Democratic Pluralism and Unconventional Political Participation: The Case of Africa

Jeff William JusticeCampbellsville Universityjw_justice@hotmail.com

Samuel S. Stanton, Jr.Grove City Collegessstanton@gcc.edu

Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association1-5 April 2009, Chicago, IL

Democratic Pluralism and Unconventional Political Participation: The Case of Africa

Russell Dalton’s Citizen Politics offers a wealth of theory regarding political culture and

mass political participation. Among these is an investigation into protest politics, including the

forms in which it may take and who is more likely than not to engage in such behavior. Among

other things, he noted that those who adhere to post-materialist politics are among those who are

most likely to protest. Other demographic factors affecting an increased likelihood of protest

behavior include ideological position (the left wing is more likely to engage than the right), age

(younger people are more likely, education (higher levels increase protest behavior likelihood),

dissatisfaction with government (higher levels lead to increased protest activity), and group

membership and party attachment (the presence of either increases protest likelihood).

While Dalton’s research on mass political behavior has spawned numerous papers,

articles, and books – including this one – we also note that his work limits its geopolitical

concentration primarily on developed states, particularly the United States, the United Kingdom,

France, and Germany. With some developing states attempting to re-establish themselves as

liberal democracies, it becomes useful to determine the utility of these models beyond the

industrialized states that they now cover. To be sure, even in areas where the population appears

to support democratization and democratic government, there can be groups that do not support

such governance and that may make efforts to derail it. Additionally, political cultures in those

areas might still find democratically-unconventional means of participation to be acceptable

alternatives as forms of public expression, especially if they do not have a long history of

democratic governance.

In this paper, we seek to extend these models to the politics of developing states, in this

case those found in Africa. We concentrate on protest politics in this article, focusing on the

forms of protest – or “unconventional” – political behavior, to see whether the model can be

extended into developing regions. Using the Afrobarometer, we examine several African states

in various stages of democratization and with varying degrees of democratic stability to test the

external validity of this work. Since the most recent wave of the Afrobarometer asks only about

protest marches, we will use this as our dependent variable in the models we test here.

Literature Review

In addition to the demographic factors noted above, Dalton’s findings illustrated one

other concept that we must address here, and that is the existence of post-materialist ideology.

Inglehart’s (1971, 1989, 1997, 2003); see also Inglehart & Flanagan, 1987; Abramson &

Inglehart, 1987, 1995; Inglehart & Abramson, 1999) pioneering work in this area is quite well-

known, suggesting that as those living in peaceful, materially-comfortable industrialized

societies are increasingly likely to adopt an ideological position that he termed “the new left,”

which would emphasize societal well-being, advancement of individual participation in society,

and other issues beyond the “material.”

Inglehart asserted that post-materialists would not generally be found in developing

societies, as those who were not materially well-to-do we were concerned with bread and butter

issues such as putting food on the table, keeping a roof over their heads, and so forth. He also

asserted that post-materialists would not be found within societies unless they had known peace

for at least a generation, which is to say that there would need to be a generation that had never

known times of struggle. Furthermore, he noted that post-materialists would always be a

minority within any given industrialized society.

Dalton (2008) asserted that post-materialists would be more likely to engage in

unconventional political participation than materialists, largely because of their minority

position. With materialists being in the majority, they should have full access to a democratic

political system and its institutions through linking institutions, to include political parties,

interest groups, and the media. Post-materialists, however, would have far greater difficulty

accessing the formal institutions of a given political system, owing to their minority position

within society. This would make it numerically difficult to gain representation in any democratic

institutions, such as national parliaments, even if they were to be represented through political

parties or other such linking institutions.

What is painfully obvious is that unconventional participation is not entirely driven by

post-materialist ideology, and there can be no doubt that such behavior does exist in developing

countries. For instance, the international press reported on a high level of social unrest and

violence in the wake of the disputed presidential election in Kenya in 2007, and we also have the

constant barrage of stories emanating from Zimbabwe relating to continued political unrest there

as a result of persistent allegations of rigging of democratic elections and political violence

directed at opposition party supporters. Despite multiple criticisms of Inglehart’s theory, Dalton

went with his version of it in his explanation for the factors that lead to unconventional political

participation. For sake of simplicity as well as replication, we will go with it as well. Hence, it

is our expectation that post-materialism will not drive the unconventional participation that does

exist in Africa, even if it is present all.

We are not of the opinion, despite our position on post-materialist values in the African

context, that it is totally invalid. We do believe – and the prior literature supports this – that

other factors that Dalton postulated as positively correlated to increasing the likelihood of

unconventional behavior will continue to hold true in developing areas. We do not necessarily

take the point that post-materialist attitudes are completely irrelevant, even if – as we expect –

they are nearly absent. One of Inglehart’s key positions that a person on his “new left” will hold

is a desire to increase people’s voice in their society. Democracy has the ability to do this,

seeing as it is a pluralistic form of governance, and so we will assert that the degree of pluralism

in a given polity will influence the likelihood of unconventional behavior. We will address this

matter first and then turn our attention to the thrust of Dalton’s theory.

Lijphart (1999) wrote that the most effective form of democratic government is one that

allows a wider variety of voices, opinions, and positions to be heard. Majoritarian systems tend

to stifle the people in that they only allow a scant few groupings to have access to representation

in democratic institutions. Anderson and Guillory (1997, see also Griffith, Plamenatz, &

Pennock, 1956; Anderson & Tverdova, 2001) built on this hypothesis and found that those who

are on the losing end of democratic processes can develop negative attitudes toward democratic

governance. Conversely, systems with more inclusive representational arrangements and more

opportunities for government-by-consensus tend to have higher degrees of supportive attitudes

toward democracy.

Gurr and Moore (1997) go so far as to suggest that the mere presence of democracy can

depress the likelihood of protest behavior, particularly if it is able to permeate throughout a given

society. Presumably, democracy gives groups with a grievance the means of air it. When

democracy is not present or it is present, but the group-at-hand does not have access to

representation in it, protest behavior becomes more likely. Lindburg and Moore (2008) note that

this is especially true in Africa. So long as a democratic regime is able to deliver good

government and, thus, gain legitimacy, it should not have to worry about coup attempts from the

military or others. Matlosa (2007) wrote that African democratization must co-exist with

development, and that the entire process must be pluralistic and de-politicized in order to have

any chance at success.

Not everyone agrees that democracy and pluralism can be used to foster peaceful

relationships. Inglehart counters the above to an extent in a work in which he notes that

democratization and democracy itself is not necessarily about the expression by the masses, but

rather it is a system established by and through political élites (2003). Bratton and van de Walle

(1992; see also Griffith, Plamenatz, & Pennock, 1956) similarly noted that élite behavior is what

drives protest politics among the masses. Whenever corruption exists among élites, it can be a

catalyst to escalation of protest behavior, particularly when a political system is orchestrated in

such a manner – such as a single-party system – to keep those who have political power in

power. Justice (2005) found that when groups lose confidence in democratic institutions and

find that they have no other way to make their voices heard, they will support political

organizations willing to resort to unconventional or even destructive means to promote their

political agenda, particularly those on the left wing and those with post-materialist leanings.

Saith (2007) also raised doubts about the benefits of democracy, asserting that there must

be a “reservoir of social capital” present in order for it to successfully exist and questioning

whether such a reservoir ever existed in Africa. Of particular note, Saith wrote that African

democracies were protected from neither internal nor external pressures that could serve to

destabilize them. Similarly, Sorenson (1993) collapsed Dahl’s eight classical criteria for

democratization to solidify into three broader criteria, among those being the need for high levels

of pluralism, respect for civil liberties involving free expression, and fair competition among

those involved in the process. Saith doubted that such conditions could be fulfilled, as African

political élites tended to exclude potential threats from political systems and stifled people’s

ability to speak freely.

Spiro (1994) also argues against democracy as a stabilizing force that brings peace,

suggesting that neo-Kantian literature saying that democracy does equate to peace is based on

flawed methodology that does not take into account a relative dearth of dyads controlling for

democratic-democratic state pairings. While Spiro takes his argument from a state-as-an-actor

perspective, one could draw from this the inference that having a democratic state does not

guarantee internal peace, either. Skocpol (1988) wrote on international implications of internal

conflict, postulating that revolutions and other forms of disruptive political participation can lead

to opportunities for neighboring states, not to mention their tendency to spill over national

borders.

Turning now to the demographic features Dalton raised beyond ideology, much has been

writing about the impact that educational levels have on political behavior. He noted that the

presence of higher levels of education improved the likelihood of not only unconventional

participation, but of conventional means as well, and literature examining the impact of

education on political participation in developing states corroborates this theory. He also found

that protest behavior tends to be the purview of younger citizens and those who claim group

membership. Political efficacy, however, was not a consistently significant predictor of protest

behavior, according to his work.

As a point-in-case, Nayek (1970) examined the political situation in India during the

1960s, with an emphasis on the behavior of university students. He found that educational levels

do correlate to increased political awareness and desire to take the political initiative, and that

pluralistic, inclusive discussions regarding political institutions lessened the likelihood of protest

behavior among student populations. Speaking in the African context, Wade (2007) argued that

education is critical for democratic government to succeed, in that it builds a sense of trust in

others, which leads, in turn, to a greater faith in democracy and its institutions.

Hypotheses

Based on previous research on unconventional political behavior and consideration of the

African context, we offer nine (9) hypotheses. These hypotheses consider the dynamics of the

relationship between various factors of democratic pluralism and unconventional political

behavior. Pacific democratic society requires citizens understand democracy, participate in

democratic behaviors, believe in the efficacy of political competition, be generally satisfied with

democracy, and agree that laws are generally useful means of governing and solving societal

problems. So, in addition to offering a number of hypotheses, we group them according to these

principals.

As we mentioned earlier we are considering protest behavior as the primary means of

unconventional participation, and this serves as the dependent phenomenon in our hypotheses.

We fully recognize that other forms of unconventional political participation exist, upto and

including violent political behavior. However, we choose to focus our work on the highest form

of non-violent, unconventional political participation for two reasons. One reason is practical—

namely that available data lends itself to studying this form of unconventional behavior. The

second reason is we are not studying causes of violent behavior, which is studied in detail in the

conflict processes, particularly civil war and ethnic conflict literature.

Hypothesis one deals with understanding democracy. As people gain greater

understanding of democracy and realize that greater personal liberty comes with democracy we

should expect them to be more willing to engage in unconventional participation.

H1: As the level of understanding democracy increases, unconventional political behavior increases.

Hypothesis set two (H2) deals with participation in democratic behaviors. The primary

form of participation in democracy by citizens is voting. We recognize in our hypotheses that

voting is often accompanied by perception of the fairness of the election, so we test both actual

voting and perception of fairness in elections. We generally regard unconventional behavior as

decreasing when political participation increases.

H2: Where voting increases, unconventional political behavior decreases; H2a: Where fairness of elections increases, unconventional behavior decreases.

Hypothesis set three (H3) examines the perception of efficacy regarding democracy. We

consider the general support for democracy among people, the perception of democracy’s extent

in a country, the satisfaction with democracy, and perception of the relationship of party

competition to conflict in relationship to unconventional behavior. Our general proposal in this

area is when efficacy increases, unconventional behavior decreases.

H3: When support for democracy increases, unconventional behavior decreases; H3a: When perceived extent of democracy increases, unconventional behavior decreases; H3b: When satisfaction with democracy increases, unconventional behavior decreases; H3c: When belief that party competition causes conflict decrease, unconventional

behavior decreases.

The fourth set of hypotheses (H4) considers the relationship between belief in laws as a

useful source of societal governance and unconventional participation. We regard increase in

belief in the usefulness of laws as causing a decrease in unconventional behavior. Two

treatments of this phenomenon are observed; one that people believe they must obey laws, and

also that people believe in increased solution to societal problems based on legal solutions.

H4: If people believe they must obey the law, unconventional political behavior decreases;

H4a: When belief in lawful solutions increases, unconventional political behavior decreases.

Data and Models

We apply a modified version of the Afrobarometer to test our hypotheses.1 This survey

includes 25,397 participants from 18 Sub-Saharan countries and was completed in the years

2000-2008.2 The probability of inclusion was weighted by proportionality of the population of

the country from which a respondent is drawn to the overall population of the 18 countries from

which the sample population is drawn.3

We create four sets of models each with the same dependent variable, but considering the

different sets of independent variables. Unconventional political behavior is represented by

participation in political demonstrations and protests and is measured in an ordinal scale. We

therefore apply ordered logistic regression modeling for the testing of our hypotheses. Before

further discussing the models we turn to the consideration of the variables used to test our

hypotheses.

DATA

Our dependent variable measures political protest behavior. Respondents were asked

about frequency of attending demonstrations or protests against the government. 86% of

respondents report that they have not attended a protest or demonstration against the government,

1 This data is available through www.afrobarometer.org. 2 See appendix 1 for list of countries and number of survey respondents from that country.3 This method of data collection will necessitate the use of a weighting variable in the models.

hardly an unexpected figure given the political climate of much of sub-Saharan Africa. Even

when considering whether a person might attend, the number that have not attended a protest is

51.4% and only 34.6% say they have not but might attend a protest. The median score is 0. The

measurements are examined in Table 1.

What we are examining is an infrequent phenomenon. As demonstrated in our data, less

than 3500 respondents have ever engaged in unconventional behavior measured as protest

against the government. While this makes studying the phenomenon difficult, it adds to the

robustness of any results that we find.

Table 1: Did Respondent Attend Political Demonstration/ProtestFrequency Valid Percentage Cummulative

PercentageNever 12698 51.4 51.4

No, might attend 8548 34.6 86.01-2 times 1862 7.5 93.6

Several times 1001 4.1 97.6Frequently 583 2.4 100.0

There are 705 cases of missing data

The particulars of the independent variables are shown in Table 2. Each of these

variables is ordinal in measurement, so the central tendency shown is the median category. In

the measurement of free and fair elections and the respondent’s belief in lawful vs. immediate

action to correct grievances, the modal category is different than the median category, but for all

other independent variables the median and the mode are equal.

Understanding democracy was measured by asking the respondent if they knew what democracy

meant. A score of 0 indicates the respondent did not understand the word, a score of 1 means

that the person understood the word but had difficulty expressing a meaning. A score of 2

represents comprehension and definition.

Table 2. Independent VariablesValid Cases Central Tendency Range

VariableUnderstand Democracy 23990 2 0-2

Vote in Last Election 25278 4 0-4Free and Fair

Elections 23017 2(3)* 0-3

Support for Democracy 21414 3 0-3

Extent of Democracy 20748 3 1-4Satisfaction with

Democracy 21287 3 0-4

Party Competition 23966 2 0-3Obey the Law 24520 4 1-5

Belief in Lawful Solutions 24960 4(5)* 1-5

*mode is reported in parentheses

Voting in the last election was measured by asking a respondent about voting and

whether they were registered to vote. A score of 0 represents not even being registered to vote.

A score of 1 indicates a person was prevented from voting. A score of 2 shows a person did not

vote and gave a reason for not voting (such as difficulty finding the polling location, belief that

voting would not be safe, etc.). A score of 3 represents a person simply choosing not to vote. A

four represents having voted.

Were the last elections free and fair is measured on a 0-3 scale. 0 represents not free or

fair, 1 that they were free and fair, but had major problems, 2 that there were minor problems,

and 3 that they were totally free and fair without problems. While the overwhelming majority

answer is totally free and fair, the median response was free and fair with minor problems.

Support for democracy was measured on an ascending scale with 0 being not supportive

at all and 3 being totally supportive of democracy. Perception of democracy is measured on a

scale of 1-4, asking how democratic a respondent believes his/her country to be, with 1

representing not democratic at all and 4 representing fully democratic. Satisfaction with

democracy asks the respondent if they are satisfied with a democratic government on a scale of 0

to 4. 0 represented totally dissatisfied and 4 represents very satisfied.

Belief that party competition causes conflict is also measured in our model. On a scale of

0-3 with 0 representing never causes conflict and 3 representing always causes conflict, the

median and most frequent respondent says that party competition often causes conflict.

The final two independent variables consider the relationship of belief in laws (a

fundamental trait of pluralist democracy) and unconventional behavior. Most people agree that

they must obey the law on a scale of 1-5, where 1 represent strongly disagreeing with this

principle and 5 represents strongly agreeing with the principle of obedience to law. When asked

about their belief in immediate solutions versus finding lawful solutions the median response

was belief in lawful solutions, but the most frequent response is strongly believing in lawful

solutions.

As control factors in the models we consider the age of the respondent, employment

status of the respondent, gender of the respondent, and race of the respondent.4 The average age

was 36.62. The most frequent and median response to employment is not employed (again not

unexpected as sub-Saharan Africa is home to the largest concentration of poverty in the world).

The division between male and female is almost exact as 12702 men are included and 12695

women are included the data. Finally, as is expected most of the respondents are black Africans

(87.9% of respondents).

MODELS and FINDINGS

We offer four models that test the hypothesis sets that we believe tests the relationship of

democratic pluralism with unconventional political behavior in sub-Saharan Africa. Table 3 4 While we very much would like to include a measure of personal ideological preferences, such information is not included in the datasets generated from the completion of the Afrobarometer surveys. We are concerned that lack of this variable may cause inflated values of other variables in our models.

shows the results of the models. Models were tested for fit and for collinearity and no issues

were noted. Model 1, testing the understanding of democracy in relationship to protest, has an N

of 23032 and a Wald Chi-Square value of 614.59, probability of .0000. Model 2, testing the

relationship of voting and protest, has an N of 22081 and a Wald Chi-Square of 498.04,

probability.0000. Model 3, testing the efficacy of democracy and protest, has an N of 18643,

Wald Chi-Square 347.86, probability .0000. Model 4, testing hypotheses related to belief in law

and protest, has an N of 23320 with a Wald Chi-Square of 533.83, probability .0000.

Table 3. Models of Democratic Pluralism and ProtestModel 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Understand Democracy

.1860***(.0168)

Vote in Last Election

.0646***(.0092)

Free and Fair Elections

-.0098(.0125)

Support for Democracy

-.0025(.0141)

Extent of Democracy

.0018(.0222)

Satisfaction with Democracy

-.0203(.0190)

Party Competition

-.0471**(.0153)

Obey the Law -.0082(.0121)

Belief in Lawful Solutions

-.0459***(.0109)

Age -.0135***(.0009)

-.0158***(.0009)

-.0129***(.0010)

-.0136***(.0009)

Employment .0805***(.0158)

.0733***(.0162)

.0772***(.0173)

.0896***(.0158)

Gender -.3549***(.0269)

-.3745***(.0272)

-.3851***(.0296)

-.4035***(.0265)

Race .0028(.0064)

-.0021***(.0004)

-.0016***(.0005)

-.0023***(.0004)

Std. error in parentheses p>.05*, p>.01**, p>.001***

We find support in the model for three (3) of our hypotheses. Increased understanding of

democracy does lead to lower levels of protest. Decreased belief that party competition causes

conflict leads to lower protest. Increased belief in lawful solutions to problems does lead to

lower protest. However, a statistically significant relationship was found in relation to voting

and it is actually that increased voting leads to an increase in protesting. We address this last

finding first, then consider the other findings.

Increasing the value of voting by one (1) standard deviation (a value of 1.52) increases

the likelihood of protest increasing by 110.32%. The implication is people who believe they are

freer to vote and participate actively in politics will be more willing to engage in protest against

their government. The other possible implication is that protests later caused the government to

relent and allow elections. In sub-Saharan Africa both of these behaviors are noticeable. If you

as a black South African if he/she has ever engaged in protest, the answer is almost assuredly yes

if they are over the age of 30. Following protests in the 1980s and early 1990s black South

Africans were universally awarded the opportunity to vote and have voted in high numbers in

elections held since the protest years at the end of the apartheid era of South Africa. Since the

data do not ask what came first—voting or protesting—it is impossible to clearly tell which is

causal. They are, however, statistically significant in relationship to one another to a high degree

in the data we tested.

Not only does an increase in understanding democracy lead to decrease in protest, but it

has a 116.31% likelihood of decreasing protest when understanding democracy increases by one

(1) standard deviation (a value of .81). Understanding democracy is at the root of democratic

pluralism having the opportunity to grow. This is an important finding, but not one that was

unexpected.

Regarding the efficacy of democracy we are at a loss to explain how support for

democracy and satisfaction with democracy have no statistically significant relationship with

protest. The extent to which a person perceives his/her state to be democratic is even less

significant in relationship to protest. It is encouraging to see that when belief that multi-party

competition causes conflict decreases there is a decrease in protest that is statistically significant.

This finding bodes well for the future of pluralistic democracy.

Concerning law as a useful source of governance, it is understandable that an increase in

belief in obedience to law is not significant in relationship to protest. If democracy is evident in

a society, the ability to voice concern and demonstrate against the state is not illegal. More

important we did find a statistically significant relationship exists between increased belief in

lawful solutions and decrease in protest. When belief in lawful solutions increases by a value of

1.21 (one std. deviation) the likelihood of protest decreases by 94.58%.

None of the findings related to the controls are surprising. Protest in sub-Saharan Africa

is a young person’s game, so as age increases protest decreases in all of the models. People who

are employed tend to engage in protest more than those who are not employed. This is

understandable as they have more to lose from poor governance. The indication of the findings

related to gender is that men engage in protest more often than women. Regarding race, black

Africans protest more than other Africans—no surprise considering their high proportion in the

cases of the dataset used for the models.

Conclusions

Our findings as expressed in the hypotheses are illustrated in Table 4. The biggest

surprise in our findings was that there was no statistically significant relationship between a lack

of support for democracy and willingness to engage in protest politics. According to Dalton,

protest politics is a game played by those who feel the need to be empowered or to empower

others, usually by those who do not feel that they have the political efficacy to make change

happen through the normal course of the democratic political process. These people are usually

found on the traditional left and the post-materialist left, both of which are ideologies that seek to

change the balance of societal power to include those who are not presently part of the system. It

may well be a case that those who express dissatisfaction with democracy feel so alienated that

they feel that there is nothing to gain by engaging in any type of political behavior.

Table 4. Summary of Findings in Relation to HypothesesHypothesis Finding

Increased Understanding Democracy causes Increased Protest Hypothesis supported

Increased Voting causes Decreased Protest Hypothesis not supported

Increased Fairness of Elections causes Decreased Protest No statistically significant finding

Increased Support for Democracy causes Decreased Protest No statistically significant finding

Increased Extent of Democracy causes Decreased Protest No statistically significant finding

Increased Satisfaction with Democracy causes Decreased Protest No statistically significant finding

Decreased Belief that Party Competition Causes Conflict causes

Decreased Protest Hypothesis supported

Increased belief in Obedience to Law causes Decreased Conflict No statistically significant finding

Increased Belief in Lawful Solutions to Problems causes Decreased

ProtestHypothesis Supported

A second consideration stems from the fact that this particular data set did not allow for

consideration of either post-materialist or traditional left/right values. If we were able to do so,

there is a possibility that inclusion of such variables with this data might have yielded a different

result on this hypothesis as well as others. We would encourage the inclusion of such

ideological measurement and/or self-placement variables in future waves of the Afrobarometer.

This is of particular interest to scholars in the area of political values and how they translate to

political participation, particularly given the continued development of Africa and its growing

place on the global stage. This is speculation on our part, however. Nevertheless, prior research

(Opp, 1990) suggests that post-materialism has an additive and multiplicative effect on protest

behavior. If it is not present at all, we may well have to reconsider our earlier assertion that it is

not the main driving value system behind protest politics. We cannot doubt that other factors are

present and significantly impact protest behavior, and the data we present here demonstrates that

there certainly are others. However, this is an issue that future research in this area should

attempt to confront.

Voting, one of the most conventional aspects of democratic political participation, is

generally accepted as a low-impact political activity. Other forms of conventional behavior,

such as volunteering in a political campaign, require participants to spend more time and

monetary capital on their activities. Protest behavior, with its unconventional attributes, leaves

and even larger impact. It takes place outside the framework of normal institutional

arrangements, and its maverick reputation necessarily engenders a level of risk beyond the usual

political capital spent in actively participating in any organized activity. Our expectation was

that the presence of a lower capital activity would attract participants and draw them away from

activities that not only fall outside the mainstream but also entail higher levels of risk. We based

this on a simple matter of rational choice: achieving the best-possible result and the lowest-

possible cost. The results of this study suggest otherwise. It may be true that the presence of

democratic norms in some political cultures lessens inhibitions against the sense of risk found in

unconventional behavior. Future studies in this area may wish to concentrate more on the

collective political cultural aspects of political participation of this type in developing areas.

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Appendix 1: Afrobarometer Countries and Respondent Numbers

Country Number of RespondentsBenin 1198Botswana 1200Cape Verde 1256Ghana 1197Kenya 1278Lesotho 1161Madagascar 1350Malawi 1200Mali 1244Mozambique 1198Namibia 1200Nigeria 2363Senegal 1200South Africa 2400Tanzania 1304Uganda 2400Zambia 1200Zimbabwe 1048