Yin on Confucian Feminism

China Media Research, 2(3), 2006, Yin, Toward Confucian Feminism: Critique of Eurocentric Feminist Discourse

http://www.chinamediaresearch.net [email protected] 9

Toward a Confucian Feminism: A Critique of Eurocentric Feminist Discourse

Jing Yin, Clemson University

Abstract: Feminist movements in the United States and Western Europe have called attention to the oppression

of women worldwide. However, as Western feminisms are gaining more and more currency, it is vital for non-Western women to be cautious of the pitfall of replacing one form of oppression with another. This article explores an alternative framework for non-Western feminism. The article offers a critique of the hegemony of Eurocentric discourse in feminist movements around the world. It problematizes three characteristics of Eurocentric feminist discourse: universalism, individualism, and right-based ethics. The article also proposes a Confucian feminism based on the principle of ren (humanness), the notion of rights as fen (share), and duty-based ethics. [China Media Research. 2006;2(3):9-18].

Keywords: Feminism; Eurocentrism, individualism; Confucianism; ren (humanness); fen (share); duty-based

ethics

Feminism is one of the most powerful struggles for social justice in the world (hooks, 2000). Feminist movements in the United States and Western Europe have called attention to women�’s oppression and exploitation worldwide. However, just as white males dominate Eurocentric humanist discourse, Western feminist discourse is also a dominant discourse that displaces non-Western cultural values. Western feminisms,1 to differing extents, have been accepted by many across the world as an inseparable part of modernization and development (e.g., Fung, 2000). In the same manner as Eurocentric modernization, Western feminisms are also forms of colonization that codify non-Western cultures as Others (Mohanty, 2002).

In the case of Chinese women, with few exceptions, Western studies present a homogeneous picture of gender oppression in traditional Chinese society or under the socialist regime (Chow, 1991; Gilmartin, Hershatter, Rofel & White, 1994; Mann, 1994). This type of research concentrated on how Chinese women were victimized and marginalized by the traditional patriarchal kinship system or the contemporary socialism (Mann, 1994). According to this view, Chinese women were victims of oppression, or were complicit in their victimization, or were their own oppressors. These analyses essentially reduced Chinese women to a monolithic Other by subjecting their experiences to Western measures and frameworks. Rather than advancing a vision of real equality, these discourses subjugate Chinese women to the hegemony of Western feminisms.

Chandra Talpade Mohanty (2002) contends that the conceptualization of non-Western feminisms ought to be a political project that simultaneously involves �“the internal critique of hegemonic �‘Western�’ feminisms, and the formulation of autonomous, geographically, historically, and culturally grounded feminist concerns and strategies�” (p. 159). In order to achieve this dual

goal, the present article first offers a critique of Eurocentric feminism. By Eurocentric feminism I mean different forms of feminism that are rooted in the experiences of European and European-American women and are relevant only to the understanding of such experiences. Second, this article explores the possibility of a form of Confucian feminism that resonates with the sociocultural experiences of women in China and other parts of Asia, such as South Korea, Japan, and Vietnam. Specifically, the present discussion will turn to the Confucian principle of ren (humanness), the conception of rights as fen (share), and duty-based ethics for cultivating feminist consciousness in China and beyond.

A Critique of Eurocentric Feminism

Asante (1980) avers that �“humanism itself was frequently nothing more than a Eurocentric concept of what was good for the world�” (p. 2). By the same token, feminism itself is often nothing more than a Eurocentric concept of what is good for all women. Just like Eurocentric humanism, the first and foremost characteristic of Eurocentric feminist discourse is its assumed universality.

Although Western feminist discourses or practices are by no means monolithic or homogenous, they are all rooted in the experiences of European and European-American women. However, this Eurocentric vision of womanhood is projected as the universal or natural definition for all women of different cultures and classes. From the outset, Eurocentric feminist discourse appropriated the notion of �“common oppression�” to build solidarity (hooks, 2000). The employment of a rhetoric of commonality or sameness by middle-class European (American) women constructed women as a homogenous �“powerless�” group. Nonetheless, Western feminists�’ emphasis on commonality or sameness did not in fact lead to an inclusion of women of different



cultures and classes. Working-class women and non-Western women often experience exclusion and alienation in feminist gatherings and college classrooms (e.g., hooks, 2000).

The discursive construction of commonality is essentially a self-representation of Western feminisms that signified the needs and desires of middle-class European (American) women as a unitary standard for all women in the world. The universalist feminist discourse imposes the Eurocentric definition of womanhood on non-Western women. Placed in the context of Eurocentric feminism, non-Western women are often viewed as Others, whereas the West remains the unquestionable standard against which non-Western cultures are measured and evaluated (Gilmartin, Hershatter, Rofel & White, 1994; Yin, 2005). The claim of common oppression in Eurocentric feminist discourse obscures asymmetrical power relationships among cultures and disguises racism, colonialism, and imperialism.

Moharty (2002) asserts that through the discursive construction of �“the third world women,�” Western feminists appropriate and colonize the complex experiences of women in non-Western countries. The construction of the homogenous �“third world women�” robs non-Western women of their political and historical agency and thus renders them objects. Just like white male dominated Western humanism, Eurocentric feminism defines non-Western cultures as Others or the peripheral. Only through the designation of non-Western women as the peripheral can the Western women represent themselves as the center. The center can be sustained only when it is placed against the peripheral that represents the lack of values (Jandt & Tanno, 2001; Said, 1978; Zhang, 2002).

Eurocentric feminist discourse, despite the rhetoric of sameness and common oppression, is in fact a form of hierarchal discourse. According to Asante (1998), hierarchal discourse has three characteristics: �“control over the rhetorical territory through definition, establishment of self-perpetuating initiation or rite de passage, and the stifling of opposing discourse�” (p. 34). Here I am not suggesting that Western feminist discourse has the same authority or status as Eurocentric humanist discourse. However, in the context of Western hegemony in the production of knowledge, Western feminists�’ definition of womanhood is a manifestation of the political, economic, and cultural colonization of non-Western cultures (Moharty, 2002). The power of this hierarchal discourse is to impose one vision of the world while suppressing others (Asante, 1998). While protesting against the androcentricism in white-male dominated humanist discourse, the writings of Western feminists impose an authoritative construction of norms which privilege the experiences and practices of

European (American) women at the expense of those of non-Western women.

Eurocentric feminist discourse also created a self-perpetuating ritual that reserves the �“real�” or �“true�” definition of womanhood only for Western feminists who initiated such a definition. The self-perpetuating characteristic of hierarchical discourse makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the colonized, non-Western women, to question Western feminisms�’ fundamental assumptions, such as Eurocentrism and individualism. Furthermore, Eurocentric feminist discourse is intolerant toward other feminist discourses. Non-Western women�’s resistance to the Eurocentric standard is dismissed as �“not progressive,�” �“backward,�” �“ignorant,�” or �“irrelevant.�” hooks (1981, 2000) and non-Western women report being ostracized and silenced by Western feminists who suppose that their issues and problems are not qualified for feminist discussion.

Despite the fact that the critique of the universalistic feminist discourse can be dated back to the mid-1980s, Eurocentric feminism remains as the unmarked standard against which all other forms of feminism are measured. For example, Fung (2000) evaluates the success of feminist movements in Asian countries according to women�’s employment opportunities and involvement in politics. Wang (1999) challenges the communist domination of feminism in China because the liberalist feminism movement was not allowed to flourish as an independent movement in China. Even in the writings of post-colonialist feminists (e.g, Moharty, 2002; Shohat, 2003), which initiated the challenge to the universality of Eurocentric feminist discourse and argued for specific forms of resistance in relation to diverse forms of oppression, the conception of women�’s rights is still rooted in Eurocentric individualism.

This issue brings us to the second characteristic of Eurocentric feminist discourse: the unambiguous assumption of individualism. Eisenstein (1981) maintains that feminism in North America is rooted in �“the competitive, atomistic ideology of liberal individualism.�” It is my contention that not only liberal feminism but also other forms of Western feminism�—such as radical feminism, Marxist feminism, socialist feminism, post-modernist and post-colonialist feminism�—conceive women�’s rights and freedom within the realm of individualism.

The Eurocentric individualist tradition views women as individuals endowed with inalienable rights against the competing claims of different social relations (Woo, 2002). The individualistic idea of rights is expressed in terms of individual choices of employment, political participation, identity, and cultural recognition. Those Western feminists who advocate social equality call for the establishment of either a gender-blind society with equal opportunities



for both men and women as individuals or a mode of production that does not exploit or discriminate against individuals in terms of class or gender (Campbell, 2002). Those Western feminists who champion representational egalitarianism demand a new cultural formation that provides women�—as individuals�—with opportunities to be heard with the same respect given to their male counterparts.

Even though post-modernist, especially post-colonialist, feminists are often from non-Western cultures, many of them reside in the United States and Europe. Undoubtedly, their emphasis on differences among women and anti-essentialism marks a major advance in challenging the Eurocentric universalistic definition of womanhood and in conceptualizing identity and difference. Nevertheless, their theorizing is a continuation of, rather than a rupture with, the individualist tradition. In the post-colonialist conception, no collective identity is innocent, and they all need to be unmasked or deconstructed (Fraser, 1997). They assume that female individuals should not be reduced to any kind of group or category, and that they should have sovereignty over their own bodies.

Following this logic, the only innocent political project is deconstruction. However, deconstruction does not necessarily lead to the emancipation and empowerment of women. Deconstruction strips women of certain sociocultural relations. Indeed, at the end of deconstructing every collective identity, when all forms of social relations have been cast away, we will find the woman as an atomistic individual�—a biological object, prior to entering any social relations. It is precisely through social relations that persons become cultural/ideological subjects and gain a sense of agency. Hence, indiscriminate deconstruction eventually not only reduces women to biological objects but also deprives them of a sense of political and historical agency. Ironically, this is exactly what post-colonialist feminists are fighting against. Asante (2005) articulates the destructive nature of deconstructionist research:

The forms of deconstruction often suggested by many postmodernist [and post-colonialist] thinkers leave nothing in the process but unadulterated individualistic narcissism that undermines the human capacity to feel solidarity with others. . . . Life as a random collage or free association of images may invoke an isolationist individuality, but it is never cohesive enough to deal with the reality of community and communities, that is, groups of people who are bound together by similar historical experiences and who are developed by common phenomenological responses. (p. 11)

Regardless of the means, whether through the

reorganization of socioeconomic structure or through

the transformation of cultural representation, Eurocentric feminism attempts to restore to female individuals the rights that have been robbed from women by unjust sociocultural relations. Here the notion of the rights of women is no different than John Locke�’s (1967) Eurocentric philosophy that privileges white men. Rights are defined as natural, absolute, and inalienable to the autonomous individual (Rosemont, 1998). From this perspective, rights are expressed as �“negative�” liberties, i.e., free from external oppressive forces (Twiss, 1998). The negative form of freedom does not allow a conceptualization of positive empowerment that serves as an equally valid form of human flourishing (Yin, in press).

The Eurocentric ontology based on individualism prevents a non-anthropocentric theorization of rights in which the individual is not the center of the world, and in which human beings embrace interdependent relationships with other beings and nature (Chen & Starosta, 2003; Ishii, 2001; Miike, 2003a, 2003b). The individualistic assumption also does not allow a conception of rights as a collective good that requires different kinds of rights and restrictions of individual freedom for greater social goods such as harmony, peace, and ecological sustainability (Parekh, 2002).

Still another characteristic of Eurocentric feminism is rights-based ethics. In Western traditions, rights are absolutely central for many theorists, especially for Kantian scholars (Rosemont, 1998; Tu, 2001). �“Rights talk�” is especially ubiquitous in the moral and political discourse of the United States. Western feminists�’ subversion of androcentrism places an exclusive emphasis on the rights of women (in a very limited sense). In this respect, Eurocentric feminist discourse is again similar to the Western humanist project largely sponsored by white males.

Right-based ethics or morality obscures inequality, discrimination, and other wrongs in today�’s world. Fingarette observes that the doctrine of individual rights �“has profound potentials as socially disruptive and anti-human forces�” (cited in Rosemont, 1998, p. 56). Western feminists, while challenging men as oppressive, often refuse to confront the impact of their own privileges and prejudices. hooks (2000) believes that by identifying themselves as �“victims�” of gender oppression, white feminists �“could abdicate responsibility for their role in the maintenance and perpetuation of sexism, racism, and classism, which they did by insisting that only men were the enemy�” (p. 46).

Here the underlying assumption is that nurturing and peace-loving women are morally superior to competitive and militaristic men (Fraser, 1997). Many Western feminists sincerely believe that because women are different from men and would exercise power differently, they would not endorse domination or



control over others �—the good girls/bad boys dichotomy (Fraser, 1997). In reality, however, women in power do not necessarily work toward the end of gender inequality or other forms of oppression. It is also clear that given the opportunity, women have the capability and willingness to kill or torture other human beings.

Rights-based ethics indeed help sustain the myth of equal opportunity for everyone. Consequently, it does not permit social remedies for injustice. Rights consciousness based on individualism makes the conflict between liberty and equality irreconcilable (Tu, 1998). Some people in the Untied States reject affirmative action on the ground that it is preferential treatment, which violates the basic right of equal consideration. Moreover, rights-based ethics sanctions and even encourages self-centeredness or selfishness. In the individualist tradition, priority is always given to one�’s own rights when rights are invoked.

This form of ethics also leads individuals to view others as rival rights claimants. When talking about affirmative action, white men often feel angry because their rights are �“trumped�” by the rights of women and minorities (Rosemont, 1998). As a result, there is no motivation to address social justice, which is perceived by many people as advocating the rights of others. This mentality of rivalry also results in indifference to other people�’s suffering. Rights-based ethics and the idea of people as freely choosing, rational, and autonomous individuals further make it possible for the established order to attack the oppressed and social welfare programs. Because in the rights-based tradition, one must give up one�’s personal rights and privileges for the sake of one�’s rivals, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to attend to social remedies, through redistribution, transformation, or reformation.

Even many Western feminists themselves are not willing to give up their class and racial privileges to redress the needs and rights of oppressed groups. This is the very difficulty that Marxist and socialist feminists, who insist on redistribution as a remedy for social/gender inequality, are wrestling with with. In Marxist theory, the proletarians are the grave-diggers of the bourgeoisie because they had nothing to lose but would gain everything in the proletarian revolution. However, in today�’s capitalist society where the myth of equal opportunity has been taken for granted, false class consciousness has been internalized by the working class, since 80% of the population claims to be middle class. Therefore, no social force is available to carry out redistribution in order to achieve equality.

The rival mentality associated with rights-based ethics has been extended to the relations of humans to nature and to other beings. The sense of entitlement rooted in individualism and the lack of respect for the rights of others justify and naturalize the

overexploitation of nature. The rights-based mentality does not allow a genuine concern for environmental issues, which means giving up one�’s rights for nature.

What is missing in rights-based Eurocentric feminist discourse is the notion of responsibility. Responsibility is a key component of ethics and the backbone for community building. However, responsibility has been ostracized and marginalized in the Western axiology informed by individualism (Rosemont, 1998). Without the notion of responsibility, without communal consciousness, it is impossible to envisage a form of feminism that regards women�’s rights not only as individual liberty but also as empowerment and enablement for women to function as truly equal participating members in a polity or community.

As we are faced with the challenge of ecological destruction, economic disruption, and political and social instability, the harmful impact of excessive individualism has become more obvious than ever (Tu, 2001). Consequently, there is an urgent need for remedies stemming from other cultural traditions (Ching, 1998). Furthermore, as argued earlier, Eurocentric feminism based on individualism has been colonizing efforts to emancipate and empower women in non-Western cultures.

Asante (2002) notes that challenging gender oppression in the non-Western world does not mean to accept Eurocentric feminism as the only right way. Non-Western women would never truly have equal rights in any meaningful way if they have to accept a definition of womanhood that does not reflect or resonate with their own experiences. Shohat (2003) argue that post-Third-Worldist feminists should refuse a Eurocentric universalizing of �“womanhood,�” and even of �“feminism,�” and claim a �“location�” that confronts diverse forms of oppression.

Afrocentrists (e.g., Asante, 1980, 1990, 1998, 2003) and Asiacentrists (e.g., Miike, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2006) demand that the displaced people, knowledges, and histories of Africa and Asia should be recentered. Other scholars such as Starosta and Chen (2003) advocate �“multiple centers�” in intercultural communication research. It is also crucial for non-Western feminists to assert a location where non-Western women�’s experiences are examined and analyzed from their own perspectives, and where they are subjects as opposed to objects of someone else�’s analysis. Toward this end, I will turn to Confucianism for a new conceptual framework for a form of feminism that can cultivate a consciousness of communal good and gender equality.

Envisioning a Confucian Feminism

To many contemporary scholars and observers, Confucianism and feminism would seem to be an



incompatible couple. Indeed, in China, the birthplace of Confucius, from the May Fourth Movement and the New Culture Movement at the dawn of the 20th century down through the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, Confucianism was condemned as the ideological cause for China�’s underdevelopment or backwardness. Even today, many in China as well as in the West still view Confucianism as a drag on modernization (de Bary, 1998). The Chinese liberal feminist movement was initiated by New Culturalists (mostly male literati). Those New Culturalists adopted Western liberalist humanism and insisted that the feiren (inhumanness) of Confucianism is the source of women suffering in China (de Bary, 1998; Wang, 1999). Both the Chinese communist government and Western feminists often echo this argument (Woo, 1994).

However, it was in the context of Western imperialism and Manchu domination that New Culturalists (male literati) connected women�’s oppression with China�’s subordination to Western powers. In addition, they equated Confucianism ethics to feudalism, which they judged to be the origin of women's oppression (Wang, 1999). It was the discourse of the New Culture Movement that depicted Confucianism as the cause for all problems by which China was troubled. In this type of discourse, Confucian ethics was constructed in opposition to liberal individualism, which was symbolized as the only viable means to rescue China from Western colonization and other social ills. Nevertheless, the acceptance of Western liberalism and the rejection of Confucianism did not liberate China from Western imperialism. Nor did it eliminate asymmetrical power relationships between women and men in China.2

The rejection of Confucianism emerged from the belief that the Confucian ethics was opposed to independence, liberty, and the inalienable rights of the individual (Tu, 2001). Rather than the timeless truth, this belief was strategically articulated as a response to a particular historical situation, that of Western colonization and Manchu domination. Now the global and local environments have changed drastically from those of a century ago. It is necessary to reevaluate and reexamine such a belief within the current political and historical context. Moreover, as the detrimental potential of individualism in Eurocentric feminism has become clearer, it is high time to return to some Confucian values that prioritize the collectivity for an alternative form of feminism. Specifically, the principle of ren (humanness), the notion of rights as fen (share), and duty-based ethics in Confucian teaching are invaluable to cultivate a communally based critical self-awareness and a common language of justice that foster gender equality.3

The Principle of Ren (Humanness)

One of the major difficulties that Western feminists face is the antipathy to women�’s rights and the lack of a philosophy for addressing the issue of justice. The Confucian principle of ren (humanness) can help Chinese and other Asian feminists utter a social consciousness that is sensitive to women�’s suffering and thus makes it possible to engage in social transformation toward gender and other forms of social equality.

Ren (humanness) is regarded as the cardinal principle in Confucian teaching (Yum, 1987). Ren is the ideal of a humane person, who values moral relationships above everything else (Ching, 1998). To be humane or to be human is to ai ren (love all human beings) (Chang, 1998; Ching, 1998). The humane person practices the five virtues (i.e., respect, tolerance, trustworthiness in words, diligence in action, and kindness) in her or his relations with all human beings (Chang, 1998). Ren is thus the goal of human nature, the ideal for the kind of people that we should strive to become (Yum, 1987).

Ren is not an innate trait. Rather, it is the result of self-development or self-cultivation (Chang, 1998). In the Confucian tradition, a person or the self is regarded as the center of relationships as opposed to the Western notion of the independent, freely choosing, atomistic individual (Tu, 1985, 1998, 2001). The Confucian person from birth stands in a network of relations that is guided by the principle of ren (Kwok, 1998). Tu (1985) notes that learning to be a humane person (or to be human) is �“to learn to be sensitive to an ever-expanding network of relationships�” (p. 175).

The primary concern of self-cultivation is de (virtue), the ability to achieve harmony both within the person and with other people (Cheng, 1998). Thus, self-cultivation is a process of transforming the private ego to the all-encompassing self which has the ability to feel the suffering of others�—or, put in the often seen negative form, the inability to endure others�’ suffering (Tu, 1985). Self-realization is essentially to extend the bonding with our parents and immediate family to larger networks of human relationships�—from respecting our parents to respecting all elderly, from caring for our own children to caring for all children in the world.

Tu (1985) maintains that egoism, nepotism, parochialism, ethnocentrism, and chauvinistic nationalism are forms of human insensitivity. Self-cultivation as an ever-expanding network of relationships transcends such an insensitivity to embrace all human beings. Cheng (1998) calls this transformation �“cohumanity�” �– �“a holistic human existence extending in time and space�” (p. 143). The Confucian teaching of tianrenheyi (the unity of Heaven and humanity) further transcends anthropocentricsm in Eurocentric humanist and feminist discourse to establish a community encompassing all beings in the universe (Tu, 1998).



The process of self-cultivation is a social act because it can take place only in interactions with other human beings (Chang, 1998). Self-cultivation requires a social order that enables the development of a person, while it simultaneously contributes to develop and maintain that order (Cheng, 1987, 1998). Moreover, the goal of self-cultivation is not merely personal growth or moral perfection. It is not just for a person�’s self-interest. Rather, self-cultivation is a way for a person to make herself or himself available to the society�—to contribute to the social order that makes moral transformation possible (Cheng, 1998).

The Confucian teaching of ren also has implications for political governing. In that case, ren is defined as the benevolent or humane government that requires the leader not only to provide for and protect the welfare of people so that the people could be taught how to develop ren, but also to set the example of personal integrity and altruistic devotion to the people (Cheng, 1998; Ching, 1998). The leader�’s rule is thus legitimized by her or his de (virtue)�—a true respect for human dignity, a critical awareness of social relationships, and the ability to make moral transformation of the society and individuals possible (Ching, 1998).

Through the Confucian principle of ren, Chinese and other Asian feminists can articulate and cultivate a consciousness founded on genuine concern and care for women (indeed for all human beings) at personal and societal levels. The interhuman regard associated with ren not only invokes empathy and compassion for the suffering of women (or the inability to endure their suffering), but also propels a social order to eliminate such an agony. Therefore, in the context of ren, we can envision a social transformation that aims at gender equality and other forms of social justice.

Self-cultivation inspired by ren is not only a means for Chinese and other Asian women to gain a sense of agency but also contributes to the development of agency of other female members of the society. Furthermore, the principle of ren compels us to conceptualize a form of political order in which the government truly represents the interests of women of different sociocultural groups. In this conception, the government is obligated to create a cultural/social/political environment that recognizes and empowers women as equal contributing members of the community.

Rights as Fen (Share) and Duty-based Ethics Another problem that hinders feminist movements

in the West is the definition of rights as a natural endowment of the individual. Grounded in individualism, the natural-rights assumption not only confines the notion of rights to a narrow definition, but also makes it impossible to address women�’s rights

without resistance from other groups or individuals who perceive women as rival claimants for rights. Moreover, living in a collectivistic society that emphasizes social relationships, Chinese women tend to understand rights in relation to the family or community (Wang, 2002; Yin, 2006, in press; Yin & Hall 2002). Thus, rather than uncritically adopting the Eurocentric notion of individualistic rights, Chinese feminists should challenge gender oppression from the viewpoint of Chinese women. The Confucian conception of rights as fen (share) can provide an alternative framework for Chinese, and possibly other Asian, feminists to conceptualize women�’s rights as communal and societal efforts.

Contrary to the liberal definition of natural rights that prioritizes those who claim rights, Confucianism gives weight to those who make the claimed rights possible (Chang, 1998). For example, in the ruler-subject relationship, Confucian teaching emphasizes what the ruler can do to secure the well being of the people as opposed to what the people could claim for their rights. Hence, rights in the Confucian tradition are expressed as fen (share or entitlement). Fen differs from the Western notion of rights that views rights as a product of human interaction or natural endowments. Fen is strictly a social product. It is a share of social good that is created by joint efforts of many members in a society (Chang, 1998). Fen, unlike the Western version of rights, is not something a person is born with or claims. It is what the society, or specifically those who are concerned, sees as fit for a person to enjoy.

Understanding women�’s rights as fen delegates the responsibilities for gender equality to every member of the society. In consequence, not only women but also men are obligated to work toward the interests of female members of the community. When women�’s rights are conceived as fen, a share of common good created for women upon social agreement, it will not leave men or other social groups feeling that their rights are taken away by women. Indeed, if the competition mentality derived from rights-based consciousness segments different social groups as rival claimants for rights, the notion of fen unites women and men through defining gender equality as a moral imperative and a common goal that requires joint efforts of both groups.

To be sure, fen, as assigned or allowed by the society, is valid or meaningful only in a society that is guided by ethics based on duty or responsibility. Without duty-based ethics, the notion of fen can be easily used by the dominant group to deprive the rights of the dominated. In Confucian teaching, people are viewed as persons located within social networks and as having specific duties or moral obligations (Yum, 1987). In duty-based ethics, the realization of the self, or the worth of the person, is essentially tied to her or his ability to fulfill her/his social responsibilities (Cohen,



1996, cited in Tu, 1998, p. 304). Although relationships in Confucianism are often hierarchical, obligations are mutual or reciprocal and required for all parties concerned (Ching, 1998; Yum, 1987). Indeed, rights associated with a position are often defined as duties.

Take the ruler-subject relationship as an example. It is commonly understood that Confucianism requires the people to meet the obligations of the ruler. However, Confucius also insisted that the entitlement of the ruler is inseparably linked to her or his responsibilities for the people. A ruler is endowed by Heaven precisely because she or he is given more responsibilities than the governed. Thus, for the ruler, her or his rights as well as identities are expressed in terms of duty or responsibility. As Cheng (1998) elegantly puts it: �“For the ruler to define his [or her] identity in terms of ruling means his [or her] duties are also his [or her] rights; on the other hand, for the ruler to define his [or her] identity as serving the interests of the people means his [or her] rights are also his [or her] duties�” (p. 145).

Moreover, in the Confucian tradition, all virtues are expressed in the form of duty or moral obligations (Cheng, 1998). The principle of ren is also expressed as a person�’s duty to define her or his relationships with other human beings. This is a duty that benefits the society as a whole (Cheng, 1998). Duty-based ethics is crucial for formulating a Chinese feminism based on fen because it promotes the kind of consciousness and behaviors that benefit other members of the community.

Duty-based ethics emphasizes the reciprocity between the self and the community. On the one hand, a person�’s self-cultivation or acquisition of virtues is encouraged and nurtured by the community. On the other hand, self-cultivation is to make the self available to contribute to the social order that enables self-cultivation. Therefore, a person�’s moral development is both a duty of the self to the community and a duty of the community to the self. As Cheng (1998) states, �“the duty consciousness comes from a vision of the perfect union or unity of self and community in which both their needs are realized�” (p. 148).

Furthermore, in duty-based ethics, public or common good is not only a moral ideal but also actually expected. Individual members�’ duties to the community promise a sense of public good. On the other hand, every member of the community is also an indirect beneficiary of other members�’ duties (Cheng, 1998). Therefore, public good can be defined not only as moral obligations but also as something intertwined with the personal interests of individual members.

Finally, duty consciousness helps overthrow powers that may distort or dominate public interests (Cheng, 1998). In Confucianism, the ruler is obligated to provide for the people�’s welfare. If the ruler�’s private interests dominate public interests, she or he should be removed (Ching, 1998). Although Confucian teaching

does not encourage violent revolt, which should be reserved as the last resort for exasperated people, it does recognize that other civil processes should be taken to depose a tyrannical ruler (de Bary, 1998).

The relationship between individual members and the community defined by duty-based ethics thus makes it possible to cultivate a feminist mentality. Self-cultivation, as a social act and a mutual obligation of individual members and the community, can be used by Chinese and other Asian feminists to develop a sense of feminist consciousness and agency in the members (both male and female) of the community. Duty-based ethics fosters a unity of individual members and the community, which makes the conception of public (common) good not only possible but also expected. As a result, a public consciousness for women�’s rights can be elaborated as both individuals�’ duty to the community and the community�’s duty to women. In addition, a Confucian feminism does not preclude women, or any other oppressed group, from demanding and fighting for their own rights if the community or society fails to fulfill the obligation to provide the well-deserved rights.

Concluding Remarks

As feminist movements are attracting increasing attention around the world, it is vital for non-Western women to be cautious of the pitfall of replacing one form of oppression with another. Challenging gender oppression in non-Western cultures should not lead to an uncritical acceptance of Eurocentric feminism, which is anchored in the experiences of European and European-American women. Non-Western women should develop different forms of feminisms that reflect and resonate with the experiences of non-Western women as subjects. Non-Western women can never be truly free if they take on the experiences of someone else.

Furthermore, we also need to keep in mind that Western feminisms themselves are struggles in process. Many fundamental problems are still yet to be addressed and resolved in Western cultures. It is very dangerous for non-Western women to accept Western feminisms as the truth or panacea for gender problems everywhere in the world. Indeed, the time is long overdue for non-Western women to re-claim their own locations and to become masters of their own destiny.

To explore alternative forms of feminism does not mean to ignore the contribution and spirit of Western feminisms. A Confucian feminism does not preclude the use of theories and strategies developed by Western feminists for Chinese and other Asian women to claim the rights that they duly deserve. The point here is that Eurocentric feminism should not be the only right way for women�’s emancipation and empowerment regardless of the locations and contexts.



Notes:

1. There are different forms of feminisms developed in Europe and the United States, including liberal feminism, radical feminism, socialist feminism, Marxist feminism, postmodernist feminism, and post-colonialist feminism.

2. The Chinese feminist movement in the context of the New Culturalist Movement aimed to reform women so that they could be the �“same�” as men (Wang, 1999). Barlow (1994b) argues that the male-led feminist movement in this period reflects a masculinist frame of anti-Confucian discourse. The liberalist feminism movement was soon subordinated by class struggles as leftist intellectuals accepted Marxist theories. Once the Communist Party established power in China, it denounced the liberal feminist movement as �“bourgeois feminism,�” and employed the new slogan of �“women�’s emancipation movement.�” This is yet another masculinist form of gender equality, which views women as genderless workers, the �“iron woman.�” As a rejection of state ideological hegemony, Chinese women have returned to a biological definition that stresses gender differences since the 1980s (Barlow, 1994a).

3. My argument is here not that Confucianism in itself and its later interpretations are not patriarchal. The feminist critique of the oppressiveness of man-made discourse is definitely applicable to Confucian discourse. Indeed, Cho (1998) notes that Confucian texts are simultaneously expressions of patriarchal principles based on agnation and endorsements of complementary relationships between the two sexes. Therefore, it is unfair to completely abandon Confucianism simply because it has an oppressive aspect. It is not uncommon for many in the West to make such a simple judgment and discard a non-Western tradition so quickly. To my knowledge, however, no feminist argues that Aristotle should be tossed into the trash because his notion of citizen excludes women (as well as slaves).

Correspondence to: Dr. Jing Yin Department of Communication Studies Clemson University 408 Strode Tower Clemson, SC 29634, USA Phone: (864) 656-4516 Email: [email protected]

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