The Missing Dimension: Britains SecretWar against France in Syria andLebanon, 194245 Part II

MEIR ZAMIR

This article is dedicated to the memory of Elie Kedourie who, without the benet ofsecret documents, understood the workings of the Middle East.

On 22 May 1945 Shukri al-Quwatlis closest aides gathered around his sickbed in thepresidential palace in Damascus. The Syrian President, suering from an acute ulcerattack, had been unable to perform his duties for several days. In Damascus andother Syrian cities clashes had broken out between demonstrators and members ofthe Syrian gendarmerie, the French army and the Troupes Speciales. The Frenchappeared ready to use force against Quwatli and his cabinet as they had againstFaisals government in Damascus in July 1920 and against the Lebanese governmentin November 1943. His political rival Foreign Minister Jamil Mardam, now ActingPrime Minister was openly voicing his intentions to replace him. Even his mostloyal lieutenant, Interior Minister Sabri al-Asali, with other members of the Cabinet,supported Mardams provocations of the French. But what worried him most wasBritains ambiguous stand: Edward Grigg, Minister Resident in the Middle East,who visited him in Damascus, and the British Ambassador, Terence Shone, hadrefused to assure him that the British Ninth Army, stationed in Syria and Lebanon,would intervene to defend him and his ministers in the event of a Frenchattack (Docs.678). The English, Quwatli suspected, had given Mardam, theirtrusted collaborator, the green light to depose him. He realized that reneging on hissecret deal with the English and the former Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri al-Said, threeyears previously would cost him dearly. Then he had agreed to incorporate Syria inan Iraqi-led Hashemite confederation in return for Britains secret support inevicting France from Syria and Lebanon and securing for himself the Syrianpresidency. He told his aides that the British are very egoistic and it is impossible torely on them as they shift their position according to their interests, which every daytake on a new twist. In contrast, the Americans are honest and today are the Arabsbest friends. Earlier that day the American Ambassador, George Wadsworth, hadvisited him. At Quwatlis request, Wadsworth had jotted down that the UnitedStates supports Syrias struggle for independence from colonial rule.

Middle Eastern Studies,Vol. 46, No. 6, 791899, November 2010

ISSN 0026-3206 Print/1743-7881 Online/10/060791-109 2010 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/00263206.2010.520412

Agent no. 325 included these details in reports sent to his controller, ColonelWalter Stirling of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) also known as MI6 who acted as an undercover liaison ocer between the Ninth Army and Quwatli.The agent, Dr. Muhsin al-Barazi, Secretary-General of the Presidents Oce, hadearlier been recruited by the SIS. His reports, like those of other agents, some ofwhom held high positions in the Syrian government, were sent to the BritishLegation in Beirut (also known as the Spears Mission) where the Britishconsulate and oces of several British intelligence agencies were located(Docs.689). A few days later, a French secret agent working in the British Legationwould send copies of these reports, together with many other secret documentsreceived from London, Cairo where the oce of the Minister Resident in theMiddle East was and other British embassies in the region, to the French militaryintelligence headquarters in Beirut. The French intelligence service had also recruitedinformers in the oces of the Syrian presidency, the government and the ForeignMinistry. These informers passed on copies of secret documents, which, promptlytranslated in Beirut from English and Arabic into French, were sent within days viaspecial courier to General Charles de Gaulle, President of the ProvisionalGovernment in Paris.The clash between de Gaulle and Winston Churchill in the Levant during the

Second World War has generated numerous studies because of the personalitiesinvolved and its long-term repercussions on Anglo-French relations. No evidencecould be found to back de Gaulles accusations, repeated in his memoirs, thatChurchills government deliberately engineered the crisis in Syria in the summer of1945 to force France out of its mandated territories of Syria and Lebanon. SecretBritish and Syrian documents uncovered recently in French archives reveal that deGaulles allegations were in fact justied, but he was unable to reveal his sources orprevent his countrys expulsion from Syria and Lebanon. De Gaulle never forgaveBritain for this most humiliating experience of his long career, and, once elected asPresident of the Fifth Republic, he took his revenge.1

In the early 1980s, the British historians Christopher Andrew and David Dilkswarned of the risk in ignoring or downplaying the role of secret intelligence ininternational relations. Dening it as the missing dimension, they stressed that thedanger in any missing historical dimension is that its absence may distort ourunderstanding of other accessible dimensions.2 Details gleaned from top-secretBritish and Syrian documents obtained by French Intelligence can indeed beregarded as missing dimensions in our understanding of the end of the Second WorldWar and the early years of the Cold War in the Middle East. A re-evaluation isnecessary, not only of the end of the French mandate in the Levant and Syriasindependence, addressed in this article, but of other major issues, such as the makingof the Arab League, the beginning of the Cold War in the region and the question ofPalestine. This has now become possible using hitherto inaccessible secret British andArab documents.One major issue that warrants examination is Britains use of its intelligence

agencies to retain its hold over the Middle East during and after the war. It can nowbe established that despite its declared policy of post-war decolonization, Britainviewed intelligence as essential in maintaining its interests there.3 Confronted withgrowing Arab nationalist opposition and international denunciation of its hegemony

792 M. Zamir

in the region, Britain rst under the Conservatives and later the Labour Party increasingly resorted to covert action, including political subversion and bribing keyArab politicians, to safeguard its vital strategic and economic interests in the MiddleEast. Unable to reconcile its multiple interests because of intense rivalries betweenprominent Arab leaders, such methods provided great exibility. Britain coulddeclare neutrality towards the three Arab dynasties while its secret agents anddiplomats backed the Hashemites against their rivals Kings Faruq of Egypt andIbn Saud of Saudi Arabia. It highlighted its role as mediator in the conict betweenFrance and Syria, while its agents worked behind the scenes to expel France fromSyria and Lebanon and incorporate the two countries within its own sphere ofinuence.Such methods were employed in Britains attempts to integrate Syria in a Greater

Syria or Fertile Crescent Confederation dominated by Iraq, to ensure the Arableaders collaboration even after independence, in its economic rivalry with theUnited States, especially over oil, and in preventing Soviet entry into the region. Oneof the ndings the documents reveal is that the Cold War began in the Middle Eastearlier than previously assumed. Covert action was also used against the Zionists inPalestine and their escalating terrorism, especially following the assassination ofLord Moyne, the Minister Resident in the Middle East, in November 1944 by twomembers of a Zionist underground movement.4

Covert warfare can be eective while under wraps; if it fails, the initiator can denyresponsibility. But it can backre if the intended target becomes aware of it. Thishappened with de Gaulle, whose discovery of Britains betrayal in the Levant was topoison his relations with London. Despite his failure to prevent his countrysexpulsion, he used information obtained by his intelligence sources to ght his ownclandestine war against Britain in the Middle East. An examination of this war isbeyond the scope of this article; it suces to point out that it played a part inundermining Britains eorts to incorporate Syria in a Hashemite federation byrevealing details of its double game to King Faruq and King Ibn Saud, therebyexacerbating its relations with the two monarchs. After the summer of 1945, theFrench also passed on information obtained by their agents about Britains duplicitytowards the Zionist movement to David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Shertok, heads ofthe Jewish Agency. Secret Franco-Zionist intelligence collaboration against Britainsolidied in April 1946 and continued under the Fourth Republic, culminatingduring the 1948 war in Palestine.5

The documents uncovered in the French archives oer a unique insight into thesecret activities of the British intelligence agencies in the Middle East during andafter the war. For the rst time, we have direct access to uncensored SIS documentsthat shed light on recruitment methods, names of intelligence ocers and agents andthe type of information required of them. They also give details of the extensive useof bribery conducted mostly by ocers of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) of prominent Lebanese and Syrian politicians.6 Obtaining accurate politicalintelligence on ruling Arab elites became a major goal of the various Britishintelligence agencies. Arab monarchs, presidents and prime ministers were encircledby informers who provided intelligence ocers with ongoing details of their viewsand activities, as well as their mutual relations. Informers were recruited frompoliticians, top ocials and advisers, and even included a personal physician Ibn

Britains Secret War against France in Syria and Lebanon 793

Sauds doctor whose controller was Walter Smart, attached to the British Embassyin Cairo under the guise of Oriental Secretary. Smart, Kinahan Cornwallis, theAmbassador in Baghdad, Alec Kirkbride, the Minister in Amman, and Shoneillustrate that the line between diplomat and intelligence ocer was not always clear-cut. The rst three were intelligence ocers who became diplomats, while the latterwas a professional diplomat who frequently played the role of intelligence ocer.7

The success of British intelligence in ensuring the collaboration of prominent Arableaders during the war enabled Britain to keep its hold over the region despite thesubversion and propaganda of the Axis powers and to indirectly implement policiesserving its interests. Tactics used in Syria and Lebanon to coerce key Arab politiciansinto cooperating included political and nancial incentives and political subversion,or undertaking to assist them against their enemies whether France, the Zionists, orthe Soviet Union. British secret agents and diplomats scored a major success bysecuring the covert collaboration of three prominent Arab nationalist leaders Riadal-Sulh, Shukri al-Quwatli and Jamil Mardam.French and British sources provide answers to an intriguing question why three

committed Arab nationalists agreed to collaborate with Britain. The experiences ofSulh, Quwatli and Mardam, all veterans of the Arab Revolt in the First World Warand of Faisals short-lived government in Damascus, shaped their current outlook.They understood that the destinies of their countries, as well as their own politicalfutures, depended on choosing correctly from among the warring Great Powers. Toavoid a recurrence of Arab disappointment in the First World War, when Britainhad occupied the Ottoman Syrian provinces only to divide them up, delivering Syriaand Lebanon to France, it was imperative that they align themselves with the Powerthat would prevail and impose its post-war settlement over the region. In early 1942,although Allied victory against the Axis Powers was still far from certain, theydecided to align themselves with Britain, a decision based on their reading ofinternal, regional and international conditions. After Britain had established controlover Syria and Lebanon in July 1941, they needed its support to realize their nationaland political goals of the end of French rule, independence and national sovereignty,the restoration of Syrian unity, and their rise to power. Despite the LytteltondeGaulle agreement, in which Great Britain recognized Free Frances predominantposition in Syria and Lebanon, British ocials, especially General Edward Spears,the British Minister in Syria and Lebanon, let them understand, albeit discreetly,that Britain would ultimately choose the Arab nationalists in Syria and Lebanonrather than support Free France once the war in Europe was over. Moreover,Britains suppression of Rashid Alis pro-Axis coup detat in May 1941 in Iraq andthe Abadin incident in February 1942 in Egypt served as a valuable lesson itdemonstrated Britains resolve to use force against any Arab leader endangering itsvital interests in the region while rewarding those who remained loyal. The Britishused the two leaders who had collaborated with them in those incidents Nurial-Said and to a lesser extent Mustafa al-Nahas, the Egyptian Prime Minister toentice Syrian and Lebanese politicians to work with them.8

Sulh was the rst to negotiate secretly. In early March 1941 he met a British agentand two weeks later sent a letter to Georey Furlonge, a diplomat in the BritishConsulate in Beirut, oering to collaborate in order to reach an entente that willsave us from this hell. He also exchanged messages with Nuri al-Said via the Iraqi

794 M. Zamir

consul in Beirut.9 British and Syrian documents disclose that Sulh coordinated hispolicies toward the British with Saadallah al-Jabri, his father-in-law and withQuwatli, to whom he was ideologically close, both originally being from the Istiqlalparty. Indeed, British ocials later used Sulh as a go-between with Quwatli andJabri. As for Mardam, French sources indicate that, while in exile in Baghdad afterbeing implicated in Abd al-Rahman al-Shahbandars assassination in July 1940, hereceived money from the British embassy. In this instance too, Nuri al-Said wasinvolved.10

Despite Quwatlis anti-British record and his collaboration with German agents,the British still worked with him. He was an obvious choice: since the spring of 1941he had established himself as the most prominent leader of the National Bloc andwas popular among the Syrian public. The British preferred him to his rival,Mardam, who had been much discredited for his failure in the 193639 treatynegotiations with France and his alleged involvement in Shahbandars assassination.Moreover, Mardam, known to be an opportunist, maintained cordial relations withGeneral Georges Catroux, the French Delegate-General in Syria and Lebanon.Quwatli, with his strong opposition to the Hashemites and close ties to Ibn Saud,had his drawbacks. But to win British support, he was seemingly willing to put asidehis hostility towards the Hashemites, at least temporarily.11

At the end of December 1941, Quwatli left for Iraq and Saudi Arabia, ostensiblyon a pilgrimage to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. In fact his visit had beenarranged by Furlonge to enable him to hold talks in Baghdad with Nuri al-Said andBritish ocials. In Baghdad for nine months, he was a guest of the Iraqi government.Nuri al-Said used Quwatlis close ties with Ibn Saud to send him twice to Riyadh tomediate between Iraq and the Saudi King. The contents of those messages are notknown, but they might have been part of the Iraqi Prime Ministers eorts toconvince Ibn Saud that his plan for an IraqiSyrian union was not directed at thehouse of Saud. In Baghdad, Quwatli met with Cornwallis, a key player in Britisheorts to incorporate Syria in a Hashemite federation. Quwatlis future role wasraised by Nuri al-Said at a meeting with Minister of State Oliver Lyttelton inBaghdad in January 1942. On 6 March Catroux received an unexpected letter fromAntony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, requesting that Quwatli be allowed toreturn to Damascus. Edens personal intervention on behalf of a recognized anti-French Syrian Arab nationalist politician who had collaborated with Nazi Germanymust have appeared unusual to Catroux, then unaware of Quwatlis secret ties withthe British and the Hashemites. He replied that it was inadvisable to allow Quwatlito return to the mandated territories, but in light of Edens request, he would bewilling to authorize his return. Quwatli, however, remained in Baghdad, returning toDamascus only in September 1942.12

With Nuri al-Said backing his rival, Mardam sought Mustafa al-Nahas helpto persuade the British and Free French to follow the Egyptian example andhold elections to facilitate his return to power. In June, accompanied by Besharaal-Khuri, he went to Cairo, where he met with Nahas and British ocials. His claimthat the British had endorsed his nomination as Prime Minister backred as Spears,faced with Catrouxs ire, was obliged to disavow him temporarily. But two yearslater he became Spears closest collaborator in a joint campaign to evict France fromSyria and Lebanon.13

Britains Secret War against France in Syria and Lebanon 795

Britain upheld the rst part of its secret deals with the three nationalist leaders.In August 1943, with the help of British ocials working behind the scenes, Quwatlibecame the Syrian President, and Mardam the Foreign Minister in Jabrisgovernment, while Sulh was nominated Prime Minister by the newly-electedLebanese President, Beshara al-Khuri. However, shortly after his election, Quwatliattempted to renege on his undertaking. Throughout 1944 and the early months of1945, British agents and Nuri al-Said tried in vain to pressure him to uphold hispledges. At stake was not merely Quwatlis personal future, but Syrias very existenceas an independent state.Nuri al-Saids secret deals with Quwatli and Mardam (Docs.1, 8, 22) in 194244

formed part of the Iraqi Prime Ministers ceaseless struggle to unite Syria and Iraq.But they also attested to Britains own designs. His role in inter-Arab relations fromthe 1930s to the 1950s and in the making of the Arab League has often beenexamined.14 His close ties with Britain and his attempts in the 1940s to establish anArab union based on a Fertile Crescent Confederation dominated by Iraq are alsowell known. But the documents now under review shed new light on his intimateinvolvement in Britains secret eorts to reorganize the Middle East for its own ends.As the front man in Britains strategy, some foreign observers well-acquainted withthe region believed that to uncover Britains true intentions, Nuris policies had to beclosely followed.Nuri al-Said, a born schemer trusted by British diplomats and senior ocers in

the region who respected his broad outlook on Arab and international aairs, wasperfectly suited to the British tactics of covert action and secret diplomacy. Heregarded politics as an art of intrigue, manoeuvring and outplaying opponents.Some ocials, such as Cornwallis (Docs.246) Stirling and Kirkbride, had knownhim since the First World War, when they had all participated in Lawrences andFaisals Arab Revolt and in the latters government in Damascus. Others, likeBrigadier Iltyd Clayton, whose brother (Gilbert, Clayton) was General AllenbysChief Intelligence Ocer, and Walter Smart, worked closely with him after the war the former during his long military service in Iraq in the 1920s and 1930s, andthe latter as Oriental Secretary in Cairo. Clayton, who was inuential in shapingBritains Middle East policy during and after the war, advocated an IraqiSyrianunion (Doc.13).15

After Frances defeat, Nuri al-Said and a powerful group of British ocialsserving in the region believed that Britain should seize the opportunity to amend twomistakes it had made after the previous war, when, dividing geographical Syria intofour entities, it gave Syria and Lebanon to France and Palestine to the Jews.Restoring Greater Syria and uniting it with Iraq under British hegemony would solvetwo pressing issues: Iraqs instability in the face of internal and external threats, andthe question of Palestine (Docs.2, 45). But there were major obstacles to a GreaterSyria or an IraqiSyrian union: in London, Churchills and Edens reservations hadto be overcome, while in Cairo, British diplomats also had doubts. France had yet tobe expelled from Syria and Lebanon; Syrian nationalist leaders had to be persuadedto endorse such a union; Amir Abdullah of Transjordan, who harboured his owndesigns on the Greater Syrian throne in Damascus, had to give his consent; thevehement opposition of Ibn Saud and Faruq had to be overcome; and theMaronites and Zionists had to renounce their goals of separate independent states.16

796 M. Zamir

And yet, as the annexed documents demonstrate, advocates of the Greater Syriasolution powerful nancial circles in London and agents in the Middle East werenot deterred. Their arguments diered, but the goal was the same: to integrate thestates of the Fertile Crescent in an Arab confederation dominated by Iraq and underBritains control. Their economic and strategic reasoning was familiar: to solve thepressing Jewish problem in Palestine within an Arab federation,17 or to present sucha scheme as a response to the spontaneous Arab desire for unity. After Yalta, theneed to counter the Soviet threat in the Middle East constituted another powerfulargument. British debates over reorganizing the Middle East have already been wellresearched, but the present documents add a new dimension, revealing the covertmethods and secret diplomacy British diplomats and intelligence agencies used toimplement their schemes.These debates raise another intriguing question concerning the role of the British

diplomats, members of the intelligence community and top army ocers in theregion in shaping Britains Middle East policy. De Gaulle was adamant in the beliefthat Churchill and Eden were fully aware of their representatives deception ofFrance in Syria and Lebanon. But Georges Bidault, his Foreign Secretary, anddiplomats in the Quai dOrsay and Beirut had their doubts. Britain was indeedconducting a two-fold policy towards France in the Levant: while Churchill andEden in London reiterated that Britain recognized Frances privileged position inSyria and Lebanon in the Lyttletonde Gaulle agreement and had no intention ofreplacing it in the Levant, British ocials there constantly undermined Francesposition and sought to force it out. Spears role illustrates the intricacies ofthe British policy. His personal animosity towards de Gaulle and his part in theLebanese crisis of November 1943 is well documented. And yet all along hemaintained that he was fullling a mission, as dened by Churchill.18 Besides, theinitiative in early August 1944 to reach a secret agreement with Quwatli (Doc.12),was taken with the full approval of Lord Moyne, while Spears was in London.Furthermore, telegrams sent to General Bernard Paget, Commander-in-Chief of theAllied Forces in the Middle East, by Churchill and Richard Law, Under-Secretary ofState in the Foreign Oce in early June 1945, at the height of the Syrian crisis,indicate that both Churchill and Eden were, at that stage, directly involved in theeorts to oust France from the Levant (Docs.8897).Many veteran British ocials in the Middle East despised the French for what

they regarded as their defeatism and sought to exploit Frances weakness to oust itfrom the region. They hoped that Britain would thus be able to reorganize the FertileCrescent states under its hegemony. Others, newcomers to the region, such as Spears,sought to make names for themselves by emulating T.E. Lawrence. The warnings ofdiplomats in London and the Middle East that this was a treacherous path wentunheeded. After the Yalta summit in early February 1945, even Churchills andEdens reservations regarding the expulsion of France were overcome.19

Few of the documents, from Syrian and British sources, annexed to this article,have been published before. Translated into French by the French intelligenceservices, the French versions have been translated into English for the purpose of thisarticle. Some documents are presented in their original English. Comments added bythe French translators have been retained. The principle guiding their selection wasto shed light on Britains secret war with France in Syria and on the struggle of the

Britains Secret War against France in Syria and Lebanon 797

Syrian National Bloc leaders to liberate their country from France without placing itunder a new foreign rule. Only a small number of the documents on Syrias role inthe making of the Arab League and on the American and Soviet intervention in theAnglo-FrenchSyrian imbroglio have been reproduced. The documents cover theperiod from April 1942, when Quwatli concluded a secret deal with Nuri al-Saidunder the watchful eyes of British ocials, until July 1945, and include secretexchanges of letters between Quwatli and Mardam on the one hand, andAmbassador Shone and General Paget on the other. Five letters the two Syrianleaders exchanged with Shone on 29 May 1945, in which they agreed to place theircountry under British hegemony and integrate it in a Greater Syria in return forBritish military assistance against the French, are of particular interest (Doc.85).The following analysis is based on the annexed documents, other secret documents

that have not been included, and on additional sources in French and Britisharchives. Information and comments appended by French intelligence ocers tosome of the documents have also been used. The analysis aims to present thedocuments in their internal, regional and international context, focusing on thosedeemed more important. The politics practised at the time in the Middle East, devoidof public, nationalist or patriotic slogans, is revealed in all its ugly detail. Thedocuments also provide insight into the nature of intelligence warfare and secretdiplomacy. They can be divided into ve groups that reect how the Syriannationalist leaders, especially Quwatli and Mardam, contended with covert andovert Anglo-Iraqi pressure to incorporate Syria in a Hashemite confederation andtheir own struggle against France for their countrys independence while locked inintense personal rivalry at a time when Syria was becoming an arena for an inter-Arab struggle and for the competing Great Powers.The rst group of documents extends from Quwatlis secret understanding with

Nuri al-Said in April 1942, to the Syro-Saudi agreement in March 1944. In thosetwo years, Quwatli moved from undertaking to collaborate with Britain and theHashemites to reneging on his pledges once elected President (Docs.17). The secondruns from Mardams secret deal with Nuri al-Said in April 1944 to the failure of theBritish initiative in AugustSeptember of that year to persuade Quwatli to reach atacit agreement. Although threatened by France regaining its position after itsliberation, the Syrian President solidied his alliance with Ibn Saud againstthe Hashemites. This culminated in the deliberations at the Arab PreparatoryConference in Alexandria (Docs.832). The third group runs from January to March1945. Despite British and Iraqi pressure, Quwatli became a full member of the anti-Hashemite Triple Alliance together with Kings Faruq and Ibn Saud on the eve ofRoosevelts and Churchills visit to Egypt and before the formation of the ArabLeague (Docs.3347). The fourth group dates from AprilMay 1945. Assisted byMardam, British agents successfully outplayed de Gaulle and Quwatli (Docs.4884).The last runs from 29 May until July 1945 when Quwatli was nally pinned downand agreed to sign a secret agreement with Britain placing Syria under its indirectinuence. Although de Gaulle knew of Britains anti-French intrigues, he failed toprevent his countrys humiliating ejection from Syria and Lebanon (Docs.85125).The NuriQuwatli agreement of April 1942 (Doc.1) was negotiated while Quwatli

was in Baghdad. French sources maintain that British ocials were directly involvedin these negotiations and that Cornwallis sent a copy of the agreement to the British

798 M. Zamir

Legation in Beirut. Quwatli disclosed to a colleague several years later that inreturn for his collaboration, British agents had undertaken to ensure his electionas President and to help free Syria and Lebanon from French rule. The secondagreement (Doc.2) was apparently prepared in July 1942, but signed only inFebruary 1943 by two leading members of the Hashemite family the Regent,Abdul llah, and Amir Abdallah in addition to Nuri and Quwatli. The agreementshould be seen against the backdrop of four events: the al-Alamein victory, whichremoved the military threat of the Axis; Nuris famous letter to Richard Casey, theMinister Resident in the Middle East, in which, prompted by the British victory, helaid out his plan for an Arab union; Edens declaration of 24 February endorsingthe idea of Arab unity; and Catrouxs announcement of Free Frances intention tohold elections in Syria and Lebanon, opening the way for a National Bloc victoryand Quwatlis election as the Syrian President. The February agreement, unlike thegeneral nature of Nuris Arab unication scheme, as outlined to Casey in his BlueBook,20 dealt specically with the establishment of Greater Syria. It is evident thatto persuade Quwatli to add his signature the Iraqi premier had to compromise byagreeing to his unity plan being implemented in stages, and that the wishes of thepeoples of the Syrian regions must be taken into consideration and their interestsmust be safeguarded. Judging from the comment he added beneath his signature,Quwatli continued to harbour reservations. Distrusted by Nuri and British agents,they wanted him to sign the agreement before becoming President.The following month, Quwatli secretly negotiated with Catroux to win French

support for his election in return for entente with France. Spears, who suspected thatQuwatli was trying to outwit him, warned Catroux that the Syrian leader had nointention of fullling his promise. Spears warning, however, spurred Catroux on tostep up his eorts to secure the collaboration of Quwatli and other National Blocleaders. In the parliamentary elections held in JuneJuly, the French refrained fromtaking action against nationalist candidates, resigning themselves to Quwatliselection as President and the subsequent formation of a nationalist government.21

Despite his agreement with Quwatli, Nuri al-Said was concerned about losing hisgrip on his initiative to form an Arab union based on Iraq and a united Greater Syriawhich he envisaged as the cornerstone of an Arab League. In March 1943, underBritish pressure, he allowed Nahas, the Egyptian premier, to lead the deliberationson forming an Arab League. But the Syrian leaders who opposed their countrysintegration in a Hashemite federation turned to Ibn Saud, Nahas and Faruq forsupport. Nuri stayed in Syria and Lebanon for the summer and followed the Syrianparliamentary elections closely, hoping to mobilize support for Iraq among thenewly-elected politicians. Condent after their sweeping victory and return to power,Syrian politicians, Quwatli among them, made it clear that Syria had to securecomplete independence and national sovereignty before it would discuss a loose formof Arab unity. Inuential leaders declared their support for a republican form ofgovernment and questioned the right of Iraq and the Hashemites to rule them.22

With Quwatli now President of the Syrian Republic and less inclined to abide byhis secret undertaking, Spears and Nuri al-Said began to promote Mardam both topressure Quwatli and as an alternative partner. His appointment in August asForeign Minister in Jabris cabinet enabled Mardam in the next two years toconsiderably inuence Syrias regional and international relations, especially the

Britains Secret War against France in Syria and Lebanon 799

conict with France. It facilitated the task of British agents to inuence Syrianforeign policy tacitly, particularly during the critical months of AprilJune 1945.Mardams letters to Spears (Docs.36) suggest that he had been a key player inBritains covert policy in Syria already in December 1943, while his agreement withNuri al-Said (Doc.8) indicates that he had replaced Quwatli as the Hashemitesmain ally in Syria.The Lebanese constitutional crisis in November 1943, engineered by Spears and

Sulh, provoked a sharp clash between Free France and Britain, enhanced Spearsprestige in Syria and Lebanon and accelerated the Arab unity debates. It alleviatedthe Arab Nationalists main concern that France would evacuate Syria whileexploiting its special relations with the Maronites to retain its hold over Lebanon.23

The Lebanese crisis and the subsequent progress of the two Levant states towardsindependence gave additional weight to the discussions that Nahas was holding inCairo on convening a conference on Arab unity. With the end of the Frenchmandate in sight, conicting Arab pressure on Syria intensied. Ibn Saud pressedQuwatli to stand rm against Hashemite intrigue. Quwatli made it clear to Spearsthat he had no intention of acquiescing to Catroux appeal for a treaty and that hewas disposed to grant Britain privileged military and economic status in Syria. Buthe opposed incorporating his country in a Hashemite Greater Syria (Docs.36, 23).Mardam, however, endorsed closer cooperation with Iraq. In January 1944 Mardamstayed in Baghdad for 11 days, holding discussions with Abdul llah and Nurial-Said. At the end of February he travelled to Riyadh where he was warned by IbnSaud that Nuri Pasha was promoting the formation of a Greater Syria under theguise of Arab unity. Mardam consequently signed both the SyrianSaudi Marchagreement (Doc.7) and the April deal with Nuri al-Said (Doc.8) the rst on behalfof Quwatli, the second being his own secret deal with the Hashemites. The twoagreements illustrated the deep dierences between Syrias leaders over theircountrys Arab orientation. Quwatli was obviously unaware that his ForeignMinister and the Iraqi premier were plotting against him.The endless intrigues in inter-Arab relations, which fully involved local British

agents, were overshadowed by the Allied forces landing in France in June 1944.Arab politicians and British ocials in the Middle East believed that the war inEurope was coming to a close. Only after the German counter-attack in the Battle ofthe Bulge in mid-December was this impression dispelled. The impact of D-Day wasespecially noticeable in Syria. Since its defeat by Germany in June 1940, Syriannationalist leaders had been dreading the moment of Frances liberation andsubsequent re-establishment as a prominent European Power. This was the messagethat de Gaulle and Catroux were conveying to the Syrian leaders to persuade themto conclude a treaty with France. But with British agents tacitly encouraging arejection of the French proposal while reassuring them that Syria could securenational sovereignty without such a treaty, they decided to wait. After the liberationof Paris in August and the formation of de Gaulles provisional government,Quwatli, Jabri, Mardam and other National Bloc leaders acted with a sense ofurgency. They feared that, as it had done after the First World War, Britain wouldbetray them once again and cut its own deal with France (Docs.10, 14). This greatlyinuenced their stand towards Britain until it expelled France from Syria in thesummer of 1945.24

800 M. Zamir

Even before D-Day, Spears sought to exploit the Syrian leaders fear of an Anglo-French agreement to coerce compliance with British demands. Spears proposals toMardam (Doc.9) and the latters request for Britains protection (Doc.10) marked arenewed British eort to press Quwatli into abiding by his pledges before beingelected President. Spears may have taken the initiative, but the documents indicatethat it was approved by Moyne (Docs.1113). Another factor that prompted theBritish authorities in Cairo to take action was the convening of the PreparatoryConference in Alexandria from 25 September to 5 October 1944 to debate theformation of an Arab Union.25

On 5 August the Lebanese Prime Minister, Riad al-Sulh, travelled to Damascusand handed his counterpart, Saadallah al-Jabri, a proposal for a secret Anglo-Syrian agreement dictated to Sulh in the British Legation by Colonel GilbertMacKereth.26 Sulhs visit took place while Brigadier Clayton, Moynes chief adviserfor Arab aairs, was in Beirut (Doc.12). The British used Sulh to conceal theirinitiative from the French and lend it an informal character. Claytons message thatQuwatli could not continue to play in both camps provides some explanation for theBritish actions (Doc.13). British policy-makers could no longer ignore Quwatlisgame of tacitly aligning Syria with Ibn Saud against their Hashemite allies. In thenext two months the Syrian President and his premier were under intense pressure which reached its height during the Alexandria Conference from British agents andNuri al-Said, to consent to the Sulh proposal.Documents 1332 illustrate the tactics used to press Quwatli into accepting the

British proposal and the ensuing intrigues and scheming that the initiative provokedamong Arab leaders. The British diplomats were not satised with Quwatlisagreement to grant Britain privileged strategic and economic status. They insistedthat he yield to their demands to unite his country in a Hashemite-led Greater Syria.Indeed, that remained the main bone of contention between Quwatli and Britainuntil 29 May 1945, when he nally succumbed to the pressure. A comparisonbetween the August 1944 proposal and the May 1945 agreement demonstrates thatthe British did not change their stand during those ten months. It is worth notingthat in their initial proposal, apart from undertaking to protect Syrian independenceagainst any aggression, namely from France, they used the Jewish incentive to lurethe Syrian leaders to acquiesce to their demands. Article 5 states that Great Britainpledges to ensure the application of the clauses of the White Paper in Palestine andpromises to put a complete stop to Jewish ambitions (Doc.12). In the comingmonths British agents used the Zionist threat both as scare tactics and to provokeSyrian and other Arab leaders against the United States as part of Britainseconomic rivalry with the latter.The Syrian President and Prime Minister did not yield to the intense British and

Hashemite pressure (Docs.1721, 23, 27). Quwatli realized, as Sulh had warnedJabri, that rejecting the British oer entailed a heavy price Syria still neededBritains support to free itself from France (Docs.1516).Yet Quwatli proved to be acrafty politician who succeeded in walking a tightrope, agreeing to collaboratesecretly with Britain, but on his own terms. His observations, after three days oftalks with Cornwallis, reveal that he well understood the British tactics (Docs.246).He concluded that the question of Greater Syria divided the British representatives,that Syria could exploit this to retain its republican regime, that Britain had its own

Britains Secret War against France in Syria and Lebanon 801

interest in ending Frances presence in the Levant, and that, contrary to Britishadvice, Syria had to improve its relations with the United States. In fact, in thesummer the Syrian government had already appealed to the United States and theSoviet Union to recognize Syrias independence. Despite Quwatlis reservationsconcerning Communist inuence, he allowed Jabri to initiate talks with the SovietMinister in Cairo in April, and in June a Russian delegation arrived in Damascus todiscuss establishing diplomatic relations. American and Soviet recognition of Syriaand Lebanon as independent states in July boosted Quwatlis condence andcontributed to his readiness to withstand British pressure.27

Ibn Sauds support of Quwatli was essential for the latters resistance to thepressure of British diplomats and Nuri al-Said, as revealed in the correspondencebetween the two before and during the Alexandria Conference (Docs.27, 29). Thealliance with Saudi Arabia was crucial in gaining indirect American backing. As hiscountrys strategic and economic importance to the United States increased, IbnSaud was better able to mobilize American support against Britains attempts toincorporate Syria in a Hashemite Fertile Crescent Union, which he considered amajor threat to the security of his kingdom. The Saudi Kings eorts culminated inmeetings with the American President, Theodore Roosevelt, and Churchill in Egyptin February 1945. Saudi Arabia also provided the nancial resources to win thesupport of politicians, journalists and other inuential personalities in Syria againstIraqi and Jordanian propaganda.Following the Syrian and Lebanese elections in the summer of 1943, France could

not retaliate against the continual overt and covert British attacks orchestrated bySpears and secret agencies operating in the two countries. But after their militaryintelligence succeeded in penetrating both the British Legation in Beirut and theSyrian government in August 1944, French agents were better able to counter theBritish ploy. With information from documents provided by their agents, Frenchrepresentatives in Syria and Lebanon, in particular General Paul Beynet, theDelegate General, became spoilers, eectively countering British intrigues, not onlyin Syria and Lebanon, but throughout the Middle East. French agents played anindirect role in solidifying the anti-British and anti-Hashemite Triple Alliance bysecretly sending Ibn Saud, Faruq and Quwatli copies of documents on the Britishplots against them, including Mardams deal with Nuri al-Said. In November deGaulle, visiting Faruq in Cairo, established direct secret ties with the Egyptian King.As Quwatli and Jabri had successfully resisted British pressure and France hadtacitly collaborated with the two monarchs, de Gaulle came to believe that the gamewas not yet over and that France could retain its inuence.28

Until his resignation in January 1946, intelligence information played animportant role in de Gaulles policy in Syria and Lebanon and the Middle East asa whole. It stiened his resolve to withstand what he viewed as Britains dirty tricksto supplant France in the Levant. He was willing to grant Syria and Lebanonindependence, but not to let Britain replace France. He tried to persuade Churchilland Eden that their countries should collaborate against the rising tide of Arabnationalism and the anti-colonial campaigns of the United States and the SovietUnion, but to no avail. He consequently insisted on treaties with the two Levantstates to safeguard Frances strategic, economic and cultural interests beforetransferring the Troupes Speciales to the local governments and pulling out its forces.

802 M. Zamir

In early September 1944 a meeting in Algiers attended by Beynet and ReneMassigli, the envoy to London, and chaired by Catroux, now serving asCommissioner for Muslim Aairs in North Africa, was almost certainly convenedto decide on a response to Britains attempt to conclude a secret agreement withSyria. The French policy-makers were also concerned that representatives of NorthAfrican nationalist movements might be allowed to participate in the AlexandriaConference. The meeting took place shortly after Massiglis return from London,where he had concluded an agreement with Eden in which the British governmentonce again reassured France that it recognized its interests in Syria and Lebanon(Doc.14). Catroux, who, unlike de Gaulle, had all along advocated agreement withBritain in the Levant, must have been angered and disappointed to receive evidencefrom Beirut of the British anti-French intrigues.29 Britains contradictory policies,coupled with reports that Spears would soon end his term in Syria and Lebanon,reinforced the Quai dOrsays belief that the Foreign Oce was not behind theattempts of British agents and top military ocers to evict France from the MiddleEast (Docs.1415). Accordingly, a three-fold policy was drawn up and implementedin the coming months: to reassure Quwatli of Frances intentions to grantindependence to Syria and Lebanon while insisting on a treaty in return fortransferring the Troupes Speciales; to continue with eorts to persuade Churchill,Eden and British representatives in the region not to heed those calling for an end toFrances presence in the Middle East; and to restore Frances inuence among theChristians in Lebanon.30

In October and November, after many disappointments, French ocials in Parisand Beirut nally had cause for satisfaction. Britain had failed to persuade Quwatlito sign a secret treaty or to promote the Greater Syria plan, and its Arab allies werein disarray. The Hashemites had lost ground as Nuri al-Saids intrigues backred.In Amman, Abdallah replaced his Prime Minister, and in Cairo, King Faruqred Nahas the day after the conference ended. The unyielding, anti-FrenchJabri was substituted by the more moderate Faris al-Khuri as a gesture towardsboth the British and the Hashemites who had been antagonized by Jabris rmstand. Britains prestige in the Middle East was further eroded by Lord Moynesassassination in Cairo. In October Beynet presented Quwatli with a toned downproposal intended to win his cooperation by stressing Frances support for Syriasindependence in its current borders with a Republican regime. In mid-November,Churchill and Eden went to Paris to celebrate Frances liberation and were warmlywelcomed by de Gaulle and the French public. De Gaulle and Bidault once moretried to convince their guests that both countries should collaborate in the MiddleEast, including on the question of Syria and Lebanon, but Churchill and Edenremained uncommitted.31

In early 1945 Quwatli again found himself in a quandary. An Anglo-Frenchagreement was increasingly becoming a reality, while Spears, his closest ally, hadbeen replaced by Terence Shone, a career diplomat. Although the handsomelyrewarded Spears became a vociferous defender of the Syrian and Arab causes inLondon, his ability to help was limited, as Quwatli was soon to discover in hismeeting with Churchill and Eden. In his messages, the former British Ministerwarned against concluding an agreement with France and advised the SyrianPresident to wait as the British government was bound to take action against France.

Britains Secret War against France in Syria and Lebanon 803

But in Damascus the British agents were displeased with him, while Mardam, theirman in Syria, intentionally provoked anti-French demonstrations. In the followingmonths, the British government and its representatives in London and the MiddleEast continued to send mixed signals, leaving Quwatli confused and unable to decidewhether the British government was indeed seeking rapprochement with France atactical move intended to put pressure on Syria or simply could not reach adecision (Docs.378, 413, 456).After the Yalta summit, the Middle East became the focus of intense regional and

international activity that culminated in Roosevelts and Churchills visits to Egyptand meetings with three Arab leaders Roosevelt with Ibn Saud and Faruq, andChurchill and Eden with Ibn Saud, Faruq and Quwatli held while the PreparatoryCommittee in Cairo deliberated on the nal form of the Arab League. The annexeddocuments illustrate the close inter-dependency between the regional and interna-tional systems in the Middle East. Syria now assumed a more important role inBritains plans for post-war reorganization of the Middle East to withstand the newSoviet threat, and in the ensuing struggle between the SaudiEgyptian axis and theHashemites. The documents also provide insight into Quwatlis eorts to steer hiscountry between the conicting pressures from the Great Powers and the twopolarized Arab camps. He still saw Britains support for evicting France as crucial,but was unwilling to pay the price, convinced that Britain had its own interest inending the French presence. His relations with Iraqs leaders further deterioratedafter he learned of their intention to use the conict with France over the TroupesSpeciales, provoked by Mardam, as a pretext to send armed volunteers to Syria. On8 February the Regent formally oered to send the Iraqi army to defend Syriaagainst the French (Docs.334). Quwatli was compelled to ally himself openly withIbn Saud and Faruq against the Hashemites, even at the risk of antagonizingBritain. He believed that the support of the two monarchs, especially Ibn Saud, forSyrias independent republican regime, would deter Iraq from using force andpersuade Britain to abandon plans to integrate his country in a Hashemite-ledfederation.The Triple Alliance, comprised of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria, was formed in

mid-February following four consecutive developments: the Hashemite meeting inShuneh; the Radwa Pact between Faruq and Ibn Saud; Quwatlis visit to Riyadh;and the summit attended by the three in Faiyum, near Cairo. In Shuneh, Abdul llahand Abdallah coordinated their stand on the eve of the Arab Preparatory Committeemeeting in Cairo. Information received in Damascus indicated that the twoHashemite leaders suspected that Quwatli was plotting to install Ibn Sauds son,Prince Faisal, as King in Damascus. They consequently discussed plans to takecovert action against Syria and Saudi Arabia. In Radwa, Faruq and Ibn Saudformed a joint front against the Hashemites, as well as against Britain. In Riyadh,Quwatli and Ibn Saud coordinated their stand towards what they regarded as anIraqi threat. In Faiyum, Faruq, Ibn Saud and Quwatli agreed to adopt a commonstrategy before their meetings with Churchill.32

Quwatlis report to his cabinet on his visit to Riyadh conrmed that the Hashemitethreat was the main issue discussed (Doc.35). It revealed that Ibn Saud was deeplysuspicious of Britain and believed that the Hashemites would not have plottedagainst him or Syria without the consent of British agents. Quwatli, who shared this

804 M. Zamir

belief, had previously told Jabri of his fears that British agents might act against theSaudi monarch in the Hijaz. The Syrian President, however, purposely downplayedIbn Sauds advice, which the latter would repeat in the coming months, that theSyrian government should not provoke a military confrontation but try to negotiatean agreement with France. In Baghdad and Amman it was believed that the Saudimonarch was seeking to improve relations with France in order to promote theenthroning of his son in Damascus.33

In another report, Quwatli summarized his meeting with Faruq and Ibn Saud inFaiyum on 16 February (Doc.36). He did not dwell on Britains policy or theHashemite threat, but highlighted the support of the two monarchs for Syrian andLebanese independence and their endorsement of Syrias stand against a treaty withFrance. A Saudi record of the Faiyum summit provides additional details. Ibn Saudapparently suggested that all three leaders pursue the same line when meetingChurchill, especially concerning Britains duplicitous attitude, with some Britishocials supporting the Hashemites and others Saudi Arabia and its allies. Ibn Saudraised the question of Hashemite ambitions in Syria with Churchill who, accordingto the Saudi minutes, promised that the issue of Greater Syria would not be settled infavour of the Hashemite family, adding that

at a particular time it was very likely, but England cannot insist on a plan whichis on the one hand opposed by the population of Syria, and on the other hand isconsidered by King Abd al-Aziz, our close friend, as prejudicial to himpersonally and to the interests of his family. As a result, nothing will thereforebe done in the way Nuri Said wishes.

At Ibn Sauds request, Churchill also agreed to meet the Syrian President.34

Quwatlis meeting the following day with Churchill and Eden, however, wasdisappointing (Docs.378). The President did not raise the issue of Greater Syria, butfocused on his countrys relations with France, rejecting any proposal to grant itprivileged status. But Churchills, and especially Edens, endorsement of a Franco-Syrian treaty left him uncertain whether it reected Britains current uctuatingposition or was merely a tactic already used by some British agents to pressureSyria into giving in to Britains demands. His proposal to reach agreements with allfour Powers should be noted, as it had initially been raised by Spears to cover up asecret Anglo-Syrian agreement. His concluding remarks quoting Spears MakeGreat Britain face the fait accompli so that it will help you indicated his condencethat he could manoeuvre Britain into supporting Syria against France withoutpenalty. But his belief that Britain had abandoned the Greater Syria plan provedpremature.35

Despite Churchills assurance to Ibn Saud that Britain had called o its plan for aGreater Syria, British agents in the Middle East and diplomatic and nancial circlesin London still promoted the idea. The new Syrian Minister in London, NajibArmanazi,36 sent messages to Damascus describing their activities, in which CamilleChamoun, the Lebanese Minister Plenipotentiary in London, known for his ties withBritish intelligence, was also involved (Doc.45). In fact, Chamoun was working withSpears to promote the nancial interests of British companies in Syria and Lebanonin which they both held shares. Armanazi must have been astonished to learn from

Britains Secret War against France in Syria and Lebanon 805

the editor of The Economist that his Foreign Minister endorsed the Greater Syriaplan. Quwatlis protests to Shone about British secret agents activities wentunheeded (Docs.413). Mardam, in Cairo for the signing of the Arab League Pact,reported that British ocials were advising Syrian leaders to improve their relationswith Iraq, and added that apparently Syria was more concerned with an Iraqioccupation than with ending the French one. In mid-March Quwatli, accompaniedby Jabri, now president of the Syrian parliament, went to Baghdad to meet the Iraqiregent and Nuri al-Said in yet another attempt to calm their misgivings. He arguedthat Syria should secure its national sovereignty before discussing the issue of unity(Docs.40, 44). But the Hashemites, and certainly British Intelligence, were aware ofhis ploys. After returning from Cairo, Churchill and Eden publicly endorsedFrances demand that treaties be signed with Syria and Lebanon. Churchill made astatement to Parliament to that eect, while the Foreign Oce issued a White Paperrestating Britains support for a Franco-Syrian agreement. In letters to Quwatli andin meetings with Armanazi, Spears warned that Eden was hostile to the Syrianposition. Even more worrying was Britains refusal to support Syrias request toparticipate in the San Francisco Peace Conference. Quwatlis protest to Shone wasanswered in general terms and the latters assurances that his country seeks noadvantage in Syria did not alleviate the Syrian Presidents fears (Doc.44).In the post-war years, Britains reputation in the Middle East often exceeded its

true ability to control the region. Even before the end of the war it was losing groundand prestige in the Arab world. What Quwatli and Ibn Saud believed to besophisticated British ploys intended to pressure Syria were often the result of aconfused, undecided policy (Doc.51). Churchills trip to Cairo, which was arrangedat the last minute after learning of the American Presidents intention to go to Egypt,was overshadowed by Roosevelts visit and meeting with Ibn Saud. The latter hadenhanced his prestige in the Arab world, while Faruq was improving his standing,with Egypt becoming the dominant force in the newly established Arab League. Incontrast, Britains loyal allies, the Hashemites, had lost ground. Economic rivalrywith the United States, especially over oil concessions, was a constant concern inBritain. In mid-March Roosevelt invited Abdul llah, the Iraqi Regent, to visitWashington. This prompted Field Marshal Lord Gort, the High Commissioner inPalestine and Transjordan, to ask Abdallah to warn his nephew, the Regent, againstbecoming too friendly with the Americans. For their part, Eden and other Britishdiplomats drew the attention of Arab diplomats to American assistance to the Jewsin Palestine. British secret agents in North Syria instigated anti-Americandemonstrations in protest against Washingtons support for the Zionist cause,leading Wadsworth to tell Mardam that the United States was not a weak Power anddid not intend to be treated the way France had been treated in Syria.37

France, however, was not as weak as British and American diplomats in theMiddle East believed. With the upper hand in the intelligence war against Britain, itused eectively intelligence obtained from its agents in the British Legation in Beirutand in the Syrian government to stage its own covert activities against Britain andthe Hashemites. In Syria, Mardam, who had emerged as Frances most hostileopponent, became the target of French covert action. Beynet indirectly informedQuwatli of his Foreign Ministers secret deals with Nuri al-Said and British agents.Similar tactics were employed in establishing secret ties with Ibn Saud and Faruq.

806 M. Zamir

In the following months both monarchs tried to mediate between Quwatli and theFrench, realizing that the English and the Hashemites would exploit a Franco-Syrianconfrontation to intervene in Syria. Beynet also initiated secret ties with the JewishAgency in Palestine. In mid-November 1944 he met in Beirut with David Ben-Gurion, the head of the Jewish Agency; three months later he was able to inform deGaulle of the contacts his assistants had made with the Zionist undergroundmovements.38

In early March Beynet left for Paris, where he remained for over two months withthe intention of passing time until the war was over and France was better positionedto impose its own terms on Syria. While in Paris, he established contact with Adnanal-Atasi, the new Syrian Minister Plenipotentiary. He must have been pleased to readAtasis letters and telegrams to Damascus endorsing an agreement with France(Docs.47, 54, 59, 61, 63). When the Quai dOrsay learned that Britain had nointention of allowing Syria to participate in the Peace Conference, laying the blameon France, it informed the Syrian government that France supported Syriasparticipation. After assuring Abdallah that Britain would not back Syrias parti-cipation in San Francisco, the Foreign Oce reversed its stand and took credit for itsinvitation to the Peace Conference. British diplomats in Cairo and Damascus thenaccused the French of claiming credit for an act they had had no part in.Lebanon again became an arena for the clandestine Anglo-French war. French

agents rst informed their trusted ally, the former President Emile Edde, and laterwarned the Maronite patriarch, Antoine Arida, that Sulh was playing a doublegame: despite his undertaking in the National Pact to support an independentLebanon, he was conspiring with Syrian leaders, the English and the Hashemites tointegrate Lebanon in a Greater Syria. French warnings fell on fertile ground, as theMaronites were already deeply concerned over their countrys future following theArab unity discussions in Alexandria and Cairo. Beynet also informed PresidentBeshara al-Khuri, through discreet channels, of the intrigues of his Prime Ministerand partner in the National Pact against the Lebanese state. Whether this played apart in Khuris apparent nervous breakdown in January 1945 is not known. It isworth noting that Mardam reported to Quwatli on the allegations of Edward Grigg,the new British Minister Resident in the Middle East, that the French had poisonedthe Lebanese President. His charges can be seen as part of the anti-French smearcampaign conducted by British diplomats. Khuris illness he stayed in Haifa innorthern Palestine for treatment until the summer created a political vacuum,provoking an intense contest for the presidency among Maronite politicians, one ofwhom, Camille Chamoun, was promoted by Spears and secret British agencies. InJanuary, the French scored a victory in Lebanon after Sulh, their bitter anddangerous opponent, was forced to resign. Replaced by Abd al-Hamid Karameh,equally hostile to France but far less sophisticated than his predecessor. Syrianleaders and British diplomats became increasingly concerned that France mightsucceed in reversing its fortunes in Lebanon by convincing the Maronites to realignthemselves with France, their traditional protector. France might then evacuateSyria, but remain in Lebanon.39

On 1 April the Middle East War Council (MEWC), chaired by Grigg, wasconvened in Faiyum for ve days to dene its recommendations to the Cabineton Britains Middle East policy. The participants, who included top military

Britains Secret War against France in Syria and Lebanon 807

commanders and senior diplomats,40 had major issues to address: Britains positionin the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East on the eve of the PeaceConference, its stance towards the Arab League and the question of Palestine. Ofimmediate concern was the future of Frances presence in Syria and Lebanon.Strategic and tactical policies dened by the MEWC in the two Levant stateswere largely implemented in the following months after Churchill and Eden gave thego-ahead (Doc.51).The documents allow detailed analysis of the complex covert policies conducted

by Britain and its Arab collaborators in Syria and Lebanon in those months. Itsuces to highlight Britains main goals, outlined in part in Griggs instructions,and the two telegrams from Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under-Secretary atthe Foreign Oce, to Beirut and the QuwatliShone secret agreement of 29 May(Docs.489, 51, 85). Three main goals can be identied: rst, to evict France fromSyria and Lebanon without appearing to be responsible. Churchill did not seekdirect military confrontation with France, being well aware of the possible negativerepercussions on Britains relations with Paris. Britains colonial policy in the MiddleEast was already under attack from the Arab Nationalists in the region, as well asfrom the United States and the Soviet Union. Expelling France from Syria andLebanon only to replace it when the Peace Conference was about to be convened inSan Francisco would have provoked a wave of international protest; hence theemphasis in Griggs and Cadogens instructions on covert action. British diplomatsexpected the moderate Bidault and ocials in the Quai dOrsay, who argued thatFrance should compromise in the Levant as it needed Britains support in Europe, tohave the upper hand. De Gaulle, however, was not convinced, especially as he wasdaily reading new evidence on Britains dirty tricks against France.The second goal was to tacitly secure Britains pre-eminent strategic and economic

position in Syria by coercing the Syrian President into fullling commitments madein 194243 to Nuri al-Said and British agents by exploiting his fears of an Anglo-French agreement, that France might use military force to impose its own terms onSyria while remaining in Lebanon, or of losing the presidency to Mardam. Barazisalmost daily reports on Quwatlis mood allowed British diplomats and intelligenceagents to deal with him more eectively. The last goal was to create conditions tofacilitate Syrias linkage, one way or another, in a union with Jordan and Iraq.Mardam, who became Acting Prime Minister in early April, was essential to

Britains clandestine war against France. He was obliged to serve his British masters,the Hashemites, with whom he had signed a secret deal and from whom he receivedlarge sums of money, and advance his own ambitions to replace Quwatli, while at thesame time freeing his country from French rule (Doc.40). His immediate goal was toprevent Ibn Saud and Faruq from persuading Quwatli to negotiate with France.Support for negotiations was gaining ground among some Syrian politicians, withthree senior diplomats, representing their country in Paris, London and Washington,criticizing Mardams extreme anti-French stand and his over-reliance on Britishsupport. The sharp disagreement with his Foreign Minister led Atasi to tender hisresignation. Mardam, however, was not deterred, and while waiting for France tomake the rst move, as Shone had advised, he exploited the dispute over the TroupesSpeciales to provoke a confrontation and lay the blame on the French themselves(Docs.556). It should be noted that this was not merely Mardams personal

808 M. Zamir

initiative, intended to force Britain to intervene militarily and expel the French hecoordinated his steps with Shone, as emerged from his reports to Quwatli on hismeeting with the British ambassador.After their failure in forming the Arab League, the Hashemites stepped up

pressure on Quwatli. Abdallah, seeking to promote his own ambitions in Syria andLebanon, planned, with British approval, to send his popular son, Crown PrinceTalal, on a trip to both countries (Doc.49). But after the Syrian governmentprevented Talal from going to Damascus he had to make do with a trip to Beirut inmid-April. Talals visit and meeting with Karameh and leading Muslim andChristian politicians caused deep concern in Damascus. Although Mardam met withKarameh to coordinate a joint Syro-Lebanese response to Abdallah, Quwatli, whodistrusted his acting Prime Minister, wrote a personal letter to the Lebanese PrimeMinister, warning him that there is a group of Englishmen who, inuenced by theJews, believe that the success of the Amir will be theirs and support his ambitionsand that

in Syria it is impossible for us to tell the people that we oppose the Union ofArab Countries, especially Syria, Transjordan, Palestine and Lebanon; but if weadopt this project, we will nd ourselves in a dire situation which will onlybenet the French since they will arouse the Lebanese Maronites against us andyourself. We will have made the situation worse instead of improving it.

Reports in early May on de Gaulles intentions to send reinforcements to Beirutled to another Iraqi attempt to renew the February plan for military interventionin Syria, ostensibly against the French army. Mardam, Chamoun and Britishintelligence agents in Baghdad were also involved (Docs.77, 84). British Intelligenceprobably hoped that an Iraqi operation would save Britain from having to takedirect action against the French in Syria. But Ibn Saud, learning of the plan from hisattache in Baghdad, warned Quwatli not to allow the Iraqi army to enter Syria(Docs.745). Tense relations with his strongest ally, coupled with the Iraqi threat tosend its army to Damascus, added to Quwatlis fears. He became increasinglyisolated in his presidential palace, a target of scare campaigns conducted by Britishagents, the Hashemites and Mardam. The rapidly rising popularity of his actingPrime Minister with the public following his determined struggle against the Frenchwas another cause for his concern. Growing numbers of deputies and ministers in theCabinet now voiced support for his rival. A week before the outbreak of the crisis hesuered an ulcer attack and was forced to remain in bed throughout the critical dayswhen his country became the focus of an international crisis.The last phase of the crisis, which continued throughout May, can be recon-

structed almost day-by-day with the help of archival sources.41 This is useful, as theprotagonists reacted to their assessment of their rivals intentions. At that stage, theSyrian crisis developed into an open Anglo-French confrontation that escalated intoa clash between Churchill and de Gaulle. Uncovering the British machinations thatprovoked the crisis necessitates rst disentangling the threads of British and Syriananti-French propaganda campaigns once de Gaulles decision to send reinforcementsbecame known. The propaganda war was a key part of Britains covert policythroughout, as is clearly illustrated in the instructions from London to General Paget

Britains Secret War against France in Syria and Lebanon 809

at the height of the crisis (Docs.9091, 93, 96, 124). De Gaulles and Churchillspersonal involvement, however, requires the historian to consider also the complexand controversial relations between them at the end of the war. Two issues must beaddressed: rst, why de Gaulle fell into the British trap although he was aware of theploy, and how far his accusations that Churchill used the crisis in the Levant to forcehim out of oce can be substantiated; and second, why Churchill allowed the Britisharmy in Syria to expel France from the Levant, well aware of the possiblerepercussions on Britains relations with France at a critical time when the issues ofGermany and the future of Western Europe, in which France was a key member,were being debated. Was there any truth in the British charges that the Britishgovernment had been forced to issue its ultimatum after the French army attackedSyrias constitutional institutions and tried to seize its elected leaders?While the MEWC met in Faiyum, de Gaulle, Bidault and Beynet met in Paris to

discuss Frances Syrian policy, especially the future of the Troupes Speciales. DeGaulle rejected Bidaults proposal to adopt a more conciliatory stand towards Syria,arguing that France could not give up its military presence in the Levant while alarge contingent of British forces remained. Such a policy, Beynet warned, mightprovoke a crisis in which the loyalty of the Troupes Speciales could not be reliedupon. He therefore asked for three additional battalions, of which two would serveas reinforcements. De Gaulle misjudged the gravity of the situation when he statedthat

each day it is becoming less likely that serious trouble will erupt in the Levant.The English are now preaching peace and quiet. The neighboring Arab statesare less inclined than ever to side with the present leaders in Damascus. Thelocal governments, in fact, thanks to France, have just gained much prestige byforcing their way into San Francisco.42

De Gaulle underestimated Churchills determination to evict France from the Levantand overestimated Saudi Arabias and Egypts ability to pressure the Syrianleadership into a more conciliatory stand towards France. His decision in early Mayto reinforce the French troops in Syria and Lebanon was based on a dierentassessment, but it provided the British and Syrians with the pretext they needed toact against France.As war ended, retention of the French Empire, which had been one of de Gaulles

main goals throughout the war, was becoming increasingly dicult. He suspectedthat the Americans and British were conspiring to exploit Frances weakness toextend their inuence over its colonies, whether in Indo-China, North and WesternAfrica, or the Middle East. Ample evidence from British and Arab sourcesreinforced his suspicions. France also had to contend with a wave of nationalistuprisings in its colonies. On 9 May French forces confronted in Setif near Algiers byprotesters calling for independence, massacred thousands. The news from Algeria,coinciding with reports on the arrival of fresh French troops, provoked fear inDamascus that France was determined to retain its mandate even if it involved theuse of force.In early May it became apparent in Paris that Frances Syrian policy had reached

an impasse: attempts to reach an understanding with Britain had failed, while

810 M. Zamir

friendly gestures to Syria had brought no result. Even an initiative to negotiate aConvention Universitaire, regarded as a test of Syrian intentions, was rejected byMardam. Mardams letter to Quwatli on his intentions to exploit the negotiations ona cultural agreement to gain time and toy with those idiot French must haveprovoked anger. A unilateral evacuation of Syria and Lebanon was out of thequestion, especially as de Gaulle was aware that Britain was plotting to expel Franceonly to take its place. His memoirs, written years later, reected his state of mind atthe time regarding what he dened as Britains policy of intimidation:

I had always expected it, for the national ambitions masked by the worldconict included the British plan to dominate the Middle East. How many timesI have already confronted this passionate resolve that was prepared to shatterany barrier that stood in its way! With the wars end in Europe, its occasionhad come. In an exhausted France, the invasion and its consequences hadobliterated our former power. As for the Arabs, a political program as subtle asit was costly had rendered a number of their leaders accessible to Britishinuence.43

De Gaulles decision to reinforce the French troops was a calculated risk intended toconvey to the British government that France was determined to retain its rights inits mandated territories at all costs, thereby forcing Britain to expose its trueambitions or seek an agreement. It was also intended to put pressure on the Syrianleaders before General Beynet returned to Beirut. On 19 May Beynet met HenriPharoun, the Lebanese Foreign Minister, and Mardam, and presented them withaides-memoires repeating the familiar demands for treaties safeguarding Francestraditional interests before turning the Troupes Speciales over to the localgovernments and recognizing Syrias and Lebanons complete independence. Butthe French demarche was never taken seriously, as Mardam and other Syrianministers, as well as British commanders, were already preparing the ground for amilitary showdown (Docs.66, 75, 81). The exact timing depended on whether theFrench could be provoked into taking the rst step and on Quwatlis response toBritish pressure.After his meeting with Churchill in January 1945, Spears recorded in his diary that

Churchill had promised that one day he would re a last broadside at de Gaullewhich ought to settle him; that would be to remind him of the fact that I had broughthim out of France. He said the French could obviously not keep their position orindeed remain in the Middle East but we ought not to be the people to push themout.44 Churchills readiness four months later to forcibly expel France from theLevant should be examined against the backdrop of international and regionaldevelopments and his deteriorating relations with de Gaulle. The eect of theYalta Summit, especially Stalins ambitions in the Middle East, on his strategicconsiderations has been discussed above. It had become clear that France could nolonger remain in Syria and Lebanon as its presence obstructed Britains eorts toreorganize the Middle East for its own strategic and economic needs. Yet until thelast minute Churchill sought to avoid a direct clash with de Gaulle over the Levant.He obviously did not realize that de Gaulle was aware of the British intrigues andwas not about to yield without a show of force. Contrary to de Gaulles assumption

Britains Secret War against France in Syria and Lebanon 811

that Churchill would back down at the last minute, Churchill was able to take actionafter his agents in Syria had provided him with the necessary pretext. His assessmentthat de Gaulles policy of confronting Britain over the Levant was not popularamong the French politicians and public proved accurate.45

In Part I it was argued that Churchill and de Gaulle often clashed in the Levant tosettle scores not directly related to the region. In the aftermath of the Yalta Summit,and as the war was coming to an end, their relations rapidly deteriorated. AlthoughBritain had allocated part of its military zone in occupied Germany to France, deGaulle, bitter and angry after the three Great Powers had ignored France, andalways wary of British foul play, was determined to demonstrate his countrysresolve to regain its position as a Great Power. His foreign policy became moreforceful, as borne out during Roosevelts visit to Algiers, the occupation of an Italianenclave on the Alpine border and the confrontation with the American army inStuttgart. Churchill was clearly troubled by de Gaulles aggressive policy, but wouldit have been sucient, as de Gaulle claimed, for him to use the crisis in the Levant toget rid of the French leader? Some studies substantiate de Gaulles accusations, butof relevance to this study is that when confronted with the Syrian crisis, de Gaullebelieved that Churchill was attempting to force him out of power. Churchills nalact was to publicly humiliate de Gaulle by reading his ultimatum in Parliamentbefore delivering it to him.46 Be that as it may, the fact that de Gaulle was readingdaily detailed intelligence reports from Beirut on Britains duplicity surely eroded thelittle trust that he had in Churchill, concerning not only the Middle East, but alsoEurope (Docs.86, 8890).Throughout May, British diplomats and intelligence and military ocers sent the

Syrian leaders mixed messages regarding their governments intention to defendSyria if the French forces attacked (Docs.68, 723, 80, 823). This policy can be seenas the result of indecision in London, but evidence indicates that it was a well-orchestrated campaign aimed to mislead de Gaulle and pressure the Syrian Presidentand his ministers into giving in to British demands. The British charade continueduntil the last minute as Shone advised moderation while Stirling was tacitly workingto provoke a confrontation with the French forces.Indecision within the Syrian Cabinet came to an end after Mardams meeting with

General Paget in Damascus on 22 May. Mardam reported to his anxious andhesitant colleagues that he had been informed by General Paget that a Britishdivision had crossed the border from Palestine into Lebanon for training, that Pagethad oered to arm the Syrian gendarmerie, and that British forces would intervene ifnecessary to ensure security in a military zone vital to the Allied war eorts againstJapan, but not to protect the French against Syrian attacks. Pagets statement gave agreen light to the Syrians to intensify their attacks, letting them understand that ifthe French retaliated, the British forces would save them. Following General Pagetsvisit to Damascus, Stirling secured the collaboration of Sabri al-Asali, the powerfulMinister of the Interior and Mardams main rival, who controlled the Gendarmerieand other Syrian security agencies. With the two prominent members of the Cabinetagreeing to forcibly expel the French, other ministers fell in line and approvedMardams proposal to step up provocation of the French army.With Quwatli conned to his sickbed, Mardam handled the events during the

critical days leading up to the 29 May crisis. French intelligence reports, and

812 M. Zamir

especially Barazis descriptions, provide details of his activities in those days. He mayhave been a crafty and opportunistic politician, but he was also a patriotic Syrianleader ghting to secure what he regarded as his countrys foremost national goal the end of French colonial rule. He was constantly in touch with British agents,coordinating with them his moves against the French. There is no need to describethe range of tactics and intrigues used by Mardam and British agents to attack anddiscredit the French in Syria. The annexed documents from JuneJuly providesucient evidence of Mardams pivotal role and his secret agreements with Shoneand Paget during and after the crisis (Docs.98125).In the week prior to the crisis, British and French commanding ocers met almost

daily following the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Syria. Two meetingsbetween Paget, Beynet and Humblot, Commander of the French army in the Levant(20 and 22 May), are of special interest, since the former was preparing the groundfor the intervention of his forces. Paget argued that as Commander-in-Chief of theAllied Forces in the Middle East, he was responsible for maintaining security in theentire region, which comprised one military zone. The crisis in Syria, he warned,could aect security in the neighbouring states, and moreover, the Middle East wasan operating base for the Allied forces in the war against Japan. He accused theFrench of provoking the crisis by sending reinforcements and rejected their claimthat it was merely a British pretext to attack France. British ocers also warned theirFrench counterparts that their intelligence agencies had reported a French plan toattack and seize Syrian government buildings and the elected leaders. Indirectevidence implied that such a plan did exist.47 But even if the French decided to act,this was becoming impossible after the precautionary measures taken by the Britisharmy in the streets of Damascus. The French attack on the parliament and theshelling and bombing in Damascus on the evening of 29 May were not calculatedoperations but acts of revenge stemming from frustration and anger beginning onlyafter a senior French ocer in the city had learned of Quwatlis secret agreementwith Shone. It nevertheless forced Churchill to issue an ultimatum to de Gaulle andinstructions to General Paget to intervene against the French forces (Docs.867).The French retaliation, however, provided the British and the Syrian governmentswith eective ammunition in their propaganda war against France which assumed acentral role after the crisis.48

After the British army seized Syria and Lebanon from Vichy with the help of deGaulles Free French forces, Spears wrote to Churchill that Britain should take theopportunity to oust France from Syria and Lebanon and reorganize the Middle Eastunder its hegemony. In the summer of 1945, the rst goal was nally achieved, butthe second was yet to be accomplished. As it turned out, it was easier to drive Franceout than organize the Middle East under a declining British Empire. Throughoutthe war and post-war years committed British ocials in the region laboureddiligently, both overtly and covertly, to defend their countrys interests against otherPowers or local nationalist movements. They debated endlessly in committees, wrotelong memoranda, negotiated, plotted, bribed, threatened and cheated, all for thesake of the higher national interest. They nally succeeded in ousting France fromthe Levant and, for a short time, had their moment in the Middle East.49 But in theend their grand designs came to naught. The secret agreement with the Syrian leaderswas not implemented, while the Greater Syrian Confederation was never established.

Britains Secret War against France in Syria and Lebanon 813

The legacy they left behind was bitter. Britain may have helped Syria free itself fromFrench colonial rule, but this came at a high price for the Syrians for the nextdecade, a weak, unstable Syria continued to provide an arena for confrontationbetween the Great Powers and the neighboring Arab states in what has becomeknown as the Struggle for Syria.50

Notes

The article was researched with the help of a grant from the Israel Science Foundation.

1. For Part I of this article see: M. Zamir, De Gaulle and the Question of Syria and Lebanon during the

Second World War, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.43, No.5 (2007), pp.675708. See also E. Kedourie,

The Chatham House Version and other Middle-Eastern Studies (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,

1970), pp.7, 21335.

2. C. Andrew and D. Dilks (eds.), The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in

the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Illinois, 1984), p.1.

3. For the use of intelligence in colonial role in the Middle East, see two recent studies: P. Satia, Spies in

Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britains Covert Empire in the Middle East

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) and M. Thomas, Empires of Intelligence: Security Services

and Colonial Disorder after 1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).

4. From 1945 until 1948 armed resistance by Zionist underground movements became a major concern

for British intelligence and security agencies. See for example C. Andrew, The Defence of the Realm:

The Authorized History of MI5 (London: Allen Lane, 2009), pp.35366.

5. M. Zamir, Bid for Altalena: Frances Covert Action in the 1948 War in Palestine, Middle Eastern

Studies, Vol.46, No.1 (2010), pp.1758.

6. S. Kelly, A Succession of Crises: SOE in the Middle East, 194045, Intelligence and National Security,

Vol.20, No.1 (March 2005), pp.12146. See also B. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular (London:

Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1965), pp.7099.

7. M. Wight, Power Politics (London: Royal Institute of International Aairs, 1979), pp.11517. See the

following memoirs written by agents involved in British intelligence and diplomatic activities in the

Middle East during the Second World War: W.F. Stirling, Safety Last (London: Hollis and Carter,

1953), pp.22743; A.S. Kirkbride, A Crackle of Thorns: Experiences in the Middle East (London: John

Murray, 1956), pp.14252; F. Stark, East is West (London: John Murray, 1945), p.2, on her

acquaintance with Kinahan Cornwallis. See also her autobiography, Dust in the Lions Paw (London:

John Murray, 1961). Walter Smart originally served as a consul-general in the early 1920s in Beirut

and Damascus.

8. Evidence of the secret collaboration of Quwatli, Mardam and Sulh with British agents during the war

is based on secret British and Syrian documents obtained by French intelligence. There are also

receipts of payments made by the British agents. For Sulhs ties with Spears, see M. Zamir, An

Intimate Alliance: The Joint Struggle of General Edward Spears and Riad al-Sulh to Oust France

from Lebanon, 19421944, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.41, No.6 (2005), pp.81132. The article was

written before the discovery of the secret French documents.

9. Tahsin al-Kadri, the Iraqi Consul-General in Beirut, played an important role in Nuri al-Saids

activities to mobilize support in Lebanon and Syria for an IraqiSyrian union before and during the war.

His telephone conversations with Lebanese and Syrian personalities, including Sulh, were routinely

monitored by the French intelligence. See G. Puaux, Deux Annees au Levant (Paris: Hachette, 1952),

p.172. The author was the French High Commissioner in Syria and Lebanon in 193940.

10. S. Mardam, Syrias Quest for Independence (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1994), pp.2630.

11. During the occupation of Damascus in June 1941 by the British and Free French forces, Quwatli,

fearing imprisonment, found refuge in the Saudi Consulate in Damascus. French sources claimed that

the Saudi court paid regular subsidies to Quwatli. See also Mardam, Syrias Quest, pp.3033.

12. Ministe`re des Aaires Etrange`res (MAE), Nantes, Syrie et Liban, carton 768, Beirut, Nov. 1943, Note

sur les Relations Franco-Britanniques au Levant.

13. The National Archives, Kew (TNA), FO226/233 31/106/42, telegram 178, 29 June 1942, from

Prodrome Beirut to Ministate, Cairo; FO226/233 31/180/42, Beirut, 1 Aug. 1942, Note from Lascelles

814 M. Zamir

to Spears; Ministe`re de la Guerre, Service Historique de lArmee, Section de Terre (Vincennes),

(SHAT), box 4H295, Note pour le General, Beirut, 29 June 1942. See also Mardam, Syrias Quest,

pp.5660.

14. Lord Birdwood, Nuri As-Said: A Study in Arab Leadership (London: Cassell, 1959), pp.18791;

Kedourie, The Chatham House Version, p.276; A. Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab

States (London: Longman, 1977), pp.6672; Y. Porath, Nuri al-Saids Arab Unity Programme,

Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.20, No.4 (1984), pp.7698.

15. Brigadier Clayton served until 1943 as deputy and head of the Middle East Intelligence Centre, and

later as an adviser to the Minister Resident in Cairo. The French followed him closely during his

frequent visits to Syria and Lebanon. See for example: MAE, Nantes, Syrie et Liban, carton 1102,

Quneitra, 21 Oct. 1943, Information a/s de la visite du General Clayton. See also: H.O. Dovey, The

Middle East Intelligence Centre, Intelligence and National Security, Vol.4, No.4 (1989), pp.800812;

W.R. Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 19451951: Arab Nationalism, The United States

and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp.136, 341, 3645; Kedourie, The

Chatham House Version, p.353; E. Elath (Epstein), San Francisco Diary (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1971), pp.60

61 (in Hebrew). Both Abba Eban, the future Israeli Foreign Minister, and Albert Hourani served as

Claytons assistants in Cairo in the early war years.

16. For Greater Syria, see a major study prepared by the Research Department in the Foreign Oce in

TNA, FO371/61497 9137/42/65, The Greater Syria Movement, London, 10 Jan. 1948. See also Y.

Porath, In Sea