zSCA Midterm Reviewer (1)

Special Civil Actions | Atty. Melo

K Suarez | 4A 2010 1

Special Civil Actions

• Special Civil Actions are not actions in the sense of claims covered by ordinary rules

Rule 62

Interpleader Section 1. When interpleader proper.—Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves. Section 2. Order.—Upon the filing of the complaint, the court shall issue an order requiring the conflicting claimants to interplead with one another. If the interests of justice so require, the court may direct in such order that the subject matter be paid or delivered to the court. Section 3. Summons.—Summons shall be served upon the conflicting claimants, together with a copy of the complaint and order. Section 4. Motion to dismiss.—Within the time for filing an answer, each claimant may file a motion to dismiss on the ground of impropriety of the interpleader action or on other appropriate grounds specified in Rule 16. The period to file the answer shall be tolled and if the motion is denied, the movant may file his answer within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial. Section 5. Answer and other pleadings.—Each claimant shall file his answer setting forth his claim within fifteen (15) days from service of the summons upon him, serving a copy thereof upon each of the other conflicting claimants who may file their reply thereto as provided by these Rules. If any claimant fails to plead within the time herein fixed, the court may, on motion, declare him in default and thereafter render judgment barring him from any claim in respect to the subject matter. The parties in an interpleader action may file counterclaims, cross-‐claims, third-‐party complaints and responsive pleadings thereto, as provided by these Rules.

Section 6. Determination.—After the pleadings of the conflicting claimants have been filed, and pre-‐trial has been conducted in accordance with the Rules, the court shall proceed to determine their respective rights and adjudicate their several claims. Section 7. Docket and other lawful fees, costs and litigation expenses as liens.—The docket and other lawful fees paid by the party who filed a complaint under this Rule, as well as the costs and litigation expenses, shall constitute a lien or charge upon the subject matter of the action, unless the court shall order otherwise. What is interpleader?

• Ocampo v. Tirona: The action for interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-‐complaint.

Elements of interpleader

1. Conflicting interests/claims a. Interest is different from claim. Claim is something

positive. Someone can have an interest but he doesn’t make a claim.

2. Same subject matter a. Plaintiff must possess/have control over subject matter

and there’s a tug of war over who deserves it more 3. Plaintiff has no claim or interest/claim is undisputed

Problem: When should you file your interpleader?



Ocampo v. Tirona, 455 SCRA 62 (2006)

• Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the contending claimants to court. She need not have awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader. An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to some conflicting claims on the property.

Atty. Melo: • Exercise diligence in asking parties to interplead. • Should not wait for a case to be filed against you before filing

interpleader. If you wait for a case, then that’s just multiplicity of suits. You will be sleeping on your rights if you wait for a case to be filed against you.

Timeline:

|-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐|-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐| 2 conflicting claims filing of case final judgment (can file interpleader by one claimant in case by starting this point) claimant

Alvarez v. Commonwealth, 65 Phil. 302 (1938) • (Definition of interpleader) • The Commonwealth cannot be sued without its consent. The

prohibition holds true both in a case where it is joined as a defendant as well as in that where, as in the present, it is being compelled to litigate against other persons without its consent. There is no substantial difference between making it defend itself against its will in a case where it is a defendant and compelling it, without its consent, to interplead in an action commenced by another person.

• It is necessary that there be a declaration to the effect of ordering the defendants to litigate among themselves before they may actually litigate among themselves and file a complaint of interpleader. The Code of Civil Procedure in truth requires such step and good practice demands that the defendants be not permitted to file claims or complaints of interpleader until after the court has ordered that they should litigate among themselves. This procedure will do away with groundless suits, and will save the parties time, inconvenience and unnecessary expenses.

Atty. Melo:

• Government refused to litigate because of its immunity. Here no more ground because of refusal.

• However, this is an old case. Today, outcome might be different. Wack Wack Golf and Country Club, Inc. v. Won, 70 SCRA 165 (1976)

• A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to court. He need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill of interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue delay. But where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred.

• A stakeholder’s action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against him in favor of one of the claimants, especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered. This must be so, because once judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable to the latter.

• Party who files action for interpleader should show that he has not been made independently liable to any of the claimants.

• Where stakeholder defends a suit by one claimant and allows it to proceed to judgment against him, action for interpleader is deemed too late. A successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in an action for interpleader and be compelled to prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants.

Atty. Melo: • Interpleader was filed after a final judgment was already entered.

No more interpleader allowed. Should have been filed when conflicting claims concurred (appeared) and before these claims are filed in court

When do you say a claim starts to exist? Is there need for some formal claim, like written claim, or can it be something asserted orally? Ex: A claims ownership of a book in the possession of B which B thinks belongs to C. Is that sufficient for B to ask for interpleader? Is there need for certainty? – possible midterm question



Ramos v. Ramos, 399 SCRA 43 (2003) • An interpleader to determine the ownership of real property is a

real action. It forced person claiming an interest in the land to settle the dispute among themselves as to which of them owned the property. Essentially, it sought to resolve the ownership of the land and was not directed against the personal liability of any particular person. It was therefore a real action because it affected title to or possession of real property.

Atty. Melo: • Not even an actual case of interpleader. Included because SC talks

about the case as if it were a proper interpleader. It was not a proper interpleader as defined. Why isn’t it proper? Go back to the elements. Here, the plaintiff has no disputed claim. Actually a case for quieting of title. Appreciate set of facts whether the case is interpleader or quieting of title.

• In quieting, plaintiff has an interest which he wants quieted against the whole world. You want the property for yourself. You have to implead all persons interested in the property. In this case, SC said it is in rem.

• Interpleader, you have no interest in the land, you want to return it to the proper owner but you don’t know who it is. Reason for interpleader is for plaintiff to avoid double vexation – being sued twice for the same property by different persons. Law says you’re safe from these conflicting claimants – in the sense that you don’t have to return the property twice. Interplead the conflicting claimants.

Beltran v. People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation, 29 SCRA 145 (1969)

• An action for interpleader requires as an indispensable element that “conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made” against the plaintiff-‐interpleader “who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants.”

• The resolution of the issue of breach of the defendants’ undertakings towards plaintiffs may not properly be sought through the special civil action of interpleader. Plaintiff’s recourse would be an ordinary action of specific performance or other appropriate suit against the defendants or either of them, as the circumstances warrant.

Atty. Melo:

• No conflicting claims. There may be conflicting claims between defendants (PHHC and GSIS) but as to plaintiff, no claim.

Sy-Quia v. Sheriff of Ilocos Sur, and De Leon, 46 Phil. 400 (1924)

• In respect to conflicting claims to property seized by the sheriff in the foreclosure of a chattel mortgage, the sheriff may bring an action for interpleader in order to determine the respective rights of claimants. Though in such cases it may ordinarily be better practice for the sheriff to sell the property and hold the proceeds of the same subject to the outcome of the action of interpleader, his action in suspending the sale pending determination of the action of interpleader seems justified by the facts in the present case and the court will not interfere by mandamus.

De Jesus v. Sociedad Arrendataria, 23 Phil. 76 (1912)

• We do not recognize the force of the contention that merely because the right of ownership was in dispute the defendant company lawfully refused to pay the rent to the plaintiff, on the ground that it could not be required to take the risk of paying the wrong person and suffering the consequences. An action for interpleader provides for just such a case. If the defendant company had any sufficient ground to be in doubt as to which of the claimants was entitled to the rent, it could have protected itself from the danger of making payment to the wrong person by requiring the contesting claimants to interplead, thus leaving the determination of the doubt to the courts.

• Defendant company not having exercised this right, it voluntarily assumed the risk of payment to the wrong person, and of course payment to the wrong person under such circumstances (even if it were actually made, which does not affirmatively appear from the record in the case), would not relieve it of liability to the person lawfully entitled to receive payment under the rental contract.

Atty. Melo: • Refusal to file interpleader, you open yourself to double vexation.

Since you assumed the risk of paying the wrong party, you cannot relieve yourself.

• Can you file solutio indebiti? Probably not, that option falls on the hands of receiver.

Mesina v. IAC, 145 SCRA 497 (1986)

• Interpleader is an issuing bank’s proper remedy where purchaser of cashier’s check claims it was lost and another has presented it



for payment. Bank merely took the necessary precaution not to make a mistake as to whom to pay and therefore interpleader was its proper remedy.

• An order to the parties named in a petition for interpleader to file answer is an order to interplead. Non-‐answering party liable to be declared in default.

Atty. Melo: • Bank exercised diligence even though it did not know who the

other claimant is. Even if you don’t know who the other claimant is, you should still file an interpleader via John Doe

• Atty: No order to interplead yet. SC: order to answer is the same as an order to interplead.

Where should you file the interpleader?

• Depends on nature and amount of claim. Depends on rule of jurisdiction between RTC and MTC

• Ex: No amount, two claims for ejectment. Occupant doesn’t know who to pay. Since ejectment – MTC.

Vda. de Camilo v. Arcamo, 3 SCRA 146 (1961)

• The petitioners did not have conflicting claims against the respondents. Their respective claim was separate and distinct from the other. De Camilo only wanted the respondents to vacate that portion of her property which was encroached upon by them when they erected their building. The same is true with Estrada and the Franciscos. They claimed possession of two different parcels of land of different areas, adjoining each other. Furthermore, it is not true that respondents Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong did not have any interest in the subject matter. Their interest was the prolongation of their occupancy or possession of the portions encroached upon by them. It is, therefore, evident that the requirements for a complaint of Interpleader do not exist.

• Even in the supposition that the complaint presented a cause of action for Interpleader, still We hold that the JP had no jurisdiction to take cognizance thereof. The complaint asking the petitioners to interplead, practically took the case out of the jurisdiction of the JP court, because the action would then necessarily "involve the title to or possession of real property or any interest therein" over which the CFI has original jurisdiction. Then also, the subject matter of the complaint (interpleader) would come under the original jurisdiction of the CFI, because it would not be capable of

pecuniary estimation, there having been no showing that rentals were asked by the petitioners from respondents.

Atty. Melo: • Filed the interpleader in the Justice of the Peace Court. SC said

since there was an issue of ownership, it should have been filed with the CFI

• Proper case of interpleader – no conflicting claim. Lot owners only interested in the portions of their land encroached by the building.

Makati Development Corp v. Tanjuatco, 27 SCRA 401 (1969)

• No question that the plaintiff may compel defendants to interplead among themselves concerning the 5K, the only issue is who is entitled to collect it. This entitlement is the object of the action which is not within the jurisdiction of the CFI (should be with JP).

Atty. Melo: • Yes, the issue here is not the money but the vexation being caused.

But the vexation was capable of pecuniary estimation so the Justice of the Peace was the proper court

• Amount of the claim determines where the interpleader should be filed.

• Possible that rule on small claims will apply but small claim na nga, why interplead.

RCBC v. Metro Container Corporation, 365 SCRA 150 (2001) Atty. Melo:

• Borrower ejected MC. Metro Con doesn’t know who to pay, instituted interpleader. MC already agreed to pay borrower. RCBC said no, I want to be paid the back rentals – interplead! MC and borrower already agreed that MC will pay. RCBC left holding the bag. Plaintiff-‐interpleader cannot be forced to continue the interpleader case if he has decided who to pay. MC will now assume the risk of who to pay. So say ejectment finishes and MC entitled to be paid, can RCBC still say no? No more, borrower shrewd. Able to escape liability from RCBC.

• RCBC could have said interpleader improper because of ejectment case. It didn’t do that because it would lose its venue for its claim.



Rule 63 Declaratory Relief

Section 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. Section 2. Parties.—All persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration shall be made parties; and no declaration shall, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the action. Section 3. Notice on Solicitor General.—In any action which involves the validity of a statute, executive order or regulation, or any other governmental regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party assailing the same and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question. Section 4. Local government ordinances—In any action involving the validity of a local government ordinance, the corresponding prosecutor or attorney of the local governmental unit involved shall be similarly notified and entitled to be heard. If such ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Solicitor General shall also be notified and entitled to be heard. Section 5. Court action discretionary .—Except in actions falling under the second paragraph of section 1 of this Rule, the court, motu proprio or upon motion, may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to construe instruments in any case where a decision would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to the action, or in any case where the declaration or construction is not necessary and proper under the circumstances. Section 6. Conversion into ordinary action.—If before the final termination of the case, a breach or violation of an instrument or a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation should take place, the action may thereupon be converted into an ordinary

action, and the parties shall be allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or proper. Allied Broadcasting Center, Inc. v. Republic, 190 SCRA 782 (1990)

• A petition for declaratory relief is not within the original jurisdiction of the SC even if only questions of law are involved. Such an action should be brought before the RTC.

Salvacion v. Central Bank, 278 SCRA 27 (1997) • The SC does not have original and exclusive jurisdiction over a

petition for declaratory relief. However, exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-‐reaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one for mandamus.

Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy, 90 Phil. 83 (1951) • Where plaintiff seeks declaratory relief not for his own personal

benefit, or because his rights or prerogatives as an accountant or as an individual, are adversely affected, but rather for the benefit of persons belonging to other professions or callings, who are not parties in this case; or where plaintiff does not claim to have suffered any prejudice or damage to him or to his rights or prerogatives as an accountant by the use of the disputed trade name by the defendants, who are also certified accountants, the case does not properly come under an action for declaratory relief.

• For an action for declaratory relief to be entertained, it must be predicated on the following requisite facts or conditions: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.

• Requirements for justiciability: (1) real parties in interest; (2) asserting adverse claims; and (3) presenting a ripe issue. The fact that plaintiff’s desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others does not confer a cause of action. The doubt becomes a justiciable controversy when it is translated into a claim of right which is actually contested.

PACU v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806 (1955) • Where the petitioning private schools are actually operating by

virtue of permits issued to them by the Secretary of Education under Act No. 2706, who is not shown to have threatened to revoke



their permits, there is no justiciable controversy that would authorize the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of the Act.

• Mere apprehension that the Secretary might later withdraw the permit does not constitute a justiciable controversy. An action for declaratory relief is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and positive relief. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest however intellectually solid the problem may be.

Cutaran v. DENR, 350 SCRA 697 (2001)

• A justiciable controversy has been defined as, “a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests” which may be resolved by a court of law through application of a law. Courts have no judicial power to review cases involving political questions and as a rule, will desist from taking cognizance of speculative or hypothetical cases, advisory opinions and in cases that has become moot. Subject to certain well-‐defined exceptions, courts will not touch an issue involving the validity of a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its validity.

Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 (1966)

• Conditions sine qua non before declaratory relief may be availed of: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) party seeking declaratory relief must have legal interest in the controversy; and (4) issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.

• Element of justiciable controversy – there is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on the part of one party and a denial thereof on the part of the other concerning a real question or issue.

Mirando v. Wellington Ty, 81 SCRA 506 (1978)

• Declaratory relief is an action which any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation or ordinance, may, before breach or violation thereof, bring to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.

Delumen v. Republic, 94 Phil. 287 (1954) • For an action for declaratory judgment to lie, there must be a

justiciable controversy. The petition must show “an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other concerning a real, and not a mere theoretical question or issue.” An actual controversy does not arise upon the mere filing by the Solicitor General of an opposition to the petition for declaratory relief, for the reason that the cause of action must be made out by the allegations of the complaint or petition, unaided by the answer.

Lim v. Republic, 37 SCRA 783 (1971) • Citizenship prior to marriage cannot be established through

declaratory relief. • The SC has already held that there is no proceeding established by

law or the rules by which any person claiming to be a citizen may get a declaration in a court of justice to that effect or in regard to his citizenship. If the petition seeks to compel the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel her and her children’s alien certificate of registration, this petition would not lie because such a remedy of cancellation of ACR can only be had by virtue of a judgment of a competent court in an action where the citizenship of parties is a material matter in issue, declaring the Filipino citizenship of the petitioner and her children, and such declaration cannot be obtained directly because there is no proceeding at present provided by law or the rules for such purpose.

• Citizenship is not a proper subject for declaratory judgment. An action for declaratory relief is not proper to resolve doubts concerning citizenship.

Dela Llana v. Comelec, 80 SCRA 525 (1977)

• The question of whether the holding of referendum is unnecessary is a political and non-‐justiciable question, involving as it does the wisdom, no more no less, of the decision to call for a referendum. The power to determine when a referendum should be called and what matter is important for referral to the people, resides in the political branch of government.

• J. Muñoz-‐Palma, dissenting: The necessity of holding the referendum is a justiciable question as it involves the use of public funds, one that is subject to certain limitations so that the matter of whether that power has been transgressed or abused or whether appropriation of public funds for the purpose indicated is within



the authority granted by the law or the Constitution is within the competence of the Court to inquire into and resolve.

Samson v. Andal, 89 Phil. 627 (1951)

• If there has been a violation of the contract in question, declaratory cannot be granted. After breach, the regular remedy obtains.

Ollada v. Central Bank, 5 SCRA 297 (1962) • A complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper if filed after a

contract, statute or right has been breached or violated. • An action for declaratory relief should be filed before there has

been a breach of a contract, statute or right. The rule is that an action for declaratory relief is proper only if adequate relief is not available through the means of other existing forms of action or proceeding.

Sarmiento v. Capapas, 4 SCRA 816 (1962) • The institution of an action for declaratory relief after a breach of

contract or statute, is objectionable on various grounds, among which is that it violates the rule on multiplicity of suits. If the action for declaratory relief were allowed [despite breach], the judgment therein [declaratory relief] notwithstanding, another action would still lie against the respondent for violation. So instead of only one case before the courts in which all issues would be decided, two cases would be allowed, one being the action for declaratory relief and a subsequent one as a consequence of the breach.

Tanda v. Aldaya, 98 Phil. 244 (1956) • A court decision cannot be the subject of declaratory relief for the

simple reason that if a party is not agreeable to a decision either on questions of law or of fact, he may file with the trial court an MR or MNT in order that the defect may be corrected. The same remedy may be pursued by a party with regard to a decision by the CA or the SC. A party may even seek relief from a judgment or order of an inferior court on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence if he avails of that remedy within the terms prescribed by the rules. The fundamental reason why the decision cannot be the subject of declaratory relief is predicated upon the principle of res judicata which stamps the mark of finality on a case which has been fully and definitely litigated in court.

Edades v. Edades, 99 Phil. 675 (1956) • Action seeking to determine hereditary rights and established

status of a child cannot be maintained as one for declaratory relief. It neither concerns a deed, will, contract or written instrument, nor does it affect a statute or ordinance, the construction or validity of which is involved. Nor is it predicated on any justiciable controversy, for the alleged right of inheritance which plaintiff desires to assert has not yet accrued for the simple reason that his alleged father has not yet died. The law is clear that rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.

Degala v. Reyes, 87 Phil. 649 (1950) • The non-‐joinder of necessary parties in a petition for declaratory

relief would deprive the declaration of that final and pacifying function it is calculated to subserve as they would not be bound by the declaration and may raise the identical issue. The absence of a defendant with such adverse interest is a jurisdictional defect, and no declaratory judgment can be rendered.

Baguio Citizen’s Action v. City Council, 121 SCRA 368 (1983) • The non-‐inclusion of the squatters mentioned in the questioned

anti-‐squatting ordinance as party-‐defendants cannot defeat the jurisdiction of the court to resolve the petition for declaratory relief on the validity of said ordinance. Nothing in Sec. 2, Rule 63 says that non-‐joinder of persons who have or claim any interested which would be affected by the declaration is a jurisdictional defect. That section contemplates a situation where there are other persons who would be affected by the declaration, but were not impleaded as necessary parties, in which case the declaration shal not prejudice them. If at all, the case the case may be dismissed under Sec. 5, Rule 63 which gives courts the power to refuse to declare rights or construe instruments.

• Reason for the law requiring joinder of all necessary parties is that failure to do so would deprive the declaration of the final and pacifying function the action for declaratory relief is calculated to subserve, as they would not be bound by the declaration and may raise the identical issue. In the case at bar, although it is true that any declaration by the court would affect the squatters, the latter are not necessary parties because the question involved is the power of the Municipal Council to enact the Ordinances in question.



Whether or not they are impleaded, any determination of the controversy would be binding upon the squatters.

• The necessary party to a suit involving nullity of an ordinance is the Mayor and the City Council.

Declaratory Relief, things to remember

• If declaratory relief involves validity of statute, law – you must implead the Sol Gen

• Ordinance – implead LGU legal officer • Constitutionality of anything – implead Sol Gen • To be safe, always implead Sol Gen • Review of court in declaratory relief is equitable – therefore it is

discretionary on the court. Determine whether petition for dec rel will terminate the uncertainty. Chances are it won’t if it’s not necessary, remember case of person who wanted to regain Filipino citizenship since all that was necessary was to take oath of allegiance

• File declaratory relief BEFORE breach/violation. If pending petition, breach/violation arises, have it converted to an ordinary action

• Ernie’s question: Can you file preliminary injunction with your declaratory relief to maintain status quo?

o Atty. Melo: inconsistent remedies. To seek injunction, you must have a claim to the action. In declaratory relief, you only want to clear the air. Court will most probably just convert your case.

Rule 64

Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit

Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit. Section 2. Mode of review.—A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided. Section 3. Time to file petition.—The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to

be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial. Section 4. Docket and other lawful fees.—Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the clerk of court the docket and other lawful fees and deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs. Section 5. Form and contents of petition.—The petition shall be verified and filed in eighteen (18) legible copies. The petition shall name the aggrieved party as petitioner and shall join as respondents the Commission concerned and the person or persons interested in sustaining the judgment, final order or resolution a quo. The petition shall state the facts with certainty, present clearly the issues involved, set forth the grounds and brief arguments relied upon for review, and pray for judgment annulling or modifying the questioned judgment, final order or resolution. Findings of fact of the Commission supported by substantial evidence shall be final and non-‐reviewable. The petition shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, final order or resolution subject thereof, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record as are referred to therein and other documents relevant and pertinent thereto. The requisite number of copies of the petition shall contain plain copies of all documents attached to the original copy of said petition. The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein, and shall contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. The petition shall further be accompanied by proof of service of a copy thereof on the Commission concerned and on the adverse party, and of the timely payment of docket and other lawful fees. The failure of petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.



Section 6. Order to comment.—If the Supreme Court finds the petition sufficient in form and substance, it shall order the respondents to file their comments on the petition within ten (10) days from notice thereof, otherwise, the Court may dismiss the petition outright. The Court may also dismiss the petition if it was filed manifestly for delay, or the questions raised are too unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings. Section 7. Comments of respondents.—The comments of the respondents shall be filed in eighteen (18) legible copies. The original shall be accompanied by certified true copies of such material portions of the record as are referred to therein together with other supporting papers. The requisite number of copies of the comments shall contain plain copies of all documents attached to the original and a copy thereof shall be served on the petitioner. No other pleading may be filed by any party unless required or allowed by the Court. Section 8. Effect of filing.—The filing of a petition for certiorari shall not stay the execution of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, unless the Supreme Court shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just. Section 9. Submission for decision.—Unless the Court sets the case for oral argument, or requires the parties to submit memoranda, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the comments on the petition, or of such other pleadings or papers as may be required or allowed, or the expiration of the period to do so.

• Go to SC on certiorari under 65, except as provided • What are the excepts?

o 30 days to file petition under • Differentiate 64 from 65

Rule 64 Rule 65 30 days 60 days If you file MR and it is denied, you only have the remaining balance (not less than 5 days)

Fresh period of 60 days

Certified true copy of all pertinent records Order or judgment questioned

What can you question under Rule 64?

Aratuc v. Comelec, 88 SCRA 251 (1979) • Under the new Constitution, decisions of the Comelec may be

brough to the SC on certiorari, that is, on the ground of GADALEJ. • Petition for certiorari distinguished from petition for review on

appeal Petition for certiorari Petition for review on appeal

Deals exclusively with grave abuse of discretion, which may not exist even when the decision is otherwise erroneous

Includes digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment

Implies an indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to weigh pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at without rational deliberation

While the effects of an error of judgment may not differ from that of an indiscretion, as a matter of policy, there are matters that by their nature ought to be left for final determination to the sound discretion of certain officers or entities, reserving it to the SC to insure the faithful observance of due process only in cases of patent arbitrariness

• SC’s certiorari jurisdiction over Comelec is not as broad as it used to be and should be confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process.

Atty. Melo: • SC no longer has the power of general review over decisions of the

Comelec. All that’s left is certiorari jurisdiction – determine whether the power has been exercised without GADALEJ

• Now more limited, may only be raised on questions of jurisdiction. If question is regarding errors of judgment, Comelec, COA, CSC decisions are final and unappealable

Dario v. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 (1989)

• Same as Aratuc, only it deals with CSC • CSC is the sole arbiter of all controversies pertaining to the civil

service. Jurisdiction of the SC over cases emanating from the CSC is limited to complaints of lack or excess of jurisdiction, complaints that justify certiorari under Rule 65.

• RA 6656 provides that judgments of the CSC are final and unappealable, certiorari therefore lies under Rule 65 in the absence


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of appeal and an MR should preface the resort to special civil action.

Ambil v. Comelec, 344 SCRA 358 (2000)

• SC has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a division of the Comelec.

• The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may be elevated to the SC is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 which requires that there be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.

• A decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to the SC on certiorari. The pre-‐requisite filing of MR is mandatory.

• The exceptions to the rule in certiorari cases, dispensing with a motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of the petition, do not apply to election cases where a motion for reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the case to the Comelec en banc.

• The Court cannot assume that the Comelec will promulgate a void resolution and violate the Constitution and the law. It must be assumed that the members of the Commission in Division or en banc are sworn to uphold and will obey the Constitution.

Atty. Melo: • For rules 64/65 to apply, it has to be a final decision or judgment of

the Comelec en banc (or CSC). If a final decision but not en banc, no go. If en banc, but not final – no go.

• Here, what was questioned was a mere notice of promulgation. There was no decision or ruling as yet. Certiorari cannot be resorted to.

• No adjudication in the notice of promulgation. It is not alleged that any rights have been violated by the notice. Petition was only filed because of Ambil’s fear that the decision was against him and he’d be asked to step down. SC said this is mere speculation.

• Question: Although R64 says final, en banc, does that mean interlocutory orders of the Comelec cannot be questioned anymore? What if there’s a completely void resolution? Ex: A, duly elected congressman of Pasig, is hereby ordered to vacate his post.

Although an interlocutory order, may it be questioned on certiorari (65) for being a void order? Does he have to wait for final order?

• See ABS-‐CBN v. Comelec ABS-CBN v. Comelec, 380 Phil. 760 (2000)

• The procedural requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.

• An exception was warranted under the peculiar circumstances of the case since there was hardly enough opportunity to move for reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in time for the elections. Moreover, not only is time of the essence; the Petition involves transcendental constitutional issues. Direct resort to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari is therefore justified.

Repol v. Comelec, 428 SCRA 321 (2004)

• Only final orders of the Comelec in division may be raised before the Comelec en banc. The Comelec en banc shall decide motions for reconsideration only of “decisions” of a division, meaning those acts having a final character.

Atty. Melo: • Precisely because there’s no appeal, there is no situation where the

status quo order alone will be decided by the Comelec en banc so petition was granted

So can you question an interlocutory order? When do you apply 64 and when do you apply 65 in general?

Situation Remedy Final order, judgment en banc 64

Neither final nor by en banc or one element absent

65, provided there are sufficient grounds for GAD, urgency, and as in Repol, no appeal or other remedy available


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Rule 65 Certiorari

Section 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-‐judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-‐forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.

• Certiorari – derived from certify/certification. Ancient Latin writ of equity (certiorar volumus) which literally means we wish to be informed

• Proper to call your petition “petition to obtain a writ of certiorari” • Writ of certiorari says “we the court, wish to be informed, whether

you have jurisdiction over this case” (eh?) • When can file a petition for certiorari be filed?

1. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-‐judicial functions

2. Has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and

3. There is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,

4. Filed by a person aggrieved thereby Tuason v. Register of Deeds, 157 SCRA 613 (1988)

• Rule 65 deals with the writ of certiorari in relation to any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial function.

• PD 293 reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised a judicial function, hence, certiorari is the proper remedy. These acts may be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari because done by an officer in the performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with

grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with judicial power – such power being vested in the SC and such inferior courts as may be established by law – the judicial acts done by him were in the circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien to his office as chief executive, and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had assumed as head of the martial law regime.

Atty. Melo: • Marcos was exercising judicial functions. There was appreciation of

facts; application of law; and adjudication • President did not have judicial functions but he was exercising

them when he passed the PD. Having no judicial power, he should not have exercised such.

• Actually a petition for prohibition and was treated as such. Does Dean CLV exercise judicial function in grading you? What if Dean CLV gives you a low grade, does he appreciate the fact that you answered miserably in your recitations and exams?

• No – need to determine where judicial power comes from. • What defines jurisdiction, where does jurisdiction come from, what

is the source of jurisdiction? o Conferred by law

• Therefore, if your power or authority to adjudicate is not conferred by law, you are not deemed a judicial officer within the ambit of Rule 65

Meralco Securities v. CBAA, 114 SCRA 260 (1982)

• Petition for certiorari can be availed of to review the decision of the CBAA in the absence of judicial review of the CBAA’s decision provided for in the RPT.

Atty. Melo: • Judicial power is basically the power of judicial review – the power

to scrutinize the acts of government officers on questions of law and jurisdiction

• Sol Gen argued that under the law, CBAA decision is final and unappealable so certiorari should be dismissed

• SC said that may be the case, but power of judicial review prevails nonetheless because power to scrutinize acts of government is embedded in judicial power itself. How is this exercised by the court? Through rule 65. Even though unappealable or no law provides for specific appeal to the court, 65 is always available as


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long as you can prove GAD when judicial or quasi-‐judicial functions are involved.

Angara v. Fedman Development Corporation, 440 SCRA 467 (2004)

• Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop. It offers only a limited form of review. Its principal function is to keep an inferior tribunal within its jurisdiction. It can be invoked only for an error of jurisdiction, one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-‐judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.

• Excess of jurisdiction means that an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer, is not authorized and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it are wanting.

• Without jurisdiction means lack or want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise authority.

• Grave abuse of discretion – capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

• Ordinarily, the remedy against an interlocutory order is not to resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law. However, where there are special circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of appeal, certiorari may be exceptionally allowed.

• When the court has jurisdiction over the case, its questioned facts, even if its findings are not correct, would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.

• A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling.

Atty. Melo: • Certiorari is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop. It is not

to be used like a hammer, broad, forceful and can hit anything. It is

more of a scalpel, directed only in a precise manner – when there is lack or excess of jurisdiction, or if there is grave abuse of discretion – whimsical, capricious, patent, gross

• Jurisdiction – is it part of the powers granted to the body by law? • GAD – capricious or whimsical exercise of discretion, equivalent to

lack or excess of jurisdiction. Etc. • Key phrase – amounting to or equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. • Law does not empower you to do an act which is patently unfair. • Discretion/jurisdiction granted by law is legal discretion. If you go

beyond contemplation of the law, that is beyond jurisdiction. Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna v. IAC, 170 SCRA 246 (1989) Atty. Melo:

• GAD depends on circumstances • Certiorari is a remedy of last resort, if there is no other remedy yet

you feel you have been treated unfairly, certiorari is always available. It is not available when there is another remedy available.

Lalican v. Vergara, 276 SCRA 518 (1997)

• Certiorari may be issued only where it is clearly shown that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.

• Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge’s findings and conclusions/

• Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an information is denied. An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

Atty. Melo: • Denial of MTQ is not GAD. It is not a question of jurisdiction • What if information is void, criminal information states a crime not

within the jurisdiction of the court, can the accused file a petition for certiorari – yes, because it becomes a question of jurisdiction


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Gold City v. IAC, 171 SCRA 579 (1989) • Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or

correct erroneous conclusions of law or fact. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal, not by certiorari.

• Abuse of discretion alone is not sufficient. It must be grave abuse. Atty. Melo: • You can appeal attorney’s fees separately • Be careful/watch when you can appeal and when it should be

certiorari • Difficult especially in cases where multiple appeals are available

St. Peter Memorial Park v. Campos, Jr., 63 SCRA 180 (1975)

• Petition for certiorari by one of the parties cannot affect the appeal of the other. Filing of petition for certiorari cannot be construed as abandonment of appeal.

• The general rule is that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not proper when ordinary appeal is available. The writ is granted in cases where it is shown that appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient and will not promptly relieve petitioner from the injurious effects of the order complained of.

Atty. Melo: • Appeal and certiorari targeted different things. Appeal did not take

into consideration the new evidence, while the MNT was for the purpose of introducing new evidence. Obviously, appeal would not have been speedy or adequate enough. Judge acted with GAD in not considering the new evidence SP sought to introduce in the MNT.

No appeal or other speedy remedy is available What is the usual speedy remedy availed of? MR. Is MR always required? Meaning if you don’t file MR, petition is doomed to fail? NO! There are numerous exceptions to this rule. Motion for reconsideration General Rrule: Required Exceptions to need for MR (not exclusive):

1. Time is of the essence (NEA) 2. Public interest (NEA) 3. MR useless, issues already passed upon (Abraham) 4. Void judgment (Leonor)

Certiorari • Plain, speedy, adequate – other remedy provided for in procedural

rules (such as ordinary appeal). That should be the recourse if available.

• Opportunity to file MR – GR is that MR must be filed before petition for certiorari will be allowed. Why? MR is generally a speedy and adequate remedy, giving the lower court an opportunity to correct whatever errors it may have made.

• Availability of certiorari depends on factual circumstances of each case that’s why cases don’t seem to be “consistent”

• Sometimes circumstances aren’t apparent in the decisions Valencia v. CA, 184 SCRA 561 (1990)

• The exercise of the power to grant or deny immediate or advance execution is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. However, the existence of good reasons is principally what confers such discretionary power. Absent any such good reason, the special order of execution must be struck down for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

• Certiorari lies against an order granting execution pending appeal where the same is not founded upon good reasons. Also, the fact that the losing party had appealed from the judgment does not bar the certiorari action filed in respondent court as the appeal could not be an adequate remedy from such premature execution.

Atty. Melo: • Mere filing of the bond is not “good reason.” Other party also said

certiorari not proper because there was another remedy (supersedeas bond)

• Supersedeas bond [if you don’t want execution pending appeal to push through] is not an adequate remedy. What’s being questioned in certiorari is the propriety of execution. Filing supersedeas bond presumes you accept the legality of execution.

• [Filing of supersedeas bond does not entitle a party to suspension of execution as a matter of right. It cannot be categorically considered as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy]

National Electrification Administration v. CA, 126 SCRA 394 (1983)

• Filing of MR before resort to certiorari or mandamus is not necessary where trial court’s orders are patent nullities and deprived a party of its right to appeal. MR may be dispensed with if under the circumstances it would have been useless.


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• Petitioner is a government corporation performing governmental functions. Public interest being involved, MR need not be availed of.

• Filing of MR is no longer a pre-‐requisite before filing certiorari or mandamus where there is urgent necessity and further delay would prejudice government interests.

Atty. Melo: • Certiorari proper despite no MR being filed because of the urgency.

Requiring to file MR results in delay, which will delay the electrification project (prejudice public interest). Execution is impending and it would have impaired operations of NEA so MR need not be filed.

Abraham v. NLRC, 353 SCRA 739 (2001)

• Certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless MR is filed before the respondent tribunal.

• Exceptions: o Order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no

jurisdiction; o Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings

have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;

o Where there is urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the government or of the petitioner or the subject matter is perishable;

o Where, under the circumstances, an MR would be useless; o Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is

extreme urgency for relief; o Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is

urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;

o Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;

o Where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and

o Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

Atty. Melo: • MR is useless. It already reversed itself once, it is unlikely it will

reverse itself again.

Metro Transit Organization v. CA, 392 SCRA 229 (2002) • [same as Abraham – GR: MR, EXC: enumeration] • Certiorari is not a shield from the adverse consequences of an

omission to file the required MR. petitioners cannot, on its bare and self-‐serving representation that reconsideration is unnecessary, unilaterally disregard what the law requires and deny respondent NLRC its right to review its pronouncements before being hailed to court to account therefore. Such prerequisite would provide an expeditious termination to labor disputes and assist in the decongestion of court dockets by obviating improvident and unnecessary recourse to judicial proceedings.

• To dispense with the requirement for the filing of an MR, there must be a concrete, compelling and valid reason for failure to comply with the requisite.

Atty. Melo: • Possibly there will be similar issues involved, but MR should have

been filed for NLRC to be given an opportunity to correct itself. • So how is it different from Abraham? Abraham gave evidence that

it tried to MR, but here there were bare allegations that issues involved will be the same. In Abraham, NLRC already decided twice, so unlikely NLRC will reverse itself a second time. Pivotal issue is that opportunity is given to lower court to correct itself

• How will you substantiate the exception in Abraham? Show that it was already passed upon.

• Circumstances unlikely that certiorari will be granted because MTO lost all the way.

Conti v. CA, 307 SCRA 486 (1999)

• Before the advent of RAC No. 1-‐95, the established rule had been that a decision, order or ruling of the CSC was unappealable subject only to the court’s certiorari jurisdiction. In other words, no appeal could then lie from judgments of the CSC and that a party aggrieved should proceed to the SC alone on certiorari under Rule 65.

• RAC No. 1-‐95 now mandates that an appeal from judgments, final orders or resolutions of quasi-‐judicial agencies like the CSC may be taken to the CA by way of petition for review within 15d from notice of the assailed judgment, order or resolution.

• An essential requisite for the availability of extraordinary remedies under the rules is an absence of an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law which has been defined as a “remedy which would equally be beneficial, speedy and sufficient, not merely a remedy which at some time in the


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future will bring about a revival of the judgment complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy which will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal” concerned. Illustrative of such a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is a motion for reconsideration that has thus often been considered a condition sine qua non for the grant of certiorari.

• Recourse to certiorari is proper not only where there is a clear deprivation of petitioner’s fundamental right to due process, but so also where other special circumstances warrant immediate and more direct action.

Atty. Melo: • Refusal to act by the body during MR and sense of urgency. • Urgent – person’s livelihood • Failure to act is deemed denial and he need not wait for resolution

of MR What is the test for filing appeal/MR/other adequate remedy? What is speedy and adequate?

• Test is whether the remedy will relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects

People v. Albano, 163 SCRA 511 (1988)

• The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it practically held that the prosecution failed to establish the culpability of the accused in a proceeding which does not even require the prosecution to do so. It acted with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, when it pre-‐emptively dismissed the cases and, as a consequence, deprived the prosecution of its right to prosecute and prove its case, thereby violating its right to due process.

Atty. Melo: • Trial judge exceeded his jurisdiction in dismissing the case. He

ruled on the merits based on pre-‐suspension proceedings, denying the prosecution due process

Escudero v. Dulay, 158 SCRA 69 (1988)

• General rule is that a special civil action under Rule 65 will not be a substitute or cure for failure to file a timely petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Exception is where the application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice.

• While the Court is cognizant of the rule that generally, a client will suffer the consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of competence of his counsel, in the interest of justice and equity, exceptions may be made to such rule, in accordance with the facts and circumstances of each case. Adherence to the general rule would, in the instant case, result in the outright deprivation of their property through a technicality.

Atty. Melo: • Even though filed late, mistakes of the counsel should not bind the

client because it would result in deprivation of property through technicality.

• It decided the case on the merits, since case already before us, we need not remand it.

• SC has wide discretion Leonor v. CA, 256 SCRA 69 (1996)

• CA has no jurisdiction in a certiorari proceeding involving an incident in a case to rule on the merits of the main case itself which was not on appeal before it. CA correctly limited itself to rule upon the procedural question lodged before it. It cannot be seriously faulted for opting to navigate the narrow banks of the placid waters of certiorari. For in doing so, it was strictly following established legal doctrines and precedents.

• A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void: “it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.”

Atty. Melo: • Important case. It summarizes the rule. • Here, what’s involved is a void decision for being in violation of due

process. Petition to cancel late registration was filed in summary proceeding. SC said void because sumpro only if status will not affected. Here, status is affected so adversarial proceedings are needed.

• While certiorari limited to lack of jurisdiction, CA rightly refused to delve into the merits of the case. But the SC is not just a toothless promoter of procedural niceties understood only by lawyers. It recognizes the basic justice of the case before it so it ruled on the


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merits. A void decision is a lawless thing which may be slain on sight.

Remember that certiorari is a petition of limited inquiry – GAD and lack of jurisdiction. Can court rule on merits in a petition for certiorari? Yes, that’s what precisely happened in Leonor. But there has to be final resolution on factual issues – all facts are already before the court. Comendador v. (?), 118 SCRA 59 Who can file a petition for certiorari?

• Any aggrieved person – a person with material interest in the subject of the case

• Q: How about an indispensable party who is not impleaded in the case? Can he file a petition for certiorari?

• A: Absence of indispensable party voids the proceedings (Barcelona v. CA),

• Even a non-‐party can file if he is a person aggrieved. (Pastor) Pastor, Jr. v. CA, 122 SCRA 885 (1983)

• Certiorari is proper where the probate court issued erroneous implementing orders of its probate order.

• It is within the court’s competence to order the execution of a final judgment; but to order the execution of a final order (which is not even meant to be executed) by reading into it terms that are not there and in utter disregard of existing rules and law, is manifest grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the rule that certiorari may not be invoked to defeat the right of a prevailing party to the execution of a valid and final judgment, is inapplicable. For when an order of execution is issued with grave abuse of discretion or is at variance with the judgment sought to be enforced, certiorari will lie to abate the order of execution.

• A motion for leave to intervene need not be resorted to first and certiorari may be commenced at once in case of urgent relief from an implementing order. Likewise, at the time the petition for certiorari was filed, appeal was not available to petitioner since his MR of the execution was still pending resolution by the probate court. But in the face of actual garnishment of their major source of income, petitioners could no longer wait for the resolution of the MR. they needed prompt relief from the injurious effects of the execution order. Recourse to certiorari was the feasible remedy.

Atty. Melo: • Although she wanted to intervene, she could not because she was

not an heir. Another, execution was pending, she could have lost property if case is remanded to lower court.

Chua v. CA, 443 SCRA 259 (2004)

• Only a party-‐in-‐interest or those aggrieved may file certiorari cases. It is settled that the offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as “persons aggrieved” to file special civil action of prohibition and certiorari.

• We held in Ciudad Real that the CA committed GAD when it sanctioned the standing of a corporation to join the petition for certiorari despite the finality of the trial court’s denial of its motion for intervention and motion to substitute and/or join as party/plaintiff.

• Note, however, that in Pastor, we held that if aggrieved, even a non-‐party may institute a petition for certiorari given the circumstances. (petitioner could not intervene in the probate of her father-‐in-‐law’s estate but her property was included in the order)

• In this case, recourse to CA was proper. Petition was brought in her own name and in behalf of the corporation. Although the corporation was not a complainant in the criminal action, the subject of the falsification was the corporation’s project and falsified documents were corporate documents. Therefore, the corporation is a proper party in the petition for certiorari because the proceedings in the criminal case directly and adversely affected the corporation.

Tang v. CA, 325 SCRA 394 (2000)

• The term “person aggrieved” is not to be construed to mean that any person who feels injured by the lower court’s order or decision can question the said court’s disposition via certiorari.

• In a situation wherein the order or decision being questioned underwent adversarial proceedings before a trial court, the “person aggrieved” referred to pertains to one who was a party in the proceedings before the lower court. The correctness of this interpretation can be gleaned from the fact that a special civil action for certiorari may be dismissed motu proprio if the party elevating the case failed to file an MR of the questioned order or decision before the lower court. Obviously, only one who was a party in the case before the lower court can file an MR since a stranger to the litigation would not have the legal standing to


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interfere in the orders or decisions of the said court. In relation to this, if a non-‐party in the proceedings before the lower court has no standing to file a motion for reconsideration, logic would lead us to the conclusion that he would likewise have no standing to question the said order or decision before the appellate court via certiorari.

• No notes c/o Atty. Melo. I wasn’t paying attention anymore. • Neighbors not aggrieved parties in the proper sense

Certiorari, in general

• Generally no issues of fact, but not always true. SC looks at facts when GAD is raised. You can detect GAD by looking at facts as in the case of Castro v. People where SC said that an acquittal normally cannot be questioned in a petition for certiorari. But if you can prove judge ignored facts which clearly show that he should not have been acquitted, certiorari is proper. But in Castro, OSG only raised errors of judgment.

• SC will not rule on issues of fact except in cases where factual findings of NLRC clash with findings of fact of the LA

Castro v. People, 559 SCRA 676 (2008)

• Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction (or those involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion). The OSG merely assailed the RTC’s finding on the nature of petitioner’s statement – whether it constituted grave or slight oral defamation. The OSG premised its allegation of GAD on the RTC’s “erroneous” evaluation and assessment of the evidence. What the OSG therefore questioned were errors of judgment. Because the OSG did not raise errors of jurisdiction, the CA erred in taking cognizance of its petition and, worse, in reviewing the factual findings of the RTC.

Tanjuan v. Phil. Postal Savings Bank, 411 SCRA 168 (2003)

• St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC laid down the mode of judicial review of NLRC decisions. The Court held that the proper vehicle for such review was a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 and that this action should be filed in the CA in strict observance of the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts.

• Verily, the appellate court, pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, has the power to review NLRC cases. Such review extends to the factual findings of the labor arbiter when these are at variance with those of the NLRC.

Differentiate 45 and 65 Rule 45 (Appeal) Rule 65 (Certiorari)

What’s involved Errors of judgment (facts, law) Errors of jurisdiction

SM Final order or judgment or award

Any order, issuance whether final or interlocutory

Nature

Appeal (not a new action, continuation of original case so same parties involved [appear in caption])

Original action, can proceed simultaneously with another action Respondent is the court or judge who issued the unfavorable order

Period 15d from decision 60d from notice of judgment or denial of MR

Effect Appeal stays judgment (no need for TRO/PI)

Does not prevent further proceedings, TRO/PI must be applied for

MR Needed? MR not required MR generally required Q: Final decision against you, option of 45/65, what’s better? A: 45. It is an appeal in the ordinary course of law. Must be filed within 15d so this is more expedient. What if there are urgent requirements such as injunction to prevent court from executing? No need for injunctive relief, 45 stays execution. So 45 is the most expeditious remedy. Failure to resort to 45 – 65 is not a remedy for lost appeal.

Prohibition Section 2. Petition for prohibition.—When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-‐judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter


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specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-‐forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. When can you file prohibition? Against whom?

• Tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person • Exercising judicial, quasi-‐judicial, or ministerial functions • Without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction • And there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate

remedy in the ordinary course of law • Same as certiorari, difference being prohibition is a preventive

remedy Against whom: certiorari v. prohibition

Certiorari Prohibition • Tribunal, corporation, board,

officer or person • Exercising judicial, quasi-‐

judicial functions

• Tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person

• Exercising judicial, quasi-‐judicial, or ministerial functions

• When ministerial duty exercised GADALEJ – prohibition is the proper remedy

• Seeks to prevent a tribunal from exercising certain functions. The limit of the purpose is not just preventive other incidental reliefs may also be prayed for/issued. Not just stopping a person from taking action, can also pray for other reliefs.

Requisites of Prohibition

1. Tribunal, officer, exercising judicial, quasi-‐judicial or ministerial functions

2. Lack or excess of jurisdiction, or GAD 3. No appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the

ordinary course of law Matuguina Integrated v. CA, 263 490 (1996)

• Prohibition is a remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law, and the issue

of whether a party is an alter ego of another person is one of fact which should be threshed out in the administrative proceeding and not in the prohibition proceedings in the trial court.

• In prohibition, only issues affecting jurisdiction may be resolved on the basis of undisputed facts.

Atty. Melo: • Execution against someone who wasn’t a party, what kind of error

was that? Error of judgment or jurisdiction? • What kind of error does a petition for prohibition deal with? • In Matuguina, not simple error of judgment but an error of

jurisdiction when MENR issued execution against a non-‐party. • Prohibition does not concern itself with factual issues, it has to be

jurisdictional issues. • Be sure that tribunal, etc acted without jurisdiction, it is beyond his

powers to do what he did. Aurillo v. Rabi, 392 SCRA 595 (2002)

• Pendency of the special civil action for prohibition before the trial court did not interrupt the investigation. It goes without saying, however, that in proceeding with the preliminary investigation and terminating the same, Aurillo did so subject to the outcome of the petition for prohibition.

• Generally, prohibition lies only when the acts have not yet been committed. Although the general rule is that a writ of prohibition issues only to restrain the commission of a future act, and not to undo an act already performed, where anything remains to be done by the court, prohibition will give complete relief, not only by preventing what remains to be done but by undoing what has been done. Under some statutes, the court must grant the appropriate relief whatever the proceeding is called if facts stating ground for relief are pleaded. Although prohibition is requested only as to a particular matter, the court has authority to grant any appropriate relief within the issues presented by the pleadings. If the application for prohibition is too broad, the court may mould the writ and limit it to as much as is proper to be granted.

• In the exercise of its jurisdiction to issue writs, the court has, as a necessary incident thereto, the power to make such incidental order as may be necessary to maintain its jurisdiction and to effectuate its final judgment. The court may retain jurisdiction of the cause to enable it to make an appropriate order in the future, even though the petition for a writ of prohibition is dismissed.

Atty. Melo:


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• When Aurillo, after the lapse of the TRO, continued with the PI, he did so subject to the outcome of the petition for prohibition. One cannot simply say wait for TRO to expire then do it and say since act done, prohibition no longer proper. Court said acts still subject to outcome of petition for prohibition.

Morfe v. Justice of the Peace of Caloocan, 67 Phil. 696 (1939)

• Prohibition has for its object that of preventing an inferior tribunal in the proper case, as a justice of the peace court, from executing or continuing to execute an act in excess of its jurisdiction, when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

• Touching on the petition for prohibition, the respondent JP having jurisdiction to receive and docket the complaints for frustrated murder and to conduct the summary as well as the preliminary investigation thereof, the writ does not lie.

Atty. Melo: • Jurisdiction of JP (1) to entertain MTD as to physical injuries – yes

within JP jurisdiction. Frustrated murder is not within its jurisdiction but it can docket the case and conduct PI. JP had jurisdiction over that case to that extent

Vergara v. Rugue, 78 SCRA 312 (1977)

• The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice. It is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For grave abuse of discretion to prosper as a ground for prohibition, it must first be demonstrated that the lower court has exercised its power in an arbitrary or despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. On the other hand, the term "excess of jurisdiction" signifies that the court, board, or officer has jurisdiction over a case but has transcended the same or acted without any authority.

• It is rather too late in the day for petitioner to question now the lack or excess of jurisdiction of the Appellate Court in rendering the said decision on the alleged ground that said Court is precluded from reversing the award of the lot on the ground of res judicata. It

should be obvious to petitioner that the defense of res judicata when not interposed either in a motion to dismiss or in an answer is deemed waived.

• The office of the extraordinary remedy of prohibition is not to correct errors of judgment but to prevent or restrain usurpation by inferior tribunals and to compel them to observe the limitation of their jurisdictions. It is a preventive remedy. Its function is to restrain the doing of some act to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished. This remedy will lie only to "prevent an encroachment, excess, usurpation, or improper assumption of jurisdiction on the part of an inferior court or tribunal, or to prevent some great outrage upon the settled principles of law and procedure; but, if the inferior court or tribunal has jurisdiction of the person and subject-‐matter of the controversy, the writ will not lie to correct errors and irregularities in procedure, or to prevent an erroneous decision or an enforcement of an erroneous judgment, or even in cases of encroachment, usurpation, and abuse of judicial power or the improper assumption or jurisdiction, where an adequate and applicable remedy by appeal, writ of error, certiorari, or other prescribed methods of review are available." It may be safely asserted as a settled law, that "unless the court sought to be prohibited is wanting in jurisdiction over the class of cases to which the pending case belongs or is attempting to act in excess of its jurisdiction in a case of which it rightfully has cognizance, the writ will be denied."

Atty. Melo: • As a general rule, petition for prohibition is intended as a remedy

for acts yet to be performed, not acts already performed. Here, the case was already decided, last ditch effort because already in execution stage.

Versoza v. CA, 299 SCRA 100 (1998)

• Status quo ante is the last actual peaceful uncontested situation which precedes a controversy, and its preservation is the office of an injunctive writ.

Atty. Melo: • Take Aurillo case, before the writ of preliminary injunction is

issued, acts already committed (does acts he wasn’t supposed to), then writ issues. Can defendant say he can no longer be enjoined for the act he already did? No, but acts already done may be


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reversed – restore parties to status quo ante by issuing a writ of mandatory injunction.

• Not really a case for prohibition. It shows what other incidental reliefs may be asked from the court. If respondents proceeds despite your petition for prohibition then argues he can no longer be restrained, this is the remedy. Mandatory injunction – court to order the undoing of acts already done.

• Why is this (undo things already done) part of the court’s incidental power? When defendant does something while prohibition is pending, he does so at his own peril. By that time, the defendant already has notice that his actions are being questioned. If he proceeds, he takes the risk of having his acts undone. Otherwise, people will ignore pending cases for prohibition there won’t be justice.

• When filing petition for prohibition, always pray for a provisional remedy of injunction. Status quo ante, not necessarily just before filing but may go even earlier than that.

• Case – Meralco reconnection Nacionalista Party v. Bautista, 85 SCRA 101 (1949)

• Strictly speaking, there are no proceedings of the Comelec in the exercise of its judicial or ministerial functions which are being performed by it without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.

• The authorities and decisions of courts are almost unanimous that prohibition will not lie to determine the title of a de facto judicial officer, since its only function is to prevent usurpation of jurisdiction by a subordinate court.

• However, the remedy of prohibition may lie in this case as no one is entitled to the office, there is no party who in his name may institute quo warranto proceedings, and the respondent, the only other party who may institute the proceedings in the name of the Republic would not proceed against himself. Were it not for his anomalous situation where there would be no remedy to redress a constitutional transgression, the time-‐honored rule that to test the right to an office quo warranto is the proper remedy, would have been strictly adhered to.

Atty. Melo: • Important case. Jurisdiction is different from a person’s title to the

office. • Jurisdiction of President is not equal to propriety of election of the

president.

• Jurisdiction is determined by law, title is determined by the appointment

• Here, petitioners were questioning the title of Bautista. There cannot be an appointment to Comelec in an acting capacity. It goes to the title of the office which cannot be questioned by prohibition, should be by quo warranto.

• Questioning acts of Comelec Commissioner beyond its powers, then it is a proper subject of prohibition. You question the jurisdiction in this case.

• SC hinted why prohibition not allowed – if you allow any person to question a title to the office by prohibition, everyone will start questioning title to office. Prohibition is more open than quo warranto.

• SC ruled that way because it knew the appointment was wrong and no one could contest it. There is also no one entitled to the office, Comelec an appointive position so no one can file the petition for quo warranto. Recognizing that appointment was wrong, the SC allowed prohibition.

• Here, you’re preventing someone from sitting in the office – not exactly proper for prohibition. Factual circumstances were just so unique in this case so prohibition allowed.

Enriquez v. Macadaeg, 84 Phil. 674 (1949)

• When a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue is erroneously denied, mandamus is not the proper remedy for correcting the error. It being a case where a judge is proceeding in defiance of the Rules of Court by refusing to dismiss an action which should not be maintained in his court, the remedy is prohibition.

• Case filed was for mandamus but considered prohibition Asinas v. CFI Romblon, 51 Phil. 665 (1928)

• While the court exceeds its jurisdiction in ordering the payment of expenses which are not administration expenses, yet as the remedy of appeal is adequate to correct said error, the extraordinary remedy of prohibition does not lie.

• Again – if there is other plain, speedy, adequate remedy, prohibition will not lie.

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