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Explaining the Different Revolutionary Outcomes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia:
A Structural Approach
Abdalla Barqawi
POL 3164
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Explaining the Different Revolutionary Outcomes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia:
A Structural Approach
Introduction
The democratic revolutions that occurred in the Middle East and North Africa region,
known as the Arab Spring, gave hope to oppressed people that the majority of Arab states will
undergo similar transformations to produce more politically inclusive, non-repressive political
regimes. However, such a hope was not manifested. While revolutions, or mass protests, broke
out in many parts of the region, other parts did not witness such mobilization. This is more
surprising as a revolutionary movement did break out in Egypt, but only a small-scale Shia
protest that lasted for only a short period of time broke out in Saudi Arabia.1 To be sure, Egypt
and Saudi Arabia were very similar before the revolution broke out in Egypt in 2011. In 2010,
just before the Arab Spring, both countries could best be classified as autocratic regimes
(Freedom House, 2010; Polity IV, 2010). Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia have one minority
population that is discriminated against: the Copts in Egypt who are a Christian sect and the
Shi’a in Saudi Arabia who have a different religious basis than the majority of Muslims. Both
countries have witnessed an average of 5 percent Gross Domestic Product (GDP) economic
growth from 2000 to 2010 (UNdata, 2010). Of course, both countries are composed of a
predominantly Muslim Arab population and were important regional powers in the Middle East
and North Africa (Brasamian interview with Chomsky, 2013). Given all of these similarities, the
employment of a comparative study to understand the underlying causes of the different
outcomes in these two countries is beneficial in the quest of discerning the causes of revolutions
in the Arab world. It has to be asked, then, why was there a revolution in Egypt, but not in Saudi
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Arabia? This paper will argue that four factors explain the different outcomes in both countries:
different economic conditions and policies that affected collective action amongst the masses in
both countries, the role of social media and the governments’ response to its use led to different
organizational and collective action revolutionary outcomes, the status of civil-military relations
weakened the Egyptian state apparatus while it strengthened that of Saudi Arabia against mass
mobilization, and the sources and level of legitimacy of each regime affected the incentive for
mass mobilization and the feasibility of a revolution differently in each country.
Definition and Theoretical Framework
To understand the underlying factors that led or impeded the outbreak of revolutions, it is
important to first define what a revolution is.2 This definitional quest has engaged concerned
scholars in a long debate. For some scholars, a revolution is a mass mobilization that is
successful in accomplishing its goals (Kimmel, 1990). An implication of this definition is that all
uprisings that are repressed could not be considered as revolutionary. Furthermore, some
scholars consider revolutions to be the antithesis of organization and order, which opposes a
view by others who claim that revolutions are based on organization and order as they seek to
create a new form of societal structure and require a certain level of organization between the
participants to achieve their revolutionary goals (Brighenti, 2008). Those who adopt a Marxist
materialistic conception claim that “revolutions are rapid, basic transformation of a society’s
state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based
revolts from below” (Skocpol, 1979, p. 4). Other scholars find this argument invalid as it does
not take into consideration ideological, religious, or other aspects of a revolution (Goldstone
2001).3 As a more contemporary definition, Goldstone claims that revolutions are an attempt to
change both political legitimacy and institutions through the actions of mass mobilizations,
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which may be violent or non-violent (Goldstone, 2001). This paper will adopt this definition of
revolution. It is important to note, however, that mass mobilization may be a result of many
factors, including economic conditions, but such factors are not the definition of a revolution and
may only be a cause of mass mobilization.
While it may seem that revolutions breakout in a sudden and chaotic manner, the study of
revolutions is embedded within a theoretical framework that attempts to explain such societal
upheavals. This theoretical framework, however, has also been a matter of debate between
theorists in regards to the scope of analysis and the immediate factors that lead to revolutions.
Some scholars have focused on the participatory aspects of revolutions. That is, why do people
join revolutionary movements and mass mobilizations? For Michael Kimmel (1990), individuals
join revolutionary movements when they have both emotions of despair and hope
simultaneously.4 It is when individuals feel that they are impeded by a certain form of political
organization and are optimistic that they can change this impediment through group action that
revolutions occur. Other scholars employ a derivative of rational choice theory and claim that
participating in a revolution is rational because it brings future rewards to groups (Goldstone,
1994; Weede & Muller, 1998).5 This argument is based on two findings, which Goldstone
elaborates on (1994). First, individuals join groups because it is more beneficial for them to be in
a social group. Within this group, collective action is overcome because all group members view
their outcomes in positive terms.6 Second, different groups in society join a revolution because
their participation holds mutually beneficial prospects. Of course, such explanations do not
explain the causal mechanisms that lead groups or individuals to partake in revolutionary action.
Theories that attempt to explain the outbreak of revolutions could be grouped into four
distinct schools: the natural history school, the psychological school, the modernist school, and
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the structural school. The natural history school emerged in the early twentieth century as a
response to the revolutions that occurred in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Goldstone,
1982). This school is based on the premise that society goes through developmental stages and
views revolutions as the force that transitions society from one stage to another (Sztompka,
1990). The purpose of revolutions from a natural history perspective is to liberate the individual
from societal as well as political constraints and to create an ideal society, which implies that the
process of revolution is continuous and inevitable because the understanding of liberty and
idealism transforms over time (Brighenti, 2008; Sztompka, 1990). From their analysis of
previous revolutions, natural history theorists have provided three causal mechanisms that lead to
mass mobilization. These are summarized by Goldstone (1982; 1994): (1) The elite and
intellectuals in society seize to support the political regime. (2) Before the outbreak of a
revolution, the existing regime will implement reforms, which will encourage revolutionaries to
mobilize as the regime has admitted to its past wrongdoings and provides incentives for the
population to join revolutionary movements.7 (3) The weakening of the old regime does not
occur as a result of the revolution, but rather to a pre-revolution crisis in its economic, political,
or military system.
Adherents to the psychological school of revolutions claim that it is psychological factors
that lead individuals to form into groups and to take rapid, often violent, action against the
existing political system (Goldstone, 1982; Goldstone 1994). Ted Robert Gurr, for example,
argues that it is relative deprivation - the perception amongst individuals that the political system
is not providing them with the goods and circumstances that they expect and should have - that
leads to revolutions (1971). Relative deprivation is important because it leads to an anger
response by individuals, which leads to aggression and rapid mobilization in the form of
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revolution (Gurr, 1971). Also part of the psychological school, James Davies argues that people
revolt when their needs are not met (1971). More specifically, Davies claims that Maslow’s
hierarchy of needs is an exemplification of causal mechanisms that lead to revolutions. In
particular, Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is composed of: physiological, safety, belonging,
esteem, and self-realization (Myers, 2010). According to Davies, individuals who do not have
physiological stability (food, for example) will revolt to attain such security. Such revolutionary
action will occur at each stage of hierarchy until they are all met.8
The modernist school of revolutions adopts elements from the psychological school and
combines them with the effects of modernization (Goldstone, 1982; Goldstone, 1994; Goldstone,
2001). One of the most influential theorists in this school is Samuel Huntington, who claimed
that revolutions are only possible in societies that are undergoing economic modernization
(Huntington, 1969; Huntington, 1994).9 For Huntington, revolutions occur in modernizing
societies because their political institutions are more rigid in their transformation and, therefore,
cannot adapt to social and economic modernization. In modernising societies, therefore, there
will be a sense of relative deprivation amongst the population, which will lead them to revolt.
Asef Bayat, by analyzing modernization in the Middle East, argues that modernization brings
about two contradictory processes (2008). On the one hand, modernization promotes
urbanization, higher levels of education, and economic development. On the other hand,
modernization has also created authoritarian political regimes, higher levels of economic
inequality and a lack of opportunity for economic development amongst the poor. To this extent,
Bayat also argues that the higher education levels amongst the population in the modernizing
states of the Middle East increases the probability of revolutionary outbreak because the majority
of this population is politically repressed, economically disadvantaged, and socially excluded,
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but this group is aware of its conditions and the opportunities that it is not afforded. Therefore,
this group is the most likely to be conscious of its relative deprivation and the most likely to
spark a revolution.
The structural school claims that different states experience different types of revolutions,
which occur as a result of “some combination of state weakness, conflicts between states and
elites, and popular uprisings” (Goldstone, 1994, p. 6). Skocpol (1979) also suggests that
international factors, such as a defeat in an interstate war, may weaken the state and provide an
opportunity for popular uprisings to occur. Furthermore, Goldstone (2001) as well as Goodwin
and Skocpol (1989) claim that the strength of the state is dependent on its legitimacy, which may
stem from the consent of the population, ideology, or religion. The relationship between elites
and the state is significant as well. More specifically, the relationship between the executive civil
branch of government and the leadership of the military is of crucial importance to the outbreak
of revolutions as the army could either repress the mass mobilization through the use of violence
or it may protect the citizens from any harm and allow the revolution to unfold (Weede &
Muller, 1998). Finally, the structural model emphasizes the role of popular uprisings, which
usually occur when “the amount of grievances, discontent and frustrations of human populations
exceed a certain threshold” (Sztompka, 1990, p. 132). In short, the structural model focuses on
the relationship between state weakness, elites, and grievances and how they lead to revolution.
This paper will use the structural school’s theoretical understanding of revolutions. This
selection is not without justification as the other schools are lacking and do not have the
universality of the structural approach. The natural history school posits that revolutions are
inevitable and continuous, but such revolutions have not occurred in all states and, in those that
have witnessed revolutions, it seems that institutions have been created to adapt to social,
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political, and economic change to prevent future revolutionary occurrences. Similarly, the
psychological school’s seemingly universal hypothesis does not apply to all countries. After all,
citizens of all states are human and undergo similar psychological developments, but revolutions
do not occur in all countries that experience similar living conditions. Modernist theory is also
not valid because many states have witnessed modernization, but have yet to witness a
revolution. In order to be able to discern why a revolution broke out in Egypt, but not in Saudi
Arabia, it is necessary to follow the structural school, which emphasizes variations between
different state circumstances. This paper, however, places very little emphasis on the role of
external actors and focuses primarily on the domestic factors of both countries. Furthermore, this
paper will draw upon rational choice theory to explain the mass mobilization in Egypt and lack
thereof in Saudi Arabia.
Economic Conditions and Policies
The economic conditions in Egypt and Saudi Arabia contributed to the different
outcomes in terms of the outbreak of revolutions. More specifically, the economic policies
implemented by each regime led to different collective action outcomes. In Egypt, the economic
conditions and Mubarak’s policies caused many grievances to the population, which provided an
incentive for the masses to mobilize in an attempt to enhance their future economic prospects. In
contrast, Saudi Arabia’s economic structure has not provided the local population with the
grievances and incentives necessary to participate in mass mobilizations against the regime.
According to the World Bank, Egypt is considered a lower middle income country
(2011). Its GDP in 2010, just before the outbreak of the revolution, was 215272 million US
dollars with a GDP per capita of 2653.7 US dollars (UNdata, 2010). Egypt’s unemployment rate
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in 2010 was a staggering 9 percent (UNdata, 2010). Under Hosni Mubarak’s rule, Egypt has
witnessed unprecedented levels of mass protests, strikes, and sit-ins by manufacturing labourers
across all parts of the country (Beinin, 2012; Ibrahim, 2011; Joya, 2011).10
These labour protests
were a response to privatization policies and laws that were passed by Mubarak’s government,
which would increase the number of the unemployed and lower the wages and benefits of those
who retain their jobs (Amin, 2011; Noueihed & Warren, 2012). The most notable of these laws
was passed in 2003 legalizing the mass dismissal of employees, the ability of employers to
assign their employees with temporary status to prevent them from attaining benefits, and the
lowering of the wages of others (Pfeifer, 2012). Such economic policies were implemented by
the Mubarak regime for two reasons. First, the economic liberalization, or infitah, policy was
forced on the political regime by the International Monetary Fund and Western powers due to its
high debt level, which Egypt was incapable of servicing (Beinin, 2012; Brynen et. al., 2012;
Bush, 2007; Joya, 2011).11
In this sense, it was the government’s lack of effectiveness and
technocratic capability that led to the economic grievances against the population. Second, in
return for military support against Iraq in the first Gulf War and the acceptance of further
liberalization and privatization, Egypt received 17.8 US billion dollars in relief to lower its debt
(Amin, 2011; Beinin, 2012; Pfeifer, 2012). It is important to note, however, that these
liberalization policies were also implemented because they directly benefited the supporters of
Mubarak, who are mainly upper class capitalists, and his son, Gamal (Bradley, 2008), which
further exacerbated the grievances of the working class. Not surprisingly, the response from the
population was a backlash against the government that cultivated in the Arab Spring revolution.
The combined outcome of these policies was increasing unemployment and lower wages
for the masses (Ibrahim, 2011).12
Keeping all of the employment and income changes in mind,
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Egypt also witnessed an increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from 100 in 2005 to 130 in
2010 (UNdata, 2010). Such an increase affected the prices of basic commodities, which the
government seized to subsidise (Amin, 2011; Beinin, 2012).13
These economic conditions led all
affected Egyptians to take collective action as many Egyptians viewed the current economic
structure as unjust. To be sure, while Mubarak, his family, and the Egyptian elite were getting
richer, many of the masses were struggling to make ends meet. In other words, the straining
economic factors acted as an incentive for the masses to view their cooperation as a positive
undertaking that would benefit all, including the poor and the middle class.14
In contrast to Egypt, the World Bank classifies Saudi Arabia as a high-income country
(2011). Its GDP in 2010 was 434666 million US dollars with a GDP per capita of 15835.9 US
dollars (UNdata, 2010). It is evident, then, that the economic conditions, or outcomes, in Saudi
Arabia are very different than those in Egypt. Also, the unemployment rate in 2009 was 5.4
percent, which is also relatively lower than Egypt’s (World Bank, 2011).15
Of course, Saudi
Arabia’s economic performance is strongly related to its oil resources, which provide the state
with an abundance of revenue and capability to increase public expenditure (Energy Information
Administration, 2005; Ayubi, 1995). However, Saudi Arabia has and will continue to face many
challenges to prepare for an economic future when natural resources diminish (Niblock & Malik,
2007). To this extent, Saudi Arabia has been implementing economic policies that would ensure
future independence from oil through progressive liberalization, social reforms to include women
in the economic sphere, and educational reforms to create an internationally competitive labour
market (Ayubi, 1995; Niblock & Malik, 2007; Brynen et. al., 2012; Al-Rasheed, 2013). Such
state policies illustrate to the majority of the population that the government is committed to the
enhancement of the general welfare of Saudi Arabia in a meritocratic and measured approach,
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which does not introduce rapid changes that would affect the majority of the population. In short,
the government is implementing economic policies that prevent the outbreak of a revolution by
not providing the population with the incentive, or grievances, to form revolutionary movements
through collective action. During the period preceding the Arab Spring, economic grievances in
Saudi Arabia, unlike Egypt, were not ripe for revolutionary uprisings against the regime.
Social Media
The use of social media was a significant factor in the revolution in Egypt, but its power
did not manifest in Saudi Arabia. Social media refers to a virtual online space where individuals
communicate for various purposes. Such social media sites are various in kind. Some allow
communication through short posts and links to photos and videos, such as twitter. Others are
more comprehensive and allow users to create events, share photos and videos, and chat, such as
facebook. There is an ongoing debate between scholars about the relationship between social
media sites and revolutions. While some scholars claim that social media sites are a cause of the
revolution and go as far as terming the Egyptian revolution “the facebook revolution”, which
allowed for a liberalizing discourse that transformed the passive identity of Egyptians to a more
revolutionary identity (Alexander, 2011; Brynen et. al., 2012; Mansour, 2012; Kazamias, 2011;
Barrons, 2012).16
Others argue that social media is a facilitation tool that increases the
communication between members of society, which lowers the costs of collective action
(Mansour, 2012; Karagiannopoulos, 2012; Kazamias, 2011). This paper will illustrate that social
media sites are important in revolutionary action only in terms of organizational concerns, which
could explain the different outcomes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
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The use of social media played a crucial part in the formation and organization of the
Egyptian revolution. Activists, such as Asmaa Mahfouz who posted a video online that called on
all Egyptians to join protests in the streets and Wael Ghoneim who used facebook to publicize
the mass mobilization on 25 January 2011, utilized social media to communicate with the masses
and to facilitate the planning of the protests (Barrons, 2012). To be sure, after these posts
attracted the attention of the masses, the Mubarak government did attempt to disrupt the use of
social media by blocking access to their websites and blocking internet signals to impede the
protesters’ ability to communicate with each other and to mobilize more support (Ali & Fahmy,
2013; El Hamamsy, 2011). However, this blockage on social media sites backfired on the
government by creating a backlash amongst the population who became more motivated to join
the protests (El Hamamsy, 2011). Also, the protestors were able to overcome the blockages by
using third party websites or, when the access to the internet was blocked, through Google’s
speak2tweet, which allowed protestors to phone in their tweets (Mason, 2012; El Hamamsy,
2011). In effect, the use of social media in Egypt had two important implications. First, the
protestors were able to organize and coordinate protests effectively. The Mubarak regime’s
efforts were not effective as they were too late to counter the revolutionary movement, which
was tech-savvy and able to face technological blockages. Second, social media sites created an
alliance between the middle class and the poor, who were able to communicate through social
media sites through internet cafés (Ibrahim, 2011; Karagiannopoulos, 2012). It is such an
alliance that strengthened the revolution as it posited the majority of Egyptians against Mubarak
and the business elite.
In contrast to Egypt, the use of social media by the Shi’a in the Eastern Region of Saudi
Arabia did not lead to a revolution. There are three important factors that could explain this
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limited role (Zdanowski, 2011). First, the response by the Saudi government to the use of social
media by these protesters was prompt and imminent. More specifically, the government passed
new “anti-terror” laws that took place immediately after the protestors resorted to social media
sites (Hammond, 2012). Such laws considered anti-government social media activities as a direct
threat to national security and, therefore, allowed the government to filter and block all posts that
were against the government and to severely punish those who were responsible for the posts
(Hammond, 2012; Freedom House, 2012).17
Second, unlike Egypt, there was no alliance
between major segments of society. The protests that were in the Eastern Region were isolated
and did not gather support from the rest of the country. Third, not only was an alliance lacking in
Saudi Arabia, there was a polarized divide in the use of the social media. While there were anti-
government social media activities, there were also many pro-government posts, mainly by tribes
that supported the monarchy and its administration, to counteract against the dissenters of the
government (Samin, 2012; Al-Rasheed, 2013).18
Therefore, the early repression and control of
the social media, the isolation of the protests and anti-government posts, and the tribal support
for the monarchy dealt a blow to the effectiveness of the social media as a tool of communication
and organization. Such a quick response and polarization were not present in Egypt, which
allowed for the revolution to unfold.
Civil-Military Relations
The relationship between the civil branch and the military branch in government was also
an important distinguishing factor between the case of Egypt and that of Saudi Arabia. Since
their independence from colonial rule, most Arab state have struggled with the dilemma of
preventing their armies from conducting a coup d’état (Ayubi, 1995). However, not all countries
pursued the same approach to consolidating the military’s interests with those of the executive
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branch (Mabon, 2012). Indeed, the relationship between the military and civil government in
Egypt immediately prior to the 2011 revolution was significantly different from that of Saudi
Arabia. As discussed above, such a relationship is important as the military could be a decisive
actor in revolutions because it has the ability to side with the protestors against the government
or vice versa, which affects the strength of state power against popular mobilizations.
Some scholars claim that the Egyptian military had a strong relationship with Mubarak
and his government, which was based on an economic incentive that would enrich the elite of the
military (Karagiannopoulos, 2012; Marfleet, 2013). In other words, the Mubarak regime sought
to contain the possibility of a military insurgency against the government by bribing the military
elite and providing them with high wages (Ayubi, 1995; Rubin, 2009). Such a relationship might
have existed at the beginning of Mubarak’s rule in the 1980s, but it does not apply to the
immediate period preceding the revolution in 2011. One of the main reasons that this incentive-
bound explanation does not apply is that the Egyptian military has established an economic
system of its own (Springborg, 2013). Within this economy, the army is responsible for its own
budget; employs a large number of civilians and retiring officers in industrial jobs to provide
them with training for future job opportunities; and establishes external economic relations with
international firms and other countries (Marfleet, 2013; Springborg, 2013). Such an existence of
an economy within an economy, which enriches the military elite, did not require the support or
the economic incentives of the Mubarak regime.19
In fact, it was this militarist-economic system
that split the interests between the government and the military, which provided the incentive for
the military to support the protestors in 2011 (Mason, 2012). In short, the civil-military
relationship in Egypt has evolved through different phases, ending with a shift in the military’s
support from that of the government to the masses protesting in the streets (Amar, 2012). Such a
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division between the government and the military weakened the state apparatus and strengthened
the masses to allow them to protest and achieve their revolutionary goals.
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has implemented more effective measures that would
ensure the loyalty of the army to the government. While the Saudi government also provided its
military with high wages as a form of incentive to remain loyal (Ayubi, 1995), its policies
differed from those of Egypt in two ways. First, the Saudi government has established two
militaries: the regular military and the National Guard, which is responsible for the preservation
of the regime, and is composed of tribal members who support the monarchy (Mabon, 2012;
Noueihed & Warren, 2012).20
This dual-military system was designed with the purpose of
establishing a local balance of power system whereby the two militaries would compete with
each other for the support of the monarchy (Mabon, 2012; Cronin, 2013).21
Second, the elite of
the Saudi military are comprised of members of the Al-Saud monarchy, which reinforces the
allegiance of the army to the state. These two conditions of divide and direct rule, which were
absent in Egypt, explain the different outcomes in the outbreak of revolutions in each country. In
Egypt, the civil-military relations were strained, which weakened the state apparatus and aided
the revolution. In Saudi Arabia, however, the civil-military relations were intertwined in a
complex relationship, which strengthened the state apparatus against the Shi’a protesters in the
Eastern Region (Matthiesen, 2012). Such civil-military relations strengthened the Saudi regime
and allowed to repress the protests promptly and harshly without granting it any support.
Legitimacy
The sources and level of legitimacy of the regimes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia also
affected the revolutionary outcomes during the Arab Spring. The legitimacy of the regime is of
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crucial importance as it is the people’s acceptance of the government’s rule and policies that
compels them to obey and not revolt (Goldstone, 2008). One of the most comprehensive studies
of the sources of legitimacy is Max Weber who provided a tripartite classification. Kathleen
Hawk provides an effective summary of these sources of legitimacy (2002). First, legitimacy
may stem from the charismatic character of the ruler or their ability to perform otherworldly
miracles. This is considered the weakest form of legitimacy because it is bound to the personality
of the ruler who may cease to be charismatic or may die, leaving a vacuum in the legitimacy of
the state. Second, legitimacy may stem from tradition, which stems from practices and beliefs
that have been in place for a long period of time. This form of legitimacy is more effective than
charismatic rule as it has a more solid structure of institutions, norms, and beliefs. Finally,
legitimate rule may stem from a legal-rational source of governing whereby the governed
citizens obey the rule of the state because they believe in its justness and effectiveness. This is
the highest level of legitimacy and Weber found it to exist in many modern democratic countries
that possess a meritocratic bureaucracy. Egypt and Saudi Arabia different sources and levels of
legitimacy explain the outbreak of a revolution or lack thereof.
Political legitimacy of the Mubarak regime in Egypt was very weak at best, and more
realistically it was non-existent. As Englund and Sockol argue in a piece published in the
Washington Post (2011), Mubarak did not possess a charismatic personality nor did his actions
or experience inspire the population to consider him a miraculous leader. Therefore, charismatic
legitimacy did not exist under the Mubarak regime.
In terms of traditional legitimacy, it may appear that Mubarak’s autocratic and despotic
rule is a continuation of the authoritarian regimes that began with Gamal Abdel Nasser’s
revolution against the monarchic regime in 1952 and his successor Anwar Sadat, who both
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prohibited any form of democratic elections, the existence of opposition parties, and public
criticism of their regimes (Bradley, 2008; Amin, 2011).22
It is important to note, however, that in
the pre-1952 revolution era, the Egyptian monarchic political system did allow for democratic
principles coexist and allowed for public participation in the political processes by providing the
public and the press the ability to criticize the regime (Botman, 1991). Indeed, the democratic
principles of the monarchic era continue to shape Egyptian society and their political demands
till this day (Podeh & Winkler, 2004). Therefore, tradition as a source of legitimacy in Egypt has
had a mixed outcome that contributed directly to the outbreak of the revolution by combining the
tradition of authoritarianism with democracy – a volatile mixture that led to incompatible
interests – whereby Mubarak sought to continue the authoritarian rule of his immediate
predecessors and the masses sought to bring back the democratic elements of the monarchic
regime.
Finally, legal-rational legitimacy did not exist in Egypt. Operating under continual
emergency law since 1981, the Mubarak government ruled arbitrarily without any presence of a
rule of law system (Noueihed & Warren, 2012). Moreover, the constitution was not perceived as
legitimate because it provided the president with unconditional powers (El-Ghobashy(a), 2012).
Also, the weak legal rational form of legitimate authority was evident from the rigged elections
that the Mubarak regime held throughout its rule, the last one of which was one month prior to
the revolution in 2011 and unsurprisingly gave the monopoly of power to Mubarak (El-
Ghobashy(b), 2012; Brynen et. al., 2012). Further, one of the most dominant opposition parties
in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, was officially banned from participating in political elections
(Shehata & Stacher, 2012). This repressive strategy backfired on the regime as the Muslim
Brotherhood forged an alliance with other political groups, such as the Political and
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Constitutional Reform Committee, and the middle class, whose majority resonated with the
Islamic ideology, against the Mubarak regime (El-Ghobashy(a), 2012; Ibrahim, 2011). Of
course, this alliance further weakened the government and motivated more protesters to join the
revolution.23
Therefore, before the 2011 revolution, Egypt did not have a strong form of
legitimacy, which provided more incentive for the masses to mobilize and made the
circumstances for a revolution more feasible.
In contrast to Egypt, the Saudi Arabian monarchy has established a legitimate rule
through a unique interplay between Islam and politics. Such a legitimate form of authority is
present in all of Weber’s typologies. In terms of charismatic authority, the role of Mohammad
ibn Abdel Al-Wahhab, who created the Wahhabi school was of crucial importance to the
legitimacy of the monarchy (Al-Dakhil, 2009).24
Ibn Al-Wahhab’s thought portrays a strict
interpretation of Islam where one is considered a believer in God or a non-believer, which
implies that actions by individuals who believed in God, but violated the principles of the school,
were considered non-believers (DeLong-Bas, 2009). As evident from name of the school, ibn Al-
Wahhab was successful in establishing a group of supporters because of his personality and
Islamic knowledge (fiqh), which ordinary individuals did not have (Commins, 2009).25
Such a
presence of charisma and the attraction of supporters are crucial because the Al-Saud monarchy
forged an alliance with the Wahhabi school of thought to strengthen its legitimacy (Mneimneh,
2009). Therefore, the charismatic authority of ibn Al-Wahhab intertwined with the Al-Saud
monarchy to strengthen its legitimacy with the population. Such an alliance between the Al-Saud
regime continues till this day and the charisma of the Wahhabi scholar still legitimizes the
political regime.
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The alliance between the Wahhabis and Al-Saud has itself formulated a form of
traditional authority that has been in place for over 200 years ruling over the majority of Saudi
Arabia (Al Atawneh, 2010; Habib, 2009). More importantly, this long reign of rule is reinforced
by the claim that the Al-Saud monarchy and its Wahhabi alliance seek to maintain the unity of
the country (Niblock, 2006). This claim creates a negative imaginative scenario for the
population in terms of revolting against the monarchy. After all, the population seeks to maintain
existing institutions as long as they meet their economic and social needs, including religious
ones. Even if the role of Wahhabism is ignored, the rule of Al-Saud has also established a form
of traditional legitimacy. The selection of a monarch in Saudi Arabia follows the ancient
Bedouin tradition of combining the birth right to kingship and adhering to a system of
appointment according to merit (Seznec, 2003).Therefore, a king has to be part of the Al- Saud
tribe and considered capable of governing. Within this system, the competition between family
members, which accounts to thousands, is fierce and involves lobbying and the formation of sub-
groups within the family (Al-Rasheed, 2005). Nevertheless, the Wahhabi alliance and the
monarchy’s commitment to tradition increase the state’s level of legitimacy.
The impact of Islam on the legitimacy of the Saudi monarchy is also evident at the legal-
rational level. In effect, Islam is not only a religious or spiritual system, but is also a legal system
that constitutes a criminal code among other regulations (Long, 1997; Al Atawneh, 2010). The
Wahhabi scholars dominate the legal and religious aspect of Saudi politics and their decrees
(fatwa) are considered legally binding (Hammond, 2012). However, these scholars have
supported some of the monarchy’s policies that oppose their principles to preserve the alliance
between them, which has led to increased tensions both within the group of Wahhabi scholars
and between other Islamic opposition groups in the kingdom (Steinberg, 2005; Al Atawneh,
20
2010). Still, support for the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam remains strong in Saudi Arabia
amongst the supporters of the school and the majority of the rest of the population supports the
government because it claims it is a defender and implementer of Islamic policies in general
(Niblock, 2006). Under such circumstances, it is very difficult to question the legitimacy of the
Islamic state as all who deviate from Wahhabism and its allies are considered infidels – a
socially and legally regrettable act (Steinberg, 2005). In short, the interplay between the Saudi
monarchy and Islamic Wahhabism provides the monarchy with legal-rational legitimacy that is
accepted by the majority of the Muslim population in the country. Therefore, the threat of the
minority Shi’a who have a different perspective of Islamic thought is irrelevant as the majority of
the population perceives the government and its religious views as legitimate.
It is evident from the above discussion that both Egypt in Saudi Arabia differ in their
sources and levels of legitimacy. Such a difference in legitimacy is important in the context of
the revolutionary outcome in each country. The lack of legitimacy in Egypt weakened the state
apparatus in the eyes of the public and provided them with an incentive to revolt, which made the
revolutionary movement more feasible. In contrast, the multi-layered legitimacy of the Saudi
regime strengthened the state and declined the feasibility of a revolution. While the Shi’a do not
view the regime as legitimate, the majority of the rest of the population does.
Conclusion
In conclusion, explaining the outbreak of revolutions through the structural model is ideal
because it accounts for the variations within states and their relationships to the populations.
Such an emphasis on difference is crucial in the analysis of the Egyptian revolution and the lack
of revolution in Saudi Arabia. This paper argued that four factors account for the different
21
revolutionary outcomes in each country. First, rapid economic liberalization, which led to lower
wages and increasing unemployment coupled with increasing prices of primary commodities
increased the grievances of the population and provided them with an incentive to revolt. In
Saudi Arabia, however, the progressive and meritocratic economic reforms have not affected the
population negatively, but rather aim to restructure the economy to a more prosperous future.
Therefore, there was not an incentive for the masses to revolt. Second, the use of social media
before and during the Egyptian revolution facilitated the communication and organization of the
masses, which led them to forge new alliances between different classes and to mobilize against
the regime. The state’s response to the social media campaign was both ineffective and delayed.
In contrast, in Saudi Arabia the use of social media as a tool to facilitate a revolution only
occurred in the Shi’a Eastern Region and did not succeed in drawing in many segments of the
population. Of course, the anti-government social media campaign was met with pro-government
social media and a timely filtering by the government. All of these factors impeded the prospects
of a revolution. Third, the strained civil-military relations in Egypt led the army to side with the
protestors, which strengthened their position and allowed them to mobilize in the streets. On the
other hand, the divide and rule policy of the Saudi government regarding the military allowed it
to repress any protests effectively and promptly. Fourth, the lack of legitimacy of the Mubarak
regime made the revolution in Egypt more feasible. Such legitimacy existed in a multi-layered
system in Saudi Arabia, which decreased the feasibility of a revolution as only one segment of
the population, the Shi’a, viewed the regime as largely illegitimate. From this discussion,
therefore, it is evident that the factors that favored mass mobilization, the weakness of the state,
and the feasible conditions for a revolutionary outbreak explain why Egypt had a revolution and
Saudi Arabia did not. Given these differences, future studies are needed to analyze the
22
repercussions of the Arab Spring on the political, social, and economic aspects in the Arab
world. Future studies should also focus on the reform capabilities of those states that did not
undergo a revolution. In this regard, it would be of importance to analyze whether, and under
what conditions, constitutional monarchies could be established in the Arab world.
Endnotes
1 As will be seen below, the protests in Saudi Arabia could not be characterized as a revolution because only a small
portion of society participated. 2 It is important to differentiate between revolution and rebellion. A revolution, as will be seen below, encompasses
mass mobilization that seeks to overthrow a social structure. On the other hand, a rebellion is conducted by a small
homogenous segment of the population and seeks to reform as opposed to overthrow the current political structure.
See: Weede & Muller, 1998 and Huntington, 1994. 3 Alexander Motyl also disagrees with this definition because it lacks conceptual clarity. Furthermore, Motyl argues
that Skocpol confuses classes and structures. To be clear, structures are not relationships that operate under a cause
and effect mechanism. What Skocpol does, the argument goes, is the provision of a relationship before it is
observed. 4 It is important to note that Kimmel is a structuralist scholar who claims that revolutions occur under circumstances
whereby different groups compete for political power against a political regime or party that are not seen as
effective. 5 Rational choice theory is usually implemented on individual action. Weede & Muller and Goldstone modify it to
apply to groups. 6 Goodwin and Skocpol offer an alternative theory of participation in revolutionary groups. This theory claims that
group leaders provide direct incentive, through the use of payments for example, to individuals to undertake
revolutionary actions or guerilla warfare against the existing regime. For more details see: Goodwin and Skocpol,
1989. 7 The incentives are created because the population will realize what it has been prevented from attaining their rights
in the past. 8 It is important to note that other scholars disagree with the psychological hypothesis as they claim that individuals
who experience relative deprivation are usually tame and not revolutionary. See Goldstone, 2001 and Bayat, 2008,
especially pages 99-105. 9 Huntington argues that traditional societies do not possess complex economic, social, and political institutions,
which makes them immune to revolutions. Also, modernized societies have already established institutions that are
able to absorb societal demands that arise from modernization. 10
More specifically, Mubarak faced 3426 occurrences from 1998 to 2010. See: Beinin, 2012. 11
To be sure, the outstanding Egyptian debt was not a result of Mubarak’s policies. He rather inherited this debt
from Sadat from the previous two decades. 12
Ibrahim also describes the widening levels of inequality and standards of living in Egypt, which were evident by
the increasing numbers of slums around urban cities, such as Cairo. 13
It is interesting that the International Monetary Fund, which usually calls for government abstention from
economic life, recommended that the Egyptian government increase subsidies for rising bread prices and implement
policies that would lower the unemployment rate. For more details see: Joya, 2011, especially p. 368. 14
As seen above, this is in agreement with the rational choice hypothesis. Group action was rational for all
individuals to join groups and for all groups to unite under one banner against the existing regime. 15
The World Bank does not have any data on unemployment beyond 2009. 16
To be sure, Kazamias does not make this claim, but he does highlight the ongoing debate. 17
According to both Hammond and Freedom House, many activists from the Eastern Region were arrested and
physically tortured for their activities. Such repressive laws are more likely to continue. There is now news that the
23
Saudi government will require all twitter users to provide their identity as a prerequisite to possession of an account
on the site. At a different level, a Saudi Arabian religious leader labelled all twitter users as a “council of jokesters,”
which further decreases the power of social media in Saudi Arabia. For more details see: RT news article: “Social
Media Crackdown: Saudi Arabia may spy on Twitter users.” Published on March 30, 2013 and Ayed, 2013. 18
In Egypt, there were also pro-Mubarak social media posts and texts messages that circulated amongst the
population. However, such rhetoric was part of a propaganda campaign by the government. The majority of the
Egyptians were aware of the propagandistic nature of these messages, which made them more eager to protest. This
is not what transformed in Saudi Arabia as it was members of the population loyal to the monarchy and government
that posted the various social media posts. For more details see: El Hamamsy, 2011, especially p. 459. 19
The economy within an economy phenomenon mirrors that of a state within a state, which is a short definition of
a failed state. In other words, the establishment of a militarist economy within the Egyptian economy led to a failure
in the relationship between the military and the regime. 20
To be sure, this is not similar to the system in Egypt where there is a division between the military and the police.
The military did not attack or repress the protestors in the revolution of January of 2011 because they did not
support the regime. In contrast, the police forces viciously attacked the protesters and attempted to repress the
revolution. 21
It is also important to note that the military system in Saudi Arabia is not based on conscription like Egypt, but
rather a on a voluntary basis. Therefore, those who join the Saudi army are supporters of the regime. Furthermore,
the armies are sub-divided into tribal allegiances, all of which compete with each other, but support the regime. This
combination of internal competition and external support is crucial for the viability of the regime. For more details
see: Cronin, 2013. 22
These two authors do not claim that this tradition made Mubarak’s regime legitimate, but that it might appear to
have done so to those who observe Egyptian history. 23
The mechanisms that link Islamic ideology and mobilization are numerous. However, Wickham provides an
important insight that focuses on the duty of every Muslim to reform their society at large. This policy, called Da’wa
in Arabic, was implemented by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt at the grassroots level, which curtailed the costs of
mobilization and encouraged many to join the revolution. For more details see: Wickham, 2002 especially pp. 124-
147. 24
al-Dakhil refuted the position that Wahhabism emerged as a religious doctrine and argues that it was a political
movement that portrayed religious characteristics. This argument is irrelevant to this section as it only seeks to
demonstrate how ibn Wahhab’s charisma helped the Saudi monarchy. 25
To be sure, the Wahhabi school, a sub-group of the Hanbali school of thought, received a wide array of criticism
by the Hanafi and Shafi’I schools of Islamic thought.
24
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