Zack Levine3/4/10

History 395: Stalin and Stalinism

“Annihilated by One Stroke of this Red Pencil”Nikolai Yezhov’s Role in the Great Terror

The Great Terror: an era of two years – 1937-38 – that made the USSR look

like Salem, Massachusetts circa 1690. Except instead of 150 arrests, there were

more than 1.5 million. Rather than 20 executions, there were three-quarters of a

million (Getty and Naumov 1999, 588). This reign of mass terror turned the USSR

into a country of paranoia, betrayal, and execution for 2 years, and this period in

history has since been dubbed Yezhovshchina, or “Yezhov’s regime.” Nikolai

Ivanovich Yezhov, Stalin’s loyal underling and the head of the NKVD among other

organizations, is the owner of the surname that lends itself to this lable. Yezhov has

been pointed to by Joseph Stalin and many others alike as the one man most

responsible for this era of terror. And while, undoubtedly, Yezhov was a force

behind these killings, and enthusiastic one at that, he was in fact not the single

greatest executioner of this era. That title belongs to Joseph Stalin. Nikolai Yezhov

was a hardworking, focused, and fanatically loyal person, thus making him the

perfect henchman to Stalin in the most brutal years of the USSR’s existence.

However, it was Joseph Stalin, not Yezhov, who was the true orchestrator of this

terror.

Some background on Nikolai Yezhov is necessary in order to accurately

evaluate his role in the Great Terror. Born in St. Petersburg on May 1st, 1895, he had

a fairly typical Russian childhood. He did not finish primary school, leaving it for

factory work, and was called to army duty when he was 20 years old. He claimed to

have joined the Bolshevik Party in 1917, and he “very actively participated” in the

October revolution (Jansen and Petrov, 6). After fighting in the civil war, he worked

various political jobs and in 1929 was appointed Deputy of the People’s Commissar

for Agriculture. From there, he worked his way up the higher political rung, and was

elected to the Central Committee in 1934. A fiercely loyal Stalinist, he made a name

for himself with his investigation of the murder of Serge Kirov in 1935. Stalin

approved of his work, and appointed Yezhov head of the NKVD in September, 1936.

It was from this position that his work in the Great Terror was accomplished.

Certain aspects of Yezhov’s character made him an ideal right-hand-man for

Stalin during the terror years. Firstly, he was incredibly hardworking. To quote

historians J. Arch Getty and Oleg Naumov, “Every document we have from Yezhov’s

bosses over the years testifies to his capability and capacity for hard work. All his

performance reports are filled with words and phrases like ‘good organizer,’

‘conscientious,’ ‘energetic,’ ‘works independently,’ and ‘good at practical work’”

(2008, 213). This ability to work hard made him an ideal candidate for Stalin as the

head of the NKVD and the executor of so many of his orders. This much is certain,

and Yezhov’s aptitude for work is well documented in many more sources than just

the one listed above.

In addition to being hard working, Yezhov was also incredibly stubborn and

focused. These traits were at the forefront of his character, and they shone through

brightly in the workplace. To quote director of the Moscow Art Theatre I.M.

Moskvin, “I don’t know of any more ideal functionary than Yezhov. After charging

him with a task, you don’t have to check up on him: he will accomplish the mission.

He has only one, indeed essential shortcoming – he does not know where to stop”

(Jansen and Petrov, ix). This type of quality was perfect for a Stalin underling; he

was someone who would get the job done regardless, no matter what the means

may have been. As posited by Getty and Naumov, “He was an excellent

administrator and organizer… [and] displayed the can-do, relentless, get-it-done-

regardless-of-consequences attitude that characterized successful Stalinist

lieutenants like Molotov, Kaganovich, and Ordzhonikidze” (2008, 112). This

relentlessness made him a perfect man to be Stalin’s executor of terror.

In combination with the above characteristics, Yezhov was also unbelievably

loyal to Stalin. His faithfulness simply had no limits. In 1936, Yezhov began to write

a book entitled “From Factionalism to Counterrevolution.” He sent the first chapter

to Stalin, asking for his suggestions. According to author Boris Starkov, “without any

particular proof” Ezhov wrote in this chapter that “a strong link existed between the

Trotskyists and the Zinovievists… There is no doubt that the Trotskyists were aware

of the terrorists’ side of the activities of the Zinovievist organization… The

consequent arrests of Zinovievists and Trotskyists establish that the latter have also

taken the path to terrorism” (Getty and Manning, 25). Leon Trotsky and Grigory

Zinoviev were both persecuted as being oppositionists to Stalin, and after their

arrests, their names became categories for millions of “enemies of the people.”

Despite the fact that they were not actually linked, Yezhov was quick to link them

together. He was incredibly active and aggressive in pursuing anyone that went

against Stalin. Another example of Yezhov’s loyalty to Stalin comes from 1938, when

Yezhov proposed to change the name of Moscow to “Stalinodar.” With Stalingrad

already in existence, to change the name of the capital would have been quite a bold

move. The idea was brought up in to the Central Committee, and Stalin himself

completely rejected the idea (Getty and Manning, 37). Thus, despite Yehzov’s

attempts, Moscow remained the city’s name.

A final and terribly poignant example of Yezhov’s loyalty to Stalin comes

from after Yezhov had been arrested. Before his execution, Yezhov spoke his final

words: “Let Stalin know that I shall die with his name on my lips” (Jansen and

Petrov, 188). This one sentences shows fervent, unrelenting loyalty at its apex;

Stalin had condemned Yezhov to death, and yet these words were still spoken.

Yezhov was truly as loyal to Stalin as one can be to another.

This analysis of Yezhov’s character has shown that he was a perfect

individual to be the head of the NKVD during the years of the Great Terror. He

always carried out his orders from Stalin, often times going above and beyond. He

never questioned his leader. And he was certainly passionate about the elimination

of Soviet enemies of the people. Many say that he was so passionate about it, he

himself instigated much of the terror. The name of the era, Yezhovschina, illustrates

this point. Almost all Soviet citizens thought this to be true as well. Historian Robert

Conquest describes a meeting between Russian poet Boris Pasternak and actor

Vsevolod Meyerhold regarding the mass terror: “Pasternak raised his hands to the

dark sky and exclaimed, ‘If only someone would tell Stalin about it!’ Meyerhold, too,

remarked, “They conceal it from Stalin” (63).

However, this is far from the truth. Despite Yezhov’s apt characteristics, he

was not the man who instigated the great terror, and he was not the man

responsible for all the arrests and murders. That man was Joseph Stalin. Yezhov was

simply carrying out orders, and myriad evidence in the form of documents proves

this. Though Stalin at times exercised moderation and could be kind, he was the

more brutal of the two men. Getty and Manning remark on a correspondence

between the two:

“In July of 1938, Yezhov sent a list of 138 names. The accompanying note stated the following: ‘Secret. To Comrade Stalin. I am sending a list of the people who have been arrested and are subject to the verdict of the military tribunal according to the first category. Ezhov. 26 July, 1938.’ The following resolution can be found on the sheet: “Shoot all 138. I. Stalin.’” (34)

This shows that the merciless Stalin was not only the one giving orders, but was the

man behind the terror, not Yezhov.

Another example illustrating this point comes from the time of the 1937

plenum, in which a series of accusations against Poles within the USSR were levied.

In September, Yezhov issued Stalin a report on the progress of his destruction of the

Poles. On it, Stalin commented: “Very good! Continue to dig up and clean out this

spying Polish filth. Destroy it in the interests of the USSR” (Hagenloh, 227). This

document further emphasizes not only Stalin’s brutality, but the fact that he was the

man behind the Great Terror as well.

In August of 1937, the head of the NKVD in the Urals region reported to

Yezhov that there was an “insurrectionary headquarters” in the Urals, combining

Troktsyites, Rightists, Socialist Revolutionaries, White officers, and clergy. Yezhov

sent the report to Stalin, who, after reading it wrote back that the NKVD was acting

too “sluggishly” and that “It is necessary to arrest immediately all (both major and

minor) participants in this ‘insurrectionary group’ in the Urals” (Hagenloh, 269).

The NKVD, in 1937, was hardly sluggish. In fact, they arrested over 1 million people,

many of whom were completely innocent, in that year alone. For Stalin to accuse the

NKVD, under Yezhov’s leadership, of sluggishness is a clear indication of how

maniacal he truly was, and of how he was the one responsible for all the arrests.

Russian historian Oleg Khlevniuk has a very pointed opinion on this issue as

well. He notes that “Extensive documentary evidence shows that what Yezhov did

was carefully controlled and directed by Stalin” (195). One of these pieces of

documentary evidence is Stalin’s visitor log. Between 1937 and 1938, Yezhov went

to see Stalin 288 times for a total of roughly 855 hours (195). Granted, Stalin was

Yezhov’s boss, and clearly they needed to communicate regardless of whether or not

he was ordering Yezhov to carry out massive arrests and executions. However, the

frequency with which Yezhov visited Stalin is what is so notable here. The only

person to see him more during those two years was Viacheslav Molotov, Stalin’s

trusted protégé (195). This leads one to believe that Yezhov was not acting of his

own accord; he was simply visiting his boss too frequently for that to be possible. It

is clear that, during many of those 288 meetings, Stalin was ordering Yezhov to

carry out aspects of the Great Terror.

One final comment from Khlevniuk can end this section of the analysis. If the

documents presented do not qualify as enough evidence to prove that it was Stalin

and not Yezhov behind the terror, perhaps the historian’s remarks here, from his

book Master of the House: Stalin and his Inner Circle, will. His opinion on the issue:

“Overall, Yezhov should not be cast at the orchestrator of the Great Terror or considered an independent political force determining the scope and shape of repressive measures. He was a diligent executor of Stalin’s will who acted on precise instructions from above. There is not a shred of evidence that Yezhov strayed from under Stalin’s control.” (196)

Be that as it may, one could also argue that while Stalin gave the orders to

Yezhov, it was Yezhov who in fact came up with many of the ideas behind the Great

Terror. Perhaps that is what they were talking about in the 855 hours in Stalin’s

office. But alas, there is sufficient documentary evidence proving that this is highly

unlikely as well. This evidence comes in the form of Stalin rejecting Yezhov’s ideas

and actions, and proves that it was indeed Stalin running the operations. In one case,

in 1938, Yezhov got into an argument with Molotov, and proclaimed this: “If I were

in your place, Viacheslav Mikhailovich, I would not ask competent organs those

kinds of questions. Do not forget that one previous Chairman of the Sovnarkom, A.I.

Rykov, has already been in my office. The road to me is not off limits even for you”

(Getty and Manning, 38). Rykov, who Yezhov mentions here, had been convicted of

being a Trotsykist and was executed. So when Yezhov said “in my office,” he meant it

far from literally. This speech angered Stalin, who requested that Yezhov send

Molotov a personal apology, which he of course did. If Yezhov had been the one

orchestrating the terror, no one outside of Stalin himself, would have been off limits.

Molotov, perhaps Stalin’s closest associate, clearly was off limits to Yezhov.

An example of Stalin rejecting one of Yezhov’s ideas comes from Getty and

Naumov’s book, The Road to Terror, which features a series of documents from the

time period. In this example, Stalin actually proves to more rational and kind than

Yezhov, which he occasionally would do. After Nikolai Bukharin (who will be

discussed in detail shortly) began to confess from prison in 1937, his wife was told

that she had to leave Moscow, and could live in another Russian city. According to

Lavrentiy Beria, Yezhov wanted her to be shot along with other “wives of enemies of

the people” (Getty and Naumov 1999, 418). Stalin, however, refused. While this

certainly illustrates Yezhov’s brutality, more importantly it also shows that Stalin

was quick to exercise his power over him whenever they disagreed. Stalin was in

charge of the terror, and thus it was applied to whomever he wanted, whenever he

wanted. In this case, Bukahrin’s wife was spared.

Examining the case of Bukharin is an interesting angle from which to look

into the relationship between Yezhov and Stalin. Nikolai Bukharin was a party

member since before the October Revolution, and in the 1920s, was one of Stalin’s

close associates. He helped Stalin win the struggle for power over Trotsky, and then

he and Stalin together ousted Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev. Trotskyists and

Zinovievist-Kamenevists became the names that were thrust upon so many enemies

of the people who were arrested in the 1930s, and so one would think that Stalin

would stay loyal to the man who helped him get rid of these people he loathed so

much. Yet, in the late 1920s, Bukharin and Stalin began to disagree on economic

policy, mainly collectivization, and Bukharin was expelled from the Politburo on

November 19th, 1929. During the Great Terror, when Stalin executed almost every

political figure who had opposed him in his life, Bukharin was not made an

exception.

However, the way in which it was done was rather unusual. In August 1936,

Kamanev, during his trial, implicated Bukharin as well as other former rightist

leaders Aleksei Rykov and Mikhail Tomsky. Yezhov, who was at the forefront of this

trial, also mentioned their names. At the closing of the session, it was announced

that an investigation on these three men was to commence (Getty and Naumov

1999, 300). The following day, Tomsky committed suicide. Then, in the December

1936 plenum, the case of Bukharin was discussed. Yezhov was extremely forward,

stating that Bukharin, Rykov, and “... the rightists were informed of all plans for

terrorism, etc., by the Trotskyist-Zinovievist bloc” (307). Bukharin then defended

himself, and, in what was certainly a rarity in Soviet political trials of the era,

confessed to nothing. He maintained his innocence throughout. After that, speaker

upon speaker accused Bukharin of being a terrorist, with comments such as “…so

thoroughly has Bukharin lied through his teeth these past few years” (Molotov)

being thrown at him constantly (316). And yet, at the end of the plenum, Stalin

moved to “look more closely into this matter…” and discuss it at the next plenum

(322). After Yezhov’s scathing report, and a host of similar speeches, Stalin chose

not to act. This is another example of Stalin rejecting Yezhov.

There is something else that is worth noting about this plenum. Unlike

almost every other plenum transcript in party history, this one was completely

hidden from the public (325). It was kept as a total secret. As Getty and Naumov put

it, “The December 1936 plenum was somehow a bungled discourse, at least for

Yezhov and the other lieutenants who had called for rightist blood” (1999, 325).

Stalin was the orchestrator of the Great Terror, and in this case, for whatever

reason, he was hesitant.

Finally, in the February-March 1937 plenum, Bukharin (and Rykov) were

discussed again. Yezhov as well as many other members of the Central Committee

continued to accuse Bukharin of being a terrorist, and Bukharin continued to

vehemently defend himself. After the series of accusations had been levied, and

Bukharin had been given a second chance to defend himself, a vote was taken by

members of the Commission of the Central Committee. Yezhov, as well as a handful

of other members, proposed the death penalty. Stalin, however, proposed a transfer

of their cases to the NKVD (412-413). Of course, the latter won. Bukharin was sent

to jail (and in fact was executed once the terror increased later on that year). The

entire case of Bukharin shows that Stalin was not afraid to diverge from and

disagree with Yezhov, whether Yezhov was suggesting more brutal measures or not,

and illustrates the fact that Stalin and only Stalin was the orchestrator of the Great

Terror.

The Bukharin case study, though an extremely revealing and interesting one

with regards to the relationship between Yezhov and Stalin, has one problem: it

tends to cast Stalin in too kind of a light. There can be no denying that, despite his

relative leniency towards Bukharin, Stalin is one of the more ruthless figures in

human history. Perhaps one document is necessary to reestablish to the reader

Stalin’s brutality, after reading about the trials of Bukharin. Jansen and Petrov

remark on Stalin’s orders to Yezhov with regards to prisoners who were not

confessing: “‘Isn’t it time to squeeze this gentleman and force him to report on his

dirty little business? Where is he: a prison or a hotel?’ Besides signing Yezhov’s lists,

Stalin sometimes gave instructions concerning certain individuals; for instance, in

December 1937 he added to M.I. Baranov’s name, ‘Beat, Beat!’” (111). It is very

necessary, in comprehending this analysis, to keep in mind how vicious Joseph

Stalin really was.

In December of 1937, Nikolai Yezhov’s political career reached its apex. He

was a candidate member of the Politburo, he had just been awarded the Lenin order,

and on December 20th, at an event celebrating the 20th anniversary of the NKVD, he

was publicly praised by many Politburo members in front of a full Bol’Shoi Theater

(Jansen and Petrov, 116-117). He even had poems written about him:

Great Lenin’s wise wordsTrained the hero Yezhov for battle.Great Stalin’s ardent callWas heard by Yezhov with all his heart, all his blood.When October’s dawn began to shine,He stormed the palace with courage in his eyes…All love you here, Comrade Yezhov!Canals, ponds, the blue lakesLook to you happily. (118-119)

Yezhov’s political career, from 1932-37, ascended at breakneck speeds.

However, in 1938, things started to change. Stalin had a history of growing

suspicious of, and eventually turning on, his subordinates; this is well documented.

In 1938, this familiar process began to be applied to Yezhov. It started when, in

April, People’s Commissar of Water Transportation, N.I. Pakhamov, was dismissed,

and Yezhov was appointed to replace him (140). While this seemed like, at the time,

just another promotion for Yezhov, it in fact was the first step in a slow process to

remove him from the NKVD. With his new responsibilities, he spent less and less

time with the NKVD, delineating most of that work to his secretary (140). In June,

Far-Eastern NKVD Chief and close friend of Yezhov G.S. Liushkov, fearing arrest,

defected to Japan. This did not look good for Yezhov at all, as rumors and suspicions

swirled over whether or not Yezhov had protected the highest-ranking man to flee

the country in the Stalin era (144). In August, Lavrenty Beria was appointed

Yezhov’s deputy, and it was becoming increasingly clear that Stalin was dissatisfied

with his People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs.

With Beria’s appointment, Yezhov, all too familiar with the process, could

sense his imminent decline. He began to drink more heavily than he ever had. One of

his deputies, in mid-1938, found him in this condition: “sitting in his shirt sleeves on

a sofa behind a table laden with bottles of vodka. His hair was ruffled and his eyes

were swollen and inflamed: he was obviously drunk…” (155). As he drank more, he

showed up to work less, and it became clearer and clearer that Yezhov was on his

way out. On November 25th, at his own request, he was relieved of his duties as

People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs, with Beria succeeding him. On March 3rd of

the following year, he was dismissed from the Central Committee, and on April 10th,

he was arrested and thrown into prison. On February 2nd, 1940, he was tried and

found guilty of being the “leader of a conspiracy within the NKVD; a spy on behalf of

Poland, England, Germany, and Japan; the plotter of a coup d’état, guilty of attempts

on Stalin, Molotov, and Beria; and a saboteur” (187-88). He was to be punished by

the penalty of death, and was shot that very night.

The fact that Yezhov was arrested and executed just as so many other Soviet

officials of the time period were further drives home the point that Stalin was

behind the Great Terror. After all, Yezhov was a victim of the terror, and he certainly

would not have purged himself. His downfall was quite similar to the downfall of

Stalin’s other henchmen. One brutally ironic similarity exists between his plummet

and the fall of Genrich Yagoda, his predecessor. The case of Yagoda was one of

Yezhov’s major breakthroughs, and Yezhov was the main force behind his arrest and

execution. Right before Yagoda was executed, Yezhov ordered him to be stripped

and beaten, instructing the guards: “Come on, hit him for all of us” (139). Merely two

years later, Yezhov found himself in a similar situation, except on the receiving end

of the beating. Procurator N.P. Afanas’ev, in charge of making sure Yezhov was

executed, described the scene: “He started to hiccup, weep, and when he was

conveyed to ‘the place,’ they had to drag him by the hands along the floor. He

struggled and screamed terribly” (189). The circle for Yezhov was complete: he

ended his life right where he was when he broke into the political main stage: in the

execution room. The fact that it only took two years time to reverse his role

illustrates that he was just another party cadre under Joseph Stalin.

There is one question, congruent with this analysis, that begs to be answered:

if so much documentary evidence exists showing that Yezhov is not the instigator of

the Great Terror, then why is it such a common belief that he was? The answer lies

multiple places. Firstly, Stalin, immediately after the conclusion of the terror, tried

his best to blame Yezhov for it. One way he did this was by releasing many of those

who had been arrested when Yezhov was in power immediately after he was ousted

from his position. According to author Robert Tucker, “Several thousand terror

victims were then released from custody, very likely because Stalin wanted people

to believe that the fallen Yezhov was the prime terrorizer. The maneuver had a

certain success” (590).

Another tactic deployed by Stalin to shield himself from blame was his

relative shyness from the spotlight. Yezhov was always the one at Central

Committee meetings with the long accusation speeches; Stalin rarely spoke. After

the February-March plenum of 1937, Stalin did not give one major public speech for

two years. He only spoke for publications three times between then and 1939, and

he even had Molotov deliver the annual November 6th address in both 1937 and

1938 (443). It was clear that, by staying out of the public eye, he was trying to avoid

being associated with the terror. Yet, as stated by Tucker, “Behind the scenes, he

was the Terror’s director general… Yezhov, who… lent his name to the epoch,

remained throughout a subservient underling” (444).

A more interesting example of Stalin staying out of the spotlight comes from

September of 1935. Speaking to regional party officials, Yezhov stated the following,

regarding sabotage from within the party:

Foreign intelligence officials, saboteurs, knew that there is no better cover for their espionage and subversive operations than a party card, and they relied on that fact. For this reason, it is necessary to hide behind a party card at whatever cost. And they utilized every means of deception in order to obtain a party card for a spy or a saboteur. We can assert firmly that Poles, Finns, Czechs, and Germans have been openly gambling on this… (201)

What this speech is saying is that the best place to look for a spy or an enemy is

within the party. This is a justification for the upcoming terror and purge of the

party, and is thus, a monumental speech. This shows that Stalin was not only staying

out of the limelight to disassociate himself from the terror. Inversely, he was doing it

to cast blame upon others as well. By having Yezhov set these incredibly significant

guidelines, it cast him, logically, as the orchestrator of the terror. It is plainly obvious

from the wealth of evidence stated earlier that this was not the case. But much of

that evidence comes from secret letters that were not available to the public until

the 1990s. To the average citizen without access to that evidence, Stalin’s tactics

were quite effective, and hence the name Yezhovshchina.

A speech made by Yezhov, said in June of 1935, at the plenum discussing A.

Yenukidze, (who was soon to be expelled from the party) shows even further how

sly and deceitful Stalin really was. For the first few pages of his speech, instead of

discussing Yenukidze, Yezhov instead brought up the topic of the Kirov affair. And

here, for the first time, he linked Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev together in a

conspiracy terrorist group with the aims of taking down Stalin and his followers:

What I would like to tell you does not alter this assessment [on the murder of Kirov] but only supplements it with new facts. These facts show that during the investigation of the circumstances surrounding the murder of Comrade Kirov in Leningrad, the role of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Trotsky in the preparation of terroristic acts against the leaders of the party and Soviet state has not yet been fully revealed. The latest events show that they were not only the instigators but in fact the active organizers of the murder of Comrade Kirov, as well as of the attempt on the life of Comrade Stalin that was being prepared within the Kremlin. (161, 162)

What is significant about this speech is not only that it is the first mention of a fusion

of Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev together into a terrorist bloc that would be

referenced so many times in the upcoming terror. Its most significant aspect is the

lack of action that followed it. After all, this was a public accusation made by a high-

ranking Soviet official. And yet, after the speech, no other members of the plenum

spoke up in agreement, and there was no trial of the accused for more than a year.

Furthermore, their names were barely mentioned publicly at all during that time

span (167).

With all that in mind, this would seem to be a situation when indeed, Yezhov

was acting of his own accord. However, it is in fact a combination of Stalin’s two

above tactics: associating the terror with Yezhov and staying out of the spotlight. By

allowing Yezhov to first propose this terrorist trio, he could cast, as it is called by

Getty, a “trial balloon” (167). At this point, it was a win-win situation for Stalin. If

other members of the plenum spoke up agreeing with Yezhov, he would know that

the time for terror was ripe. However, if, as actually happened, the room did not

speak out in concordance with Yezhov’s words, Stalin could simply bide his time.

The benefit of this would be further evidence that Yezhov, not Stalin, was behind the

terror. Stalin’s tactics, with the benefit of hindsight and the opening of the Soviet

archives that have made all these documents available, can be exposed for being as

deceitful as they really were.

Additionally, one might wonder why, when Yezhov was on trial and facing a

likely death sentence, he did not expose Stalin as the true author of the Terror. The

reason is that, up until his fate was sealed, Yezhov clung to the hopes of survival; his

fainting when his death sentence was read serves to prove that he was not fully

prepared for his fate. In his speech at his trial, he defended himself to the end,

stating:

I am charged with corruption as pertaining to my morals and my private life. But where are the facts? I have been in the public eye of the party for 25 years. During those 25 years everyone saw me, everyone loved me for my modesty and my honesty. I do not deny that I drank heavily, but I worked like a horse. Where is my corruption? (Getty and Naumov 1999, 562)

Since Yezhov was still hoping to be spared, it is simply not realistic to believe

that he would have called out Stalin at his trial. As put by Getty and Naumov, “Nor

could he follow what might have seemed an obvious strategy to the court: to argue

that he was innocent of everything because ‘Stalin told me to do it’ would have been

suicidal” (565). Yezhov held tightly to his slim chances of living until the very end,

and in doing so, missed out on his opportunity to reveal the truth about Stalin.

It is clear, through the findings of this analysis, that the name Yezhovshchina

is a misnomer, and that Stalinshchina would be more apt. However, it is also clear

that, undoubtedly, Yezhov’s personality made him a perfect fit to lead the NKVD

through one of the most bloody eras in recent history. Historian Donald Rayfield put

it best: “Undoubtedly, had Yezhov refused to carry out the terror, Stalin would have

used Kaganovich or Molotov or his newer acolytes Andreev or Zhdanov instead. But

the terror was amplified by Yezhov’s uniquely maniacal compliance [to Stalin]…”

(286). The result of the combination of Yezhov’s compliance and Joseph Stalin’s

brutality: the Great Terror.

Works Cited

Conquest, Robert. The Great Terror: A Reassessment. London: Pimlico, 2000. Print.

Getty, J. Arch, and Oleg V. Naumov. The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-destruction

of the Bolsheviks, 1932-1939. New Haven: Yale UP, 1999. Print.

Getty, J. Arch, and Oleg V. Naumov. Yezhov: the Rise of Stalin's "iron Fist" New Haven:

Yale UP, 2008. Print.

Getty, J. Arch, and Roberta Thompson Manning. Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives.

Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993. Print.

Hagenloh, Paul. Stalin's Police: Public Order and Mass Repression in the USSR, 1926-

1941. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2009. Print.

Jansen, Marc, and N. V. Petrov. Stalin's Loyal Executioner: People's Commissar Nikolai

Ezhov, 1895-1940. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 2002. Print.

Khlevniuk, O. V. Master of the House: Stalin and His Inner Circle. New Haven: Yale UP,

2009. Print.

Rayfield, Donald. Stalin and His Hangmen: the Tyrant and Those Who Killed for Him.

New York: Random House, 2004. Print.

Tucker, Robert C. Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above - 1928-1941. New York:

W.W. Norton & Company, 1990. Print.