XIV Paper 38
-
Upload
zenon-kociuba -
Category
Documents
-
view
216 -
download
0
Transcript of XIV Paper 38
-
7/24/2019 XIV Paper 38
1/11
1CHSME SYMPOSIUM SERIES NO. 144
T HE U S E OF R IS K B A S E D A S S E S S M E N T T E C HN IQU E S T O OP T IMIS E
IN S P E C T ION R E GIME S
G R Bennett, M L Middleton, P Topalis
Det Norske Veritas. Stockport Technical Consultancy, Highbank House. Exchange Street,
Stockport, SK3 OET.
Regulators and insurance companies now recognise the acceptability
of a risk based approach to the optimisation of inspection and
maintenance intervals. Qualitative approaches to Risk Based
Inspection (RBI) have been developed for general use and more
detailed quantitative methods exist for activities with major loss
potential or large preventive expenditure requirem ents. DN V
pioneered the use of RBI in the chemical process industry in 1992 and
has produced a resource document for the API (API 581). DNV
subseque ntly further develo ped Quantified RBI software. A number
of case studies and client projects have been conducted and the RBI
techniques and software are becoming valuable tools for the oil and
chemical industry.
Keyw ords: Risk Based Inspection, Inspection Planning ,
Consequence, Likelihood, Corrosion
WHY CONSIDER RISK IN INSPECTION PLANNING ?
The first duty of business is to survive and the guiding principle of business econom ics is
not the maxim isation of profit, it is the avoidance of loss
(P e te r Dru c k e r )
All industrial organisations use people, equipment and property to add value to a
commodity and thus generate a return on their investments. If the returns are in excess of
the costs, the com pany is in profit, if they are less, a loss occ urs and if the losses co ntin ue
to be sustained, the organisation will ultimately fail.
People and equipment are not infallible. People do make m istakes and equipment does
fail. All mistakes and failures have consequences, some sm all and others large. The
magnitude of those consequences influences the ability of the organisation to achieve a
sustained profit and thus survive . It is therefore good business prac tice to consider the
consequences of failures and how likely they are to occur, i.e. to systematically consider
the risks arising from failures.
All forward thinking organisations practice some form of loss avoidance policy.
Equipment maintenance, inspection and testing, and the training of personnel are all
undertaken to avoid failures and red uce or m itigate their associated losses
-
7/24/2019 XIV Paper 38
2/11
CKEMO S' MFOSrt'M SERIES N'
How many organisations however, know in detail how effective their investment in
loss prevention activity is ? Does the extent and frequency of inspection reflect the
mag nitude of the conseq uen ces of an undesired failure ? Is the inspection activity likely to
identify the degradation mechanisms that exist ? Do the planned maintenance routines
actually influence the chance of the equipmen t breaking dow n ? Is mo ney be ing spent on
inspecting and maintaining equipment which, if it fails, has very little effect on the
organisation ?
An organisation's abili ty to consider these questions has traditionally been driven by
legislative rather than business need. For exam ple, inspection of pressure retaining
equipment or structures has been primarily calendar based, driven purely by legislative
requiremen ts. This no longer needs to be the case. The new goal setting legislative
environm ent provides the opportunity to plan loss avoidance activities by linking any
increase in the level of activity, to the reduction in risk ach ieve d by that increased level
of activity.
Both regulators and insurance companies now recognise the acceptabili ty of a risk
based approach to the optimisation of maintenance.
R ISK B A SED I N SPEC TI O N MET H O D S
Risk Based Inspection (RBI) techniques have been developed along two complementary
routes. Qualitative approaches to RBI have been developed for general use and detailed
quantitative methods have been developed and are being refined for activities with major
loss potential or large preventive expend iture requirements. This paper will con centrate
on recent developments in the quantitative assessment approach.
QUALITATIVE RISK BASED INSPECTION
Qualitative RBI is based on answering a series of questions regarding likelihood of failure
and the consequen ces of failure and assigning notional levels ( High / Med ium / Low ) to
the answers to place the item on a risk matrix, see Figure 1.
The closer an item is to the top right corner of the matrix, the more critical the item is,
and the greater the inspection activity warranted. It should be noted how ever, that chan ges
to inspection regimes can only effect the frequency of an event, and not its consequences.
Therefore if an item is in the high risk category primarily due to it 's consequences, then no
amount of additional inspection will improve it , and design changes to the system may be
required instead. Th is statemen t is equa lly true for qua ntitative assessm ent techn iques .
Software packages are now available which allow a qualitative estimate of inspection
frequency to be made. They vary in complexity, and in the degree of "engineering
judgement" to be applied, but they can be used as an effective screening tool in order to
determine w hich equipm ent should be subjected to a more detailed quantified assessment.
An example screen shot from o ne of the DNV software p ackag es is shown in Figure 2.
The software is driven simply by the selection of various options from drop down
menus, which prompt the user to select the most appropriate category for equipment type.
504
-
7/24/2019 XIV Paper 38
3/11
SCHEME SYMPOSIUM SERIES NO.
\44
location, fluid type and inventory, business interruption consequence, and specific details
relating to the material of construction of the equipment, and its susceptibility to various
failure m ech anis ms . Based up on these inpu ts, the software then use s a set of pre-defined
rule sets to calculate a risk ranking and a corresponding recommendation for the next
inspection interval.
THE QUANTIFIED RISK BASED INSPECTION METHOD
The Quantified Risk Based Inspection philosophy and method has been endorsed and is
being promoted by the American Petroleum Institute Committee on Refining Equipment.
The group is comprised of representatives from the following com panie s:
Amoco
Aramco
Arco
Ashland
BP
Chevron
Citgo
Conoco
Dow
DNO Heather
DSM
Exxon
Fina
Koch
Marathon
Mobil
Pennzoil
Petro Canada
Phillips
Shell
Sun
Texaco
Unocal
DNV pioneered the use of RBI in the chem ical process industry in 1 992. In 1993 the
API approach ed D NV with the reque st to join tly fund a larger dev elop me nt effort, aimed
at producing a resource document for how to establish risk based inspection in the
petroleum industry. DN V obliged, and in 1994 it produced the Base Resource Docum ent
on Risk-Based Inspection. This document is now being promoted by API as a standard
referred to as API 581, it will be followed shortly by API 580 which will become an API
Recommended Practice.
In 1995, the API commissioned DNV to develop software for i ts members to allow
them to automate some of the processes required by API 581 . This software based system
has now been used successfully on a number of studies conducted both by DNV, and the
sponsor group mem bers. DNV d ecided to further develop the Quantified R isk Based
Inspection Software in 1996. The new software, called OR BIT w as initially released in
March 1998 and is available to the industry as part of an integrated package of Risk Based
Inspection services. ORB IT provides a fast interpolation approac h for consequ ence
analysis.
The quantified RBI approach provides a methodology for determining the optimum
combination of inspection method s and frequencies. Each available inspection method
can be analysed and its relative effectiveness in reducing failure frequency can be
estimated . Give n this information and the cost of each proce dur e, an optimisation
program can be developed. The key to developing such a procedure is the abili ty to
-
7/24/2019 XIV Paper 38
4/11
: - ' >SiUM SERIES NO. 44
quantify the risk associated with each item of equipment and then to determine the most
appropriate inspection techniques for that piece of equipment.
SY STEMA TI C A PPR O A C H TO R ED U C I N G R I SK S
A fully integrated Risk Based Inspection system should contain the steps shown in Figure
3. The system includ es inspe ction activities, inspection data collection and updatin g, and
continuous quality improv emen t of the system. Risk analysis is "state of kn ow ledg e"
specific and, since processes and systems are changing with time, any risk study can only
reflect the situation at the time the data were collected . Althou gh any syste m, whe n first
established, may lack some needed data, the risk based inspection program can be
established based on the available information, using conservative assumptions for
unkno wns. A s know ledge is gained from inspection and testing prog ram s and the
database imp rove s, unce rtainty in the analys is will be reduced. This results in reduced
uncertainty in the calculated risks.
The combination of elements required as inputs to a quantitative RBI analysis are
shown in Figure 4.
The two major elements of a quantitative RBI analysis, as with any risk based study are
an assessment of the probability (or l ikelihood) of an event occurring, and its
consequences should it occur.
LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS
When considering the likelihood of a failure occurring, the RBI process utilises a series of
technical modules, in order to establish a dam age rate for the equipment. Th e calculated
dam age rate depends upon the item's material of construction, the process fluids it is
exposed to, i ts external environment and the process conditions (pressure, temperature
etc.).
Details of the current technical mod ules are shown in Figure 5.
It is also necessary to consider the current inspection regime, and to identify when the
equipment was last inspected, how it was inspected, and what the results of those
inspections were.
For example, if an equipment is subject to damage by corrosion or erosion, and if no
inspections have been performed, then the likelihood of failure may be high. If however,
many inspections of sufficient quality have been performed ( and the equipment still meets
its design intent ) then the likelihood of failure will be quite low, even if there has been
significant corrosion, as the rate of corrosion will be well understood.
Inspection activity is not however guaranteed to provide precise details of actual
corrosion rates, each inspection h as an error band associated with the particular technique.
These error bands can be established by trials and review of historical surve ys. Inspection
activity does not change a corrosion rate, it reduces the error band and increases our
confidence that we k now th e actual corrosion rate.
506
-
7/24/2019 XIV Paper 38
5/11
ICHE.VIE SYMPOSIUM SERIES NO. 144
Statistical m ethods can be used to evaluate the likelihood that damage severe enoug h to
cause a failure could exist given the am oun t of app ropria te inspection activity that has
been performed. As the damage rate is t ime based, future inspection techniques and
intervals can be planned based upon the amount of damage expected to be seen at some
point in the future. A proper balance must be established between advancing damage and
increased knowledge of the amount of damage, to ensure safe and economic operation.
An exam ple of a screen shot of the equipmen t details from the equipmen t specification
mo dule of the software is shown in Figu re 6. A screen shot of the likelihood m odu le is
shown in Figure 7.
C O N SEQ U EN C E A N A LY SI S
The consequ ence analysis conducted w ithin the RBI software is based upon look-up tables
calculated using the DNV software package
PHAST .
Conseq uences are calculated in
terms of the area of equipment damage, and the areas within which personnel will be
adversely affected by flames, explosions, or the toxic effects of the product concerned.
Using the input data on process pressure and temperature, material properties, and
inventories, the system determines the release rate for a range of representative hole siz es,
and also determines the release type. After d etermining w hether a release is continu ous or
instantaneous (as in a vessel rupture), the software calculates the final phase in the
environm ent (liquid or gas) and then determines the toxic or flammable co nsequ ences. In
evaluating the consequences, the software also allows modeling of account mitigating
features such as isolation and shu tdown systems.
An example of the Consequence data module can be seen in Figure 8.
R I SK A SSESSMEN T
Having evaluated both the likelihood of an event, and its consequences, the system then
combines this data to produce the overall risk evaluation for each piece of equipment.
This allows the assessment of the overall risk levels of the plant, and the identification of
whe re the high risk items on the plant are. so that inspection effort can be focused initially
on the high risk items. Various reports can be automatically g enerated to produ ce a w ide
range of analyses. These reports include:
Action damag e/mechan ism summary reports.
Financ ial risks.
Inspection planning.
Risk rank ing.
Graphs can also be produced for specific i tems of equipment showing the optimised
number of inspections (cost of risk per number of inspections versus years of inspection)
and the percentage of equipment versus the percentage of risk. An exam ple plot is
illustrated in Figure 10. The curve demonstrates the general principle that 80-90% of the
risk is contributed by only 10-20% of a plants fixed equipment.
507
-
7/24/2019 XIV Paper 38
6/11
EGHEME SYMPC5TUM 3 O. 144
PLA N T EX PER I EN C E
It should be clear from the forgoing that regardless of whether a qualitative or quantitative
approach is followed, i t cannot be implemented without the active involvement of
personnel familiar with the plant and its operation. Corrosion engineering experience is
required to determine the damage mechanisms possible. Inspection management personnel
are required to extract the knowledge of past inspection, and operations personnel are
required to assist with establishing the safety and prod uction im plication s of failures. It
must be a team effort, in order to be effective.
CASE STUDIES
DNV has now completed a number of botii pilot and full scale studies, in order to validate
the data in the model, and to evaluate the usage of the technique. Results demo nstrate that
the RBI techniques and software are becoming valuable tools for the oil and chemical
industry.
On one site, an RBI analysis of nearly 2,000 piping sections in an ethylene plant
show ed that less than 10% fell into the high risk category. Failure of those items
cons tituted a busines s interruption and asset dam age risk of SI 1.5 million per year. Th e
application of improved inspection techniques reduced this risk to $4.1 million per year, a
saving of S7.4 million per year. The re was of course a cost associated with this risk
reduction, and the improved inspection technology utlised was estimated to cost $250,000
per year. In this case the benefits clearly outw eigh ed the cos ts. On the other hand, a
review of the bottom 10% of risk items showed that the application of the same inspection
techniques could still result in a risk reduction from $12,000 per year, to $4,300 per year a
saving of $7,700 per year. Ho wev er the costs of the improved inspection of those items
would still cost $250,000, and this was clearly not cost effective.
On another site. 10 vessels were removed from the annual inspection plan, at an annual
cost saving of $25,000 per vessel, and some pipework materials were upgraded at a 20%
increased cost of materials, but avoiding a possible $3 million loss in bu siness
interruption.
S U M M A R Y
The RBI methodology and its supporting computer program has already gone a long way
toward an integrated risk management program.
The technology is sti l l being developed by DNV, and the author wishes to take this
opportunity to thank the RBI sponsor group for their advice and support during the
develo pm ent phase. The RBI philosophy and database has drawn upon the experience of
both DNV and the project sponsors in order to evaluate failure mechanisms, corrosion
rates,
consequences etc.
The author would also like to acknowledge the contribution of his colleagues Mark
Middleton (DNV Stockport), Panos Topalis (DNV Software Products), Angus Lyon
(DNV Aberdeen) and Gert Koppen (DNV Rotterdam) to the production of this paper.
508
-
7/24/2019 XIV Paper 38
7/11
LCHEME SYMPOSIUM SERIFSN
Figure 1 Exam ple Risk Ma trix
Increasing
Likelihood 3
2
1
; MecJiium@l ' m
w s . w
: : -
. .V... ,
. ; . .
i
. - - . V .
Mediun
1 2
3 4 5
Increasing Consequence
Figure Example of Qualitative RBI Software
R~~
z
qipmenH den#co(Jon
3
C iM e* tao af
C a ra a ue n C s t h e o r y f c ? ;R f c M & f e l M dH i g h R i t k
-Irw&oCtcn RocomrandabcfT:
&r
-
7/24/2019 XIV Paper 38
8/11
ICHEME
SYMPOSIUM SERIES NO. ^
Fi gur e3 Risk Based Inspec t ion Pr og ram for In-Service Eq uip me nt
-
PLANT DATABASE
RISK BASED PRIORITISATION
INSPECTION PLANNING '
r
INSPECTION RESU LTS
FITNESS FOR SERVICE
I
- . ' a
a i - .
-.
INSPECTION UPDATING
. - . . , ' . . .
3
SYSTEM AUDIT
Fi gur e4 Overview of Risk Based Inspect ion
125.vsd
; . - . . * .
:
. . . . . - . . .
PROCESS SAFETY
MANAGEMENT
IMPROVEMENTS
510
-
7/24/2019 XIV Paper 38
9/11
SCHEME SYMPOSIUM SCRIES NO. 144
Figure 5 RBI Technical Modules
Thinning
Modu le
Corrosion
U nder
Insulla l ion
Techn ica l M odu les
Set -up
Stress
Corros ion
Cracking
High
Temperature
Hydrogen
Attack
Fatigue
Brittle
Fracture
No
Me ch a n isms
App ly
HCI
HT Sulf idat ion
HT H.S/H.
H j S O ,
HF
Sour Water
Amine
HT Oxidat ion
C U I
Caustic H
Amine
Carbonate
Sulphide
HIC/SOHIC - H
3
S
HSC/HF
HIC/SOHIC - HF
Fatigue
Brittle
Fracture
Figure 6 General Equipment Module
' ; Fquipm ent Deta i l D ata
Consequence
e n e r a l
Likelihood
Results
- Tempetatuie and Pressute -
Op tempetature: J293
Op pressuie:
102000
Design temperatuie: |263
Design pressure:
Miri.
|263
|99000
Max.
|323
|103000
K
Pa
T empetatuie and Pressure Check j
-Add i t iona l Data
Material ot ICarbon S teel
Construction;
PJID-
ZJ
100-1000 Re v
1
Equipment Dimensions-
Wall Thickness: [5
Tank Sha pe: |Verti
Internal Length : ("
Internal Diameter lg.0
Internal Height |3.rj
D a t e ;
]Current Service Starting Data
11987-01 04 1
; Insulated fr-es) I~ PWHT [Vast [""
;
Exterior Coating fTest 17 Notmalized
[Yes):
T j
: Vessel Lining
(Yes):
l~" Impact Test (Yes ): F \
3
Help-1
Notes
5 1 1
-
7/24/2019 XIV Paper 38
10/11
1CHEME SYMPOSIUM S5H;E5
NO N
Fi gur e7 Like l ihood Analys i s Module
8
E q u i p m e n t D e t a i l D a t a
eneia l J L ik e l ih ood Consequence
- D a m a g e - T y p e s
Jhinnkig
SCC
I - Failure Freauency -
U iiltfe Fracture
r
No M echanisms App(y
3
r
Small
Medium
Large
Rupture
Leak Frequency
(peiyeaf|
4.00E-05
1.00E-Q4
100E-05
200E-O5
Cfosa
Help
Fi gur e8 Consequence Analys i s Module
I t q u r p m e n t D e t a i l D a t a
Senetal ] Lfcelihood Consequence]_ Results
Chemical Name : |KER0SENE
Look up Table Name: |Keiosene
Inibal Fluid State: jLiquid Vesse l Type : [Pressurized Liquid
Chemical.
Vessel TypeandInitial Fluid Sta te
Method: |
Lookup Melhod 3
Inventory -
-
7/24/2019 XIV Paper 38
11/11
ECHEME SYMPOSIUM SERIES NO. 14^
Figure 9 Results Module
Eq u ip me n t De ta i l Da ta
:
U k d h o o d R esu K s
Ukelhood Categoiy
Consequence Resul t s
Area Based Results
3.81E-03 Events/yeaf
i C o n s eq u en ce
F a c t a
3 6 8 . 0 0 1 s q .
Categoiy ;
2 2 4 1
j Equipment Damage:
FataU y:
ToacAfea:
1.13E*Q2
| s q m
|
3.68E-02
I sqm
[
O.O0E+OQ
| sq m" j
2241
Inspection Plann ing Calculations
Inspection Planning J
.
CJoae Help Notes
F ig u re
10
Risk Results
Percentage of Equipmentvs.Percentage o f Risk
i
I
s,
100
o~
80
70
m
50
4 0
30
20
10
0
i j j
P e r c e n t a g e o f E q u i p m e n t
513