Managing Threat and Error in Medicine
Robert L. Helmreich, PhD, Robert L. Helmreich, PhD, FRAeSFRAeS
American Society ofAmerican Society ofSafety EngineersSafety Engineers
Atlanta, March 13, 2003Atlanta, March 13, 2003
Human Factors Research ProjectHuman Factors Research ProjectThe University of Texas at AustinThe University of Texas at Austin
UT Human Factors Research UT Human Factors Research ProjectProject
Support from:Support from: Federal Aviation AdministrationFederal Aviation Administration Agency for Healthcare Research and QualityAgency for Healthcare Research and Quality
Applying aviation safety approaches to medicine Applying aviation safety approaches to medicine NASANASA Daimler-Benz FoundationDaimler-Benz Foundation American College of SurgeonsAmerican College of Surgeons Kaiser-Permanente HMOKaiser-Permanente HMO
Medicine and AviationMedicine and Aviation
Safety is primary goalSafety is primary goal– But cost drives decisionsBut cost drives decisions
Technological innovationTechnological innovation
Multiple sources of threatMultiple sources of threat
Second guessing after disasterSecond guessing after disaster– Air crashesAir crashes
– Sentinel eventsSentinel events
Teamwork is essentialTeamwork is essential
Error is Inevitable Because of Error is Inevitable Because of Human LimitationsHuman Limitations
Limited memory capacityLimited memory capacity Limited mental processing Limited mental processing
capacitycapacity Negative effects of stress Negative effects of stress
– Tunnel visionTunnel vision Negative influence of fatigue and Negative influence of fatigue and
other physiological factorsother physiological factors Cultural effectsCultural effects Flawed teamworkFlawed teamwork
Journalists can sensationalize error!
Journalists can sensationalize error!
In both aviation and medicine, In both aviation and medicine, people must cope with technologypeople must cope with technology
Newer technology doesn’t Newer technology doesn’t eliminate erroreliminate error
Nor does even newer technologyNor does even newer technology
Threats in AviationThreats in Aviation
Overt ThreatsOvert Threats Adverse weatherAdverse weather TerrainTerrain TrafficTraffic Airport conditionsAirport conditions A/C malfunctionsA/C malfunctions Automation eventsAutomation events Communication eventsCommunication events
Operational time pressuresOperational time pressures Non-normal operationsNon-normal operations ATC commands / errorsATC commands / errors Cabin events / errorsCabin events / errors MX events / errorsMX events / errors Dispatch events / errorsDispatch events / errors Ground crew events / errorsGround crew events / errors
Latent ThreatsLatent Threats
Factors not directly linked to Factors not directly linked to observable threat and error that observable threat and error that increase risk and the probability of increase risk and the probability of errorerror
Crew management of latent threats Crew management of latent threats is difficult because they are not is difficult because they are not immediately visibleimmediately visible
Latent threat identification is key to Latent threat identification is key to accident and incident analysisaccident and incident analysis
Latent Threat ExamplesLatent Threat Examples Inadequate management oversightInadequate management oversight Inadequate regulatory oversightInadequate regulatory oversight Flawed procedures Flawed procedures Organizational culture and climateOrganizational culture and climate Scheduling and rostering practicesScheduling and rostering practices Crew fatigueCrew fatigue Performance assessment practicesPerformance assessment practices Inadequate accident and incident Inadequate accident and incident
investigationinvestigation
Representative Threat Findings:Representative Threat Findings:Data from Observations in 12 Data from Observations in 12
AirlinesAirlines 90% of flights had one or more 90% of flights had one or more
threatsthreats Organizational range – 84% to 97%Organizational range – 84% to 97% Most frequent threatsMost frequent threats
Adverse weather – 19%Adverse weather – 19% ATC clearances/late changes 16%ATC clearances/late changes 16%
Why Teamwork Matters Why Teamwork Matters
Most endeavors in medicine, science, and Most endeavors in medicine, science, and industry require groups to work together industry require groups to work together effectivelyeffectively
Failures of teamwork in complex Failures of teamwork in complex organizations can have deadly effectsorganizations can have deadly effects
More than 2/3 of air crashes involve More than 2/3 of air crashes involve human error, especially failures in human error, especially failures in teamworkteamwork
Professional training focuses on technical, Professional training focuses on technical, not interpersonal, skillsnot interpersonal, skills
3 Cultures – National, 3 Cultures – National, Organizational, ProfessionalOrganizational, Professional
Culture influences how juniors relate to Culture influences how juniors relate to their seniorstheir seniors
Culture influences how information is Culture influences how information is sharedshared
Culture influences attitudes regarding Culture influences attitudes regarding stress and personal capabilitiesstress and personal capabilities
Culture influences adherence to rulesCulture influences adherence to rules Culture influences interaction with Culture influences interaction with
computers and technologycomputers and technology
Professional CultureProfessional Culture Pilots and doctors have a strong Pilots and doctors have a strong
professional culture with positive and professional culture with positive and negative aspectsnegative aspects
Positive:Positive:– Strong motivation to do wellStrong motivation to do well– Pride in professionPride in profession
Negative:Negative:– Training that stresses the need for perfectionTraining that stresses the need for perfection– Sense of personal invulnerabilitySense of personal invulnerability
Personal InvulnerabilityPersonal InvulnerabilityThe majority of pilots and doctors in all cultures The majority of pilots and doctors in all cultures
agree that:agree that: their decision-making is as good in their decision-making is as good in
emergencies as in normal situationsemergencies as in normal situations their performance is not affected by personal their performance is not affected by personal
problemsproblems they do not make more errors under high stressthey do not make more errors under high stress true professionals can leavetrue professionals can leave behind personal behind personal
problemsproblems
Pilots’ and Doctors’ AttitudesPilots’ and Doctors’ Attitudes
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Pilot Doctor
Decision as good inemergencies as normal
Effective pilot/doctor canleave behind personal problems
Performance the same with inexperienced team
Perform effectively whenfatigued
%
Threat in Threat in medicinemedicine
Expected Events and Risks
Patient conditionStaff support
Environmental conditions
Unexpected Events and Risks
Patient conditionStaffing
Equipment failure/availability
External ErrorDrugs
LaboratoryPatient diagnosis
Threats – Latent and ActiveEvents and errors outside the individual or team
that require active management for safety
OrganizationalCulture
SchedulingStaffing
Error policyEquipment
SystemNational culture
Health-care policyMedical coverage
ProfessionalQualificationMotivation
Culture(Invulnerability)
Fatigue as ThreatFatigue as Threat
24 hours of sleep deprivation have 24 hours of sleep deprivation have performance effects comparable to performance effects comparable to a blood alcohol content of 0.1%a blood alcohol content of 0.1%
Drew Dawson – Drew Dawson – Nature, 1997Nature, 1997 US resident shifts may exceed US resident shifts may exceed
100hrs100hrs Fatigue may be the greatest source Fatigue may be the greatest source
of error in medicine (US and many of error in medicine (US and many other countries – excluding other countries – excluding DenmarkDenmark))
Threats to Safety in the ORThreats to Safety in the OR
ProficiencyProficiency
FatigueFatigue
Flawed group dynamicsFlawed group dynamics
LeadershipLeadership
Unexpected patient reactionUnexpected patient reaction
ErrorError
CFIT: Controlled Flight into CFIT: Controlled Flight into TrainTrain
44,000-98,000 deaths/year 44,000-98,000 deaths/year due to medical errordue to medical error
- IOM Report- IOM Report
““Deaths Due to Medical Errors Are Deaths Due to Medical Errors Are Exaggerated in Institute of Medicine Exaggerated in Institute of Medicine
Report”Report”-McDonald et. Al., JAMA 5 Jul 2000-McDonald et. Al., JAMA 5 Jul 2000
““Institute of Medicine Medical Error Institute of Medicine Medical Error Figures Are Figures Are NotNot Exaggerated” Exaggerated”
- Leape, JAMA 5 Jul 2000- Leape, JAMA 5 Jul 2000
Typology of Observable Team Typology of Observable Team ErrorError
1. Task Execution1. Task Execution – – Unintentional physical act that deviates Unintentional physical act that deviates from intended course of actionfrom intended course of action
2. Procedural2. Procedural –– Unintentional failure to follow mandated Unintentional failure to follow mandated proceduresprocedures
3. Communication3. Communication – Failure to transmit information, failure to – Failure to transmit information, failure to understand information, failure to share mental modelunderstand information, failure to share mental model
4. Decision4. Decision – Choice of action unbounded by procedures that – Choice of action unbounded by procedures that unnecessarily increase riskunnecessarily increase risk
5. Intentional Noncompliance5. Intentional Noncompliance – Violations of formal – Violations of formal procedures or regulationsprocedures or regulations
Decision ErrorDecision Error
Decision that increases risk in a situation Decision that increases risk in a situation with:with:– Multiple courses of action possibleMultiple courses of action possible– Time available to evaluate alternatives Time available to evaluate alternatives – No discussion of consequences of alternate No discussion of consequences of alternate
courses of actioncourses of action– No formal procedures to followNo formal procedures to follow
Maintaining Competence in Maintaining Competence in AviationAviation
In addition to initial competency In addition to initial competency qualification, airline pilots must re- qualification, airline pilots must re- qualify annuallyqualify annually
Airline pilots are strictly limited in Airline pilots are strictly limited in terms of flight time – 8 hours in one terms of flight time – 8 hours in one day, 30 hours in one week, 100 day, 30 hours in one week, 100 hours in one month, 1,000 hours per hours in one month, 1,000 hours per yearyear
Conceptual Framework of our Conceptual Framework of our ProjectProject
The University of Texas Threat and The University of Texas Threat and Error Management Model – developed Error Management Model – developed in aviation and being adapted to in aviation and being adapted to medicinemedicine
An empirically derived model of how An empirically derived model of how professionals deal with latent and overt professionals deal with latent and overt threats in their operating environments threats in their operating environments and the inevitable errors that occurand the inevitable errors that occur
Threat and Error Management Threat and Error Management ModelModel
Th re ats:Late n t an d Ov e rt
Th re at M an ag e me n t
In co n se q ue n tial In cide n t / Accide n t
Erro rs
Erro r M an age me n t
Un de sire d AircraftState
Un de sire d AircraftState M an age me n t
Use of the ModelUse of the Model
International Air Transport International Air Transport Association using to classify all air Association using to classify all air accidents worldwideaccidents worldwide
Continental Airlines using to classify Continental Airlines using to classify all incident reportsall incident reports
Being implemented as framework for Being implemented as framework for near-miss reporting system at UT near-miss reporting system at UT hospitalshospitals
Team Processes Are Both Team Processes Are Both Sources of Error and Defenses Sources of Error and Defenses
Against Threat and ErrorAgainst Threat and Error
Authority Impedes Authority Impedes CommunicationCommunication
Junior staff is unwilling to question the actions of Junior staff is unwilling to question the actions of seniorsseniors– Refrain from speaking up when errors are observedRefrain from speaking up when errors are observed
Nurses say nothing when anesthesiologist dozesNurses say nothing when anesthesiologist dozes
Communication from junior to senior is indirect Communication from junior to senior is indirect (and, hence, not understood)(and, hence, not understood)– Indirect communication from junior surgeon who Indirect communication from junior surgeon who
sees senior neurosurgeon about to operate on wrong sees senior neurosurgeon about to operate on wrong side of brainside of brain
– Co-pilot who reads aloud from manual instead of Co-pilot who reads aloud from manual instead of warning captain that aircraft will run out of fuel and warning captain that aircraft will run out of fuel and crashcrash
Antidotes toAntidotes toThreat and ErrorThreat and Error
Safety Requires DataSafety Requires Data
Surveys/interviews of front-line Surveys/interviews of front-line personnelpersonnel
Non-jeopardy observations of Non-jeopardy observations of normal behavior (e.g., OR)normal behavior (e.g., OR)
Analysis of adverse and sentinel Analysis of adverse and sentinel events, near misses, and successesevents, near misses, and successes
Confidential incident reporting Confidential incident reporting systemssystems
ProceduresProcedures
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) were aviation’s first countermeasures were aviation’s first countermeasures against threat and erroragainst threat and error
Aviation is arguably over-Aviation is arguably over-proceduralizedproceduralized– Tombstone regulationTombstone regulation
Medicine is under-proceduralizedMedicine is under-proceduralized– Example: Checklists are critical error Example: Checklists are critical error
countermeasurescountermeasures
Training in Threat and ErrorTraining in Threat and ErrorCountermeasures:Countermeasures:
Crew Resource Management Crew Resource Management (CRM)(CRM)
CRMCRM
CRM training has evolved through 6 CRM training has evolved through 6
generations from psychobabble management generations from psychobabble management
training to threat and error management training to threat and error management
integrated with traditional “stick and rudder” integrated with traditional “stick and rudder”
trainingtraining It focuses on teamwork and communicationsIt focuses on teamwork and communications It is being extended into space-flight, nuclear, It is being extended into space-flight, nuclear,
maritime domains – and medicine maritime domains – and medicine
An Expanded Definition of An Expanded Definition of CRMCRM
CRM Skills
Error Management
Error Avoidance
Threat Management
Undesired Aircraft State Management
Sixth Generation CRM
Training Issues in ThreatTraining Issues in Threatand Error Managementand Error Management
Human limitations as sources of errorHuman limitations as sources of error The nature of error and error managementThe nature of error and error management Culture and communicationsCulture and communications Expert decision-makingExpert decision-making Training in using specific behaviors and procedures as Training in using specific behaviors and procedures as
countermeasures against threat and errorcountermeasures against threat and error– BriefingsBriefings– InquiryInquiry– Sharing mental modelsSharing mental models– Conflict resolutionConflict resolution– Fatigue and alertness managementFatigue and alertness management
Analysis of positive teamwork and adverse and sentinel Analysis of positive teamwork and adverse and sentinel eventsevents
Lessons I Have LearnedLessons I Have Learned
Basic medical education should include human Basic medical education should include human factors, human limitations, and human errorfactors, human limitations, and human error
Safety initiatives must reflect and address Safety initiatives must reflect and address organizational and professional culturesorganizational and professional cultures
Culturally relevant team training can enhance Culturally relevant team training can enhance safetysafety
Organizations need a clear policy regarding Organizations need a clear policy regarding errorerror Tolerant of unintentional error but not violationsTolerant of unintentional error but not violations
Medicine has a long way to goMedicine has a long way to go
The University of Texas The University of Texas Human Factors Research ProjectHuman Factors Research Project
www.psy.utexas.edu/HumanFactors