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Capt., a
AIRBORNE (
RESUPPLY CEVACUATION O
)PERATION
)F FINAL CF PATIENTS
VARSITY)FFENSIVE
AND POW'S
26 JUN 1945
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HEADQUARTERSIX TROOP CARRIER COMMAND
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ICAL AND NON-TACG
ERATI
DURING THE FINAL PHASE
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G W GENBROUS 0 G BIRTWISTLI G W ERITSTCol. D C/S Col. A-1 Col. A-2
G M JONmS
Col. A-3
Major General PAUL L WILLIAMS
J E DUKECol. C/S
F A McBRIDE
Col. A-4E L BF.RGQUISTCol. M ed
J C PRUITTCol. Comm
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P R E F A CE
It is with great pride that I salute the courage an d magnificent
devotion to duty of the officers and men of IX Troop Carrier Command
whose deeds contributed their ful l share to the victory over Germany,
These chapters recount the extent of their participation in the
airborne operation VARSITY which assisted the Allied armies in crossing
the Rhine, the aerial resupply which helped maintain the lightning
sweep across Germany an d subsequent activity before redeployment.
Toward the end of perpetuating the record of IX Troop Carrier
achievement in the European Theater and offering a guide fo r the future,
this chronology will supplement existing documents dealing with the
performance of this Command in operations in Normandy, southern France,
Holland and Bastogne.
It is hoped that these pages will stand as a valuable chronicle
of experience as well as a tribute to the officers and me n who lived
an d died by their devotion to duty in the accomplishment of the Troop
Carrier Command Mission.
PAUL L, WILLIAMS,Major General, USA,
Commanding,
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PREPARED AT HEADQUARTERS, IX TROOP CARRIER COMMAND (FWD)
APO 133 - USAAF STATION 186
JUNE 1945
. ''I Wf" "',11 "I-I r i I I, i w i ;I ` I'---'1- ' n
RESEARCH AN D NARRATIVE BY BT H HISTORICAL UNIT
SPECIAL LAYOUTS, STATISTICS AND COORDINATION BYIX TROOP CARRIER STATISTICAL CONTROL
PHOTOGRAPHS BY IX TROOP CARRIER C01BAT CAMERA UNIT (PROV)
r] g, ! i;-; :.y -^ i a? p ' '
REPRODUCTION LATOON, 01st ENGINEER F HQ. O.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pege
CHAPTER I
CHAPTER II
CHAPTER III
CHAPTER IV
CHAPTER V
CHAPTER VI
CHAPTER VII
CHAPTER VIII
APPENDIX
- OUTLINE OF AN OBJECTIVE
- MOVEMENT - CONSTRUCTION - DEFENSE
- DISCUSSION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN
- DRESS REHEARSAL AND FINAL PLANNING
- MISSION ACCOIMPLISHED
- A3RIAL RESUPPLY - EVACUATION OF PATIENTS AN D POW'S
- ADDITIONAL PLANS AND MISSIONS
- POSTWAR TROOP CARRIER AVIATION
1
17
27
39
75
93
105
127
133
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Development of th e highly special ized technique of airborne war-
fare in World War II ma y a t some future date be regarded as dynamic to
military science as the introduction of horse cavalry or the invention
of gunpowder. Without question, the tactic of "vertical envelopment"
was one of the most decisive in shattering Hitler 's European Fortress.
Both in Normandy and on the Riviera the guns and men of th e
Wehrmacht pointed toward the sea. But the aer ia l cavalry of IX Troop
Carrier Command assaulted from the sky, and the Airborne Divisions
helped unlock the Fortress barricades from within,
In March 1945, the swift-flowing Rhine was the moat guarding the
Inner Citadel of the enemy. And again "vertical envelopment" proved
instrumental in breaching the gates.
As the ai r echelon participating in all airborne operations in
the European Theater, IX Troop Carrier Command embarked on the campaigns
as pioneer and ended as veteran in the ar t of the paradrop, the glider
tow, the paranack drop in resupply, air-landing of supplies and medical
evacuation.
Ho w Troop Carrier performed its manifold mission in the final phase
of the European war is the subject of the narrative that follows.
Any material in this report classified as Top Secret has since
been downgraded to Secret and will be treated as such.
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CHAPTER I
OUTLINE OF AN OBJECTIVE
Section 1
Target Across th e Rhine! EMMERICH 9761 - WESEL 22)40!
From th e first days of November 1944 u n t i l H-hour f in ia l ly struck at
1000 hours 24 March 1945, these two Teutonic towns on th e nor theas t bank
of th e Rhine held a magnetic a t t r ac t ion fo r th e IX Troop Carr ier Command
planning s ta ff under Major General PAUL L. WILLIAMS.
Seizure of th e ammerich-Wesel sector would fling open th e gate to th e
indust r ia l ly-prec ious Ruhr and th e heart of the Reich. So it wa s that th e
greatest of German rivers was being spanned on Troop Carrier planning
tables hardly before the echo of September 's skyborne thrust into Holland
had faded into th e silence of past events.
In November, at his headquarters in Ascot, England, General WILLIAMS,
commander of the air component of th e First Allied Airborne Army, surveyed
th e pro jec t designated as Operation VARSITY with a s ta ff of seasoned
veterans-Colonel JAMES 3. DUKE, JR., Chief of Staff ; Colonel GLYSNE M.
JONES, Ass i s t an t Chief of Staff , A-3; Colonel OWEN G. BIRTWISTLE, Assis-
tant Chief of Staff, A-l; Colonel GRANT W. ERNST, Assis tant Chief of
Staff , A-2; Colonel FRANCIS A. McBRIDE, Ass i s t an t Chief of Staff , A-4;
Colonel JAMES C. PRUITT, Signal Officer; and Colonel EHRLING L. BERGQUIST,
Medical Officer.
Always recognized as a monumental mil i tary obs tac le , th e eas tern
bank defenses of th e Rhine were to f a l l victim to vertical envelopment
by paratroops and g l ide r infant ry in conjunction with waterborne assaul t
by ground forces from th e west bank. It wa s to be th e same fundamental
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pattern that spun out victory on Cherbourg peninsula and la ter on the
Riviera coast of France.
When the plan fo r Operation VARSITY was f i r s t outlined by Head-
quarters, First Allied Airborne Army on 7 November, 'it called upon IX
Troop Carrier Command to be prepared to lift two airborne divisions by
25 November.
To Seize a Bridgehead
Mission of the airborne force in the Emmerich-Wesel area was to
ass i s t the advance of the 9th U.S. Army of the Central Group of Armies by
seizing a bridgehead on the east bank of the Rhine between Rees 0852 an d
Bislich 1443. Then the skyborne troops would assist in enlarging the
bridgehead to the required size of five to 10 miles in width an d five
miles in depth in order to enable bridging operations to be undertaken
relatively unhindered by artillery fire.
Following the lift phase of VARSITY, Troop Carrier was committed to
its no w traditional role of resupplying bridgehead troops by ai r until
adequate ground arteries were able to function.
Immediately available for the lift were the 6th Brit ish Airborne
Division an d the 17th U.S. Airborne Division. The battle-famed 82nd and
101st U.S. Airborne Divisions were still engaged against the enemy in
Holland. It was expected that rebuilding an d further training of these
outfits could not be completed before 15 January.
3valuation of Possibilities
The projected rple of Troop Carrier plane and glider formations
called for a preliminary evaluation of existing possibi l i t ies . This was
supplied in a report by Colonel ERNST (A-2) on 12 November on (1) Possible
drop and landing zones, (2) Disposition of ground forces affecting the
airborne operation, (3) Enemy flak strength an d (4) Ability of the German
Air Force to launch effective opposition.
Studies of photographic evidence revealed three broad areas on the
northeast bank of the Rhine as most suitable fo r airborne assault. Almost
unmarked by trees an d obstacles of comparable height, this sweep of low
imeadowland invited lo w glider approaches. Fields ranged 190 to 250 yards
in length on the average ani-side stretched to 350 yards. Drainage
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ditches, about nine feet wide, sliced the cultivated fields and appeared
quite dry.
In the firmest levels of terrain, few farmhouses interrupted the land-
scape, while none existed on the swampier soil. Yet the softer ground was
due for a frost the following month, and the newly-hardened outer surface
would supplement the already existing numerous roads and paths that were
counted upon to simplify rapid cross-country troop movements. About th e
only type of glider obstacles to be found in the territory were wire
fences and ditches.
Location of Assault Areas
These characteristics fitted each of the three proposed assault areas.
the first extending five miles southeastward from Emmerich an d three miles
in depth from the Rhine; The second, a chunk of land covering approximately
three square miles, pointing three miles north of Rees and bordered by the
Rhine loop on the west and south; the third stretching eight miles from
Rees to a point east of Bislich and pushing ou t tw o to three miles from the
Rhine.
In the first zone around Emmerich, the intelligence photos revealed
the largest and firmest fields to lie north of a railroad about two miles
from th e r iver and no t grouped too compactly. Reconnaissance of the area
south of the railroad had been obscured by cloud and offered no adequate
information.The second zone, nestling in the Rhine loop north and west of Rees,
disclosed the best concentration of spacious an d dry fields, easily
accessible to a thousand gliders, but a cluster of villages-Speldrop,
Androp and Esserden--posed tactical disadvantages.
Big 2nough fo r 1.500 Gliders
Inviting the widest choice of landing zones, the third area, from
Rees to Bislich, could accomodate 1,500 gliders but presented disad-
vantages in a dispersal of f ie lds and the potential threat of scattered
villages as well as tree-bordered roads and boundaries.
With the picture of the possible assault objectives laid out, Colonel
ERNSTIS (A-2) report proceeded to fill in the disposition of ground troops.
It was assumed that the bleeding away of German armor by Allied pressure
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l X along the entire lengt th e Western front would leave the enemy with-
ou t suff ic ient strength fo r effective counterattacks. That being th e
case, he would be forced to re ly on f ixed defensive ins ta l la t ions to meet
th e t h r ea t of Allied armor. In pursui t of such a. strategy, it appeared
tha t Emmerich and Wesel would be heavily defended as key points , and th e
Reichewald Forest could well become another stronghold.
Mailn Flak Concentrations
Bolstering th e threat of German ground defenses were th e three main
concentrations of f lak around Emmerich, Rees and Wesel. Al l these would
grow more menacing as a large portion of the mobile guns then deployed on
th e west bank of th e Rhine would be withdrawn in the face of the Allied
advance to the river.
In the immediate rear of the battle line from th e German-Dutch
frontier at Emmerich to Geldern, southwest of Wesel, there were known to
exist 42 heavy and 28 5 light flak posit ions with th e majori ty of these
west of th e Emmerich-Cleve area.
Further, it could be assumed that withdrawal and repositioning would
provide a heavier buildup between Emmerich and Rees than between Rees and
Wesel. This factor obviously made the latter a more l ikely assault point
fo r th e projected Operation VARSITY.
Need fo r Advaace Boabardment
It was believed that much of th e enemy's withdrawn flak equipment
would be converted fo r ground defense owing to h is increasing shortage of
f i e ld an d an t i - t ank a r t i l l e r y, but security fo r airborne success dic ta ted
th e necessity fo r thorough advance bombardment of th e area.
Although th e rai lway flak in th e sector added up to only four heavy
and three l i g h t guns pinpointed a t Wesel, the possibility of moving
addit ional guns ou t of th e heavily defended Ruhr to counteract a Troop
Carrier operation had to be considered as a threat, since Wesel fringed
th e northern outskirts of the Ruhr. With the railway connecting Emxnerich
and Wesel running just east of potential drop and landing zones, it wa s
deemed vital that this line be severed at both extremities to forestall
th e commitment of t h i s type 'f : f lak to th e area.
Other flak threats -cai fo r consideration were barges an d Seibel
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ferr ies plying the Rhine waters with light gun instal la t ions.
No smoke cloud generators were reported in the assault zone, but th e
balloon barrage a t Wesel offered another hazard.
It was believed that threats from isolated pockets of enemy resist-
ance on the west bank of the Rhine could be avoided by close liaison with
ground forces. Routes then could be planned to give these pockets a wide
berth.
Short Range Weapon a Menace
As a substitute for 20 MM . flak and supplementing normal ack-ack
fire, the Germans ha d begun to use greater numbers of 13 MM. anti-aircraft
machine-guns. With a higher rate of traverse an d a more rapid rate of
fire than the 20 MM., it was a much more effective weapon at short range.
Since it was a standard gun, it was believed available in large quantity.
Troop Carrier formations probably would find the enemy concentrating
hi s 13 MM . guns in numbers at vital points in the communications net, es-
pecially along roads. It also could be expected that ground troops
would be employing them on improvised ant i -a i rc ra f t mounts.
Although the Luftwaffe ha d long been written off as a force that
could ultimately affect the outcome of the war, it could no t be underrated
as an instrument which, under favorable conditions, could wreak inestimable
destruction against unarmored, unarmed an d comparatively slow-moving C-47
and C-46 aircraft an d the even more vulnerable gliders they towed.
Threat of 300 Fighters
Colonel ERNST'tS (A-2) estimate of German Air Force daylight
capabilities as of 7 November disclosed the availability within 24 hours
notice of an Allied airborne effort of 250 to 300 single-engine fighters,
20 to 25 twin-engine fighters, 15 to 20 fighter-bombers and five to 10
reconnaissance planes.
To meet a night operation, the Germans in 24 hours could assemble a
maximum of 200 to 210 twin-engine fighters, 20 to 25 twin-engine ground
attackers, 10 to 15 single-engine fighters an d the same number of fighter-
bombers.
Over a three or four day period, the enemy was believed capable of
mustering fo r daylight: 150 to 200 single-engine fighters, 10 to 20
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| ~/'~:~engine fighters, fivweo. fighter-bombers and a similar number of
reconnaissance aircraf t ; at night: 150 to 200 twin-engine fighters, 15
to 20 twin-engine ground attackers and 10 to 15 single-engine fighters.
These figures were based on an estimate of 60 per cent service-ability of total aircraft inside 150 miles striking range of the target.
One sortie a day was counted upon as maximum capacity for single-engine
fighters. It was assumed that twin-engine fighters would. be employed
principally against Allied resupply or reinforcement flights under cover
of darkness. However, they could be switched over to ground attack or
bombing against suitable targets.Threat ef the Je t lighters
Looming as possibly the most dangerous threat was the German Me 262
Jet-propelled fighter, since Troop Carrier formations and height were
ideally suited to the tactical capabilities of this enemy ship. The 500 to
6 00-mile-an-hour speed together with the small number of Me 262s available
might enable them to slip inside Troop Carrier formations unnoticed.A total of 30 to 35 Jet-propelled machines were known to be based in
the area of Achmer, but only 15 to 20 were believed serviceable. Attempts
to step up Jet-propelled. aircraft production indicated that they might be
augmented in strength.
Favorite tactic of the M e 262 was described as the head on or out of
the sun attack in a single sweep. Pilots were being trained to attackeither from 12 o'clock high coming in, or from shallow dive, or in one
pass and run Just above the formation. An attacking formation would
include 10 or 15 planes strung out in a single line.
Warned. AMalst Overconfideace
Colonel DRJST (A-2) believed that cover against hostile aircraft
should not be too difficult to effect in view of the Troop Carrier route
following friendly territory for a ll except three to five miles. But he
warned that an enemy already stung three times on the continent by
airborne blows might be tempted to come up this time in force.
On 13 November, Lt. Colonel Leonard T. Geyer, A-3 Plans Officer, in
a memorandum to Colonel JONS (A-3), submitted the view that the Operation
VARSITY would present no undue difficulties from the standpoint of ai r
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delivery of troops and gliders.
Although the original plan called for Troop Carrier a i rc ra f t to
remain over host i le terr i tory fo r a comparatively short period, Colonel
Geyer declared the time could be shortened still more by dispatching four
columns--two paratroop and tw o glider--to h it simultaneously. This system
would accomplish total delivery in an hour and a half.
Natural Check Points on Route
The memorandum pointed out that routes from the continent were not
difficult. A northern course from Blankenberghe to Goch was well marked
with natural check points that could be easily supplemented by normal
radio aids. It was suggested that twin columns to British an d American
target areas swing out in opposite directions for the homeward run.
With the fairly certain knowledge that all terrain up to the west
bank of the Rhine would be in friendly hands, no diff icul ty was con-
templated in providing navigation aids fo r Troop Carrier a i rc ra f t .
In view of unstable weather conditions prevailing at the time,
Colonel Geyer recommended that the operation be confined to a single day
to be followed up by emergency resupply, if neccessary.
He indicated that it might be necessary to move IX Troop Carrier
Command entirely to France in order to accomplish existing commitments.
However, military developments during the month precluded th e accomplish.
ment of VARSITY on 25 November, as originally scheduled.
Still Held First Priority
On 7 December, Major General FLOYD L.PARKS, Chief of Staff, FAAA,
informed IX Troop Carrier Command that VARSITY still held first priority
over Operations CHOKER TWO an d NAPLES TWO in that order.
General PARKS also indicated that an y one of the three airborne
operations might be called on 20 days notice by General OMAR BRADLEY,
commander of the Twelfth Army Group. On the other hand, if none were
called during December and January, it could be expected that two
operations would be mounted in February with the 82nd and 101st U.S.
Airborne Divisions participating in the second.
On 12 December, Colonel JONES (A-3) IX Troop Carrier Command,
4 formed G-3, FAAA that the mac1 (hics were fairly complete fo r the three
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proposed operations but called attention to difficulties to be encountered
in resupply. He warned that the enemys awareness of the imminence of an
airborne blow together with his tremendously heavy flak concentration
could conceivably inf l ic t losses on Troop Carrier to outstrip a ll previous
missions.
Planning Limited by Weather
Further, it was pointed out by Colonel JONZS (A-3) that extensive
resupply planning was limited by weather so unsettled that flying for
two or more consecutive days over a route of three to five hundred miles
was not considered possible. He advanced the possible solution that a
resupply mission be accomplished by the 50th Troop Carrier Wing which had
350 aircraf t available in Prance. By setting up a field in Belgium
from which to originate resupply fo r VARSITY, the route would be con-
siderably shortened and thereby less subject to changing weather con-
ditions as well.
However, Colonel JONES (A-3) stated that the problem could be solved
most adequately through an arrangement for channeling supplies to air-
borne troops through normal ground routes as soon as the water-borne
crossings brought the main army to a Junction with the airborne divisions.
But again the operation was delayed. December and January passed
with the Allies s t i l l held in check along the main Siegfried defenses.
Airborne tactics were no t ye t feas ib le .
Revisioa of ABRSITY Plan
Then, on 10 February, FAAA submitted a revised plan for Operation
VARSITY. The merich-Wesel objective remained the same, but now the air-
borne task force would be dropped to ass is t both the 2nd British Army and
the 9th U.S. Army of the Northern Group of Armies. 25 March was
established as the new deadline.
It was considered that flood conditions of the Rhine might limit
drop and landing zones which otherwise were ideal. But flak could not
now be viewed as a seriously limiting factor despite the anticipated
movement of guns in the Nazi retreat across the river from the west bank.
With the 17th and 13th U.S. Airborne Divisions based on the continent,
I ^!d-he double towof CG^-A Waco gliders became practicable and opened the way. - _, _
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fo r hauling increased numbers of fighting men. The element of distance
was solved. Each C-47 aircraf t flying from a base inside France couldZMMM. . . . . . . . . . . . . t
Waeo C G - 1 4As ix Dual Tew
safely tug a pair of gliders to landing zones on the east bank of the
shine. However, limitations in planes and airdromes prevented the
simultaneous lift of the 13th and 17th Divisions.
From i ts starting point in East Anglia, the 6th British Airborne
Division coul4 easily negotiate the distance in Hora& l iders towed
singly by Halifax, Stirling or Dakota aircraf t . Parachute lift likewise
offered no problem.
Bombardment of Targets
The revised plan fo r VARSITT provided fo r pre-D-Day bombardment of
any targets that might affect the operation. It was established that
should it be necessary to employ heavy or medium bombers over DZ's or LZ'I
or vicinity on D-Day that the operational schedule would permit ample
time to elapse fo r smoke and dust to subside prior to arrival of Troop
Carrier columns.
The plan also called fo r proper timing to allow fo r visual precision
bombing by heavies and mediums. Necessary diversions and dummy drops
would be carried out as requested by the Airborne Corps commander.
Fighter cover and escort were committed to accomplish maximum neu-
tralization of flak along the route and over DZ's and LZ'. Fighters
and fighter-bombers would be assigned the task of accompanying and pre-
ceding Troop Carrier formations to attack a ll hostile batteries, guns or
troops using small arms fire.
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Accurate anticipation of Troop Carrier supply and maintenance needs
fo r Operation -VARSITY demanded considerably more than crystal ball
technique from the various A- 4 branch sections under Colonel McBRIDE (A-4).
Against ne w problems constantly arising, only the foresight and patience
forged in the experience of past operations insured sound planning by
Air Corps Supply and Engineers, Ordnance, Quartermaster and Chemical
Warfare.
97 Per Cent Operational
On the eve of VARSITY, 97.3 per cent or 1,251 out of a total of
1,285 C-47 and C-53 aircraf t were reported in operational condition by
Lt. Colonel Charles H. Jourdan, Air Corps Engineering Officer. Almost
a ll supply problems connected with this type of aircraf t had been en-
countered and solved in previous combat action, and these planes were
ready to Jump either American or British paratroops.
The chief task this time was to properly equip the ne w group of
C-46D aircraft never before employed operationally by IX Troop Carrier
Command. Improvisation on a high order became necessary to gird these
planes of the 313th Group for combat, and the necessary steps were taken.
A very limited quantity of supplies accompanied the first C-46's to
arrive in early January and necessitated the initiation of procurement
action for spare parts and ground handling equipment.
Modification of B-24 jacks and B-17 tow-bars was the method adopted
to assure an adequate supply of these critical items.
No Tested Means of Dropping Parapacks
The C-46D aircraft arrived in the European Theater without a prac-
ticable and tested means of dropping parapacks with latest information on
the subject disclosing that experiments were still being conducted at
Wright Field, Ohio. However, the following equipment was available:
six electric releases and means of attaching bomb shackles; six 2,000-
pound bomb shackles; an d 24 buckles, straps and strap tighteners.
One of the most acute problems crying for a solution involved a
system for protecting the parachute of the A-5 parapack container from
A th Eplipstrenam.xperimental attempts in the States to use plastic*'~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1gy?'fy.;,'* .;'*' " yss
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- ' fair ings proved a failure when these crushed in f l ight . A later develop-
ment was the aluminum hood, but these would be impossible to obtain in
the European Theater before May.
That le f t the question squarely in the lap of Troop Carrier Air Corps
Engineers. Colonel Jourdan's section instituted a series of tes ts with
paper P-51 jettisonable 108-gallon fuel tanks, and these provided the
answer,
Not only did the P-51 paper tank prove adaptable as a parachute hood,
bu t it also was procurable in sufficient quantities through Ai r Technical
Service Command in Europe to furnish each C-46D with a total of 12 as
part of normal aircraft equipment.
1.700 Paper Tanks Converted
Contributing to the success of the experiments were the A- 4 an d S-4
sections of the 52nd Wing, the 313th and 316th Groups, the 3S3rd Air
Service Squadron and the ls t Air Service Squadron (Prov). In the final
process, upwards of 1,700 salvaged P-51 paper tanks were converted into
1,350 hoods--a total considered adequate for the contemplated operation.
Another bug to be ironed out was the inability to release a ll para-
pack bundles from the bomb shackle after normal pressure on the release
switch. To overcome this diff icul ty, the 313th Group, advised by Major
Jacob J. Myers.,Jr., Engineering Officer, together with the 383rd Ai r
Service Squadron supplied the necessary "know-how" to modify the bomb
shackle by welding a fillet into the release jaw. Then a directive was
issued with detailed instructions on the attachment of hoods and loading
A-5 containers on the pararack equipment of the C-46D.
Requisitioned from U.S.A.
The 24 straps an d buckles available per plane were believed in-
sufficient to meet commitments, so urgent action was instituted to
procure an additional 12,000 by ai r shipment from the States. A size-
able proportion of this requisition arrived in time to guarantee com-
pliance with immediate requirements.
With the eight-foot span between the door of a C-46 and the ground
necessitating the employment of fork-l i f ts , two of these were provided
for each Squadron.
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BU
C"46 Comsand.o Marshalled for Takeoff....
.... Approaching the Wind Sock....
.. . ,Almos t Overhead
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^ i" A reserve of maintenance parts for C-46 aircraft to cover a minimum
period of 30 days was in the possession of the 313th Group in the form of
four consignments of Combat Table II and six prod-packs. Combat Table
II consisted of standard C-46 parts, while the prod-packs carried items
applicable to the latest model C-46D.
Refueling Facilities Supplemented
In every combat operation, refueling facilities are of paramount
importance and fo r Troop Carrier units preparing for VARSITY on the con-
tinent, it was necessary to supplement existing capacities. To fill the
maximum possible requirements, 19 complete refueling units were provided
in the following quantities: two F-1, two P-2, 10 F-3, five A-3.
Deterioration of paper Bolero gas tanks introduced the necessity for
replacement and resulted in the decision to install metal fuselage types.
In this connection, it was believed the P-38 discardable metal tank would
be of particularly high value in planes towing two gliders, and steps were
taken immediatelyto procure and i n s t a l l the P-38 tanks. This type of
tank, with a capacity of 155 U.S. gallons, was slated to be installed in
pairs in the fuselage of each aircraft, since little more hardware was
required than for a Bolero tank.
With glider assembly at Crookham Common speeded uD in January an d
service teams with the 53rd Wing inaugurating further assembly on their
ow n stations, the program wasstill further intensified when the
Commanding General, Ai r Technical Service Command in Europe, instructed
Base Air Depot Area at Burtonwood to assemble gliders at Wharton.
Assembly Lines for Gliders
The l a t t e r step, recommended by the Commanding Officer of the IX
Troop Carrier Service Wing resulted in assembly line development to a
point where five CG-4A gliders were producedper day while the assembly
at Crookham Common reached 15 to 18 daily.
As a result of this assembly program, IX Troop Carrier CommanC on
D-1 was able to point to 2,162 operational Waco gliders out of a total
of 2,290.
During the glider buildnup period, a leading source was the area
around Eindhoven where the landing zones for the Holland operation were
- 14 -.v?
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located. Here the reclamation-program of the Service Wing produced a
sizeable yield of silent craf t which had flown on the previous mission.
After these had been distributed among units of the 50th and 53rd
Wings, a thorough inspection procedure was established to detect any
structural flaws that might have been discovered during reclamation.
The obvious purpose of this move was to eliminate the possibi l i ty of any
glider mishap other than that inflicted by direct enemy action.
Inspection to Eliminate Flaws
Before VARSITY was attempted, an inspection wan carried out on every
f ield of the two Troop Carrier Wings by a committee of four officers,
comprising the Command glider inspector, the Service Wing Ai r Corps
Engineer Officer, a glider officer of the particular Group Involved an d
th e Air bervice Squadron Engineer Officer serving the Group. These
officers checked every glider of doubtful condition to determine its
combat worthiness.
To equip gliders for VARSITY, rapid steps were taken to obtain De -
Acceleration Parachute Kits. Three thousand were requisitioned on high
priori ty from the States on 20 January, and before D-Day 326 were re.
ceived fo r instal la t ion. Another request was made' o have parachute
arrestors installed on or included with a ll unassembled gliders leaving
the Zone of Interior. These measures accounted for 1,246 gliders being
equipped with De-Acceleration Parachute Kits on D-Day.
Nose Crash Protection Kits
Another vital glider accessory was the nose crash protection, and
1,585 of these, either Corey or Griswold models, were available fo r th e
operation after arrangements had been made to procure every k it held in
the depot. From January unti l D-Day, 412 Corey and 28 Griswold kits were
obtained to swell the overall total to almost 1,600.
When Colonel McBRIDX (A-4) received a request on 19 February for
Landmark Beacon Trailers (Pundits) to be employed on occupied fields and
forward airdromes fo r assembly and turning points, he obtained a high
priority fo r delivery of seven of these cri t ical items from SAEF Main
Air. Troop Carrier was thus enabled to embark on VARSITY with a total of
10 beacon t rai lers .
: ' ^ ^:. - : e J15
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CHAPTER II
MOTVIMT * CONSTRUCTION DUISE
Section 1
Strategic nobility of Troop Carrier units, demonstrated many times
in the ]Nropean Theater, was reemphaseized in Operation VABSITY which re-
quired the moTement from Britain to France of a ll five tactical Oroups
under the 53rd. Wing, two Groups of the 52nd, the Pathfinder Group and
large elements of the IX Troop Carrier Service Wing.
The emergency nature of land and water movement, dating from 11
February, unfolded new problems for Major Udward J. Sandetrom, Chief
Quartermaster Officer, and his assistant, Major John VW,Daughtry.
Decision to move came too swiftly to permit normal preparation for
overseas movement, Ixtreme urgency forced cancellation of the routine
procedure of issuing warning and alert orders, holding showdown
inspections, preparing administrative orders and marahalling.
Special purpose vehicles shuttled 53rd Wing organizations from home
stations to their assigned port of embarkation within. 48 hours of notice
and accomplished the project according to plan.
More serious difficulty attended the aovement of the 52nd Wing.when
the Chief of Transportation at Headquarters, United Kingdom Base refused
to move forward the original embarkation date, since no formal priori ty
had been designated for IX Troop Carrier Command.
Finally, through coordination with PAAA and U.S. Strategic Air Forces
in Europe, a priority was obtained from SEAfD to advance the 52nd*t
||giir^~~~~ 17-^ JjP ^ ' ! * '.- .- * - - ** ;
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movement date by u4 houre.
The same obstacle was confronted in connection with moving the rear
echelon of the 53rd Wing and the Pathfinder Group. Again the schedule w as
advanced. this time by four days, after contact with the liaison of USSTAF.
Actual movement was expedite by splitting each tactical and service
Group into two echelons, with the f i rs t echelon taking charge of the main
body of vehicles required for completing preparation for VARSITT.
Those Groups engaged in the glider assembly program were faced with
the most critical need for vehicles. Their situation wa alleviated by
a policy which diverted vehicles to then from organizations with a later
readiness date.
Major Project For Wlneerg
By D-Day, a total of 4,000 personnel and 3, 300 vehicles had completed
the transition from ktgland to France without serious interruption of
operational commitmentE,
As uwual, the word #"movement added up to a major project for the IX
Troop Carrier ngineer section. On 9 February, Lt. Colonel Charles C.
Burbridge, Command Engineer, and his Chief assistant, Major Frederick M.
Kaiser, were handed the assignment of rigging 15 airfields into oper-
ational condition in a time span of 34 days.
It was a new version of an old headache to Engineers who belong to
an army on the offensive. Typically, they had been given a back-breaking
job with instructions to wind it up in a hurry.
Deadline Established
Construction target date had been deadlined at 15 March when the
Engineers plunged into an effort that called for everything from general
maintenance up to wholesale rehabilitation of airdromes which had fallen
into various states of disuse in the wake of a retreating enemy's
demolitions and bombardment.
As the construction men bent to their work, Troop Carrier units began
to move across. On 11 February, ground detachments of the 53rd Wing
boarded ship for passage across the Channel as flight echelons took wing
overhead., the 434th Group enroute to Mourmelon Le Grand (A-80); the 435th
to Bretigny (A-48); the 436th to Melun (A-55); the 437th to Coulommiers
jj ( 3 i WQ ^si^ '*'* . 2. - 8
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- .-.. );'and th e 438th to Prosnes (A-79). - F
Accompanying th e 53rd were Service Wing elements of th e 10th, 82nd
and 318th Service Groups as well as th e 33rd A ir Depot Group.
The pilgrimmage was resumed on th e 23rd by two Groups o f th e 52nd
Wing, th e 313th to Achiet (B-54) and th e 314th to Poix (B-44), along with
elements of th e 82nd and 317th Service Groups.
Slated to Land in France
In th e case of th e 52nd Wing, th e Engineer pro jec t didn ' t stop with
prepara t ion of a i r f i e lds fo r th e 313th and 314th. Although VARSITY cal led
fo r th e remaining three Groups to carry 6th Bri t ish Division paratroops
from bases in England, it also s la ted them to land on French airdromes on
th e return t r ip , th e 61st a t Abbevil le-Drucat (B-92), th e 315th at
Amiens/Glisy (B-48), th e 316th a t Vitry-en-Artois (3-50). The latter three
f i e lds , therefore , ranked j u s t as high on th e Engineer list as an y of th e
others.
Four days a f t e r th e 52nd arr ived on th e continent , th e Pathfinder
Group moved into Chartres (A-I40). This famous ca thedra l ci ty also wa s
th e si te of th e 50th Wing headquarters which had arr ived in France in
September, along with four Groups, th e 439th a t Chateaudun (A-39), th e
440th a t Bricy (A-50), th e 44ls t a t Dreux (A-41), th e 442nd a t St. Andre
De L'Eure (B-24).
Only 34 Days to Go
In th e slim 34 days a l lo t t ed to him, Colonel Burbridge threw 3,200
American and Bri t ish Engineer troops, rotated on a 24-hour schedule, and
750 French c iv i l i ans into th e mammoth task of building runways, marshal l-
in g areas, hardstands, taxiways and access roads. Existing facilities
which had been damaged by enemy action were e i the r converted fo r us e or
cleared away. Hazardous bomb cra ters were f i l l e d . Hardstands were
cleared. Access roads, drainage di tches and culver ts sprang to useful
service in answer to engineering ingenuity.
A var ie ty of problems cropped up for IX Troop Carrier Engineers as
they examined th e ind iv idual requests of each Group commander. In some
cases, two commanders with ident ica l commitments each demanded a different
plan of construction. Such a development invariably produced new
problems and consequent delays for th e Engineers who nevertheless,, EX C -- ;F . C: [|.
if W; ;' i,
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UNCLASSiFIED' -accepted them because they recognized that commanders were Justified on
the basis that no two fields were laid ou t alike nor did the runways have
the same magnetic bearing. Bugs were ironed out in the most expeditious
manner, and work proceeded.
With a greater number of gliders allocated to each airf ield than ever
before, glider parking loomed as the most intr icate of Xagineering problems
fo r VARSITY. The apron method, employed in previous operations, proved
inadequate owing to the 7,000 square feet of surfacing material required
fo r each motorless craft. This system was based on an area approximately
100 feet wide and 70 feet long with an allowance of 20 feet between noseand ta i l serving as trucking and loading space.
Limited time, materials and transportation faci l i t ies demanded a
Glider Marshalling From Individual Hardstands
simpler method. The answer was supplied in a br i l l ian t solution by IX
Troop Carrier Command Xngineers who designed individual hardetands, only
77 feet long and 21 feet wide, fabricated from three rolls of square mesh
track.
The hardstand area of 1,617 feet, contrasted to the old apron,
accomplished a saving of 5,383 feet of material pe r glider-..a phenomenal
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SKETCHES SHOWING SAVING OF SQ.UAB:
MATiRIAL BETWEEN THE APRON TYPE OF GLIDERPARKING AN D TEE IYDIVIDUAL HARDSTAND METHOD
:," -' (:i .~ : ; .W~t '/
Layout of apro0 type of glider parking requiriag 7,000 squarefeet of SM T fo r each glider including aisles fo r trucks, etc.
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a consolidatedarea equivalentto 48 individualhardstands shcthe saving matbetween that tand the apronfo r an equal nof gliders.
Layout of individual hardstandmethod requiring 1,617 square
feet of SMT pe r glider.
Enlarged scale showing the individualhardstands placed along the taxitrack! ^:ing clearance fo r planes and gliders.
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developmen on i d mightily to acceleration of the construction
tempo.
Other advantages also were derived. In a ll cases, hardstands were
situated adjacent to taxiloops and gliders parked behind the taxiloops,
allowing full wing clearance for aircraft. This arrangement permitted
any glider to be pulled off th e stand without interfering with any other
glider.
Buabooe in Transportation
Procurement and transportation of materiel provided bugaboos, as
always. But plane and Jeep made possible rapid coordination between
Engineers of Troop Carrier, USSTAF, IX Engineer Command and British
supply sources in Brussels, To expedite deliveries, a system was estab-
lished under which enlisted men were detailed to ride supply trains from
points of origin to destination. Aircraft often were dispatched over
railroad lines to locate and speed th e movement of materiel. Ivery
possible medium was utilized for speed and more speed,
Engineer aviation units and materiel were provided principally by IX
Bngineer Command under Brigadier General JO B. NEWMAB and the First
Canadian C.S. Works at Brussels under Brigadier D. H. Storms,
Manpower and materiel totals sreak for themselves, During th e 34
days of airfield preparation, a total of 469,750 man hours was contributed
by U.S. Army personnel; 150,000 by British Army personnel; and 99,880 by
French civilians,
Vast Tonnae Consumed
In terms of materiel, the Job swallowed up 13,719 tons of pierced
steel plank; 7,050 tons of Tarmac surfacing material; 2,500 tons of rock
for maintenance; 100 tons of stone chip screenings; 18,000 gallons of
bitumen seal coat; 5,310 rolls of square mesh track; 1,070 rolls of Hessian
mat; 53,300 cubic yards of hardcore; 55,686 bales of straw; and 300
barrels of tar,
With th e entire 50th and 53rd Wings together with tw o Groups of th e
52nd already on the continent, the forward headquarters of IX Troop Carrier
Command was opened at Chateau de Prunay in Louveciennes, a suburb of Paris,
on 22 February. A rear headquarters was st i l l maintained in Ascot.
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I ;t ' t I
Only
de Prunay
echelon.
sections
officers
I*,
i:
r si x miles from TAAA headquarters in Malsons Laffitte, Chateau
r was ideally located fo r close l iaison with the next higher
General WILLIAMS brought with him to Trance his A- 2 and A-3
together with other key personnel, comprising a total of 43
and 116 enlisted men.
Operatioxal Headcquarters at Louveclennes
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U~NC~LAL~'IF~~ElSection2
Recognising that a determined German effor t against newly-established
Troop Carrier airf ields on the continent could seriously impair prospects
fo r the successful execution of VARSITY, Colonel John S. Spencer, Command
Defense Officer, began a survey of a ll fields in France on 24 Febru&ry.
Colonel Spencer, a British officer (Duke of Wellington's Regiment)
serving with Troop Carrier, found that conditions of destruction and
deterioration on the new airdromes precluded a policy of dispersal of
planes and gliders, as practiced in England. Under the circumstances,
massed parking could not be avoided.
Called fo r Increased Vigilance
The situation called fo r increased vigilance and training on the part
of the 4roups concerned and additional defense measures to be supplied by
appropriate branches of the Army.
Already operating in France since September, units of the 50th Wing
were best prepared fo r discharging the responsibilit ies of airdrome defense.
Each squadron had been equipped with four .50 caliber machine guns and
had trained the requisite number of gunners.
More remote from the front on British bases, the 52nd and 53rd Wings
found it necessary to intensify airdrome defense programs prior to em-
barkation fo r France and after arrival, Training was stepped up and re -
fresher courses inst i tuted to bring these organizations up to date fo r the
commitments imposed by VARSITY,
Allocation of AA Arti l lery
On 6 March, a le t te r was ini t ia ted to the Commanding General, 7AAA,
requesting allocation of anti-aircraf t ar t i l le ry fo r Troop Carrier fields,
And on the 14th, Colonel DUKE, Troop Carrier Chief of Staff, Colonel JONES
(A-3) and Colonel Spencer visited IX Air Defense Command to draw up a plan
fo r maximum protection of Troop Carrier bases.
As a result, anti-aircraf t battalions were allocated fo r distribution
around the Command, and on 2000 hours of the same day these outf i ts were
alerted fo r duty.
The 391st AA A automatic weapons battalion was stationed a t Proesses
,^?4 i,3: -f-v"r i fe -\ 1, v^s>i,.. -k? . -
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(A-79) and the 133rd AA A gun battalion, leas one'battery, a t Mourmelon Le
Grand (A-S0). These organizations were sp l i t to provide two automatic
weapons batteries fo r each field and three gun batteries fo r area defense
of the two combined.
Airstrips Poix (B-44), Achiet (B-54) and Abbeville-Drucat (3-92) each
were alloted an automatic weapons battery by the 791st AA A battalion. A
similar arrangement was provided fo r Bretigny (A-48), Melun (A-55),
Coulommiere (A-58) and Bricy (A-50) by the 564th AAA battalion, and for
St. Andre De L']ure (B-24), Villacoublay (A-42), Chartres (A-40) and
Chateaudun (A-39) by the 789th AAA battalion.
Night Fighters on Call
Ninth Air Force also agreed to act upon IX Troop Carrier 's request
to hold night fighter units available fo r limited periods beginning
20 March fo r interception of enemy aircraf t and to divert day fighters
whenever necessary fo r the same purpose.
By 19 March, a ll airdromes in France were fully alerted for defense,
and Colonel Spencer flew to England to complete security preparations for
the three Troop Carrier staging fields in East Anglia. In cooperation
with 38 Group (RAP), it was decided that anti-aircraf t batteries for
individual fields wa s not essential in view of existing area defense, but
local blackout discipline was rigidly enforced.
--
t.
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CHAPTER III
DISCUSSION AN D DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN
Section 1
Planning went forward at a rapid pace a t Chateau de Prunay. Agenda
was drawn up fo r a conference on 26 February to include key Troop Carrier
commanders and representatives of Airborne Divisions.
Meanwhile, in preparation fo r the impending operation, a training
schedule had been dispatched by TW X on 17 February to a ll Troop Carrier
units. The program outlined by Major William V. Morgan, A- 3 Training
Officer, directed the 439th and 44oth Groups of the 50th Wing to stress
double and single tow. Double tow missions would be performed by two
planes and four gliders echeloned to the right. The remaining two Groups
of the 50th, the 441st and 4 4 2nd, were directed to concentrate on single
glider tow and American parachute technique.
In the 53rd Wing, emphasis was placed on single glider tow by the
435th and 436th Groups; double and single glider tow by the 437th; an d
American paradrop work by the 434th and 438th.
The 52nd Wing breakdown called for the 313th Group to continue
transition training in C-46 aircraft and to include paradrop technique.
A second priority for the C-46's consisted in double tow of the CG-4A
and single tow of the CG-13. American parachute work was designated for
the 316th Group and British paradrop technique for the 61st, 314th and
315th.
The Pathfinder Group continued to rehearse its own special techniques
but also trained for standard American paradrop activity.-O 7
L Ai_71Ac i r u n~ i ~ J j 6
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ICNLAMSI*ns o:fft0 0 X S 0 :000X00;if00Q0000ft~tAti0=tffit0000 f000;; E~iS~~f00000 i;;:00000\ : idi;;l l t :;00:X0X00t~iVff:0000:i~::~ff00i~f::f00:D:0:: :::Q::: :
Formation of C-46't in Flight
Intensive glider pilot training wa s ordered in a ll Groups, and each
Wing was directed to schedule an exercise before 2 March.
On the 26th a t Chateau de Prunay, General WILLIAMS opened the pre-
VARSITY conference with a general discussion of the proposed operation
and the part it would play in assisting the crossing of the Rhine by th e
Northern Group of Armies under Field Marshal BERNARD HONTGOMERY.
The General stated that although specific information was s t i l l
lacking in regard to certain phases of the operation, it was now possible
to complete a major part of the air planning.
The requirements of the 6th British Airborne Division were outlined
by Lt. Colonel N.J.L. Field of the lot Brit ish Airborne Corps. For th e
parachute lift, 275 aircraf t were needed, while a total of 425 gliders,
including 398 Horeas and 27 Hamilcars, would be the maximum towed.
Six-Pound Guns to Be Dropped
Colonel Field represented the minimum acceptable glider figure as
383 Horsas and 23 Eamilcars. In addition, the 6th Division desired to
drop 12 to 16 six-pound guns -- a commitment which could be accomplished
only by 38 Group (RAF).
With three Groups of the 52nd Troop Carrier Wing already allotted to
the British 6th by Major General MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY, commander of XVIII
Corps (Airborne), General WILLIAMS stated it was unlikely that additional
IX Troop Carrier Command aircraft would be allocated for British glider
tows.
To lift the 6th, 38 Group (RAY), operating from United Kingdom
airf ields a t Great Dunmow, Earls Colne, Shepherd's Grove, Rivenhall and
.
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training of tug crews, it was recommended that the 0-461s should no t be
required to tow the CG-13 glider unless terrain was considered suitable.
In that case, it might be attempted on a l imited scale.
General WILLIAMS stated that he would further discuss the matter
with the commanding generals of PAAA and X7VIII Corps.
The tentative plan of operation fo r the 17th Division was- then out-
lined. Fo r paradrops, 72 C-46 aircraft would be committed by the 313th
Group from Achiet (B-54); 162 C-47's by the 434th and 438th from Prosnes
(A-79) and Mourmelon Le Grand (A.80); 90 C-47's by the 44lst and 442nd
from St. Andre De L'Eure (B-24) and Dreux (A-41).
Siule Tow of SO by 314th
The glider schedule called for single tow of 80 by the 314th from
Poix (B-44); single tow of 80 by the 435th from Bretigny (A-); single
tow of S0 by the 436th from Melun (A-55); double tow of 144 by the 437th
from Coulommiers (A-58); single tow of 48 by the 442nd from St. Andre De
L'Zure (B-24); single tow of 48 by the 441st from Dreux (A-41); single
tow of 90 by the 439th from Chateaudun (A-39); single tow of 90 by the
44oth from Bricy (A-50).
General CLARK stated that to accomplish an 80-glider lift from
Poix (B-44) or to sp l i t it between Poix (3-44) and Amiens/Glisy (B-4$),
considerable work would yet have to be accomplished by the Engineers.
General WILLIAMS concurred and said the project had been referred to
Colonel Burbridge, Command Engineer.
Surplus Aircraft for 50th
Brigadier General JULIAN M. CHAPPELL, commander of the 50th Wing,
pointed out that the 17th Division's requirement of 370 planes instead
of 400 would leave his 441st and 4 4 2nd Groups with surplus aircraft.
Under those circumstances, he was in a position to recommend that the
aforementioned tw o Groups accomplish an additional lift of 20 to 30
gliders. He was requested by General WILLIAMS to give further study to
the possibilities an d submit a recommendation.
On his status of 420 aircraft, Brigadier General MAURICE M, BEACH,
commander of the 53rd Wing, asserted that he would be left with only a
five per cent overage bu t could still meet hi s commitments.
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General WILLIAMS wasii-nftrmed that enough A-5 containers modified
fo r C-46 use had been obtained fo r the in i t ia l lift. A total of 425
already had been delivered to the 313th Group and another 500 were on th e
way.
Following the conference, Colonel JONES (A-3) requested a ll part ies
concerned to remain fo r a discussion on training. It was decided that
f i r s t priori ty would go to combined training of Troop Carrier and airborne
troops,
Glider Infantry Trained as Unit
A l imitation of 16 gliders was placed on each lift owing to the con-
dition of airf ields and the necessity fo r transferring large numbers of
motorless craf t from England to Prance. A lift total of 16 was agreed
upon since it enabled an entire glider infantry company to train as a unit.
In addition, an extensive a ir program was set up fo r Troop Carrier
units with a view to solving the individual problems of each airf ield in
the l imited time remaining before the operational deadline. Units were
urged to utilize all flyable weather to the greatest extent possible when
not committed to combined training.
For training in loading and lashing, 80 glider fuselages from the
Eindhoven area were made available to the 17th and 13th Divisions.
Pull Dress Rehearsal Inadvisable
A 100 per cent dress rehearsal of VARSITY was considered inadvisable
in the few remaining weeks of training, since airborne units would be
unable to replace possible losses incurred. It was decided to set up a
mock operation on a reduced scale approximately 10 days before D-Day to
test communications, operational suitability of airf ields, timing, navi-
gational aids and related problems.
Upon completion of therehearsal, a ll training would cease to permit
proper staging of troops and necessary maintenance of a i rc ra f t , 20 March
was established as a tentative date fo r termination of training.
It was further decided that a pair of Troop Carrier Glider Combat
Control Teams would accompany each Airborne Division. And glider pilot
control would follow procedure to be laid down in the new Memorandum
50-21A, Headquarters. IX Troop Carrier Command, subject: "SOPfor the
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4 .1 , 11 . I1 .4 JI M IWI '-, I -1
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Equipment of a Combat Control Team --Jeep and SCR-499 Radio Set on Special Tr a i l e r. . . .
.... Closeup of the SCL-499 Badio Set
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A Complete Teaf Ready
... Belaying Information from the Yield
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f o r A c t i o n . . . .
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U AWgaI~e . ider Pilots", dated 11 March 1945.General WILLIAMS strongly emphasized the need for continued training
of airborne personnel in C-46 aircraft. He stressed that two Regiments.,
one from each American Division, be selected for C-46 lifts an d be moved
immediately to the area adjacent to Achiet (B-54) to faci l i tate training
and to have these troops in position fo r actual staging.
Conferees were informed that VARSITY control would center a t the
Brussels headquarters of Lieutenant General LZWIS H. BREEETON and Air
Chief Marshal OONINGHAM to FAAA (Main) to IX Troop Carrier Command (FWD)
and 38 Group. Overall plans would be drawn up at FAAA (Main) by repre-
sentatives of IX Troop Carrier Command and the Airborne Divisions.
Section 2
On 8 March General WILLIAMS reported to General B3RZITON that eight
Glider Combat Control Teams had been specially equipped and trained to
perform the duties carried out by a ir coordination part ies during the
Normandy and Holland operations. Operationally, each team could function
as a completely self-sustaining unit.
General WILLIAMS stated that tw o such teams would be assigned to
each Airborne Division to insure reliable communications. He pointed out
that in Normandy two out of four a ir coordination parties were los t due
to enemy action, while the Holland battle saw six out of eight parties
suffer casualties an d damage with three units completely knocked out,
A further reason fo r employing a spare team was the fact that all
control personnel could not be carried in a single glider, this factor caus-
ing a dispersal of team members. Under such conditions, an extra control
team would permit reshuffling of personnel on the spot and accomplish
necessary communication in a minimum of time.
In addition to combat dril l , the control teams had been thoroughly
trained in the use of codes and ciphers and the maintenance of their
radio equipment.
Under the plan outlined by General WILLIAMS, two Combat Control
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Teais Were scheduled for assignment to XVIII Corps (Airborne) during
Operation VARSITYT
Normally two gliders would be adequate to lift the necessary
personnel and equipment of each team, but in this case an additional two
gliders would be required to haul special pickup apparatus of both teams,
bringing the total number of gliders to six. Every effort was being
made to insure the operational success of the control teams, General
WILLIAMS stressed.
Responsibility Delegated to Teams
Abroad range of responsibility was delegated to the teams which
were to establish themselves with XVIII Corps headquarters fo r the purpose
of coordinating a ll outgoing messages through the Corps or Division
commander, Further coordination was to be established with Corps G-3 to
arrange glider pickups from combat landing zones if emergencies dictated
such measures. In preparation for such a contingency, necessary pickup
ropes and stations would be sent in with thecontrol t eams . Both IX
Troop Carrier Command and XVIII Corps had agreed upon the desirability of
such action if permitted by the tactical situation.
In line with this procedure, 16 gliders committed for the movement
of a medical Battalion also were equipped with l i t ter straps in the event
it was considered practicable to evacuate patients by glider, Decision
to make such a pickup was reserved by GeneralWILLIAMS, In case the
method were to be employed, the glider pickup location would be designated
by the grid coordinate system.
Three Hour Weather Reports
The control teams were further directed to effect radio contact
with the headquarters of both IX Troop Carrier Command and FAAA in order
to facilitate th e transmittal of three hour weather reportsto
D-Day
serials and later to resupply formations. UCO code was stipulated as the
medium of communication,
Information was to be relayed by the teams to IX Troop Carrier
Command concerning known strength of resistance points that could be
circumvented enroute to and surrounding DZIs and LZ's. Hazards in glider
rLZ's and methods of eliminating them were to be pointed out,if
possible.
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DZ's.
Teams were to maintain contact with Troop Carrier serial leaders
and to supply necessary pert inent information over V H F. They were re .
sponsible fo r setting up pickup stations, if called upon to do so, an d
transmitting coordinates together with timing and any other information
applicable to such a task.
In addition, control teams would transmit a ll messages directed by
the Commanding General, XVIII Corps relative to concentration of enemy
troops, enemy a ir activity and any other necessary information.
Tamiliarisation with Units
Preliminary to VARSITY, Troop Carrier Combat Control Teams No. 1 and
2 would be placed on five days detached service beginning 12 March with
XVIII Corps for the purpose of familarising themselves with the units with
which they would serve. Then they would proceed to marshalling areas.
The Glider Combat Control Teams of IX Troop Carrier Command were
molded in the crucible of combat on the fields of Normandy and Bolland.
Their development was in answer to the acute need fo r on-the-spot recon-
naissance from DZ's and LZ's during an operation and speedy communication
to oncoming serials and operations leaders a t headquarters.
Faulty relay of information under extreme pressure of fluid batt le
l ines during previous operations resulted in continuous improvements that
culminated in the formation of eight combat control teams to part ic ipate
in VARSITY.
Two Teams pe r Division
Colonel JONDS (A-3) pointed out that eight teams were formed in order
to provide two fo r each of the American Airborne Divisions in the European
Theater- the 82nd, 101st. 17th and 13th.
A wide range of versatility was demanded of the four glider pilots
and single enlisted ma n who comprised each team. One GP, with a minimum
of 500 hours as a power pilot in addition to at least two combat missions,
served as flying control operator, while each of the remaining three
glider pilots doubled as radio operators. The enlisted ma n functioned
as radio operator and mechanic. All personnel were qualified to drive a
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in locatlons of LZt's and resupply
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Jeep and t rai ler.
In addition to possessing special ski l ls in the use of radio and
cryptographic equipment, each ma n was given infantry training with th e
airborne uni tin
which he was intended to serve.Since the control teams were to operate from airborne landing areas,
often inside enemy lines under the most fluid battle conditions, their
ability to survive was the only guarantee of a workable communications
system. The paramount importance of combat training was obvious.
Jeep and Trailer
A single team's equipment included a Jeep and a one-quarter ton two-
wheeled t ra i le r with special rebui l t body to provide adequate space for
radio apparatus and an operator. A standard Jeep t ra i le r could not
accommodate an SCR-399 radio set and still permit an operator to work
efficiently.
Either an SCR-399 or SCL-499 radio could be employed along with a
P3-75 power uni t substituted fo r the PE-95.
Also included in the t rai ler was the SCR-522 VHP radio to provide an
auxiliary channel of communication to aircraf t in f l ight . This se t could
be mounted in th e Jeep, but such an installation would require additional
power equipment which was listed as a critical item and difficult to
procure.
NoSpace Inconvenience
Although the team could function without the SCR-VHF, the set added
less than 100 pounds to the total load without imposing any space incon-
venience an d therefore was considered a highly valuable aid.
Each team carried a set of documents to include three M-209 convert-
ers with special settings to provide approximately 32-hour security for
an y message; special code similar to air support request code but with
vocabulary to fit the type of messages to be handled and assuring a
longer period of security than the M-209; and air-ground authentication.
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CHAPTER IV
DRESS REMAARSAL AN D FIIAL PLANNING
Section 1
To stage a limited dress rehearsal for VARSITY, Colonel JONES (A-3)
directed plans to be drawn up fo r Exercise TOKEN and published a f ield
order on 12 March, designating the 16th as D-Day.
With a ll units of IX Troop Carrier Command together with 38 and 46
Groups (RAF) scheduled to participate, TOEX2 was primarily an a ir exercise
fo r the purpose of testing timing, communications, operational sui tabi l i ty
of airf ields and navigational aids.
In the overall picture, TOKEN provided the extent of Troop Carrier
participation in the larger Exercise BULL-FIGHT ordered on 6 March by
FAAA. As stated in the original directive, BULL-FIGHT's three objectives
were (1) To thoroughly test communications, (2) To test the detailed
functioning of the Combined Command Post at Headquarters, FAAA; Tactical
Headquarters, FAAL (a t 2nd TAF); forward Headquarters, IX Troop Carrier
Command; and Headquarters, 38 Group (RAP), Marks Hall, (3) To train flight
leaders of the Troop Carrier echelons and key personnel of the participat-
ing ai r forces.
The BULL-FIGHT directive named the Commanding General, IX Troop
Carrier Command, to exercise control of all Troop Carrier aircraft from
the Combined Command Post at Headquarters, FAAA. Communications to each
transient camp headquarters would be checked as aircraft and gliders
operated from fields assigned for pending operations, but no troops would
be Jumped and no gliders released.
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3 rescribed in BULL-FIGHT, the Exercise TOKEN
established fo r Troop Carrier th e task of flying an air route to a drop
zone-landing zone area, simulating drops and releases and returning to
home bases.
Under the plan, formations would simulate actual Troop Carrier and
RAF serials with (1) Parachute elements in the three ship V; (2) Single
glider tow with four aircraft and four gliders echeloned to the right;
(3) Double glider tow with two aircraft and four gliders echeloned to the
right; (4) RA F single tow with two aircraft and two gliders at a 10-second
interval and in loosepairs.
Rope Drop Area Selected
In view of the comparatively short time to be spent over enemy
territory during the Operation VARSITY, a rope drop area had been desig-
nated for the return trip. Similarly, a rope drop area was selected for
TOKEN and all glider tug pl.anes, except the 439th Group and 38 and 46
Groups (RAP),directed to proceed to it after swinging 180 degrees from
the LZ's, then to keep on going for home stations.
The 439th Group and 38 and 46 Groups (BAF)--all with double glider
tow--would proceed only as far as the Command Assembly Point at MARFAK,
then would return to starting points on a reciprocal route.
Head to head time intervals were specified at four minutes for 48-
aircraft parachute serials; three minutes for 36-aircraft C-46 serials;
seven minutes for single glider tow; and ten minutes for double glider tow.
Payload Maximaums stablished
Payload maximums were established at 5,000 pounds fo r the C-47, 9,000
pounds for the C-46 and 3,750 pounds for the CG-4A Waco glider,
Unit assignments on Exercise TOKEN called for the following simulated
parachute serials: two by the 434th Group; two by the 438th; one by Path-
finder; tw o by the 313th; and two each by the 316th, 61st and 315th.
Simulated glider serials would approach in the following order: four
single tow by 46 Group (RAP); 11 single tow by 38 Group (EAF); tw o double
tow by the 437th, 436th and 435th; two single tow by the 440th, with two
gliders of the f i r s t serial containing personnel and equipment of the IX
Troop Carrier Command Control Teams and to be released on Villeneuve/Vertus
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(A-63) airf ield after passing simulated LZ'1; two s*ingle tow by the 441st;
one single tow by the 442nd; and two single tow by the 314th.
During the staging and buildup period fo r TOKEN, the IX Troop Carrier
Communications section furniahed adequate signal and radar facil i t ies for
the exercise.
Direct speech and teleprinter circuits were made available from Head-
quarters, IX Troop Carrier Command (FWD) (Tomahawk) to Headquarters, JAAA
(Midnight); Headquarters, 50th Troop Carrier Wing (Transport); Headquarters,
52nd Troop Carrier Wing (Tradewind); Headquarters,. 53rd Troop Carrier Wing
(Transfer).These were supplemented by similar direct circuits from
each Wing to each of It s Ro. ,
CT?' -- VWoahorse Planes of World Wa r II
Teleprinter traffic was confined exclusively to operational messages
from six hours before D-Day to 2000 hours on D-Day.
Special point to point speech circuits were installed between A-3,
IX Troop Carrier Command, located in the operations room of PAAA, and the
A-3 sections of each Wing. In addition, a special cross-channel speech
circuit was made available between Headquarters, FAAA and Headquarters,
38 Group (RAF) on a common user basis.
Normal operation of the Command-Wing radio net was assured on a
frequency of 3940 kilocycles, with an alternate of 2956 kilocycles.
The heart of air to ground communication was a W/T radio station
established at Headquarters, IX Troop Carrier Command (FWD) on 5915
kilocycles and using the call sign K69. This station was to be employed
primarily for recall of planes whenever necessary.
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the strict maintenance of radio silence except for
the exercise of command function by Wing and higher commanders, or by any-
one in cases of extreme emergency. Permission was granted to break silence
on the return Journey for navigational purposes when aircraft were at least
40 miles from the DZ-LZ area.
Time signals would be broadcast on the hour and half hour, and all
Troop Carrier aircraft were directed to listen to K69 at a ll times when
they were no t working on HF or MF/DF stations.
Air to Ai r Intercom
Fo r ai r to ai r intercommunication, VHF channel "D" was allocated to
Troop Carrier aircraft.
Navigational aid faci l i t ies included the usual full complement of
radio, radar an d visual instruments. 14 beacons were in operation at
seven points along the route and on DZ's "A", "B", "X m and "W".
Provision also was made for air-sea rescue.
Procedure called fo r Rebecca to be operated only by the Squadron
leader of each nine-plane element. However, one additional aircraf t in
each nine would maintain Rebecca in standby position, with se t switched
on bu t the transmitter off. Rebecca equipment was to be turned off
immediately following drops and would not be turned on again unti l planes
had traveled 40 miles beyond the drop-release area. Again no deviation
from this arrangement was permissible except in emergencies.
Weather Causes Postponement
It was decided that whenever serials were broken np, each small
element lead ship would operate Rebecca. SCR-717-C was to be turned on
in a ll planes carrying this type of equipment in order to confuse enemy
radar l istening posts as much as possible.
Inclement weather caused postponement of TOK3N D-Day from 16 March
to 17 March.
Upon completion of the exercise, Colonel JONES (A-3), in a memorandum
to General WILLIAMS, reported the results of navigational aids, timing
an d communications.
The 50th and 53rd Wings had found Rebecca functioning sat isfactori ly.
at all points, an d visual aids on the DZ were excellent. Bu t the MF
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Eurieka also proved adequate fo r the 52nd Wing which stated that DZ
markings stood out very well over a 20-mile radius. In addition, the MF
beacon a t Marfak and the Gee a t Rheims met their tests successfully, but
th e Ruhr Gee Chain faded at the DZ, probably as the result of high terrain.
One squadron could not identify Eureka on the las t lap, and anotner was
unable to pick up the MP beacon in the same area.
The Pathfinder Group reported the MF beacon fair to good, the Eureka
adequate an d visual aids excellent.
Speedy Arrival over DZ'a
Colonel JONES (A-3) added that most serials arrived over the DZ much
sooner than scheduled with variations ranging from one to 12 minutes.
With three exceptions, the communications system functioned normally.
The direct line to the 53rd Wing became inoperative at 1730 an d remained
unserviceable until 1910 hours, while the direct line to the 50th kept
cutting in an d out. And the 50th Wing's A- 3 line to the 442nd Group went
dead late in the exercise.
As additional training for VARSITY, a simulated resupply mission to
the 17th U.S, Airborne Division was se t up by Colonel JONES (A-3) for
18 March at 1130 hours. It was to be accomplished by the 44Oth Group,
departing from Bricy (A-50) an d flying the TOKET route to DZ "V" and LZ
"A", With the mission designed to test communications only, the 27
aircraft and 12 CG-4A gliders assig ned to the task actually never left the
ground. It was further warmup fo r VARSITY.
Successful on the Whole
At the critique for TOKEN held at 1100 hours on the 15th at IX Troop
Carrier Command (FWD), General WILLIAMS declared the practice mission as
successful on the whole. There were no aborts an d no accidents. The
Troop Carrier commander pointed out that the Command Post established at
FAAA only two days before TOKEN had satisfied General BEERETON.
Citing a failure in cross-channel lines during the exercise, Air
Vice Marshal SCABLETT STREATFIELD, commander of 38 Group (RAF), indicated
that a ll else was on the positive side of the ledger. Airfields were
suitable, while navigational aids and inter-unit communications had proved
adequate.
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0 C Ln$ IIIfifTroop Carrier Communications Officer, reportedthat steps were being taken to correct those failures which had occured
during the exercise.
ColonelBurbridge
andthe Command Engineer
sectionwere commended by
General CLARK, 52nd. Wing commander, fo r speedy preparation of airdromes.
Timing System Modified
After General CHAPPELL, 50th Wing commander, and Colonel Joel L.
Crouch, Pathfinder Group commander, discussed timing diff icul t ies on
TOKEN, General WILLIAMS stressed the need for modifying the existing plan.
Wind had caused some formations to coast ahead of the Pathfinder echelonleading the mission. A discussion of methods resulted in the decision
to maintain a constant airspeed af te r leaving the Command departure point
in order to alleviate the timing diff icul t ies which had arisen during
TOKEN,
Confidence in the double tow fo r VARSITY was expressed by General
BEACH, 53rd Wing commander.No w that TOWK had been successfully executed, General WILLIAMS
could feel assured that h is Command was ready fo r its greatest achieve-
ment in the performance of VARSITY.
Section 2
As it must fo r a ll operations, the Communications section worked out
a system of speech and teleprinter circuits, radio fac i l i t ies and nav-
igational, radar an d visual aids for VARSITY.
Telephone and teleprinter l ines linked Headquarters, IX Troop Carrier
Command (PWD) to Firs t Allied Airborne Army (Midnight) and to each of th e
Wings--50th (Transport), 52nd (Tradewind) and 53rd (Transfer). In addition,
there were direct circuits between each Wing headquarters and its respective
Groups.
From si x hours prior to D-Day unti l 2000 hours on D-Day, these channels
were kept clear fo r operational t raff ic only.
Special point A in t speech circuits were made available between
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i 'i 5, Ix Troop Carrier i , located in the Operations Boom, lirst
Allied Airborne Army and the A-3 section of each Wing. A special cross-
channel speech circui t was rigged up between First Allied Airborne Army
and Headquarters, 38 Group (SAY) on a common user basis.
Pattern of TOE1 Followed.
Employment of radio fac i l i t ies followed the pattern of Xxercise
TOKIE. Policy dictated radio silence except fo r the exercise of command
function by Wing and higher commanders n"' fo r cases of extreme emergency.
On the return Journey, the breaking of radio silence was permitted for
navigational purposes when aircraft had travelled at least 40 miles from
the DZ-LZ sector, but transmission* were still to be held to a nininum.
The Command-Ving radio net was se t up to function at a frequency of
3940 kilocycles, with 2956 ae alternate. For the primary purpose of re-
call, air-ground W/T radio station was to be established at Troop Carrier
forward headquarter on 5915 kilocycle., using call sign 169.
G 6 * e - Oa the Ground a d in the Air
Call sign fo r any serial would be UGG, followed by the number of th e
serial, and KTRC was the collective W/T call sign fo r a ll Troop Carrier
aircraft . All messages would be broadcast by the "F # method.
In each V of V's of nine aircraft , two planes would be designated to
guard EF command air-ground frequency 5915 kilocycles during the ent ire
rlight, and no frequency checks or routine exchange of signals would be
made.
With Station X69 broadcasting time signals on the hour and half hour,
the sixth blip on each broadcast would denote the exact time.
In a ir to a ir communication, VHF channel #D" was reserved fo r IX
Troop Carrier aircraft inter-communication.
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.< .. 1J2 -. I _5 1S % r t l *I- - - -_-f - I -auUo aB agagiona al s IncDloea. 'Ar Deacone a t JL locations along the
route leading into the DZ-LZ sector. For air-sea rescue, the use of sect-
ion "H" was directed together with M/F D/F, cal l sign B12, frequency 273
kilocycles. Aircraft properly equipped could also use section "A" VEF
channel 755) for air-eea rescue,
Radar and visual aids called for standard display and codings of
panels and Eureka beacons except for the panel letters at LAST LAP,
Smoke identification would be stil l another form of visual aid.
Rebecca Used by Leaders
It was directed that Rebecca would be operated only by the Squadron
leader of each nine-aircraft element, but on e additional plane in the
element would hold Rebecca in standby position with se t switched on but
transmitter off. Deviations were expressly banned except in emergency.
Rebecca equipment would be turned off immediately after drops were com-
pleted and would no t be turned on again unti l a t least 40 miles from the
DZ-LZ sector.
In cases where serials broke apart, the leading plane of each small
element would operate Rebecca. ReFe stages of all Rebeccas would be peaked
to LAST LAP frequency,
Choice of two Eureka channels would depend on the specific DZ des-
tination of aircraf t , and pilots would be briefed by unit radar officers
on which of the two was to be employed.
Removal of Radomes
IFF would be used in accordance with existing procedures, bu t no SC0R.
717-C would be employed on VARSITY. Units were instructed to remove
radomes and associated antenna equipment for storage unt i l a la ter dates
The two radio-equipped combat control teams would maintain contact
with IX Troop Carrier headquarters from LZ "tN" by using W/T call sign B-38
on the frequency 4375 by day and 2436 by night. For transmitting information
to headquarters, the teaes would use special settings fo r X-209 and One-
Time Pad Cipher. An authentication table also would be employed.
If necessity arose fo r the teams to contact approaching Troop Carrier
aircraf t , it would be done on VHF channel 757, Team R/T cal l sign would
be ACHILLES. The team station would take over net control after estab-
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lishing contact with IX Troop Carrier headquarters,
To guard against unforeseen communication interruptions, a Command
relay would be in operation a t MARFAK. It would monitor the frequencies
used by the Combat Control Teams and the Troop Carrier headquarters net
and copy a ll messages. In the event a message from the DZ were not
acknowledged by Troop Carrier headquarters, or vice versa, the relay
station would immediately pass along the message to the station concerned.
W /T call sign of the Command relay would be J68. At H plus 5 hours, th e
relay point would contact headquarters fo r instructions regarding further
operation of the M/F beacon fo r resupply missions.
Operational Message Centers
Operational message centers capable of handling a ll