AD-A202 750.
AIR WAR COLLEGE
RESEARCH REPORT DTICJAN 1 11981
INSURGENCY: A FORMIDABLE 6DTHREAT TO PHILIPPINE
SECURITY
COLONEL SESINANDO C. CANDING
1998
VDFOR PUBLIC
AIR qREASE DISIRIBUION
UNAE ATR FORCEBAAABAM
MAXWEFLL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMAt
AIR WAR COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY
INSURGENCY
A FORMIDABLE THREAT TO PHILIPPINE SECURITY
Accesioti For
NTIS CRA&I
by OTIC TAB CUiiamnoi,-ced 0Jul;"If, .la ,il.-._ 1
Sesinando C. Canding
Dlstribut.on I
Avaalihity Codes
Avail and or.
A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY Dist Spccal
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH
REQU I REMENT
Thesis Advisor: Colonel David G. Kimball
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA
April 1988
89 1 11 f054
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
DISCLAIMER -ABSTAINER .......................
ABSTRACT ....................................
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .................................
INTRODUCTION ..................................
Objective and Method of the Research
Defining the Problem
Significance of the Research
Research Methodology
Definitions of Terms
II THE TYPES. CHARACTERISTICS, AND DYNAMICS OF
PHILIPPINE INSURGENCY ...................... 6
Types of Insurgency in Philippine Setting
Characteristics of Insurgency
The Dynamics of Philippine Insurgency
Differences Between the Two Types of
Insurgency
III FACTORS THAT FAVOR THE GROWTH OF INSURGENCY ... 18
Location and Geography
The Filipinos and Their Social Life
Philippine Economy
Political Factors
IV THE PHILIPPINES UNDER MARCOS ..................... 30
Basis of the Declaration of Martial Law
Economic Crisis Caused by Martial Rule
Politicization of the AFP
V THE NATIONAL SECURITY SITUATION .................. 42
The Social, Economic, and Political Climate
The Threats to National Security
The Military - The Armed Forces of the
Philippines
ii
Organization
Capabilities
The Budgetary Problem
The Military Strategy to Combat the Insurgents
VI SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 62
Summary and Analyses
Conclusions
Recommendations
Military Actions
Non-military Actions
NOTES 74
iii
AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT
TITLE: Insurgency, The Most Formidable Threat to Philippine Security
Author: Sesinando C. Canding, Colonel, PAF
A critical analysis of past events, attempted solutions, and
the underlying assumptions in the past studies of the problem of
insurgency in the Philippines is provided by the research paper.
It addresses the characteristic and dynamics of the insurgenc-, pro-
blem by determining and analyzing the factors which have been respon-
sible for creating the situations which brought about insurgency.
From the root cause, the author traced the events which complicated
the issues involved. The impact of the colonial powers which dominated
the country for more than 400 years were shown to have played the
greater part. As the paper concluded that insurgency is Lhe most
formidable threat to the Philippine national security, it recommends
a holistic solution involving efforts by the whole machinery of the
Philippine Government as necessary to stop the threat. (, )
iv
DISCLAIMER-ABSTAINER
This research report represents the views of the author
and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Air
War College or the Department of the Air Force.
This document is the property of the United States government
and is not to be reproduced in whole or in part without permission
of the Commandant, Air War College. Maxwell Air Force Base,
Alabama.
V
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Colonel Sesinando C. Canding, Philippine Air Force (MNSA,
National Defense College of the Philippines) was a Wing Commander
in a PAF base in Southern Philippines where the AFP is actively
engaging the Muslim rebels. He has served in the Headquarters
of the Philippine Air Force and the General Headquarters, Armed
Forces of the Philippines, as Operations Officer. He is a graduate
of the Philippine Military Academy. He finished Squadron Officer
Course in the Philippines and completed ACSC in Maxwell. He is a
member of Class 88 of the Air War College.
vi
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Third World countries, beset by the problem of insurgency, have
common backgrounds and share almost the same past experiences. Most
of them have at one time been coloaes of present or past powerful nations.
There are recorded histories of their struggles for independence from
the previous rulers. However, once independence was gained, the coun-
tries remained within the protective hegemony and tutelage of their
colonizers. They have had short periods of peace and stability that
interchanged with both peaceful and violent changes of government.
In all these events, the assistance and role played by their former
colonizers were readily apparent. Because of this, the factors that
inflame violent changes in these insurgency-prone nations became more
susceptible to the machinations of either side of the bipolar world.
The Philippines is one of these countries. Today it faces an in-
surgency problem that increases in gravity along with economic trou-
bles. Both problems, insurgency and economic, are so intertwined
nobody can be sure which causes the other. Many theorize that sol-
ving the economic ills of the country will automatically resolve
the causes that spawn insurgency. Others likewise believe that no
economic development will come unless the rural areas are cleared of
the insurgent rebels. This is not difficult to understand as the
military activities directed against the insurgents compete for
resources which are also needed for economic activities.
Objective and Method of the Research Paper
This paper hopes to critically analyze the insurgency problem
1
in the Philippines and develop a, workable approach to the problem.
The critical analysis will build on past studies, proposed and
implemented solutions, and the underlying assumptions. It will
furthermore focus on the problem in the light of the new developments
that have recently changed the dimensions of the issue. It will also
consider other factors and historical perspectives not previously
considered, but which contemporary developments have shown to be
relevant. In other words, while this study builds on previous
* similar experiences, it shall also question issues which were used
as a basis for past actions.
Defining The Problem
Insurgency is a social conflict with politico-economic dimensions.
To address insurgency in a broad context will be far beyond the
ability of this author due to constraints of time and availability
of data. Instead, this paper will approach the subject more speci-
fically and definitely in the narrower context of a particular
nation's setting. This delineation of scope is important to prevent
this study from encountering the same difficulty other authors have
encountered in trying to find a solution to the same problem. While
one may find a common framework for conceptualizing the insurgency
problem, the circumstances in each country where insurgency presents
itself, and the nature and cause factors of such circumstances may
be different. More often than not, these circumstances are fashioned
by the character, values, and mores of the people, who in the same
manner are also affected by circumstances and events often not of
their own making and far beyond their control.
The main thesis, therefore, of this research work is that there
2
is a web of interlocking factors which make the insurgency problem in
the Philippines very complex. There is a need therefore to break the
chain that binds these factors together to find the solutions to the
problem. This paper proposes that the answers to the following ques-
tions will help to fully understand the complexities of the problem:
What are the true nature and character of Philippine
insurgency? What are its causes? How have the nature of these
causes changed from their original forms?
Why have past efforts failed? What were the defects and
failings of past strategies?
What must be done to permanently end the problem? Is
it possible? How can it be made possible?
Significance Of The Research
Insurgency has been with the Philippines since it obtained its
independence in 1946. It managed to tone down the problem in the
early '50s up to about the early '60s. For a while the Free World
thought the Philippines had found the answer to communist insurgency.
The United States, as the professed champion of democracy in the bi-
polar world of this period gloried in the success of the Philippines.
The Philippine example was cited as a model for fighting insurgencies
in other countries. However, insurgency is still a problem in the
Philippines. The recent growth in size of the insurgency may reflect
that the approach in the past merely removed the symptoms, but
failed to uproot the seeds of the problem. It is also possible
that past efforts in fact addressed the real causes, but the subse-
quent actions failed to institutionalize the changes. With this in
mind, the importance of the study lies in the need for a more holistic
3
analysis of insurgency in order to formulate the right solution to
the right problem.
A furtier value of this research is to provide students of war
an understanding of another type of warfare that has become a fad
in the conflict between the two sides of a bipolar world. The
proliferation of destructive nuclear weapons and the concomittant
destruction they portend have convinced superpowers of the limitations
on their use. The rivalry continues, however, and the resort to
warfare on the low-intensity side of the war spectrum becomes very
logical and attractive.
The importance of the study to the United States cannot be
overemphasized. Any change of government in the Philippines will
endanger the future of American investments and trade relations.
Even without the insurgents taking over, the bases are already an
issue. A communist takeover would bring an immediate loss of the
bases. The strategic location of the Philippines in the Pacific
makes the bases a bulwark of American presence, especially at present
when the Russians have a foothold in the Indo-China peninsula.
Research Methodology
Research of the problem involves analyses of reported events,
current news, and literature on the subject. Theses on the subject
by previous students at US Armed Services' schools which were
available were used as documents either to support the author's
propositions, rebut current thinking on the matter, or show incon-
sistencies. In this respect.this study can be considered a histo-
rical research. In the sense, however, that academic truths and
knowledges have been cited as proofs, the research is also a conceptual
paper.
4
Most of the material used was found in the Air University
library. Situational Briefs were obtained from the Philippine Embassy
in Washington, DC. Reading materials issued by Air War College were
also used. Most importantly, the study draws much from my personal
experiences and observations.
Definitions of Terms Used
To be clear about the usage of terms the following definitions
are used:
Insurgency - A social conflict that transcends the economic-
political relationship between the government and a sector of society
over which the former governs. It is:
a protracted political military activity directedtoward completely or partially controlling the resourcesof a country through the uTe of irregular military forcesand illegal organizations.
Insurgent - Interchangeably used with the terms, guerilla, rebel,
or subversive. It refers to a member of an insurgency movement,
either armed or unarmed. Its activities include, but are not
limited to, "guerilla warfare, terrorism, political mobilization like
propaganda, recruitment, front and covert party organization and
international activities."2
Counterinsurgency - "All military, paramilitary, political,
economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to
defeat subversive insurgency."3
5
CHAPTER II
THE TYPES. CHARACTERISTICS, AND DYNAMICS
OF PHILIPPINE INSURGENCY
In order to be objective in the pursuit of a workable approach
to the insurgency problem in the Philippines, we will have to look
deeply into its nature, characteristics, and dynamics. Insurgency
is not new in the Philippines. Even before its independence in 1946,
insurgency was used by earlier Filipinos. Filipinos fought as insur-
gents for their freedom against Spain, the United States, and Japan.
As a result a stereotype has been attached to the Filipinos: they are
naturally rebellious and rebelling for any grievance is in their
nature.1
Types of Insurgency in Philippine Setting
We will begin with examining the nature of Philippine insurgency
by first classifying the types of insurgency that are recognizable.
In general there are two types.
First is the secessionist insurgency; a type of rebellion with
an objective to cut off a piece of Philippine territory and to declare
it independent. It is this type of insurgency that is being waged by
the Muslim Filipinos in Mindanao and other smaller islands in the
Southern Philippines.
The second type, which the most formidable problem, is the
communist insurgency. It aims to overthrow the present government
and establish a commuri&st form of government. This may be considered
as the resurgent Hukbalahaps (Hukbong Laban sa Hapon or Huk) and
HMBs (Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan). The Huks were surpressed by
the late President Magsaysay in 1954 and reemerged as HMBs in the
6
early 1960s. It became the New People's Army (NPA) in the late '60s
as the armed component of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).
There is a third type but it is a variant and offshoot of the
communist insurgency. The Cordillera People's Liberation Army under
the renegade priest, Father Conrado Balweg, operates in the Cordillera
mountain areas in Northeastern Luzon. It champions the lot of the
minority groups in the area who were victims of the onslaught of
development projects during the incumbency of President Marcos.
Foremost among these projects is the Chico River Dam. the construction
of which caused the displacement of the native residents from their
ancestral lands and the desecration of the burial grounds of their
ancestors. Initially the group started as communist insurgents.
Under the leadership of Father Balweg they later shifted to a
secessionist objective; the grant of autonomy in the region. The
new constitution promulgated after the People's Revolution in 1986
implemented the demand of this group of insurgents in a provision
granting autonomous status to specific regions of the country.
Characteristics of Insurgency
Insurgency is characterized by the use of unconventional method
and irregular forces who in most cases are indigenous to the area
where they operate. They travel light and move around fast. T'ley
never stay in one place longer than necessary to demonstrate to the
people their freedom to move around and their invulnerability to
government forces.
The communist insurgents of the New People's Army roam the rural
areas of the Philippines staging hit-and-run attacks on government
forces. Their propaganda promises of equality and prosperity in a
7
land that has known little of either. They exploit grievances that
were supposedly addressed by government development projects many
years back. Where their primary operating areas were previously the
Central Plains of Luzon and the bigger islands in Central Visayas,
they have now extended their operations to the island of Mindanao
where they coexist with the muslim secessionist rebels.2
The Muslim rebellion in the south broke out almost at the same
time as President Marcos' declaration of Martial Law in 1972. The
seeds of its onset have been planted many years before by neglect of
the Central Government in Manila to develop the Muslim regions in
the Southern Philippines. There are other more deep-seated causes
that will be discussed later in this paper. There were other short-
lived rebellions in the past, such as that of the tribe of Hadji
Kamlon in 1953. Suppressed by military actions, like the Huk rebellions
in the North, the rebels laid low. While there was truth to the charge
*of government neglect to develop Mindanao, the Muslims themselves were
* alsb victims of corruption by their native leaders who represented
them in the government.
Many ethnic divisions among the Muslims continue to work against
* their unity. The creation of the Moro National Liberation Front
which followed the Jabidah Affair in 19683 and its increased prominence
after the declaration of Martial Law in 1972 created a degree of
unity. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) succeeded in holding
the secessionist movement in tow by placing a tight clamp on them
and forcing their leader, Nur Misuari, into exile in the Middle East.
Nur Misuari, a former professor at the University of the Philippines,
propagandized the movement in the Muslim world and obtained moral
8
and material support. The concerted effort of the AFP and the
cooperation of many other Muslim political leaders continued to
suppress the movement until Nur Misuari was effectively resurrected
by President Corazon Aquino when she met with him to seek an end to
the Muslim rebellion. Succeeding events showed that Nur Misuari
desired more than what was understood by the President.
Today, however, the MNLF'has again broken into three factions
because of differences in objectives and personalities. Nur Misuari
continues to head the largest faction operating in Western Mindanao.
Hashim Salamat heads the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) which
is deployed in Central Mindanao. An MNLF reformist group under
Dimasangkay Pundato is the smallest group and is deployed in the Lanao
Provinces. The MNLF is reliant on foreign benefactors to carry out
its armed struggle. In the past Libya has significantly supported
the MNLF financially and materially.4
The Dynamics of Philippine Insurgency
Insurgency has been defined earlier as a social conflict. This
is because it involves the violation of rules that govern the relations
between members of society. At the outset, the government may not
even be one of the protagonists in the conflict. It only becomes
involved when in the process of mediating between the members of
society, it cannot come up with a solution to the problem acceptable
to all sides. In attempting to carry out the laws of the land, it
gets entangled in the conflict and becomes a protagonist itself.
The losing side, therefore, becomes aggrieved and to redress the
grievance it rises in revolt against the government in order to
influence it to change sides. A conflict situation like that could
not have developed if the social interaction between the protagonists
9
is not played upon and blown out of proportion by a third party who
has a higher interest than the interest of either of the origiral
protagonists. In the case of the communist insurgency, the coiiuunists
took advantage of the conflict of interests between the landholders
and the tenants to complicate issues. The Muslim rebellion began
when the Muslim intellectuals in the '60s found support from the Pan-
Islam awakening after the World War II. The grievances against the
government assumed more complicated dimensions to justify the Muslim
secessionists' demand. This has been the pattern of the dynamics of
the insurgency problem in the Philippines.
The two major types of insurgency run in parallel course. One
started much earlier than and provided the motivation and the model
for carrying out the objective of the other. Both began with
objectives that were less than what they profess now. The process
by which the government got mired in the conflict is an interesting
case study as it can provide the proper answers to the problem.
The communist insurgency, as the most formidable between the
two types, was born out of a historical incident - the colonization
of the Philippines. The present day communist insurgency evolved
out of the agrarian unrest that indigenously developed in the latter
part of the Spanish colonization of the islands and continued during
the American rule. Early historians averred that "the agrarian
unrest unrest was not a product of American control in the Philip-
pines nor, in fact did it stem directly from the Spanish regime." 5
They chronicled the existence of a home-grown agrarian slave-serf-
tenant system that resembled patterns found in Medieval Europe.
When Magellan landed in the Philippines in 1521, he found small
colonies under chiefs known as 'datus' living along the coastal areas.
10
They were the first settlers who came from Malaysia and Indonesia in
large outrigger boats called "barangay". As settlers, they e19anized
themselves into communities known as barangay (named after the out-
rigger boats), holding communal lands. The following aptly describes
Philippine communities at the time the early Spaniards arrived in
the islands:
Since the family grew from the family group,community and family were one and the same. Thefunctions of the family could not be distinguishedfrom those of the community. A man performing thefunctions of a father was at the same time perform-ing those of a citizen. Each age group had specificcommunity duties. A high degree of family solidarityand loyalty developed. In the barangay communitiesa good leader was a strong brave man who embodiedthe old traditions and preferrably had benevolentancestors and a good citizen was a loyal followerwho live up to the obligations of his community andfamily status. The dominant value was security andto thg extent that the community was secure it wasgood.
The Spaniards took advantage of the natural weaknesses of the
scattered barangays. One by one they were subjugated by the Spanish
conquistadores. At first indirect rule was practiced by maintaining
the original authority structure of the datus, appointing them either
as "gobernadocillo" or "cabeza de barangay." As more members of the
Catholic religious orders arrived, the priests established themselves
in the countryside and usurped the authortiy of the datus. They
divided the land into large areas of jurisdiction, sometimes combining
several villages together. Lands were also distributed to the officers
of the Spanish soldiers to include the members of the community
living on the lands to work on them. In return, the grantees assumed
the responsibility to protect the people in the community and help
them to learn the Christian faith. This was how the big plantations
called haciendas originated. As more lands were opened, Spaniards
11
got first the priority for ownership. Some datus were later awarded
also to appease them and to obtain their cooperation. Thus the
corruption of the traditional values began. This corrupted sector
of the old Filipino society later intermarried with the Spaniards to
form another class, in addition to the properties ruling class, that
exploited the agricultural peasants as ruthlessly as the Spaniards.
From them also came some of the intellectuals who inflamed the fire
of Filipino nationalism and triggered the revolts of the 19th century.
The seeds of the agrarian unrest were planted, and sprouted during
the American period.
The Americans were not really happy when they took over the
islands. Their discomfiture was not assuaged when they spent no
less than two years to end the insurrection against 5pain which
carried over in their regime. If the United States did prepare the
Philippines for political independence better than the Europeans
prepared their dependencies, the same cannot be said of US achieve-7
ments in the economic field. They did little to modify the Spanish
heritage of large landholdings, the high proportion of sharecropping,
and the wealth and influence of the Catholic Church. Gunnar Myrdal
in his three-volume research on the poverty of nations entitled
Asian Drama, wrote that American policy made the situation worse in
8some respects. American investments in and free trade with the
Philippines stimulated the colony's dependence on the export of a
few agricultural products like sugar, coconuts, and abaca. This led
to an increase in the number of absentee landlords who engaged in
the profitable business of export of the products from their lands.
Between the period 1900 and 1935, the percentage of Filipino farmers
12
who were tenants doubled. In summary, American economic policy
strengthened the economic and political power of the wealthy and
hereditary landlords whose interests were to maintain their privileged
positions; a situation hardly compatible with the democratization of
Filipino society. Because of their economic power, this class also
gained political power which continues to the present. There are
other impacts of American occupation of the islands which will be
discuseed in later chapters where their relevance is connected.
The secessionist insurgency being fought now by the Muslim
Filipinos started in the 1970s. The communist insurgents provided
in no small measure the motivation. There were, however, other
factors that had built up in the past. The Muslims from Borneo could
have swept the whole Philippines had the Spaniards not arrived. The
Spaniards contained them in Western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago.
but never really conquered them. The many series of wars between
the Spaniards and the Muslims called "Moro Wars" were significant
in that they contributed to the tensions and conflicts that exist9
today between Christian and Muslim Filipinos. The Spanish desire
to convert the Muslims to Christianity was so ruthlessly and force-
fully carried out that present day Muslims still harbor the fear that
the Christians who have settled and are settling in Mindanao intend
to christianize them.
The Americans contributed, unintentionally perhaps, to the
animosity between the Christian and Muslim Filipinos. By bribing
the datus, no Muslim united actions were taken against the Americans.
The US carried out some military operations against recalcitrant
groups who did not submit themselves to American rule. To westernize
the Muslims so they would be as capable of governing themselves as
13
the Christian Filipinos, they sent Filipino civil officials from Manila
to Muslim areas to introduce new ways of government and to encourage
both communities to cooperate in civic project with the objective ofI10
reducing the deep-rooted Christian-Muslim animosity. To strengthen
the program further, they encouraged Christians to settle in Muslim
lands. This action sowed more seeds of tension and conflict between
the two communities as private ownership of land is opposed to the
Muslim's concept of communal use of the land. Furthermore, due to
ignorance of Islam, the Americans prevented visits of foreigners,
especially Arab Muslims, to the Muslim South. They wanted to limit
contacts only to those between the Christian and Muslim Filipinos to
facilitate the pacification and the institution of government..1 The
Muslims saw this as subtle attempts to christianize them. The Muslims
never understood the easy manner in which Christian Filipinos cooperated
with the Americans and when the Americans tried to use the Christians
to convince the Muslims to do the same, distrust further deepened.
They viewed the Christian Filipinos as aiming to change the Muslim
way of life in the same manner they perceived the Spaniards. This
distrust became apparent when the Muslims did not cooperate in the
nationalist movement for an independent Philippines. On the other
hand, Muslim who once fought the Americans opted to be under the
American protectorate rather than be subjugated by the Christian
Filipinos. Some Americans favored this Muslim position either out of
spite toward Filipino nationalists or because of sympathy with the
Muslim cause. American economic interests wanted Mindanao and Sulu
to be made into a separate political entity, independent from the rest
of the country, and governed by a special commission. Contained in
14
a bill proposed in the United States Congress in 1926, the idea did
12not materialize. As a result Filipiho nationalists viewed this as
an effort to divide the country. The Muslims viewed the rejection
on their preferred option as a joint effort of the US and the Christian
Filipinos to proceed with the total subjugation ofthe Muslim nation.
The distrust and animosity continue to be the standing block in the
reconciliation of the Muslims and the Christians up to the present,
and one of the reasons for the Muslim rebellion in Southern Philippines.
Differences Between the Two Main Types of Insurgency
Communist and secessionist insurgencies are treated as one problem
in this study because of their common characteristics and dynamics.
Both use terrorist activities to achieve their objectives. For this
reason, in intelligence reports by the AFP they are referred to as
Communist terrorists (CTs) and muslim terrorists (MTs). They differ,
however, in their goals. The CTs aim to topple the present government
and replace it with a Marxist-Leninist government. The MTs want to
have the whole Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago, and Palawan (MINSUPALA)
consisting of 13 provinces, to become one independent nation separate
and distinct from the Philippines. This difference sometimes reassures
the government of the impossibility of cooperation between the two
insurgent groups. The AFP, however, is wary of an MNLF-NPA tie-up.
The military fears that because of a common enemy, the two will put
aside their ideological differences and forge a temporary alliance to
fight the government. 13 The communists may use this route in their
move for political control of the entire country. Fighting a force of
less than 20,000 Muslims later on may be easier than fighting alone
the AFP consisting of more than 200,000 men with the whole government
15
machinery behind it. The NPA, just like any communist organization,
will follow Mao's "one step-backward, two-steps-forward strategy".
Additionally, Nur Misuari was known to be a leftist radical when he
was a student and later a professor at the University of the Philippines.
It would not be far-fetched for him to be convinced to sell the muslim
14cause.
In fighting style, while both use the hit-and-run tactics, the
Muslims are more camp-bound and less mobile. By nature, families of
Muslim rebels follow the band of their husbands. In the past, this
practice caused difficulties for the government forces as they found
it difficult to avoid inflicting casualties on civilian stragglers
among the armed Muslim bands.
Another difference is the degree of political organization. The
communist insurgents are more politically organized than the Muslims.
This is understandable inasmuch as they have had more years of experience
receive and not only military training from sponsor nations, but poli-
tical indoctrination as well. They have already had two generations
of leaders. The pre-World War II and post-World War II leaders have
now been replaced by a younger and more h.ighly educated leadership
that is adept in the state-of-the-art methods of the insurgency conflict.
They learned much from their experience in the Huk era when they
overestimated their strength and abilities to rally the population
of Central Luzon to their cause because of the absence of a political
front to provide them the intelligence and a careful estimate of the
situation. They have now become highly reliant on the support of
established political democratic fronts which not only give direction
to their activities, but also provide them the needed logistical
16
-1 .- -- . ... -, . .... , , . .... - ' -" . . . . . . . -
support and other venues of subversion.
The Muslims are less politically organized. The MNLF is supposed
to the political front organization, but it busies itself more with
military undertakings. The leadership is oriented on personalities
and ethnic groups. The movement is divided into three factions and
no one leader is recognized as the political head. This makes
coordination with sponsor nations difficult to attain. Nur Misuari's
self-exile during the Marcos regime enabled him to gain contact with
leaders in the Muslim World. For this, he may be presumed to have
an edge over the other two leaders. But Hashim Salamat, a graduate
of the Al Hazar'University in Cairo, Egypt, has some international
contacts, too. This division is not healthy for the Muslim cause as
the International Conference of Muslim Ministers organization finds
difficulty in communicating with the Filipino Muslims because of the
lack of a unified organization.
17
CHAPTER III
FACTORS THAT FAVOR THE GROWTH OF INSURGENCY
Lest agrarian unrest be blamed totally for all the conditions
that facilitated the growth of insurgency, this chapter shall discuss
other internal and external factors that play a part. The internal
factors are those deriving from the physical attributes of a nation
such as geography and its people, and the different attributes of
national character reflected in social, political, and economic systems.
The external factors are those that affect and impact on the internal
systems over which the Philippines has no control.
Location and Geography'
The Philippines lies within the tropics and extends about 1,770
kilometers north to south along the southeastern rim of Asia. It
forms a land chain between the Pacific Ocean on the east and the South
China Sea on the west. and between the China mainland on the north and
Malaysia and Indonesia on the south.
As a archipelago, it consists of some 7,100 islands and islets,
only 154 of which have areas exceeding 14 square kilometers. Ninety
five per cent of the population lives on eleven of the islands. There
are three major regional groupings of the islands. The largest island
is Luzon, about the size of Kentucky. The second largest is Mindanao,
about the size of Indiana. Between these two major islands lies the
third regional grouping of smaller islands called the Visayas. The
islands are characterized by irregular coastlines, marked by bays,
straits, and inland seas, and stretched for more than 16,000 kilometers,
a distance twice as long as the coastline of the coterminous United
States. Most of the large islands are mountainous with the uplands
18
making up 65% of the land area. Most have narrow coastal lowlands,
except for Luzon, Negros, Panay, and Mindanao, which have extensive
lowland areas. The mountains and forest close by these lowlands
provide a location where insurgents often operate and establish mass
bases and a refuge where they can disappear when government forces
clamp down on them. These lowland areas are where the agrarian unrest
started and continues to take the lead today. The long coastlines
make the country vulnerable to smuggling, not anlyof untaxed merchandise
but also of arms for the insurgents from sponsor nations. The strategic
location of the Philippines has made the United States place importance
on military bases in the Philippines to pursue their power projection
in the Pacific.
The Filipinos and their Social Life
In 1985 there were 54.8 million Filipinos. With an average growth
of 2.4% per year, they should be close to 58 million in 1988. The
Filipinos are 95% Christians (83% Catholics, 9% Protestants, and 3%
of other religious denominations) and 5% Muslims. English is the
language of business and commerce and is used also as the medium of
education, although Filipino (Tagalog) is a required subject in all
schools. There are many ethnic groupings, even among the Malay stock
which predominate. There are some 87 languages and dialects being
spoken by the different ethnic groupings.
The Filipinos make up an extremely complex society that defies
easy generalization. It is shaped by a rich variety of cultures.
Filipino attitudes and values are derived from several diverse insti-2
tutions. First is the tightly-knit, hierarchical barangay with its
emphasis on security and survival. Second is the Catholic Church,
19
with its universalist civilization and its support for the priveleges of the
descendants of the Spaniards who still control much of the wealth of
the nation. Third, Filipinos derived much from the energetic, pragmatic
administrative and political structures of the American type of gouernnret.
Inspite of this rich variety of cultures social scientists claimed
that Filipinos have achieved a degree of national unity and a commitment
to democracy that makes them different from other developing nations.
They claim, however, that the closely-knit hierarchical barangay based
on familial kinship predisposes them to give greater weight to primary
groups and personal relationships than to the contractual and abstract
values of nationhood. Their Catholic upbringing instituted respect
and submissiveness to the sector controlling their means of livelihood,
causing them to be vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation. They
have been exploited by religious friars in the past, the landed gentries
during the Spanish regime, and continue to be exploited by the newly
emerged commercial and industrial groups that have taken over from
the traditional elite during contemporary times.
The Philippines has remained predominantly rural. The process
of urbanization has accelerated in the last decade, especially in
Luzon. The improvements in communication, by way of radio and television,
have increased the awareness of the rural population. They have
become more informed on the affairs of government and a better life
in which they could not share because their economic status has not
improved as fast as that of most Filipinos who live in the urban areas.
The young rural folks have begun to treke to the cities in search of
jobs that they soon discover are not available. They contribute to
the multitude of unemployed in the cities. Some of them join the
20
colonies of squatters who put up make-shift abodes on private and
government lands, normally near probable places of employment. Their
sad state provides the background for the issues raised against the
government by cause-oriented groups in the past and at present. The
radical left and the communists make use of and draw much support
and sympathy from these squatters. Their homes and residences become
safehouses for the urban terrorists and liquidator units of both the
communist and the secessionist insurgents. Communist infiltrators
have reportedly intentionally joined these colonies of urban squatters
to act as agitators and propagandists. For lack of jobs, most of them
have become for-hire demonstrators. No one can fail to observe their
presence during big rallies and demonstrations.
Philippine Economy3
The Philippines is still an agricultural country. Citizens of
the US and other nations cannot understand how a country so rich in
agricultural resources and bestowed with a climate suitable for food
production can not be self sufficient in food production and has had
resorted to importation rice, its staple food on several occasions.
There are several explanations for this sad reality. First is the
low productivity of the land. Initially fertilizers were not widely
used. When the use was started, the cost of fertilizers became
exhorbitantly high and the increased output did not offset the cost
of the fertilizer. This was especially true for small farmers.
Another explanation is the concentration on crops for export, a
factor that tended to increase the number of tenants and further
complicated the agrarian problem. Although the Philippines has
reached some degree of self sufficiency in rice production through
21
the adoption of improved technology, it still suffers periodically
from the effects of floods due to typhoons. Finally, hoarding is
perpetuated by the Chinese merchants, whose money-lending practices
to small farmers create false picture of shortages.
The traditional Philippine economy correlates with traditional
Filipino society, both of which were a creation of the hacienda economy
started by the Spaniards during their rule. The two-class society
made up of a few wealthy landowners and masses of dependent workers
was passed on to the United States. Unfortunately, because of concen-
tration of efforts on education and the institution of a government
system, the United States failed to correct the economic institution.
Instead, a colonial economy developed tying the Philippines to the
United States' market by free trade policies concentrated on the
production of a few agricultural products.4 This arrangement did
little to ameliorate the living conditions of the masses in the rural
areas because the bulk of the income goes to the government, the rich,
and the urban centers. Additionally, it has made the Philippines
highly dependent on the traditional crops for export, and the number
of tenant farmers for such crops increased. When the world's demand
for these commodities is reduced, the tenant workers are displaced.
A good example of this is the lot of the sugarland workers in Negros
Island. During periods of demand for sugar the workers did not see
the disparity in the distribution of income from the proceeds of their
labor because to them it was more than sufficient. Now that they
have lost their source of livelihood because of closure of the sugar
plantations and the sugar mills, they realize how they previously had
been taken advantage of. Even when allotted lands by the owners to
22
grow food for themselves, they find themselves inexperienced. Progres-
sive foundations and cooperatives created by farmers have failed to
alleviate the sugar planters' miserable conditions. Although some
progress has been made much more needs to be done.
The government has initiated efforts to stimulate ventures in
new and profitable investment opportunities in other forms of agri-5
culture. Some of them can be exploited relatively quickly, like
growing of vegetables and flowers and exporting them as Taiwan has
done. Others would need conversions and preparation to other crops,
and would need a longer period of gestation. They would need greater
government help by way of technical assistance and modern institutions
to prop up small-holders of land. Similar efforts have been tried
before. However, graft and corruption, inefficiency and ineptness of
government machinery tasked to carry them out and lack of viable plan
to sustain them, caused those efforts to fail. The program of the
current government on new economic projects to uplift the masses of
the tenants and small landowners will attract foreign investments if
the government can assure the investors of their security from monopo-
lists and a stable investment climate.6
There were also past government policies intended to correct the
agricultural problem of inequities in the land distribution.7 Land
reform as an agricultural policy has failed to address the many social
ramifications such as the Filipino's tie to his land and the basic
economic problems of increasing population, inaccessible technology
for productivity and lack of capital. There are a number of proposals
which have been discussed, adopted, and carried out. Most of them
faced insurmountable obstacles which doomed them right from the begin-
ning. Others failed to consider the potential social effects and
23
other societal considerations.
8First among these proposals is land redistribution. It calls
for the government to purchase large tracts of land and divide them
among the tenants who worked them. This was started in the *social
justice program" of President Manuel Quezon in the late 1930s, and
expanded under the Magsaysay administration. An expensive option, it
faced the difficulties of assessing the price of an estate, and the
even greater problem of financing the purchase. Landlords wanted
immediate cash and tenants can pay only small sums over a very long
period. Another problem is how to distribute the land because small
lots are uneconomic, yet larger lots would force out some tenants.
The population increased has also played an impact on the redistribution
problem. All these problems resulted in little success and created
subsequent problems. Because small lots are inefficient. the farmer
recipients could not earn enough to pay for the land, thereby forcing
them to default in their payments. When they resorted to borrowing
they became victims of usurious lenders from among the original land-
lords or the Chinese merchants. Utimately they lost the land.9
Resettlement was the second solution. The Philippines has
large areas of fertile unused lands in Mindanao in the south, and
the Cagayan Valley in the North. The government oppned up resettle-
ment colonies in Mindanao during Quezon's time and e colonies
increased in magnitude during Masaysay's presidency. Under Magsaysay,
the program formed part of the solution to the Huk problem in Central
Luzon. The program was successful in some measure because the government.
provided the settlers with capital, seed, better technology, health
and educdtion services, and tools in addition to the free transportation
24
7'S.
for the farmers and their families. Such resettlement was very expen-
sive and consumed much government financial resources. Failure to
sustain support for the program placed the settlers at the mercy again
of the traditional loan sources who extracted usurious interests.
There was another more significant impact of the resettlement. it
revived the animosity between the Muslims and the Christians because
of differences in the concept of property ownership.
The Muslirs look on land ownership through theprism of the Koran. the Sunnah, and other Muslim customarylaws. The Torrens system of land ownership, importedfrom Australia, is effective in Christian areas. It ishowever, in irreconcilable conflict with Muslim landtenure traditions.10
Another solution that was tried was to raise productivity.11
This was begun during the Magsaysay time and succeeding administrations
adopted it because it was less drastic in nature. However,-it was
difficult to carry .out. Government agencies undertook agricultural
extensions services, and other public and private projects were
carried out to increase productivity. These faced social and techni-
cal obstacles that had to be overcome and there was a limit to the
increase in production from the small farm plots. Support and sus-
tenance services like marketing , credit, irrigation, etc., can be
created through cooperative effort with minimal or with no govern-
ment support. But obstacles and resistance were encountered. The
result was more failure than success stories and the spirit of the
cooperative movement faltered. The primary cause of the failure was
a lack of managerial abilities of the farmers and other agricultural
workers to operate a cooperative. Related to this lack of managerial
expertise, the local acknowledged leader of the community is normal ly
tho wealthy member whose primary interests were to maintain their
25
____-
position of stature and wealth. Rural banks managed agricultural ex-
tension credits given by the Central Bank of the Philippines to an
established pre-cooperative organization called "samahang nayon".
These banks were normally owned ty the richest members of the communi-
ty with proper connection with the National Government. Because of
lack of education and natural respect for the family, a member of these
same rich families was chosen to head the samahang nayon. There were
cases where income derived from the cooperative ventures that was
supposed to be remitted to the Central Bank by the rural bank was
withheld by the latter until Central Bank declared the cooperative in
default. During investigations, the head of the cooperative hid the
farmer signatories to the loans. When the loans were erased as bad
debts by the Central Bank, the rural banks retained the original
income contributions from the farmers and at the same time expropriated
the property used as collateral. In the end, the family owning the
rural bank got the proceeds from the farmers' labor and got his land,
too. The national government lost the value of the loan. Many cases
like this occurred during the Marcos administration and either were not inves-
tigated or even if investigated were quashed because influential members
of the bureaucracy were involved.
Still another alternative to improve the agricultural economy was
one sponsored by the entrepreneurs and economic management groups.
They proposed to relieve the pressure on the land by the government
opening up urban employment opportunities. These newly emerged members
of Filipino society would rather shift government resources to pro-
duction of goods and services. According to this group, "when jobs are
-allable in the city. the people will leave thu land." 1 2 However
2 6
there was no need for this motivation. The working conditions in the
countryside have already been intolerable for centuries. Their resul-
tant migration to the urban centers have created new social problems:
overpopulation, the mushrooming squatter colonies, increased urban
crimes, higher unemployment, labor unrest and strikes, and demonstra-
tions.
Almost all past administrations have used elements of the economic
policies described above. Combinations of them at times brought some
degree of success and raised the living of the rural population to a
tolerable level. The efforts failed to institutionalize the changes
because there was no change in the social structure. The policies
tried to give opportunities for the poor to rise to within distance
of the few who had much more in life. But the mechanisms are still
controlled by those who have always been protective of their status.
The basic cause has not been removed.
Political Factors
The two preceding sets of factors conditioned the political
system of the Philippines. The Philippines, like other developing
countries, adopted government institutions modelled after those of
Western nations. In particular, the United States' achievements in
the political development of the Philippines are incomparable with
the rest of the colonial powers in the 19th century. There was, how-
evera difference in the process by which government institutions
developed. The difference lies in the social and economic situations
as well as the speed by which the institutions of governemnt were
introduced. In the United States as well as in other western demo-
cracies, the slow process of the development of the contractual
27
S d o .... . . .--
relationship between the government and the people enabled the modifi-
cations of their attitudes and social behavior to keep abreast of the
demands made on the political system. In the former, structures were
established well ahead with provision for the development of a popular
base relevant to them. 13 In the Philippines, this process has been
speeded up and disjointed. As in other developing countries, this kind
of situation has caused imbalances in the modernization process and
the traditional behavior is only partially adapted to the new structures.
The imbalances have placed many pressures on the resultant political
system. Most articulate was a section of society which originally
came from the wealthy families based on land ownership or taken over
by professional politicians.
While national affairs have always been the domain of the tradi-
tional elite of Philippine society, after the Second World War a
phenomenon started in the political scene, especially in the remote
local areas. This phenomenon involved "the displacement of men of
prominence and prosperity from local leadership positions by upwardly
mobile men from small farming, fishing, and business families and
other humble backgrounds." 1 4 This came about because of the impact
of national politics in local communities and the political competition
involving a growing mass participation. These two forces led to the
adoption of more professional criteria for recruitment to the positions
of town political leadership. This phenomenon, however, has not been
observed to have occurred uniformly throught the country. It has
occurred more in towns and provinces where the level of social mobili-
zation was high and concentration of landownership was low. 15 The
level of social mobilization was high in towns and provinces around
28
- a ma. S....,.-. -
principal cities like Manila, where access to education is easier than
in other areas. The fast urbanization process taking place in the
Philippines will tend to promote the changes initiated by this pheno-
menon, but will also bring about the debilitating political corruption
*that is a consequence of the patron-client relationship.
29
CHAPTER IV
THE PHILIPPINES UNDER MARCOS
No other President has had as much impact on the Philippines as
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Elected as president in 1965 he
remained as the president until he was deposed in February 26, 1986
by the much heralded "People's Revolution". He extended his consti-
tutionally allowed two terms of office by declaring martial law in
1972. While the country was under martial law he allegedly rigged a
constitutional convention that was called to draft a new constitution
to change the form of government which would allow him to continue to
remain in office far beyond the two terms.
Basis of the Declaration of Martial Law
The fundamental reasons for the declaration of martial law on
September 22. 1972, were embodied in Proclamation 1081, the written
instrument by which President Marcos instituted the era of martial rule
in the Philippines. He primarily cited the "lawless men" and "ruthless
group of men" who are
waging an armed insurrection and rebellion against theRepublic of the Philippines in order to forceably seize poli-tical and state power in this country, overthrow the dulyconstituted government and supplant our existing political,social, economic and legal order with an entirely new onewhose form of government, whose system of law, whose conceptionsof God and religion, whose notion of individual rights andcommn relations,and its political, social, and economic, legaland moral precepts are based on Marxist-I3ninist-Maoist teachingsand beliefs.
All except one other introductory paragraph described the heinous
threat and danger posed by the communists. This paragraph addressed
the "equally serious disorder in Mindanao and Sulu resulting from
the unsettled conflict between certain elements of the Christian and
Muslim population". 2
30
6- m"m rnummNa mma m m l~ m PI I, Ii
mr o ,rN m" - .. - '. .
The basis of the threat for the declaration of martial law was
the most controversial, as the events that were transpiring in the
Philippines were alleged to have been stage-managed by President Marcos
and his close allies in the government. The allegations were based on
the fact that the President was in the last years of his term of office
allowed by law, and he still wanted to continue to rule. Whoever was
responsible for the events occurring in the Philippines during the few
months and days before the declaration of martial law had created a
situation so bad the attitude of the US Embassy in Manila was described
by Francis T. Underhill, a political officer from 1969-1971 as
follows:
This place is a hopeless mess. Power is sodispersed that nothing can be done. Graft and cor-ruption are rife. The streets are unsafe. ThePhilippines needs a strong man, a man on horsebackto get the country organized and going again.Look at the progress being made by Park in Korea,Suharto in Indonesia, and Lee in Singapore. 3
An incident in July 1972 involving a cache of arms in northern
Luzon generated a lot of talk about the incipient communist insurgency,
but it was rejected by the opposition and critics of the administration.
Even the CIA doubted that the cache of arms came from the foreign
supporters of the communist rebels. They were proven wrong a decade
later by the admittance of two leaders of the Communist Party that the
arms were really intended for their revolution. They revealed that4
the arms came from North Korea.
The opposition to the Marcos regime claimed that the series of
bombing incidents days before the declaration of martial law was staged
in order to justify to the United States the plan to declare martial
law. Accordingly, Ambassador Byroade transmitted a message to Presi-
31
dent Marcos that the U.S. Government would have no objection if martial5
law were needed to put down the communist insurgency. The US, there-
fore, provided a reenforcement for the decision made in September
1972. Some sectors in the present government continuously made this
charge against him, and the communists propagandized this as US inter-
ference.
Economic Crisis Caused by Martial Rule
The Marcos Administration, especially beginning in 1972, ushered
in the period of crony capitalism.6 Crony capitalism refers to the
economy created by favored businessmen who obtained undue advantage
in domestic business. While past administrations had also granted
favors to a number of existing business conglomerates, during the
authoritarian rule of Marcos favors were granted to special friends
with no known business establishment.
One cause of the economic crisis was the massive government spend-
ing that characterized the first two terms of Marcos presidency. Due
to a vast infrastructure investment program, especially in Mindanao,
"the government widened the gap between investment and savings from
an excess supply savings in 1961-1965 to an excess of investment over
savings at the rate of P294 million yearly during the 1966-1974"7
The "savings deficiency was inevitably reflected in the current
accounts deficits in the balance of payments, the balance of which
increased almost . However, some aspects of infrastructure
program proved to be effective. Road networks were expanded in Minda-
nao. Rice self-sufficiency was reached through the construction of
irrigation systems all over the islands. But continuous heavy spend-
ing beyond 1970 only paid dividends as far as the investment made in
32
the energy self-reliance program which reduced dependence on imported
oil from 81% in 1974 to 58% in 1984. 9 Other capital expenditures
financed by foreign borrowings were dubious in utility because of poor
planning and outright mismanagement by favored businessmen of the
Marcos government.
There were certain achievements of the economic policies of the
government under Marcos during the first five years of martial law.
The leaders of the initial martial law years trimmed government defi-
cits to lower levels, primarily through better tax collections.
Capital expenditures were limited to outlays for infrastructure
projects and not on "other capital outlays" which included construction
by ministries not directly related to public works. The reduction of
dependence on imported oil through the energy self-reliance program
was another achievement which cushioned the 1973 first oil shock.
People in and out of the government welcomed the strong government,
particularly as they saw the destabilising effects of the quadrupling
of oil prices in the world market. The economic policies carried out
during that period helped to limit the inflation rate to a single-
digit level by 1975.10
After 1975. however, unsound economic policies began to charac-
terize the Marcos government. Political interference in the working
of the economy during the 70s and early 80s became noticeable. Where
before the period, priority was given to infrastructure projects,
there was shift to the "other capital outlays". Major construction
projects whose value to the economy-was questionable began in 1976
coinciding with the IMF meeting in Manila. These included the Manila
Bay Reclamation Project, the Cultural Center Complex, five-star hotels
33
financed by government banks, the University of Life facilities, and
three highly sophisticated medical centers. The Kidney Foundation of
the Philippines was a medical center for the treatment of the suspected
sickness of the President. All these were the brain children of the
First Lady, Imelda Marcos, and they caused her to be tagged as suffering
from an "edifice complex"."1 The situation became much worse in the
early 80s when corporate equity investment became the most important
capital outlay, surpassing infrastructure investments. This trend was
attributable to the bail-out operation of large private firms, mostly
owned by Marcos' cronies, which had to be rescued from financial col-
lapse. Government banks like the Central Bank, the Philippine National
Bank, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the Land Bank, and the
National Development Company were made to extend loans and charged
with the management of the distressed firms.12
Another policy that contributed to the economic crisis was the
creation of government mandated monopolies in key agricultural sectors
like sugar, tobacco, coconut, and grains. There would not have been
a problem with the single trading agency in the sugar industry, for
example, if it had been managed by all participants in the sugar
industry who are represented on the Board. The single trading agency,
however, was controlled by the cronies of the government who gave in-
complete or false information about their operations to the planters,
millers, and other industrial participants. The effect on millions
of farmers and their dependents resulted in great disastisfaction
with the government.
Socio-Political Development
Political development during the Marcos administration followed
34
the same pattern as the economic events, both of which were brought
about by the shifting economic policies. While hopeful scepticism
greeted the period in 1973, despair and frustration bordering on anger
characterized the years after 1983. With the imposition of martial
law in September and the completion of the constitutional revision in
late 1972, indications of change in the political structure and proce-
dures associated with Philippine democracy in the past became apparent.
The barangay became the new base of the Philippine-style democracy,
and new channels of communication between the government and the people
were defined.
Later developments in the socio-political arena indicated the
Marcos family intended to institutionalize their regime. At the baran-
gay level Marcos bureaucrats provided the leadership and linkages to
the national government. The military and police forces became the
privileged organizations tasked to protect and preserve the first family
in the National Capital Region. In successive national and local
elections which were held, Marcos' men and relatives were supported
and made to win. His son Bongbong Marcos became the governor of their
home province, Ilocos Norte, at the age of 21. On the question of
succession, a committee was created to be headed by the Prime Minister
which would provide the transition until a new president could be
elected. His wife, Imelda Marcos, was made a member, thereby confirm-
ing the suspicion that the First Lady was being prepositioned to take
over.
Opposition however began to build up in the late 1970s and
strengthened after the assassination of Benigno Aquino in August
1983. Disenchantment with the regime began as early as the middle of
35
the 1970s. Political activism gained adherence even among the middle
and upper classes as they began to symphatize with the students who
resumed demonstrations in 1977 after a period of relative quiet.
Some sectors of the Catholic Church joined in the fray. The
excesses of the regime forced the more radical members of the religous
sectors towards a politically active stance. A small number of priests
and nuns joined the New People's Army as active combatants. Others
supported it through the Christians for National Liberation, a member
13of the communist-led National Democratic Front. Even Protest minis-
ters in a display of ecumenical cooperation actively criticized and
opposed Marcos.
The Marcos regime propelled the Church, against its wishes and
traditions, into an active changing political role with Cardinal Jaime
Sin as its leader and spokesman. The Church was almost alone in
criticizing the President and his associates for the excesses of their
rule for quite sometime. It became later on the moving force that
emboldened the silent opposition to come out and consolidated all the
forces that finally toppled Marcos.
The Politicization of the AFP
There used to be a time when the Philippine military played a
non-political role and was "accustomed to nonpartisan subordinate of
successive civilian governments under the alternate control of one
political party and one elected president or another".14 This is
not to be taken, however,that the military were totally isolated from
politics. Retired and older military officers still could recall with
bitterness how they had to curry favors with the Congressional members
of the Commission on Appointments in their hope for advancement to the
36
rank of Colonel and above. The officers of the Philippine Constabulary,
a national police force and a major service of the AFP, found they had
to establish close relationships with town mayors, provincial governors,
and their province's congressmen. All past presidents of the Philip-
pines, even before Marcos, gave key positions, especially the post of
Chief of Staff, to officers whom they trusted. That meant they were
usually officers from their home region or province. Largely, however,
before martial law the military was a nonpolitical servant of the
nation and remained largely beholden to the president or a political
party. They looked down on officers and other peers who allowed
themselves to become involved in politics. They dreaded the thought
of having their military file stamped with the word "politicking",
as it could portend a difficult path to advancement.
The role of the military greatly changed under President Marcos..
Two tendencies were immediately observed by his critics during his
first two terms in office: undue promotion preference was given to
officers coming from his home region of Ilocos and he was generou's
with the Armed Forces. His decision to declare martial law was support-
ed and implemented by all of his senior officers. Only General Rafael
Ileto opposed the move, and he was exiled to a diplomatic post abroad.
After President Marcos was deposed, Ileto was recalled from retire-
ment and became the Assistant Secretary of National Defense under the
Aguino Government. He subsequently became the Secretary of National
Defense after President Aquino fired Secretary Enrile when the latter
became critical of the government. General Ileto recently resigned
as Secretary of National Defense and was replaced by General Fidel
Ramos, the former Chief of Staff.
37
During the martial law period, the military was alleged to have
become "an active, privileged and essential bulwark of the Marcos
Government". 15 With the increase in size from 54,000 to three times
that number, came rapid promotions,a series of pay increases, and
generous opportunities for outside and post-retirement incomes. 1 6
Military men began to take civilian functions. In the provinces,
military commanders replaced mayors and governors as the principal
holders of powers. In some instances this became necessary because
the governors and mayors in insurgent-ridden areas were absentee office
holders or they simply deserted their posts out of fear of the insur-
gents. Some retired military officers, especially general officers,
were appointed governors in their home provinces to head the President's
party, the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL).
The Marcos era also developed elitism in the military. Not only
were the security and intelligence units based in and around Manila
"Ilocanized" (infused with Ilocanos who are from the President's region),
but these units were the recipients of special favors, including promo-
tions of their officers, grants of more financial support, and better
equipment. Examples included the Presidential Security Command, the
Presidential Guard Battalion, the Metropolitan Command of the Philip-
pine Constabulary (METROCOM), the National Intelligence and Security
Authority (NISA), the Manila Unit of the Integrated National Police,
the 2nd Infantry Division in Camp Capinpin, Tanay, and the 5th Infan-
try Brigade in Camp Aquino, Tarlac. This concentration of highly
privileged forces in and near the capital region were intended to
secure the President and his family, as well as other members of the
regime. General Fabian C. Ver created these units and insured that
38
*~~ .4.~ 1. 7 7r.. 7 7
they remained loyal to him by dispensing material and financial rewards.
However, these forces failed to save the President during the February
1986 People's Revolution. From these units also came the core of
the Marcos' Loyalists who remained a threat to the security of the
present government.
In addition to the size and structure of the AFP, the Marcos
regime brought about changes in the values and behavior in some sectors
in the military. Starting with the security and intelligences offices
and units, many young and promising officers became attracted to lu-
crative assignments in the logistic and financial fields where they
observed their classmates and contemporaries not only getting faster
promotions,but partaking of other privileges and benefits accruing
from the graft and corruption perpetuated by ranking military officers.
Additionally, they sought assignments near and around the national
capital. Many of these officers were those who had assignments outside
of Manila fighting the insurgents for some years. As a way of escape
from assignments in units combatting the communist insurgents or the
muslim rebels, they curried connections with those in the in-group of
General Ver. This resulted in the undesirable consequence of leaving
the combatant forces with the less capable officers. Forced to live
off the land due to failures of higher headquarters to provide them
even with most basic resources to sustain combat operations, they be-
came unpopular among the civilians and vulnerable to the NPA's attacks
due to inadequacies of equipment. In 1981 and 1982, officers from
the units who had been fighting on the insurgency fronts formed the
"Reform the AFP Movement" (RAM), also called "We Belong" which aimed
to restore professionalism within, and public respect for, the armed
forces by bringing nonprofessional behavior of their colleagues and
39
higher ranking officers to the attention of the President. Born in
period when the president's health started to deteriorate, the RAM was
isolated by the sector of the military loyal to General Ver, the then
Chief of Staff. Furthermore, it was infiltrated by officers belonging
to another camp wielding political power in the government, the Minis-
try of National Defense under Minister Juan Ponce Enrile. Enrile
was at this time the competition to the suspected Imelda/Ver power duo.
He controlled a majority of the original RAM officers and they played
a significant role in the downfall of the Marcos regime. Unfortunate-
ly, however, having become politicians themselves, this group later
became rebels against the present administration which they once joined
and helped to establish.
In sum. the deterioration of the AFP under Marcos was due to the
schizophrenia it suffered from two very conflicting missions: one, to
support and defend the Marcos government and two, to protect the
nation against external and domestic armed threats. The first mission
was reflected in the characteristics and level of elite organizations
concentrated around Manila which provided the most attractive career
opportunities for the rank and file. The task of defending the nation
was carried out by AFP units outside of Manila area. In contrast to
those that protect the First Family, the life of those who served
the units fighting the insurgents was unpleasant and their rewards
were very meager. They were inadequately supplied and equipped be-
cause equipment due them was sold off to enrich officers at the support
organizations in the urban areas.
The military environment under the Marcos regime facilitated the
corruption of the military and caused the division which has become
40
apparent after its fall. As the AFP now intensifies its operations
against the insurgents, it also watches its ranks for those who are
still loyal to the previous regime. A third faction, consisting of
the die-hard members of RAM, lurks on the side waiting to repeat what
they failed to complete on 28 August 1987.
41
CHAPTER V
THE NATIONAL SECURITY SITUATION
The overall situation in the Philippines is characterized by a
general atmosphere of uncertainty. Although President Aquino still
enjoys popular support, her government is beset by a multitude of
fundamental problems which are carryovers from the past administra-
tion. Additionally there are a number of social, political, economic,
and military issues that have emerged out of the basic problems
inherited from the past. These issues will be described and analyzed
in this chapter together with the most current situations of the pri-
mary protagonists in the conflict - the government and the military on
one hand versus the insurgents on the other.
The Social, Economic, and Political Climate
Social Climate. As described earlier, Philippine society is
basically rural. Despite migration to the urban centers by rural
people, 70% of the population remains in the countryside. They con-
tinue to live in basically the same conditions as before with only
limited improvements such as roads, irrigations, bridges, and electric
power due to a trickle of development projects that filtered to some
areas, especially during the Marcos regime. They continue to typify
the hardened and unaffected rural folk whose basic needs are still
simple, and whose only dreams are to insure that their children receive
a better education and obtain better opportunities in life. Most of
them are still tenants, although a number were lucky enough to get
Certificates of Land Transfer, the instrument used in the Land Reform
Code decreed by President Marcos in 1972 to divide and distribute large
ricelands to the tenants. Those who obtained parcel of lands in
42
productive areas are getting by in paying off the land transferred
to them. Others encountered difficulties either because of the poor
condition of the land or the absence of farm support facilities like
irrigation and electricity. Some farmers in this group have opted to
return their land and work as tenants in other regions.
In the urban areas life is no better, as the economic slumps
affect them much more. Inasmuch as they are nearer and have much more
access to communication facilities they are more aware of the happen-
ings in the world. This makes the urban population the prime deter-
minant of the political mood of the country. It maybe recalled that
the overthrow of President Marcos was led and effected by the so
called "people's revolution" in the Greater Manila Area with some
support from the other urban areas such as Baguio, Cebu, Bacolod, and
Davao.
Altogether the social situation, measured by the same standard,
is no better than before. The Bishops-Businessmen Conference estimated
in 1985 that "74% of the Filipinos considered themselves 'poor'". 1
Poverty however is relative. If compared to the wealthy five per
cent of the population including foreigners doing business in the
Philippines, local businessmen, and the members of the Catholic Church,
a great majority of the people are indeed poor. In most rural areas
of the Philippines, however, the people continue to value hard work,
eat better food and live under healthier conditions with simple
amenities of life. But as it is, the ones most critical of the social
and economic situation in the country are the ones that perpetuate
the great disparity in wealth distribution - the prime cause of the
insurgency problem.
43
Political Climate. When President Aquino took over the helm of
2government, she faced two difficult political realities. First, the
extraordinary long rule of Marcos practically made the Philippine
bureaucracy beholden to him. Secondly, the nation was emotionally
split between those who stood by Marcos and those who supported her
during the presidential election that preceded the February 1986
People's Revolution. The present political climate has been shaped
by the actions taken by her government to deal with these problems.
The attempts to break the grip of the Marcos loyalists' bureaucracy,
especially the immediate replacement of the elected governors and
mayors before the expiration of their tenure, began the division of
the nation. There were also isolated cases of indiscriminate termina-
tion in the lower civil service positions and subsequent replacements.
Political observers viewed this action as a repetition of the age-old
practice of "To the victors belong the spoils of war".
There has emerged a perception that the Aquino government is
mishandling the communist insurgency problem because the government4
is infiltrated by communists. This perception was challenged by
Pro-Marcos factions of the military who attempted a number of coup
d'etat in 1986 and 1987. The followers of deposed Secretary of
National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile, were one group that criticized
the government on this basis and used it as an excuse for their violent
attempt to take over the government on August 28, 1987. The perception
was reinforced when the President released all political prisoners
over the military's objections in fulfillment of her campaign promise
and to open avenues for a peaceful solution to the insurgency problem.
The perception was further reinforced when the government agreed to
44
a 60-day ceasefire with the CPP/NPA that began in December 1987. The
military cooperated with the national government initiative, but the
National Democratic Front exploited the period for propaganda and
reorganization. The NPA in many areas blatantly violated the cease-
fire agreement and staged shows of force, brandishing their weapons
and strength in populated areas. Nothing was attained for the govern-
ment, but the event proved to the President the apparent hopelessness
of dealing with the communists. The peace initiative with the MNLF
followed the same course. The Muslim rebels, under the resurrected
leadership of Nur Misuari, used the period to appear in force in many
municipalities in Western Mindanao in an agit-prop technique to rally
the Muslim population. Up to the present time, the Muslims under him
still demand the independence of the 13 provinces in MINSUPALA where
the Muslims are a minority.
The Philippinc government has completed its reorganization of
the three branches of government with the election and convening of
the members of the two houses of Congress in July 1987. The local
provincial and municipal officials were likewise elected in January
of 1988. A real democratically elected government is now running the
affairs of the Philippines. President Aquino has progressed from the
simple housewife she was before to a dedicated and sincere head-of-
-ate who seeks to govern by consensus. She has now unsheathed "the
sword of war" against the communist insurgents, although she still
leaves the door open for insurgents who desire to return to the folds
of the law. She has the full backing of the majority of the Senators
and Congressmen whose sucess in the pol Is were accredited to her
1)(PuljrityT. The composition of the two houses is a mix of old anl
4r
ioung politicians. Most of the new ones still come from old-line
families that have run Philippine politics for many years. Their
average political orientation is centrist, despite the perception by
pro-Marcos factions and the military that a number of them are either
communists or left-leaning. Some of them had even been detained by
the military in the past. This in some ways created feelings of dis-
trust, especially those who were supported by the CPP/NPA in their
elections to office. As President, Cory Aquino has to mediate the
differences between the political leadership in Congress and the mem-
bers of her cabinet on one hand, and the military on the other. She
needs the support of both if she has to succeed.
Economic Climate. The Philippine economy still reels from the
mishandling of foreign debts by the Marcos administration. With a
foreign debt of $28 billion to be paid, the government is heavily
burdened by the principal and interest payment. It continues to labor,
as reflected by the positive, though less than desired, growth of the
GNP. This is an achievement considering the negative growth that
began in 1983, triggered by the assassination of Senator Benigno
Aquino. The flight of Filipino capital which was massive before has
observably been reduced. The investment climate has considerably
improved so that European business consortiums have expressed interests
in investing in the country.
The government continues to stress the importance of the business
sector. Just like Marcos, President Aquino calls on business leaders
to have a "positive attitude". Despite adverse situations that conti-
nue to plague the nation , like increased fuel prices, mort! labor
trike s and rcidi cal demons t: rat ions , the c( overfrimrnt sti [I raintaills
,j prr; t. ivm: r,.jt ook ir; 1,ir is ecoriornir; dev- lopr ri t i:; o-)nr.rn(,( . It
4r,
is trying to balance development in the agricultural and industrial
sectors. Realizing the need for more export products to balance trade
deficits and to earn more foreign currencies, the government continues
to search for more non-traditional export products.
The Threats to National Security
This research is focused on the insurgency threat; the foremost
and most formidable threat that endangers the security of the Philip-
pines. Because the overall threat includes not only the two types of
insurgency described earlier, the AFP likewise continues to monitor
the activities of the ultra-rightist groups, consisting of the Marcos
loyalists and the RAM faction of the military. They are significant
in the sense that they can cause some degree of distability and pro-
vide the main threats more opportunities to stage their operations.
The CPP/NPA. The strength of the CPP/NPA is estimated at 23,260
regulars with 12,200 firearms deployed in 61 guerrilla fronts through-
out the country. The Communist terrorists (CTs) are active in 20% of
the 42,000 barangays nationwide. The media reports that the strength
has reached 26,000, agrees with military's report that they are active
in 20% of the countryside, but adds that they are in full of control5
of the 20% of the countryside. Of the 58 million Filipinos, approxi-
mately 2 million give them support through cash, food, and sanctuary
6either out of sympathy or because of fear due to coercion and terror.
The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) is at the helm of
the communist movement in the Philippines. Pursuing objectives of
World Communism. it tends to follow more the Chinese-Maoist line. It
relies on popular fronts to stage and drum up its activities because
it cannot legally exist. The largest of these fronts is the National
47
- Democratic Front which has come to be the umbrella for all the popular
fronts comprised of labor, students, farmers, and professional organi-
zations. The NPA is the armed component of the movement. It is orga-
nized into provincial districts whose operations and activities are
orchestrated by regional committees. The insurgent organization in a
province is portrayed and described by the military in the following
manner:
i j OGU
MRGU
LEGEW INSURGENT ORGANIZATION
- 0ARMED SUPPORT---- W L OF COM- Figure No. 1
MUNICATION
"1" represents the political underground infrastructurewithin the population in the different towns and cities of theprovince. The political cells or agents of the CPP (semi-legalteams, armed propaganda units, party branches, etc.) are primarilyresponsible for subversion propaganda, tax collection, repressionand sabotage. They organize the people into mass organizationsfor employment in the united front effort. Importantly, theyprovide recruits, information, food and shelter and other suppliesto the NPA guerrilla units at "2", "3" and "4". The operationsof the political infrastructure is the blood giving life to theinsurgency.
"2" represents the NPA militia which provides directarmed support to the political underground infrastructure.This unit with a strength of fron 3-15 men operates in oraround the barangays or towns.
1"3" represents NPA district guerrilla units with averagestrengths of 30 men which are responsible for small-scaleguerrilla actions against government forces within a guerrilla
48
district covering fran 2 to 10 towns. They also provide directarmed support to the NPA militia and the political undergroundinfrastructure.
"4" represents front or regional guerrilla units withstrength varying from 100 to 300. Considered top rate units,the front or regional guerrilla units are responsible forcarrying out small to large scale guerrilla attacks and ambus-cades against goverrment forces in one to three provinces.These units are the best arned of all guerrilla forces.
Figure one shows the dependence of NPA guerrilla unitson the political underground infrastructure in the town orcity. For as long as the political underground infrastructureexists within the population, the NPA guerrilla units areprovided with all necessary support for their survival in thebattlefield. Similarly, with the armed support of NPA guer-rilla units, the political underground infrastructure is ableto expand in the countryside, subverting one barangay to another.The continued existence of the underground political infra-structure will explain why communist insurgency grew steadilyin the last 20 years despite government countermeasures directedprincipally at NPA guerrilla units. Since the politicalunderground infrastructure remained untouched in the populatedareas, it was able not only to replace the casualties sufferedby guerrilla units, but also provide additional new recruitsfor new NPA guerrilla units. With the symbiotic relationshiprestored, i.e., the NPA guerrilla units supporting the politi-cal underground infrastructure and vice versa, the insurgencyvas able to develop additional political and military strengthand expand to other areas.
Although Figure 1 shows that the underground politicalinfrastructure within the population is somewhat separatedfrom the NPA guerrilla units, particularly the militia, theyare not so in actual practice. In the CPP-influenced andinfiltrated barangays, the underground political infrastructure,the militia and even the larger NPA guerrilla units live withthe population. In the CPP-targetted barangays and in the non-affected areas, while the underground political infrastructureis imbedded within the population, the NPA guerrilla unitsremain in close contact along the fringes of these areas readyto provide military support. In the case of MetropolitanManila for instance, the armed city partisans (an NPA guerrillaunit) operate clandestinely from safehouses in the cities andtowns of the metropolis or fran support bases along the Bulacanand Cavite boundaries.
The activities of the underground political infrastructureand the NPA guerrilla units are closely coordinated and inte-grated by party committees organized in a hierarchical structurefran the barangay to the territorial level (e.g., NorthernLuzon). The rembers of these committees, excluding the sectionparty committee responsible for grassroots operations, do notnormally live with the population, except in areas under theCPP influence. However, at the grassroot level, i.e., barangaysand even towns and cities, the members of the section party
49
cannittee remain with the population in order to maintainclose contact with and provide direction to the undergroundpolitical infrastructure. It is the responsibility of thesection party committee to manage the cell system of theunderground political infrastructure which includes thereplacement of destroyed political cells and the upgradingof political cells on merit. 7
The CTs have found the current socio-economic-political situation
conducive to the progress of its movement. Its strategy includes
both violent and non-violent actions. Taking advantage of the coup
attempts, they have undertaken and continue to conduct tactical offensives.
In the period from 28 August to 20 October 1987 alone, the CTs initiated
289 violent incidentswhich is 15% higher than the same time period imme-
diately preceeding. Significant increases were recorded in sabotage
(667%), disarming of policemen and other persons in authority (100%),
robbery and hold-ups (100%), landmining (50%), and ambuscades (48%).8
Casualties and firearms losses rose by 49% and 4% respectively.
The CTs have intensified their sparrow operations in the National
Capital Region (NCR) and other urban centers. These operations are
so named because they are undertaken by the sparrow units of the NPA
trained for liquidation jobs. Their missions aim to undermine the
people's faith in the government's ability to maintain peace and order
and to create an atmosphere of anarchy in the country. Since the
aborted coup led by Gringo Honasan in August of 1987, they have
launched 30 suspected sparrow operations which have resulted in the
deaths of 16 soldiers, five policemen, four security guards and seven
civilians. From January 1 to October 15 1987, the CTs were involved
in 2,366 violent incidents all over the Philippines, 65% of which
they initiated. The death toll was staggering: 525 soldiers, 179
policemen, 192 CHDF members, 743 civilians including 50 government
50
officials and 1,202 CTs. 268 CTs were captured.9
The NDF, on the other hand, in the middle of 1987 started a six
year plan consisting of three two-year long phases to topple the
government. The plan covers the duration of President Aquino's term
of office. It calls for the assignment of NDF elements to key offices
in the different government departments, to be followed by the infil-
tration of sensitive positions, and finally, the fielding of a national
democratic front candidate for the presidential election in 1992.10
This is the basis of the military's perception that some of President
Aquino's appointments are either communists or left-leaning. Those
whom the military accuse of NDF ties always shrug off the accusation
and hide behind the cloak of neo-nationalism. They may not be self-
avowed communists now, the military says, but they are the ones sus-
ceptible to being used by the communists in their steps to power.
Some of them have been detained before and charged of subversion
and tie-up with communists by the military in military tribunals.
In a move to exploit the present situation, the Central Commit-
tee of the CPP issued a directive on 5 September 1987 to intensify
military operations in order to cripple the AFP. Among the tasks
assigned to the party cadres and insurgents are the following:
1. Hasten the establishment of combat formations whichwill be supported by the establishment of secondary forces inthe district and municipal levels;
2. Form democratic political organs at higher levelsand NDF organizations in the countryside and urban areas;
3. Prepare the revolutionary forces and the citizensryin the urban centers for both armed and non-armed struggleagainst the formation of a military dictatorship;
4. Intensify mass movements and develop the capabilityto stage mass actions that could lead to an uprising or rebel-lion;
5. Seize every opportunity to weaken the AFP forces; and6. Map out contingency plan to counter the imposition of
martial law or a state of emergency. 11
51
This directive explains the rash of insurgent activities in 1987.
The CTs took every opportunity to stage ambuscades and sabotage while
the military were busy fighting each other during the series of coup
d'etats. Labor organizations were agitated to go on strikes. The
increased price of fuel last year caused the drivers of public trans-
portation to go on demonstrations and stage strikes. It is signifi-
cant, however, to note that the CPP fears and anticipates that the
II distability it intends to create may precipitate a military dictator-
ship, or may force the government to declare martial law as Marcos
did in 1972. Either of the two would be a nemesis to their long range
plan. They would rather have the tolerance and permissiveness of the
present government to continue.
The CPP continues to plan ahead. A three-year plan spelled out
in a document captured last 16 September 1987 in Sta. Cruz. Zambales,
revealed the following plan of the CPP/NPA in the next years:
1. Improve the NPA by organizing company-size formationsand specialized units and acquiring high-powered firearms;
2. Organize wide-spread strikes, mobilize the workers forthe revolution and form provisional groups for the revolutionarygovernment.
3. Step up solidarity work abroad.12
This document of the CPP/NPA echoes the plan of the NDF earlier
described. It indicates the growing confidence of the communists to
carry out their ultimate plan to topple the present government by pre-
paring to progress to the strategic offensive phase of their revolu-
tionary movement. So far they have been cruising through the strate-
gic defensive phase with limited tactical offensives. The stepped-
up solidarity work abroad is intended to generate not only moral
support, but financial and material support. 1 3
52
A difference in the concept over the formation of provisional
groups for the revolutionary government may surface between the CPP and
the NDF as outlined by William Chapman.
There are, however, fragments of evidence that a genuinedisagreement exists over policy between the NDF and the CPPCentral CoTmnittee and that a tug-of-war has been underway foryears over the shape of a social system that would follow avictory by insurgents. In 1986, NDF officials became quiteexplicit about the differences. In a remarkable magazineinterview, the NDF's highest-ranking public spokesman, SaturOcanpo, defined the schism. The Communist Party, he said,"is a party with a socialist perspective.
That is, ultimately, the CPP intends to establisha socialist form of government and a society alongMarxist-Leninist concept, with, of course, correspondingadjustments based on the specific characteristics of thenational situation in the Philippines.On the other hand, Ocaipo explained, the NDF program
embraced non-Marxist elements and openly welcome disparategroups, even big landlords who sympathized with the revolution. Hethus drew a distinction between "national democrats" whobelieved in pluralism and the CPP which, he made clear, stillhewed to the Marxist-Leninist line. One is left with the sensethat a genuine ideological conflict over fundamentals was ragingsomewhere within the highest councils. One had no way oftelling, however, which would prevail if it ever came tomatter in the Philippines. 14
The Secessionist Insurgents
The MNLF, which has broken up into three factions, has an es-
timated strength of 19,800 regulars with 10,600 firearms. Of the total
regulars, about 15,930 belong to the Misuari faction. The MILF under
Hashim Salamat has about 3,330 men equipped with 2,540 firearms. The
MNLF reformist group under Dimasangkay Pundato has about 540 men with
480 firearms.15
The MNLF has been consolidating and strengthening its depleted
and demoralized forces through massive recruitment and training.
Since last year arms have arrived for their use as well as MNLF person-
nel trained abroad. They still are holding the government to the
ceasation-of-hostilities agreement. However, the government original-
53
ly understood this agreement on an ending of talks based on an autonomous
region under the Philippine jurisdiction, but which Nur Misuari claims
is an independent Muslim nation. To strengthen his position in the
negotiation he is building up his arms and manpower. He is preparing
for open hostilities in case the government fails to meet his demands.
Reportedly there were firearms shipments delivered on September 30 and
October I of 1987 in Tawi-Tawi.
The MNLF's strategy to pressure the government to grant its demand
is to conduct terrorist activities in Mindanao as well as in Metro
Manila, primarily targetting commercial establishments and public
places. Misuari also plans to join forces with other revolutionary
and political groups in the country to topple the Aquino Government, if
these groups will recognize the MNLF's demand for autonomy for the 13
provinces in the south. 16
Without foreign aid, the MNLF cannot sustain a protracted guer-
rilla warfare. It primarily relies on its foreign benefactors in carry-
ing out its armed struggle. Libya is its number one supporter. On
October 20, 1987, Nur Misuari and his top aides were reported to have
attended the Organization of Islam Conference to drum up support for
full autonomy of Mindanao. Just like the NPAs, the seccessionists
are taking advantage of the government's tolerant and reconciliatory
stance and the military's apparent disunity.
The Military - The Armed Forces of the Philippines
Organization. The AFP is tasked primarily to secure the sove-
reignty and integrity of the national territory. Created by National
Defense Act Nr. 1 in 1905, it has evolved to its present organization,
which in 1987 had an authorized strength of 160,000. The mass media
reports a strength of 250,000 but this includes the police force and
54
other paramilitary forces which are under the supervision of either
the GHQ AFP or the Philippine Constabulary. The AFP is organized into
a General Headquarters (GHQ) and four major services, namely: the
Philippine Army (PA), the Philippine Constabulary (PC), the Philippine
Air Force (PAF) and the Philippine Navy (PN). As tactical arms,the
AFP maintains unified commands (UCs) and specified commands. There
are two types of unified command. One is the Area Unified Command
(AUC) and the other is Regional Unified Command (RUC). The difference
between the two is the size of the area of operation. An AUC has a
jurisdiction covering more than one administrative region of the coun-
try. The RUC has one one region for its area of operation. There are
three AUCs: the Northern Luzon Command, covering Regions 1 and 2;
the Southern Luzon Command, covering Regions 4 and 5; and the Southern
Command in Mindanao which cludes Regions 9, 10, 11, and 12. Four RUCs
secure Regions 3, 6, 7, and 8. The Western Command is a UC which has
a province for its jurisdiction, the Palawan Islands, but it also has
all the surrounding waters under its protection. The four specified
commands are the PAF Security Command (PAFSECOM, formerly AVSECOM),
the Clark Air Base Command (CABCOM), the Subic Command (SUBCOM), and
the Narcotic Command (NARCOM).
The four major services vary in the manner by which they contri-
bute and support the unified commands. The Philippine Army, whose
main resources are organized into divisions and separate brigades,
may either have a division, a separate brigade, a tactical brigade,
a batallion or several batallions committed and attached to the UC
commander. The PC, organized into regional commands (RCs) corres-
ponding to the administrative divisions of the country, simply place
55
the RCs falling within the territorial jurisdiction of the AUC or RUC
under its operational control. However, PC policy is for the RCs to
continue to carry out their police functions within their regional ju-
risdiction. The PAF contributes Composite Air Strike Forces (CASFs)
consisting of elements of COIN air assets. To facilitate the PAF su-
pervision of the CASFs, the PAF maintains three Air Divisions one each
in the three major divisions of the islands, namely Luzon, Visayas, and
Mindanao. The headquarters of these air divisions integrate air sup-
port to the RUCs and AUCs, not only with the CASFs' aircraft, but with
general support air resources, such as airlift and fighter support,
which normally are not detached from the PAF. The PN has the same
concept of supporting the AUCs and RUCs. They have divided the country,
however, into several naval districts from which the integration and
support of naval efforts are controlled and monitored. The Philippine
Marines (PM) normally augment the PA and the PC as ground combatant
force.
A number of AFP-wide Service Support units also exist to support
and provide services to the AUCs, RUCs, and the four major services.
They are under the supervision of GHQ.
The total force committed to fight the insurgents include four
separate infantry brigades, 23 tactical brigades, 87 maneuver batal-
lions, 73 provincial commands (PC), 223 PC eompanies and 7 PC Metropo-
litan District Commands (Metrodiscom). The PAF provide tactical air
support as needed.
Capabilities of the AFP. The preceding description may give
the impression that the AFP is substantially strong. However, the
size and topography of the countryside where they must deploy to
battle the insurgents spreads them so thin their operational effec-
56
tiveness is very much diminished. They suffer from other deficiencies.
The maneuver batallions of the PA and the PM are on the average only
84% filled. The fill-up of the PC companies is much better at 95%.
For lack of motorized vehicles, the mobility of the troops is only 25%.
Tactical communication equipment fill-up is only around 47%. While the
soldiers are all provided with M-16 rifles, crew-served weapons and
artillery pieces are in much shorter supply than the desired. The
best that could be given each individual soldier is only around 70% of
the necessary combat clothing and individual equipment. Soldiers have
to use part of their pay and allowances to provide some of the basic
necessities for fighting. Considering that there are insufficient aircraft
to provide air support to the ground troops, the PAF programed flying
time is further reduced by the constraint of a limited budget. The
PAF has always .overflown its annual programmed flying hours, and GHQ
has consistently supported the POL overconsumption. In 1987, out of
all the aircraft in the PAF inventory, only about 65% are supportable
by the approved budget.
The Philippine Navy is in almost the same predicament. Due to
budgetary constraints it is operating fewer ships and small craft than
are in the inventory. Moreover, the material readiness of most of their
ships are marginal due to age and the very high cost of maintenance.
17The Budgetary Problem of the AFP. The budget of the AFP has
been the target of criticism from all sectors of Philippine society
to include those who are now part of the leadership of the present
government. Contrary to popular perception, the budget of the AFP has
not increased in real terms despite the nominal increases observed.
Records from 1972 to 1987 show that since 1974, the AFP percentage
57
share of the national budget has declined from 22.3% in 1974 to 7.2%
in 1987. As a percentage of the GNP, the AFP buget has continuously
declined, from 4.5% of GNP in 1976 to 1.25% in 1987. The average AFP
share of the GNP in the last 15 years is 2.04%. These indicators
show how much the AFP has endured in carrying out its tasks. More
significantly, it explains the effect on operational readiness of mili-
tary equipment and the poor fill-up in the basic equippage of the
troops. Among the ASEAN nations, the Philippines has the least defense
support per soldier. Brunei spends 28.4% more than the Philippines.
In descending order, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand
spend 6.8%, 3.3%, 2.9% and 2.2% more respectively.
The Military Strategy to Combat the Insurgents. After the failure
of the ceasefire and the peace negotiations between the government
panel and the NDF, representing the CPP, the NPA and their front orga-
nizations on 30 January 1987, President.Aquino directed the AFP to go
after the hardcore communist rebels who refused to stack their arms
and accept the government's offer of amnesty and reconciliation. As
Commander in Chief of the AFP she exhorted her soldiers "to unsheath
the sword of war and give our nation a string of honorable victories."'18
The AFP's response to her call was Letter of Instruction Number
01/87 codenamed Pagsubok. It was an AFP-wide operational directive
which ordered major tactical offensive operations to be launched
against suspected CPP/NPA strongholds in Regions 3, 4, and the NCR. 19
LOI Pagsubok also directed all AFP forces in other regions to conduct
limited tactical offensives in their respective areas of operations.
Handcuffed for almost a year since the People's Revolution in Februa-
ry 1986, and uncertain on the gains of NPA consolidation efforts
58
condjcted during the period of tlo ceasefire. The AFP began by making
probes, concentrating first in the heartland of the insurgents: the
Central Plains of Luzon (Region3), the Laguna-Batangas-Quezon region
(Region 4), and the National Capital Region (NCR) consisting of Metro
Manila and the provinces of Bulacan, Cavite, and Rizal.
The results of the probes in Operations Pagsubok, and the guidance
of the National Government embodied in the National Reconciliation
and Development Program promulgated by Proclamation Number 80 and
Executive Order Number 103, form the basis for the AFP Broad Front
Strategy against the insurgents. The strategy unleashes "the military
power against the purveyors of violence, at the same time keeping open
the channels for dialogue and reconciliation with our rebel brothers
who may choose to rejoin the rest of the Filipino nation in our quest
for peace and prosperity.2 0
The overall concept of the strategy is depicted in FiguLe 2. It
envisions the destruction of the underground political organization
of the CFP in the populated areas. The methodical plan calls for
POLITICAL CELL tip
OGUU
PRIORITYOP TARGETSLEGEND' igure No. 2
,ARMED SUPPORT
-w--- LINE OF COMMUNICATION
59
targeting the lines of communication, such as the constant movement
of couriers, "pasabilis" (fast pass), and supplies, on the fringes of
populated areas, and between the populated areas and guerrilla bases
in the mountains. When the link is severed, the next target should
be the underground political organization in the populated area, inclu-
ding the section committee providing direction to operations of both
the underground political organization and the NPA guerrilla units.
After the underground political organization is neutralized, the NPA
21guerrillas will be the next target.
Two programs are supposed to carry out the strategy.
The first program, city/town defense, is aimed at theprotection of the population, the severance of the line ofcormmunication of the CPP in the city or town, and the des-truction of the underground political infrastructure within thepopulation in the city or town. The second program, militarlofferisiveshould seek to break the line of carrunication ofthe CPP between the city and town and the NPA guerrilla unitsin the outling areas, and destroy or neutralize NPA guerrillaunits isolated fra the underground political infrastructure.To be successful, it is mandatory that both programs be mutuallysupporting.2 2
The strategy appears well thought out and makes sense. Compared
to the previous strategies, such as LOI Katatagan adopted in the last
administration, it is more focused on the organization and modus ope-
raridi of the enemy. The grandiose strategies of the past played on
words "to win the hearts and minds of the people", but put less
direct efforts to protect them. Programs on civil relations and civic
actions only made the people very reliant on the AFP, even for servi-
ces that the other government agencies ought to provide and, thereby,
diverting the AFP from its real tasks. Value formation activities
made wrong premises and addressed the wrong targets. TargetnP&r for
the most part the soldiers and the lowly people, past strateqies
60
assumed that they had bad and undesirable values and, therefore, should
*develop better one. In actuality it was the values of the leaders,
wallowing in corruption and abuses, that were in question.
This chapter has described the current socio-economic-political
situation in the Philippines. The whole climate indicates the conti-
nuing influence of the past. The insurgents have taken advantage of
the effects of the incidents of the past and the present inadequacies
of the government to strengthen their organization and capabilities.
In the political sphere, however, significant developments show some
rays of hope to improve the socio-economic situation. President Aquino
has finally decided to deal more strongly with the insurgents although
she still keeps the door open for peaceful solution. The military on
the other hand is trying another strategy to combat the insurgents.
Without full knowledge of the current strategy, other than that con-
tained in available sources, I hope the strategy provides guidance for
increasing military presence in the rural areas. The insurgents in
the past have been more visible than government troopers. At times,
the people in the areas have been made to believe that the NPA guer-
rillas are really in control. Hence, their forced cooperation.
61
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary and Analyses
Insurgency in the Philippines became more complex because of the
accumulation of factors which muddled the issues that initially caused
it. From the Central Plains of Luzon where its roots started, the
problem has spread to almost encompass the whole country. From the
simple violations of the rules of relations between landlord and tenant,
the causes have taken much more complex dimensions, brought about by
social, political, and economic developments from within and outside
of the Philippines.
The Root Cause. Insurgency is not new to the Philippines. Fili-
pinos fought the same type of warfare against their colonizers: Spain,
the United States, and Japan. The root cause of the original version
of the insurgency started with the historical incident of the Spaniards
arriving in the Philippines, christianizing the Filipinos while limit-
ing their education, appropriating great vast of agricultural lands
for the Spanish settlers and the religious friars, and enslaving the
Filipinos who once communally tilled the lands. Just as the winds of
nationalism had gained momentum in Europe with the French Revolution,
its sparks reached the nationalists in the colonies and lit the fire
of their dream of independence. Unconsciously, however, the economic
system that was established by the early settlers and religious friars
was passed on to and was nurtured by their descendants who comprised
but a small percentage of the native Filipinos. They were the ones
who perpetuated the inequities of land distribution for centuries.
Their landholdings became the sources of wealth used in later changes
62
in the economic system and their source of power in the political deve-
lopment of the country. From among these propertied class came the
politicians during the pre-independence and post-independence periods.
Their protective actions to preserve their economic status prevented
the legislation that could narrow the inequities in Filipino society.
But the gap between the rich and the poor is not totally the cause
of the problem. As in the case of the landlord and the tenant in Cen-
tral Luzon, social investigation reveals that farmers were happy and
content with the relationship with their landlords in the past because
the landlords provided some degree of economic security for them. There
may have been some unfairness in the crop sharing by present standards,
but this was more than made up by the readiness and willingness of
their landlords to provide emergency sustenance during periods of cala-
mities and poor harvests or other assistance such as medicines and
financial loans without interest. Conflicts arose when these arrange-
ments were broken because descendants who took over the management of
the farms applied the business practice of charging interest and
required payments for assistance rendered.
Added to these violations of the existing rules in the relationship
were the agitation by agents of a foreign country with the objective
to spread its ideology of communism. The result is an insurgency
problem.
Political Ramifications of the Problem. Insurgency in the Ph~lip-
pines is a social problem caused by inequities in the economic status
of the people. It has become more complex because past political actions
either sidestepped the causes or were palliative in nature due to
inadequate resources to sustain and institutionalize corrective pro-
63
grams. Furthermore, political solutions failed to consider that a
counterforce such as the communists would make use of any failure or
detectable bad intentions for propaganda. There had been examples in
the past where government mismanagement, oligarchic plunder, and shod-
dy foreign borrowings were used as propaganda to discredit the existing
government. The Marcos regime is one example. It would be the highest
state of naivette' for any Philippine government to ignore leftist-
leaning critics who highlight alleged government malpractices, even
if they were not true. Propaganda has attained its objective if the mes-
sage has been communicated and not challenged.
Past Philippine governments, even before Marcos, planned develop-
ment programs oriented towards insuring the continuance of the party
or the person in power. When the economic programs are designed to
attain political objectives, they tend to have a short gestation in
order to attain early impact. As such, these programs have temporary
and fleeting values that will not contribute to a lasting solution to
the problem being addressed. Many of these programs are inefficient
and lead to wasteful spending. Furthermore. they are vulnerable to
graft and corruption.
In the sphere of government, changes in structure and systems
were attempted but apparently failpd. The cause of failure was not
because the system was inappropriate, but because the defects were
with the policy implementors whose motivations were far from desirable.
Cases of graft and corruption were not fully investigated and punished
because justice was made a plaything by those who were in the positions
of power. This has created the environment for the grievances, and
the resultant disenchantments and dissatisfactions made the cause of
64
the insurgents acceptable to the masses.
Economic Reforms. All the economic programs in the past intended
to emancipate the sector of Philippine society vulnerable to the in-
surgent propaganda worked in a limited manner because of several rea-
sons. A number of land reform programs had been attempted in the past
that were either very expensive to undertake; fraught with so many
technical difficulties such as land valuation, a compensation plan for
the landowners, and payment schemes by the grantee farmers; or there
were more farmers than there were lands that could be distributed in
sizable and economic lots. The reforms continued to be effective only
as long as the government was capable of supporting the transportation
cost of the farmers and their families, providing the initial tools
and seeds to help the relocated farmers turn new farms into a paying
concern, and provide security to the new relocated homestead colonies.
This last item became necessary in the later phase of the program when
the resettled farmers ran into conflict with the Muslim population
who resented the Christian Filipinos' arrival.
Raising productivity of the land became a primary objective also,
but it met with some social and technical difficulties. There were
limits to the productivity of small plots. Arranging marketing, credit,
irrigation, and other problems which could have been easily solved through
the system of cooperatives, proved difficult because of lack of
education and preparation of the farmers for such undertaking. In
many cases, the unscrupulous rich and business merchants took advan-
tage of the farmers.
In order to decongest the rural areas of farmers with little or
no land to till, the policy of opening jobs in the cities was adopted.
65
Proponents of this policy were entrqpreneurs and industrialist who belived
that economic development could be accelerated through industrialization.
Adopting this policy, the government rerouted financial resources
destined for the agricultural sectors to the job-rich industrial enter-
prises. While a number of these enterprises actually created employment
opportunities, many ventures ran aground because of mismanagement,
graft and corruption in the government agencies responsible for moni-
toring the activities, and the simple ineptness of those running the
new enterprises whose only credentials were their connections with
government authorities. Industrialization caused multitudes from the
rural areas to flock to the urban centers which then became congested.
Far more complex social problems, such as unsanitary squatter colonies,
drug additions, child prostitution and other crimes, emerged in the
congested urban centers. All these problems fell right into the
scheme of the radical left to attact to their side the many cause-
oriented groups that sprouted to champion the lot of the masses.
The US and Other Countries' Influence. As a developing nation,
the Philippines is just as vulnerable as any-other country to any upheaval
in the socio-economic-political spheres. The vulnerabilities began
as early as the first foreigners stepped on Philippine soils to stay
and supplant the traditional value and way of life.
The Spaniards were the first group of foreigners and they left
the most lasting legacy of religion and the hacienda economy. The
economic heritage had the most profound impact and was the primary
causative factor for the economic ills in contemporary times. This
system laid the fundamentals for the great disparity in the level of
life between the rich and the poor which characterises Philippine
66
society.
The American legacy which followed the Spanish developed a poli-
tical system and introduced an educational system, but maintained the
economic system already established by their predecessors. While
Spain ruled for a little less than 400 years, the American regime
lasted only for a little less than 50 years. The Americans however
had the most influences on phases of Filipino life. Seemingly bene-
volent and generous in their policies towards the Philippines, these
same policies continued to be guided by their national interests and
their business group's interests. The grant of independence was ex-
pedited by "American beet lobbies opposed to Philippine sugar, dairy
lobbies opposed to coconut oil, and labor lobbies opposed to Filipino
immigrant labor." 2 These economic factions were furthermore aided by
the "isolationists and the power realists fearful of Japan, a new
generation of anti-imperialists by party or principle, and others who
might be called emancipatory gradualists, disinterested persons who
simply believed that 'that time had come' for an independent Philip-
pines .3
The US granted Philippine independence in 1946, at most inoppor-
tuned time after the Second World War when the Philippines was in
shambles, the economy shattered and the population divided over the
issue of collaboration by those who served the Japanese-sponsored
government. Whether intended by design or not, Filipinos' preoccupa-
with rehabilitating the nation enabled the Americans to secure agree-
ment to three bases of post-war relations, namely, the Parity Rights
Amendment to the 1935 Constitution, the Bell Trade Act, and the Mili-
tary Bases Agreement. The second agreement was t.ed to the first which
granted the same right to Americans as Filipinos in the ownership and
67
exploitation of natural resources. In return, trade preference for
Philippine products that was supposed to terminate in 1946 was extended
to 1974 on the rationale that the Philippines needed it for stabilized
recovery. All these agreements were clearly a recipe for prolonged
semi-colonial association to confine the independence granted to the
sovereign legal sense of the word. But even sovereignty was infringed
upon by the investment rights granted to the Americans and the extra-
territorial jurisdiction granted to the bases. The nature of this
relationship became the dominant theme of all the cooperative under-
takings by both governments, except that the Filipinos always ended
up on the short end of the bargain. This is best exemplified in the
field of military cooperation.
The Armed Forces of the Philippines has been organized and trained
on the same pattern and orientation-as the United States Armed Services.
This is not unexpected as the AFP has been trained and advised by
Americans for many years and is equipped with American-made weapons.
Its effectiveness, therefore, is liable to diminish if it is not sup-
ported as well as it should ordinarily be. The AFP is deficient in
logistic support because of overdependence on the Americans, whose
generosity depends very much to the degree of cooperation between the
US and the Philippine governments. During the Marcos regime the size
of the aid package depended in large degree on the extent of Marcos'
subservience to the American government's bidding. The US efforts to
depose General Noriega of Panama are similar to the squeeze placed
on Marcos. Luckily for Panama, they do not face a problem of insurgency.
Conclusions
The insurgency problem is both real and imminent. The Muslim
68
rebel secessionists are not yet formidable, but the communist insurgents
have evolved into a threat much stronger anid more determined than
their forerunners, the Huks and the HMBs.
The nature, characteristics and dynamics of insurgency in the
Philippines are so complicated no single solution can do the job. It
needs a simultaneous socio-economic-political solutions with the mili-
tary providing the stability through loyal and cooperative effort to
confront the armed component of the conflict. Socially, the govern-
ment may have to put up both long and short term programs along with
educational systems to encourage active participation in government.
Politically, the government should address its weaknesses in order to
strengthen its structure to protect and serve the people. Economical-
ly, the government should look for more workable solutions to equally
distribute the fruits of development. Militarily, the AFP should
study its present mission, organization, and strategy to counter the
strategies and tactics of its enemies.
In the field of.foreign relations, the Philippine government should
restudy its foreign policies and assess the currenc relationship with
the United States in order to attain full nationhood and regain self-
respect.
Recommendations
Military Actions. While military actions will not solve insur-
gency totally, the AFP can, however, face the NPA and the Muslim re-
bels in such a way as to demobilize their capabilities to expand
influence beyond the areas that they have now attained. The CPP/NPA
strategy of protracted war calls for the war to drag on to enable it
to build its forces sotkat it will be difficult for the AFP to defeat
69
it strategically. In 1969 when it was first organized, the NPA had
only nine original squads with only 35 assorted rifles and handguns.
It has now opened 60 guerrilla fronts and base areas in the country-
side, with an estimated strength of 23,000 armed regulars. The National
Democratic Front, the front organization of the CPP, was just a skele-
ton organization in the early 70s. Now it has even attracted into its
ranks influential members of the clergy, the business community, mem-
bers of media, politicians, teachers, and other strategic sectors of
society. The AFP, therefore, has to act now. Obviously, the govern-
ment should put emphasis on military actions.
Lt Colonel Victor Corpus, once a rebel himself and now working in
the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations in GHQ, recom-
mends undertaking a "WAR OF QUICK DECISION" intended to destroy the
NPA in the next two or three years. The AFP Broad Front Strategy
described earlier has not been explicit in the actions to be taken
and has not considered the overall strategy of the CPP/NPA. Corpuz's
master plan uses the operational and organization techniques of the
NPA as the basis for the offensives he envisions the AFP must take.
If there are 60 NPA base areas nationwide, the AFP should determine the
major and most advanced CPP/NPA base areas and carryout simultaneous
offensive operations against them until all principal enemy bases are
dismantled and the main guerrilla forces in those base areas are
decisively defeated.
His master plan calls for two major phases:
The first phase involves general preparationwhich includes reorganization, retraining and reo-rientation, and getting rid of the unnecessary bag-gages in the organization.
The second phase is the launching of simultaneousand sustained campaigns against all guerrilla fronts
70
and base areas nonstop until all the principal enemybases are dismantled and their main forces in eachgiven area rre defeated and destroyed. 4
A major recommendation in his plan calls for the reorganization
of the ground combatant forces. He advocates the primary COIN orga-
nization be the Commando Brigade which shall be composed of commando
batallions, the number of which in each brigade will depend on the
geographic size of the enemy base area. This concept of organization
resembles the COIN AFP units in the 1950s when the batallion combat
teams (BCTs) successfully conducted operations against the Huks.
They were sustained by support from the main base camps known as
military areas (Army) and constabulary zones (PC). To describe the
operational tactics would belabor the point. It will suffice to say
that this plan improves on the "search and destroy" and "clear and
hold" strategy adopted before which made the government forces vulne-
rable to ambuscades and their small holding detachments subject to
annihilating attacks.
In addition, as part of military reforms, the military should
address the eradication of service parochialism. This is necessary
to facilitate cooperation among the four armed serv.ices. The interser-
vice rivalry in the past prevented rational long and short range
planning that resulted in disjointed growth of the services. For
example, the PA and the PC have grown so big, the PAF and the PN
could not support their air and naval support requirements for joint
operations.
Present doctrines have to be studied and rewritten to conform
to the changes in the organization restructuring. Future doctrines
should emphasize jointness in thinking and actions.
71
Non-military Actions. The Philippine Government has for a long
time accepted the fact that a military solution will not totally
eradicate insurgency. The ideological underpinnings of the conflict
are the domain of the civilian government. There were attempts in
the past that could have gained some measures of success. Insincere
* and vicious political motivations have clouded the gains that were
attained.
To strengthen the social system, the government should preempt
the caused-oriented groups, with their rallied masses forcing the
government to react to their demands, by formulating workable poli-
cies based on complete social investigation to correct'social inequi-
ties. Where demands are not attainable immediately the government
should communicate the truth instead of promising or making evasive
replies to preserve its popularity that only cause more dissatisfac-
tion and generate rising expectations.
Economic policies should address the gap between the rich and
the poor. This is most important as thisisthefundamental cause of
the insurgency problem. As the government encourages the private
sector to grow, it should be made to absorb more burdens, either by
way of higher taxes or voluntary assistance to the masses.
The judicial system should be strengthened. The full force of
the law should be applied to all violators. Government officials
from the President down to the lowliest civil servant should be sub-
ject to the same standards of treatment.
Present foreign policies should be restudied. Special relation-
ship with countries that advance the attainment of our national in-
terests should be sought and continued. Others that impinge on the
72
exercise of sovereignty be renegotiated to correct them.
The Filipinos in the final analysis will determine their future.
They have had lessons in the past which placed most of them where they
are today. They will have to decide on the manner by which they would
like to go and what they want to be. Someone said before that the
people deserves the kind of government they elect. On the Filipino
people, therefore, depend the successful pursuit of above recommen-
dations as theyare the one to select the people who will formulate and
carry out the policies.
73
73
NOTES
CHAPTER I
1. Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, Handout, p.2.
2. Ibid, p. 2
3. Clarence G. Barrens, "I Promise: Magsaysay's Unique Psyop
Defeats Huks," A thesis presented to the US Army Command and General
Staff College, p. 7.
CHAPTER II
1. Wyman J. Priester, Jr., Civilian, "The Huk Movement in the
Philippines: Its Origin, Its Decline, and Its Revival", A Research
Report submitted to the Faculty,AWC, p. 10.
2. Walter A. Taylor, "Rebirth of a Rebel Army", US News & World
Report, September 28, 1987, p. 75.
3. Cesar Adib Majul, The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the
Philippines, Mizan Press, Berkeley, pp. 62-65.
4. The National Security Situation, a manuscript of the briefing
by the AFP to Philippine Senate Finance Committee, 20 October 1987.
5. William H. Scott, The Philippines: A Matter of Concern
(Air University Air War College Professional Study), p. 4.
6. Jean Grossholtz, Politics in the Philippines, A Country Study,
(Boston Toronto; Little, Brown and Company) p. 17.
7. Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama, Vol. I, p. 147.
8. Ibid, p. 148.
9. Cesar Adib Majul, The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the
Philippines, (Mizan Press, Berkeley), p. 19.
10. Ibid, p. 21.
74
11. Ibid, p. 21.
12. Ibid, pp. 22-23
13. The National Security Situation, A manuscript of the the
* AFP briefing to the Philippine Senate Finance Committee, 20 October
1987.
14. Cesar Adib Majul, The Contemporary Muslim Movement in
the Philippines, (Mizan Press, Berkeley), p. 53.
CHAPTER III
1. Background Notes, Philippines, United States Department of
State, Bureau of Public Affairs, August 1986.
2. Jean Grossholtz, Politics in the Philippines, A Country
Study, Boston and Toronto (Little, Brown and Company), pp. 78-80.
3. Ibid, with added personal comments.
4. Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama, Vol. I, p. 148.
5. Asian Agenda Report 4,"The Philippines Facing the Future,"
An Assessment of the Prospects for the Philippines and for Philippine
American Relations, (A report of the findings of a study mission to
the Philippines sponsored by the Asia Society of New York and the
Center for Research and Communication, Manila.)
6. Ibid.
7. Jean Grossholtz, Politics in the Philippines, A Country Study,
Boston and Toronto, (Little, Brown and Company), pp. 69-71.
8. Ibid, pp. 69-70.
9. Ibid, p. 70.
10. Raul S. Manglapus, Philippines: The Silenced Democracy,
Orbis Books, Maryknoll, New York, p. 29.
75
11. Jean Grossholtz, Politics in the Philippines, A Country Study,
Boston and Toronto (Little, Brown and Company), p. 70.
12. Ibid, p. 70.
13. Jean Grossholtz, Politics in The Philippines. A Country Study,
Boston and Toronto (Little, Brown, and Company), p. 70.
14. K. G. Machado, "Changing Patterns of Leadership Recruitment
and the Emergence of the Professional Politicians in the Philippine
Local Politics," in Political Change in the Philippines: Studies of
Local Politics Preceding Martial Law, Benedict J. Kerkvliet, ed.
(The University Press of Hawaii, p. 79.)
CHAPTER IV
1. Ferdinand E. Marcos, Proclamation 1081, dtd 21 September 1972.
2. Ibid.
3. Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, The Marcoses and
The Making of American Policy, (Times Books), p. 93.
4. Ibid,, p. 95.
5. Ibid., p. 96.
C. Bernardo Villegas, "The Economic Crisis" in Crisis in the
Philippines, The Marcos Era and Beyond by John Brennan, ed. (Prince-
ton University, Princeton, New Jersey), p. 155.
7. Ibid., p. 155.
8. Ibid., p. 155.
9. Ibid., p. 156.
10. Ibid., p. 157.
11. Ibid., pp. 161-161.
12. Ibid., p. 162.
13. Carl H. Lande, "The Politi-al Crisis" in Crisis in the
Philippines by John Brennan, ed. (Princeton University Press,
76
Princeton, New Jersey), p. 120.
14. Ibid, pp. 134-135.
15. Ibid., p. 136.
CHAPTER V
1. Asian Agenda Report 4, The Philippines Facing the Future, An
Assessment of the Prospects for the Philippines and for the Philippine
American Relation, p. 11.
2. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
3. Ibid.
4. Issues and Answers. A Paper prepared presumably by the
civilian government in the Philippines to answer issues raised by
the military.
5. Walter A. Taylor, "Rebirth of a Rebel Army," U.S. News &
World Report, September 28. 1987, p. 75.
6. Ibid.
7. "City/Town Defense Program", a paper of Colonel Ismael
Z Villareal, PA (GSC) on 15 April, 1987.
8. The National Security Situation, a manuscript of the AFP
briefing to the Philippine Senate Finance Committee, 20 October 1987.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. William Chapman, Inside the Philippine Revolution, W. W.
Norton and Company (New York and London), p. 228.
77
15. The National Security Situation, a manuscript of the AFP
briefing to the Philippine Senate Finance Committee, 20 October 1987.
16. Ibid.
17. Statistical information cited in this paragraph were taken
from the paper justifying the AFP proposed budget for the Calendar
Year 1988.
18. From the President's address delivered in the graduation
ceremony at the Philippine Military Academy in March 1987.
19. The AFP Broad Front Strategy Against the Communist Insurgen-
cy, 1986.
20. Ibid.
21. "City/Town Defense Program", a paper of Colonel Ismael Z
Villareal, PA (GSC) on 15 April 1987.
22. Ibid.
CHAPTER VI
1. Benedict J. Kerkvliet, "Agrarian Conditions Since the Huk
Rebellion: A Barrio in Central Luzon," in Political Change in the
Philippines: Studies of Local Politics Preceding Martial Law. ed.
(The University Press of Hawaii).
2. Theodore Friend, "Philippine-American Tensions in History",
Crisis in the Philippines, John Brennan, ed. (Princeton University
Press), p. 8.
3. Ibid., p. 8.
4. Victor Corpuz, A Working Paper for Seminar Workshop (5-6
November 1987).
78
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