WWII 3rd Marines Div - Bougainville

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21 March, 1944.v*

From: The Commanding General.To: The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.

First Marineia: The Comnandi^ General,amphibious Corps.

Subject: Combat Report of the 3d Marine Division in the Bougainville Operations, 1November

28 December, 1943.

(a ) Narrative of the Campaign (D-3 Report) -?\u25a0*nclosures:(3) Report D-l Section -*>. is

(C) Report D-2 Section -/>(D) Report D-4 3ection -p . -f o

(2) Report Division Air 'Officer -p- 53>'(F)Reoort

3dMarines

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' *G) Reoort 9th Marines -.'--

-H) Report 21st Marines -p./7*(I) Report 12th liarines -f.

i(J ) Reoort 19th Marines -PZ^(X) Report Service Troops -p.^r(L) Report Special Troops -cm(ii) Report 2d aarine *talder's -f 3^X.

1. The Combat Report of the 3d *<iarine Division in theOperations at impress /tuûsta Bay, Bougainville, British SolomonIslands, from 1 November to 26 December, 1943, is presented asa narrative based on the Resorts of the Executive Staff Sections

Division,nd the several Administrative and Tactioal Units of thewhich Reports are appended to the narrative as annexes. Theannexes amplify, in detail, the incidents related in the narrative*

2» The purpose df the Combat Report is to establish anhistorical record of the campaign* The recommendations andsuggestions for modifications of tactics, technique, organization, ,

and materiel, which are a par t of the Reports of Subordinate Units,are herein included as an essential part of the record Inasmuch asthe cause of a recommendation is an effect of an experience in

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a. H. TURIIaG^/DISTRIBUTION: ComSoPac (4)

CliC (10) one (1 ) Historical Section.VPhibCorps (2)

IllPhibComs (2)CTF 31 (2)

MC3 (2)3d Marines (4)

9th Marines (4)12th Marines (&)19th Marines (1)

!!\u25a0\u25a021st Marines iA\

3pTrs3dMarDiv

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• •HEnDgJARTERS,

THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,

IN THE FIELD.

lURRaIIVS OF THE

CAMPAIGN-(D REPORT)3

Instructors Iteadinfc thi#,Doctnwnt

(*%eNo **—)Sign Below

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1



• •_DECLASSIFIED

(2) Unload the ships simultaneously in a minimum

of time bo thoy could withdraw.

(3) Obtain maximum dispersal of men and supplies consistent with tactical safety for protection against

air attack.

(4) Be so disposed as to develop without delay a beachhead in whatever direction ground reconnaissancedictated after landing.

(5) Be prepared to resist immediately a seaborne attack.,and/or counter landing.

(6) Provide air defonso of the beachhead as soon aspracticable.

The

considerations listeddictated the following

deolsions:

(1) To embark three task units in the ships allotted,two to be reinforced Infantry regiments of 4Landing Teams each, and the third basically anti-aircraft artillery of the 3d Def Bn. With eachof these units were assigned the detachments ofEngineer, *ir,llaval Base, Signal and 3erviceTrooos whose mission was the Immediate developmentof the ;»ir and Haval Base facilities.

(2) To restrict the loading of the shloa to about 500tons each in order to be able to unload withinfive to six hours total elapsod time.

(3 ) To land all elements simultaneously, combatant

elements covering non-combatant elements.(4) To seize a broad shallow beachhead, initially,

in order to contain immediately whatever Japanesedefenses had been Installed, to institute vigorousterrain reconnaissance inland fo r location ofroutes of ingress and airfield sites, and to dis-perse troops and stores against air attack.

(5) To be prepared to shift elements laterally withoutdelay in order, either to reinforce, or to developthe beachhead to the direction reconnaissancedictated*

(6) To bo prepared to organize beach and air defensesimmediately on landing.

(7)To transport to impress *£usta Bay area theremaining echelons of the Division as rapidlyas the availability of ships and distance permitted.

The plan as completed divided the equipment and sulliesor toe organization into three categories:

-m Those items essential to live and fight for ten

days. This included at least ten days rations,3 units of fire for the weapons embarked,^nd^fuel fo r the same period.



BtbtnSSiflEß^"-- - -°"-

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B Those items required fo r the continuation ofcombat, additional munition*, rations, fuel,

-

and the engineering tools and equipment for the

development of the beachhead area and airfields**

C All other items no t Included in or B.

Category A was to accompany the assault echelon,Category B vac to be forwarded with subsequent echelons, andCategory C was to remain stored with the rear eohelon on Guadalcanal pending further instructions. Thus the equipment and suppliescarried initiallycame within the tonnage limitation* imposed fortactioal safety of the transports.

The plan of landing was to employ twelve beaches, oneper ship, eleven extending west from CLiPg MROKIHA some 8000 yardsand one on the north (inner) shore of FUHU*Jp I?JUnjJP *11 elementswere to land simultaneously, the 3d Mar reinforced by the RaiderRegiment (less one Landing Team) in the right seotor (6 beaches),

(Raider)the 9th Mar reinforced by on e LandlxurXoam in the loftsector (5 beaohes), and on PUKLUIA laLiJip (1 beach). Two groupsof the 3d Def Bn were to land in the right seotor and two in theleft sector. Each combat team was to overrun and destroy allenemy beach defenses, seise an initial shallow beachhead andinstitute vigorous reoonnalssanoe Immediately to the front andflanks, meanwhile unloading the ships as rapidly as possible andinstalling beach defenses, and prepared to shift laterally ineither direction.

2. REHEARSAL.

With the completion of the plan of attack, the CombatTeams began embarkation at £Utt&ftfc£ftUab

°*313 October, 1943, and

proceeded to ETaTE. flfflfflHpigg. where complete rehearsal of thelanding was exeouted. The Defense Bn task unit exercised at

fffftPnfcfrftlinl «U foroes rendezvoused enroute to &EMBSUU&

3.

The initial landing was executed as originally plannedbut subsequent disposition of tactioal units ashore was precipi-tated by the faot that stronger resistance than expected was meton the right flank. Beach and surf conditions to the west of theKOROMOKIIURIVER were found to be unsuitable for oontlnued use aslanding beaches (some 70 landing oraft broaohed on these beaohes-D-day), and ground reoonnalssanoe disclosed that the llUM^»Mlm>PIVj» TiUILarea constituted the main overland access to our vitalbeachhead area fo r the enemy, as it became apparent that noimmediate enemy oontaot was forthcoming on the left (west) flank,it was deolded to exeoute the redlspostlon of units as previously

Therefore, the (2)lanned for consolidation of the beachhead.left Landing Teams, Ist and 2d Bns, 9th Mar, ware moved in succession to the right (fast) sector. The right LT, Ist Bn 3d Kar,

wae brought into reserve in the left sector and the oenter LT,2d Bn 3d Mar, moved to the right of the left sector. As of 5Hoy 43, the disposition of troops consisted of five battalionson a limited beachhead line, a battalion in reserve in the leftseotor, a Aaider battalion plus one Co with Aegtl Hq in reservein the right seotor, a Raldsr company blocking the PjVA Tftj^fcbeyond the beachhead, and a Raider battalion less two (2 ) ooapanlesoccupying PURIUTj* iaLnHD.

7



(Cont'd).

the 3dhe Bnd Bn SwiTray,Beforeefore 9ZbTWav t landedand Initially onleft,could be shifted to the r ightsector, an enemy fo?ce

the

compositeated as a battalion, transported estlfrom RABAUL inmade a on 7 Ilov 43, beyond?e5?

e5J r2?er ?» counter-landing Jußt theleft flank of the beachhead. Prompt developmeAtby X Co, 3d Bn 9th Mar, and rapid employment

of the Snemvof the left SeS to rreserve battalion (Ist Bn 3d Mar), plus the newly arrived Jet Bn2l8!*?& destroyed the major portions of the enemy and completely

routed the remainder, so that by the evening of a Uov « theyno longer constituted a threat to our beachhead

On the afternoon of 8 Uov 43 , the enemy made mnt-«nrwith the daider company blocking the PJV* ?LIL?

Bn (less oTt\w 43the 3d flaider two oomptnlesJ^lSs^twrcoopanle; of 2daaider Bn. four companies in all, attacked, supported by artilleryand mortars, and drove the enemy back towards Ply* VlLL«a£ aftera very heavy fire fight. Movement to the flafeTWaTîtrlctedfor both forces due swamp eacho deep on side of the

PIvII^XLn the morning of 10 Ilov 43, the 9th Mar (less 1Bn] TOTwTna close support air strike, passed through the Haiders in columnf Bns; found the enemy had withdrawn, occupied PIV* VILLAGE and

The poor coordination and tiaing-oTtEirenemy atî^î*SiS 8J? r imme4la i;

******offensive reaction, caught Japaneseheoff balance, so that the threat to both or either flank was re

moved spaoert the of three days. In both these actions artillery

*. -i** * The 148th Inf CT, having arrived on 8 Nov 43, commenced

Sf iS'r?0 l,ov S3.r 1

55t K'J^S? l^8 On 9 Wov «5 thle waa comoletedon The 3d Bn 9th Mar moved to the right

flenk of thet0 tha?i^ BeCir priOrwaUac^ of 10 Nov 43. The 3d Mar moved

inland and to the east, thus creating a center sector of thebeachhead. On 8 i:ov 43, Ca, IM*C arrived at SMPRS33 AUSL'STA BAYand, at 1200, 9 Hoy 43, assumed command of all forcesTrTtnat'* 'rea, relieving the CO, 3d Mar Dlv as CG, SMPRS33 jkUGPSi* Attk****l^rl^r^t^25 ac«t vcre'lffTêr^Lia^rcal~

ontrol of CO, 3d Mar Div until a later date.

*. 4J^ J*

1 fxception of the engagement of tho 2d Bn

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in^!!Battle of the Cocoanut Orbve, near the Junctionof %jteWJ^ j^H, and jy^J W£^ TxUIL across the PIVA iivai,

12-1^ i ,ov 43, subsequent to which the enemy withdrew7"th^rT"waBno Indication of enemy strength until 20 Hoy 43. During thisperiod the main attention of the Division was directed to oatrolllng, development of supoly routos under extremely difficultconditions, and the extension of the beachhead line in the Divsector to include the proposed inland air

field sites which hadbeen selected by ground reconnaissance.

*._ *! elements of 37th Div, U3A, continued to arrive,w beachhead was extended inland with the 37th Div occupyinghetne left (west) sector and the 3d Mar Div defending the right(east) sector, ofxtension the beachhead in the 3d I4ar Divsector was necessarily slow due to :

kcussi ED



(Cont'd).

ll^^tdwvltlGV^-1-"(1) Enemy resistance in foroe in the entire PIVA H1V 251

forks area,

(2) Extremely swampy ground unsuitable fo r continuedoccupation, located east of the PIV* aivaa and

•

south of the £»3T WEST TiUIL and.

(3) The great difficulties encountered in road construction and ingress through swamps for supplyroutes to the troops, Special precautions had to

be exercised to the ond that our forces be notadvanced beyond our means of supply and evacuation*

as the beachhead was being extended* Japanese resistance wasdeveloped to the north and east of the PIVA HIYSI forks and northof the E*3T WEST TRAIL, The first indication of enemy resistancein strength appeared on 20 Nov 43. This developed into theBATTLE Cg Ply* rOrtKS which was continued on through 25 Hoy 43 bythe 3d Har, reinforced during the latter phases by elements ofthe 2d A&lder Aegt, the 9th Mar, and the 21st Mar. artillery wasconstantly employed in increasing force until on 24 lloy 43, sevenbattalions fired the preparation for the 3d «tar attack. Thisattack destroyed the major portion of the enemy foroe (estimatedas a relnforoed regiment) and completely routed the remainder,most of whom fled well to the 6ast of the TOaOCH* RIVZR.

On 25 Hoy 43 the Ist Bn 9th Mar and six companies ofthe 2d Haider Regt passed through the 34 Mar and, against l ightretiring resistance, occupied the hillmass east of the PIVA RIVKRdominating the EfJR VXBT TRAIL. Reoonnalssanoe to the TcKKSaSSSM urns initiated Immediately. On 23 Soy 43, the CO, SdTlarDivordered the 3d and 9th Marines to exohange subseetors, therebyallowing the latter,

whloh had beenonly lightly

engaged atany

time so far, to take over an active subseotor and the 3d Mar tooocupy the relatively quiet sector on the right (south) flank ofthe beachhead. This exohange of sectors was initiated on 24 Uov43 and oompleted 26 Hoy 43. The 21st Mar remained in the centereubseotor and the 2d Balder Aegt returned to Corps town; The3d Mar badly depleted by battle casualties, sickness, and exhaustion, was relnforoed in Its new seotor by the Ist Bn, 145thXnf (Begtl reterw) and other special units.

When reeonnalssanoe disclosed that the enemy was no toooupying the hillmass Just west of the TOaaciliA RIVER, eventhough supply and evacuation would be most dimoult, the CO,3d Mar- -Dlv, initiated advance to and occupation of that generalline Hills 1000, 600, and 500, and the high ridge runningwestward from Hil l1000. The first stsp was the occupation ofan OPLR by: the 3d Parachute Bn and units of the 9th, 21st and 3d

Marines, pending construction of amphibian tractor routes forsupply and evacuation through the dense Jungle swamp*. On 10Deo 45 the three Infantry regiments advanced to and occupiedthe FBL without incident. In the meantime, however, the 3dParachute Bn, outpostlng Hil l1000 and a portion of the sub-sector to be oooupied by the 2ist Marines, had beoome engagedwith an enemy force, estimated as a reinforced company, stronglyentrenched on the east slope (nose) of HUI 1000. After repeatedattacks by units of the 21st Mar, supported by artillery and doseair bombardment, this foroe was eliminated on evening of 18he _Deo 43. '_. ,*-» IT^

-6

DECLASSIFIED



oMoffbed,heline above with

minor adjustments,

became the MLR of 3d Mar Dlvs seotor of FBL. The enemy having

fled to areas east and northeast of the TOROK^IjtA RIVES , and

further activities being limited to local and distant patrolling,deliberate organlratlon of the ground was initiated immediately

together with continued construction of roads and trails over

the swamp and hills of the subs actors. These projects wore 85%complete at the time of relief of 3d Mar Div by the AmerlcalDivision.

belief of front line elements of the 3d Mar Divcommenced 21 Dec 43 with relief of the 3d d&r by the 3d HaiderAegt and attached troops, and oontlnued as elements of thoJtsdrloal Division arrived at TOftOKIUx. GO, 3d Mar Div relinquishedcommand of the East Seotor to GO, *merlcal Division at 1600, 28Dec 43.

Detailed aooounts of the various operations may befound in reports by organisations of 3d Mar Div, enclosed herewith*

4. COMMSHTB.

The unloading of the ships transporting and accompany-ways.ng initial landings affects the tactioal plan in numerous

In general there is need for employing, during the unloadingperiod, approximately 33 l/$2 of the personnel embarked in orderto attain the maximum eff ioienoy possible and thereby to reducethe unloading time to a minimum, Beoause a oertain percent ofthis labor Is performed by naval, personnel who have no combatmieelona at the moment, tint total result affects the combattroops to the extent of at least 2% f of the total effectivestrength. There are two solutions to this labor problem, themost obvious one being to transport labor troops whose sole pur-pose is to handle the details of the unloading. This is not

entirely satisfactory inasmuch as it oauses the landing of elementswhich are not suitable for ground oombet at a time when they maybe a hindrance to the operation. Further, their Maintenance and•apply creates an additional burden on those funotlons withoutadding anything to the ef flolenoy of the foroe landed Immediatelythat the unleadias le oompleteoV The following solution wouldalso provide the vital labor. When the estimate of the strengthneoeeeary to aocompllsh the oombat mission has been determine!,the eeatatant unite should have their strength increased tX& inthe ranks of private and private first olaae or organised replace-ments should be embarked to the strength of 25^ of the oombattroops. This additional strength would provide the shore partylabor initiallywithout Jeopardising tactioal strength and unityof ooabat organiaations. Oji the completion of the unloading thispersonnel le iismediately available for replacement of oombatlosses, for garrison or other duties, or may be returned to rearareas in same ships.

When kXA's are employed with the assault echelon, theshore party organisation should be embarked in «PD*s, LSD's orLST's and accompany the assault. aKA's cannot accommodate suffi-cient personnel aboard to constitute their own shore parties, andAfta's.aay accommodate only their own in addition to the LandingTeam embarked, otherwise, the Landing Team suffers such a drainon its personnel that its oombat offeotiveneM «*4mmVßrefe-

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• •(Cont'd).wetAsstfe

,«. Xan*ln§ of •i1 •leaents simultaneously In any..?"JYiJJV beachhead without a Division reserve oan onlybe

Justif led by providing the least taotioal unit with a localreserve, and by Baking detailed plans calculated for the execution of a lateral shift of force to Beet unexpected threat.?lans in this instance were suoh that the time interval provided*?«£}* JOBBltjiemt of the local reserve would permit a lateralshift of reinf orolng units to sect the situation. In the execution of the landing at TQBflgHa the soundness of this plan wasproved, the result being that reserve force continued to be In-creased in the area of contact during the early phaees of aotlonthere.

The value of the early and continued employment ofBases* artillery fire cannot be overestimated. It is the oneam of the ground foroee with which the eoaaandor oan influence

the aetlon over his entire front without the movement of troops.The largest nuaber of batteries possible, consistent with thesue of the landing force, should be in the initial landing force,along with the proper artillery heedquartere to Bake centralisedtiro oontrol possible*

'tfhero units not ordinarily a part of the Division are

attached for a particular operation, these units should be attachedwell in advance of D-Day. Shis is necessary In order that boththe Division and special units asy becone acquainted with eachother and execute their initial planning together.

. Without the oonstsnt use of amphibia** an the right(cast) ecctor of the beachhead, the devslopacnt and final ocoupaucn of this sector verti have been delayed by at least twoweeks and very probably acre. •Aaphlbs* were the only «esjn of

ewaapyr#Mßort that could negotiate the areas at all time..Ftob DJJay on they vere in constant use tor forward displacement

!f!S!^M *Ad oquMnt, anT?orcvi«ttttion of wounded. To saythat they were "invaluable* would constitute an understatement.In this ease they wore a vital necessity.

In the seisure of suooescive objeotlvee in Jungle warfare the mm ot action usually become broader and broader andlines beoope thin and overextended to the very Halt of safetyaplnsjtpenete'atlon or infiltration. Under suoh condition* intgc moMVUmiiA nsßpsian. thethe foiiowins mi foundfound to im th«JTlWii ftesaslgn, following was to be theeuo method when contact was imminent:

(a) When reconnaiesanoe discloses the pretence ofenemy force ou t front, oontain the advanoe elementsof the enemy with thin lines (division front) andhit him Immediately with a highly mobile strikingforce, well out front, strongly supported by artillery.

°*it«fc«M« -4~J? Js* *•!*«*•* *» *ree for the purpose of eetab-

X?MtJnA oth v *"WUIUUom. svsrything should beto the capture and seisure of the areaneoessaryJ^ordinated

«2^J?f. WSurJJ 3rw? rJ ttCh "•Wlittw, Initially, the first

priority should be the taotioal situation with means• together for

SE^XSL*!*11?*1?1:, t*landi ftOttXd *• «»3Loyed for thie pur

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• •

UcpXU ABiOJC|E|IImp*IQU (Confd).

EJEULftudinLUThe Jap is not a cross-country fighter. As a general•rule he operate on or near a road, trail, or beach line whichafford him the easiest aeans of ingress, supply, and retreat.* relatively oan a large area bysmall foroe defendblocking the trails until reserves oan be brought up, if required.

Throughout the JMPRI33 jiUftUaT*Bi*y operation- -he 3dJapMar Dlv was faced with three mo«t formidable obstacles

forces, deep swanp, and dense Jungles. It is believed that seldomhave troops experienced a more difficult ooobinatlon of combat,supply and evacuation than was encountered in this operation* Fromits very inception it was a bold and hazardous operation. Itssuooess was du s to the planning of all echelons, and the indomitablewill,courage, and devotion to duty of all members of all organi

tatlone participating.

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4

* #

HEADQUARTERS,. THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,

IN THE FIELD.flCsUl AAAm17 March 1944>

lr«wl?floXlfffII' r V^fHf|(||;G|uloM REPORT CF STRENGTH

AKD CASUALTIE^TR THZ. OPERATIC AT EMPRESS

AUGUSTA BAY, 30UGAl:rVTLLE.

1. Casualty figures for this division durir^ the

Bougainville oa^paign were as follows:

KjAjA WIAIAC WOO E,, 0 V.O Enl.O Enl0 WOO £nini 0 Enlnl

SpTrepTre r~~ 0 3 2 0 311 0 0 1 3 0 355

0 0 1 3 1 555ServTrservTrs i 0 5 2 1 300

3dMardMar 4 1 799 200 0 37878 2 0 155 266 1 47272

9thMarthMar 1 0 300 7 2 12525 0 0 3 8 2 15858

12thKar2thKar 1 0 9 3 1 255 0 0 1 4 1 355

19thHar9thHar 0 0 4 1 0 499 0 0 1 1 0 544

21stKar

TOTAL 15 1 177 41 6 833 2 0 61 58 6 1071

ac

0 WO Efll 511B. Total burials effeottd by this division were follows

Cemttery #1 IS. 0 126 1Cemetery #2 0 0 16 0

Cemetery #3 11 1 147 0

\u2666TOTAL 24 1 289 1

\u2666TfceM figures include personnel of II4AC, Third MarineDiYlaion and miso#llaneoug naval units attached for the operation.

9. Total nuab#s of patients evacuated sick were ac follows:WO Snl

TO 143T

4. Total number of patients evacuated wounded were asfollows:

Enl i£10 0 256

operation:5. Losses in non-effectives throughout period of

KZA tI- >? -W hMIA 2 0 61* Slok(Evao) 79 9 1431Wounded( EvaoJjy^C^SggTOTAL 106 10 1925

Died of wounds reoelved in oombat:

4 0 66

7. Average strength present for

0 WO Enl BECLASSIFIED35 S5 13676

Auth strength 938 93 18006 ISENCLOSURE (B)



by cat:vory against ~ltlce aKra*e(1) md authorized st:\?:i«t:h ( 2} :

(2)

\\- -£- foil Tot -I

i 1.60 T7oB

,

.98 THJi'J.A .26 .48 .43 .21 .34 .33ok< .vac) 10. OS 14.51 10.46 10.45 3.42 - 7.93.68 7.9EI-ixM'ao) 1.2& --»?\u25a0-\u25a0 Iny^ 1.83 1.07 144£1 44£ 1.40

/

C. 8. WITS,LtCol., U3MC,

D-l.

E!JCLO3UHE (P)

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HJT/fr IHTELLIOE'TCS SECTION, HSAD^UARTtSS,iMAQTW? TVrVTHTfiW Vt V>r"V M A Q T V T SYIRr§^MgkM TVRD WARIMS DIVISION, FLSST MARINE FORC2,m

EMP3SSS AUGUSTA BAY OPERATION,

1. The performance of the Divisional Intelligence Agencies

during the Empress Augusta. Bay operation was, on the whole,satisfactory." In order to avoid a tedious narration oftrivialities; and mattere of importance to the DivisionIntelligence Section only, this report will be oonfinAd topertinent

comments and r?oommsndatlons«2. For a resume of enemy operations during the period see

Annex A, "Enemy Operations.

3. Dlv

(a) In g?nerfll the organisation of the section wasAdequate; but it is considered that a reduction of p?r*onnclin two oi> see *n& an Increase and redistribution in another,bp.eed on Teble of Organisation strength (B->9B), isnble. (See following discussion).

(b) Intelligence Pnl,t.

(1) In order to effectively carry out the n«#eflsra*yolcriopl and administrative funotions of the Int«lllf«*etUnit a total of six olerks wp« found necesMry, Vht one, atauthorised,resent being inadt<ms.te The distribution 9tthe clerks should b? as follows:

t

-ombpt Intflligenoe - 3

Language 1Reproduction and Photography-- 1Public Relations 1

The four clerks at present authorised for the API unit artnot neoeeeary, one being suffioient. Therefore a net in-crease of one clerk over the authorised allowance for th*eootlon is recommended.

(2) Based on experience gained during the operat ion, it is considered that the liaison offioers are aninvaluable asset in maintaining a continuous flow of infor-

mation between higher and lover echelons.

DECMSSIOE»



DECLASSIFIEDoutstandingly' (3) The lnngurge personnel performed\ % eneny

In Interrogating prisoners md translatingtrpnslax.a,documents. Two epptured documents, «h:n

of mnneuv-r\u25a0;\ gpve information as to plannrd rnsmy schemes

counterwhich pernltted our forcre to take cffectlv?men sure e. Prior to the op-rption two rierl iSseonageneration Jrpancse) were pp signed to the division oy

one assigned r.ft-r tn:ComSoPac. An Additional welpndlng. The >!isei p-rform:d lnvplupblc work km v

cix be- «eelgncdle highly r-eoan*nded if ooepible thpt

to the division prior to future orerptions thrrc to

be fisslgned to thf Division Intrlllgence Section pn d

Except r>mplpyone to op ch lnfpntry r?ciîrnt. for theorrctlcpblc,ment of Nisei «c priditionnl r.rrsnnnel where

it is consid-rsd th»t the lp.nguflge r^rsonnel fluthorlzedfor the Division «r3 pdequpte.

(4) (p) Except for the mpnnlng of Division OPs

r*iich were nonoxietpnt due to th? terrain, it le con

sidered thrt tho obs-rvere p. t present assigned to theDivision Intelligence Section pr: Inpd^qup.to rrA vlthout vp.lue. compr.nyA veil trrined reconnaissancepttpchc-d to Division Hrpdouprters, «nd under the operr

lnvwlupbl?.tionnl control of D-2 T^nuld hpve proved

It In etrongly r. fiomn3 ended thpt the present observersbe eliminpted pnd pêclpl scout compftny be organizedp.nd mp.de an lntegrpl pprt of tho Division Hgndouprtere

Bpttnllon to o-Dcrrte under the control of 3-2 for theperforming of the following epeolp.l functione.

(1) Amphibious reeonnpleennce pntrole fie

necêsftry prior to the actual, operation.

(2) Special distant patrol operationsrequired.

(3) Manning Of Division OPe as reoulred.

(4) As special details to assist organisation oommrnders in the gathering, segregating andguarding of enemy documents, equipment Mid material onthe scene of oombat operations until proper dispositionof same can be made.

(b) The light tank battalion scout company wasnot able to perform its normal functions during theoperation; And it is doubtful if it can be used in itsnormal joapa.olty in the South Paoifio Area. It isrecommended, therefore, that the scout company be re*

organised as a speolal infantry rifle company oomposcdof a company headquarters, three rifle platoons eAohof twenty four enlisted and consisting of a platoonheadquarters And three squads; and a normal infantryrifle company yeapo ns platoon. Sufficient radio personnel should be included to permit each rifle platoon

-2

• DECLASSIF IED... «... #



• •

\u25a0^ \u25a0\u25a0^F Wmluni^atlon while on patrols. The scout company ac reorganised to be lnoluded ac an integral unit of the DivisionHeadquarters Battalion; but under the control of D-2 foroperations and training.

(c) ir s

(1) It vps found that the personnel authorized forthe Aerial Photo Interpretation Unit was in exoeee of thatrequired. It la considered that tvo offioers and six en-*

listed (API) plus one clerk can adequately perform thenecessary photo interpretation work for the Division,

(2) After the landing, one API officer was loanedto the 12th Marines and thereafter one set of each photo

coverage received was forwarded directly to the ArtilleryRegiment as quickly ac possible* It was found that byallowing the artil lery organisation to oonduot and followthrough on their own interpretation of aerial photographsthat the delay incident to Division Intelligence personneldetermining targets and transmitting the information to theartil lery was saved* It le strongly reoommended that twoAPI officers be assigned to artillery regiments for thepurpose Indicated above.

4. &

(a) During the planning phase suitable vertloals,mosaics and obliques should be made available in time forcomplete distribution down to and inoluding platoon leadersprior to embarkation. Photo coverage received prior to andduring the operation were excellent; but an lnoreased quanti

ty sufficient for distribution above le highly desirableprior to the initial landing.

(b) It wae found impossible to pick up enemy positionsin the Jungle from aerial photographs. Except for the defensive positions oh Cape Torokina, at no time were any ofthe subsequent enemy defenelve positions determined fromaerial photographs. Artillery targets beyond the beach headline were determined by noting the gradual lnoreaee in theuee of tralle and oroe sings aoroee the Torokina River. Dueto the Jungle the great majority of close in *lr searchesrequested were neg-tive.

<o) It ie not considered that the taking of aerialphotographs in Jungle areae after landing is of any valueuntil the enemy has been definitely located In strong

defensivepositions.

No aerial photo eoverags was reouestedon this operation until D plue 20 daye due to the fluidityof the situation. -

3

JEtIASSIFIBfJL



DECLASSIFIEDd) After D plus 20 days # twice weekly coverage of

of the beaoh head ares .was of marked assistance In the trac-ing and correct orienting of the Increasing road networkwithin th# beaoh he*d area; and in terrain lntsrpretation.

(c) The Piper Cubs assigned to the artil lery forair spot missions were also used for air reconnaissancemissions and as such were invaluable. It is recommendedthpt Pt least ona flfflfehlblnn ol*ne be r>lrcd under thsoontrol of ths Division initially. Th?seplanes Capable of operating from vne water, wouxd be available to the division possibly from D^day.until the establishing of air fields ashore, thus initiallygreatly expediting requests for reconnaissance and small photographicmissions. During the early stages of the landing end t>rlorto the establishing of the fighter strip on Caps Toroklna,reconnaissance and photographio planes were based at such

a distanoe from' the beach head and performing so many othermissions that on occasions there was an Interval of two orthree days between the reouest for and the fulfilling of amission*

6. R

(a) All combat photographers mutt be thoroughly trained,not only in the technique of taking photogt-rphaj bit altowhat to take. Insufficient pictures of aotual oombat operations were made.

,fb) The processing of all photographic prints andnegatives should be done by the Division Intelligence Section.The regiments were not oapablo of p*ooe«slng prints ordeveloping negatives on the operation due to the lots ordestruction or their equipment upon landing. If all film

lirocessed by the Division Photographio Officer he it ableto maintain a much greater degree of supervision over thetype of pioturVs submitted by the combat photographers andcan issue instructions and orders accordingly. Ruining ofgood negatives due to poor processing would also be eliminated

(o) A total of 1587 still photographs and 38,000 feetof motion picture film were taken and submitted during theoperation.

(d) Prior to the arrival of the reproduction andphotographio trailers, undeveloped film was forwarded tohigher echelons by the first available transportation. Afterthe arrival of the trailers all photographio ooverags, wasprocessed by the Division Photographio Officer. The- trailerswere also used to process aerial photo film, a total of 16

rolls of 9 inoh aerial film beingprocessed.

3,124 9 x 18J.noh prints were made from film developed.

- * -.<*a .

itciircsfii,4 • • #



12 enlieted)Thirteen oombat correspondent e (one officer andwrote a combined total of 734 neve artlolee b/»eed on variousnotions of the oampalgn. Seven magazine articles, including.

two based on picture sequenoes, were transmitted, A totalof 680 nevs pictures, with complete captions by correspond-ents, have been transmitted. It is considered that theperformance ej f the combat correspondents during the operationwas highly satisfactory and they continually exposed them-selves under fire at great personal ride in order to obtainstories of greater emphasis vas placednevs value. Orsaton the forwarding of the initial photographs taken for presspurposes vith the greatest possible apeed.

7.

(a) Sufficient tentage to house the office personnel

was not available until P plus seven days. As a result,the Intelligence Seetlon suffered extreme difficulty infmnot lotting during the frequent rains of the first week,

•ufflt&eftt tentaf e to protect eaulpsient and essentialpersonnel M*t be made available a* soon as possible Afterlanding.

(b) In general., Intelligence information vas rsoelvedfrom lover mnlts with a minimum of delay. All oomsmnloatlonagencies functioned satlsfaetorifjr throughout the operation

and itit ooneidercd that the prison t agencies of oommunlca-tlon are ample for normal 'lntelligence requlrments.

(c) The usual local security patrols vere maintained:at all times for a distance of from 400 to 2,000 yards tothe front. After the establishing of the final beaoh beadline,

eeoh regiment sent a dally oombat patrol to coverthe ar«a in front of the regimental sector for a distanceof 4,000 yards. Zn addition oombat units provided 9000181recomalssanos patrols to aooomplish missions designatedby Division. Patrol reports vere In general satisfactory

and in some oats* were outstanding* Zn many oases patrolleaders vere not sufficiently trained or Instructed in whatto look for and hoy to rsport It vith the. result that theirInformation was praotioally without value. Zn jungle terrain,patrols are the only oertaln renns of obtaining definiteinformation on the terrain to the front; and all unit intell-igence offie ere and potential patrol leaders should be in -doctrinated with the fact that aoeurate terrain informationIs almost a vital as enemy Information, especially duringadvances. -

6

flffltt»f/fl>

p{



• •

equipment pnd the-^^^^fc#AMfAPvW&WBBBF cpptured

number of weapons" turnfa^n was unsatisfactory due, It is

considered, to the following conditions:

(a) The persistent Instinct of personnsl toretain Items as souvenirs even though they had been thoroughly Instructed to the contrary *>rtor to' the landing.

(b) The drain on personnel required for supply

and evacuation purposes did not leeve, in organisations,sufficient personnel to collect, segregate, and guard captured

material on the scene of oombrt.

(o) Transportation problems ovor poor trailswere so aoutc that, due to the demands of supply and evacua-tion, captured material oould not be moved and thereforevpB abandoned or destroyed In the Jungle.

(2) It Is considered that the only practicablemethod of assuring that captured material, and documentsare not lost, destroyed, or retained as souvenirs is tohave special units, supervised by offlocrs, right on thescene whose primary miselon Is to gather, segregate, protectfrom the clem ants, and safeguard captured material anddoouments until proper disposition 6f same can be made.Regiments do not have suff latent spare personnel to perform

the above tasks and It is believed that special units sentdown from higher echelons to assist organisation tommandera inthe gathering and safeguarding of captured material wouldprove to be of inestimable value. See discussion on special

scout company under paragraph 3 above.

jP* V vtv*cfccv\H. TURSONLt.cox, uacc.

> 0-2

•fflttHßtf



• •

KMJSIFIEDJT/JmhHEADQUARTERS,INTELLIGENCE SECTION,

THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,

IN THE FIELD.

1 February, 1944

NA ttANNEX to D-? SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

ENEMY OPERATIONS

I ROUND.•

The Cape Torolcina area was defended on Nov. Ist by the2d Company, Ist3n, 83 d Infantry plus 30 men from the regi

mental gun company and one ?smm gun, type 41. Totalstrength was 270. On lov. sth the strength of this companywpB 63 end the company commander, Carat. ICHIKAWA had beenreplaced by the CO of the 2d Platoon, a probationary officer.

The Cape Itself was fortified with 19 pillboxes solidly

constructed of coconut logs and dirt. The one piece oi artillery was located on the Cape. 3each Green 1 (on PURUATAISLAND) and Beach Green 2 were defended by a platoon eachand TOROKINA ISLAND by a squad which was later reinforcedby a few Japs who escaped from FURUATA ISLAND. All otherbeaches on T<*hlch our troot>B landed were undefended. It

became known subsequently that the enemy hpd based his dispositions on an estimate thpt allied forces vould attackEast of CAPE TCROKINA and West of CAPE MUTUPSNA.

On D-day, 1 November, as our landing boats roundedPURUATA ISLAND on their way to 3epchee Blue 1, Green 1, andGreen 2, they were taken under cross fire by machine gunson PURUATA ISLAND, TOROKINA ISLAND, and CAPS TOROKINA as

well as by one 75mm gun on the Cape. 3 boats were sunk and3 damaged. As our troops hit the above beaches they were

pillboxesalso fired on by mortars. There were 18 enemy

on CAPE TOROKINA and the last one was not reduced until1900, 1November. Enemy troops defending Baach Green 2

were overcome after they had inflioted several casualtieson our troops. Enemy resistance on FJRUATA ISLAND was very

determined and consisted of several enrolaced machine guns

and well-concealed snipers*

During 2 Novaaber, fighting oontlnued on PURUATA ISLAND.The remnants of enemy forces which had been on the Cape andon Beach Green 2 retired to the East.

On3 November, resistance on

PURUATA ISLAND finallyeeasod during the morning. After an artil lery preparation

at 1315, our troops landed on TOROKINA ISLAND and enemy

resistance cc«eed thereafter.hortly

-1

KMttS/flfl)#>



• •

DEMOTEDDuring the first 3 days, 192 enemy dead vere burled In

all seotors lnoludlng thoec burled by the enemy. Onsprisoner, a Sergeant Major, wounded In the elbow was cap-tured on 2 November Inland from Beaoh Green 2.

Enemy aotlvlty on 4, 5, and 6, November vac confined topatrols on our flanks. 13 Japs were killed In this period.

At approximately 0600, 7 November, the enemy landed aprovisional battalion on our Vest flank. This unit wasoomposod of ths following elements:

HqCo, 2dßn, 54th In f Regt.sthoo,2dßn, 54th Inf Regt.6thCo,2dßn, 54th Inf Regt.

Ist PlAt.7thCo.2dßn, 54th Inf Regt.M&Co, 2d3n, 54th Inf Regt.6th00,2d3n, 53d Inf Regt.lPlflt. (38 men) Shipping Engineers.

The unit had oomc down from RABAUL on 4 DD1•and had

landed In 21 boats and barges along the beach from JustVest of our left flank up to ATSINIMA BAY. 20 of themwere killed oros sing the LARUMA RIVER by our outpost whichwas near the mouth of the river, After the landing, thisforoe, moved to the East and contacted our troops holding

the Left flank, 90 of them were killed during the dayl sfighting. Our foroes ambushed a part of this force atdusk at a point on the beaoh 500 yards Vest of the per-imeter and killed 29 more. Meanwhile on the right flank,a ooßpany of Japs attaoked the PIVA ROAD blook and 8 werekilled beforo the rest withdrew. 3 more were killed by apatrol Just off the PIVA TRAIL.

On 8 November, on the Left flank, our troops attaokedalong the boaoh to the Vest at 0915 after a 15 minute artillery preparation. They killed 100 Japs during the courseof the day* s fighting. On the Bight flank, the enemy beganadjusting mortar fire on the PIVA road blook at 0330, Oneenemy battalion was reported dug in just Vest of PIVA No,

village* Our foroos attaoked and killed 200 Japs*

On 9 November, on the Left flank, one Jap was killed.On the Right flunk the Japs attaoked, at 0600, our positions

Just Northoast of the PIVA ro*d blook. They were stopped,

and dug In , 100 yards In front of our positions. After anartillerypreparation of 800 rounds, our foroos attacked nt0900, The onemy put up a very stubborn resistance and wlth-drow slowly towards PIVA No. 2 leaving 100 dead behind him.

Ufl}'s and 90mme was using the usual tre? snipers, mortars.

-2

ftOttSfflEßtf»



on both flanks. Hastily abandoned bivouac areas extending

for 2200 yards along the NUMA NUMA trail North of PIVA No.2, were estimated to have contained a battalion. Abandonedear included demolitions, grenades, personal pa ok8, l-75mm

mountain gun (Type 41). l-37mm "Rapid Fire gun, 1heavyma ohine gun, several light machine guns, 80am grenade dischargers, and small anas*

The enemy* e first serious effort to oounter-attaok ourbeachhead wns thus defeated by vigorous attacks of ourforces whenever and wherever oontaot was mads. He lost 561killed in the 3 days of fighting. The ertmy scheme of maneuver was as follows: The provisional battalion whichlanded on our Vest flank vas to go inland and harass ourperimeter on the loft flank and In front* Vhile they at

tracted attention to the Vest and North sectors of the per*»lmcter, the East flank was to be hit vigorously at 0600,9 November, by the Ist and 3d Bne, of the 23d Infantry supported by Field Artillery, the Regimental Gun Company, anaa Light Trench Mortar Company. This foroe was to attackSouth and Vest from an assembly area near PHCO (Northeastof HOPARA) and effeot a Junction with the foroe on our Leftflank In tha vicinity of PIVA No 2, Another foroe (elseunknown) was to make a landing Immediately Vest of TOROKINARIVER, and a platoon of 40 men and 1 officer Just East ofTOROKINA RIVER, The enemy estimated ou r beaohhead wi further to the East than It actually was and his estimate ofour strength was 6-10,000 troops. There are tome Indicationsthat the enemy planned to send further echelons down fromRA3AUL but was prevented by 9.8*Naval and air action. Thetwo landings scheduled to be made East and Vest of themouth of the TOROKINA RIVER were not carried out*

10, 11 pnd 12 November: The enemy wns contacted only

In small patrol actions resulting in the killingof 24 Japs.

13 November: A strong enemy position was establishedSouth of the Junotlon of the NUMA NUMA and East-Veet traUe.Strong resistance was offered to ou r troops who finallybroke oontaot fo r the night, U. S. foroe s attacked againthe next day, 14 November, using tanks. Bf 1545 the eneoyhad withdrawn leaving 25 dead behind* 6We had been captured by our troops.

15 , 16 and 17 November: Miner patrol activity. 2 Japswere killed on the 17th.

18 November: The enemy was patrolling aggressively feelin g

out ourpositions.

A Jap Lieutenantand

8men

were\u25a0

killed. The offloor was carrying a sketch which indicatedthe positions of the istßn, 23d Infantry to our Immediatefront.

-3

ft.



19 November: 100 enfljy^ftxholee in close proximity toour front lines were found to have been Abandoned duringthe night presumably as a result of our artillery fire.1? dc«d Jap§ wore found*

20 November: At 1230, an enaay company attacked ourtroop e Just Cast of the East branch of the PIVA RIVER (196.2-219.6). The attaok was be* ten off and enemy casualtieswere thought to be heavy. About 1200 yards South of thispoint, 18-20 enemy positions and some machine guns werelocrtod.

21 Novembcrt As our troops AttAOked along the last-Vesttrail, the enemy gave ground slowly fighting stubbornly Alltho time. Maohlne guns were smplaoed to the North of thetrull with fire lanes out to cover the trail* 76 dead Japs

were found* Sporrdic75mm enemy artillery

fire was ro*oolved during tho day in ou r Artillerypositions in thegeneral art* (154*2-214.2). A company rotter of the IstCo, 53d Infantry was found* The 6th 00, 53d Infantry hadbeen idantifiod on the Left flunk 7 November*

£2 November: Tho oneay AttAOked with r+lnforoed platoonsduring the day apparently probing for weak spot a, the letand 3d Bns, 23d Infantry were displaced in dtpth North ofthe East-Vtat trail* k>ohlnt gun Had laog+jar fir*mm: tta>»tlnous all day* One ooopany tu t located on biaji gpound latho general area (136. 3-820. 3). Shortly tHjp apon. «§»,..

tillary fire was reoelyed on the TOHMC2NA tttt*af* no**our 155am gun positions* One g«n notltlon «a*Mi aad *§*on fire. Bone 156mm shells exploded*

no further fittingoownred. me MilmMm&mm HmInfantry wtro ldtotifijd in this tottor. It Itbelievedthat survivors of the 7 November attaok on oo loft flMifihad oomo overland to «{# rtfht fluslu A» mm*Hmbatttr>«« ¥eT« n«rtraUtsd"by mt amU*^ talaf «Jm da;A ofptured etttay sketoh lndloiitla« th«

tsWQr

as£3eyW.a»nsuver stkovsd a 9 pronged attaslitalion headquarters posinon North pTthp^ti[<Mti Siu(Rtgiamtal headquarters ist iaditii^d to t fem> tmsl «v?BS»talion hoadmiarttrt)! one oa «*» North flas* —om*m «»

-4

•



NUMA NUMA trail to & point due North of CAPS TOROKINA andthence South toward? tho Cape; ono '.-Jest along the East-Westtrail, thence South alonp the FIVAv.NUMA NUMA trail to thevicinity of the bench; and one swinging South find West inp. wide eves^p to Join tho previous ftttnok nonr tho beach.

25 November: An attack by our forces ran Into strongresistance in the area (136.2-219.1) and vac held up allday; but the enemy withdrew during the night. Imnydi&'-elySouth of this area the enemy fired sporadio urchin* ;u.i

fire into our lines during the dry. At 1845 enomy artillery,both 15od. and 75mn, started shelling our artillery positionson CAPS TOROKINA, the division dumps on Beach Blue 1 nnd artillerypositions Northeast of CAPE TOROKINA. This firingcontinued »t Intervals until doming of 26 November nhenall enemy activity quieted down. The second large- scale

attempt to break up our beachhead had been defected after6 days of heavy fighting. The enony had lost 1196 dead inthis attempt. It la estimated that 450 of this number hrdbeen killed by artillery fire and the balence by Infantry,

A prisoner of wpr, orotured 27 November stated that tha 23dInfantry had suffered at least 40 t>er oent oaeualtiee endthe Regimental Commander had been killed. Units identifiedvere as follows:

23d Inf (less Cd3n and 9th Co, 3d3n)7th Co, 2dßn, 23 Inf.lstßn, 13th Inf.2 Go's, 45th Inf.6th EngineersOne lOoa. platoon.lstßn, 6th FA. (2-2 sun batteries)

2d3n, 4thHeavy

FA.[2-2 gun batteries)

3d Light Mortar Bn. (less Ist Company)sth Co, 54th Inf.6th Co, 54th Inf.6th Div. Signal Unit.Ist Co, 53 Inf (t) (Co rotter only evidenoe) '

87, 28, 29 and 30 November: No enemy aotivity except

for 20-25 15cm shells vhloh fell in tho general vicinity ofGAPE TOROKINA on 29 November. A gasoline dump was ignitedvhloh burned ou t a nearby 15Seam gun position.

1 , 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 December: Mo enemy aotivityexoept for small patrol contacts.

9 December: While one of our companies was advancingas part of a plan to straighten out the lines, they ran

intoan

enemy foror, eetimat^d to be ono company, in thovicinity of Hill10C0 (15?. 5-219. 3) at 1530. Anothercompany whloh was suppoccd to advance with them did not doso bcoause of patrol pant acts on their immediate front.Snemy snipers penetrated the gap between the two oompanlos.The enemy broke off the fighting at IJJO.

So



#>t

MttASSIFIED1, 18, 13 and 14 Dtotnbtrt Thert vtrt minoreklrmlehee vlth th t rennantt of th t 3dßn, 23rd Inf vho wereholding potltlont in th t general vlolnlty of mil 1000(139.6-C19.2). Tht tntmy foroe oontltttd of about 800-300troops During thlt ptrlod our Northeaet ttotor rtoelvedeporadio artillry and 90mm aftratart atihtlllnf from 75mmwtll at 50mm mortar and machine gun firt.

16 Btoambtri After a preparation by artillery and divebombart our troop e

attackedth t Jap p©el

t lone onRill 1000

and by dark had oooupltd th t vttttrn part of tht Jap poaltions*

16 Dtotnbtrt Tht enemy gtvt up all th t higher groundafter further attaoke by our foroee and vlthdrev into apooktt optn to th t Morta; but turrowndtd by ou r troop e onth t Meet, South and Eatt, A Ftinforbed platoon madt ton-taot vith oat ojf our patxolt on tht baath Satt of th t mouthOf tht TORdCZMA XXTSU

•eâouattd, fern* b»t|tt nejrt fxmmd ant «ft%lont-e>fttrtral o%'ff%

18 Tênamjptrt H>trt patfol tmntattt in th tnolalty of 'ItoaJipm «N» Hap%jgßU *b#y and 9 Japt

***Î*^ Thprtwirt^SeWiimmt mammgi \f vSj »fti V7 r**4|KjHbeMfeft BBes 4e» vBBHeImV <e» tflf 4flmam%^KNm^ VVBl&ttWl ' imr-%pe)am»

it,m and q. Pttembm ooatottt vtrt aadt

WBBIOII

mm) «m !»•*%•* fee tat*

fin«m a laid dew oa

thlapotlttona*

tt OejataWrt At 1000. oat of tar combat patrtlt aadttoataat with Jape> oaaapflnf ootarti paiatftntt an till800A. An attack by a ooapany failed to eUaUdft thorn.Tht taamjr «m t using l ight mortal* and at ltatt 9 aaohintomm, Owr otapany vlttdrtv btfort XtOO aaA. at 1000,MO loajei of artillery flrt varo pXaaaft on th t Jap positions

-«.

• •>3

i



•

)

A platoon- _ patrol ran Into Jap prepared pou25a0"^TeotmbTr: ___•:... . . If

sitions nsar (140.50-211.85; at 1000. The point was a marinewith a m ilitary dog. As coon as tne dog alerted, the Japsopened fire, killing4 (plus the dog) and wounding 10.Our patrol withdrew while an Qlmm mortar concentration waslaid in . Reinforce* by another platoon, the attaok was reeumed but was unsuocecoful and our troops withdrew Ueutaoross the TOROKIKA RIVER. The Jape were dug in arciml thebases of trees and had 1 heavy mpyhine gun, 3 light machineguns as well as 60mm mortare. Another unsuoceecful etJtaokwas made on the Jap positions in the saddle of Hil l 600A.

24 Deoember: Patrols on Hill 600 Aeported the eneayhad withdrawn to the No~th. About 30 covered emplacementswere found. The Jape were reported to be organising a defensive position extending from the North end of Kil l600 Aon a2O degrree azimuth for 500 yards. One of our patrolshad a brief fire fight at (140.6-219.8).

26 and 26 Deoembert Minor patrol oontaots were madeand on 26 Daoeoibar. Fire from enemy 76mm. lOoa artil leryand COmm mortars was reoelved in different parte of thedivision sector.

27 and 28 Deoemberr There were minor patrol oontaots.One oompany oroe fed the TOROKINA going Sast and North ofthe old Jap position "and attacked it from the last. 10Japs were killed and 10-20 fled into the bath. Our troopswired the positions for demolition before withdrawing tothe veS t aoross the TOROIINA RIVZR.

1600, 28 December: Oommand of the Division sector was

turned over to the Amtrtoal Division commander. There wereno enemy forces In oontaot with our lines and no knownenemy Vest of the TOROXINA RIVER. The Third Marine Divisionand attached units had killed 2,111 Japs.

II NAVAL ACTION:lov ember: At 0760, 2 heavy orulsers, 2 light cruisers,and 6 destroyers were reported heading Northwest at 26 knotsabout 70 miles West of 3CTKA PASSAGE.

2 November: At 0248, CTF 39 reported that he was attacking on enemy surface force of cruisers and destroyersat 6-208, 164-308. At 0438, the enemy had been defeatedand fled to the North leaving one cruiser and four destroyers sunk. A transport group, oomposad of 3-APA's(Hunter Liggett, Aaerloan Legion, and Ore sent City) and 1AKA (ALCHI3A) had not been able to complete unloading all

gear and equipment on D-day and was waiting offshore fordaylight to return to CAPE TOROKIHA to oomplete their unloading. This group was only 35 miles from the scene of thebattle. Task Foroe 39 was heavily attacked by 100 enemyplanes at 0824 tfiioh probably diverted a similar attack fromthe transports.

-7

DECLASSIFIED32-



\u25a0eT.P^^'^^ovomDef: to o onemy succeeded In transporting and

landing a provisional battalion on the Woe t flank of ourdestroyersbeachhead during the night of 6-7 November. Four

wcr: used for this purpose.

25 November: At 0145, 6 Japanosc destroyers were inter

2 enemy destroyers wereoeptod by 4of our destroyers.1 by

sunk by torpedoes, 1by torpedoes and gunfire, andgunfiro alone. Tho romaining 2 destroyers were chased to

At 0435, broke offwithin 100 miles of RABAUL. our forcesof the remaining destroyers

the chase reporting that onewas damaged.

ThT"suocees of the CAPE TOHDKINA operation was «£**£*}/lints from GUADAa*FALdependent on the maintenance of supplywith troops fromand the prevention of sea-borne attacks

RABAUL. This task was executed perfectly with the exception

relatively email (450.t*oope) landed on theof the foroenight of 6-7 November. Captured documents indioato that tn e

enemy had plans to land muoh lamer forces from,«"*••*• -and destroyers (supported by a liberal application of naval

area); was forced to abandongunfire on the beachhoad butexcellent protection given «Vthese plane because of tho

cf nsrehipe inour naval forcoe plus tho losses sustainedheavy U. B. air raide on lUBAUL on ft and 11 Bovember.

11 * byvac straf* at 0746November: The beachhead aree

day and early hours of darknessenemy fightere. During the

tneri wIS three bombing attacks.The convoy was forced

to stop unloading and put to eea tvioe-onoe grog artagain at 1300. There were a few casualties from theee

damage.attacks but no serious

and 0330 numerous bombe were7 November: Betwesn 0100dropped. 1-260 Kg. (5601b5) boab was dropped in the

division command poet killing one war correspondent^andenlisted; and wounding another correspondent,one marine

one marine officer, and five enlisted.

8 November: There woe an air attack on AP»e Oiioh were

unloading. A 250 Kg. dud hit the JACKSON and "»e^tnrown

over the eide by 6 membere of the crew. The FULLER wastu t waehit by a bomb *falch killed 6 and wounded 20 men

unloading.ble to continue

-52alerte,

13 November: Summary for first 12 days10 bombings, and 1 strafing attack.

Right after dawn enemy fighters oame in15 November:low over the mountalne and out of the eun to boeib and strafethe area.

-8-

iftusflnn• ~ • 33



• •

DECLASSIFIEDNovember: From 0130 to 0515 there wero four alerts.

27 bombs were dropped killing1marine officer and 4 :n was

listed end wounding 12 enlisted. l-75m= pack tovitserput out of action and galley and switchboardattery

were destroyed.one

20 November: There were several alerts between 0030A larpo fire In the dumps on PURUATA ISLAND

wasand 0657.

string of bombs. fighters knockedstarted by one 5 Japfo r early

down by our fighters as the Japs cane over

morning strafing. One pilot was picked up and nade a PW .

al:rts during the night.21 November: There were seven

early morningTwo enemy pianos were shot down In an

fighter battle.

23 November; Number of bombs dropped during the nightsome being 20 minute delay type*

from D-day to26 November: There have been 86 alerts

date. *or the first time a *faole night passed without

any alert.

1December: During Hovcmber tho CAPE TOROKINA beach

90 alerts and 22 bombings. These caused 24head had

deatht and 96 wounded*

6 Deoember: One enemy plane was shot down by a night

fighter during an alert.

were14-15 December: During the night there 6 alertsareabetween 2010-0536. At least 6 bombs landed in the

damagein DSIO Head-of vhloh 2 were duds. Some was donequartore and the fighter command camp area. One twin

engine bomber was shot down.

16 Deoember: At 0111, one single engine twin floatmonoplane was shot down by an P4U night fighter.

18 Deoember: There were alerts from midnight to 0119

and from 0139-0236. 40-60 bombs were dropped, the ocntor

of impact being between CAPE TOHOKINA and PURUATA ISLAND.

Casualties were 1dead, 10 missing, and 28 wounded. 3

LCVP and 1-LCM were sunk and 6-LCVP and 7-LCM were danagod.

Our nitfit fighter had engine trouble and did not get offthe bombing.the ground until 0210 after

25-3019 Deoember: 10-16 planes were over and droppedbombs. One hit near tho fighter strip, one on PURUATA

ISLAND, and one Just off shore. There was no damage bu t3 men were wounded.

About 15 planes oame over in 4 waves and20 December:

-9*

DECLASSIFIEDsi



DECLASSIF IEDropped 25-35 bombs In various parts of the beachhead area.

2 men vere killed An d 9 were wounded. One Jap plane wasehot down by a night f ightor.

24 December: The enemy dropped 2 small bombs 1 nonrthe boat pool nnd lon PURUATA ISLAND. One piano straf 3dthe TOROKINA fighter etrip.

25 December: 135 alerts to date since 1November.

27 December: One alert but the bogey did not close.

28 December: Surnnnry: For the whole period 1November-2Q December inclusive, there wore 136 nir nlerts. Bombswere dropped during 27 of these plerts. Approxtnrte

casualties were 28 dead, 10 missing, And 136 wounded amongAPD oarryall forces located in the beach head area. OneingMarines from the 3d Division was sunk by an onemy

torpedo plane on its way to CAPE TOROKINA and 38 Marineswere lost. Damage was rolntivoly small and was confinedohicfly to dumps on PURUATA ISLAND and boats in the boatpool.

H. V. TURTON

LtCol. UBMC

D-2

-•

10-

Bttussma



HJT/fr INTELLIGENCE SECTION, HEADQUARTERS,

FL'ST MARINE FORC2,THJRD_IU§ttn»MIIBION,

x rcbruKry> 1944ufcyLnvSii \u25a0tU'Appendix 1 to Annex A, Enemy Operations

Plan of Enemy Cape ToroklnjGeneral Defences.

1. In gcnerpl the Cnpe Torokina defense a wore oomposed of adefense in depth consisting of mutually supporting bunkers,

trench systems and individual rifle pits so sited as to•

cover all approaches to the Cape from the sea. The bulkof the defensive system vas sited so rs to cover the waterapproaches from the west. One 75mm RoglmantfJL Gun type "41"(1908) was omplaccd in a bunker on the west side of the Caponear

the bass of the neck and was sited for antlboat defense.

For further details on the enemy defenses refer to CombatReport of the Third Marines (Reinforced). For the generalplan of the enemy defenses see sketch number 1, appended.

2. All bunkers were of log construction covered with sand,debris and vegetation for protective and camouflage purposes.(See appended photographs). Defensive installations wereof the following types:

Single (See 2).a) 3unkers sketch No.

Built to Accomodate on e or two machine guns.

(b) Twin Bunkers (See sketch No. 3).

i'Built inpairs with a connecting trenoh and oontaln

ing one machine- gun

(o) Personnel and StorAga Bunkara HSae sketoh N0.4).

Some of the bunkers hod firing ports and openingsthrough which fire oonld be deliver ad.

(Seed) Rifle Bunkers sketch No. 5).

Not bunkers in the true sense; but rather revettedrifle pits with an ovsrherd covering of small logsor sapling 8.

(c) Individual rifle pits (Sec sketch Ho. 6).

Generally scattered throughout the oape area sited

ingroups

tocover water approaches, or singly or

In small groups to cover approaches to bunkers.

#*:St^Lt.Col. USMC.

D-2

DECLASSIFIED



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HEADQUARTERS, THIRD MAPIIIE DIVI^N,FLEST KAftiNE FORCE

29'7a;&M^, l'J*J*

MARINE DIVISION

1. PLANNING.

Third Marine Division participation in the DIPPER o^era.tion commenced October 4, 19 W with the submission of an embarkationplan for the movement of the Division reinforced by 3d Defense Bat-talion, 2d Marine Raider Regt {Pro -lJional) ,

Ist 155mm Arty Bn, IMACNaval Construction Bn, Detachment CuMAIRUORSOLS, Advance Naval Base

Unit #7, ACORN 13 , Branch #3, 4th Base Depot, Advance Echelon Headquarters IMAC, let Echelon H&S Bn lI£AC and le t Echelon Ist Corps

Signal. Bn. This plan (based on the shipping available together with

certain restrictions on the amount of cargo that could be carried)called for some 13,900 men and 6,£GO tons of cargo in the first

echelon of eight APA's and four A& A!s for the D day landing, followedby five LST echelons five days epart, eaoh carrying approximately3000 troops and 5,500 tons of cargo * The organization of the 3d

Marine Division, reinforced, for this operation ie shown in Annex "A*.

COMMENT: This plan, with the addition of echelons totransport the 3?th Division ana with minor changes to meet the situa-

tion as it developed, was successfully carried out substantially asplanned.

The AKA'e were formed into a separate transport group.Buch a group has an excess of cargo over personnel fo r combat loading

and has no place In a landing against possible enemy opposition. It

is recommended that AXA's to be used on D day be fitted into other

transport groups in aooordanoe with the tactical plan rather thanbeing formed into a separate group.

SBPPLXKt.

The embarkation plan contemplated that the first echelonwould carry three unite of fire fo r troops embarked (except two unite

for heavy AA units), ten days landing rations, ten days B rationsand ttoft days fuel; and that svoosedlng echelons would carry similaramounts for troops embarked plus additional quantities lntonded tobring levels on hand at D plus 90 days to five units of fire and

thirty days of other supplies. Eaoh combat team was also furnisheda thirty day supply of malaria control and medical items.

OQNMEHT: This scheme worked satisfactorily but for futureoperations such items as malaria control and medical supplies shouldbe Intrusted to the combat teams only, in amounts to mee£ immediaterequirements, the bulk of such supplies should be shipped laterafter division dumps have been established* Also replenishment s inequipment and clothing (TBA Oroup 12) should be scheduled fo r ship-ment at intervals beginning about D plus 10 days.

3. SHIPMENT.

The equipment of the division was divided into three categories as indicated below.

Category kx Equipment required to live and to fight fora limited period in a limited space.Equipment necessaryategory B: for the continuation ofcombat and extension of the combat zor.u.

Category C: Equipment for which uo need was contemplated

within the first 30 days, (to be sent forwardon call).

Equipment ism assigned to the several categories axterconsideration of the the terrain of the proposedtheater and the minmmtmjmfiW^wf 03#ecJLpd. These same principles

a



formation of the battalion landing teams to lar.*were applied to theD day (for example, no tanks or antitank units were attached to

onthese landing teams).

COMMENT: The application of these rules produced a rcin-

forccd'tjattnllon landing team which could be acebmodated on one A?Awith necessary

with a load limit of 500 tone (category A equipmentsupplies), with the remaining category B equipment and units to

satisfactorily bu tfollow in successive ochelons. This plan worked closely spaced.can bo applied only when the several echelons are

Troops landed with the haversack only, the knapsack and

blanket rollbeing embarked as organisation baggage (sea bags, cotsIn any ccnelon).

and pads were classed as category C and not embarkedknapsack be lei u

For future movements it is recommended that the

behind as category B equipment.

4. shore part ies.

Each APA was required to furnish a complete shore party

of oome 550 officers and mSn, of which lj» wore for work inJ-'C

ship, 60 were used as "boat riders" and 200 on the beach "j^tn the

of unloading cargo from boats"; remainlngpersonnel beingsole duty

used for shore party fieadquartors, pioneer work, vehicle fivers,dunro supervisors, men

ommunicators, medical oorsonnol, teach party and

for work at inland dumps. Each AKA was supposed furnish 120

to work in the holds, 50 men to ride the boats and

o 200 on the beach

with the sole duty of unloading cargo from boats. As the AKA'snecessary up thecarried only 350 officers and men, it was to make

difference by drawing men from the APA's (in addition to the regular

with an adjacent; APA, the APAAPA shore party). Each AFA was Joinedshore party headquarters supervising the work on both beaches.

COMMENT: The application of those rules meant about 40#

of the entire landing force was initiallyengaged on shore party

duties. It Is believed that this number is excessive. and that withproper organization a shore party composed of 30% of the landing

APA).force should be sufficient (450 for an average It is alsobelieved that the personnel capacity of the AKA's to be employed on

D day should be lnoreased so that an AKA can unload itself withoutthe need of drawing additional working details from the APA's.

5. FIRST PHASE.

Twelve ships unloaded simultaneously on D day (November Ist)on a front of 8000 yards. Difficult hydrographic conditions causedthe lose of some 86 boats on their initial trip. Difficult terrain

inland (swamps) made the formation of inland dumps impracticable andall cargo was placed on the beach itself, Just above the high watermark. Heavy surf caused the abandonment of the three western beachesafter the personnel had landed, all cargo originally intended for'

those beaches was diverted to other beaches. The loss of large

numbers of boats slowed the unloading; this condition was aggravatedby frequent alerts which caused the ships to cease unloading and put,

to sea. Eight of the twelve ships completed unloading on D day, theremaining four returning on D plus 1 to complete unloading.

COMMENT: Regiments gradually assumed control of their

beaches and consolidated their dumps but it was not until November 12

that division was able to assume control of the supply of rations,

ammunition and fuel. During this period organl ra t ions and unite

obtained tholr supplies from the nearest shore party dump. Tc pcrrcitthe regiments to perform this function, many units remained attacn^u.to the rogimonts that would normally have reverted to organic controlearlier. For example, the dates on which certain units reverted toorganic control is indicated below:

Nov 3d: CB Battalion (to construct roads)

Nov 4th: Artillery battalionsNov 6th: Pioneer Bn (for permanent shore party to handle

succeeding echelons)EngineerNov 9th: Battalion

Nov 11th: .Mec'icaX Companies

Nov 12";h: •Service & Supply Platoons of S&S Co.

Nov 17 ch: All remaining reinforcing elements.



•)

The long delay Indicated by the above table vac ca'.uod '\\the lack of roads Inland which made it necessary (in ao fa r ac eupyly

and evacuation was concerned) to leave the problem in the hands ofthe regimental commanders until the situation clarified and the roqulrod supply routes could bo devoloped.

6, ROADS.

Initiallythere wereno roads. (The one native traMleading inland on the right flunk broke dorvas soon as it wan sub-jected to heavy traffic.) The beach itself was used, as a rosxi forall lateral traffic and amphibian traotors wero used fo r the nov«ment of supplies and fo r the n\ acuatAon of wounded; track layli'f^trailers pulLed by traotors wh*c aXco used where practicable. C&lffhteen track laying trailers wi5h rt -9 traotors had been obtained .e^eclally for this operation). Tho front linos gradually advanced in land across the swamps until dry ground was reached. A divisioninland dump was then established vDump No. 2, three miles by roadinland from tho beach). Until a road was built supplies were trans

ported to ,thiB dumo by amphibian tractors; joeps and trailers werealso porto-ed forward by amphibian tractor for local distributionfrom this forward dump. This procua6 was repeated at- a.later etap:e

of the operation to raoet a similar condition, i.e. the front lines

advanced again across swanros beyond the existing road not. The tablestages.below show 8 the various

Nov 1 to 14: Supply from boaoh dumps.

Nov 15 to 24: Bupply via amphibian traotor trail todump Ho. 2.

Nov 26 to D»# 8: Supply by truck to Dump No. 2.Deo 0 to 23: Supply by truck to Dump Ho. 2 thenoe by

amphibian traotor to Dump No. 3 (Sirmiles inland from Dump No. 2).

Thereafter: Normal supply, by truck to regimental orbattalion dumps, thenoe forward by Jeep,•track laying trailor or hand carry.

COMMENT: On November" 13, the date on vhloh the first major

movement of supplies by amphibian traotor•oommenoed, there were 64

amphibian traotors available. (X INovember 86, the date the roadopened and amphibian tractors were relieved by trucks, there wereonly 28 amphibian traotors still in operation. By December 9th, 48amphibian traotor e had been repaired and made serviceable, but by

Deoember 23rd only 12 remained In running condition. It la obviousthat amphibian traotore are special instruments fo r special operations and cannot bo depended upon for hard servioe over extended

•\u25a0periods. _.

_ _ _\u25a0

It was notedvthat the 2*-ton oargo truck oowld negotiateroads that were impassable to Jeeos. The track laying trailerspreviously mentioned were reloaoca *so regiments for use In movingsupplies forward beyond the head of navigation fo r B*-ton truoks.The Jeep was a useful supply vehicle only whon conditions were good;in .mud and rain the Jeap cannot move and recourse must be had to

2i-ton truoks, traok laying trailers, anrohlblan traotors or handcarry.

7. AMMUNITIONEXPENDITURES.

Ammunition expenditures for the two month period are in dloated in Annex B.

COMMENT: It should be noted that in actual rounds firedthe artillery expended considerably more than three uiilts of fire

per gun, the Browning Automatic Rifle and the 60mm mortar expended

Just three units of fire, while alj other weapons averaged a muchlower rate. (AA expenditures are n^t included ih'tKls list; suchweapons were under corps control the majority of the time). It isbclloved these figures should be c«neld«r«A in Planning re-suoply tomeet expenditures while retaining the policy of landing three unitsof flro with the troops on D day.

Wi



8. LOSS OF ESJIPMEUT.

A quantity of equipment was lost during this operation.This matter is being handled by separate correspondence.

COMMENT. In spite of all that can be done, tromendouslosses must bo expected under difficult campaign conditions. To mc«3t

this fact, salvage operations should be started early and plans shouldprovide for the shipment forward, commencing about D plus 10 rays,of replenishments in all typos of equipment. This equipment shouldbe earmarked for this purpose and shipping space provided for it

in the original embarkation plan. As a rough figure the TBA 90 dayreplenishment allowance should be provided for c ach 30 days of activeoperations.

9. EXCHANGE OF EQUIPMENT WITH ARMY.

The relieving Army Division left in rear areas, and thisDivision delivered in the combat area such items of heavy equipmentas were common to each organization. This included machine guns,mortars, 105mm howitzers, l/4-ton trucks, water trailers, cargotrailers, water cans, some tentago, some pieces of engineering equipment.

COMMENT: The exchange was limited to items for whichspare parts were regularly provided by each organisation and only

serviceable items were exchanged. Considerable shipping space wassaved by this exchange. However, neither division was entirelysatisfied with the equipment they received.

10. RELIEF.

Departing personnel embarked in the sane APA's and AKA'swhich brought the incoming, relieving echelons, taking with themonly light equipment (maximum 50 tons per ship). The remainingheavy equipment, guns, vehicles etc, were brought back on returning

LBT»s.

COMMENT: The relief was accomplished without moient.

11. EVACUATION.

Evacuation of wounded, while difficult,was executed innormal manner. Hospital companies were kept dose behind the regi-ments, patients being evacuated to the Division Hospital, thenoethrough beach evacuation stations for evacuation to rear areas by.ship or plane. The main difficulty was the lack of roads.

COMMENT: The one ton or 3/4-ton anbulanoe proved moresatisfactory than the Jeep ambulance.

12. AIRPLANE EROPS.

Supply by air was tried on several occasion* with fairresults.

COMMENT: Supply by air from distant bases, especially

where the supplies must be dropped in thick Jungle, does not appearto be a reliable means of supply.

•- -

• W

4



•#

13. CONCLUSION:

This report covers only selected Important points of theoperation which are believed to have a boarlng on future operations.

No attempt is mado to report on matters of supply and evacuation

which, while difficult, require no special solution.organizationa!:itsxe3: "a" of 3D uarine division reinforced.

nnBM -JfftJHITIOH SXPSUPTTUrSS DURING DIÊR OPÂTION."C" EMPRESS AUGUSTA SAX- 19TH MaRII-^S !IAP, BUD

"DI?IO!T 1:20,000 V^TH ADHI'TISTÂTr^ Ii»S7AL-LA?IO!TS TAm ROAD !ST AS <^P 20 15CSH3SR 1940lIPOS3D TH^RSon.

*'. C. KALLColonel, USMC

D-4

WWII 3rd Marines Div - Bougainville

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