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Feminists, Islamists, and Political Change in TurkeyAuthor(s): Yeim AratSource: Political Psychology, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Mar., 1998), pp. 117-131Published by: International Society of Political PsychologyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792117

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Political Psychology, Vol.19, No. 1, 1998

Feminists, Islamists, and Political Change in TurkeyYe?im AratDepartment of Political Science and International RelationsBo6azifi University, Istanbul, Turkey

Thispaper examineshow somefeminist andIslamist women in Turkeyhelpedbringaboutchange inpolitical valuesduringthepast decade. The traditionalpolitical cultureupheldstatist,corporatist as opposedto liberal, individualist)norms.The statecontrolledreligionin the name of secularismand limiteddemocracywithin the confines offormal equality.Both eministsand Islamists contestedtraditionalpolitical values by insistingon their owndefinitionof their interests,as opposed to those that were state-enforced.Thefeministsquestioned he usticeofformalequalityas theysoughtsubstantive quality; slamistwomenchallenged the secular concept of equalityas they insisted on thejustice of male-femalecomplementarity.Bothgroups engaged in activepolitics and expandedtheparameters ofdemocraticparticipationas theysoughtsubstantive qualitybeyondformalequality.Yet hepatriarchal heritageof Islamdefinedthe limitsof Islamist women's searchfor liberationwithintheconfines of religion.KEY WORDS: feminists;Islamists;Turkey;politicalchange;women in Turkey

Inthisessay, I would like to examine how womenhelpedbringaboutpoliticalchangesincethemid-1980s inTurkey.1 focus on two groupsof women:feministswho organizedagainstdomestic violence andIslamistwomen. These two groupsare worth our attentionbecause, althoughthey are composed of activists whoseworldviews are radically opposedto one another,both groupshave successfullyraisedtheirvoice to make a differencein politics. Feministsinsist on women'sunequivocalrightto choose theirpredicament;slamists,even whentheydo makepleas for women's rights,areboundwithin the constraintsof sacred aw. Yet bothgroupshave left theirimprinton politicaldiscourse with theirdemands or rightsas they themselvesdefine them.

1An earlier versionof this articlewas presentedat the InternationalSociety of PoliticalPsychologyconference,21-24 July 1997, Krakow,Poland.117

0162-895X ? 1998 International ociety of PoliticalPsychologyPublishedby BlackwellPublishers,350 MainStreet, Maiden,MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford,OX4 1JF,UK.

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If powerinvolves "setting heagendaof publicdebate"and"shaping hewaypeople define their concerns"(Katzenstein,1995), then these women, whoseactivities ookplacebeyondthescopeof traditional olitical nstitutions, eneratedpower to advocate change in political values and consciousness. Demands forpolitical changecame as womenresistedprevailingstructures f power-those ofthe state as well society-and in turn were resisted by these loci of power.Prevailingnormsadvocatedbythestateandadoptedby society regardingndividu-alism as opposed to solidarismwere questioned.Concepts of democracyandsecularism were challenged. As women redefinedtheir identities in search ofpoliticalgains,the stateandsociety againstwhichthoseidentitieswereformedalsochanged.Inow discuss howthese two differentgroupsof women encroacheduponthe entrenched imitsof women's traditionalpoliticalactivism to initiatechange.

Context of Turkish PoliticsWith the adventof theTurkishRepublic n 1923, thefoundingfathershad torespondto the challenge of creatingnew political identitiesin a new politicalculture.Theprojectof modernizationnitiatedby the state elites was promptedbyaspirationsfor the West on one hand, and shaped by the local practices ofcommunitarianolidarismon the otherhand(Bozdogan& Kasaba,1997).To theextent thattheprojectof modernitywas "atotalproject,embracingand internaliz-ing all the culturaldimensionsthat madeEuropemodern" Keyder,1997, p. 37),

religious laws and norms of the polity were obstacles to progress. Ideals ofliberalismand individualismassociatedwith Westernculturecould not be prac-ticed in such a way as to undermine hese establishedinstitutions,which weredeemedto opposeWesternization nd the West.Engagedin the enormous task of modernizingthe state and the polity, theleaders of the Republic resortedto authoritarianmeasuresto implementtheirreforms(Tun9ay,1981). A solidaristcollectivist ethic servedas the tool of mod-ernizingreforms Parla,1992)whenappeals o individualism ouldnot beeffectiveas a meansto achieve thetask athand.Populism,which was to meangovernmentby the people, came to representgovernmentby thepeople for thepeople, whichat times vergedon being despitethe people (Parla,1992, p. 219; Shaw & Shaw,1977,pp. 378-384). Thegoverningelite knewthe best interestsof thepeopleandthuscouldjustify the single-partyregimeof the Republicuntil 1945. Interestsofthe communityand the nation wouldcome beforethe interestsof the individual(Heper, 1985). It was in this context that the Islamic law was abolished,to bereplacedby secularcodes. The newcivic code grantedwomenrightsequalto thoseof menin, forexample, nheritance nddivorceby 1926.Inthe samespirit,womenweregiven suffrage n 1934. Thefounding atherspromotedwomen'spublicrolesandchangingstatuswithpatriarchal enevolence.However, liberalism as the heart of the much-admiredWesterncivilizationwas implicitly recognized. To the extent that Westernizationwas the goal of

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Feminists,slamists, nd PoliticalChangen Turkeymodernization, he values of liberalismsurfacedin both economic and culturaldiscourse.MustafaKemal,the founderof the Republic,gave his personalsupportfor the cultivationof a liberalcapitalistentrepreneuriallass. Eventhough,to thisday,the Turkish ntrepreneursavenot liberated hemselvesfromthispaternalisticrelationship o the state (Bugra, 1994; Keyder, 1987), aspirations or liberalismremain.In the culturaldomain, liberalism as an ethic of individualismwas notaltogether ignored. The importantideologue of the day-Ahmet Agaoglu, aRussianemigre who had studiedin France-defended the values of liberal indi-vidualismagainstthe authoritarian,ollectivistpracticesof the state.The battlebetween iberalismandcollectiviststatismcontinues ocharacterizethepoliticallife of thecountry o thisday.What liberalismmeans,its relationshipto individualism,and meanings of statism are still contested. It is within theparametersof this debate that women's political activism in the contemporaryperiodcan be best understood.

Feminist WomenThe tensionamongindividualism,collective social norms,and statismchar-acterizedthe periodof women's political activismthatbegan in the mid-1980s.This periodwas characterizedby a political vacuum where the militantleft andright were suppressed(Tekeli, 1986). Women who had been engaged in leftistpolitical activism and whose boyfriends or husbandswere imprisonedhad an

opportunity o contemplate heirpredicament. n the context of a global feministupheaval,feminist ideas inevitablyhad theirappealfor Turkishwomen as well.The vanguardof feminist activismin Turkeywere educated,mostlyprofessionalmiddle-classwomen who hadpersonal inks to feminists abroador wereexposedto feminist literature hroughfriends or connections. Works of MaryWollstone-craft,Simone de Beauvoir,Betty Friedan,KateMillet, and SchulamithFirestonecirculatedamong women who first came togetherallegedly with the purposeofpublishinga series on women for a publishing companyand later identified thisactivism as consciousness-raising. n the shadow of militarysupervision, eministrhetoricreasonably eemed innocuousenoughto have its own space(Arat, 1994a).Eventhough he formandcontentof feminism nthe 1980s wouldbe verydifferent,therewas theheritageof a statefeminismthatthefounding athersof theRepublichad nitiatedand egitimized,whichalsohelpedfeminismto flourish napoliticallycircumscribedcontext. By the mid-1980s the vanguardhad branchedout, andwomen who began calling themselves feminists organizednot merely in smallgroups,butinpublic protests n Istanbuland Ankara.Eventhoughdifferentgroupsthat identifiedthemselves as radicalor leftistfeministsemergedduring he 1980s,these groupswere unitedby the issue of domesticviolence. Where abortionhadignited feminist heartsin many Westerncountries,domestic violence activatedfeminists of differentpersuasions n Turkey.Turkishwomen, despite shortcom-ings, did have abortionrights.

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The feminists who organized the campaign against domestic violence inIstanbulbegantheirprotest ndividuallyby contesting he state's urisdiction Arat,1994b; Ann, 1996). When a feministactivist read in a barjournala courtrulingthat gave explicit legitimacy to domestic violence, the feminist protestagainstdomestic violence was triggered.The judge had refused to granta divorce to awoman,mother of three childrenandpregnantwith a fourth,who was regularlybeatenbyherhusband;he expoundedhisdecision withthesayingthat"one shouldnot leave a woman's backwithouta stick,herwomb withouta donkey."At first,a small groupof women sent protestletters to thejudge andattempted,withoutsuccess, to takehim to court withthe claim thathe hadinsultedthem as women.The next stage was the collective decision taken to initiate the campaignagainstdomesticviolence. A rallywas organized n May 1987 thatprotested hepervasivepracticeof domestic violence as well as the state's lack of attention othe issue.The enthusiastic urnout nd he mediafocus onthecampaignencouragedthe participantso organizea 1-dayfestival in Octoberof the sameyear, to drawfurtherattention o the issue and raise funds to publishthe personalaccountsofwomenwhohad beenexposedto domesticviolence. Collective efforts asfeministswere now geared towardincreasing public awareness ratherthan seeking stateaction on the problem.The process increasedwomen's self-confidenceandtheirfaith thattheycould make a differenceby themselves.InApril 1990, 14feministsestablisheda foundationwith thepurposeof openinga shelter or womenexposedto domesticviolence. PurpleRoof Women's ShelterFoundationwas the accom-plishmentof individual eminists who had discoveredtheir own collective poweragainst he state.Thefoundationwas the firstof its kind nitsgoalsandthe feministmodesof achievingthose goals.The women of the PurpleRoof waged a battleagainstthe institutionsof thestate to remain autonomousand to have the discretionarypower-as feministsrather hanas social service providers-to accommodatebatteredwomen. Theyrefused to allow the stateto subvert hefeministmeaningof their endeavor.Theychallengedthe traditionalrhetoricof the women-friendlystate that had grantedsuffrageto women-a challengethatled to the establishmentof the PurpleRoof.Ironically, he feministswho had their ndividualand ndividualistic evoltagainststatistand solidaristsocietal normshad to act in solidarity o reachtheirgoals. Forthe sake of feministsolidarity, ndividual eminists had to curb ndividual eministdemands.Collective feminist determinationo have an autonomous oundation ed themembersof the PurpleRoof to decline the supportmunicipalitiescould providewith certain conditions. The founders of the PurpleRoof sought help from theSocial DemocraticPopulist Party mayor of Istanbul at the time, without muchresult.Themayorexpectedto have the ultimatedecision-makingpowerregardingtheoperationof the shelter.Whenthe feminists nsistedon their ndependenceromthemunicipality,hebuildinghe wasplanning odesignate or the use of thePurpleRoof was given to the municipalityof Sisli to be used as a shelter(Ann, 1996,

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Feminists,slamists, nd PoliticalChangen Turkeypp. 148-149). A similarstoryfollowed when the feministssoughtsupportromthemayor of Bakirkoy.In due course, the Bakirkoy municipalityopened its ownshelter.Two districtmunicipalitiesopeningsheltersfor the firsttimein Turkey nresponseto feminist initiation was a significantoutcome in itself. However, thefeministsresolutely nsisted ontheirautonomyandforesawthatsheltersshouldnotbe left to thevicissitudesof partisanpoliticsorpatriarchalmanagement.Whentheyrealizedthey could not get the kind of help they needed from the municipalities,they rented a small flat, provided consulting services to women exposed toviolence, andworkedto raise themoney needed for the shelter.Overtime,therelationshipbetween these feminists andthe statechanged.Thefeministsinitiateda successfulcollaboration,not withthe local but with thefederalgovernment.They acceptedthatthe state couldbe an important ource of supportfor them,and the relevant nstitutionsof the stateacceptedthat the feministshadto retaintheirautonomy.In 1993, The PurpleRoof Women's ShelterFoundationacquireda house to be used as a shelterwith the help of the State MinistryofWomen,FamilyandSocial Services.The ministryprovideda substantialamountof funds toward hepurchaseof thebuilding,whichthe foundationwouldhave theauthority o operateas a shelter.Feminist members of the PurpleRoof who hadindividuallyprotestedagainstthe state and its patriarchalnstitutions n the mid-1980s hadgainedtheself-confidenceto approachhe stateandtameits patriarchalproclivities.They were able to convince the state of the importanceof the projectto be able to get the money they did, at the same time as they ensuredtheirownindependence. In turn, the state-at least, the state ministry responsible forwomen-had the confidence to recognizethe feministsandresistco-optingthemwith its traditional"thestate knows the best interestsof its people, includingitswomen, better thanthey themselves do" attitude.This collaborationchangedthepatronizingpolitical relationship hathad long characterized he interactionbe-tween women andthe state.The trickle-downresults were noteworthy. There might have been otherfactors at work-such as the global context,the internationalreatiesthatTurkeyhad signed,andinternational rganizations hatTurkeyworked with-but never-theless the feminist goal to make the invisible problemof pervasive domesticviolence visible was reached.The second and thirdperiodic reportsof Turkeypreparedn 1996 underarticle 18 of the ConventionontheElimination f All Formsof DiscriminationAgainstWomencites 15researchprojectsundertakenince 1989thatshedlightondifferentaspectsof domesticviolence inTurkey CEDAWreport,1996). Among these, some are carriedout in universities,others by the StateMinistry of Women, Family and Social Services, the Prime Ministry FamilyResearchInstitution,or the PrimeMinistryDirectorateGeneralon the StatusandProblems of Women. Thus, institutionsof the state were involved in studyingdomestic violence and focusing attentionon the issue. These projectsand otherresearchcarriedoutbyprivatesurveygroupshadrepercussionshrough hemedia,both the populardailies andtelevision.

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Besides thePurpleRoof, anumberof otherofficialandvoluntaryassociationsthatprovidecounselingand shelter services for women opened.In 1991, a yearafter hePurpleRoofwasfounded nIstanbul,Women'sSolidarityFoundationwasestablished n Ankarawith theinitiativeof a feministgroupand a local municipal-ity.Bornova,Kiiuqikekmece,Kayseri,andNazillimunicipalities penedwomen'shomes (althoughthe lattertwo have been closed after a devolutionof politicalpower).The DirectorateGeneralfor Child Protectionand Social Services estab-lished women's guest houses in many regions, includingIzmir (1990), Ankara(1991), Bursa (1991), Antalya (1991), Eski?ehir(1993), Istanbul(1995), andTekirdag 1996) (CEDAWreport,1996,pp. 33-35).In contrast,the women of the PurpleRoof, with 60 volunteers,providedcounseling to about 1,000 women between 1990 and 1995. With their limitedmeans,they organizedpanelsand discussionsto drawpublicattention o the issue.Inthiscontext,feministsprovidedradicalcritiquesof thelegal frameworkpertain-ing to domestic violence (Ann, 1996, pp. 130-139). They argue that violencetowardwomen's bodies should be treated undera separatesection as "sexualassaults"withinthe criminalcode.Thereshouldbenotoleranceof violencetowardwomen, andjudges shouldnot be allowed to refer to extenuatingcircumstancessuch as traditionsand local customs.These crimes should not dependon formalcomplaint; ather, veryoneshouldberequiredoreport ases of domesticviolence.Inlinewith thespiritof theexistingformalegalitarianawsbutagainst heir ormalegalitariancontent, they argue for a substantiveequalityby asking for laws toprovide special care and treatment or women exposed to violence (Ann, 1996,p. 138).Beyond all this effort is the attemptto make self-respecting ndividuals ofwomen who have been socialized to be sacrificing,selfless mothers and wives.Domestic violence is one importantarenawhere the battle between the liberalindividualismof the feminists and the solidaristcommunitarianismf the state isfoughtwith conviction.Ironically, eminists first had to wage an individual ightagainstsocial normsand communitarian ractices,thenjoin together n feministsolidarity o underline he grievancesof womenas a group.Theirgoal, neverthe-less, was making ndividualsof womenwho wereviolentlydiscriminated gainstas a group.CananAnn, one of the prominent oundersof the PurpleRoof, endedheressay (1996) on the storyof the institutionwitha revealingcommenton theirgoals or what it is that satisfiesher in this challengingenvironmentof domesticviolence:

Working n a place like the PurpleRoof is a very tiring,exhausting ask,whichat timesfills one with feelings of hopelessnessanddespair.How-ever, the biggest prize is seeing torn women who have completely lostconfidence n themselves,shyandhesitant o talk,those who have lost allhope andwho believe in their"nothingness" ecome, abouta yearlater,self-confident, ndependent itizens andindividualswho can laugh,and

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Feminists, Islamists, and Political Change in Turkeymake ncrediblyhealthydecisions andstandon their wo feet.It(theprize)is metamorphosingn solidarity,understanding ne another's anguagebetter.(p. 151)

It is revealingthat even thoughthe self-confident,independent ndividual s theprize, Ann immediatelyadded the collective communal dimension of the goal.Women thus seek substantiveequality in political participationbeyond formalequalityas equallyendowed individuals.Islamist Women

It was not merelythe politicalacts and debates of secularfeminists,but alsothose of Islamist women thatshed light on how women may have contributed opoliticalchangein the country.By the termIslamist,I referto the explicit use ofIslam as apoliticalideologyrather hana privatereligiousbelief system."Islamistwomen" s a loose phrase hatdenotes aheterogeneousgroupof women,includingthose who only seek the rightto cover their headsin publicas well as the militantactivists of the IslamistWelfareParty.Withinthis wide spectrum, ome are moreactive thanothers.

Contextof IslamistWomenAs political actors, Islamistwomen were partof the Islamistmovement of

post-1980s Turkey.Therehave been variousexplanationsof this contemporaryIslamistupsurge. nfluentialwriters,both secularandIslamist,haveargued hat hedeficiencies of the Kemalist modernizationproject that was staged after thefoundationof the Republicaccountfor the appealof Islam. It has been suggestedthat the "superficialityand lack of organic linkages with society, of Kemalism"(Mardin,1989,p. 170)has led theIslamiststo fill the vacuumcreated n thelife ofthe people. Othershave pointedto the consequencesof migration Toprak,1991)or to the crises of nationalidentityin the context of global modernity(Keyman,1995) to explainthe Islamistappeal.Manyhave pointedto therole of the state incontrolling(Sunar& Toprak,1983) or accommodating slam(Cizre-Sakallioglu,1996).It is inthe contextof thesesociopoliticalandeconomicforces that heappealof Islam has increased n Turkeyand womenbegancoveringtheirheads.Wearingheadscarves n publicinstitutions s not an innocuousact in Turkey.The secularismof the Republicanstate has traditionallymeantnotmerelysepara-tion of religion and state but also state control over religion. Imbued with theconviction that the state representsthe best interests of the people despite thepeople, theKemalistreformershaveaimed to confinereligionto theprivaterealm.Even thoughthese secularizingKemalistreformersneverprohibited he veil (as,for example, Rlza Shah of Irandid), dress codes of public institutions make itillegal to cover hair n publicservice.Headscarves, n theinstitutionalRepublicanTurkishcontext, stand for and propagatea religious ideology perceived to be

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inimical to the secularfoundationsof the Republicby the rulingelite. BecauseKemalistreformshave been successful at one level, uncoveredhair has been thenormin publicinstitutions.Until the 1990s, thepublicsector was predominantlyoccupied by people who were educated with this particularsecular Kemalistideology, and with the exceptionof singular nstances,this custom had not beenchallenged.

Activismof Islamist WomenUnder these circumstances, o wear headscarves n a context where womendid not cover theirheadsrequired ourageanda faithin oneself. The women whodid cover their headsmightnot have been alone;they were influencedby eitherfriends or mentorsand, as such, usually had a community they could refer to(Saktanber, 1994). However, they were quite alone in classrooms and school

groundswherethey were made most visible withtheir headscarves.Even thoughheadscarveswere worn to make women publicly less visible accordingto thedictatesof Islam, ntheTurkish ontextthe coveredwomen were morediscernible.Unlike whatthey mighthave meant n a liberalnon-Muslimcontext,these womenwereperceivedas different n,if not a threat o, theexistingorder. n apolitywherereligionhadtraditionallybeen controlledby the state in the name of secularism,they stoodfor a criticism of this secularorder.Independent f what theirprivate,individualreasonsfor coveringthe headmighthavebeen, theyhadto assume theresponsibilityof whattheymeant n thisparticularituation.As such,even thoughthey might have acted in solidaritywith membersof theirreligiouscommunity,they were engaged in an act of individuationand political resistance as theyconfronted hegaze of theuncoveredwomenwho thoughtof them as different.Thetendency o considerwomen who cover theirheads as victims of Islamistpropagandawas most acuteregardingmilitantswho worked orthe WelfarePartyin mobilizing votes. These women were not merely individualvictims of anideologythatsubordinateswomen,butproselytizerswhoinjured therwomen. YettheWelfarePartymilitantswerenot mere membersof a mobilizedcrowd. At leastamongtheleadingcadres,radicaland ndividualistwomencriticalof thepartyanddeterminedofightfor theirown fateloudlyspoke.SibelEraslan,who callsherselfa "feministwithfaith," s such anexample.Eraslan,a graduate f theIstanbulLawfaculty,chaired heIstanbulWelfarePartyWomen'sCommission ormany years.She was one of the mostimportantnamesin mobilizingthewomen's vote for theparty n theMarch 1994 localelections,whichbrought heparty opowerin majormunicipalitiesncludingAnkaraand Istanbul.She workedwith 18,000 womentomobilizeotherwomen.In 1month,theywouldmeetwith200,000 women face toface (Pazartesi,1995, pp. 2-5). After the electoralvictory,she was not given anypositionwithin the newly elected WelfarePartyadministration nd was expectedto go back hometo look afterherkids. She is known to have accostedthe WelfarePartymayorTayyipErdoganof Istanbulregardinghis dismissal of women after

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Feminists, Islamists, and Political Change in Turkeythe elections (Benton, 1996, p. 114). In an interview she gave to the feministmonthlyPazartesi, she expressedhow she believes in women's rights,their needto work outside the house, and the public need to have women's shelters.Sheexplainedthatthrough heprocessof mobilizingwomen for theparty,theyhad

made the woman who had the veil speakfromunderneath he veil; thiswoman began going to the grocerand askingwhy the price of this eggshotupto 4,500. Shebegan going to the teacher n school andprotectingherchild's rights.... (They)had madethe women who did not talk talk.(Pazartesi, 1995,p. 5)In responseto a questionon what they talked about and how they attracted hewomen they approached,Eraslanexplainedas follows:

In ourprivatetalks, before anythingelse we wantedthem to recognizetheir own power.Everythinghad made the womanshy, hadimprisonedher. For example, we call her to a meeting, she says "I have to ask myhusband";we explainto herthat shehas to decide for herself and that shehas a separatepersonality han her husband.At times, theywould askusto elaborategeneral policies. For example, we would explain "la ilaheillallah":There is no deity over you but God. One entersinto faithwithdenial,denialof all otherdeities;it is very interesting,we weretryingtoexplainthis and[phonecalls] begancomingfrom men... "Whatareyoudoing?You aretakingour wives fromourhands,you have underminedour order" .. Andslowly womenbeganbothcursingtheirhusbandsandcoming to the party. Women came with reactions, "my husbandisdeceivingme, my husband s beatingme...." (Pazartesi,1995,p. 5)

Listeningto the storyof Islamistmobilizing throughSibelEraslan's enses, one isremindedof the "secular" eminists'attempts o makewomen"recognize heirownpower."Despiteradicaldifferencesbetweenthe feministsand Islamistsregardingthe ultimatesourceof authority vertheindividual, hereareoverlapsandapparentinfluences of the feminists over the Islamists.Not all women in the ranksof the WelfarePartymayhave been like Eraslanor the women she helped to empower in the process of Islamic mobilization.Besides those who might have been mobilized like a herd, there were Islamistwomenwho weredisappointedwith the WelfareParty.Ayse Dogu, who was sucha dissenter,would haveagreedwith Eraslanon theimportance f women's subjectstatus.When asked to remarkon the coalition formedwith the True PathParty,whichbrought he WelfareParty o poweras the seniorpartner,Dogu said:

The WelfareParty'sstruggle s to be inpower;our,the covered women'sstrugglehasdevelopedas a struggle oridentity.... As aMuslim womanwho does notapproveof theworldviewandstructure f theWelfarePartybecause it is shallow andinsufficient,I believe in the individuals' con-

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sciousnesses, choices, and actions rather han institutions,organs, andparties to be ultimately transformative.What is to be feared is thereactionarymentalityrootedin either the secularor the Islamistranks,which areanobstacleto theliberalization f oursociety.(Pazartesi,1996,P. 9)Whether hey walked in university ecture halls one by one or demonstratedin the universitygardenswith their fellow male and female students,or becameactivists in the Welfare Partyranks,the Islamist women challengedprevailingnotionsof secularism,democracy,andnational dentity nthecountry.TheRepub-lican state, which controlledreligion and attempted o confine it to the privaterealm,had to confront the realityof women who disobeyedits laws. With theirheadscarves he women carriedreligionto the publicrealm. Theirpublicdisobe-dience of law was ironically coupled with their appeal to the constitutional

guaranteesof religious freedom. They relied on their constitutionalrights topracticereligionwithout obstructionas they soughtlegitimacyfor the wearingofheadscarves n publicinstitutions.Even though t is still illegal for them to covertheirheadsinpublicemploymentanduniversities, heyhavesucceeded ncreatinga public opinionthatenables women to attenduniversitieswith theirheadscarveswithout the interferenceof the administration.The Republicanunderstanding fsecularism,which involves statecontrolover religion through ts various nstitu-tions, has been contested with an alternativeunderstandingof secularism thatrejectsstate control overreligion.Theissueof a changingconceptionof secularisms intimately iedupwith thechangingboundariesof democracy.If democracymeans self-rule and involvesparticipationn politics to define one's future,women who coveredtheirheadsinpublic spaces were makingstatementsabout the way politicalauthorities houlddefine civic rights,and thus were using their democraticrightsto participate npolitics.Theintensityand nvolvementof these womenindemocraticparticipationchanged. Some chose to be militantsfor the party,which promisedthem moreextensiverightsof religious practice,and vested their interest n traditionalpartypolitics.Othersexercisedtheirdemocratic ightsby remaining riticalof theparty.

Limitsto IslamistIndividualism,Secularism,andDemocracyEven thoughIslamist women mighthave challengedthe prevailing concep-tions of secularismanddemocracyof theRepublican tateand exhibitedpromisesof personal iberationwithin the confines of Islam,therewere limits to individualliberation.Manywritershave commentedon the similaritiesbetweenthe Islamistscenteredaroundhe WelfarePartyandthe Kemalists (inar, 1996,pp.32-38; Insel,

1996,pp.29-31). Islamistsargue hatKemalistshave alienated hepolityfromitsauthenticroots and adoptedWestern culture as a global framework,therebyallowingthecultural olonizationof thecountry.Kemalists,on theotherhand,seethe Islamistsas a radicalthreat o the fundamentaldictatesof the Republic,such

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Feminists,slamists, ndPoliticalChangenTurkeyas secularism,liberalism, and ultimately democracy. What is common in thismutualskepticismis each group's assumption hatthey andonly they know thebest interestsof the society. Both have a transcendentalonceptionof society andsee themselvesas responsible ortransforminghepolity in theway theythinktheideal society should be. A unitarysolidaristconceptionof the polity prevails inboth the Kemalistand the Islamist discourses. It was no coincidence that whenSibel Eraslan alked aboutherworkwith the women herpartywas recruitingntoits ranks, she arguedthat their local governmentswere trying to do what thepeople's houses had done before them(Pazartesi,1995,p. 4). Thepeople's houseswere the networkof culturalclubs establishedby the foundingfathers n 1932 topropagate heirideologies andlifestyle so thatthey would createthe right society(Oztiirkmen,1994, pp. 159-181).Aynur Ilyasoglu,who analyzesIslamistnovels, drew attention o similaritiesbetween the heroinesof novels writtenby KemalistWesternizingauthorsof theearly Republicanera and the Islamists(Ilyasoglu, 1994, pp. 69-75). Heroinesofthese two ideologically very differentgenres, she argued,are both missionarieswho worktopropagate heideology theyhappen obelieve in. BothintheKemalistand theIslamistnovels, whatthe heroinesbelieve in is rightandothershave to beenlightened.Liberal individualism s replacedby an ethos of militantsolidarismand elitist transcendentalism.Personal salvation has otherpitfalls within the confines of Islam. Even theIslamist novelists admit and depict the disappointmentof women who werepromised ndividual iberation n their Islamic lives. Marriage hwarts deals, andMuslim husbandsendupbeinglike anyotherbourgeoismen.Muslimwomen whomarriedMuslimmen hoping to create an ideal Islamic way of life discover thatthey are left alone in a patriarchalmarriageand society that is too corruptedbyWestern valuesfor them to changeon their own (Ilyasoglu, 1994, pp. 78-81).At this point, the promises of women's liberationsought by Islamist andKemalistwomendiverge.Despitetheircommonelitist transcendentalistiscourse,the Kemalists,whatevertheirpractice,do rely on a secularconcept of universalrightsandequalityrather han sacredtruths.Feminists canhave recourse o thesesecularrightsand use them as legitimatetools of personal iberation n search ofsubstantiverights. The task of the Islamist women is more difficult. Seekingautonomyand substantiveequalitywithin the confines of Islam is bound to bethwartedby patriarchalnterpretationsf the conceptof complementarity f menand women that is enshrined n the holy doctrine. However much Sibel Eraslanexplainsto women that here s nopoweroverthemexceptthatof God,many argueto the contrary,offering the most common interpretations f the Quran,hadiths(sayingsof theProphet)andsunna(practicesof theProphet):Menhavepoweroverwomen. At least under the prevailingconditions,Eraslan s easily asked to stepdown. Those groupsthathappento have politicalauthority n the name of Islamhave thelegitimacyof divineauthority,whichtheycan(anddo)useto subordinatewomen. The appeal to secular universal humanrights and equality can be an

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importantmeans to fight patriarchalubordination ecause it does not lend itselfto manipulation n the name of divine rule and faith. Islamistwomen fight notmerelyagainstthe secular nterpretationsf theirrights,butalso againsta patriar-chythat s legitimizedby sacredauthoritywithintheconfines of Islam.In thelatterfight, they are deprivedof a recourse to the secularconcept of universalrights,whichsecularfeminists have.

Feminists and IslamistsSecularfeminist andIslamistpremisesareradicallyopposedto one another.Feminists have been concerned with problems women have because of theirgender, and they have appealedto concepts of secular rights to redeem theirpredicament. slamistshave been concernedwithrealizingthe will of God.Theirattempts o alleviatethepredicament f women as individualswere circumscribedby the dictatesof God, whichpoliticalauthoritieshappened o define differentlyin different,historicallyspecific pointsin time.Yet the two groups influenced one another. Not all feminist and Islamistwomen wereready o acknowledgeandaccommodate ne another.However, herewas solidaritybetween certainfactions.Withinthe Islamistranks,someone likeSibel Eraslan,who called herself a feminist with faith, had been influencedbyfeminists.Others, ike MuallaGtilnaz,who were criticalof thedemands orsexualliberation hatradical eminists voiced and who argued hatthesedemandsmerely

helpedturnwomen into sexualobjects,neverthelessexpressed eministsentiments(Gtilnaz,1996, pp.66-69). Giilnaz's criticismof theradical eministswas carriedout in the verylanguagefeminists used: thatdemands or sexualliberationmerely"reproduced alues associatedwith sexualitythat were seepedwith a male view-point and merely helped the male dominantsociety" (Giilnaz, 1996, p. 67). Incontrast,Gtilnazargued,accordingto the dictatesof Islam,the division of laborbetween men and womenwas complementarywithoutbeing hierarchical. n thiscontext,womenwholivedby givingpriority o their ntuition, eelings, andvaluescould act more courageouslyand forthrightly.This situation would topple thetraditional haracterizations f genderandthe traditional atriarchyhat restedonthese values (Giilnaz,1996,p. 68). Giilnaz,who challengedthe radical eminists,did so to be able to betterreach the aims they sharedof underminingpatriarchy.Eventhoughshe was an Islamistwoman,she shared hegoalsof underminingmalehegemonywiththe radical eminists whose concernsfor sexual liberation he didnot share.Within the feminist ranks, the radical feminists who gatheredaroundthejournalPazartesigave explicitsupporto the effortsof Islamistwomen who wantedto redefinetheiridentities as women. Thejournaldid not merely carryessays onand interviewswith Islamistwomen,but also allowed Islamistwomen to writeinits pages to express theirviews on head coveringor the WelfareParty.On twodifferentoccasions, when some feminist readers of the journal reactedto the

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Feminists, Islamists, and Political Change in TurkeysupportIslamistwomen got from thejournal,thejournalissued editorialson thenatureof theirsolidaritywithIslamistwomen(Savran& Tura, 1996;Tura,1997).It was arguedthat theirunderstanding f feminism was critical of the Kemalistdiscourseon women and involved solidaritywith women who shareda commonsubordination espite manydifferences(Savran& Tura,1996). "Tofight politicalIslam as women, they had to expose its sexism, contest the sexist undertakings fthe WelfarePartygovernmentwithoutconcession,explainhowtheShariat IslamicLaw] was againstwomen, rather hanhouse-arrestingwomen who covered theirheads" Tura,1997,p. 7). The radical eministsof Pazartesiaimedto fight politicalIslam in dialoguewith its femaleproponents.

ConclusionThe founding fathers of the Republic nurturedand advocated a unitary,transcendentalonceptof the commongood for thepolity. Accordingly,the stateorthegoverningelite knewthebest interestsof thepeople.Itwas assumed hattheinterestsof differentgroups,men and women as much aspeasantsandindustrial-ists, werepotentiallycomplementary.Societal interestspreceded ndividual nter-ests. Thescopefordemocracywas limitedwithintheconstraints f formalequality.Secularismmeantstatecontroloverreligion.Thistradition,hough tevolved overtime,continued nto the 1980s. Women of differentpersuasions,attimesradicallyopposedto one another,such as thefeminists andIslamists,helpedchallengethis

understandingwith their activism. Both groups began by defining what theythemselvesperceivedto be their interests.Then,bothgroupscontestedconceptsof equalityenshrined n the legal systemandexpandedthe domainof democracyasparticipantswith"affected nterests" Dahl, 1970,p. 64). Women'swill to shapetheirpredicamenthelpedto reshapetheprevalentconceptof the commongood.The feministsquestioned hejustice of formalequalitythat was constitution-ally guaranteedand sought substantiveequality. Drawing attentionto domesticviolence and the physical subordinationhey were exposed to becausethey werewomen, they sought specialtreatment o thattheycouldactuallybe equalto men.With their nsistenceon theirspecial nterests, heyquestioned herealityandutilityof a unitarysolidaristconceptionof the commongood, within which the Republi-can women's rights discourse was framed.They underlinedthe importanceofresponsible ndividualismas opposedto communallydefinedresponsibilities.Islamistwomen,on theotherhand,challengedthesecularconceptof equalitywith theirinsistence on male-femalecomplementarity f roles andtheirequiva-lence in Islam.They sought equal status andindividualismwithinthese comple-mentaryroles. Theirsearchfor a religiouslydefinedidentitycaused them to defythe secularcodes of theRepublic.Oneimportant mplicationof this defiance wastheir challenge of the prevailing concept of secularism,which was under thesurveillanceof a paternalist tate.

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Islamistwomenactivists did notrepresent heorthodoxyamongthe Islamists.Theirchallengeof the secularcodes of theRepublicaccompanied heirchallengeof the patriarchaland solidaristheritageof Islam. However, the limits of thisradicalismdid not seem far. The threatof subjugationwithin a religiouscommu-nity, wherethe good is sacredly,unitarily,and universalisticallydefined,hangsover the Islamist women who seek liberation within Islam, like the sword ofDamocles. Whetherthey are ignoredanddismissedby the orthodoxyor merelydominated, hey have yet to resolve the issue of reconcilingindividualismwithaholy communitarianism.

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