
cost-benefit analysis document).
The stakeholder meetings were an opportunity to clarify our understanding of
the assumptions underpinning the ex ante CBA, and to obtain any additional
data. Additionally, the meetings provided a chance to discuss the overall
usefulness of the CBA in the decision-making process. We also made follow-up
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contact with each of the stakeholders where further support and advice was
necessary.
In addition to this workshop, we also met with the Mayor of Agios Konstantinos
and a representative from the Sterea Ellada region which covers the project area
to discuss the local and regional impacts of the project.
We have also had a regular dialogue with Ionia Odos, the current operator of the
route following handover from PATHE in 2009.
We are grateful to Ionia Odos and the other stakeholders listed in this section for
their valuable input to this study and timely provision of data.
Project Documentation
We have obtained a number of documents relating to the Agios Konstantinos
Bypass project which are listed in Table 1 together with their source.
Table 1. Summary of project related documentation
Document (Author) Obtained from
Technical & Financial Feasibility Study for the Project:
Upgrade of National Road 1 (PAThE) to Highway. Road
Section: Agios Konstantinos – Skarfeia. September 2001.
(TRADEMCO)
Ministry of Economy
EC Application for Assistance Ministry of Economy
EC Commission Decision DG REGIO
Annual Report, April 2009 DG REGIO
Final Report (Draft) Ministry of Economy
Expected Impact in the Agios Konstantinos and Kamena
Vourla wider area from the construction of the new ring
road in Maliakos Bay Area, June 2008
Municipality of Agios
Konstantinos
Primary and secondary data
In addition to the project related documentation, we have also undertaken a
comprehensive data collection exercise with a summary of the documents
obtained shown in Table 2. We are grateful to the Ministry of Economy,
Ministry of Public Works and Ionia Odos for their assistance.
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Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
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Table 2. Summary of Primary & Secondary Data Availability
Data Pre-project Opening Post-project Opening
Traffic flows through Agios Konstantinos.
No count data exists for the project section in the vicinity of Agios Konstantinos. However, data is available from Tragana toll station downstream of the project (see below).
The evaluation team commissioned traffic surveys on the old road east and west of Agios Konstantinos (2 x five day counts).
In addition, traffic flow data from the tunnel monitoring system (located on the new road between Agios Konstantinos and Kamena Vourla) was provided for 2009 and 2010.
Traffic flows upstream & downstream of the project
Traffic flow data from the Tragana Toll Station (southbound only) was provided by PATHE for the period 2001 to 2008.
Traffic flow data from the Tragana Toll Station was provided by Ionia Odos from 2008 to 2010 (southbound only until Sept 2009, then bidirectional).
Highway journey times
No observed journey times are available. However, before opening journey speeds are presented in the CBA which has enabled average journey times to be calculated.
Post opening journey time surveys were undertaken by the evaluation team in July 2010.
Accident data Accident statistics for the project area have been provided for the period 2001 to 2007 by PATHE.
Accident statistics for the project area have been provided for the period November 2008 to July 2010 by Ionia Odos
Project costs Forecast investment costs were obtained from the CBA.
Outturn costs were supplied by PATHE.
5.2 Ex post cost-benefit analysis
This section presents the results of the ex post cost benefit analysis for the Agios
Konstantinos Bypass project using observed data between 2000 and 2010 (that is
before and after project opening).
Headline results from the analysis:
This section offers some headline results from the analysis which will be explored
in more detail in the following section. Before presenting the ex post results, the
following table shows the traffic demand assumptions we have used in our low
and high case scenarios developed for this evaluation
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Economic analysis
The results of the ex post economic analysis for the high and low case over the
30 year appraisal period are presented in Table 3
Table 3. Summary of ex post economic analysis (2000 prices)
Low Case High Case
Net Present Value (€m) 233 283
Economic IRR (%) 12.6% 13.4%
Benefit-cost ratio 2.1 2.4
Source: Own calculation
A detailed breakdown of these results by year is shown in Annexe 1.
The headline results in Table 3 shows that the project represents good value for
money with a benefit-cost ratio ranging from 2.1 to 2.4 and an IRR ranging from
approximately 12% to 14%. The narrow range between the Low and High case
demonstrates the robustness of the project benefits and shows that despite
different traffic growth assumptions, the large journey time benefits provided by
this project are sufficient to generate considerable levels of economic benefit. It
should also be noted that, in the ex post analysis, we have not considered the
impacts of the removal of severe congestion events which often occurred at
weekends in the summer holiday season. The time savings provided by the
project on these occasions would offer considerable benefits to road users.
Therefore the ex post economic results presented here represent a conservative
estimate of actual impacts of the project.
We consider the details underlying this estimate in more detail later in this
chapter.
Financial analysis
The results of our ex post financial analysis for the high and low case are
presented in Table 4 which shows the return on the investment and the return
on capital (2008 prices, 5% discount rate, and 30 year appraisal period). The
financial analysis considers the investment costs, future maintenance costs, and
income from tolls. A detailed breakdown of the results is shown in Annexe 1 and
the detail underlying this estimate is considered in more detail later in this
chapter.
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Table 4. Summary of ex post financial analysis (2000 prices)
Low case High case
Net Present Value – Investment (€m) -173 -166
Financial IRR – Investment (%) -1.7% -1.3%
Net Present Value – Capital (€m) -85 -78
Financial IRR – Capital (%) 0.5% 1.0%
Source: Own calculation
Table 4 shows that the project is not financially viable. This was also predicted
in the ex ante CBA. This is due to the high investment cost associated with to the
complex structures required to overcome for the difficult topographical
conditions in the Agios Konstantinos area. Moreover, lower traffic volumes than
expected have impacted the revenue from tolls.
The financial analysis differs from the economic analysis because the latter
includes time savings for road users which make up the vast majority of the
benefits attributable to this project.
Wider socio-economic impacts
The Agios Konstantinos bypass is only approximately two years into its expected
economic life. Generally, economic and social and environment impacts often
take many years to materialise. Clearly the effect of the recent economic
downturn in Greece must also be considered as this may be offsetting the initial
positive impact of the project. However, a number of immediate benefits are also
apparent. These are summarised below, with more details provided later in this
chapter:
noise and air quality improvements for Agios Konstantinos residents;
improved town centre and urban environment ambience following the
removal of through traffic and congestion; and
reduced (and more reliable) journey times between Athens and
Thessaloniki to support economic activity between Greece and other
EU states.
5.2.1 Costs
This section considers the one-off costs associated with the project construction,
and the ongoing annual costs associated with the maintenance of the new
infrastructure.
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Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
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One-off costs
Investment cost data has only recently been finalised. At the time of writing, the
Final Report for the project was still in draft form. PATHE have, however, been
able to provide some unit cost data at a partial level of disaggregation. The data
was provided in ‘as spent’ costs. However, PATHE also provided information on
the year in which each expenditure was made. This has enabled the conversion
into 2000 prices to match the forecast costs contained in the CBA document.
Table 5 provides a summary of the outturn costs broken down into unit costs at
the best level of detail possible from the information supplied. We have been
informed that ‘constructions’ refers to ‘bridges, crossings, retaining walls,
drainage canals and small tunnels’. The total cost of the entire project was
€317.863m (2000 prices including VAT) and the cost per kilometre was
€15.658m.
Table 5. Summary of ex post unit costs (2000) prices.
Description Unit cost
Level 1
'All in' unit cost (€m/km) € 15.658
Level 2
Unit cost of land (€m/ha) € 0.311
Unit 'build' cost roadworks (€m/km) € 2.706
Unit 'build' cost of tunnels (€m/km) € 19.276
Unit 'build' cost of constructions (€m/km) € 2.456
Source: PATHE
Unfortunately, forecast unit costs were not provided in the CBA document so
Table 6 shows the forecast project costs in as much detail as is available.
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Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
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Table 6. Summary of forecast project costs (2000) prices
Description Unit cost
Construction € 267.057
Design € 4.402
Land/Expropriation € 5.869
Project Management € 0.880
Other unknown costs € 0.587
Total Cost (including VAT) € 278.795
Total cost (excluding VAT @ 20%) € 223.000
Source: Ex ante CBA
A comparison of the forecast with outturn project investment costs shows that
the project was 14% over the original forecast contained in the CBA. PATHE
supplied a number of reasons for the cost overrun. These were:
compensation for expropriation is determined by the Greek courts and
therefore is almost impossible to forecast in advance;
activation of EU Directive EN 54/2004 for tunnel safety midway
through construction;
additional transported soil material was required as the excavated soil
had poor characteristics;
additional embankment stabilisation works were required; and
increased construction time due to archaeological findings.
Ongoing costs
A number of ongoing costs are incurred every year to maintain and operate the
new road. They include both the maintenance and operation of the road surface,
structures, drainage, electronic driver information systems and environmental
maintenance.
Annual maintenance costs were calculated and included in the ex ante CBA and
were forecast to be approximately €2.3m per annum (2000 prices), with
additional major works every 10 years costing €4.9m. These figures have been
taken to remain constant throughout the project’s life and are maintained for the
14 Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS | March 2011
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
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ex post analysis because the majority of outturn maintenance costs have not yet
been incurred, limiting the potential to use observed figures.
5.2.2 Direct benefits
Time savings
The ex ante CBA provided forecasts of journey times without the project and
with the project (on both the new and old roads). We have collected post
opening journey times. Table 7 provides a comparison.
Table 7. Summary of Predicted vs. Observed Journey Time Savings (LGV)
Route
Without
project
(mm:ss)
With
project
(mm:ss)
Time saving
(mm:ss)
Predicted (2010)
Old Road 22:30 15:18 07:22
New Road N/A 11:00
11:30
(compared to old road
without project)
Observed (2010)
Old Road 22:30* 13:12 09:18
New Road N/A 9:06
13:24
(compared to old road
without project)
Source: Predicted: Ex Ante CBA. Observed: Data collected by evaluation team in July 2010.
(*) Pre implementation journey time data was not available for this project. The predicted ‘without’ project
journey times have therefore been used for the purposes of this evaluation.
The table shows that the journey time savings resulting from the Agios
Konstantinos Bypass project are greater than forecast for both the old and new
roads. The reason for this difference is that it was observed on the site visit that
many of vehicles using the bypass travel in excess of the 80-100km/h speed limit
in place and the ex ante appraisal did not consider speed limit violations along
the extent of the project.
We have undertaken the calculation of the ex post monetary journey time benefit
using the following approach:
step 1: calculation the forecast annual vehicle hour saving in 2010 using
traffic flow and journey time data in the ex ante CBA;
step 2: calculate the actual vehicle hour saving in 2010 using observed
traffic flow and journey time data; and,
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Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
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step 3: relate the difference between the forecast and actual vehicle hour
saving in 2020 to the monetary saving in 2010.
We have used this approach for the remainder of the appraisal period (up to
2030). We were able to calculate the forecast annual vehicle hours in all years
using the journey speed/time and traffic forecasts presented in the ex ante CBA.
To calculate ‘actual’ annual vehicle hours, we deduced traffic growth assumptions
(High and Low case), and assumed the same decrease in vehicle speeds forecast
in the CBA.
Traffic Impacts and Congestion Reduction
The project has been successful in reducing congestion due to the provision of
extra highway capacity in the area. Figure 6 shows a comparison between the
before and after opening traffic flows in the Agios Konstantinos area. This
shows a considerable reduction in the number of vehicles using the route
through the town compared to the pre project situation, and these flows are also
lower than those forecast. Traffic flows using the new bypass are also lower than
expected, likely to be due to the recession affecting overall traffic growth in
Greece.
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Figure 6. Predicted vs. observed traffic flows in the study area.
Source: Openstreemap.org
The CBA assumed that 36% of traffic would remain on the old road and 64%
would switch to the new bypass. Although the CBA does not state the location
of the traffic forecast on the old road (i.e. east or west of Agios Konstantinos),
surveys commissioned by the study team either side of the town shows that
traffic flows are almost the identical at the two locations. Figure 7 shows that
transfer of trips onto the new road is actually 84% with only 16% of vehicles
remaining on the old road. This transfer of trips, larger than expected, is
therefore likely to have enhanced the local air quality and noise impacts for local
residents in the area.
The traffic flows presented in Figure 7 show that traffic growth has been lower
than predicted between 2007 and 2010 across a ‘screenline’ encompassing the old
road through Agios Konstantinos and the bypass. This is most likely a direct
result of the recession causing a general decrease in traffic volumes throughout
Greece exacerbating the differences between predicted and observed flows rather
than a error in the traffic forecasting undertaken for this project.
To Athens
To
Thessaloniki
Highway 1 (E75)
National Road 1
N
-
17,200
17%
-
-
-
Legend
AADT Before Opening (2007)
AADT After Opening (2010)
%HGV
-
3,300
4%19,000
-
18%
-
10,900
20%
Observed Forecast
25,500
-
22%
ForecastObserved
-
19,000
20%
ForecastObserved
March 2011 | Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS 17
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
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Figure 7. Predicted vs. observed traffic flows in the study area
Note: The locations of the traffic flows shown on this map are for presentation purposes only.
The reliability of journey times would also have improved as a result of the
increased capacity of the route. The CBA did not quantify the reliability of
journey times, as it is very difficult to model and monetise. However, it is
reasonable to assume that journey time reliability (particularly in the busy summer
months) has improved considerably. The Mayor of Agios Konstantinos stated
anecdotally that delays in excess of 60 minutes were not uncommon in the
summer months before the project opened. This potential for delay has now
been removed following opening of the project.
Vehicle Operating Costs (VOC’s)
Vehicle operating costs savings were calculated in the ex ante CBA. However,
these benefits or dis-benefits cannot be isolated because they have been included
with the monetary journey time benefits and are not presented separately.
Therefore, for the ex post evaluation, we have had to consider journey time
savings and VOC savings together using the approach described earlier for the
evaluation of journey time benefits.
To Athens
To
Thessaloniki
Highway 1 (E75)
National Road 1
N
84%
-
-
-
Legend
AADT Before Opening (2007)
AADT After Opening (2010)
% Change
19,000
20,500
+8%
- % Of Corridor Traffic
25,500
30,000
+18%
Observed Forecast
Forecast
36%
Observed Forecast
64%
16%
Observed
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Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
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Toll Revenues
The ex ante CBA forecast an increase in toll revenues from the project. This was
based on a rate of €0.03 per PCU (Passenger Car Unit) per kilometre. The CBA
was prepared based on the assumption that the project (and the rest of the
motorway) would not be part of a concession. This has not occurred in reality, as
Ionia Odos now have responsibility for the road as part of a 30 year contract
which commenced in 2007.
Although any toll revenues generated by the project currently benefit a private
operator, we have calculated the ex post impact on toll revenues for the purposes
of the financial analysis. The approach is based on relating the difference
between forecast and actual traffic volumes to annual toll revenues. For example,
if traffic volumes are twice those forecast, then the toll revenues would be
double. We haven’t considered necessary to undertake a more complex
evaluation of toll revenues; firstly because they represent a relatively small
proportion of the financial impact of the project, and secondly because the €0.03
per km rate is similar to the rate we understand is being used in Greece at present
(€0.04per km).
5.2.3 Externalities
Safety
Observed accident statistics in the study area have been made available from
PATHE (before opening) and Ionia Odos (after opening). These data cover the
period 2001 to 2010. The opening year (2008) has been excluded from the
evaluation as it has not been possible to determine whether the accidents
recorded in this year occurred before or after opening.
Table 8 provides a summary of the casualty numbers in the area covered by the
project. It should be noted that the coverage of the accident areas in the pre- and
post-project situation is uncertain, although we have presumed it to be the same.
We also acknowledge that accident reporting is likely to be considerably more
comprehensive on the new road compared to the old road, where many minor
accidents may not have necessitated a police presence and thereby may not have
been recorded. The pre-opening casualty numbers presented in the table are
therefore likely to represent a best case scenario.
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Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
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Table 8. Summary of Predicted vs. Observed Casualty Numbers
Year Slight Serious Fatal
Be
fore
Op
en
ing
2001 21 4 3
2002 23 5 1
2003 21 4 0
2004* 34 7 30
2005 13 3 1
2006 5 1 1
2007 6 1 1
2008 Excluded from analysis
Aft
er
Op
en
ing
2009 20 4 1
2010 (Jan-Jul) 7 1 0
Source: PATHE and Ionia Odos
* The casualty figures for 2004 are skewed by a serious accident involving a coach with numerous
passengers. The 2004 data has also been excluded from the ex post economic analysis to avoid the
monetary benefits becoming skewed by one major accident.
The casualty figures show a clear decrease in accidents since the project opened
compared to the five year period between 2001 and 2005. There is a large
decrease in casualties in 2006 and 2007 before the project opened. The reasons
for this are unknown. However, based on the limited amount of post opening
data available, the early indications are that the project is reducing the number of
accidents in the Agios Konstantinos area.
The ex ante CBA only presents the monetary accident benefits and does not
show the predicted number of accidents saved to generate this benefit.
Therefore, for the ex post evaluation we have used the HEATCO accident values
and applying these to the modest saving in accidents observed in Table 8. (Pre
project average of 2001-2007 (excluding 2004) & post project 2009 and 2010).
The ex ante CBA assumes an accident benefits profile whereby the opening year
monetary benefits are replicated throughout the appraisal period despite forecast
increases in traffic. The ex post evaluation has used the same assumption, but the
HEATCO values have been adjusted to reflect changes in GDP, so the accident
benefits increase over time.
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Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
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Environmental (noise, pollution, CO2)
Environmental externalities were considered briefly in the ex ante CBA, but the
impacts were not monetised. The considerable reduction in traffic using the
former main route through Agios Konstantinos would have had beneficial local
air quality and noise impacts for local residents. This is also supported by
anecdotal evidence provided by the Mayor of Agios Konstantinos, as most traffic
now uses the new road with limited noise and air quality impacts.
5.2.4 Wider impacts
The ex ante documentation for the Agios Konstantinos provides only little
detailed information about this project’s wider impacts. The ex ante
documentation reports a number of local and strategic wider impacts of the
project, as summarised below.
With regards to local benefits, the ex ante documentation mentions:
improvement to Air Quality, Noise, Groundwater and general urban
environment in Agios Konstantinos through the maintenance of speed
on the new facility and removal of through traffic in the town;
respect of the landscape and of the protection of cultural heritage
including the Spa at Kamena Vourla and other archaeological sites of
significance; and,
support of regional economic and cultural development through
increasing access to employment opportunities and minimising outward
migration from the area.
The following wider impacts are also considered:
as the project forms part of the PATHE Highway upgrade (one of 14
high priority TEN projects), it was expected for the improvement to the
north-south axis to improve Greece’s commercial connectivity with
external countries (particularly Balkan States) and major sea ports
including Thessaloniki; Athens; and Patra;
enhancement road characteristics of the north-south access to standards
consistent with those across the EU;
reduction of manufacturing costs (thanks to better travel links), leading
to an increase in Greece’s competitiveness.
Further to the above, the ex ante evaluation provides an estimate of the number
of jobs (direct and indirect) that the project was anticipated to generate in its
construction and operational phases. The detail of the forecast impact on jobs is
discussed further in the sections that follow. The remainder of this section sets
March 2011 | Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS 21
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
out our general approach to the ex post evaluation and summarises the impacts
identified in discussions with key stakeholders with an appreciation of the project
and its social, environmental and economic impacts.
Approach to ex post evaluation
The effects of the recent economic downturn have been particularly prevalent in
Greece. As such the impacts reported in this section need to be considered
within the context of such challenging economic conditions.
We have drawn upon the following sources of information:
a post opening study examining the post opening impacts of the bypass
on the towns of Agios Konstantinos and Kammena Vourla (Expected
Impact in the Agios Konstantinos and Kammena Vourla wider area from the
construction of the new ring road in the Maliakos bay area, June 2010);
a semi structured interview with the Mayor of Agios Konstantinos and a
representative from the Sterea Ellada region (July 2010); and,
focus group discussion (July 2010) with representatives from:
PATHE;
Greece Ministry of Public Works; and
Greece Ministry of Economy.
Economic Impacts
The economic benefits of this project need to be considered within the context
of a number of major infrastructural improvements in Greece including: Athens
Metro; Rio – Antirion Bridge, Athens International Airport; Athens Tram;
Thessaloniki Metro, Egnatia Odos, Ionia Odos and PATHE.
Impact on the Local Economy
The Agios Konstantinos bypass and Kamena Vourla bypass (separate to this
project, but integral to it) are two of the projects in the Maliakos bay intended to
improve the PATHE to cities in bordering countries and remove traffic from the
two cities bypassed.
A post-graduate study completed in June 2008 (supervised by the department of
Economic and Regional Development, Pantio University of Social and Political
Sciences) concluded the following with regard economic impacts.
The removal of traffic will initially result in a reduction in passing trade and
therefore revenue generated for businesses located on the old route. These
initial adverse impacts will however be offset by longer term gains
22 Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS | March 2011
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
attributable to the likely future growth in tourism fuelled by the change in
urban realm.
In accordance with the anticipated loss in employment for businesses
immediately following project open, an increase in tourist trade facilitated by
removal of the town centre traffic will help to increase local employment
opportunities.
Assuming that future land use planning in Kamena Vourla and Agios
Konstantinos is coordinated, both could benefit from the rewards of growth
in tourism.
The Agios Konstantios officials stated that, prior to the Agios Konstantinos
Bypass, that traffic had restricted the town’s ability to take advantage of passing
trade. This is because, during peak times in the summer season, temporary traffic
management prevented vehicles from stopping. Our consultation also
highlighted a series of further impacts.
On the whole the long-term effects were likely to far outweigh the adverse
impacts on local businesses (for example, 250 job losses at a local hotel on
the old route – shown in Figure 8). Moreover, the town would now be able
to exploit the opportunity to develop its tourism sector.
The tourism sector can now benefit from enhanced parking management,
sea front catering facilities, access to ferry terminal (connection with
Skiathos), better access to local cultural and historical monuments, improved
pedestrian environment, increased provision of holiday home
accommodation.
There is anecdotal evidence that Kamena Vourla may have been slightly
disadvantaged in comparison to Agios Konstantinos in economic terms, as
increasing numbers of people using the corridor appear to be stopping in the
latter relative to the former.
Relief of the old route has facilitated access and egress to Agios
Konstantinos’s sea port, which serves 400,000 passengers per annum
(Figure 9).
March 2011 | Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS 23
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
Figure 8. Hotel in Agios Konstantinos – 250 jobs lost upon closure
Figure 9. Agios Konstantinos Port and ferry to Skiathos
Stakeholders’ anecdotal views suggest that the project has made a contribution
towards achieving the strategic objectives set out at the beginning of this section.
24 Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS | March 2011
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
This largely appears to have been achieved through improvements to journey
times, better safety and improved journey time reliability. Simultaneous to this,
the project has also contributed to improving the economic attractiveness and
future growth potential of the bypassed towns through removing traffic
congestion on less suitable routes through built up areas.
Administrative burdens and local authorities
Other than the contractual arrangements associated with the implementation of
the toll infrastructure, the project has not created any direct administrative duties
for the local authorities or businesses bypassed by the improvement. One
interesting feature of this project is that the concessionaire (Ionia Odos) has
continued responsibility for the maintenance of the old route alignment through
Agios Konstantinos as it forms the only diversion route in the event of tunnel
closures on the route. Consequently, remedial water drainage works undertaken
following project opening have been funded by the concessionaire rather than
the local authority. Such arrangements were obviously well supported by officials
in Agios Konstantinos.
Quality of life and community impacts
The post opening study, undertaken in 2010, suggests that there has been a
qualitative improvement in the urban and natural environment in the bypassed
settlements. In turn, these will offer immediate quality of life benefit for both
permanent and temporary residents.
Such findings were substantiated through feedback from Agios Konstantinos’s
officials, who confirmed that local quality of life impacts form the bypass had
been positive. The perception was that the effects of reduced traffic had been
much better than expected and consequently there have been significant benefits
to Agios Konstantinos’s residents in the form of reduced noise, improved air
quality, reduced severance between the town and sea, and safer access to the
coast. Furthermore, it was felt that the project had made a positive contribution
to local tourism as well as tranquillity and road accident problems along the old
route – all of which contribute to an improved community environment.
Property and land use
At a local level, the officials at Agios Konstantinos identified that the removal of
traffic and congestion, paralleled with fast access and reliable road access from
Athens, has created conditions for regeneration of the town to strengthen its
tourism economy. Whilst the project does not appear have generated immediate
changes in land use, its impacts in traffic terms is being used as an opportunity to
reconfigure spatial planning policies in the town. It was estimated by one
stakeholder that the project had facilitated the construction of 2,000 new homes
over the wider local area – many of which are thought to have a holiday home
March 2011 | Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS 25
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
function. The importance of tourism in the town is demonstrated through an
increase in the summer population to around 15,000, compared to just 5,000 in
the winter months.
Skills, Labour and Employment
Whilst it is not clear how these figures were prepared, Table 9 summarises the
number of jobs forecast to be created as a result of the Agios Konstantinos
project at the ex ante stage. With an absence of baseline assumptions and the
range of other factors influencing employment growth in the vicinity of the
project and Greece more generally, it is not appropriate to provide a quantitative
estimate of the number of jobs created by this project.
Table 9. Summary of forecast job creation
Construction Phase Operational Phase
Project
Phase
Direct
Jobs
Indirect
Jobs
Expected
Duration
Direct
Jobs
(Increase
per
annum)
Indirect
Jobs
(Increase
per
annum)
Agios
Konstatintos 5585 4495 6 years 65 50
Source: Ex ante CBA
There is very limited evidence of the measured actual impacts of the bypass on
skills, labour and employment. There is perception amongst local officials that
the project will aid local tourism, which will in turn lead to job creation for
people in the area. Figure 5 above suggests that there has been increase in the
employment levels in the prefecture within which the project passes. However,
given that the geographical coverage of the prefecture is much greater than the
project’s influence area and there is an absence of employment data beyond 2007,
it is not possible to verify whether this upward trend is permanent or attributable
directly to the project. The project was constructed using resources from the
local area, however it was not possible to confirm whether or not these were in
line with expectations.
Environmental impacts
No post opening environmental impact monitoring has taken place for this
project and hence it is not possible to verify the forecast benefits on the physical
environment in quantitative terms. From the information available at the time of
post opening evaluation, the following can be assumed regarding environmental
impacts:
26 Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS | March 2011
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
reduced traffic levels in the town will have inevitably resulted in a
substantial reduction in air pollution and noise levels;
the removal of traffic from the town has enabled the local authority to
re-modal its spatial planning framework to enhance opportunities for
tourism activity and reduce severance between the main town and
seafront;
Figure 10. Old road through Agios Konstantinos to be integrated into future master
planning proposals
the removal of traffic has helped to mitigate the disruption caused by
remedial drainage works needed to remove flooding risk in Agios
Konstatinos;
the use of tunnels along part of the route means that it has been
sympathetically integrated into the landscape to minimise visual
intrusion to properties overlooking the route; and,
public areas and the urban environment has dramatically improved
following the opening of the motorway, which in time will promote
tourist activity.
March 2011 | Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS 27
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
Other Impacts
To conclude this qualitative assessment of wider impacts it is worth mentioning
that feedback from stakeholders and our own site visits that the project will make
a long term contribution to the strategic objectives set out at the beginning of
this section. More specifically the improved route demonstrates a step change in
service level on the A1 through this part of the north south corridor and is in
accordance with that provided on other parts of the TEN-T network.
Utilisation rates
As requested by the TORs, we have considered the evolution of the utilisation
rate of the project since opening. We have calculated this by considering, for the
year 2010, the ratio between the actual flow (AADT) and the total potential flow
(AADT) that could be accommodated on the E75, based on our route capacity
calculations.
Table 10 shows the total AADT in 2010 on the E75. The table also shows the
total maximum capacity available, based on a calculation of Congestion
Reference Flow given by the UK formula:
350,75*100
*100
*** AAWT
AADT
PkDPkFWfNLCapacityCRF
where,
NL = Number of lanes per direction = 2
Wf = Width factor = 1
PkF = Percentage of 2 way daily flow occurring in peak hour (assumed to be 10
for this project)
PkD = Percentage directional split of peak hour traffic (assumed to be 50 for
this project)
AADT/AAWT (assumed to be 1 for this project)
Capacity = 2300 – (25 x proportion of HGVs) = 2300 – (25 x 16.7%) = 1884
28 Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS | March 2011
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
Table 10. Utilisation rates on the E75 Agios Konstantinos Bypass (2010)
Observed Flow Theoretical
Capacity
Utilisation
Rate
Agios
Konstantinos
bypass
17,213 75,348 23%
Source: Own calculation based on Ionia Odos tunnel data and UK capacity formulae.
Based on our calculation, we have found that utilisation rates on the bypass are
around 23%. However, we note that, due to the assumptions underpinning this
calculation, this result should be treated as purely indicative and only represents a
snapshot of the current situation.
Table 11 presents the utilisation rate at the end of the appraisal period (2030) if
the forecast traffic growth is realised (3% annual increase). This shows that the
project will be approaching half capacity in 2030 if the forecast traffic growth
between 2010 and 2030 is realised.
Table 11. Utilisation rates on the E75 Agios Konstantinos Bypass (2030)
Observed Flow Theoretical
Capacity
Utilisation
Rate
Agios
Konstantinos
Bypass
31,088 75,348 41%
Source: Own calculation based on Ionia Odos tunnel data and UK capacity formulae.
Meeting environmental requirements
The Greek planning process requires a comprehensive assessment of the
environmental impacts of major investment proposals, prior to the issuing of an
environmental permit. An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was
prepared in 2001, but we could not obtain it for this study. However, we are
aware that the EIA covered the extent of the project works and facilitated the
approval of the Environmental Permit and the EC Application for Funding
document.
The project does not pass through or near to any internationally important sites
(Natura 2000), and potential environmental impacts were mitigated where
required (noise barriers and animal crossings). However, the project did have an
impact on the local spring water, but this was successfully managed by the
March 2011 | Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS 29
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
mitigation measures proposed. Indeed the successful management of the
potential hydrology issues was raised by the Mayor of Agios Konstantinos.
Unintended effects of the project
With the exception of traffic levels on the new road being lower than forecast,
the nature of the impacts identified in the ex-post evaluation were broadly in line
with expectations and stakeholders were unable to elaborate on any additional
unintended impacts.
Uncertainty and sensitivity analysis
There are clearly many uncertainties involved when forecasting the long term
impacts of large scale investment projects such as the Agios Konstantinos
Bypass. Although the ex post evaluation uses observed data from before and
after project opening, there are still many years of the appraisal period which are
unknown, as the project is so recent. We have therefore presented a range of
results in the form of a ‘low’ and ‘high’ case which aims to consider future levels
of traffic growth. The differences between the low and high case were presented
earlier in this report, and are presented in Table 12 along with the ex ante CBA
traffic demand assumptions for comparison purposes.
Table 12. Summary of traffic growth assumptions between low and high case
Ex Ante Ex Post
Low case High case
2008-2012 3% 0% 0%
2013-2019 3% 2% 4%
2020-2025 3% 1.5% 3%
2026-2031 3% 0.75% 1.5%
Source: Own calculation
Note: The Ex ante appraisal period is 2000-2030 with an opening year of 2007. The ex post appraisal
period has been extended to 2031 to account for 2008 opening year.
It is our view that the two scenarios presented above represent a best estimate of
the lower and upper levels of impact attributable to the project, and the actual
impacts will lie somewhere between the two tests.
Margin of Error
The high case scenario demand over the 30 year evaluation period generates an
NPV of 21% above the low case scenario. This margin of error is due to the
30 Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS | March 2011
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
uncertainty relating to economic and associated levels of traffic growth expected
over the 30 year period.
5.3 Review ex ante cost-benefit analysis
This section of the report presents a review of the ex ante cost benefit analysis
(dated 2002) that supports the EC Application for Assistance and includes an
overview of the headline results, and commentary on the methodology and
approach to the ex ante CBA.
The ex ante CBA submitted for the project detailed the forecast costs and
benefits that the project would deliver over the 30 year appraisal period (2000-
2030), and the opening year was assumed to be 2007. The CBA only considered
one route option (which was built), but a number of sensitivity tests were
undertaken which are considered later in this section.
Table 13 presents the headline economic results presented in the CBA for the
Agios Konstantinos Bypass project. The figures shown are in 2000 prices
discounted to 2000 at 5%.
Table 13. Results of ex ante economic analysis
NPV (€ million, 2000
prices)
Economic IRR
(%)
BCR
Agios Konstantinos
Bypass 422.1 17.6% 3.1
Source: Ex ante CBA
This table shows that the project was forecast to generate considerable economic
benefits, and the BCR in excess of 3 proves that in economic terms the project
was predicted to be good value for money.
Table 14 shows the results of the financial analysis presented in the CBA. The
figures presented are in 2000 prices discounted to 2000 at 7%.
March 2011 | Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS 31
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
Table 14. Results of ex ante financial analysis
NPV
(€ million, 2000 prices)
Financial IRR
(%)
Agios Konstantinos
Bypass -154.0 -0.7%
Source: Ex ante CBA
The results of the financial analysis show that the project was not forecast to be
financially viable. The high investment cost was cited as the main reason for the
negative IRR presented in the CBA. It is clear therefore, that this project was
justified purely on economic grounds.
5.3.1 Key aspects of ex ante CBA
The CBA calculated monetary impacts for the following benefit streams:
traffic impacts – including journey times and vehicle operating costs
savings; and,
reduction in accidents.
We note that costs and benefits associated with environmental impacts were not
monetised in the CBA.
The remainder of this section briefly reviews some of the key elements of the ex
ante CBA.
Traffic Analysis
The CBA contains traffic forecasts for the ‘without project’ and ‘with project’
variants for the forecast opening year (2007) and a horizon year (2030). The key
assumptions relating to the traffic forecasts are listed below.
Annual traffic growth of 3% per annum over the entire appraisal period.
This is based on three previous road studies that were undertaken in
Greece for different projects, and forecast GDP growth. A description
of the studies used to inform this calculation was not provided.
36% of total traffic would remain on the old road through Agios
Konstantinos and Kamena Vourla.
This figure was derived from a traffic model which was developed
especially for this project.
32 Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS | March 2011
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
10% extra light vehicle trips assumed in the opening year in the ‘with
project’ scenario (i.e. induced traffic).
The 3% per annum increase in traffic was then applied to this traffic
flow.
The assumption underpinning this 10% increase has not been supplied
in the CBA document.
The ‘rule of a half’ has been applied to the additional generated traffic,
in accordance with the EU’s CBA guidelines.
The calculations used to determine the performance of the route with and
without the project were based on simple capacity formulae and speed-flow
relationships contained within the United States Highway Capacity Manual
(HCM).
Accident analysis
Improvements in safety were forecast to occur as a result of the project, and
these have been converted into monetary accident benefits. However, it seems
from the CBA that a detailed analysis of accident location and causality was not
undertaken, and the assumptions underpinning the monetary benefits derived
have not been provided. It is also noted that despite the 3% per annum increase
in traffic forecast, the annual accident benefit has been forecast to remain the
same. This therefore represents a conservative estimate, as increased traffic
would normally be expected to increase the saving in accidents in the ‘with
project’ compared to the ‘without project’ scenario.
Economic and Financial Analysis
The CBA the results of the economic and financial analysis and the results were
presented in Table 13 and Table 14 earlier in this section. Here we to highlight
the main areas where the analysis could have been undertaken differently.
Future year maintenance costs associated with the new highway have been
included both in the economic and financial analysis. Current guidance
recommends that maintenance costs are included in the financial analysis
only. Therefore the economic benefits presented represent a conservative
estimate due to the inclusion of the maintenance costs.
The CBA assumed that project would not be part of a concession. This has
not occurred as Ionia Odos now have responsibility for maintaining the
route in return for the toll revenues. Therefore any increase in toll revenues
as a result of the project now go to the private operator rather than
contributing to national funds.
March 2011 | Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS 33
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
Sensitivity analysis and risk Assessment
A detailed risk assessment was not undertaken for this project. However, a
number of sensitivity tests were undertaken to demonstrate the robustness of the
economic benefits of the project. The tests which were presented in Table 15 are
as follows.
Table 15. Results of ex ante sensitivity analysis
Scenario Net Present Value
(€ million, 2000 prices) BCR
3% discount rate €663.9m 3.9
7% discount rate €267.3m 2.5
5% discount rate & 15% cost increase €400.4m 2.8
5% discount rate & 15% cost decrease €443.7m 3.5
Source: Ex ante CBA
The forecasts in Table 15 show that despite the variations in costs and discount
rates tested, the project was still forecast to deliver value for money. It should be
noted, however, that the CBA did not consider the potential for changes in
traffic demand.
5.4 Differences between ex post and ex ante
analysis
Table 16 compares the results of the ex ante economic analysis with the results
of the ex post CBA for the Agios Konstantinos Bypass project.
34 Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS | March 2011
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
Table 16. Comparison of ex ante and ex post economic CBA (2000 prices)
Ex ante Ex post
Low case High case
Net Present Value (€m) 422.1 233 283
Economic IRR (%) 17.6% 12.6% 13.4%
Benefit-cost ratio 3.10 2.1 2.4
Source: Ex ante CBA and own calculation (for ex post analysis)
Overall, PATHE estimated that the project would deliver value for money. With
an NPV of about €422, and a benefit cost ratio of 3.1. However, we have
reviewed in detail many of the key parameters and some significant changes to
the assumptions made in our ex post evaluation, and even with these changes the
ex post analysis has confirmed that the project has delivered value for money,
despite the lower than forecast traffic volumes which are currently being
experienced in the area.
We have identified the following sources of differences between the ex ante
analysis and the ex post evaluation:
the CBA assumed that 64% of road users will switch to the Bypass and
the observed data shows that 84% of traffic has switched to the Bypass;
traffic volumes on the new road are currently lower than forecast in the
CBA (most likely due to the recession), and the observed journey time
savings are actually greater than forecast;
our ex-post evaluation does not capture the benefits of the scheme in
the height of the summer season and therefore potentially represents an
under estimate of the true scheme benefits.
investment costs were underestimated by approximately €40m due to a
number of reasons stated earlier in the report;
the ex ante CBA included maintenance costs in the economic and
financial analysis, whilst the ex post evaluation included maintenance
costs in the financial evaluation only;
a discount rate of 5% was used in the ex ante economic analysis and
5.5% in the ex post evaluation (in accordance with the EC’s 2008 Guide
to CBA of Investment Projects);
March 2011 | Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS 35
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
a discount rate of 7% was used in the ex ante financial analysis and 5%
in the ex post evaluation (in accordance with the EC’s 2008 Guide to
CBA of Investment Projects); and,
the Agios Konstantinos Bypass opened in 2008, and not 2007 as
forecast.
in the ex post analysis we have calculated the expected residual value of
the project at the end of the appraisal period by applying a linear
depreciation over 30 years to the capital expenditure incurred. The ex
ante CBA also calculated the residual value of the project, but this was
based on a series of calculations for each element of the project
construction (bridges, tunnels, surfacing, electronic message signs etc).
The impact of these differences results in an ex post and the BCR and IRR are
lower than forecast, however, the project still represents good value for money.
5.5 Role of CBA in decision-making process
As mentioned above, we held a workshop with representatives from the Greek
Ministry of Economy and Public Works and stakeholders representing both the
Agios Konstantinos project and also the Thriasio to Korinthos Rail project. The
discussion on the role of CBA in the decision making process was therefore a
discussion about CBA in Greece generally. A summary of the main points raised
is provided below.
The CBA was recognised as being both a necessary procedure to complete
the funding application and a useful tool for prioritising options within
projects where alternative options can be tested. It was noted that a CBA is
normally not prepared for smaller local projects.
The CBAs were produced by external consultants with audits by the Ministry
of Economy. This consisted of logical and common sense checks.
In the case of both the Agios Konstantinos Bypass and the Thriasio to
Korinthos railway, the CBA was not used as a tool to compare alternative
options. For the bypass in particular, there was little potential for alternative
route options due to the difficult topography in the area.
The CBA process has not been used to prioritise between different projects
(e.g. the Agios Konstantinos Bypass as opposed to the Thriasio to
Korinthos railway). Decisions at this level had been based on the
requirements for improving the priority axes and the total funding allocated
to Greece.
36 Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS | March 2011
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
The CBA is considered a useful process because it provides estimations of
the main impacts. However, it is considered limited because CBA struggles
to capture the potential for regional benefits which take time to materialise.
It was noted that whilst the applications had stressed these benefits they, had
been unable to be quantified within the CBA;
Feedback relating to the EC’s CBA guidance document was positive and the
guide was deemed helpful to standardise the CBA process.
There was a view that the level of effort required to complete a CBA is
proportional to the project being considered. It was noted that the majority
of the time input required is for the detailed project design and not the CBA.
March 2011 | Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS 37
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
Detailed results
Figure 11. Agiou Konstantinou bypass – Greece. Economic analysis (€m, 2000
prices) – Low case
Source: Own calculations
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
BENEFITS
Consumers Surplus
Time Benefits & Vehicle Operating Costs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 44.8 48.3 42.2 42.5 42.7 43.8 44.8 45.8 46.8 47.8 48.7 49.7
Accident Reduction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
TOTAL BENEFITS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 45.4 48.9 42.7 43.0 43.3 44.4 45.5 46.5 47.5 48.5 49.5 50.4
COSTS
Investment Costs
Land 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.3 2.8 12.0 9.6 15.7 1.7 2.1 0.1
Roadworks 0.1 0.2 1.0 0.4 3.4 14.6 11.6 19.0 2.1 2.5 0.1
Tunnels 0.2 0.7 2.9 1.2 10.3 44.4 35.5 58.1 6.3 7.7 0.3
Constructions 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.4 3.1 13.2 10.6 17.3 1.9 2.3 0.1
Total Investment costs 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 11.9 14.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TOTAL COSTS 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 11.9 14.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NET BENEFITS -0.4 -1.3 -5.5 -2.4 -19.6 -84.2 -67.4 -110.1 33.6 34.3 42.1 43.0 43.3 44.4 45.5 46.5 47.5 48.5 49.5 50.4
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031
BENEFITS
Consumers Surplus
Time Benefits & Vehicle Operating Costs 50.3 50.9 51.5 52.1 52.6 53.1 53.2 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3 53.3
Accident Reduction 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0
TOTAL BENEFITS 51.1 51.7 52.3 52.9 53.5 54.0 54.1 54.2 54.3 54.3 54.3 54.3
COSTS
Investment Costs
Land
Roadworks
Tunnels
Constructions
Total Investment costs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -130.6
TOTAL COSTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -130.6
NET BENEFITS 51.1 51.7 52.3 52.9 53.5 54.0 54.1 54.2 54.3 54.3 54.3 184.9
Discount Rate 5.5%
ENPV 233
ERR 12.6%
B/C Ratio 2.1
38 Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS | March 2011
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
Figure 12. Agiou Konstantinou bypass – Greece. Financial return on investment (€m,
2000 prices) – Low case
Source: Own calculations
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
TOTAL REVENUES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 6.2 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.7 5.8 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3
Land 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.3 2.8 12.0 9.6 15.7 1.7 2.1 0.1
Roadworks 0.1 0.2 1.0 0.4 3.4 14.6 11.6 19.0 2.1 2.5 0.1
Tunnels 0.2 0.7 2.9 1.2 10.3 44.4 35.5 58.1 6.3 7.7 0.3
Constructions 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.4 3.1 13.2 10.6 17.3 1.9 2.3 0.1
TOTAL INVESTMENT COSTS 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 11.9 14.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Maintenance 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3
TOTAL OPERATING COSTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3
TOTAL OUTFLOWS 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 14.2 16.9 3.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3
CASH FLOW -0.4 -1.3 -5.5 -2.4 -19.6 -84.2 -67.4 -110.1 -8.4 -10.7 2.4 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.5 1.0 3.8 3.9 4.0
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031
TOTAL REVENUES 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8
Land
Roadworks
Tunnels
Constructions
TOTAL INVESTMENT COSTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -130.6
Maintenance 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
TOTAL OPERATING COSTS 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
TOTAL OUTFLOWS 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 -128.3
CASH FLOW 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.4 1.8 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 135.1
Discount rate 5.0%
FNPV (C) -173
FRR (C) -1.7%
March 2011 | Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS 39
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
Figure 13. Agiou Konstantinou bypass – Greece. Financial return on capital (€m,
2000 prices) – Low case
Source: Own calculations
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Revenues 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 6.2 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.7 5.8 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3
Residual values
TOTAL FINANCIAL INFLOWS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 6.2 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.7 5.8 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3
Local contribution
Regional contrintribution
National contribution 0.2 0.8 3.5 1.5 12.3 53.1 42.4 69.4 7.5 9.2 0.4
Total national public contribution 0.2 0.8 3.5 1.5 12.3 53.1 42.4 69.4 7.5 9.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Maintenance 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3
Total Operating Costs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3
TOTAL FINANCIAL OUTFLOWS 0.2 0.8 3.5 1.5 12.3 53.1 42.4 69.4 9.8 11.5 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3
NET CASH FLOW -0.2 -0.8 -3.5 -1.5 -12.3 -53.1 -42.4 -69.4 -4.0 -5.3 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.5 1.0 3.8 3.9 4.0
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031
Revenues 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8
Residual values 130.6
TOTAL FINANCIAL INFLOWS 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 137.4
Local contribution
Regional contrintribution
National contribution
Total national public contribution 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Maintenance 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
Total Operating Costs 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
TOTAL FINANCIAL OUTFLOWS 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
NET CASH FLOW 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.4 1.8 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 135.1
Discount rate 5.0%
FNPV (K) -85
FRR (K) 0.5%
40 Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS | March 2011
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
Figure 14. Agiou Konstantinou bypass – Greece. Financial sustainability (€m, 2000
prices) – Low case
Source: Own calculations
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
EU Grant 0.1 0.5 2.0 0.9 7.2 31.2 24.9 40.7 4.4 5.4 0.2
Local contribution
Regional contrintribution
National contribution 0.2 0.8 3.5 1.5 12.3 53.1 42.4 69.4 7.5 9.2 0.4
Total national public contribution 0.2 0.8 3.5 1.5 12.3 53.1 42.4 69.4 7.5 9.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Operating subsidies
FINANCIAL RESOURCES 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 11.9 14.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Passenger vehicles
Goods vehicles
TOTAL REVENUES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TOTAL INFLOWS 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 11.9 14.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Land 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.3 2.8 12.0 9.6 15.7 1.7 2.1 0.1
Roadworks 0.1 0.2 1.0 0.4 3.4 14.6 11.6 19.0 2.1 2.5 0.1
Tunnals 0.2 0.7 2.9 1.2 10.3 44.4 35.5 58.1 6.3 7.7 0.3
Constructions 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.4 3.1 13.2 10.6 17.3 1.9 2.3 0.1
TOTAL INVESTMENTS COSTS 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 11.9 14.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3
TOTAL OPERATING COSTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3
TOTAL OUTFLOWS 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 14.2 16.9 3.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3
NET CASH FLOW 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -5.0 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3
CUMULATED CASH FLOW 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.3 -4.6 -7.0 -9.3 -11.6 -2.3 -4.6 -7.0 -12.0 -14.3 -16.6 -18.9
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031
EU Grant
Local contribution
Regional contrintribution
National contribution
Total national public contribution 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Operating subsidies
FINANCIAL RESOURCES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Passenger vehicles
Goods vehicles
TOTAL REVENUES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TOTAL INFLOWS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Land
Roadworks
Tunnals
Constructions
TOTAL INVESTMENTS COSTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Maintenance 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
TOTAL OPERATING COSTS 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
TOTAL OUTFLOWS 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
NET CASH FLOW -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -5.0 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3
CUMULATED CASH FLOW -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -5.0 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3
March 2011 | Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS 41
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
Figure 15. Agiou Konstantinou bypass – Greece. Economic analysis (€m, 2000
prices) – High case
Source: Own calculation
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
BENEFITS
Consumers Surplus
Time Benefits & Vehicle Operating Costs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 44.8 48.3 42.2 42.5 42.7 44.7 46.6 48.6 50.6 52.7 54.8 56.9
Accident Reduction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
TOTAL BENEFITS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 45.4 48.9 42.7 43.0 43.3 45.3 47.2 49.2 51.3 53.4 55.5 57.6
COSTS
Investment Costs
Land 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.3 2.8 12.0 9.6 15.7 1.7 2.1 0.1
Roadworks 0.1 0.2 1.0 0.4 3.4 14.6 11.6 19.0 2.1 2.5 0.1
Tunnels 0.2 0.7 2.9 1.2 10.3 44.4 35.5 58.1 6.3 7.7 0.3
Constructions 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.4 3.1 13.2 10.6 17.3 1.9 2.3 0.1
Total Investment costs 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 11.9 14.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TOTAL COSTS 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 11.9 14.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NET BENEFITS -0.4 -1.3 -5.5 -2.4 -19.6 -84.2 -67.4 -110.1 33.6 34.3 42.1 43.0 43.3 45.3 47.2 49.2 51.3 53.4 55.5 57.6
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031
BENEFITS
Consumers Surplus
Time Benefits & Vehicle Operating Costs 58.5 60.1 61.7 63.3 64.9 66.5 67.1 67.7 68.2 68.7 69.2 69.7
Accident Reduction 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0
TOTAL BENEFITS 59.2 60.9 62.5 64.1 65.7 67.3 68.0 68.6 69.2 69.7 70.2 70.7
COSTS
Investment Costs
Land
Roadworks
Tunnels
Constructions
Total Investment costs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -130.6
TOTAL COSTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -130.6
NET BENEFITS 59.2 60.9 62.5 64.1 65.7 67.3 68.0 68.6 69.2 69.7 70.2 201.3
Discount Rate 5.5%
ENPV 283
ERR 13.4%
B/C Ratio 2.4
42 Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS | March 2011
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
Figure 16. Agiou Konstantinou bypass – Greece. Financial return on investment (€m,
2000 prices) – High case
Source: Own calculations
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
TOTAL REVENUES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 6.2 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.7 5.9 6.2 6.4 6.7 7.0 7.2
Land 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.3 2.8 12.0 9.6 15.7 1.7 2.1 0.1
Roadworks 0.1 0.2 1.0 0.4 3.4 14.6 11.6 19.0 2.1 2.5 0.1
Tunnels 0.2 0.7 2.9 1.2 10.3 44.4 35.5 58.1 6.3 7.7 0.3
Constructions 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.4 3.1 13.2 10.6 17.3 1.9 2.3 0.1
TOTAL INVESTMENT COSTS 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 11.9 14.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Maintenance 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3
TOTAL OPERATING COSTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3
TOTAL OUTFLOWS 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 14.2 16.9 3.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3
CASH FLOW -0.4 -1.3 -5.5 -2.4 -19.6 -84.2 -67.4 -110.1 -8.4 -10.7 2.4 3.1 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.9 1.4 4.4 4.7 4.9
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031
TOTAL REVENUES 7.4 7.6 7.9 8.1 8.3 8.5 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.7 8.8 8.9
Land
Roadworks
Tunnels
Constructions
TOTAL INVESTMENT COSTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -130.6
Maintenance 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
TOTAL OPERATING COSTS 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
TOTAL OUTFLOWS 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 -128.3
CASH FLOW 5.1 5.3 5.5 5.7 5.9 6.1 3.5 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.5 137.1
Discount rate 5.0%
FNPV (C) -166
FRR (C) -1.3%
March 2011 | Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS 43
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
Figure 17. Agiou Konstantinou bypass – Greece. Financial return on capital (€m,
2000 prices) – High case
Source: Own calculations
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Revenues 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 6.2 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.7 5.9 6.2 6.4 6.7 7.0 7.2
Residual values
TOTAL FINANCIAL INFLOWS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 6.2 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.7 5.9 6.2 6.4 6.7 7.0 7.2
Local contribution
Regional contrintribution
National contribution 0.2 0.8 3.5 1.5 12.3 53.1 42.4 69.4 7.5 9.2 0.4
Total national public contribution 0.2 0.8 3.5 1.5 12.3 53.1 42.4 69.4 7.5 9.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Maintenance 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3
Total Operating Costs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3
TOTAL FINANCIAL OUTFLOWS 0.2 0.8 3.5 1.5 12.3 53.1 42.4 69.4 9.8 11.5 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3
NET CASH FLOW -0.2 -0.8 -3.5 -1.5 -12.3 -53.1 -42.4 -69.4 -4.0 -5.3 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.9 1.4 4.4 4.7 4.9
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031
Revenues 7.4 7.6 7.9 8.1 8.3 8.5 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.7 8.8 8.9
Residual values 130.6
TOTAL FINANCIAL INFLOWS 7.4 7.6 7.9 8.1 8.3 8.5 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.7 8.8 139.5
Local contribution
Regional contrintribution
National contribution
Total national public contribution 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Maintenance 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
Total Operating Costs 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
TOTAL FINANCIAL OUTFLOWS 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
NET CASH FLOW 5.1 5.3 5.5 5.7 5.9 6.1 3.5 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.5 137.1
Discount rate 5.0%
FNPV (K) -78
FRR (K) 1.0%
44 Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS | March 2011
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
Figure 18. Agiou Konstantinou bypass – Greece. Financial sustainability (€m, 2000
prices) – High case
Source: Own calculations
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
EU Grant 0.1 0.5 2.0 0.9 7.2 31.2 24.9 40.7 4.4 5.4 0.2
Local contribution
Regional contrintribution
National contribution 0.2 0.8 3.5 1.5 12.3 53.1 42.4 69.4 7.5 9.2 0.4
Total national public contribution 0.2 0.8 3.5 1.5 12.3 53.1 42.4 69.4 7.5 9.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Operating subsidies
FINANCIAL RESOURCES 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 11.9 14.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Passenger vehicles
Goods vehicles
TOTAL REVENUES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TOTAL INFLOWS 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 11.9 14.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Land 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.3 2.8 12.0 9.6 15.7 1.7 2.1 0.1
Roadworks 0.1 0.2 1.0 0.4 3.4 14.6 11.6 19.0 2.1 2.5 0.1
Tunnals 0.2 0.7 2.9 1.2 10.3 44.4 35.5 58.1 6.3 7.7 0.3
Constructions 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.4 3.1 13.2 10.6 17.3 1.9 2.3 0.1
TOTAL INVESTMENTS COSTS 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 11.9 14.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Maintenance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3
TOTAL OPERATING COSTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3
TOTAL OUTFLOWS 0.4 1.3 5.5 2.4 19.6 84.2 67.4 110.1 14.2 16.9 3.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3
NET CASH FLOW 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -5.0 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3
CUMULATED CASH FLOW 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.3 -4.6 -7.0 -9.3 -11.6 -13.9 -16.2 -18.6 -23.5 -25.9 -28.2 -30.5
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031
EU Grant
Local contribution
Regional contrintribution
National contribution
Total national public contribution 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Operating subsidies
FINANCIAL RESOURCES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Passenger vehicles
Goods vehicles
TOTAL REVENUES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TOTAL INFLOWS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Land
Roadworks
Tunnals
Constructions
TOTAL INVESTMENTS COSTS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Maintenance 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
TOTAL OPERATING COSTS 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
TOTAL OUTFLOWS 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
NET CASH FLOW -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -5.0 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.3
CUMULATED CASH FLOW 0.0 -2.3 -4.6 -7.0 -9.3 -11.6 -16.6 -18.9 -21.2 -23.5 -25.9 -28.2
March 2011 | Frontier Economics, Atkins, ITS 45
Appendix 5 – Agiou Konstantinou bypass in
Greece
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