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Topside Minis: WWII Naval Engagement Synopsis Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters

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Table of Contents

1. Battle of the River Platte……………………………………………………2 2. Naval Action at Narvik……………………………………………………….7 3. Attack on Mers‐el‐Kébir……………………………………………………11 4. Battle of Calabria……………………………………………………………..14 5. Battle of Cape Spada……………………………………………………..…19 6. Battle of Dakar………………………………………………………………….21 7. Battle of Taranto……………………………………………………….........24 8. Battle of Cape Spartivento………………………………………………..28 9. Battle of Cape Matapan…………………………………………………….31 10. Sinking the Battleship Bismarck…………………………………………35 11. Naval Warfare Associated with the Siege of Sevastopol……42 12. Battle of Cape Bon…………………………………………………………….45 13. First Battle of Sirte…………………………………………………………….46 14. Battle of the Kerch Peninsula…………………………………………….48 15. Second Battle of Sirte………………………………………………………..50 16. Operation Harpoon……………………………………………………………53 17. Operation Vigorous……………………………………………………………56 18. Operation Pedestal…………………………………………………………...58 19. Battle of the Atlantic………………………………………………………….64



Battle of the River Platte The Battle of the River Platte, fought 13 December 1939, has the twin distinctions of being the first naval battle of WWII and being the only battle of the war to take place off the continent of South America. The combatant on the German side was Admiral Graf Spee (hereafter Graf Spee), a Deutchland‐class cruiser (also known as a Panzerschiff or “Pocket Battleship”) launched in 1934 and commanded by Kapitän zur See Hans Langsdorff. The combatants on the British side were the York‐class heavy cruiser HMS Exeter (launched in 1929), the Leander‐class light cruiser HMS Ajax (launched in 1934), and the Leander‐class cruiser HMNZS Achilles (launched in 1932). Graf Spee had been stationed in the South Atlantic before the war began. When war was declared in September 1939, Graf Spee began raiding commerce shipping towards the end of the month. Her first victim was the cargo ship Clement on 30 September off the coast of Brazil. Langsdorff, exhibiting a brand of chivalry associated with raiders, took two prisoners from Clement and allowed the rest of the crew to take to their lifeboats before sinking the vessel. He also ordered the broadcast of a distress signal so that the crew would be rescued. On 5 October 1939 the Allies reacted by forming eight naval groups to hunt down Graf Spee. Capital ships committed to the hunt included 4 aircraft carriers, one battle cruiser, 2 battleships and 16 cruisers. Force G, commanded by Commodore Henry Harwood, consisted of Exeter, Ajax and Achilles, in addition to the cruiser Cumberland, which was absent, patrolling off the Falkland Islands, when the combatants met. The main body of Force G patrolled off the River Platte. While the Allies were organizing, Graf Spee was raiding. On 5 October 1939 she captured the steamer Newton Beech, and used it as a floating POW camp. On 7 October Graf Spee sank the merchant ship Ashlea .Newton Beech was unable to keep pace with Graf Spee, so the prisoners were transferred to the cruiser on 8 October and Newton Beech was sunk. On 10 October Graf Spee captured the steamer Huntsman, put a prize crew aboard, and sent it to the rendezvous location of the German supply ship Altmark. On 15 October Graf Spee rendezvoused with Altmark, took on fuel, and transferred prisoners. Huntsman arrived 16 October and also transferred prisoners to Altmark. No longer of any use to the Germans, Graf Spee sunk Huntsman the following day. On 22 October Graf Spee sank the steamer Trevanion. Meanwhile the Allies searched in vain. In spite of the uncontested successes so far, at the end of October Langsdorff sailed Graf Spee out of the south Atlantic and into the Indian Ocean in order to divert Allied warships away from the south Atlantic where he intended to continue operations after misdirecting the Allies. While in the Indian Ocean, Graf Spee sunk the tanker Africa Shell.



The thus far successful cruise was not without its toll. After cruising for 35,000 miles (30,000 nautical miles) Graf Spee was in urgent need of an engine overhaul. Not able to address that need, Graf Spee returned to the south Atlantic in late November to address a more pressing need. She rendezvoused with Altmark and took on fuel and supplies. Graf Spee’s reign of terror was coming to an end, though she kept taking victims. She sank the merchant ship Doric Star, but Doric Star was able to send a distress signal before sinking. Based on the distress signal location, Commodore Harwood brought Force G (minus Cumberland) to the mouth of the River Platte, anticipating Graf Spee’s arrival there due to the heavy shipping traffic. Graf Spee sank her penultimate victim, the steamer Tairoa, on 5 December 1939. Rendezvousing with Altmark for what would be the last time on 6 December, Graf Spee transferred prisoners taken from Doric Star and Tairoa. Graf Spee’s last prize taken was the freighter Steonshalh on 7 December 1939. The prize crew discovered information regarding shipping routes on board, and based on this intelligence, Langsdorff ordered the ship to sail to the seas off Montevideo, and unwittingly, to the ship’s fateful meeting with Force G. Force G rendezvoused off the River Platte estuary on 12 December 1939. Harwood was confident in the ability of three cruisers to defeat a single pocket battleship, and planned to attack immediately once contact was made. If by day, the ships would attack in two groups, Exeter alone and Ajax and Achilles in tandem. If by night, the attack would be with all three ships together but in open formation. Harwood’s intent was to negate the German advantages in range and firepower by forcing Graf Spee to split its fire and thereby reduce its effectiveness, or to concentrate fire on one ship and allow the other two to attack unmolested by German fire. Though at a tactical disadvantage, Harwood knew that the strategic environment favored his force, and he need not sink Graf Spee in order to further his strategic mission of ensuring the safety of the shipping carrying food and war materials to Great Britain. Even a tactical defeat could serve that greater purpose if Force G could render Graf Spee unable to continue surface raiding or to engage surface combatants while returning home. Graf Spee returning home would have to run the Home Fleet gauntlet in the North Sea, and a damaged Graf Spee would do so at greater peril. The final part of the calculus was the relative strength of the naval assets of the opposing nations. In the worst case for Great Britain, the loss of all three ships in Force G could be absorbed by overall Allied naval capabilities. However, Graf Spee was one of a handful of German capital ships, and if lost would not be replaced. A defeat would more severely affect the Germans than the Allies. The Germans had already sighted mastheads of Force G at 0552 hours (though they thought they were Exeter and two destroyers protecting a merchant convoy) when at 0610 hrs on 13 December 1939 the Allied forces sighted smoke. Graf Spee’s float plane



was not operational, so Langsdorff had to rely on his observers. He had fairly accurate intelligence that the Force G, including Cumberland, was in the area of the River Platte, but relying on his observers’ estimation of a lesser force he decided to engage. Soon realizing he was facing three cruisers, Langsdorff ordered immediate acceleration to close with the British at 24 knots (28 mph), intending to engage before the British could get up full steam. Critics of Langsdorff say he should have used his ship’s superior range to his advantage, maneuvering to keep the British ships in range of his 11.1‐inch (28.3 cm) guns while, at least at first, staying out of the range of their 6‐ and 8‐inch guns. The speed advantage of the cruisers conversely could have allowed them to stay out of range of Graf Spee’s guns while Force G summoned reinforcements, so Langsdorrf decided to force the issue. Harwood stuck to his daylight plan. The ships split into two groups. Exeter headed northwest. Ajax, which was Harwood’s flagship, and Achilles headed northeast. Making use of her superior range, Graf Spee fired first at 0618 hours, taking Exeter under fire with from 19,000 yards with her 11.1‐inch guns. Two minutes later, Exeter began to return fire. A minute later Achilles opened fire. Another minute passed and Exeter’s aft guns bean to fire. Another minute passed and Ajax opened fire. It was now 0623 hours. At 0623 hours shells were not just going up; they were coming down. An 11.1‐inch shell, a near miss, burst abreast of Exeter. Splinters from the shell killed torpedo tube crewmen and damaged equipment on deck, wrecking the ship’s spotter aircraft just about to be launched. At 0626 hours a shell struck Exeter’s “B” turret putting both guns out of action. Shrapnel swept the bridge killing and wounding personnel. Communications were knocked out, including those with the aft conning position. For the rest of the battle Exeter would be steered using a chain of human messengers. By 0630 hours, Ajax and Achilles had closed to within 13,000 yards of Graf Spee, causing her to split her main armament targeting. At 0632 hours, the now wounded Exeter fired two torpedoes from her starboard tubes, and both missed. At 0636 hours, Graf Spee left an easterly course to turn northwest, behind Ajax and Achilles and parallel to Exeter. She started to lay smoke. At 0637 hours, Ajax launched her spotter plane. At 0638 hours, while still being pummeled Exeter had managed to turn in order to fire her port torpedoes. Exeter was struck twice more by 11.1‐inch shells. “A” turret was put out of action and fires had started. Exeter now had only the “Y” turret operational, was



taking on water, and was listing seven degrees. Fire control for the “Y” turret consisted of an officer on the roof of the turret shouting instructions to those inside. But an 8‐inch shell from the battered Exeter had already delivered what would turn out to be the decisive blow. The shell penetrated two decks and destroyed Graf Spee’s raw fuel cleaning and processing system leaving the ship with only 16 hours of diesel fuel. Graf Spee would not be returning home in its current state. Though damage to her combat systems thus far included the loss of two‐thirds of her anti‐aircraft guns and one secondary turret, the fuel system was key and could not be repaired while under fire. She had no support to call on, and friendly ports were beyond her reach. At 0656 hours, Ajax and Achilles brought their guns to bear on Graf Spee. The German ship turned away from them and laid more smoke. At 0710 hours, Ajax and Achilles turned towards the Graf Spee in order to reduce the range, even at the expense of being able to bring only their aft guns to bear. At 0716, Graf Spee turned on the stricken Exeter, but within the next four minutes fire from the Ajax and Achilles forced the Graf Spee to turn her big guns on them. The pair turned to starboard and brought all of their guns to bear. At 0724 hours, Ajax turned to starboard again, and fired torpedoes at Graf Spee at a range of 4.5 miles, causing Graf Spee to turn away and make smoke yet again. One minute later at 0725 hours Ajax paid a price for her audacity, bring struck by an 11.1‐inch shell that caused casualties, put “X” turret out of action, and jammed “Y” turret. The fight continued, showing signs of turning into a struggle of attrition. At 0730 hours, a splash from a near miss short‐circuited the electrical system for Exeter’s last functioning turret. She broke off action, but Graf Spee did not pursue. Ajax and Achilles were still closing on Graf Spee, and Langsdorff focused his attention on them. By 0740 hours, one and a half hours after sighting Graf Spee, Ajax and Achilles were low on ordnance, and Harwood decided to change tactics. The British moved east obscured by smoke. Harwood decided to follow Graf Spee and attack again at night. This would accentuate his advantages of speed and maneuverability, but the risks were high. Nightfall was a long way off, especially in December in the Southern Hemisphere. Graf Spee could turn on the wounded British during the long remaining hours of daylight. As Harwood was making his decision Ajax was hit again by an 11.1‐inch shell, causing more casualties and destroying her mast. Graf Spee continued southwest, and the pursuit was on. Ajax and Achilles kept about 15 miles from Graf Spee, with Ajax to port and Achilles to starboard.



At 0946 hours, Harwood finally called Cumberland for reinforcement. The British Admiralty, determined not to allow Graf Spee to escape, ordered ships within 3,000 miles of the action to the Platte River. At 1010 hours, Achilles had closed the gap between her and Graf Spee, and for her troubles got a pair of three‐gun salvos. Achilles turned away making smoke. Ajax and Achilles followed Graf Spee for the rest of the day, including past the British steamer Shakespeare, whose crew ignored instructions from the Graf Spee to abandon ship, yet due to Langsdorff’s haste, was not fired upon. At 1915 hours, Graf Spee turned and fired on Ajax, who turned away making smoke. Graf Spee entered the Platte River estuary. Harwood ordered Achilles to continue to follow Graf Spee, while Ajax patrolled the other reaches of the 120‐mile wide estuary to ensure that the Graf Spee did not slip away through a different channel. At 2048 hours, the sun finally set. Achilles strayed too close to Graf Spee one final time, drawing fire. Achilles turned away. These were the last shots fired. The British had suffered 72 dead, mostly from Exeter (61) and 28 wounded, while German casualties were thus far 36 dead and 60 wounded. The battle was over, but the fate of Graf Spee had yet to be resolved. Graf Spee dropped anchor at a neutral port, Montevideo, Uruguay. The 13th Hague Convention, which forbids a belligerent warship from remaining in a neutral port for more than twenty‐four hours except due to damage, was invoked. British diplomats pressed an already favorably inclined neutral to force the Graf Spee to leave immediately. This was theater. The British were choreographing daily departures of British and French merchantmen from Montevideo, while the Uruguayan government enforced Article 16 of the Convention which prohibits warships from leaving a port within twenty‐four hours of the departure of a merchantman flying the flag of an opposing belligerent. Graf Spee was caught on fly paper while British warships made steam for Montevideo. While the diplomatic dance was on, the British fed the Germans false intelligence about the strength of the Allied naval force lurking outside the estuary. Late on 14 December 1939, Cumberland arrived on the scene and was the only British warship expected to arrive before 19 December when overwhelming forces would arrive. Cumberland was only slightly superior to Exeter and outgunned by Graf Spee. The Germans were fooled by the deception, while cognizant of their desperate fuel situation and depleted stocks of ammunition. Langsdorff in consultation with his high command was not given the option of internment in Uruguay. He believed that returning to action against the British fleet would cause loss of life with no possible gain of military advantage. Langsdorff ordered Graf Spee scuttled in the River Platte estuary



on December 17, 1939. The crew of Graf Spee was taken to Buenos Aires, Argentine where they suffered their final casualty of the battle when Kapitän zur See Hans Langsdorff took his own life by gunshot. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_River_Plate http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/battle_of_the_river_plate.htm http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Exeter_(68)

Naval Action at Narvik Prelude On 1 March 1940, Adolf Hitler ordered the execution of Operation Weserübung, the invasion of Norway. For the operation, the Kriegsmarine organized five groups with the goal of occupying six Norwegian ports. Force I, commanded by Kommodore Friedrich Bonte, consisted of ten destroyers. Escorted part of the way by the battleships Scharnhorst and Gniesenau, Force I departed Bremerhaven on 6 April carrying 1,900 mountain troops from the 139th Mountain Regiment of the 3rd Mountain Division. The ground forces were commanded by General Eduard Dietl. Germany got most of its iron ore from Sweden. The Ofotfjord leads to Narvik, an ice‐free port at the terminus of a rail line bringing iron ore from Sweden. Half of the ore that Germany obtained from Sweden came through Narvik. Both Axis and Allies sought to secure the ore for their own use. On 9 April 1940 Germany simultaneously invaded Norway and Denmark. Force I (minus the battleships and one destroyer, Deither von Roeder delayed by engine trouble) arrived at the Ofotfjord after unsuccessful British attempts to engage Force I. The British had mined the entrance to Narvik on the previous day. In fog and heavy snow, the German destroyers captured three Norwegian patrol boats, but not before one of the patrol boats raised the alarm with the local Norwegian naval commander. The destroyers of Force I split up within the fjord to deliver their troops to their objectives. Wolfgang Zenker, Erich Koellner, and Hermann Künne delivered their Gebirgsjäger in a northern branch of Ofotfjord with the mission of capturing a Norwegian regimental supply base. Hans Ludemann and Herman Künne landed troops on a wild goose chase to neutralize nonexistent Norwegian forts. In the face of the German assault, Norway was not going to roll over. Old Norwegian coastal defense ships put up a fight. Around 0415 hours on 9 April 1940, the German invaders were sighted, and when they failed to respond to a Norwegian signal, a shot



was fired across the bow of the lead German destroyer. The Germans preferred to occupy Narvik peacefully, so responded to the signal and arranged to negotiate. Negotiations got underway, and the Germans tried to convince the Norwegians that they had come as friends, while also trying to persuade the Norwegians to surrender their coastal defense ships. They failed on both counts, and as the negotiators departed, the fighting started. The Germans sunk both Norwegian coastal defense ships in a matter of minutes with a total loss to the Norwegians of 276 lives. The Germans suffered no casualties. Norwegian naval resistance at Narvik was over. Fuel immediately became an issue for the German destroyers. Plans called for three tankers to be in the fjord with the destroyers, but two had been intercepted by British and Norwegian vessels, and only Jan Wellem was present to refuel the destroyers. Jan Wellem was a converted whale factory ship with improvised refueling capability. Two destroyers could be refueled at a time, but by early morning on 10 April 1940, only three of the nine destroyers had been refueled, and refueling was underway on two more. First Naval Battle of Narvik On 10 April 1940 the British navy struck. The 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, under the command of Captain Bernard Warburton‐Lee, entered the Ofotfjord. The flotilla was comprised of five H‐class destroyers: Hardy, Hotspur, Havoc, Hunter and Hostile. Warburton‐Lee had made Hardy his flagship. The late‐arriving Diether von Roeder had been posted as a picket ship at the entrance to the fjord, but had entered the fjord to queue up for refueling. Refueling was currently underway for Hermann Künne and Hans Lüdemann. The British attacked at 0430 hours, surprising the German force at the harbor entrance. They sank the Wilhelm Heidkamp and Anton Schmidt. Commodore Bonte, commander of Force I, went down with Wilhelm Heidkamp. Diether von Roeder was heavily damaged. Before leaving the British destroyers turned on the two dozen German and captured merchant ships in the harbor in order to deny their use to the Germans, and sank eleven of them. As the British headed out to open water, they encountered German destroyers emerging from smaller fjords leading off Ofotfjord. Wolfgang Zenker, Erich Koellner, and Erich Giese emerged from Herjangsfjord, while Georg Thiele and Bernd von Arnim exited Ballangen Bay and joined the fray. In the ensuing melee, Hardy came aflame and was beached. Hunter was torpedoed and sunk. Hotspur was badly damaged by a torpedo. The British destroyers broke off the battle and continued to open water, damaging Georg Thiele on their way. The inadequate refueling capabilities of the German force came into play as they were unable to give pursuit due to low fuel. Shortage of ammunition was also a factor. The ammunition situation was not going to improve soon. On the way out of the fjord, the surviving British destroyers encountered and sank the



German ammunition supply ship Rauenfels. The final act of the First Naval Battle of Narvik occurred when U‐25 and U‐51 fired torpedoes at the withdrawing British destroyers. There were no hits, either due to poor aim or faulty torpedoes, as some were observed to detonate before reaching their targets. The battle was over. Cost in combat vessels was two destroyers for each of the major combatants. Both commanders had been killed. Second Naval Battle of Narvik The British needed a victory at Narvik for both political and strategic purposes, so committed a battleship, nine destroyers, and two naval air squadrons under the command of Vice Admiral William Whitworth to complete the destruction of the remaining eight German destroyers in Ofotfjord, now under the command of Fregattenkapitän Erich Bey. The British returned to Ofotfjord on 13 April 1940 to find the German forces still low on both fuel and ammo. As a warm up to the surface ship action, a float‐equipped Swordfish aircraft launched from the catapult of the battleship Warspite bombed and sank U‐64 in Herjangsfjord, north of Narvik. The Swordfish made history in that it was the first case of an aircraft sinking a U‐boat during WWII, and it would stand as the only case of an aircraft launched from a battleship sinking a U‐boat. The Swordfish was not finished contributing and returned to its original mission, reconnaissance. It detected Erich Koellner trying to ambush the British ships. The full wrath of the British destroyers and battleship came down on her with shells and torpedoes, sinking Erich Koellner. Her commander and surviving crew were captured ashore by Norwegian forces. The British also attacked the German destroyers from the air, but the Swordfish torpedo/bomber aircraft from Furious had no success and lost two aircraft. Four German destroyers (Wolfgang Zenker, Bernd von Arnim, Hans Ludemann and Hermann Künne) engaged the British forces, but were ineffective, only managing to lightly damage the destroyer Bedouin. As ammunition supplies went from low to critical, the German destroyers began to withdraw deeper into the fjord. Hermann Künne missed the withdraw order and was set upon by the destroyer Eskimo. Undamaged but out of ammunition, Hermann Künne was scuttled in Herjangsfjord. Eskimo pursued to ensure that Hermann Künne could not easily be refloated. She struck the Hermann Künne with a torpedo, setting it aflame. Eskimo, in turn, was attacked by Georg Thiele and Hans Ludemann. Eskimo lost her bow, but refused to sink. Deither von Roeder and Erich Giese had engine problems and were docked, from whence they fired, damaging destroyers Punjabi and Cossack. Both German destroyers were sunk in place, and the German counterattack fizzled out. Warspite’s guns pounded shore batteries and installations to good effect. Warspite was the target of one final futile torpedo attack from U‐46 and U‐48 as she departed the fjord 14 April 1940.



The surviving German destroyers (Wolfgang Zenker, Georg Thiele, Bernd von Arnim, and Hans Lüdemann) fled into Rombaksfjord. Low on fuel and ammo, outgunned by a battleship, and with no counter to the British air component, the destroyers were scuttled. Aftermath On the water, the Germans had lost ten destroyers and one U‐boat, along with assorted cargo ships and an ammunition supply ship. The British had lost two destroyers. Not only were the losses lopsided, the German losses amounted to half of the Kriegsmarine’s destroyer strength. But in spite of the result on the water, the Allies had no ground forces immediately available to follow it up. Narvik and vicinity remained in German hands. The Germans had approximately 5,000 ground forces at Narvik from various sources. The original 1,900 mountain troops were augmented by 2,600 sailors who had lost their destroyers. Approximately 300 specialist troops had arrived after passing through neutral Sweden while posing as health workers. And later in the land campaign, another 1,000 airborne troops were dropped in and rounded out German forces at above 5,000. Norwegian and other Allied troops in the Narvik vicinity would top out at about 24,500. The Allied contingents sent to the vicinity of Narvik were a varied lot. Besides the Norwegians, there was a British detachment, a French expeditionary force that included two battalions of the Foreign Legion, and the Polish Independent Highland Brigade (so named for a highland region of southern Poland from whence it came; they did not wear kilts.) Though the contribution to the effort from the various Allies led to a substantial force, there was no unity of command for the Allies, or even unity of command between land and naval forces for the British, until 21 April 1940 when British Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cork was given supreme command of all Allied forces. Other than Norwegian advances in the east, the Narvik front was quiet through early May 1940. Using an amphibious attack on 12 May 1940, the Allies cleared both sides of Herjangsfjord and planned to follow that up by attacking across Rombaksfjord toward Narvik. At 2340 hours on 28 May, the Allies began a naval bombardment in support of a coordinated attack on Narvik. The German commander decided to evacuate Narvik and did so before 0700 hours on 29 May. More than 6 weeks after the naval victory at Narvik, the Allies had achieved victory on land at Narvik. But the wider Norwegian campaign would not be as successful. The Germans were pressed from three directions by Norwegians, French and Poles, and surrender began to look inevitable. But five days earlier on 24 May, due to the German advances in France and the Low Countries which had begun on 10 May, Lord Cork had received orders to withdraw from Norway. The attack on Narvik was to disguise British intentions and fool the Germans. It fooled the Norwegians, too, who were not informed of the withdrawal



order until early June. Plans for Norway to carry on alone were realized as being futile, and King of Norway Haakon VII and his government were evacuated to Britain on 7 June 1940. The evacuation of Allied troops was already underway, and was completed on 8 June. The Germans under General Dietl re‐entered Narvik that same day, and Norwegian resistance ended on 10 June. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Narvik http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/timeline/factfiles/nonflash/a1148483.shtml http://www.naval‐history.net/WW2CampaignsNorway.htm http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/campaign_narvik_1940.html

Attack on Mers‐el‐Kébir Introduction On 3 July 1940, British naval forces attacked the French Navy at Mers‐el‐Kébir, a French base on the Mediterranean Sea in what was then French Algeria. The British had lost its most important ally at the time when on 22 June, France signed an armistice with the victorious Germans. A new French pro‐Nazi collaborationist government centered in Vichy had taken over France. This government had control over the second largest force of capital ships in Europe behind Britain. The British reasonably feared that the French navy would fall into the hands of the Germans just at a time when the Battle of the Atlantic was getting underway, negating their tenuous naval superiority at a critical juncture. Britain had given conditional consent for the French entering talks with the Germans for an armistice on the condition that the French fleet would sail immediately for British harbors. After the armistice, Winston Churchill, British Prime Minister and former First Lord of the Admiralty, was unconvinced by assurances from Vichy France that the French fleet would remain under its control. He felt that the risk of the French fleet coming under German control was too great. A combined German and Vichy fleet would be a serious challenge and might cut off Britain’s supply lines, sea communication with her empire, and links to British forces in North Africa. The Armistice between France and Germany precluded German demands on the French fleet, but by 1940 Germany’s word was worthless.



Prelude Operation Catapult was the British plan to neutralize French ships not under British direct control. The first step of the operation was to grab the low‐hanging fruit, those ships that were in British or British‐controlled ports. It was successful, but not bloodless. The crew of a French submarine resisted at Portsmouth, killing three Royal Navy personnel and suffering one fatality themselves. Overall the British took two obsolete battleships, two destroyers, eight torpedo boats, six submarines, and other lesser vessels. The action created tension between the British and the French, including the Free French. It was only the beginning. Mers‐el‐ Kébir was home to a powerful squadron of French ships including two WWI era battleships (Bretagne, Provence), two modern battleships (Dunkerque, Strasbourg), six destroyers (Mogador, Volta, Terrible, Kersaint, Lynx, Tigre), and a seaplane tender (Commandant Test). The French commander was Admiral Marcel‐Bruno Gensoul. From Gibraltar, the British Force H commander, Admiral James Somerville (Vice‐Admiral in some sources), sent an ultimatum to Admiral Gensoul. The ultimatum demanded that the French fleet either join the British against the Germans, sail to some British, French Caribbean, or American port where they would be beyond the reach of the Germans, or be scuttled by the French. Failing to select one of the options would leave Admiral Somerville to take whatever actions necessary to ensure that the fleet did not fall into German hands. Admiral Gensoul had six hours to accept. The ultimatum was backed up by the carrier Ark Royal, battlecruiser Hood (Admiral Somerville’s flagship), battleships Valiant and Resolution, cruisers Arethusa and Enterprise, and destroyers Wrestler, Forester, Faulknor, Foxhound, Fearless, Escort, Foresight, Keppel, Active, Vidette and Vortigern. The submarine Pandora was part of the force, but was operating off Oran. The negotiations got off to a bad start and went downhill. Admiral Somerville sent the commander of Ark Royal, French‐speaking Captain Cedric Holland, to present the ultimatum. Miffed that he would not be negotiating with a senior officer, Admiral Gensoul sent an underling to negotiate, leading to delay and confusion. The basis for a peaceful solution was there. French Navy Minister Admiral Darlan had already in earlier orders given Admiral Gensoul the option of moving the French fleet to American waters if the fleet was in danger of being seized by a foreign power. This option in the British ultimatum was not transmitted to Admiral Darlan when Admiral Gensoul sent an account of the British ultimatum. A possible nonviolent option was not taken. Another monkey wrench in the negotiations was Admiral Darlan’s order to French naval vessels in the Mediterranean to make steam for Mers‐el‐Kébir to assist Admiral Gensoul. The Admiralty intercepted the order. The British felt pressed for time. Negotiations had gone on for over two hours. At 1726 hours, Admiral Somerville radioed Admiral Gensoul and informed him that he had fifteen minutes in which to accept the ultimatum.



The Battle The British force was comparable to the French fleet, but there were factors that gave the British an advantage. First, the French fleet was at anchor in a narrow harbor. Second, an attack was not expected in spite of the ultimatum, and the French ships were not ready for combat. Third, the two French modern battleships, Dunkerque and Strasbourg, were so positioned as to be unable to immediately bring their main armaments to bear. And finally, the 15‐inch guns of the British capital ships outgunned the French. While negotiations were not yet terminated, the British made their first move. Ark Royal launched Swordfish torpedo aircraft, escorted by Skua fighter bombers, to drop magnetic mines on the Mers‐el‐ Kébir harbor exit route. French H‐75 fighters intercepted the British aircraft and shot down a Skua. Both crewmembers of the Skua were killed, and they would be the only British fatalities in the battle. At 1754 hours on 3 July 1940, the British fleet executed Churchill’s orders and opened fire. They scored their first hit on their third salvo, causing the magazine on the battleship Bretagne to explode. At 1809 hours the Bretagne went down with 977 dead. French return fire was ineffectual. Dunkerque’s boiler was hit and she was immobile within the harbor. Provence and destroyer Mogador were damaged by the British fire and intentionally run aground within the harbor. Twenty minutes after the start of the battle Admiral Somerville ordered his surface vessels to cease fire. Several French ships got underway, made it out of the harbor and successfully traversed the minefield. Strasbourg and four destroyers made it to open water, and came under attack by Ark Royal Swordfish armed with bombs. The bombing was ineffectual and cost the British two Swordfish shot down by antiaircraft fire. Their crews were rescued by the destroyer Wrestler. At 1843 hours Admiral Somerville ordered a surface pursuit of the fleeing French vessels. The British cruisers Arethusa and Enterprise reported firing on an unidentified French destroyer which escaped. At 2020 hours Admiral Somerville called off the surface pursuit but aircraft from Ark Royal continued their attack. At 2055 hours Swordfish attacked Strasbourg with no better results than the earlier attack. Strasbourg made its way to safety at the French port of Toulon, arriving the following day. The British assessed the damage to Dunkerque and Provence to be low, so Swordfish returned to Mers‐el‐ Kébir on 6July 1940. The patrol boat Terre‐Neuve, moored alongside Dunkerque, was struck by a torpedo from a Swordfish, and its supply of depth charges exploded, causing serious damage to Dunkerque. Terre‐Neuve did not survive the explosion.



Epilogue One French battleship, Bretagne, was sunk, five other ships were damaged, 1,297 French servicemen lost their lives, and about 350 were wounded. Two British airmen from Ark Royal were killed. Relations between the two nations that had fought side by side against Nazi Germany a mere two months earlier were wounded and sunk to an even lower stage than that reached with the installation of the collaborationist Vichy regime. On 27 November 1942 the Germans did what was expected of them all along and tried to seize the French fleet at Toulon as they occupied Vichy France. Dunkerque and Strasbourg survived Mers‐el‐ Kébir only to be scuttled at Toulon, along with all the other ships there of any military value, before the Germans arrived. In a letter to Churchill days later, Admiral Darlan reminded him of their conversation in which he (Darlan) said that there was no question of ever surrendering the fleet. He said that the destruction of the fleet at Toulon proved him right. His unstated bottom line was that the Battle of Mers‐el‐ Kébir had been an unnecessary British betrayal. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Mers‐el‐K%C3%A9bir http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/worldwari1/p/operation‐catapult.htm http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/operation_catapult.htm http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/articles/merselkebir.aspx http://www.historynet.com/operation‐catapult‐naval‐destruction‐at‐mers‐el‐kebir.htm http://forum.worldofwarships.com/index.php?/topic/11107‐battle‐of‐mers‐el‐kebir/

Battle of Calabria Prelude Italian ground forces fighting for the Axis in North Africa required supply convoys from Italy to keep them in fighting trim. Early in the war, supply efforts were needed just to get Italian forces equipped for offensive operations. On 6 July 1940, an Italian convoy of four merchantmen left Naples bound for Benghazi, shaping their route to deceive the British into thinking that they were bound for Tripoli, but British code breakers knew the true Italian plans. (The Italians were reading British mail, too.) The merchantmen were joined by two torpedo boats and a fifth merchantman and escorts the following day. It was a substantial convoy for this theater. The payload was 2,190 troops, 72 M‐11 medium tanks, 232 vehicles, 10,445 tons of supplies, and 5,720 tons of fuel and



lubricants. Some vessels originally with the convoy, primarily destroyers, did not take part in the ensuing battle due to mechanical problems or fuel shortages. (Combatants for both sides are shown in Table 1.) Britain was also sending a resupply and reinforcement convoys to Malta at the same time. The British Malta convoy was to return to Alexandria in Egypt with evacuees. The convoy was divided into two groups based on the speed that the merchantmen could maintain, a fast group (13 knots) and a slow group (9 knots). Convoy escorts were divided into three groups. Force A had five cruisers and a destroyer. Force B had the battleship Warspite (last seen by our readers pounding German destroyers at Narvik) and five destroyers. Force C was the main body of escorts and consisted of the battleships Royal Sovereign and Malaya, the aircraft carrier Eagle, and ten destroyers. The vessels that took part in the battle are shown in Table 1. At 1440 hours on 8 July 1940, two Italian Cant Z.506 triple engine float planes based out of Tobruk sighted and followed the British fleet. The Italian commander, Admiral Inigo Campioni, ordered the warships in the convoy fleet to turn eastward towards the British and prepare to give combat. He was overruled by the Italian Supreme Command who did not want to risk what would have been a night engagement by the time the two fleets met. Instead the Italians avoided contact for the time being, and dealt with logistics problems. Two cruisers and three destroyers were detached to refuel in Sicily, and the merchantmen kept several destroyers as escorts. A destroyer group from Taranto was called up to replace the detached destroyers. Meanwhile, the Italians took up the cudgel against the British fleet using air attacks. From mid‐morning to early evening, 72 land‐based bombers of the Regia Aeronautica harried the British from 12,000 feet. The hope was to weaken the British fleet to set up the surface battle. The British escaped with only a single hit, but a telling one, on the cruiser Gloucester. A hit on the bridge killed 17 including the ship’s captain, and wounded 9 more. Gloucester would remain on duty, but would have to be controlled from an emergency station. Later in the day on 8 July 1940 the Italians lost contact with the British fleet. During the evening the British commander, Admiral Andrew Cunningham, maneuvered so as to keep his fleet between the Italian fleet and their return route to the Gulf of Taranto while at the same time avoiding Italian air reconnaissance. He was successful. His position remained a mystery to the Italian commander until 1330 hours on 9 July. On the other hand, the location of the Italian fleet was made known to Admiral Cunningham at 0730 hours when a reconnaissance aircraft from Malta spotted the Italians at 0730 hours and tailed them for four hours.



Table 1. The Combatants Battle of Calabria 9‐Jul‐40 Italy Britain Conti di Cavour Battleship Eagle Carrier Giulio Cesare Battleship NAS 813 (Torpedo) Swordfish Zara Cruiser NAS 824 (Torpedo) Swordfish Fiume Cruiser Warspite Battleship Gorizia Cruiser Malaya Battleship Pola Cruiser Royal Sovereign Battleship Bolzano Cruiser Orion Cruiser Trento Cruiser Neptune Cruiser Eugenio de Savoia Cruiser Sydney (AUS) Cruiser Emanuele Filiberto Duca d'Aosta Cruiser Gloucester Cruiser Muzio Attendolo Cruiser Liverpool Cruiser Raimondo Montecuccoli Cruiser Nubian Destroyer Alberico de Barbiano Cruiser Mohawk Destroyer Alberto di Giussano Cruiser Hero Destroyer Duca degli Abruzzi Cruiser Hereward Destroyer Giuseppe Garibaldi Cruiser Decoy Destroyer Vittorio Alfieri Destroyer Stuart (AUS) Destroyer Artigliere Destroyer Hyperion Destroyer Lanciere Destroyer Hostile Destroyer Leone Pancaldo Destroyer Hasty Destroyer Dardo Destroyer Ilex Destroyer Sestri Ponente Destroyer Dainty Destroyer Freccia Destroyer Defender Destroyer Saetta Destroyer Juno Destroyer Strale Destroyer Janus Destroyer Marconi Submarine Vampire (AUS) Destroyer

Voyager (AUS) Destroyer The Battle At 1200 hours on 9 July 1940 the opposing fleets were 90 miles apart off Calabria, the toe of Italy. Admiral Cunningham untethered the faster Warspite (28 knots) from the slower Royal Sovereign and Malaya (18 knots), and sent in Warspite supported by cruisers without them. At 1310 hours Admiral Campioni received orders from the Italian Supreme Command to engage the British and to keep the action close to the Italian



mainland and airbases. At 1315 hours Eagle launched Swordfish against the Italian heavy cruisers with no success. By 1400 hours Admiral Cunnigham had successfully maneuvered his fleet to cut off the Italian fleet from its base in Taranto. The Allies were formed up with the cruiser group as their leading edge, followed by Warspite. At 1452 hours, Neptune made the first British report of an enemy fleet since Jutland during WWI, and the first sighting in the Mediterranean since Nelson sailed there. At 1515 hours at a range of 21,500 meters the Italian cruisers opened fire. Neptune and Liverpool responded at 1517 hours. The gunnery capabilities of the two opponents differed but were well matched. Italian range finding was superior to that of the British. Allied gunlaying was superior, and they could produce tighter shot groups. At 1522 hours the Italian fire began to come close to the cruisers, so Vice Admiral John Tovey broke off the engagement a mere seven minutes in. It was none too soon for Neptune, however, which was struck at this time by splinters from a round fired by Giuseppe Garibaldi. Neptune’s reconnaissance aircraft was rendered unusable, and the catapult was damaged. By 1530 hour the opening round of the surface engagement ended and firing ceased. The fight moved “up card” to the heavyweights. Warspite started taking Italian cruisers under fire, but her early rounds fell short. The Italian cruisers retired under smoke. Warspite was unable to press the battle, and instead circled in place to allow Malaya to catch up. Royal Sovereign was still hopelessly out of the action. Admiral Campioni moved his two battleships forward to counter Warspite. At 1548 hours Giulio Cesare opened fire on Warspite at a range of 26,400 meters. Conte di Cavour was with Giulio Cesare, but held her fire. Her assigned targets were Malaya and Royal Sovereign, still out of range. The decision not to add the fire of Conte di Cavour to that of Giulio Cesare because of the difficulty rangefinding parties had identifying their own splashes when more than one ship was firing on the same target. Warspite assumed both ships were immediate threats and split her fire between the two. Long fire from Giulio Cesare caused light damage to Warspite’s escort destroyers, Hereward and Decoy. At 1555 hours the Italian cruisers, counting on Warspite’s fire to be concentrated on the Italian battleships, reentered the fray but were driven off by the return of the Allied cruisers. The battleships began to get the range. At 1559 hours two rounds from Giulio Cesare nearly hit Warspite, while one of Warspite’s 15‐inch rounds struck Giulio Cesare killing 66 and wounding 49. At a range of over 24,000 meters and a 33‐second flight, it was one of the longest naval artillery hits in history. Though the structural damage was superficial, a secondary effect proved very damaging. Stored anti‐aircraft ammo had been set off, and smoke from the resulting fire was drawn into the engine room causing an evacuation and the shutting down of half the boilers. Giulio Cesare’s speed dropped to 18 knots, and Conte di Cavour shifted her attention from Malaya to Warspite. The Italian cruiser Bolzano was also struck but without serious damage.



Warspite appeared to have the hobbled Giulio Cesare for the picking, put again turned off to allow the Malaya to catch up. At 1601 hours, Italian destroyers made smoke and their larger brethren reached concealment. Meanwhile the cruisers reentered the battle. At 1558 hours Fiume opened fire on Liverpool, and was soon joined by Zara, Bolanzo and Pola. Gorizia and Trento entered firing range and commenced firing. At 1607 hours Neptune struck back avenging the loss of her reconnaissance aircraft, hitting Bolzano with three 6‐inch rounds. The hits temporarily locked Bolzano’s rudder and caused two fatalities in the torpedo room. On the fringes of the battle, a near miss caused minor damage to an Italian destroyer, Vitorio Alfieri. Back on Giulio Cesare, repairs had been made to the extent that the battleship could make 22 knots, but she was withdrawn from battle along with Conte di Cavour, as Admiral Campioni considered the matchup between his one good battleship and the three British battleships and a carrier as too unfavorable. Destroyers from both sides made long range torpedo attacks, but there were no hits. At 1640 hours, the final act of the battle took place as 126 Italian aircraft attacked the British fleet. Eagle, Warspite and Malaya all suffered minor damage. Showing no partiality, about 50 of the Italian aircraft also attacked Italian ships, but none were damaged. The next day, 9 July 1940, at 0940 hours the British naval air arm offered a riposte, and a Swordfish sunk the destroyer Leone Pancaldo. It was shallow water, however, and the Leone Pancaldo was raised and back in service in less than a year and a half. Epilogue Both fleets made for home ports after the battle. The Italian cargo ships had sailed past the action and made it safely to Libya. This was the primary basis of Italians claimed of victory. These claims may have also been inspired by inflated battle reports from the Regia Aeronautica claiming to have damaged half of the Allied fleet. In fact the air superiority that the Italians enjoyed was ineffectively employed and achieved nothing other than minor damage to Gloucester. On the Allied side of the ledger, their cargo ships and escorts also made it safely to their destination. A lesson learned was that modern battleships were needed. The older models were more of a hindrance than a help. Ultimately, with only one ship, the Italian destroyer Leone Pancaldo, sunk the first battle between the belligerents in the Med during WWII can fairly be said to have had an indecisive outcome. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Calabria http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?t=8466



http://www.desertwar.net/battle‐of‐calabria.html http://regiamarina.net/detail_text_with_list.asp http://www.naval‐history.net/WW2CampaignsRNMed.htm https://sites.google.com/site/mezeviris/battleofcalabria http://blog.mongoosepublishing.co.uk/?p=338 http://www.gunplot.net/matapan/scrapironflott3.html

Battle of Cape Spada Prelude On 19July 1940, ten days after the Battle of Calabria, the British Navy pitted five veteran ships of Calabria and one veteran of the First Battle of Narvik against two untested cruisers of the Italian Navy. The engagement took place in the Mediterranean Sea off Crete’s Cape Spada, the northwest end of the island. The two Italian high‐speed light cruisers, Giovanni dalle Bande Nere and Bartolomeo Colleoni, were enroute from Tripoli in North Africa to a new duty station at Leros in the Dodecanese Islands. The two cruisers formed the 2nd Cruiser Division and were commanded by Vice Admiral Fernando Casardi. While transiting the Aegean they were discovered by an Allied surface patrol. The Allied squadron consisted of the HMAS Sydney, the British H class destroyers Havock, Hyperion, Hasty and Hero, and I class destroyer Ilex. Havock had been at Narvik, the rest at Calabria. The Allied force was commanded by Australian Captain John Collins. Battle Sydney and Havock were on a sweep for submarines near the approaches to the Gulf of Athens and were approximately 64 kilometers (40 miles) north of the four other British destroyers when the four destroyers encountered the Italian cruisers at 0730 hours on 19 July 1940. The destroyers alerted Sydney at 0733 hours. The Italian cruisers pursued the outgunned British destroyers north, but without using their IMAM Ro. 43 reconnaissance aircraft, they did not know that they were being drawn towards Sydney. Sydney, however, was kept abreast of developments by wireless from the bait destroyers while maintaining radio silence herself. The crew of the Sydney took up battle stations at 0815 hours. The Italian cruisers came within sight of Sydney at 0826 hours and three minutes later Sydney opened fire from 18,300 meters. The Italian



cruisers gave up the chase and turned southwest. At this point the speed advantage of the Italian cruisers was negated by the course they were forced to take. Going directly south would trap them between Crete and Sydney. Going southwest gave Sydney an approach angle that ensured an engagement. The hunters had become the hunted. Sydney gave chase, making her top speed of 32.5 knots. The Italians made smoke. Sydney fired upon whichever ship was visible at a given moment. She pounded Bartolomeo Colleoni. The light armor of the Italian cruisers was scant protection against Sydney’s shells. These Condottieri class light cruisers bore the less than confidence‐building nickname “cruisers of paper”. Shots from Sydney struck Bartolomeo Colleoni’s boilers at 0923 hours and she drifted to a stop, dead in the water. Her main guns were gone and she could not maneuver, but Bartolomeo Colleoni fought on with her 3.9 inch (100 mm) guns until, at 0959 hours, torpedoes from Ilex and Hyperion sent her to the bottom. The dead numbered 121, while 555 were rescued by the British destroyers despite harassment by Italian bombers. Sydney could now concentrate all her fire on Giovanni dalle Bande Nere, and traded hits. Sydney sustained damage to her foremost funnel resulting in one man wounded, while Giovanni dalle Bande Nere was struck at least twice and suffered eight killed. But Sydney was unable to finish the job. With her ammo low and Giovanni dalle Bande Nere pulling away, she gave up the chase at 1037 hours. Giovanni dalle Bande Nere returned to North Africa, making port at Benghazi. Epilogue With the Giovanni dalle Bande Nere at large, Allied shipping was disrupted. Convoy AN.2 out of Port Said was ordered back to port where it remained until the Allies were certain that Giovanni dalle Bande Nere was no longer at sea. The British battleship Warspite made an appearance at the end, and with a screen of destroyers made sure that Giovanni dalle Bande Nere did, in fact, go back to a North African port. Havock suffered a flooded boiler when she was damaged by Italian bombers trying to keep pursuing British ships away from the coast of North Africa. While searching for Giovanni dalle Bande Nere, a floatplane from Warspite developed engine trouble and had to ditch in the sea near Tobruk. The crew was rescued by the Italians and became POWs. Meanwhile, Captain Umberto Narvi, commander of the Bartolomeo Colleoni and one of the 555 rescued Italian sailors, died of wounds aboard a British hospital ship in Alexandria. He was buried with full naval honors in the British military cemetery there, and his funeral was well attended by British sailors. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cape_Spada http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages‐battles/ww2/cape‐spada.htm



http://www.desertwar.net/battle‐of‐cape‐spada.html http://museum.wa.gov.au/explore/sydney/history‐hmas‐sydney‐ii

Battle of Dakar Prelude The port of Dakar and French West Africa (modern Senegal) had a number of attractions to Allied forces in the early fall of 1940. Capture of the port would deprive Vichy France of a colony, and bring another French colony over to the Allies (to join Cameroun and French Equatorial Africa already with the Free French). French West Africa was at that time the unlikely location of the gold reserves of both the Polish government in exile and the Banque de France. Finally, the only port that the Allies had in the area was at Freetown, Sierra Leone, and this port was inferior to the port of Dakar. Just over two months earlier, a British attack at Mers‐el‐Kébir had neutralized a French fleet that the British feared would fall into German hands. This time the leader of the Free French, General Charles de Gaulle, would attempt to get the French forces at Dakar to change sides before force would be used. The Allies sent a task force of one aircraft carrier, two battleships, five cruisers, and eleven destroyers (Table 1) to support what was codenamed Operation Menace. They were accompanied by troop transports carrying 8,000 soldiers. Should the peaceful approach fail, they were to take the port by force. Table 1. The Combatants France Britain Richelieu Battleship Ark Royal* Carrier

Georges Leygues Cruiser NAS 800 (Fighter/Bomber) Skaus

Montcalm Cruiser NAS 803 (Fighter/Bomber) Skaus

El Dzejair Aux Cruiser NAS 807 (Fighter) Fulmar El Kantara Aux Cruiser NAS 810 (Torpedo) Swordfish El Mansour Aux Cruiser NAS 820 (Torpedo) Swordfish Schoelcher Aux Cruiser Barham Battleship Ville d'Oran Aux Cruiser Resolution Battleship Audacieux Destroyer Australia (AUS) Cruiser Fantasque Destroyer Cumberland Cruiser Malin Destroyer Devonshire Cruiser Hardi Destroyer Dragon Cruiser Ajax Submarine Dehli Cruiser



Bévéziers Submarine Echo Destroyer Persée Submarine Eclipse Destroyer

Escapade Destroyer Faulknor Destroyer Foresight Destroyer Forester Destroyer Fortune Destroyer Fury Destroyer Griffin Destroyer Greyhound Destroyer Inglefield Destroyer

The Allied force had some combat veteran ships, including veterans of the attack on the French fleet at Mers‐el‐Kébir. The aircraft carrier Ark Royal, the battleship Resolution, and the destroyers Faulknor, Foresight, and Forester had all battled the French there. Forester had also been at the second battle at Narvik. The cruiser Cumberland had been at the River Platte. The Allied commander was Admiral John Cunningham. The French fleet at Dakar had one battleship, two cruisers, five auxiliary cruisers, four destroyers, and three submarines. The French lacked combat experience, except for the Richelieu. Richelieu was only 95% complete when she left Brest just ahead of the Germans on 18 June 1940. Once at Dakar, and after the establishment of the Vichy regime, Richelieu was attacked and torpedoed by aircraft from the HMS Hermes, who days before had been operating with the French forces there. Rendered immobile by the torpedo damage, Richelieu, one of the most advanced warships in the French fleet, was reduced to serving as a floating gun battery. Battle The battle started mildly enough. On 23 September 1940 the British fleet aircraft dropped leaflets rather than bombs over Dakar. Free French aircraft crews and emissaries flying from Ark Royal to nearby Ouakam airfield were taken prisoner as soon as they landed. The Vichy did not want to talk. Free French trying to peacefully enter Dakar by boat in the port were given an even less friendly welcome, and were fired upon. This set the tone for subsequent encounters. At 1000 hours Vichy ships trying to leave port were given warning shots from Australia, and returned to port. Once the ships were back, coastal batteries opened fire on Australia, leading to a lively exchange between the British fleet and the coastal guns. An attempt later in the day to land Free French on a beach south‐east of Dakar was scrubbed when it drew heavy fire from strongpoints on the shore. Weather was also a factor, as a heavy fog caused confusion.



The first surface engagement occurred that same afternoon when the Vichy destroyer Audaceiux ignored the warning shots fired earlier in the day, sallied forth, was intercepted by the Australia, fired upon, and set aflame. Audaceiux had to be beached. Leaflets having been ineffective, the British tried bombs on 24 September 1940. A series of three aerial attacks were made. The first was made by six Skua fighter bombers carrying 500‐pound bombs against Richelieu, but no hits were made. The second attack was made by six Swordfish carrying 250‐pound bombs against the coastal batteries. This attack also failed. The third attack was a return visit to Richelieu. Three Skuas and three Swordfish attacked, and again the attack failed. The aerial attacks cost the British three Skuas and three Swordfish shot down. The leaflet drops were as effective and less costly. During the rest of the 24th and into 25 September 1940, the fighting was mainly between British fleet and the coastal batteries including the floating battery Richelieu, which did not fare well. Barham struck Richelieu with two 15‐inch shells. Richelieu was ineffective striking back. She had gun failures and propellant problems. Richelieu was using reconditioned propellant left at Dakar the previous winter by the battleship Strasbourg, a participant in the battle of Mers‐el‐Kébir. The degraded propellant reduced the range of the Richelieu’s guns and created fire control difficulties. Richelieu went 0 for 24, not scoring a single hit over the two days of action. Barham was struck twice herself, and if not from Richelieu guns, Richelieu still got a measure of revenge. The coastal batteries that hit Barham were manned by crewmen from Richelieu, redeployed when the ship’s No. 1 main turret become nonoperational. At the end of the day on 24 September 1940 British naval air tried once more, this time with torpedoes. A flight of nine Swordfish escorted by three Skuas went for the French cruisers. Thick flak and evasive maneuvers prevented any torpedo hits. Two planes were shot down bringing the number of lost British aircraft to eight. If the Vichy surface ships (other than Audaceiux) would not or could not come out to fight, the subsurface ships would. The Vichy submarine Bévéziers torpedoed the British battleship Resolution. Damage to Resolution was so severe that she had to be towed to Capetown, South Africa for repairs. The submarines Persée and Ajax were not as successful. Both were sunk before they could strike any Allied ships. Results It was clear that the Vichy French were not going to negotiate or back down. De Gaulle had oversold his ability to bring the garrison over to the Allies’ side, and his reputation amongst the Allies suffered accordingly. Dakar and French West Africa would remain in Vichy hands. One would have to go all the way to French Equatorial Africa to find a Free French garrison on the continent. Perhaps that is why Rick and Louis planned to go from Casablanca all the way to Brazzaville.



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_DakarOne http://www.desertwar.net/battle‐of‐dakar.html https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5kiNJcDG4E0 http://ww2today.com/23‐september‐1940‐the‐french‐fire‐on‐the‐british‐at‐dakar http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?t=12077 http://armedforcesmuseum.com/wwii‐west‐africa‐campaign/ http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=96 http://forum.warthunder.com/index.php?/topic/178286‐unknown‐and‐unsung‐battle‐of‐the‐second‐world‐war‐remembering‐dakar/

Battle of Taranto Prelude The Battle of Taranto took place on the night of 11/12 November 1940 between forces of the British navy and the Italian navy. The battle was a rematch of sorts for the commanders facing off. Admiral Andrew Cunningham commanded the British Mediterranean Fleet, while Admiral Inigo Campioni commanded the Italian forces. They had fought to a draw at the Battle of Calabria four months earlier. The British task force that fought the Battle of Taranto was commanded by Rear Admiral Lumley Lyster. Taranto is a port city on Italy’s southeast coast. The British working assumption was that the Italians vessels kept there were the major part of a “fleet in being”. Though a threat to the Allies due to its existence, the Italian fleet would not seek battle on the open seas. They would sally forth to interdict British efforts to resupply and reinforce their forces in North Africa (and Malta), but would stay conservative. Convoy support was a task not planned for and adopted by Italy until after Italy entered the war. The Italian fleet outnumbered the British fleet in every vessel class except aircraft carrier, but Italy had no hope of replacing any losses larger than a destroyer. The British had contingency plans dating back to 1935 for the seizure of Taranto. After the Munich Crisis of 193, Commander of the British Mediterranean Fleet Admiral Sir Dudley Pound modified the plans to consist of a night attack on the harbor using Fairey TSR Swordfish aircraft carrying torpedoes. Training for such a mission began, and security was so tight that no written records were kept. Pound turned his command



over to Cunningham with a recommendation to consider the attack, which became known as Operation Judgment (also found as Operation Judgement). Operation Judgment was originally planned for 21 October 1940. It was Tafalgar Day, a good omen. However, mishaps aboard the aircraft carrier Eagle caused the mission to be scrubbed. Auxiliary fuel tanks had been mounted on the Swordfish to give them the ranged needed for the mission, and fire broke out in one of the tanks and spread. Additionally, Eagle’s fuel system broke down. She was replaced in the mission by Illustrious. The mission was rescheduled for the night of 11/12 November, which would make it part of Operation MB8, a series of ten naval operations in the Med. The flurry of activity was expected to confuse the Italians and work to the advantage of Operation Judgment. In addition to the Illustrious, Rear Admiral Lumley’s force consisted of the heavy cruisers Berwick and York, the light cruisers Gloucester and Glasgow, and the destroyers Hyperion, Ilex, Hasty and Havelock. Among the two dozen Italian capital ships at Taranto were the battleships Conti di Cavour, Andria Doria, Littorio, Vittorio Veneto and Caio Duilio, the cruisers Gorizia and Trento, and the destroyers Lebeccio and Passagno. Hyperion, Ilex and Hasty had been at the battles of Calabria and Cape Spada. Gloucester had been at Calabria. Conti di Cavour, Gorizia and Trento had been at Calabria. But this was to be a new type of naval battle, and previous surface experience would not yield high dividends. Preparation The naval aircraft that would figure so prominently in the battle consisted of 21 Swordfish from the 813, 815, 819 and 824 Naval Air Squadrons (NAS), down from 24 Swordfish due to contaminated fuel and other technical difficulties. There was concern that the force was too small. Only half of the Swordfish were to carry torpedoes while the other half carried bombs (and flares meant for diversions). Casualties of 50% were expected. The final squadron in the task force, 806 NAS, was a fighter squadron and would fly cover for the task force with Fairey Fulmars. Reconnaissance flights from Malta confirmed the presence of the Italian fleet at Taranto. Photos taken during these flights revealed previously undetected barrage balloons. Appropriate changes were made to flight approaches. On the night of 11 November 1940 as the attack was forming up, one final reconnaissance aircraft overflew Taranto to make sure that the Italian fleet was present. The Italian fleet was present, and an attack on the harbor was not expected. The Attack The British attack would face a harbor defense of 101 anti‐aircraft guns and 193 machineguns in addition to ships’ guns. Passive defensive measures included barrage



balloons and torpedo nets. Twenty‐seven barrage balloons were in place on the night of the attack. Originally 87 balloons had been installed, but high winds and lack of hydrogen had reduced the number deployed to 27. Capital ships were protected by torpedo nets, but only one third of the required netting was in place at the time of the attack. Additionally, the nets allowed a gap of over two feet (60 cm) between the bottom of the net and the bottom of the harbor. Getting a torpedo through that gap might be difficult, but the British were more afraid that their torpedoes would bottom out in the harbor mud. If they could avoid that pitfall, there was a small but sufficient gap to exploit. A torpedo travelling just above the bottom and passing below a ship would still explode due to its magnetic proximity fuse. Bombs would be used too, so the attack did not depend entirely on torpedoes. At 2040 hours on 11 November 1940 the first wave of NAS 815 aircraft, six Swordfish with bombs and six with torpedoes, launched from Illustrious. A second wave left at 2134 hours but had one aircraft turn back due to an auxiliary fuel tank problem. The timing of the assault allowed the aircraft to attack in the direction of the rising moon. The first wave unintentionally split into two sections when three torpedo‐armed Swordfish and one bomb‐armed Swordfish became separated in the thin cloud cover. This small group of strays continued on to Taranto. At 2258 hours the main group reached the harbor from the southwest. An aircraft dropped flares, and then was joined by a second aircraft in an attack on the oil tanks, which they set aflame. The next three aircraft, led by NAS 815 commander Lieutenant Commander K. Williamson, used this other‐worldly illumination to attack the battleship Conti di Cavour. A torpedo put a 27‐ft hole below the waterline in the side of Conti di Cavour. Lieutenant Commander Williamson’s Swordfish was shot down by Conti di Cavour’s anti‐aircraft guns and both crewmen were captured. The two surviving aircraft pressed on to attack the battleship Andrea Doria, but in spite of excellent flying while dodging barrage balloons in heavy anti‐aircraft fire, they were unable to hit her. The next three aircraft from the first wave came in from a slightly more northerly vector and went after the battleship Littorio, striking it with two torpedoes. The third torpedo missed the battleship Vittorio Veneto. The bombers in the first wave attacked next. They targeted cruisers and destroyers, but had no hits. The second wave arrived just before midnight from the southwest and its lead aircraft dropped flares. Two aircraft attacked Littorio with torpedoes, and the battleship suffered her third torpedo hit. An aircraft launched a torpedo at Vittorio Veneto, but the ship’s luck held and the torpedo missed. The battleship Caio Duilio was not as lucky, and was hit by a torpedo. She sustained a large hole in her hull and both of her forward magazines were flooded. The cruiser Gorizia shot down a Swordfish while it was attacking Littorio. Both crewmen were killed.



Results Conti di Cavour, hit by a torpedo, sunk. Permission to ground the ship came too late. Fortunately she sunk in a relatively shallow spot, and her superstructure and armaments were above water. She was raised and was still undergoing repairs when Italy switched sides in the war. Conti di Cavour saw no further action. Damage to the Caio Duilio caused by the torpedo strike was serious, but she was able to run aground and save herself from sinking. It took seven months to repair her. The three torpedo strikes suffered by Littorio caused extensive damage, considerable flooding and 32 fatalities. Somehow Littorio staggered along far enough to beach herself. She was repaired in five months. Two Italian aircraft were destroyed by bombing. The destroyer Pessagno was damaged by near misses. The cruiser Trento and the destroyer Libeccio were struck by bombs that failed to explode. (In all about 25% of the 60 bombs dropped failed to explode.) The British lost two aircraft to anti‐aircraft fire. The Italians had fired 13,489 shells from land batteries and several thousand more from the ships in harbor. The initial British estimate of 50% losses proved overly pessimistic despite the volume of fire that the British aircraft faced. Aftermath Regia Marina Italiana moved all undamaged ships from Taranto to Naples. Though losses had been severe, they did not diminish Italian capacity to support Axis convoys to North Africa. Nor was the overall balance of naval forces in the Mediterranean tipped in favor of the British. The British success was only tactical in nature, providing a temporary superiority in capital ships. (For a detailed critique of British force composition for the mission, weapons selection, target selection and follow‐up see the United States Naval War College paper cited in the references below.) A major technical develo

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