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ACTIVISM REPORT
Contested Elections Resea
June 20
Dave Whissel
Director of [email protected]
+1 212 961 7506 x211
488 Madison Avenue, 23rdFl
New York, NY 100
+1 212 961 75
www.proxymosaic.c
Beware of Activists Bearing Formulas: Activist Investors
and the Success of Financial Engineering
Over the past several years, activist investors have grown considerably in
prominence and firepower. Since 2010, 15% of the members of the S&P 500 have
been the subject of an activism campaign,1 and in 2014, more activists targeted
more companies than ever before.2 Investors, attracted by the promise of strong
returns from this burgeoning asset class, have rushed in to the sector. During 2014,
activist stock holdings increased to nearly $250 billion,3and there is even more dry
powder available for future campaigns.4Despite its apparent explosion in popularity,
however, activism is hardly a new strategy. Instead, its basic tenets have shifted over
the years, to the point where there is now a fairly well-defined taxonomy5 of
activism strategies. Of these, financial engineering has been one of the most
popular.
According to Activist Insight, there have been 2,426 activist investments in North
America since 2010, more than a quarter of which have been concerned with some
kind of financial engineering. In the prototypical situation, an activist will take a
position in an underperforming company and argue that it is undervalued. This value
may be unlocked through a transaction that monetizes a portion of the companys
assets, typically via a divestiture or spin-off of a business unit. More exotictransactions, such as a sale-leaseback of a companys real estate assets or a
conversion from a C-corporation to a master limited partnership (MLP) or real estate
investment trust (REIT), are also possible.
At the other end of the spectrum, companies that have been performing well have
also found themselves in activists crosshairs. In the years following the financial
crisis, corporations had been hoarding tremendous piles of cash, making them
fodder for activists to enter the scene and advocate for that cash to be put to more
1"An Investor Calls." The Economist. The Economist, 07 Feb. 2015. Web. 05 June 2015. Available at:
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21642175-sometimes-ill-mannered-speculative-and-wrong-activists-
are-rampant-they-will-change-american2Black, Josh. "Editor's Foreword." Activist Investing: An Annual Review of Trends in Shareholder Activism (2015).
Available at: http://www.shareholderforum.com/access/Library/20150130_ActivistInsight-SRZ.pdf3Id.4Zagger, Zachary. "M&A Boom To Continue In 2015 With Deal-Friendly Economy." Law360. 05 June 2015.
Available at: http://www.law360.com/articles/599657/m-a-boom-to-continue-in-2015-with-deal-friendly-
economy5Levin, Michael. "A Taxonomy of Activist Investing Strategies." The Activist Investor. 05 June 2015. Available at:
http://www.theactivistinvestor.com/The_Activist_Investor/Blog/Entries/2014/6/17_A_Taxonomy_of_Activist_Stra
tegies.html
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ACTIVISM REPORT
Contested Elections Resea
June 20
Dave Whissel
Director of [email protected]
+1 212 961 7506 x211
488 Madison Avenue, 23rdFl
New York, NY 100
+1 212 961 75
www.proxymosaic.c
efficient use, such as via share buybacks or acquisitions.6The flow of cheap money
enabled by ZIRP has also fueled this phenomenon.
But amidst the proliferation of activist investing in general and its sub-strategy of
financial engineering in particular, few have stopped to ask what is, to us, an obvious
question: Do these financial engineering transactionsshare buybacks, divestitures,spin-offs, and acquisitionsactually create shareholder value like activists claim?
In many respects, there is an unbridgeable divide between activists and issuers.
Activists will claim that issuers and their management teams are too self-serving and
resistant to change; issuers will claim that activists have only short-term goals in
mind, and are hardly concerned with long-term shareholder value. However, we
believe that by looking at the data objectively, we can begin to bridge the divide. We
have examined a sample set of approximately 100 cases of activism campaigns
involving financial engineering over five years. Rather than having to rely on rhetoric,
our data-driven approach to this question can help determine whether claims of
unlocking shareholder value are just hot air, or whether activism truly does what it
says on the tin.
A Background on Financial Engineering
Financial engineering is somewhat of a pejorative term that refers to a sub-set of
activist investing that encompasses a range of strategies. There are two activist
investing taxonomies that we can use. One, posited by Michael Levin, includes
categories of social activism, governance activism, operational activism, and
financial activism.7 The second, used by Activist Insight, includes board-related
activism, balance sheet activism, business strategy activism, M&A activism, and
governance activism.
Source: Activist Insight
6Plath, Chris. Shareholder Activism: Impact on North American Corporate Sectors. Moodys Investor Service. 05
June 2015. Available at: http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/corp_gov/activist-interventions-roundtable-2014-
materials/2014_03_shareholder-activism-impact-on-na-corporates.pdf7Levin, Michael. "A Taxonomy of Activist Investing Strategies." The Activist Investor. 05 June 2015. Available at:
http://www.theactivistinvestor.com/The_Activist_Investor/Blog/Entries/2014/6/17_A_Taxonomy_of_Activist_Stra
tegies.html
Balance SheetActivism
ShareRepurchase
Dividends
Recapitalization
Leverage
Board RelatedActivism
Gain BoardRepresentation
EliminateStaggered
Board
SeparateChair/CEO
BusinessStrategy
OperationalEfficiency
REIT/MLPConversion
Cost-Cutting
M&A Activism
Merger
Acquisition/Divestiture
Takeover
Spin-Off
GovernanceActivism
Compensation
BylawAmendments
Poison Pill
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ACTIVISM REPORT
Contested Elections Resea
June 20
Dave Whissel
Director of [email protected]
+1 212 961 7506 x211
488 Madison Avenue, 23rdFl
New York, NY 100
+1 212 961 75
www.proxymosaic.c
Broadly speaking, financial engineering activism represents a cross between purely
financial or balance sheet activism, business strategy or operational activism, and
M&A activism. Specifically, financial engineering activism deals with activist
campaigns where the primary goal of the shareholder is to pursue one of the
following:
Dividends Share
repurchases
Capital
restructuring
(e.g., increasing
leverage)
Acquisitions Divestitures Spin-offs
REIT/MLP
conversion
Pursue sale to
third party (e.g.,
private equity
buyout)
Mergers
Overall, financial engineering strategies are used in approximately half of all North
American activism campaigns. The reasons for the popularity of financial
engineering strategies within activism are manifold, but boil down to several factors
at both the macro and micro levels.
Source: Activist Insight
First, the return of a robust M&A market following the financial crisis has meant that
there are more opportunities available for activists to push for strategic acquisitions,
divestitures, or mergers.8
Second, many corporations have large piles of cash on hand that need to be put to
work.9With companies still somewhat reluctant to invest heavily in R&D and organic
growth, activists have sought to use that cash to fuel buybacks, dividends, or
8Black, Josh. "Editor's Foreword." Activist Investing: An Annual Review of Trends in Shareholder Activism (2015).9Plath, Chris. Shareholder Activism: Impact on NorthAmerican Corporate Sectors. Moodys Investor Service. 05
June 2015. Available at: http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/corp_gov/activist-interventions-roundtable-2014-
materials/2014_03_shareholder-activism-impact-on-na-corporates.pdf
Activism Campaign Strategies
Balance Sheet Activism
Board Related Activism
Business Strategy
M&A Activism
Other
Other Governance
Remuneration
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ACTIVISM REPORT
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Dave Whissel
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+1 212 961 7506 x211
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+1 212 961 75
www.proxymosaic.c
strategic acquisitions. Perhaps not surprisingly, this feature has made the cash-rich
technology sector a notable activist hunting ground.10
Third, the relative success of spin-off strategies have emboldened other activists to
try to replicate these and other financial engineering campaigns at a broader array
of companies. A report by Deloitte and Edge Consulting highlights the fact that theaverage TSR of parent companies one year after a spin-off is approximately 14%,
besting the S&P 500 over the same time period.11This figure rises to nearly 30% two
years after the break-up.12
With respect to real estate-related activism, such as REIT conversions and sale-
leasebacks, much of the popularity has been driven by the recovery of the real estate
market as a whole, which has restored lofty funds from operations (FFO) multiples
that provide for attractive monetization opportunities.13 And, the acceptance of
REITs as total-return vehicle for the masses14has meant that REIT conversions are
gaining traction among activists looking to unlock value through more exotic means.
Additionally, there are numerous other secondary factors such as the relative
strength of the dollar and tax reforms relating to inversions that have further
driven a rush of M&A activity, often at the behest of activists.
At the micro level, it is important to keep in mind that while many activist hedge
fund managers may lack the sort of operational experience that can form the basis
for a campaign centered on business strategy, they often find financial engineering
well within their zone of competency.15Portfolio managers are far more comfortable
building financial models that show the accretive impact of spin-offs than they would
be, for example, waiting tables to get a better understanding of the operating side
of the business.16
A recent study by FTI Consulting found that nearly 90% of those polled expected
financial engineering activism in general to continue to increase,17and a report by
Alliance Advisors suggests that, over the past few years, capital allocation (i.e., share
buybacks and dividends) and restructuring (i.e., asset sales and spin-offs) have
become the key issues in activism campaigns.18 But while the fundamental
10Id.11Black, Will. "Value of Companies Globally Undertaking Spinoffs to Hit US $664 Billion for 2014." Deloitte LLP. 05
June 2015. Available at: http://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/press-releases/articles/value-of-companies-
globally-undertaking-spinoffs-to-increase.html12Id.13Black, Josh. "Editor's Foreword." Activist Investing: An Annual Review of Trends in Shareholder Activism (2015).14Buller, Steven. REIT Stocks: An Underutilized Portfolio Diversifier. Fidelity Investments. 05 June 2015. Available
at: https://www.fidelity.com/bin-public/060_www_fidelity_com/documents/REIT%20Stocks%20-
%20An%20Underutilized%20Portfolio%20Diversifier_Fidelity.pdf15Klingsberg, Ethan. Risks and Opportunities of Hedge Fund Activism. Cleary Gottlied Steen & Hamilton. 05 June
2015. Available at: http://www.clearymawatch.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/506/2015/04/1505Klingsberg.pdf16Giammona, Craig. Olive Gardens Hedge Fund Bosses Waited Tables to Aid Turnaround. Bloomberg LP. 05
June 2015. Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-01/olive-garden-s-hedge-fund-
bosses-waited-tables-to-aid-turnaround17Balet, Steven. The Shareholder Activists View: M&A Activism to Rise in 2014. FTI Consulting. 05 June 2015.
Available at: http://www.fticonsulting.com/global2/media/collateral/united-states/shareholder-activism-views-
2014.pdf18Westcott, Shirley. Dealing with Evolving Activist Investor Strategies. Alliance Advisors, LLC. 05 June 2015.
Available at: http://allianceadvisorsllc.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Alliance-Advisors-March-12-2014-
Webinar-Deck.pdf
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ACTIVISM REPORT
Contested Elections Resea
June 20
Dave Whissel
Director of [email protected]
+1 212 961 7506 x211
488 Madison Avenue, 23rdFl
New York, NY 100
+1 212 961 75
www.proxymosaic.c
conditions at the macro and micro levels support this kind of activism, many of these
recent reports and analyses have ignored a more fundamental question: Does
financial engineering actually create long-term value for shareholders, as activists
might claim?
Unlocking Value: eality or hetoric?
To answer this question, we used Activist Insights comprehensive database to
derive a sample set of 100 discrete instances over the past ten years where financial
engineering was one of the primary objectives of the activist, and where the activist
was successful in achieving this objective. We excluded financial engineering
situations where the corporate parent company did not survive (i.e., takeovers and
private equity buy-outs) as well as situations where the focus was on securing
dividends. We initially included situations in which the activist pushed for a merger
in our sample set, but ultimately excluded these situations from our analysis because
there were not enough discrete instances to make the data meaningful. We were
left we four broad activist objectivesacquisitions, share buybacks, divestitures, andspin-offs.
Buybacks were the most common objective of activists in our sample set,
representing about half of all campaigns. Acquisitions were the least common of the
four objectives.
Our data also revealed some interesting features about the activists themselves. As
one might expect, the big names dominated our list, with JANA Partners, Starboard
Value, and Blue Harbour occupying the top three slots in terms of number of
financial engineering campaigns. They were followed by other heavyweights such as
Relational Investors, Elliott Management, Third Point, Pershing Square, and Carl
Icahn. But the frequency of campaigns had little to do with performance, with some
of the most active players specifically Third Point and Elliott also among the
worst-performing.
Number of Campaigns
Acquisitions Buybacks Divestitures Spin-Offs
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ACTIVISM REPORT
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Dave Whissel
Director of [email protected]
+1 212 961 7506 x211
488 Madison Avenue, 23rdFl
New York, NY 100
+1 212 961 75
www.proxymosaic.c
To assess whether financial engineering campaigns have actually created
shareholder value, we focused on two primary metrics: TSR and EPS. We measured
TSR over three primary time periods: during the 60-day window surrounding an
announcement, one year after an announcement, and from the announcement to
the present. With respect to EPS, we took the TTM EPS prior to the announcement
and compared it to the TTM EPS one year after the announcement. In addition to
looking at absolute TSR, we also looked at returns relative to the S&P 500, which
serves as an appropriate benchmark.
Overall, our data suggests that these types of financial engineering campaigns,
broadly speaking, do in fact unlock shareholder value, with one (highly important)
caveat. Across each of our four financial engineering verticals, the average TSR since
the announcement date has been more than 25%. Here, the fact that the average
TSR in these situations has been less than 1% on the announcement date and only
about 5% during the 60-day window around the announcement date suggests that
the value created during these campaigns goes beyond an initial short-term pop
in the target companys stock price. Instead, the fact that the average TSR is nearly
20% one year after the announcement and continues to rise past 25% past the one-
year mark indicates that the unlocked value is reasonably sustainable, which should
please institutional shareholders.
However, our results do not suggest that financial engineering transactions are
universally accretive to shareholder value. Instead, the data indicates that certain
types of financial engineering are considerably more successful than others. On
average, acquisitions have been the least successful of our four types of financial
engineering, with an average TSR since the announcement of -3.56%. The three
other strategies, are generally value-accretive. Buybacks, divestitures, and spin-offs
all have an average TSR since the announcement of more than 15%, with spin-offs
generating more than 50% TSR.
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
TSR 1 Year After
Announcement
TSR On Announcement
Date
TSR During 60-Day
Window
TSR to Present
Average TSR - All Financial Engineering Campaigns
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ACTIVISM REPORT
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Dave Whissel
Director of [email protected]
+1 212 961 7506 x211
488 Madison Avenue, 23rdFl
New York, NY 100
+1 212 961 75
www.proxymosaic.c
Interestingly, about half of the campaigns where the activist pushes for strategic
acquisitions have resulted in the destruction of shareholder value. This may suggest
that, although activists today are more operationally savvy than ever, management
teams are still in a much better position to assess the benefits of strategic
acquisitions. This is the clearest indication from our data that there are still certain
areas that lie beyond activists core competencies.
These results are reversed when looking at median returns over the 60-day window
surrounding an announcement. In that case, acquisitions seem to be well-received
by the markets, with a median TSR of more than 3%double that of the next-closest
strategy. Spin-offs have the lowest median TSR over the very short-term, which
should perhaps be expected given that the financial benefits of that particular
strategy (e.g., the re-rating of the Parent and SpinCo with higher multiples) take
longer to play out.
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Acquisitions Buybacks Divestitures Spin-Offs
Average TSR Since Announcement
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Acquisitions Buybacks Divestitures Spin-Offs
% Negative TSR Since Announcement
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ACTIVISM REPORT
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Dave Whissel
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+1 212 961 7506 x211
488 Madison Avenue, 23rdFl
New York, NY 100
+1 212 961 75
www.proxymosaic.c
However, whereas financial engineering strategies have been largely conducive to
shareholder value in terms of TSR, these same strategies have often been dilutive to
shareholder value in terms of EPS. Of the four types of financial engineering we
examine, only onedivestitureshas produced positive median EPS growth. With
respect to the other three strategies, median EPS growth is slightly negative.
Interestingly, campaigns centered on buybacks have not been especially productive
in terms of growing EPS; which seems counterintuitive given the positive benefits of
decreasing the share count. It could be that the benefits to EPS produced by this
strategy are largely short-lived if the target company does not substantially alter its
operating efficiency.
Predictably, less than a third of spin-offs are actually accretive to EPS, which makes
sense given that the surviving parent company is left with a smaller earnings base
following the spin; for divestitures, this figure rises to about 60%.
-1.5%
-1.0%
-0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
Acquisitions Buybacks Divestitures Spin-Offs
Median TSR During 60-Day Window
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
Acquisitions Buybacks Divestitures Spin-Offs
Median EPS Growth
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ACTIVISM REPORT
Contested Elections Resea
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Dave Whissel
Director of [email protected]
+1 212 961 7506 x211
488 Madison Avenue, 23rdFl
New York, NY 100
+1 212 961 75
www.proxymosaic.c
Once again, we note that campaigns focused on pushing for strategic acquisitions
have been largely ineffective at creating longer-term shareholder value, and that
divestituresaddition by subtraction have been comparatively more successful.
Finally, it is important to note that, while our data indicates that financial
engineering activism does create value on an absolute basis, there is no evidence
that shareholders of these companies are necessarily better off than they would
have been had the activism never occurred. The median TSR of all types of financial
engineering trails the S&P 500 over a one-year time period and since the transaction
announcement.
Overall, financial engineering situations have trailed the S&P 500 since the
transaction announcement nearly 60% of the time. And while this paints financial
engineering with a fairly broad brush, we note that only one of these strategies
spin-offs has beaten the S&P 500 since the transaction announcement. As
mentioned above, the fact that acquisitions have fared so poorly reinforces the idea
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Acquisitions Buybacks Divestitures Spin-Offs
% EPS Accretive
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
TSR Since Announcement TSR 1 Year After Announcement
Median TSR
Financial Engineering Situations S&P 500
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ACTIVISM REPORT
Contested Elections Resea
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Dave Whissel
Director of [email protected]
+1 212 961 7506 x211
488 Madison Avenue, 23rdFl
New York, NY 100
+1 212 961 75
www.proxymosaic.c
that management teams (rather than activists) are likely best-suited to make those
types of high-level capital allocation decisions.
Conclusion
While we are hesitant to draw broad-based conclusions from a sample set of 100,
there are several interesting takeaways from the data. First, when examining the
merits of an activists campaign, the type of financial engineering matters.
Acquisitions have typically been dilutive to shareholder value over the long-term,
while spin-offs have generated strongly positive returns; this suggests that
shareholders should examine activist campaigns that push for strategic acquisitions
with a good deal of scrutiny.
Second, while managers like BlackRock CEO Laurence Fink may rail against the
short-termism inherent in activism,19 our data suggests that these kinds of
transactions may actually have moderate longer-term benefits to shareholders. The
short-term initial pop around the announcement of these transactions is minimal
compared to the value that is created in the next year and beyond.
Lastly, our data comes with an important caveat: Given the fact that shareholder
returns in financial situations typically trailed the S&P 500 over the same time
period, shareholders have legitimate reason to be wary of activists that advocate for
financial engineering transactions such as share repurchases, divestitures, and spin-
offs. The results from our sample set suggest that financial engineering has been a
valid and productive strategy on an absolute basis, but it is not clear that
shareholders are actually any better off after the activist intervention. In fact, our
data suggests that shareholders in activist-targeted companies may actually be
better-served by selling their shares in these troubled companies and following
19Sorkin, Andrew Ross. BlackRocks Chief, Laurence Fink, Urges Other C.E.O.s to Stop Being So Nice to Investors.
The New York Times. 05 June 2015. Available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/business/dealbook/blackrocks-chief-laurence-fink-urges-other-ceos-to-
stop-being-so-nice-to-investors.html
48%
33%
40%36%
-4%
30%
18%
51%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Acquisitions Buybacks Divestitures Spin-Offs
Average TSR Since Announcement
S&P 500 Activist Investments
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ACTIVISM REPORT
Contested Elections Resea
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Dave Whissel
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+1 212 961 7506 x211
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+1 212 961 75
www.proxymosaic.c
Jeffrey Sonnenfelds advice by investing in broad index mutual funds.20While we
admit that the goal of most activist hedge funds is to achieve absolute, uncorrelated
returns, this is a troubling conclusion for those that claim that activism is generally a
force for good.
Ultimately, our message for shareholders is a simple one: In assessing the merits ofa particular activism campaign, shareholders should not assume that the
consequences will be positive, or even that the interests of activists are wholly
aligned with the shareholders they purport to serve. Instead, each activist campaign
deserves and requires a careful and thorough assessment of all the relevant facts.
Our data demonstrates that not all types of activism, and indeed, not all activists,
are necessarily equally adept at creating shareholder value. Some may be largely
beneficial, but others merit additional scrutiny.
20Sonnenfeld, Jeffrey. Activist Shareholders, Sluggish Performance. The Wall Street
Journal. 09 June 2015. Available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/jeffrey-sonnenfeld-
activist-shareholders-sluggish-performance-1427929984
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Dave Whissel
Director of [email protected]
+1 212 961 7506 x211
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New York, NY 100
+1 212 961 75
www.proxymosaic.c
Appendix: Sample Set and Aggregate Data
Source: Activist Insight
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Livermore Partners
Luxor Capital Group
Audley Capital
Marcato Capital Management
California State Teachers' Retirement System
Meruelo Investment Partners
Engine Capital LP
Paulson & Co
Harbinger Capital Partners
Raging Capital Management
Kettle Hill Capital
Riley Investment Management
Western Investment
SpringOwl Asset Management
Carlson Capital
Steel Partners Holdings L.P.
Harry Wilson
The D3 Family Funds
Bulldog Investors
Third Avenue Management LLCAltai Capital Management
Trian Fund Management
Greenlight Capital, Inc.
Voce Capital Management
Lawrence Seidman
Eminence Capital
Engaged Capital
FrontFour Capital Group
Atlantic Investment Management
ValueAct Capital Partners
Clinton Group
Barington Capital Group
Corvex Management LP
Sandell Asset Management
Pershing Square Capital Management
Carl Icahn
Third Point Partners
Orange Capital LLC
Elliott Management
Relational Investors
Stilwell Value LLC
Blue Harbour Group
Starboard Value
JANA Partners
Number of Financial Engineering Campaigns in
Sample Set
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+1 212 961 7506 x211
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+1 212 961 75
www.proxymosaic.c
Source: Activist Insight
-100% -50% 0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300%
Kettle Hill Capital
Clinton Group
FrontFour Capital Group
Paulson & Co
Trian Fund Management
Marcato Capital Management
Voce Capital Management
Greenlight Capital, Inc.
Stilwell Value LLC
Bulldog Investors
Starboard Value
Pershing Square Capital Management
Harbinger Capital Partners
ValueAct Capital Partners
Carl Icahn
Orange Capital LLC
JANA Partners
Blue Harbour Group
Western Investment
Sandell Asset Management
Lawrence Seidman
Corvex Management LP
California State Teachers' Retirement System
Relational Investors
Engine Capital LP
Atlantic Investment Management
Elliott Management
Steel Partners Holdings L.P.
Third Point Partners
Raging Capital Management
Altai Capital Management
The D3 Family Funds
Engaged Capital
Audley Capital
Average TSR One Year After Announcement
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ACTIVISM REPORT
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Dave Whissel
Director of [email protected]
+1 212 961 7506 x211
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+1 212 961 75
www.proxymosaic.cSource: Activist Insight
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
Adopt Majority Vote Standard
Amend Bylaw
Board Independence
Business Focus
Business Restructuring
Cancel Contract
Change Board Composition
Closure of Business Unit
Dividends
Elect Director
Eliminate Staggered Board
Equity Issuance
Excess Cash
Focus on Growth Strategies
General Cost Cutting
Lack of/Inaccurate information from Company
Nepotism
Operational Efficiency
Oppose acquisition of third party
Oppose Equity Issuance
Oppose merger
Oppose Proxy Contest
Oppose takeover terms
Oppose Terms of Merger
Push for acquisition of third party
Push for Company Division
Push for Merger of Company with third Party
Push for Sale of Company to third Party
Push for/Oppose merging of shares
Recapitalization
Redemption/Amendment of Poison PillREIT / MLP Conversion
Removal of CEO or other Board member
Remuneration
Replace Auditor
Replace Management
Restructure Debt
Return Cash to Shareholders
Sell/Retain Assets
Separate Chairman & CEO
Share Repurchase
Spin-off/sale of business division
Succession Planning
Takeover Company
Use Universal Ballot
Frequency of Activist Objectives Over Past 10 Years
(excl. Board Representation)
Top Related