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1. Tapuz vs. del rosario
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M. ASUNCION,
LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN
TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS,
Petitioners,
- versus -
HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC
Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC, THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE stationed in BoracayIsland, represented by the PNP
STATION COMMANDER, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU
18th
DIVISION, SPOUSES GREGORIO SANSON & MA.LOURDES T. SANSON,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 182484
Promulgated:
June 17, 2008
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance ( pursuant to Sections 1 and 4 of
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; Sections 1 and 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo ;[1]
and Sections 1 and
6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data[2]
) is the petition for certiorari and for the issuance of the writs
of amparo and habeas data filed by the above-named petitioners against the Honorable Judge Elmo del
Rosario [in his capacity as presiding judge of RTC Br. 5,Kalibo], Sheriff Nelson de la Cruz [in his capacity as
Sheriff of the RTC], the Philippine National Police stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP Station
Commander, the Honorable Court of Appeals in Cebu, 18th
Division, and the spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma.
Lourdes T. Sanson, respondents.
The petition and its annexes disclose the following material antecedents:
The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson (the “ private
respondents”), filed with the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court ofBuruanga-Malay, Aklan (the “MCTC ”) a
complaint[3]
dated 24 April 2006 for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga,
Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly TapuzMadriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and
Marian Timbas (the “ petitioners”) and other John Does numbering about 120. The private respondents allegedin their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare parcel of
land located at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay, Malay, Aklan(the “disputed land ”); (2) they were the
disputed land’s prior possessors when the petitioners – armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and
together with unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the disputed land by force and intimidation,
without the private respondents’ permission and against the objections of the private respondents’ security
men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
In their Answer[4]
dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material allegations of the
complaint. They essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2)
on the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private respondents’ certificate of title
to the disputed property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a
counterclaim for damages.
The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision[5]
in the private respondents’
favor. It found prior possession – the key issue in forcible entry cases - in the private respondents’ favor, thus:
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“The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in the Amended
Commissioner’s Report and Sketch found on pages 245 to 248 of the records and the evidence
the parties have submitted. It is shown in the Amended Commissioner’s Report and Sketch that
the land in question is enclosed by a concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence in pink and
green highlighter as shown in the Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said perimeter fence was constructed by
the plaintiffs 14 years ago. The foregoing findings of the Commissioner in his report and sketch
collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that after they acquired the land in question on May 27,
1993 through a Deed of Sale (Annex ‘A’, Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.), they caused
the construction of the perimeter fence sometime in 1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, pp.271-275, rec.).
From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that the plaintiffs were in
actual physical possession of the whole lot in question since 1993 when it was interrupted by
the defendants (sic) when on January 4, 2005 claiming to (sic) the Heirs of
Antonio Tapuz entered a portion of the land in question with view of inhabiting the same and
building structures therein prompting plaintiff Gregorio Sanson to confront them before BSPU,
Police Chief Inspector Jack L. Wanky and Barangay Captain Glenn Sacapaño. As a result of their
confrontation, the parties signed an Agreement (Annex ‘D’, Complaint p. 20) wherein they
agreed to vacate the disputed portion of the land in question and agreed not to build any
structures thereon.
The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident of January 4,
2005 when the plaintiff posted security guards, however, sometime on or about 6:30 A.M. of
April 19, 2006, the defendants some with bolos and one carrying a sack suspected to contain
firearms with other John Does numbering about 120 persons by force and intimidation forcibly
entered the premises along the road and built a nipa and bamboo structure (Annex ‘E’,
Complaint, p. 11) inside the lot in question which incident was promptly reported to the proper
authorities as shown by plaintiffs’ Certification (Annex ‘F’, Complaint, p. 12) of the entry in the
police blotter and on same date April 19, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Office of
the LupongTagapamayapa of Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan but no settlementwas reached as shown in their Certificate to File Action (Annex ‘G’, Complaint, p. 13); hence the
present action.
Defendants’ (sic) contend in their answer that ‘prior to January 4, 2005, they were
already occupants of the property, being indigenous settlers of the same, under claim of
ownership by open continuous, adverse possession to the exclusion of other (sic)’. (Paragraph 4,
Answer, p. 25).
The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in question is enclosed by a
perimeter fence constructed by the plaintiffs sometime in 1993 as noted by the Commissioner in
his Report and reflected in his Sketch, thus, it is safe to conclude that the plaintiffs where (sic) in
actual physical possession of the land in question from 1993 up to April 19, 2006 when they
were ousted therefrom by the defendants by means of force. Applying by analogy the ruling of
the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Molina, et al. vs. De Bacud, 19 SCRA 956, if the land
were in the possession of plaintiffs from 1993 to April 19, 2006, defendants’ claims to an older
possession must be rejected as untenable because possession as a fact cannot be recognized at
the same time in two different personalities.
Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly entered the land in
question on April 18, 2006 at about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon as shown in their Certification
(Annex ‘D’, Defendants’ Position Paper, p. 135, rec.).
The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their allegations made to the
commissioner who constituted (sic) the land in question that they built structures on the land in
question only on April 19, 2006 (Par. D.4, Commissioner’s Amended Report, pp. 246 to 247),
after there (sic) entry thereto on even date.
Likewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical statements of defendants’
witnesses, Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez
and EdgardoPinaranda, in their Joint Affidavit (pp. 143- ‘144, rec.) [sic] categorically stated ‘that
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on or about April 19, 2006, a group of armed men entered the property of our said neighbors
and built plastic roofed tents. These armed men threatened to drive our said neighbors away
from their homes but they refused to leave and resisted the intruding armed men’.
From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of forcible entry
happened on April 18, 2006 but it was only on April 19, 2006 when the defendants overpowered
by their numbers the security guards posted by the plaintiffs prior to the controversy.
Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted in their picturesattached as annexes to their position paper were not noted and reflected in the amended report
and sketch submitted by the Commissioner, hence, it could be safely inferred that these
structures are built and (sic) situated outside the premises of the land in question, accordingly,
they are irrelevant to the instant case and cannot be considered as evidence of their actual
possession of the land in question prior to April 19, 2006[6]
.”
The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court ( “RTC,” Branch 6
of Kalibo, Aklan) then presided over by Judge Niovady M. Marin (“ Judge Marin”).
On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents’ motion for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction through an Order dated 26 February 2007, with the issuance conditioned on
the private respondents’ posting of a bond. The writ[7]
– authorizing the immediate implementation of the
MCTC decision – was actually issued by respondent Judge Elmo F. del Rosario (the “respondent Judge”) on 12
March 2007 after the private respondents had complied with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to
reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition.
The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration and to Defer
Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in an Order dated 17 May 2007
[8]
.
Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition.[9]
The respondent Judge nevertheless
issued via a Special Order[10]
a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff’s written
notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively
take actual possession of the land.
The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, a Petition for
Review[11]
(under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and
Order of Demolition of the RTC of Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil Case No. 7990 .
Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition
on 19 March 2008.[12]
It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present petition last 29 April 2008. The
petition contains and prays for three remedies, namely: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court; the issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data; and finally, the
issuance of the writ of amparo under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present factual positions
diametrically opposed to the MCTC’s findings and legal reasons. Most importantly, the petitioners maintain
their claims of prior possession of the disputed land and of intrusion into this land by the private
respondents. The material factual allegations of the petition – bases as well of the petition for the issuance of
the writ of amparo – read:
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“29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12 gauge shot guns
intruded into the property of the defendants [the land in dispute]. They were not in
uniform. They fired their shotguns at the defendants. Later the following day at 2:00 a.m. two
houses of the defendants were burned to ashes.
30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire fence put up by
defendants to protect their property from intruders. Two of the armed men trained their
shotguns at the defendants who resisted their intrusion. One of them who was identified as
SAMUEL LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years old, single, and a resident of Binun-an, Batad, Iloilo,fired twice.
31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing them to ashes. [...]
32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were reported by one of
the HEIRS OF ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The terrorists trained their shotguns and fired at minors
namely IVAN GAJISAN and MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who resisted their intrusion. Their act is a
blatant violation of the law penalizing Acts of Violence against women and children, which is
aggravated by the use of high-powered weapons.
[…]
34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and unlettered
petitioners continue because the private respondents Sansons have under their employ armed
men and they are influential with the police authorities owing to their financial and political
clout.
35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in dispute by
defendants and the atrocities of the terrorists [introduced into the property in dispute by the
plaintiffs] are attested by witnesses who are persons not related to the defendants are therefore
disinterested witnesses in the case namely: Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac,Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Penarada. Likewise, the affidavit of Nemia T. Carmen is submitted
to prove that the plaintiffs resorted to atrocious acts through hired men in their bid to unjustly
evict the defendants.[13]
”
The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry that
the private respondents filed below. Citing Section 33 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7691,[14]
they maintain that the forcible entry case in fact involves issues of title to or
possession of real property or an interest therein, with the assessed value of the property involved
exceeding P20,000.00; thus, the case should be originally cognizable by the RTC. Accordingly, the petitioners
reason out that the RTC - to where the MCTC decision was appealed – equally has no jurisdiction to rule on the
case on appeal and could not have validly issued the assailed orders.
OUR RULING
We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective, both in
substance and in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally
defective with respect to content and substance.
The Petition for Certiorari
We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition forcertiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. It is not lost on us that the petitioners
have a pending petition with the Court of Appeals (the “CA petition”) for the review of the same RTC orders
now assailed in the present petition, although the petitioners never disclosed in the body of the present
petition the exact status of their pending CA petition. The CA petition, however, was filed with the Court of
Appeals on 2 August 2007, which indicates to us that the assailed orders (or at the very least, the latest of the
interrelated assailed orders) were received on 1 August 2007 at the latest. The present petition, on the other
hand, was filed on April 29, 2008 or more than eight months from the time the CA petition was filed. Thus, the
present petition is separated in point of time from the assumed receipt of the assailed RTC orders by at least
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eight (8) months, i.e., beyond the reglementary period of sixty (60) days[15]
from receipt of the assailed order or
orders or from notice of the denial of a seasonably filed motion for reconsideration.
We note in this regard that the petitioners’ counsel stated in his attached “Certificate of Compliance with
Circular #1-88 of the Supreme Court”[16]
(“Certificate of Compliance”) that “in the meantime the RTC and the
Sheriff issued a NOTICE TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION not served to counsel but to the petitioners who sent
photo copy of the same NOTICE to their counsel on April 18, 2008 by LBC.” To guard against any insidious
argument that the present petition is timely filed because of this Notice to Vacate, we feel it best to declare
now that the counting of the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65 cannot start from theApril 18,2008 date cited by the petitioners’ counsel. The Notice to Vacate and for Demolition is not an order that exists
independently from the RTC orders assailed in this petition and in the previously filed CA petition. It is merely a
notice, made in compliance with one of the assailed orders, and is thus an administrative enforcement medium
that has no life of its own separately from the assailed order on which it is based. It cannot therefore be the
appropriate subject of an independent petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the context of this
case. The April 18, 2008 date cannot likewise be the material date for Rule 65 purposes as the above-
mentioned Notice to Vacate is not even directly assailed in this pet ition, as the petition’s Prayer patently
shows.[17]
Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty of willful and
deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping.
By the petitioners’ own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA – G.R.
SP No. 02859) for the review of the orders now also assailed in this petition, but brought the present recourse
to us, allegedly because “the CA did not act on the petition up to this date and for the petitioner (sic) to seek
relief in the CA would be a waste of time and would render the case moot and academic since the CA refused to
resolve pending urgent motions and the Sheriff is determined to enforce a writ of demolition despite the defect
of LACK OF JURISDICTION.” [18]
Interestingly, the petitioners’ counsel - while making this claim in the body of the petition - at the same
time represented in his Certificate of Compliance[19] that:“x x x
(e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION copy of the petition is attached (sic);
(f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION because it held that the ORDER TO
VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION OF THE HOMES OF PETITIONERS is not capable of being the
subject of a PETITION FOR RELIEF, copy of the resolution of the CA is attached
hereto; (underscoring supplied)
(g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2007 but up to this date the same
had not been resolved copy of the MR is attached (sic).
x x x”
The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the appellate court level is
replete with significance regarding the petitioners’ intentions. We discern -- from the petitioners’ act of
misrepresenting in the body of their petition that “the CA did not act on the petition up to this date” while
stating the real Court of Appeals action in the Certification of Compliance -- the intent to hide the real state of
the remedies the petitioners sought below in order to mislead us into action on the RTC orders without
frontally considering the action that the Court of Appeals had already undertaken.
At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, via the present petition, the
same relief that it could not wait for from the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02859. The petitioners’ act of
seeking against the same parties the nullification of the same RTC orders before the appellate court and before
us at the same time, although made through different mediums that are both improperly used, constitutes
willful and deliberate forum shopping that can sufficiently serve as basis for the summary dismissal of the
petition under the combined application of the fourth and penultimate paragraphs of Section 3, Rule 46;
Section 5, Rule 7; Section 1, Rule 65; and Rule 56, all of the Revised Rules of Court. That a wrong remedy may
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(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or
violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances,
and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct
of the investigation, together with any report ;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate orwhereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act
or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.”[22]
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts
determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat
to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.
The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations heretofore
quoted,[23]
that are essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of the petition. These allegations are supported by the
following documents:
“(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac,
Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting the factual positions of the petitioners, id .,
petitioners’ prior possession, private respondents’ intrusion and the illegal acts committed by
the private respondents and their security guards on 19 April 2006;
(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts (firing of guns,etc.) committed by a security guard against minors – descendants of Antonio Tapuz;
(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially
corroborating Nemia’s affidavit;
(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Jackson Jauod regarding the
incident of petitioners’ intrusion into the disputed land;
(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis, narrating the
altercation between the Tapuz family and the security guards of the private respondents,
including the gun-poking and shooting incident involving one of the security guards;
(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that a house
owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by a certain JorgeBuenavente, was accidentally burned by a
fire.”
On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the overriding involvement of
property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by
the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the
extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is
alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments implied from the presence of “armed men bare tothe waist” and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits
compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is
continuing.
A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them – the statements
of Nemia Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are practically identical andunsworn. The Certification by Police
Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other hand, simply narrates what had been reported by one
Danny Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that the burning of two residential houses was “accidental.”
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As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in the forcible entry case
which rejected all the petitioners’ factual claims. These findings are significantly complete and detailed, as they
were made under a full-blown judicial process, i.e., after examination and evaluation of the contending parties’
positions, evidence and arguments and based on the report of a court-appointed commissioner.
We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop of a dispute (with
incidents giving rise to allegations of violence or threat thereof) that was brought to and ruled upon by the
MCTC ; subsequently brought to the RTC on an appeal that is still pending; still much later brought to the
appellate court without conclusive results; and then brought to us on interlocutory incidents involving a plea forthe issuance of the writ of amparo that, if decided as the petitioners advocate, may render the pending RTC
appeal moot.
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facie existence of the
ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of a writ ofamparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a
continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be
purely property-related and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and
hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary
criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.
Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings, as our action may carry theunintended effect, not only of reversing the MCTC ruling independently of the appeal to the RTC that is now in
place, but also of nullifying the ongoing appeal process. Such effect, though unintended, will obviously wreak
havoc on the orderly administration of justice, an overriding goal that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not
intend to weaken or negate.
Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this point the indicators, clear
and patent to us, that the petitioners’ present recourse viathe remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere
subterfuge to negate the assailed orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before the appellate
court because of the use of an improper remedial measure. We discern this from the petitioners’
misrepresentations pointed out above; from their obvious act of forum shopping; and from the recourse itselfto the extraordinary remedies of the writs of certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far from
forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the ordinary course of law fail because of
deficient legal representation or the use of improper remedial measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor that
of amparo - extraordinary though they may be - will suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The writ
of amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or
when it will inordinately interfere with these processes – the situation obtaining in the present case.
While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for rules on the
institution of separate actions,[24]
for the effect of earlier-filed criminal actions,[25]
and for the consolidation of
petitions for the issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed criminal and civil action .[26]
These rules
were adopted to promote an orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for the issuance of the writ
of amparo when the parties resort to other parallel recourses.
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and
the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a
writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security –
the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the
danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a
proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the
co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.
The Writ of Habeas Data
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of ultimate
facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
“(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
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(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life,
liberty or security of the aggrieved party ;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in
charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression ordestruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent .
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of;
and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.”
Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:
“1. [ … ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the PNP
may release the report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of violenceemployed against them by the private respondents, furnishing the Court and the petitioners
with copy of the same;
[ … ]
66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the Philippine National
Police [PNP] to produce the police report pertaining to the burning of the houses of the
petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the investigation report if an investigation was
conducted by the PNP.”
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus
rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful
violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not
alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police authorities other than
those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ,
based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum,
the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the “fishing expedition” that this
Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of
habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
data is fully in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present petition OUTRIGHT for deficiencies
of form and substance patent from its body and attachments.
SO ORDERED.
2. Castillo vs. Cruz
P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS, RUPERTOBORLONGAN, EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES, ARNOLD TRIA, and
GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. MILLAN, ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA
CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN, MR. ARTEMIO ESGUERRA, “TISOY,”
and JOHN DOES,
Petitioners,
G.R. No. 182165
- versus -
DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T. CRUZ, Promulgated:
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Respondents. November 25, 2009
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J .
Petitioners[1]
, employees and members of the local police force of the City Government of Malolos,
challenge the March 28, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Branch 10 in a petition for
issuance of writs of amparo and habeas data instituted by respondents.
The factual antecedents.
Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz),
leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the property,
despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize it for
local projects.
The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Spouses Cruz before the then
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bulacan, Bulacan.
By Decision of September 5, 1997, the MTC rendered judgment against the Spouses Cruz, which
judgment, following its affirmance by the RTC, became final and executory.
The finality of the decision in the ejectment case notwithstanding, the spouses Cruz refused to vacate the
property. They thereupon filed cases against the Province[2] and the judges who presided over the
case.[3]
Those cases were dismissed except their petition for annulment of judgment lodged before Branch 18
of the RTC of Malolos, and a civil case for injunction 833-M-2004 lodged before Branch 10 of the same RTC
Malolos.
The Spouses Cruz sought in the case for injunction the issuance of a permanent writ of injunction to
prevent the execution of the final and executory judgment against them.
By Order of July 19, 2005, the RTC, finding merit in the Spouses Cruzes’ allegation that subsequent events
changed the situation of the parties to justify a suspension of the execution of the final and executory
judgment, issued a permanent writ of injunction, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated
August 10, 2004 is hereby GRANTED. Order dated August 10, 2004 is
herebyRECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Further, the verified petition dated November 05, 2002
are hereby REINSTATED and MADE PERMANENT until the MTC-Bulacan, Bulacan finally resolves
the pending motions of petitioners with the same determines the metes and bounds of 400 sq.
meters leased premises subject matter of this case with immediate dispatch.
Accordingly, REMAND the determination of the issues raised by the petitioners on the issued
writ of demolition to the MTC of Bulacan, Bulacan.
SO ORDERED.[4]
(Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Finding that the fallo of the RTC July 19, 2005 Order treats, as a suspensive condition for the lifting of the
permanent injunction, the determination of the boundaries of the property, the Province returned the issue
for the consideration of the MTC. In a Geodetic Engineer’s Report submitted to the MTC on August 31, 2007,
the metes and bounds of the property were indicated.
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The MTC, by Order of January 2, 2008, approved the Report and ruled that the permanent injunction
which the RTC issued is ineffective. On motion of the Province, the MTC, by Order of January 21, 2008, thus
issued a Second Alias Writ of Demolition.
On receiving notice of the January 2, 2008 MTC Order, the Spouses Cruz filed a motion before Branch 10
of the RTC for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) which it set for hearing on January 25, 2008on which date, however, the demolition had, earlier in the day, been implemented. Such notwithstanding, the
RTC issued a TRO.[5]
The Spouses Cruz, along with their sons-respondents Nixon and Ferdinand,
thereupon entered the property, placed several container vans and purportedly represented themselves as
owners of the property which was for lease.
On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed by
the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to
“protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property,” entered the property.
Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the RTC July
19, 2005 Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners,
forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of
light threats.
Respondents later filed on March 3, 2008 a “Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas
Data,” docketed as Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008, which was coincidentally raffled to Branch 10 of the
RTC Malolos.
Respondents averred that despite the Permanent Injunction, petitioners unlawfully entered the property
with the use of heavy equipment, tore down the barbed wire fences and tents,[6]
and arrested them when they
resisted petitioners’ entry; and that as early as in the evening of February 20, 2008, members of the Philippine
National Police had already camped in front of the property.
On the basis of respondents’ allegations in their petition and the supporting affidavits, the RTC, by
Order of March 4, 2008, issued writs of amparo and habeas data.[7]
The RTC, crediting respondents’ version in this wise:
Petitioners have shown by preponderant evidence that the facts and circumstances of the
alleged offenses examined into on Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data that there have been an
on-going hearings on the verified Petition for Contempt, docketed as Special Proceedings No.
306-M-2006, before this Court for alleged violation by the respondents of the Preliminary
Injunction Order dated July 16, 2005 [sic] in Sp. Civil Action No. 833-M-2002, hearings were held
on January 25, 2008, February 12 and 19, 2008, where the respondents prayed for an April 22,
2008 continuance, however, in the pitch darkness of February 20, 2008, police officers, some
personnel from the Engineering department, and some civilians proceeded purposely to the
Pinoy Compound, converged therein and with continuing threats of bodily harm and danger and
stone-throwing of the roofs of the homes thereat from voices around its premises, on a pretext
of an ordinary police operation when enterviewed [sic] by the media then present, but at 8:00
a.m. to late in the afternoon of February 21, 2008, zoomed in on the petitioners, subjecting
them to bodily harm, mental torture, degradation, and the debasement of a human being,
reminiscent of the martial law police brutality, sending chill in any ordinary citizen,[8]
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rendered judgment, by Decision of March 28, 2008, in favor of respondents, disposing as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commitment Orders and waivers in Crim. Cases
Nos. 08-77 for Direct assault; Crim. Case No. 08-77 for Other Forms of Trespass; and Crim. Case
No. 08-78 for Light Threats are hereby DECLARED illegal, null and void, as petitioners were
deprived of their substantial rights, induced by duress or a well-founded fear of personal
violence. Accordingly, the commitment orders and waivers are hereby SET ASIDE. The
temporary release of the petitioners is declared ABSOLUTE.
Without any pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.”[9]
(Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, pursuant to Section 19[10]
of The Rule on the Writ
of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC),[11]
which is essentially reproduced in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC).[12]
In the main, petitioners fault the RTC for
… giving due course and issuing writs of amparo and habeas data when from the allegations of
the petition, the same ought not to have been issued as (1) the petition in [sic] insufficient in
substance as the same involves property rights; and (2) criminal cases had already been filed and
pending with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, City of Malolos. (Underscoring
supplied)
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights.[13]
In view of the heightening prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued and took effect on October 24, 2007 which
coincided with the celebration of United Nations Day and affirmed the Court’s commitment towards
internationalization of human rights. More than three months later or on February 2, 2008, the Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data was promulgated.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall
cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
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From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life,
liberty and security. And the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo[14]
teaches:
As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of “extralegal
killings” and “enforced disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these
two instances or to threats thereof. “Extralegal killings” are “killings committed without dueprocess of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.” On the other hand,
“enforced disappearances” are “attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention
or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals
acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to
disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.[15]
(Underscoring
supplied, citations omitted)
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement thattheir right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the
present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial Government and
respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents’
right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry into the
property.
Apropos is the Court’s ruling in Tapuz v. Del Rosario:[16]
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response tothe extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the
perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is
intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an
extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as
a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are
purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo – in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands –
requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying
allegations of fact, to wit:
x x x x
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the
ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how
and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the
aggrieved party was or is being committed.[17]
(Emphasis and italics in the original, citation
omitted)
Tapuz also arose out of a property dispute, albeit between private individuals, with the petitioners
therein branding as “acts of terrorism” the therein respondents’ alleged entry into the disputed land with
armed men in tow. The Court therein held:
On the whole, what is clear from these statements – both sworn and unsworn – is the
overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical
possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to
life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past
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violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent
of the treats and harassments implied from the presence of “armed men bare to the waist” and
the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits
compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is
imminent or continuing.[18]
(Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing
threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations that petitioners “in unison, conspiracy and in contempt
of court, there and then willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the use of force and intimidation entered and
forcibly, physically manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and arrested the herein petitioners
(respondents)”[19]
will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue
confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day
after their arrest.[20]
Although respondents’ release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the writ
of amparo, absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuingrestraint on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right
to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.
That respondents are merely seeking the protection of their property rights is gathered from their Joint
Affidavit, viz:
x x x x
11. Kami ay humarang at humiga sa harap ng mga heavy equipment na hawak hawak angnasabing kautusan ng RTC Branch 10 (PERMANENT INJUNCTION at RTC ORDERS DATED February
12, 17 at 19 2008) upang ipaglaban ang dignidad ng kautusan ng korte, ipaglaban ang prinsipyo
ng “SELF-HELP” at batas ukol sa “PROPERTY RIGHTS”, Wala kaming nagawa ipagtanggol ang
aming karapatan sa lupa na 45 years naming “IN POSSESSION.” (Underscoring supplied)
Oddly, respondents also seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is not even alleged that
petitioners are gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding their person, family, home and
correspondence.
As for respondents’ assertion of past incidents[21]
wherein the Province allegedly violated the Permanent
Injunction order, these incidents were already raised in the injunction proceedings on account of which
respondents filed a case for criminal contempt against petitioners.[22]
Before the filing of the petition for writs of amparo and habeas data, or on February 22, 2008, petitioners
even instituted a petition for habeas corpus which was considered moot and academic by Branch 14 of the
Malolos RTC and was accordingly denied by Order of April 8, 2008.
More. Respondent Amanda and one of her sons, Francisco Jr., likewise filed a petition for writs
of amparo and habeas data before the Sandiganbayan, they alleging the commission of continuing threats by
petitioners after the issuance of the writs by the RTC, which petition was dismissed for insufficiency and forum
shopping.
It thus appears that respondents are not without recourse and have in fact taken full advantage of the
legal system with the filing of civil, criminal and administrative charges.[23]
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It need not be underlined that respondents’ petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are
extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in
a property dispute.
AT ALL EVENTS, respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have
been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante
delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112[24]
of the Rules of Court. Validity of the
arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and
not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the writs may, however, be
made available to the aggrieved party by motion in the criminal proceedings.[25]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged March 4, 2008 Order of Branch 10 of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos is DECLARED NULL AND VOID, and its March 28, 2008 Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
3. Roxas vs. Arroyo
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF
MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS,
Petitioner,
-versus-
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME
VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA,
PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 189155
Promulgated: September 7, 2010
D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J .:
At bench is a Petition For Review on Certiorar i [1]
assailing the Decision[2]
dated 26 August 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA — a petition that was commenced jointly under the Rules on
the Writ of Amparo ( Amparo Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule). In its decision, the Court of Appeals
extended to the petitioner, Melissa C. Roxas, the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data but deniedthe latter’s prayers for an inspection order, production order and return of specified personal
belongings. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. This Court hereby grants
Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain from distributing or causing the
distribution to the public of any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers
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relative to Petitioner’s Melissa C. Roxas, and/or Melissa Roxas; alleged ties to the CPP-NPA or
pertinently related to the complained incident. Petitioner’s prayers for an inspection order,
production order and for the return of the specified personal belongings are denied for lack of
merit. Although there is no evidence that Respondents are responsible for the abduction,
detention or torture of the Petitioner, said Respondents pursuant to their legally mandated
duties are, nonetheless, ordered to continue/complete the investigation of this incident with the
end in view of prosecuting those who are responsible. Respondents are also ordered to provide
protection to the Petitioner and her family while in the Philippines against any and all forms of
harassment, intimidation and coercion as may be relevant to the grant of these reliefs.
[3]
We begin with the petitioner’s allegations.
Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent.[4]
While in the United States, petitioner enrolled in
an exposure program to the Philippines with the groupBagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America
(BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member.[5]
During the course of her immersion, petitioner toured various
provinces and towns of Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-
Tarlac[6]
in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical mission.[7]
In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard
disk, IPOD,[8]
wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines.[9]
After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions, Juanito Carabeo (Carabeo) and
John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo)
in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac.[10]
At around 1:30 in the afternoon, however,
petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of someone banging at the front
door and a voice demanding that they open up.[11]
Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and ordered
petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face down.[12]
The armed men were all in civilian clothes
and, with the exception of their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces.[13]
Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men ganged up on her and tied her
hands.[14]
At this juncture, petitioner saw the other armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already
blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to shout her name.[15] Against
her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner towards the van—bruising her arms, legs and
knees.[16]
Once inside the van, but before she can be blindfolded, petitioner was able to see the face of one of
the armed men sitting beside her.[17]
The van then sped away.
After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped.[18]
Petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc were ordered to
alight.[19]
After she was informed that she is being detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the
Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated from her companions and was escorted to
a room that she believed was a jail cell from the sound of its metal doors.[20]
From there, she could hear the
sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing and some construction bustle.[21]
She inferred that
she was taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.[22]
What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with torture.[23]
The thrust of the
interrogations was to convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to “the
fold.”[24]
The torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and suffocating the
petitioner.[25]
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Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in blindfolds even in her
sleep.[26]
Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds when she was allowed to take a bath, during which she
became acquainted with a woman named “Rose” who bathed her.[27]
There were also a few times when she
cheated her blindfold and was able to peek at her surroundings.[28]
Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the names of three of her
interrogators who introduced themselves to her as “Dex,” “James” and “RC.” [29] “RC” even told petitioner that
those who tortured her came from the “Special Operations Group,” and that she was abducted because her
name is included in the “Order of Battle.”[30]
On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncle’s house in Quezon
City.[31]
Before being released, however, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM[32]
card, a
slip of paper containing an e-mail address with password,[33]
a plastic bag containing biscuits and books,[34]
the
handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes.[35]
Petitioner was also sternly warned not to report the
incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her family.[36]
Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular phone given to
her.[37]
Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family,
petitioner threw away the cellular phone with a SIM card.
Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any existing
government files or records linking her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of
Amparo and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June 2009.[38]
Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying
the uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was
government agents who were behind her abduction and torture. Petitioner likewise included in her suit “Rose,”
“Dex” and “RC.”[39]
The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be enjoined from harming or even
approaching petitioner and her family; (2) an order be issued allowing the inspection of detention areas in the
7th
Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents be ordered to produce documents
relating to any report on the case of petitioner including, but not limited to, intelligence report and operation
reports of the 7th
Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)and its subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during and subsequent to 19 May 2009; (4) respondents be ordered
to expunge from the records of the respondents any document pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas,
Melissa Roxas or any name which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be ordered to return to petitioner her
journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch,
sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and her P15,000.00 cash.[40]
In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs and referred the case to the Court
of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action.[41]
The Resolution also directed the
respondents to file their verified written return.[42]
On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Return of the Writ s[43]
on behalf of the
public officials impleaded as respondents.
We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents.
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The public respondents label petitioner’s alleged abduction and torture as “stage managed.”[44]
In
support of their accusation, the public respondents principally rely on the statement of Mr. Paolo, as contained
in the Special Repor t [45]
of the La Paz Police Station. In the Special Report , Mr. Paolo disclosed that, prior to the
purported abduction, petitioner and her companions instructed him and his two sons to avoid leaving the
house.[46]
From this statement, the public respondents drew the distinct possibility that, except for those
already inside Mr. Paolo’s house, nobody else has any way of knowing where petitioner and her companions
were at the time they were supposedly abducted.[47]
This can only mean, the public respondents concluded,
that if ever there was any “abduction” it must necessarily have been planned by, or done with the consent of,
the petitioner and her companions themselves.[48]
Public respondents also cited the Medical Certificate[49]
of the petitioner, as actually belying her claims
that she was subjected to serious torture for five (5) days. The public respondents noted that while the
petitioner alleges that she was choked and boxed by her abductors—inflictions that could have easily produced
remarkable bruises—her Medical Certificate only shows abrasions in her wrists and knee caps.[50]
For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in question the very authenticity of petitioner’salleged abduction and torture, more so any military or police involvement therein. Hence, public respondents
conclude that the claims of abduction and torture was no more than a charade fabricated by the petitioner to
put the government in bad light, and at the same time, bring great media mileage to her and the group that she
represents.[51]
Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine, the public respondents insist on
the dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas Data petition based on the following grounds: (a) as against
respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in particular, because of her immunity from suit ,[52]
and (b) as
against all of the public respondents, in general, in view of the absence of any specific allegation in the petition
that they had participated in, or at least authorized, the commission of such atrocities.[53]
Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in their duty to ascertain the truth
behind the allegations of the petitioner.[54]
In both the police and military arms of the government machinery,
inquiries were set-up in the following manner:
Police Action
Police authorities first learned of the purported abduction around 4:30 o’clock in the afternoon of 19 May
2009, when Barangay Captain Michael M. Manuel came to the La Paz Municipal Police Station to report the
presence of heavily armed men somewhere in Barangay Kapanikian.[55]
Acting on the report, the police station
launched an initial investigation.[56]
The initial investigation revolved around the statement of Mr. Paolo, who informed the investigators of
an abduction incident involving three (3) persons—later identified as petitioner Melissa Roxas, Juanito Carabeo
and John Edward Jandoc—who were all staying in his house.[57]
Mr. Paolo disclosed that the abduction
occurred around 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon, and was perpetrated by about eight (8) heavily armed men who
forced their way inside his house.[58]
Other witnesses to the abduction also confirmed that the armed men
used a dark blue van with an unknown plate number and two (2) Honda XRM motorcycles with no plate
numbers.[59]
At 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the investigators sent a Flash Message to the different
police stations surrounding La Paz, Tarlac, in an effort to track and locate the van and motorcycles of the
suspects. Unfortunately, the effort yielded negative results.[60]
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On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial investigation were included in a Special Repor t [61]
that was
transmitted to the Tarlac Police Provincial Office, headed by public respondent P/S Supt. Rudy Lacadin (Supt.
Lacadin). Public respondent Supt. Lacadin, in turn, informed the Regional Police Office of Region 3 about the
abduction.[62]
Follow-up investigations were, at the same time, pursued.[63]
On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon Nilo Dela Cruz, as Director of the Regional Police
Office for Region 3, caused the creation of Special Investigation Task Group—CAROJAN (Task Group CAROJAN)
to conduct an in-depth investigation on the abduction of the petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc.[64]
Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making a series of background examinations on the victims
of the purported abduction, in order to reveal the motive behind the abduction and, ultimately, the identity of
the perpetrators.[65]
Task Group CAROJAN also maintained liaisons with Karapatan and the Alliance for
Advancement of People’s Rights—organizations trusted by petitioner—in the hopes of obtaining the latter’s
participation in the ongoing investigations.[66]
Unfortunately, the letters sent by the investigators requesting for
the availability of the petitioner for inquiries were left unheeded.[67]
The progress of the investigations conducted by Task Group CAROJAN had been detailed in the
reports[68]
that it submitted to public respondent General Jesus Ame Verzosa, the Chief of the Philippine
National Police. However, as of their latest report dated 29 June 2009, Task Group CAROJAN is still unable to
make a definitive finding as to the true identity and affiliation of the abductors —a fact that task group
CAROJAN attributes to the refusal of the petitioner, or any of her fellow victims, to cooperate in their
investigative efforts.[69]
Military Action
Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of National Defense, first came to know about the
alleged abduction and torture of the petitioner upon receipt of the Resolution of this Court directing him and
the other respondents to file their return.[70]
Immediately thereafter, he issued a Memorandum
Directive[71]
addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP, ordering the latter, among others, to conduct an inquiry
to determine the validity of the accusation of military involvement in the abduction.[72]
Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive, public respondent General Victor S. Ibrado, the AFP Chiefof Staff, sent an AFP Radio Message
[73] addressed to public respondent Lieutenant General Delfin N. Bangit (Lt.
Gen. Bangit), the Commanding General of the Army, relaying the order to cause an investigation on the
abduction of the petitioner.[74]
For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in the amparo petition, public respondent Lt. Gen. Bangit
instructed public respondent Major General Ralph A. Villanueva (Maj. Gen. Villanueva), the Commander of the
7th
Infantry Division of the Army based in Fort Magsaysay, to set in motion an investigation regarding the
possible involvement of any personnel assigned at the camp in the purported abduction of the petitioner.[75]
In
turn, public respondent Maj. Gen. Villanueva tapped the Office of the Provost Marshal (OPV) of the 7th
Infantry
Division, to conduct the investigation.[76]
On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th
Infantry Division released an Investigation Repor t [77]
detailing the
results of its inquiry. In substance, the report described petitioner’s allegations as “opinionated” and thereby
cleared the military from any involvement in her alleged abduction and torture.[78]
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
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In its Decision,[79]
the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration to the petitioner’s version that
she was indeed abducted and then subjected to torture for five (5) straight days. The appellate court noted the
sincerity and resolve by which the petitioner affirmed the contents of her affidavits in open court, and was
thereby convinced that the latter was telling the truth.[80]
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded the argument of the public respondents that the
abduction of the petitioner was “stage managed,” as it is merely based on an unfounded speculation that only
the latter and her companions knew where they were staying at the time they were forcibly taken .[81]
The
Court of Appeals further stressed that the Medical Certificate of the petitioner can only affirm the existence of
a true abduction, as its findings are reflective of the very injuries the latter claims to have sustained during her
harrowing ordeal, particularly when she was handcuffed and then dragged by her abductors onto their van.[82]
The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat against the security of the
petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of “RC” to contact and monitor her, even after she was
released.[83]
This threat, according to the Court of Appeals, is all the more compounded by the failure of thepolice authorities to identify the material perpetrators who are still at large.
[84] Thus, the appellate court
extended to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo by directing the public respondents to afford
protection to the former, as well as continuing, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, their existing
investigations involving the abduction.[85]
The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to informational privacy of the
petitioner, noting the existence of “records of investigations” that concerns the petitioner as a suspected
member of the CPP-NPA.[86]
The appellate court derived the existence of such records from a photograph and
video file presented in a press conference by party-list representatives Jovito Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor
Alcover (Alcover), which allegedly show the petitioner participating in rebel exercises. Representative Alcover
also revealed that the photograph and video came from a female CPP-NPA member who wanted out of the
organization. According to the Court of Appeals, the proliferation of the photograph and video, as well as any
form of media, insinuating that petitioner is part of the CPP-NPA does not only constitute a violation of the
right to privacy of the petitioner but also puts further strain on her already volatile security.[87]
To this end, the
appellate court granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data mandating the public respondents to refrain
from distributing to the public any records, in whatever form, relative to petitioner’s alleged ties with the CPP -
NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture.[88]
The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not convinced that the military or
any other person acting under the acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the abduction and
torture of the petitioner.[89]
The appellate court stressed that, judging by her own statements, the petitioner
merely “believed” that the military was behind her abduction.[90]
Thus, the Court of Appeals absolved the
public respondents from any complicity in the abduction and torture of petitioner.[91]
The petition was likewise
dismissed as against public respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her immunity from
suit.[92]
Accordingly, the petitioner’s prayers for the return of her personal belongings were
denied.[93]
Petitioner’s prayers for an inspection order and production order also met the same fate.[94]
Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.
AMPARO
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A.
Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the public respondents from any
responsibility in her abduction and torture.[95]
Corollary to this, petitioner also finds fault on the part of Court
of Appeals in denying her prayer for the return of her personal belongings.[96]
Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried out, as well as the
sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes that she heard while in detention, as these were detailed in her
two affidavits and affirmed by her in open court, are already sufficient evidence to prove government
involvement.[97]
Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to implicate
the high-ranking civilian and military authorities she impleaded as respondents in her amparo petition.[98]
Thus,
petitioner seeks from this Court a pronouncement holding the respondents as complicit in her abduction and
torture, as well as liable for the return of her belongings.[99]
Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings
It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command
responsibility as the justification in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally
inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes
liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in
an amparo petition.[100]
The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,[101] which was the first to examine command responsibility in the context
of an amparo proceeding, observed that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico notes that:[102]
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of
laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its
simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate
members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict."[103]
In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal
complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command
responsibility,[104]
f oreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for
the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over
them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal
liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates
for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators[105]
(as opposed to crimes he ordered).
(Emphasis in the orginal, underscoring supplied)
Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is
more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a
summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself:
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the
appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific
violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.[106]
While the principal
objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal
killing or threats thereof had transpired—the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance,
killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive
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law.[107]
The rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo writ has been, in turn, clearly set forth in
the landmark case of The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo:[108]
x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that
requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it
is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility
requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings .[109]
(Emphasis
supplied)
It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in
an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the
ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In
which case, commanders may be impleaded—not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but rather
on the ground of their responsibility, or at leastaccountability. In Razon v. Tagitis,[110]
the distinct, but
interrelated concepts of responsibility and accountability were given special and unique significations in
relation to an amparo proceeding, to wit:
x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence
to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a
measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate
criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on
the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who
exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their
complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge
relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who
carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation ofthe enforced disappearance.
Responsibility of Public Respondents
At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner in impleading the
public respondents is to ascribe some form of responsibilityon their part, based on her assumption that they,
in one way or the other, had condoned her abduction and torture.[111]
To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was government agents who were
behind her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls attention to the circumstances surrounding her abduction and
torture—i.e., the forcible taking in broad daylight; use of vehicles with no license plates; utilization of
blindfolds; conducting interrogations to elicit communist inclinations; and the infliction of physical abuse —
which, according to her, is consistent with the way enforced disappearances are being practiced by the military
or other state forces.[112]
Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military camp Fort Magsaysay—a
conclusion that she was able to infer from the travel time required to reach the place where she was actuallydetained, and also from the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes she heard while thereat.
[113]
We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire
reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was detained at Fort
Magsaysay.
First . The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those
surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to
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exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability are not determinable in a mere
summary amparo proceeding.[118]
But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact that
a person’s right to be restituted of his property is already subsume d under the general rubric of property
rights—which are no longer protected by the writ of amparo.[119]
Section 1 of the Amparo Rule,[120]
which
defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property rights.
B.
The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of Appeals of her prayer for an
inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.[121]
Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military involvement in petitioner’s
ordeal, this Court finds no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in denying an inspection of the military
camp at Fort Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court that a contrary stance would be equivalent tosanctioning a “fishing expedition,” which was never intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim
relief of inspection order.[122]
Contrary to the explicit position[123]
espoused by the petitioner, the Amparo Rule
does not allow a “fishing expedition” for evidence.
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner
in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision .[124]
A basic requirement before
an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable
from the allegations of the party seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does not require that the place to
be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an
inspection order that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima
facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do.
Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to make out a prima
facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. An
inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful.
HABEAS DATA
As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas
data, by enjoining the public respondents from“distributing or causing the distribution to the public any
records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers” relative to the petitioner’s “alleged ties with
the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture.” Though not raised as an issue in this appeal,
this Court is constrained to pass upon and review this particular ruling of the Court of Appeals in order to
rectify, what appears to Us, an error infecting the grant.
For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the Court of Appeals in granting the privilege of the
writ of habeas data, We quote hereunder the relevant portion[125]
of its decision:
Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence reports and
reports on the investigations conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas be produced and
eventually expunged from the records. Petitioner claimed to be included in the Government’s
Order of Battle under Oplan Bantay Laya which listed political opponents against whom false
criminal charges were filed based on made up and perjured information.
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Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify before Us, Ex-
army general Jovito Palaparan, Bantay party-list, and Pastor Alcover of the Alliance for
Nationalism and Democracy party-list held a press conference where they revealed that they
received an information from a female NPA rebel who wanted out of the organization, that
Petitioner was a communist rebel. Alcover claimed that said information reached them thru a
letter with photo of Petitioner holding firearms at an NPA training camp and a video CD of the
training exercises.
Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioner’s denial that she was the person in said video,there were records of other investigations on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas which violate
her right to privacy. Without a doubt, reports of such nature have reasonable connections, one
way or another, to petitioner’s abduction where she claimed she had been subjected to cruelties
and dehumanizing acts which nearly caused her life precisely due to allegation of her alleged
membership in the CPP-NPA. And if said report or similar reports are to be continuously made
available to the public, Petitioner’s security and privacy will certainly be in danger of being
violated or transgressed by persons who have strong sentiments or aversion against members of
this group. The unregulated dissemination of said unverified video CD or reports of Petitioner’s
alleged ties with the CPP-NPA indiscriminately made available for public consumption without
evidence of its authenticity or veracity certainly violates Peti tioner’s right to privacy which must
be protected by this Court. We, thus, deem it necessary to grant Petitioner the privilege of theWrit of Habeas Data. (Emphasis supplied).
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most
especially the right to informational privacy of individuals.[126]
The writ operates to protect a person’s right to
control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such information is being collected
through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is theshowing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life,
liberty or security of the victim.[127]
This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do.
The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no evidence on
record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the
petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that would have violated or
threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other reports about
the petitioner’s ties with the CPP-NPA, was not adequately proven—considering that the origin of such records
were virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the video and
photograph released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on
record even shows that any of the public respondents had access to such video or photograph.
In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the public
respondents from “distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports,
documents or similar papers” relative to the petitioner’s “alleged ties with the CPP-NPA,” appears to be devoid
of any legal basis. The public respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the
first place, it was not proven to have.
Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be actually responsible for the
abduction and torture of the petitioner, any inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation
of the petitioner’s right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature.
For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of
the writ of habeas data.
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while telling of its innate insufficiency to impute any form of
responsibility on the part of the public respondents, revealed two important things that can guide Us to a
proper disposition of this case. One, that further investigation with the use of extraordinary diligence must be
made in order to identify the perpetrators behind the abduction and torture of the petitioner; and two, that
the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to its Constitutional mandate to “investigate all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights and to provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights,”[128]
must be tapped in order to fill certain investigative and remedial voids.
Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken
Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner was not able to adduce
substantial evidence proving her allegations of government complicity in her abduction and torture, may be
attributed to the incomplete and one-sided investigations conducted by the government itself. This“awkward ” situation, wherein the very persons alleged to be involved in an enforced disappearance or
extralegal killing are, at the same time, the very ones tasked by law to investigate the matter, is a unique
characteristic of these proceedings and is the main source of the “ evidentiary difficulties” faced by any
petitioner in any amparocase.[129]
Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent safeguard—requiring the
“respondent who is a public official or employee” to prove that no less than “extraordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.”[130]
Thus, unless
and until any of the public respondents is able to show to the satisfaction of the amparo court that
extraordinary diligence has been observed in their investigations, they cannot shed the allegations of
responsibility despite the prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect.
With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule, was not fully
observed in the conduct of the police and military investigations in the case at bar.
A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Task Group CAROJAN shows modest effort on the
part of the police investigators to identify the perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said reports arereplete with background checks on the victims of the abduction, but are, at the same time, comparatively silent
as to other concrete steps the investigators have been taking to ascertain the authors of the crime. Although
conducting a background investigation on the victims is a logical first step in exposing the motive behind the
abduction—its necessity is clearly outweighed by the need to identify the perpetrators, especially in light of the
fact that the petitioner, who was no longer in captivity, already came up with allegations about the motive of
her captors.
Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations solely on the cooperation or non-
cooperation of the petitioner—who, they claim, was less than enthusiastic in participating in their investigative
efforts.[131]
While it may be conceded that the participation of the petitioner would have facilitated the
progress of Task Group CAROJAN’s investigation, this Court believes that the former’s reticence to cooperate is
hardly an excuse for Task Group CAROJAN not to explore other means or avenues from which they could obtain
relevant leads.[132]
Indeed, while the allegations of government complicity by the petitioner cannot, by
themselves, hold up as adequate evidence before a court of law—they are, nonetheless, a vital source of
valuable investigative leads that must be pursued and verified, if only to comply with the high standard of
diligence required by the Amparo Rule in the conduct of investigations.
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Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group CAROJAN’s reports still failed to explain
why it never considered seeking the assistance of Mr. Jesus Paolo—who, along with the victims, is a central
witness to the abduction. The reports of Task Group CAROJAN is silent in any attempt to obtain from Mr.
Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the abductors or, at the very least, of the one who, by petitioner’s account, was
not wearing any mask.
The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative material to the sketches included in
petitioner’s offer of exhibits that, it may be pointed out, were prepared under the direction of, and first
submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the latter’s independent investigation on the abduction and torture of t he
petitioner.[133]
But as mentioned earlier, the CHR sketches remain to be unidentified as of this date.
In light of these considerations, We agree with the Court of Appeals that further investigation under the
norm of extraordinary diligence should be undertaken. This Court simply cannot write finis to this case, on the
basis of an incomplete investigation conducted by the police and the military. In a very real sense, the right to
security of the petitioner is continuously put in jeopardy because of the deficient investigation that directlycontributes to the delay in bringing the real perpetrators before the bar of justice.
To add teeth to the appellate court’s directive, however, We find it fitting, nay, necessary to shift the
primary task of conducting further investigations on the abduction and torture of the petitioner upon the
CHR.[134]
We note that the CHR, unlike the police or the military, seems to enjoy the trust and confidence of
the petitioner—as evidenced by her attendance and participation in the hearings already conducted by the
commission.[135]
Certainly, it would be reasonable to assume from such cooperation that the investigations of
the CHR have advanced, or at the very least, bears the most promise of advancing farther, in terms of locating
the perpetrators of the abduction, and is thus, vital for a final resolution of this petition. From this perspective,
We also deem it just and appropriate to relegate the task of affording interim protection to the petitioner, also
to the CHR.
Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as follows—
1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation regarding the
abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the norm of extraordinary
diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the
cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue anyother leads relevant to petitioner’s abduction and torture.
2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his successor, and the
incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation
of the CHR, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the
time of the petitioner’s abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the
Constitution and existing laws.
3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court
of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their
recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90)
days from receipt of this decision.
4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt
of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and
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to (b) provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the
Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court.
Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of monitoring
compliance with the above directives and determining whether, in light of any recent reports or
recommendations, there would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents
responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit its
own report with recommendation to this Court for final action. The Court of Appeals will continue to have
jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its tasks under this decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We hereby render a decision:
1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for the return of her personal belongings;
2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort
Magsaysay.
3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice, however, to any
modification that this Court may make on the basis of the investigation reports and recommendations
submitted to it under this decision.
4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken, as follows—
a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the lead agency tasked with conducting
further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the
Commission on Human Rights shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue
to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches
submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads
relevant to petitioner’s abduction and torture.
b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, and the
incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or his successor, to extend
assistance to the ongoing investigation of the Commission on Human Rights, including but notlimited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioner’s
abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and
existing laws.
c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, to
furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of
the reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already
part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.
d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights (a) to furnish to the Court of Appeals
within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation
and its corresponding recommendations; and (b) to provide or continue to provide protection to
the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be
determined by this Court.
5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for the following purposes:
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a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by the PNP, AFP, and the CHR;
b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and recommendations of the CHR, the
abduction and torture of the petitioner was committed by persons acting under any of the
public respondents; and on the basis of this determination—
c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of the report and recommendationof the Commission on Human Rights—its own report, which shall include a recommendation
either for the DISMISSAL of the petition as against the public respondents who were found not
responsible and/or accountable, or for the APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL MEASURES, AS MAY BE
ALLOWED BY THE AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE UNDERTAKEN as against those
found responsible and/or accountable.
Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to answer for any
responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.
Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-
WRA that are not contrary to this decision areAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
4. Rodriguez vs Arroyo
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN
FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner,
- versus -
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA,
LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G.
TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an officer named
MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name “HARRY,”
ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN “BONG” PASICOLAN and VINCENT CALLAGAN,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 191805
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN
FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, POLICE DIR. GEN. JESUS A. VERSOZA, P/SSUPT.
JUDE W. SANTOS, BGEN. REMEGIO M. DE VERA, 1ST
LT. RYAN S. MATUTINA, LT. COL.
LAURENCE E. MINA, ANTONIO C. CRUZ, ALDWIN C. PASICOLAN and VICENTE A.
CALLAGAN,
Petitioners,
- versus -
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 193160
Promulgated:
November 15, 2011
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, J.:
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Before this Court are two consolidated cases, namely, (1) Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari dated
20 April 2010 (G.R. No. 191805), and (2) Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 19 August 2010 (G.R. No.
193160).[1]
Both Petitions assail the 12 April 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data is GRANTED.
Respondents Gen. Victor S. Ibrado, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Z. Ochoa,
PCSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, PSSupt. Jude W. Santos, Col. Remigio M. De Vera, Lt. Col. LaurenceE. Mina and 1Lt. Ryan S. Matutina, or their replacements in their official posts if they have
already vacated the same, are ORDERED to furnish this Court within five (5) days from notice of
this decision, official or unofficial reports pertaining to petitioner – covering but not limited to
intelligence reports, operation reports and provost marshal reports prior to, during and
subsequent to September 6, 2009 – made by the 5th
Infantry Division, Philippine Army, its
branches and subsidiaries, including the 17th
Infantry Battalion, Philippine Army.
The above-named respondents are also DIRECTED to refrain from using the said reports
in any transaction or operation of the military. Necessarily, the afore-named respondents
areORDERED to expunge from the records of the military all documents having any reference topetitioner.
Likewise, the afore-named respondents, as well as respondents Police Director General
Jesus Ame Versoza, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicente Callagan are DIRECTEDto ensure
that no further violation of petitioner’s rights to life, liberty and security is committed against the
latter or any member of his family.
The petition is DISMISSED with respect to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on account
of her presidential immunity from suit. Similarly, the petition is DISMISSED with respect to
respondents Calog and George Palacpac or Harry for lack of merit.
Petitioner’s prayer for issuance of a temporary protection order and inspection order
is DENIED.
Noriel Rodriguez (Rodriguez) is petitioner in G.R. No. 191805 and respondent in G.R. No. 193160. He is a
member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
On the other hand, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (former President Arroyo), Police Director General (PDG.)
Jesus A. Verzosa, Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSupt.) Jude W. Santos, Brigadier General (Brig. Gen.)
Remegio M. De Vera, First Lieutenant (1st
Lt.) Ryan S. Matutina, Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col.) Laurence E. Mina,
Antonio C. Cruz (Cruz), Aldwin C. Pasicolan (Pasicolan) and Vicente A. Callagan (Callagan) are respondents in
G.R. No. 191805 and petitioners in G.R. No. 193160. At the time the events relevant to the present Petitions
occurred, former President Arroyo was the President of the Philippines. PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, Brig.
Gen. De Vera, 1st
Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina were officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP). Cruz,
Pasicolan and Callagan were Special Investigators of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in Region II.
Antecedent Facts
Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya,making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
[2]
On 6 September 2009, at 5:00 p.m., Rodriguez had just reached Barangay Tapel, Cagayan onboard a
tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos (Carlos), when four men forcibly took him and forced him into a
car. Inside the vehicle were several men in civilian clothes, one of whom was holding a .45 caliber pistol.
Subsequently, three more persons arrived, and one of them carried a gun at his side. Two men boarded the
car, while the others rode on the tricycle.[3]
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The men tied the hands of Rodriguez, ordered him to lie on his stomach, sat on his back and started
punching him. The car travelled towards the direction of Sta. Teresita-Mission and moved around the area until
about 2:00 a.m. During the drive, the men forced Rodriguez to confess to being a member of the New People’s
Army (NPA), but he remained silent. The car then entered a place that appeared to be a military camp. There
were soldiers all over the area, and there was a banner with the word “Bravo” written on it. Rodriguez later on
learned that the camp belonged to the 17th
Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.[4]
Rodriguez was brought to a canteen, where six men confronted him, ordering him to confess to his
membership in the NPA. Due to his exhaustion, he unintentionally fell asleep. As a result, the men hit him on
the head to wake him up. After the interrogation, two of the men guarded him, but did not allow him to
sleep.[5]
In the morning of 7 September 2009, the men tied the hands of Rodriguez, blindfolded him and made him
board a vehicle. While they were in transit, the soldiers repeatedly hit him in the head and threatened to kill
him. When the car stopped after about ten minutes, the soldiers brought him to a room, removed his blindfold,
and forced him to confess to being a member of the NPA. During the interrogation, the soldiers repeatedly hit
him on the head. Thereafter, he was detained inside the room for the entire day. The soldiers tied his stomach
to a papag, and gave him rice and viand. Fearing that the food might be poisoned, he refused to eat anything.He slept on the papag while being tied to it at the waist.
[6]
On 8 September 2009, the men forced Rodriguez into a vehicle, which brought them to Bugey and
Mission. While passing houses along the way, the men asked him if his contacts lived in those houses. When
he failed to answer, a soldier pointed a gun to his head and threatened to kill him and his family. Because he
remained silent, the soldiers beat him and tied him up. The vehicle returned to the military camp at past 1:00
p.m., where he was again subjected to tactical interrogation about the location of an NPA camp and his alleged
NPA comrades. He suffered incessant mauling every time he failed to answer.[7]
At dawn on 9 September 2009, soldiers armed with rifles took Rodriguez and made him their guide ontheir way to an NPA camp in Birao. Accompanying them was a man named Harry, who, according to the
soldiers, was an NPA member who had surrendered to the military. Harry pointed to Rodriguez and called him
a member of the NPA. He also heard Harry tell the soldiers that the latter knew the area well and was
acquainted with a man named Elvis. The soldiers loaded Rodriguez into a military truck and drove to Tabbak,
Bugey. While he was walking with the soldiers, he noticed a soldier with the name tag “Matutina,” who
appeared to be an official because the other soldiers addressed him as “sir.”[8]
Upon reaching Birao on foot, the soldiers looked for and was able to locate a certain Elvis and told him
that Rodriguez had identified his whereabouts location. The soldiers forced Rodriguez to convince Elvis to
disclose the location of the NPA camp. They brought the two to the mountains, where both were threatened
with death. When the soldiers punched Elvis, Rodriguez told them that he would reveal the location of the
NPA camp if they let Elvis go home. They finally released Elvis around 3:00 p.m. that day. The soldiers and
Rodriguez spent the next three nights in the mountains.[9]
On 12 September 2009, the soldiers again hit Rodriguez and forced him to identify the location of the
NPA camp. He was blindfolded and warned to get ready because they would beat him up again in the military
camp. Upon arrival therein, they brought him to the same room where he had first been detained, and two
soldiers mauled him again. They repeatedly punched and kicked him. In the afternoon, they let him rest and
gave him an Alaxan tablet. Thereafter, he fell asleep due to over-fatigue and extreme body pain. The soldiers,however, hit him again. After giving him a pen and a piece of paper, they ordered him to write down his
request for rice from the people. When he refused, the soldiers maltreated him once more.[10]
On 13 September 2009, the soldiers forced Rodriguez to sign documents declaring that he had
surrendered in an encounter in Cumao, and
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that the soldiers did not shoot him because he became a military asset in May. When he refused to sign the
document, he received another beating. Thus, he was compelled to sign, but did so using a different signature
to show that he was merely coerced.[11]
The soldiers showed Rodriguez photographs of different persons and asked him if he knew the men
appearing therein. When he told them that he did not recognize the individuals on the photos, the soldiers
instructed him to write down the name of his school and organization, but he declined. The soldiers then wrote
something on the paper, making it appear that he was the one who had written it, and forced him to sign the
document. The soldiers took photographs of him while he was signing. Afterwards, the soldiers forced him
down, held his hands, and sat on his feet. He did not only receive another beating, but was also electrocuted.
The torture lasted for about an hour.[12]
At 11:00 p.m. on 15 September 2009, the soldiers brought Rodriguez to a military operation in the
mountains, where he saw Matutina again. They all spent the night there.[13]
In the morning of 16 September 2009, the soldiers and Rodriguez started their descent. When they
stopped, the soldiers took his photograph and asked him to name the location of the NPA camp. Thereafter,
they all returned to the military camp. The soldiers asked him to take a bath and wear a white polo shirt
handed to him. He was then brought to the Enrile Medical Center, where Dr. Juliet Ramil (Dr. Ramil) examined
him.[14]
When the doctor asked him why he had bruises and contusions, he lied and told her that he sustained
them when he slipped, as he noticed a soldier observing him. Dr. Ramil’s medical certificate indicated that he
suffered from four hematomas in the epigastric area, chest and sternum.[15]
Back at the camp, the soldiers let Rodriguez eat with several military officials and took pictures of him
while he was eating with them. They also asked him to point to a map in front of him and again took his
photograph. Later, they told him that he would finally see his mother.[16]
Rodriguez was brought to another military camp, where he was ordered to sign a piece of paper statingthat he was a surrenderee and was never beaten up. Scared and desperate to end his ordeal, he signed the
paper and was warned not to report anything to the media.[17]
Around 6:00 a.m. on 17 September 2009, the soldiers instructed petitioner to take a bath. They gave him
a pair of jeans and perfume. While he was having breakfast, the two soldiers guarding him repeatedly
reminded him not to disclose to the media his experience in the camp and to say instead that he had
surrendered to the military.[18]
At 9:00 a.m. on the same day, the mother and the brother of Rodriguez arrived surrounded by several
men. His mother, Wilma Rodriguez (Wilma), talked to Lt. Col. Mina. Rodriguez heard one of the soldiers tellWilma that he had surrendered to the military and had long been its asset. His brother, Rodel Rodriguez
(Rodel), informed him that the men accompanying them were from the CHR, namely, Pasicolan, Cruz and
Callagan. Upon seeing Rodriguez, Cruz instructed him to lift up his shirt, and one of the CHR employees took
photographs of his bruises.[19]
A soldier tried to convince Wilma to let Rodriguez stay in the camp for another two weeks to supposedly
prevent the NPA from taking revenge on him. Respondent Calog also approached Rodriguez and Rodel and
asked them to become military assets. Rodel refused and insisted that they take Rodriguez home to Manila.
Again, the soldiers reminded them to refrain from facing the media. The soldiers also told them that the latter
will be taken to the Tuguegarao Airport and guarded until they reached home.[20]
Rodriguez and his family missed their flight. Subsequently, the soldiers accompanied them to the CHR
office, where Rodriguez was made to sign an affidavit stating that he was neither abducted nor
tortured. Afraid and desperate to return home, he was forced to sign the document. Cruz advised him not to
file a case against his abductors because they had already freed him. The CHR personnel then led him and his
family to the CHR Toyota Tamaraw FX service vehicle. He noticed that a vehicle with soldiers on board followed
them.[21]
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The Tamaraw FX pulled over and respondent 1st
Lt. Matutina boarded the vehicle. Upon reaching a mall in
Isabela, Rodriguez, his family, Callagan, 1st
Lt. Matutina and two other soldiers transferred to an orange Toyota
Revo with plate number WTG 579. Upon reaching the boundary of Nueva Ecija and Nueva Viscaya, 1st
Lt.
Matutina alighted and called Rodriguez to a diner. A certain Alan approached Rodriguez and handed him a
cellphone with a SIM card. The latter and his family then left and resumed their journey back home.[22]
Rodriguez reached his house in Sta. Ana, Manila at 3:00 a.m. on 18 September 2010. Callagan and two soldiers
went inside the house, and took photographs and a video footage thereof. The soldiers explained that the photos
and videos would serve as evidence of the fact that Rodriguez and his family were able to arrive home safely.
Despite Rodriguez’s efforts to confront the soldiers about their acts, they still continued and only left thirty minutes
later.[23]
On 19 September 2009, Dr. Reginaldo Pamugas, a physician trained by the International Committee on
Torture and Rehabilitation, examined Rodriguez and issued a Medical Certificate stating that the latter had been a
victim of torture.[24]
Around 7:00 a.m. on 3 November 2010, Rodriguez and his girlfriend, Aileen Hazel Robles, noticed that
several suspicious-looking men followed them at the Metro Rail Transit (MRT), in the streets and on a
jeepney.[25]
On 7 December 2009, Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for
the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents
and Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009.[26]
The petition was filed against former President Arroyo,
Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino,
P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st
Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac (Palacpac), Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.
The petition prayed for the following reliefs:
a. The issuance of the writ of amparo ordering respondents to desist from violating Rodriguez’sright to life, liberty and security.
b. The issuance of an order to enjoin respondents from doing harm to or approaching
Rodriguez, his family and his witnesses.
c. Allowing the inspection of the detention areas of the Headquarters of Bravo Co., 5th
Infantry
Division, Maguing, Gonzaga, Cagayan and another place near where Rodriguez was brought.
d. Ordering respondents to produce documents submitted to them regarding any report on
Rodriguez, including operation reports and
provost marshall reports of the 5th
Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), prior to, on and subsequent to 6 September 2009.
e. Ordering records pertinent or in any way connected to Rodriguez, which are in the custody
of respondents, to be expunged, disabused, and forever barred from being used.[27]
On 15 December 2009, we granted the respective writs after finding that the petition sufficiently
alleged that Rodriguez had been abducted, tortured and later released by members of the 17 th Infantry
Battalion of the Philippine Army.[28]
We likewise ordered respondents therein to file a verified return on the
writs on or before 22 December 2009 and to comment on the petition on or before 4 January 2010 .[29]
Finally,
we directed the Court of Appeals to hear the petition on 4 January 2010 and decide on the case within 10 days
after its submission for decision.[30]
During the initial hearing on 4 January 2010, the Court of Appeals required the parties to submit
affidavits and other pieces of evidence at the next scheduled hearing on 27 January 2010.[31]
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On 8 January 2010, respondents therein, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed their
Return of the Writ, which was likewise considered as their comment on the petition.[32]
In their Return,
respondents therein alleged that Rodriguez had surrendered to the military on 28 May 2009 after he had been
put under surveillance and identified as “Ka Pepito” by former rebels.[33]
According to his military handlers,
Corporal (Cpl.) Rodel
B. Cabaccan and Cpl. Julius P. Navarro, Rodriguez was a former member of the NPA operating in Cagayan
Valley.[34]
Wanting to bolt from the NPA, he told Cpl. Cabaccan and Cpl. Navarro that he would help the military
in exchange for his protection.[35]
Upon his voluntary surrender on 28 May 2009, Rodriguez was made to sign an Oath of Loyalty and an
Agent’s Agreement/Contract, showing his willingness to return to society and become a military asset.[36]
Since
then, he acted as a double agent, returning to the NPA to gather information .[37]
However, he feared that his
NPA comrades were beginning to suspect him of being an infiltrator.[38]
Thus, with his knowledge and consent,
the soldiers planned to stage a sham abduction to erase any suspicion about him being a double
agent.[39]
Hence, the abduction subject of the instant petition was conducted.[40]
Meanwhile, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Consolidated Return of the Writ dated 15 January
2010,[41]
alleging that they had exercised extraordinary diligence in locating Rodriguez, facilitating his safe
turnover to his family and securing their journey back home to Manila. More specifically, they alleged that, on 16
September 2009, after Wilma sought their assistance in ascertaining the whereabouts of her son, Cruz made
phone calls to the military and law enforcement agencies to determine his location.[42]
Cruz was able to speak
with Lt. Col. Mina, who confirmed that Rodriguez was in their custody.[43]
This information was transmitted to
CHR Regional Director Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga. He, in turn, ordered Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan to accompany
Wilma to the 17th
Infantry Division.[44]
When the CHR officers, along with Wilma and Rodel, arrived at the 17th
Infantry Battalion at Masin,
Alcala, Cagayan, Brigade Commander Col. de Vera and Battalion Commander Lt. Col. Mina alleged that
Rodriguez had become one of their assets, as evidenced by the Summary on the Surrender of Noriel Rodriguez
and the latter’s Contract as Agent.[45]
The CHR officers observed his casual and cordial demeanor with the
soldiers.[46]
In any case, Cruz asked him to raise his shirt to see if he had been subjected to any maltreatment.
Cruz and Pasicolan did not see any traces of torture. Thereafter, Rodriguez was released to his family, and they
were made to sign a certification to this effect. During the signing of the document, herein CHR officers did not
witness any threat, intimidation or force employed against Rodriguez or his family. [47]
During their journey back to the home of Rodriguez, the CHR officers observed that he was very much
at ease with his military escorts, especially with 1st
Lt. Matutina.[48]
Neither was there any force or intimidation
when the soldiers took pictures of his house, as the taking of photographs was performed with Wilma’s
consent.
During the hearing on 27 January 2010, the parties agreed to file additional affidavits and position
papers and to have the case considered submitted for decision after the filing of these pleadings.[50]
On 12 April 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision.[51]
Subsequently, on 28 April 2010,
respondents therein filed their Motion for Reconsideration.[52]
Before the Court of Appeals could resolve this
Motion for Reconsideration, Rodriguez filed the instant Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari (G.R. No.
191805), raising the following assignment of errors:
a. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for temporary
protection order.
b. The Court of Appeals erred in saying: “(H)owever, given the nature of the writ
of amparo, which has the effect of enjoining the commission by respondents of violation to
petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security, the safety of petitioner is ensured with the issuance
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of the writ, even in the absence of an order preventing respondent from approaching
petitioner.”
c. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that respondent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
had command responsibility.[53]
On the other hand, respondents therein, in their Comment dated 30 July 2010, averred:
a. The Court of Appeals properly dropped then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a
party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual
incumbency.
b. Petitioner had not presented any adequate and competent evidence, much less
substantial evidence, to establish his claim that public respondents had violated, were violating
or threatening to violate his rights to life, liberty and security, as well as his right to privacy.
Hence, he was not entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data or to the
corresponding interim reliefs (i.e. inspection order, production order and temporary protection
order) provided under the rule on the writ of amparo and the rule on the writ of habeas data.[54]
On 19 August 2010, PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, BGen. De Vera, 1st
Lt. Matutina, Lt. Col. Mina, Cruz,
Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking the reversal of the 12 April 2010
Decision of the Court of Appeals.[55]
They alleged that Rodriguez –
Has not presented any adequate and competent evidence, must less substantial
evidence, to establish his claim that petitioners have violated, are violating or threatening with
violation his rights to life, liberty and security, as well as his right to privacy; hence, he is not
entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data and their corresponding interim
reliefs (i.e., inspection order, production order and temporary protection order) provided underthe Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.
[56]
In ascertaining whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in issuing its assailed Decision
and Resolution, the following issues must be resolved:
I. Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the writs
of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his favor.
II. Whether former President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent on the basis of thepresidential immunity from suit.
III. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data
cases.
IV. Whether the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or threatened by
respondents in G.R. No. 191805.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the writs of amparo and habeas data were promulgated to
ensure the protection of the people’s rights to life, liberty and security .[57]
The rules on these writs were issued
in light of the alarming prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.[58]
The Rule on the Writ
of Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007,[59]
and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data on 2 February 2008.[60]
The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it
partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and
permanent reliefs available to the petitioner.[61]
It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings .[62]
Rather, it
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serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.[63]
It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these
offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading
to subsequent investigation and action.[64]
Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a person’s right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information is being collected through
unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.[65]
As an independent and summary remedy to protect the
right to privacy – especially the right to informational privacy[66] – the proceedings for the issuance of the writ
of habeas data does not entail any finding of criminal, civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations in the
petition are proven through substantial evidence, then the Court may (a) grant access to the database or
information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the database or information contains erroneous
data or information, order its deletion, destruction or rectification.[67]
First issue: Grant of interim reliefs
In the petition in G.R. No. 191805, Rodriguez prays for the issuance of a temporary protection order. It
must be underscored that this interim relief is only available before final judgment. Section 14 of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo clearly provides:
Interim Reliefs. – Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment , the
court, justice or judge may grant any of the following reliefs:
Temporary Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu
proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediatefamily be protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or private institution
capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an organization, association or
institution referred to in Section 3(c) of this Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers
involved.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend
temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.
The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and
conditions that may be imposed by the court, justice or judge.
(a) Inspection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after
due hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other
property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing
the property or any relevant object or operation thereon.
The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported
by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced
disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of
the information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the
merit of the opposition.
The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the
aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated.
The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the
inspection and the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe
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other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall expire five (5)
days after the date of its issuance, unless extended for justifiable reasons.
(b) Production Order. – The court, justice, or judge, upon verified motion and
after due hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, or objects
in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or
the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of
the movant.
The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged
nature of the information, in which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in
chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.
The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional
rights of all the parties.
(c) Witness Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu
proprio, may refer the witnesses to the Department of Justice for admission to the Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981.
The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or
to accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety.
(Emphasis supplied)
We held in Yano v. Sanchez[68]
that “[t]hese provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it
arrives at a judicious determination of the amparopetition.” Being interim reliefs, they can only be granted
before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ
of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant petitionerthe privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary protection order independently of the
former. The order restricting respondents from going near Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege of the writ.
Second issue: Presidential immunity from suit
It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability
in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or
accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing. As we held in Razon v. Tagitis:[69]
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance;rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for
purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by
substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to
file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper
courts. Accountability , on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be
addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing
the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed
with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure;or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of
Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the
victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.[70]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, in the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision[71]
found respondents in G.R. No. 191805 – with
the exception of Calog, Palacpac or Harry – to be accountable for the violations of Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty
and security committed by the 17th
Infantry Battalion, 5th
Infantry Division of the Philippine Army.[72]
The Court of
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Appeals dismissed the petition with respect to former President Arroyo on account of her presidential immunity
from suit. Rodriguez contends, though, that she should remain a respondent in this case to enable the courts to
determine whether she is responsible or accountable therefor. In this regard, it must be clarified that the Court of
Appeals’ rationale for dropping her from the list of respondents no longer stands since her presidential
immunity is limited only to her incumbency.
In Estrada v. Desierto,[73]
we clarified the doctrine that a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity
from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that courts
should look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for
truth or impairs the vindication of a right, to wit:
We reject [Estrada’s] argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he
must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner
Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of
the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83
“Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.” Since the Impeachment Court is
now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached
and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar
against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him ina better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment
proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the
Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become
moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be
filed against him, viz:
“xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been
filed against the President, for example, and the President resigns before judgment of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment court or by the
body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily
dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one
from office, then his resignation would render the case moot and academic.
However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in
the ordinary courts.”
This is in accord with our ruling in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez that “incumbent Presidents
are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency
and tenure” but not beyond. xxx
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-
sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They
involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these
crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of
immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing
the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from
liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful
acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the Stateand the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any
other trespasser.
Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial
disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or
impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon, US President Richard Nixon, a
sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents relating to his
conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's associates were facing
charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice and other offenses which were committed in a burglary
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of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's Watergate Hotel during the 1972
presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator.
President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among others, that the President
was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and removed from
office before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the
US Supreme Court. It concluded that “when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed
materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in
confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of criminal justice.” In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the US Supreme Courtfurther held that the immunity of the President from civil damages covers only “official acts.”
Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton
v. Jones where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising
out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.[74]
(Emphasis supplied)
Further, in our Resolution in Estrada v. Desierto,[75]
we reiterated that the presidential immunity from
suit exists only in concurrence with the president’s incumbency:
Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity
from suit. His arguments are merely recycled and we need not prolong the longevity of thedebate on the subject. In our Decision, we exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity
in our jurisdiction and its bends and turns up to the present time. We held that given the intent
of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the
petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal
acts committed while a sitting President. Petitioner's rehashed arguments including their thinly
disguised new spins are based on the rejected contention that he is still President, albeit, a
President on leave. His stance that his immunity covers his entire term of office or until June 30,
2004 disregards the reality that he has relinquished the presidency and there is now a new de
jure President.
Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys
immunity from suit during his term of office. He buttresses his position with the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission, viz:
“Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in
the draft proposal the immunity provision for the President. I agree with
Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out this
second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit
under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a
restoration of at least the first sentence that the president shall be immune from
suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an
immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigations, as the President-in-
exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily?
Fr. Bernas:
The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in
present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez:
So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas:
There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made
by the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other things.
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Mr. Suarez:
On the understanding, I will not press for any more query, madam
President.
I thank the Commissioner for the clarification.”
Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term means the
time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after
which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term duringwhich the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons
within or beyond the power of the incumbent. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is
clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his
term.[76]
(Emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing rationale to the case at bar, it is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the
presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the
context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.
Third issue: Command responsibility in amparo proceedings
To attribute responsibility or accountability to former President Arroyo, Rodriguez contends that the
doctrine of command responsibility may be applied. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo ,[77]
command
responsibility pertains to the “responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of
the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict.”[78]
Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine
has also found application in civil cases for human rights abuses.[79]
In the United States, for example,
command responsibility was used in Ford v. Garcia and Romagoza v. Garcia – civil actions filed under the Alien
Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act.[80] This development in the use of command
responsibility in civil proceedings shows that the application of this doctrine has been liberally extended even
to cases not criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may likewise find application in
proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo. As we held in Rubrico:
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold
military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats,
may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility
doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in
accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution.
… … …
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it
should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for,
and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to
enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to
protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination
should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal
prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing
administrative issuances, if there be any.[81]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether
respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable
the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from applying
the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In this regard, the Separate Opinion of Justice Conchita
Carpio-Morales in Rubrico is worth noting, thus:
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That proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil
or administrative liability should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command
responsibility. Taking Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo and Razon v. Tagitis in proper
context, they do not preclude the application of the doctrine of command responsibility to
Amparo cases.
Manalo was actually emphatic on the importance of the right to security of person and
its contemporary signification as a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. It
further stated that protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of thegovernment apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances, or threats thereof, and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of
justice.
Tagitis, on the other hand, cannot be more categorical on the application, at least in
principle, of the doctrine of command responsibility:
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were
the ones who were remiss in their duties when the government completely failed
to exercise the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires. We hold
these organizations accountable through their incumbent Chiefs who, under thisDecision, shall carry the personal responsibility of seeing to it that extraordinary
diligence, in the manner the Amparo Rule requires, is applied in addressing the
enforced disappearance of Tagitis.
Neither does Republic Act No. 9851 emasculate the applicability of the command
responsibility doctrine to Amparo cases. The short title of the law is the “Philippine Act on
Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against
Humanity.” Obviously, it should, as it did, only treat of superior responsibility as a ground for
criminal responsibility for the crimes covered. Such limited treatment, however, is merely in
keeping with the statute’s purpose and not intended to rule out the application of the doctrineof command responsibility to other appropriate cases.
Indeed, one can imagine the innumerable dangers of insulating high-ranking military and
police officers from the coverage of reliefs available under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The
explicit adoption of the doctrine of command responsibility in the present case will only bring
Manalo and Tagitis to their logical conclusion.
In fine, I submit that the Court should take this opportunity to state what the law ought
to be if it truly wants to make the Writ of Amparo an effective remedy for victims of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. While there is a genuine dearth of
evidence to hold respondents Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon
accountable under the command responsibility doctrine, the ponencia’s hesitant application of
the doctrine itself is replete with implications abhorrent to the rationale behind the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo.[82]
(Emphasis supplied.)
This Separate Opinion was reiterated in the recently decided case of Boac v. Cadapan ,[83]
likewise
penned by Justice Carpio-Morales, wherein this Court ruled:
Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases
to determine criminal liability. The Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement as faras amparo cases are concerned.
Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command
responsibility in amparo cases to instances of determining
the responsible or accountableindividuals or entities that are duty-bound to abate any
transgression on the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these
proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first
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instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and
harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial
measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered
by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should
not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal
prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under
existing administrative issuances, if there be any.
In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in
order to identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement
whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court does
not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best
position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.
Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a
preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further
investigation by the appropriate government agency. (Emphasis supplied.)
As earlier pointed out, amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors have
been established by substantial evidence to haveparticipated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an
enforced disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those
(i) who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to
the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the
burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. Thus, although there is
no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may
nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions.
a. Command responsibility of the President
Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings, it
must now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or
accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must
obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and
the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been
committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal
acts or punish the perpetrators thereof .[84]
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces,[85]
necessarily possesses control over
the military that qualifies him as a
superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine. [86]
On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a strict
standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be established through circumstantial
evidence.[87]
In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive
knowledge. This view is buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as
the Institutionalization of the Doctrine of ‘Command Responsibility’ in all Government Offices, particularly at all
Levels of Command in the Philippine National Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies (E.O. 226).[88]
Under
E.O. 226, a government official may be held liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine of command
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responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed, or has been
committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he
did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or immediately after its
commission.[89]
Knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the
acts are widespread within the government official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly or
regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate staff or office personnel
are involved.[90]
Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the commander-in-
chief of the armed forces, the president has the power to effectively command, control and discipline the
military.[91]
b. Responsibility or accountability of former
President Arroyo
The next question that must be tackled is whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence
that former President Arroyo is responsible or accountable for his abduction. We rule in the negative.
Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the “Melo Commission” and
the “Alston Report,” respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had knowledge of and information on, and should
have known that a climate of enforced disappearances had been perpetrated on members of the
NPA.[92]
Without even attaching, or at the very least, quoting these reports, Rodriguez contends that the Melo
Report points to rogue military men as the perpetrators. While the Alston Report states that there is a policy
allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do not automatically impute
responsibility to former President Arroyo for each and every count of forcible disappearance.[93]
Aside from
Rodriguez’s general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish her responsibility or
accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should have known
about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent
it.
Fourth issue: Responsibility or accountability of respondents in
G.R. No. 191805
The doctrine of totality of evidence in amparo cases was first laid down in this Court’s ruling
in Razon,[94]
to wit:
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced intheir totality , and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be
admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our
rules to the most basic test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand
and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can
be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.[95]
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, the
same being supported by substantial evidence. A careful examination of the records of this case reveals
that the totality of the evidence adduced by Rodriguez indubitably prove the responsibility and accountability
of some respondents in G.R. No. 191805 for violating his right to life, liberty and security.
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a. The totality of evidence proved by substantial
evidence the responsibility or accountability of
respondents for the violation of or threat to Rodriguez’s
right to life, liberty and security.
After a careful examination of the records of these cases, we are convinced that the Court of Appeals
correctly found sufficient evidence proving that the soldiers of the 17th
Infantry Battalion, 5th
Infantry Division
of the military abducted Rodriguez on 6 September 2009, and detained and tortured him until 17 September
2009.
Rodriguez’s Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 December 2009 was a meticulous and straightforward
account of his horrific ordeal with the military, detailing the manner in which he was captured and maltreated
on account of his suspected membership in the NPA.[96]
His narration of his suffering included an exhaustive
description of his physical surroundings, personal circumstances and perceived observations. He likewise
positively identified respondents 1st
Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina to be present during his abduction,
detention and torture,[97]
and respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan as the CHR representatives who
appeared during his release.
[98]
More particularly, the fact of Rodriguez’s abduction was corroborated by Carlos in his Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated 16 September 2009,[99]
wherein he recounted in detail the circumstances surrounding the
victim’s capture.
As regards the allegation of torture, the respective Certifications of Dr. Ramil and Dr. Pamugas validate
the physical maltreatment Rodriguez suffered in the hands of the soldiers of the 17th
Infantry Battalion,
5th
Infantry Division. According to the Certification dated 12 October 2009 executed by Dr. Ramil,[100]
she
examined Rodriguez in the Alfonso Ponce Enrile Memorial District Hospital on 16 September 2009 and arrived
at the following findings:
FACE
- 10cm healed scar face right side
- 2cm healed scar right eyebrow (lateral area)
- 2cm healed scar right eye brow (median area)
- 4cm x 2cm hematoma anterior chest at the sternal area right side
- 3cm x 2cm hematoma sternal area left side
- 6cm x 1cm hematoma from epigastric area to ant. chest left side
- 6cm x 1cm hematoma from epigastric area to ant. chest right side
- Multiple healed rashes (brownish discoloration) both forearm
- Multiple healed rashes (brownish discoloration)
- both leg arm
- hip area/lumbar area[101]
Dr. Pamugas performed a separate medical examination of Rodriguez on 19 September 2009, the
results of which confirmed that the injuries suffered by the latter were inflicted through torture. Dr. Pamugas
thus issued a Medical Report dated 23 September 2009,[102]
explicitly stating that Rodriguez had been tortured
during his detention by the military, to wit:
X. Interpretation of Findings
The above physical and psychological findings sustained by the subject are related to
the torture and ill-treatment done to him. The multiple circular brown to dark brown spots
found on both legs and arms were due to the insect bites that he sustained when he was forced
to join twice in the military operations. The abrasions could also be due to the conditions related
during military operations. The multiple pin-point blood spots found on his left ear is a result of
an unknown object placed inside his left ear. The areas of tenderness he felt during the physical
examination were due to the overwhelming punching and kicking on his body. The occasional
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difficulty of sleeping is a symptom experience (sic) by the subject as a result of the psychological
trauma he encountered during his detention.
XI. Conclusions and Recommendations
The physical injuries and psychological trauma suffered by the subject are secondary to
the torture and ill-treatment done to him while in detention for about 11 days. The physical
injuries sustained by the subject, of which the age is compatible with the alleged date of
infliction (sic).
[103]
(Emphasis supplied.)
In assessing the weight of the Certifications, the Court of Appeals correctly relied on the medical finding
that the injuries suffered by Rodriguez matched his account of the maltreatment inflicted on him by the
soldiers of the 17th
Infantry Battalion, 5th
Infantry Division of the Philippine Army. Further, the kind of injuries
he sustained showed that he could not have sustained them from merely fal ling, thus making respondents’
claim highly implausible.
Despite these medical findings that overwhelmingly supported and lent credibility to the allegations of
Rodriguez in his Sinumpaang Salaysay , respondents in G.R. No. 191805 still stubbornly clung to their argumentthat he was neither abducted nor detained. Rather, they claimed that he was a double agent, whose
relationship with the military was at all times congenial. This contention cannot be sustained, as it is far
removed from ordinary human experience.
If it were true that Rodriguez maintained amicable relations with the military, then he should have
unhesitatingly assured his family on 17 September 2009 that he was among friends. Instead, he vigorously
pleaded with them to get him out of the mil itary facility. In fact, in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 December
2009[104]
Wilma executed, she made the following averments:
18. Na nang Makita ko ang aking anak ay nakaramdam ako sa kanya ng awa dahil samukha syang pagod at malaki ang kanyang ipinayat.
19. Na niyakap ko sya at sa aming pagkakayakap ay binulungan nya ako na wag ko
syang iiwan sa lugar na iyon;
xxx xxx xxx
23. Na sinabihan ako ng mga sundalo na kung pwede daw ay maiwan muna ng dalawang
linggo sa kampo ako at si Noriel para daw matrain pa si Noriel sa loob ng kampo;
24. Na hindi ako pumayag na maiwan ang aking anak;
xxx xxx xxx
33. Na sa kasalukuhan, hanggang ngayon ay nag-aalala pa ako sa paa (sic) sa kaligtasan
ng aming buong pamilya, lalo na kay Noriel; xxx[105]
Also, Rodel made the following supporting averments in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 3 December
2009:[106]
24. Na nang makita ko si Noriel, hindi sya makalakad ng diretso, hinang-hina sya, malaki
ang ipinayat at nanlalalim ang mga mata;
25. Na nang makita ko ang aking kapatid ay nakaramdam ako ng awa dahil nakilala ko
syang masigla at masayahin;
26. Na ilang minuto lang ay binulugan nya ako ng “Kuya, ilabas mo ako dito, papatayin
nila ako.”
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27. Na sinabihan kami ni Lt. Col. Mina na baka pwedeng maiwan pa ng dalwang linggo
ang aking kapatid sa kanila para raw ma-train sya.
28. Na hindi kami pumayag ng aking nanay; xxx[107]
Moreover, the Court of Appeals likewise aptly pointed out the illogical, if not outrightly contradictory,
contention of respondents in G.R. No. 191805 that while Rodriguez had complained of his exhaustion from his
activities as a member of the CPP-NPA, he nevertheless willingly volunteered to return to his life in the NPA to
become a double-agent for the military. The lower court ruled in this manner:
In the Return of the Writ, respondent AFP members alleged that petitioner confided to
his military handler, Cpl. Navarro, that petitioner could no longer stand the hardships he
experienced in the wilderness, and that he wanted to become an ordinary citizen again because
of the empty promises of the CPP-NPA. However, in the same Return, respondents state that
petitioner agreed to become a double agent for the military and wanted to re-enter the CPP-
NPA, so that he could get information regarding the movement directly from the source. If
petitioner was tired of life in the wilderness and desired to become an ordinary citizen again, it
defies logic that he would agree to become an undercover agent and work alongside soldiers
in the mountains – or the wilderness he dreads – to locate the hideout of his alleged NPA
comrades.[108]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Furthermore, the appellate court also properly ruled that aside from the abduction, detention and
torture of Rodriguez, respondents, specifically 1st
Lt. Matutina, had violated and threatened the former’s right
to security when they made a visual recording of his house, as well as the photos of his relatives, to wit:
In the videos taken by the soldiers – one of whom was respondent Matutina – in the
house of petitioner on September 18, 2009, the soldiers even went as far as taking videos of the
photos of petitioner’s relatives hung on the wall of the house, as well as videos of the innermost
part of the house. This Court notes that 1Lt. Matutina, by taking the said videos, did not merely
intend to make proofs of the safe arrival of petitioner and his family in their home. 1Lt.
Matutina also desired to instill fear in the minds of petitioner and his family by showing them
that the sanctity of their home, from then on, will not be free from the watchful eyes of the
military, permanently captured through the medium of a seemingly innocuous cellhpone video
camera. The Court cannot – and will not – condone such act, as it intrudes into the very core of
petitioner’s right to security guaranteed by the fundamental law.[109]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Taken in their totality, the pieces of evidence adduced by Rodriguez, as well as the contradictory
defenses presented by respondents in G.R. No. 191805, give credence to his claim that he had been abducted,
detained and tortured by soldiers belonging to the 17th
Infantry Battalion, 5th
Infantry Division of the military.
It must be pointed out, however, that as to respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan, there was no
substantial evidence to show that they violated, or threatened with violation, Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty
and security. Despite the dearth of evidence to show the CHR officers’ responsibility or accountability, this
Court nonetheless emphasizes its criticism as regards their capacity to recognize torture or any similar form of
abuse. The CHR, being constitutionally mandated to protect human rights and investigate violationsthereof ,
[110] should ensure that its officers are well-equipped to respond effectively to and address human
rights violations. The actuations of respondents unmistakably showed their insufficient competence in
facilitating and ensuring the safe release of Rodriguez after his ordeal.
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b. The failure to conduct a fair and effect investigation
amounted to a violation of or threat to Rodriguez’s rights
to life, liberty and security.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly states that the violation of or threat to the right to life, liberty
and security may be caused by either an act or anomission of a public official.[111]
Moreover, in the context
of amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the participation of the respondents, by action
or omission, in enforced disappearance.[112]
Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to respondents who
are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or
those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance.[113]
In this regard, we emphasize our ruling in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo[114]
that the right to
security of a person includes the positive obligation of the government to ensure the observance of the duty to
investigate, viz:
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the
right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to
security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity)
under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the
policy that the State “guarantees full respect for human rights” under Article II, Section 11 of the
1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the
Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered
ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are
under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the
government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of
justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation inthe Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and
not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must
have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step
taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his
family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by
the government.
xxx xxx xxx
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the “right to
security” not only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a
positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to liberty. The ECHR interpreted the
“right to security of person” under Article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights in
the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey . In this case, the claimant's son had
been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The family's requests for
information and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant
suggested that this was a violation of her son's right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:
... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in
conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of national law but mustequally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the
individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual it is
incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this
reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective
measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a
prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been
taken into custody and has not been seen since.[115]
(Emphasis supplied)
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In the instant case, this Court rules that respondents in G.R. No. 191805 are responsible or accountable
for the violation of Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security on account of their abject failure to conduct a
fair and effective official investigation of his ordeal in the hands of the military. Respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG.
Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De Vera and Lt. Col. Mina only conducted a perfunctory
investigation, exerting no efforts to take Ramirez’s account of the events into consideration. Rather, these
respondents solely relied on the reports and narration of the military. The ruling of the appellate court must be
emphasized:
In this case, respondents Ibrado, Verzosa, Bangit, Tolentino, Santos, De Vera, and Mina
are accountable, for while they were charged with the investigation of the subject incident, the
investigation they conducted and/or relied on is superficial and one-sided. The records disclose
that the military, in investigating the incident complained of, depended on the Comprehensive
Report of Noriel Rodriguez @Pepito prepared by 1Lt. Johnny Calub for the Commanding Officer
of the 501st
Infantry Brigade, 5th
Infantry Division, Philippine Army. Such report, however, is
merely based on the narration of the military. No efforts were undertaken to solicit petitioner’s
version of the subject incident and no witnesses were questioned regarding the alleged
abduction of petitioner.
Respondent PDG Verzosa, as Chief of the PNP, is accountable because Section 24 ofRepublic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the “PNP Law,” specifies the PNP as the
governmental office with the mandate “to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of
criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution.” In this case, PDG
Verzosa failed to order the police to conduct the necessary investigation to unmask the mystery
surrounding petitioner’s abduction and disappearance. Instead, PDG Verzosa disclaims
accountability by merely stating that petitioner has no cause of action against him. Palpable,
however, is the lack of any effort on the part of PDG Verzosa to effectively and aggressively
investigate the violations of petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security by members of the
17th
Infantry Battalion, 17th
Infantry Division, Philippine Army.[116]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the absence of a fair and effective official investigation into the claims of Rodriguez violated his
right to security, for which respondents in G.R. No. 191805 must be held responsible or accountable.
Nevertheless, it must be clarified that Rodriguez was unable to establish any responsibility or
accountability on the part of respondents P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Calog and Palacpac. Respondent
P/CSupt. Tolentino had already retired when the abduction and torture of Rodriguez was perpetrated, while
P/SSupt. Santos had already been reassigned and transferred to the National Capital Regional Police Office six
months before the subject incident occurred. Meanwhile, no sufficient allegations were maintained against
respondents Calog and Palacpac.
From all the foregoing, we rule that Rodriguez was successful in proving through substantial evidence
that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st
Lt.
Matutina, and Lt. Col. Mina were responsible and accountable for the violation of Rodriguez’s rights to life,
liberty and security on the basis of (a) his abduction, detention and torture from 6 September to 17 September
2009, and (b) the lack of any fair and effective official investigation as to his allegations. Thus, the privilege of
the writs of amparo and habeas data must be granted in his favor. As a result, there is no longer any need to
issue a temporary protection order, as the privilege of these writs already has the effect of enjoining
respondents in G.R. No. 191805 from violating his rights to life, liberty and security.
It is also clear from the above discussion that despite (a) maintaining former President Arroyo in the list
of respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and (b) allowing the application of the command responsibility doctrine
to amparo and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial evidence that former
President Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property. He
likewise failed to prove through substantial evidence the accountability or responsibility of respondents Maj.
Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.
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WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the Petition for Partial Review in G.R. No. 191805 and DENY the
Petition for Review in G.R. No. 193160. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION.
The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt.
Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and
Vicent Callagan for lack of merit.
This Court directs the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to
take the appropriate action with respect to any possible liability or liabilities, within their respective legal
competence, that may have been incurred by respondents Gen. Victor Ibrado, PDG. Jesus Verzosa, Lt. Gen.
Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Ochoa, Brig. Gen. Remegio De Vera, 1st
Lt. Ryan Matutina, and Lt. Col. Laurence
Mina. The Ombudsman and the DOJ are ordered to submit to this Court the results of their action within a
period of six months from receipt of this Decision.
In the event that herein respondents no longer occupy their respective posts, the directives mandated
in this Decision and in the Court of Appeals are enforceable against the incumbent officials holding the relevant
positions. Failure to comply with the foregoing shall constitute contempt of court.
SO ORDERED.
5. Manila Electric Co. vs. Lim
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A. SAPITULA,
Petitioners,
– versus –
ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 184769
Promulgated:
October 5, 2010
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Court is once again confronted with an opportunity to define the evolving metes and bounds of the
writ of habeas data. May an employee invoke the remedies available under such writ where an employer
decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein ─ imputing to
her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to inform
her of the details thereof?
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric
Company (MERALCO).
On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the
Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing
respondent. The letter reads:
Cherry Lim:
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MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON
NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG
GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA
LOOB….[1]
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondent
reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police.[2]
By Memorandum[3]
dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s Human
Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as “A/F
OTMS Clerk,” effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of “… reports that there were accusations and
threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and
security.”
Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President and
Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so
she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the “punitive” nature of the transfer
amounted to a denial of due process. Citing the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang
and back entails, and violation of the provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA),
respondent expressed her thoughts on the alleged threats to her security in this wise:
x x x x
I feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have intimated to me the nature
of the alleged accusations and threats so that at least I could have found out if these are
credible or even serious. But as you stated, these came from unknown individuals and theway they were handled, it appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be
[sic] highlysuspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.
Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the alleged threats exist as the
management apparently believe, then my transfer to an unfamiliar place and environment
which will make me a “sitting duck” so to speak, seems to betray the real intent of
management which is contrary to its expressed concern on my security and safety . . . Thus, it
made me think twice on the rationale for management’s initiated transfer. Reflecting further,
it appears to me that instead of the management supposedly extending favor to me, the net
result and effect of management action would be a punitive one.
[4]
(emphasis andunderscoring supplied)
Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending resolution
of the issues she raised.
No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition[5]
for the issuance of a
writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, docketed as SP. Proc.
No. 213-M-2008.
By respondent’s allegation, petitioners’ unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure
and refusal to provide her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly
received concerning threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life,
liberty and security, correctible by habeas data. Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a writ
commanding petitioners to file a written return containing the following:
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a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the report
purportedly received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and security; the
nature of such data and the purpose for its collection;
b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or
information; and
c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained.
Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining
petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.
By Order[6]
of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of the Bulacan RTC directed petitioners to file their verified
written return. And by Order of September 5, 2008, the trial court granted respondent’s application for a TRO.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on the grounds that, inter alia,resort to a petition for writ of habeas data was not in order; and the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case
which properly belongs to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).[7]
By Decision[8]
of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondent’s
transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the disclosures required.
The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to a writ of habeas data should
extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like
respondent whose rights to life and security are jeopardized by petitioners’ refusal to provide her with
information or data on the reported threats to her person.
Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rule on
the Writ of Habeas Data[9]
contending that 1) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case and cannot restrain
MERALCO’s prerogative as employer to transfer the place of work of its employees, and 2) the issuance of the
writ is outside the parameters expressly set forth in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.[10]
Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what they contend is clearly a labor dispute,
petitioners argue that “although ingeniously crafted as a petition for habeas data, respondent is essentially
questioning the transfer of her place of work by her employer”[11]
and the terms and conditions of her
employment which arise from an employer-employee relationship over which the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters
under Article 217 of the Labor Code have jurisdiction.
Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain the implementation of the
Memorandum transferring respondent’s place of work which is purely a management prerogative, and that
OCA-Circular No. 79-2003[12]
expressly prohibits the issuance of TROs or injunctive writs in labor-related cases.
Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the issuance of the writ
only against public officials or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in the gathering, collecting
or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved party’s person, family or home; and that MERALCO (or
its officers) is clearly not engaged in such activities.
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The petition is impressed with merit.
Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCO’s Memorandum directing her
reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession
of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to
enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees
of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the
lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security
as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.[13]
Castillo v. Cruz[14] underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario[15] that the writs of
amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purelyproperty or commercial concerns nor when the
grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.[16]
Employment constitutes a
property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution.[17]
It is evident that
respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and
conditions of one’s employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data.
Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed
any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent’s right to privacyvis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or
security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats
to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact
trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10,
2008 letter as “highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all. ”[18]
And she even
suspects that her transfer to another place of work “betray[s] the real intent of management]” and could be a
“punitive move.” Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2008 Decision of the Bulacan RTC,Branch 7 in SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE. SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is,
accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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6. Saez vs. Arroyo
G.R. No. 183533 September 25, 2012
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF
FRANCIS SAEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, 22ND MICO,
CAPT. LAWRENCE BANAAG, SGT. CASTILLO, CAPT. ROMMEL GUTIERREZ, CAPT. JAKE OBLIGADO, CPL. ROMANITO QUINT ANA, PVT. JERICO DUQUIL, CPL. ARIEL FONTANILLA, A CERTAIN CAPT. ALCA YDO, A CERTAIN FIRST
SERGEANT, PVT. ZALDY OSlO, A CERTAIN PFC. SONNY, A CERTAIN CPL. JAMES, A CERTAIN JOEL, RODERICK
CLANZA and JEFFREY GOMEZ, Respondents.
For action by the Court is the Motion for Reconsideration1 dated September 26, 2010 filed by petitioner
Francis Saez of our Resolution2 dated August 31, 2010 denying the Petition for Review
3 he filed on July 21,
2008.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Comment4 thereon stating that it does not find cogent
grounds to warrant setting aside our decision.
Antecedent Facts
On March 6, 2008, the petitioner filed with the Court a petition to be granted the privilege of the writs
of amparo and habeas data with prayers for temporary protection order, inspection of place and production of
documents.5In the petition, he expressed his fear of being abducted and killed; hence, he sought that he be
placed in a sanctuary appointed by the Court. He likewise prayed for the military to cease from further
conducting surveillance and monitoring of his activities and for his name to be excluded from the order of
battle and other government records connecting him to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).
Without necessarily giving due course to the petition, the Court issued the writ of amparo commandingthe respondents to make a verified return, and referred the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) for hearing and
decision.The case before the CA was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00024 WOA.
In the Return of the Writ,6 the respondents denied the assignment in the units of Captains Lawrence
Banaag and Rommel Gutierrez and Corporal Ariel Fontanilla. The respondents also alleged that the names and
descriptions of "Capt. Alcaydo," "a certain First Sergeant," "Cpl. James," "Pfc. Sonny," and "Joel" were
insufficient to properly identify some of the persons sought to be included as among the respondents in the
petition.
On the other hand, respondents General Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. (Gen. Esperon), Capt. JacobThaddeus Obligado, Pvt. Rizaldy A. Osio (Pvt. Osio), Pfc. Romanito C. Quintana, Jr. and Pfc. Jerico Duquil
submitted their affidavits.
The CA conducted hearings with an intent to clarify what actually transpired and to determine specific
acts which threatened the petitioner’s right to life, liberty or security.
During the hearings, the petitioner narrated that starting April 16, 2007, he noticed that he was always
being followed by a certain "Joel," a former colleague at Bayan Muna. "Joel" pretended peddling pandesal in
the vicinity of the petitioner’s store. Three days before the petitioner was apprehended, "Joel" approached and
informed him of his marital status and current job as a baker in Calapan, Mindoro Oriental. "Joel" inquired if
the petitioner was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. When asked by the CA justices during the hearing if the
petitioner had gone home to Calapan after having filed the petition, he answered in the negative explaining
that he was afraid of Pvt. Osio who was always at the pier.
CA-G.R. SP No. 00024 WOA
On July 9, 2008, the CA rendered its Decision,7 denying on formal and substantial grounds the reliefs
prayed for in the petition and dropping former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a respondent. The CA
ratiocinated:
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There was no attempt at all to clarify how petitioner came to know about Zaldy Osio’s presence
at their pier if the former had not gone home since the petition was filed and what Zaldy Osio was doing
there to constitute violation or threat to violate petitioner’s right to life, liberty or security. This Court
cannot just grant the privilege of the writs without substantial evidence to establish petitioner’s
entitlement thereto. This Court cannot grant the privilege of the writs applied for on mere speculation
or conjecture. This Court is convinced that the Supreme Court did not intend it to be so when the rules
on the writs of Amparo and Habeas Data were adopted. It is the impression of this Court that the
privilege of the writs herein prayed for should be considered as extraordinary remedies available to
address the specific situations enumerated in the rules and no other.
x x x x
Not only did the petition and the supporting affidavit x x x fail to allege how the supposed threat
or violation of petitioner’s [right to] life, liberty and security is committed. Neither is there any narration
of any circumstances attendant to said supposed violation or threat to violatepetitioner’s right to life,
liberty or security to warrant entitlement to the privilege of the writs prayed for.
x x x x
A reading of the petition will show that the allegations therein do not comply with the
aforestated requirements of Section 6 Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data of the pertinent rule. The
petition is bereft of any allegation stating with specific definiteness as to how petitioner’s right to
privacy was violated or threatened to be violated. He did not include any allegation as to what
recourses he availed of to obtain the alleged documents from respondents. Neither did petitioner allege
what specific documents he prays for and from whom or [sic] from what particular office of the
government he prays to obtain them. The petition prays "to order respondents to produce any
documents submitted to any of them in the matter of any report on the case of FRANCIS SAEZ, including
all military intelligence reports."
x x x x
Both the rules on the writs of Amparo and Habeas Data (Section 17, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and
Section 16, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC) provide that the parties shall establish their claims by substantial
evidence. Not only was petitioner unable to establish his entitlement to the privilege of the writs
applied for, the exigency thereof was negated by his own admission that nothing happened between
him and Joel after July 21, 2007. The filing of the petition appears to have been precipitated by his fear
that something might happen to him, not because of any apparent violation or visible threat to violate
his right to life, liberty or security. Petitioner was, in fact, unable to establish likewise who among the
respondents committed specific acts defined under the rules on both writs to constitute violation or
threat to violate petitioner’s rights to life, liberty or security or his right to privacy thereof.
x x x x
x x x The ruling in David, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et al. (G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006,
489 SCRA 160, 224) is aptly instructive:
"Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may
not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.
It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into
court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official
duties and functions. x x x."
x x x x
IV. The petition lacks proper verification in violation of Section 12, 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice.8
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On July 21, 2008, Petition for Review was filed assailing the foregoing CA decision with the following
issues submitted for resolution:
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING THE PETITION AND
DROPPING GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO AS PARTY RESPONDENT.
WHETHER OR NOT THE NOTARIAL OFFICER’S OMISSION OF REQUIRING FROM THE PETITIONER
IDENTIFICATION CARDS RELATIVE TO THE LATTER’S EXECUTION OF THE VERIFICATION AND
CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING JUSTIFIES THE DENIAL OF THE PETITION.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED GROSS ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO
CONCLUDE FROM THE EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE PETITIONER THE FACT THAT BY BEING PLACED IN
THE ORDER OF BATTLE LIST, THREATS AND VIOLATIONS TO THE LATTER’S LIFE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY
WERE ACTUALLY COMMITTED BY THE RESPONDENTS.9
Court’s Resolution dated August 31, 2010
On August 31, 2010, the Court issued the Resolution10
denying the petition for review for the following
reasons, viz:
A careful perusal of the subject petition shows that the CA correctly found that the petition was
bereft of any allegation as to what particular acts or omission of respondents violated or threatened
petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security. His claim that he was incommunicado lacks credibility as he
was given a cellular phone and allowed to go back to Oriental Mindoro. The CA also correctly held that
petitioner failed to present substantial evidence that his right to life, liberty and security were violated,
or how his right to privacy was threatened by respondents. He did not specify the particular documents
to be secured, their location or what particular government office had custody thereof, and who has
possession or control of the same. He merely prayed that the respondents be ordered "to produce any
documents submitted to any of them in the matter of any report on the case of FRANCIS SAEZ, including
all military intelligence reports."
Petitioner assails the CA in failing to appreciate that in his Affidavit and Fact Sheet, he had
specifically detailed the violation of his right to privacy as he was placed in the Order of Battle and
promised to have his record cleared if he would cooperate and become a military asset. However,
despite questions propounded by the CA Associate Justices during the hearing, he still failed to
enlighten the appellate court as to what actually transpired to enable said court to determine whether
his right to life, liberty or security had actually been violated or threatened. Records bear out the
unsubstantiated claims of petitioner which justified the appellate court’s dismissal of the petition.
As to petitioner’s argument that the CA erred in deleting the President as party -respondent, wefind the same also to be without merit. The Court has already made it clear in David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo that the President, during his or her tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in
any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade
the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if the President can be dragged into
court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that the President be freed from any
form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable the President to fully attend to the performance
of official duties and functions.11
(Citation omitted)
Hence, the petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.12
Petitioner’s Arguments
Contrary to the CA’s findings, it had been shown by substantial evidence and even by the respondents’
own admissions that the petitioner’s life, liberty and security were threatened. Military personnel, whom the
petitioner had named and described, knew where to get him and they can do so with ease. He also became a
military asset, but under duress, as the respondents had documents allegedly linking him to the CPP and
including him in the order of battle. The petitioner claims that the foregoing circumstances were not denied by
the respondents.
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The petitioner likewise challenges the CA’s finding that he was not rendered incommunicado as he was
even provided with a cellular phone. The petitioner argues that the phone was only given to him for the
purpose of communicating with the respondents matters relative to his infiltration activities of target legal
organizations.
The petitioner cites Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,13
which pronounced that "in the amparo
context, it is more correct to say that the ‘right to security’ is actually the ‘freedom from threat’".14
According
to the petitioner, his freedom from fear was undoubtedly violated, hence, to him pertains a cause of action.
Anent the quantum of proof required in a petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, mere substantialevidence is sufficient. The petition "is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings".15
Sadly, in the petitioner’s case, the court not only demanded a greater quantum of proof than what the
rules require, but it also accorded special preference for the respondents’ evidence.
The petitioner also cites a speech delivered in Siliman University by former Chief Justice Reynato Puno
who expressed that "the remedy of habeas data can be used by any citizen against any governmental agency or
register to find out what information is held about his or her person." The person can likewise "request the
rectification or even the destruction of erroneous data gathered and kept against him or her." In the
petitioner’s case, he specifically sought the production of the order of battle, which allegedly included his
name, and other records which supposedly contain erroneous data relative to his involvement with the CPP.
OSG’s Comment
In the respondents’ comment16
filed by the OSG, it is generally claimed that the petitioner advances no
cogent grounds to justify the reversal of the Court’s Resolution dated August 31, 2010.
The Court’s Disquisition
While the issuance of the writs sought by the petitioner cannot be granted, the Court nevertheless finds
ample grounds to modify the Resolution dated August 31, 2010.
The petition conforms to the
requirements of the Rules on the
Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data
Section 517
of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (Rule on the Writ of Amparo) and Section 618
of A.M. 08-1-16-SC
(Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data) provide for what the said petitions should contain.
In the present case, the Court notes that the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the writs of
amparo and habeas data is sufficient as to its contents. The petitioner made specific allegations relative to his
personal circumstances and those of the respondents. The petitioner likewise indicated particular acts, which
are allegedly violative of his rights and the participation of some of the respondents in their commission. As to
the pre-requisite conduct and result of an investigation prior to the filing of the petition, it was explained that
the petitioner expected no relief from the military, which he perceived as his oppressors, hence, his request for
assistance from a human rights organization, then a direct resort to the court. Anent the documents sought to
be the subject of the writ of habeas data prayed for, the Court finds the requirement of specificity to have been
satisfied. The documents subject of the petition include the order of battle, those linking the petitioner to the
CPP and those he signed involuntarily, and military intelligence reports making references to him. Although the
exact locations and the custodians of the documents were not identified, this does not render the petition
insufficient. Section 6(d) of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is clear that the requirement of specificity
arises only when the exact locations and identities of the custodians are known. The Amparo Rule was not
promulgated with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights .19
Thus, despite the
lack of certain contents, which the Rules on the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data generally require, for as long
as their absence under exceptional circumstances can be reasonably justified, a petition should not be
susceptible to outright dismissal.
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reason for their non-presentation.This could have made a difference in light of the denials made by the
respondents as regards the petitioner’s claims.
The existence of an order of battle and inclusion of the petitioner’s name in it is another allegation by
the petitioner that does not find support on the evidence adduced. The Court notes that such allegation was
categorically denied by respondent Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Jr. who, in his Affidavit dated March 31, 2008, stated
that he "does not have knowledge about any Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) ‘order of battle’ which
allegedly lists the petitioner as a member of the CPP."24
This was also denied by Pvt. Osio, who the petitioner
identified as the one who told him that he was included in the order of battle.
25
The 2nd Infantry (JungleFighter) Division of the Philippine Army also conducted an investigation pursuant to the directive of AFP Chief
of Staff Gen. Esperon,26
and it was shown that the persons identified by the petitioners who allegedly
committed the acts complained of were not connected or assigned to the 2nd Infantry Division.27
Moreover, the evidence showed that the petitioner’s mobility was never curtailed. From the time he
was allegedly brought to Batangas in August of 2007 until the time he sought the assistance of KARAPATAN-ST,
there was no restraint upon the petitioner to go home, as in fact, he went home to Mindoro on several
instances. And while he may have been wary of Pvt. Osio’s presence a t the pier, there was no claim by the
petitioner that he was threatened or prevented by Pvt. Osio from boarding any vehicle that may transport him
back home. The petitioner also admitted that he had a mobile phone; hence, he had unhampered access to
communication and can readily seek assistance from non-governmental organizations and even government
agencies.
The respondents also belied the petitioner’s claim that they forced him to become a military informant
and instead, alleged that it was the petitioner who volunteered to be one. Thus, in his Sinumpaang
Salaysay28
executed on March 25, 2008, Pvt. Osio admitted that he actually knew the petitioner way back in
1998 when they were still students. He also stated that when he saw the petitioner again in 2007, the latter
manifested his intention to become a military informant in exchange for financial and other forms of
assistance.
The petitioner also harps on the alleged "monitoring" activities being conducted by a certain "Joel", e.g.,the latter’s alleged act of following him, pretending to peddle pandesal and asking him about his personal
circumstances. Such allegation by the petitioner, however, is, at best, a conclusion on his part, a mere
impression that the petitioner had, based on his personal assessment of the circumstances. The petitioner even
admitted in his testimony before the CA that when he had a conversation with "Joel" sometime in July 2007,
the latter merely asked him whether he was still connected with ANAKPAWIS, but he was not threatened "with
anything" and no other incident occurred between them since then.29
There is clearly nothing on record which
shows that "Joel" committed overt acts that will unequivocally lead to the conclusion arrived at by the
petitioner, especially since the alleged acts committed by "Joel" are susceptible of different interpretations.
Given that the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner failed to support his claims, thereliefs prayed for, therefore, cannot be granted. The liberality accorded to amparo and habeas data cases does
not mean that a claimant is dispensed with the onus of proving his case. "Indeed, even the liberal standard of
substantial evidence demands some adequate evidence."30
The President cannot be
automatically dropped as a
respondent pursuant to the doctrine
of command responsibility
In Noriel Rodriguez v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et al.,
31
the Court stated:
a. Command responsibility of the President
Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo
proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can
be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. We rule in the
affirmative.
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To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements
must obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior
and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been
committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control
over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility
doctrine.
On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a
strict standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be established through
circumstantial evidence. In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged
with constructive knowledge. This view is buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order No. 226,
otherwise known as the Institutionalization of the Doctrine of ‘Command Responsibility’ in all
Government Offices, particularly at all Levels of Command in the
Philippine National Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies (E.O. 226). Under E.O. 226, a
government official may be held liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine of command responsibility
if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed, or has been
committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite such
knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or immediately after
its commission. Knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a)
the acts are widespread within the government official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have beenrepeatedly or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate
staff or office personnel are involved.
Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has the power to effectively command, control
and discipline the military. (Citations omitted)
Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the
AFP, can be held liable for affront against the petitioner’s rights to life, liberty and security as long as
substantial evidence exist to show that he or she had exhibited involvement in or can be imputed withknowledge of the violations, or had failed to exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting the
necessary investigations required under the rules.1âwphi1
The Court also stresses that rule that the presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence
with the president’s incumbency.32
Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even
for acts committed during his or her tenure.33
Courts look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of
immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right.34
The petitioner, however, is not exempted from the burden of proving by substantial evidence his
allegations against the President to make the latter liable for either acts or omissions violative of rights against
life, liberty and security. In the instant case, the petitioner merely included the President’s name as a party
respondent without any attempt at all to show the latter’s actual involvement in, or knowledge of t he alleged
violations. Further, prior to the filing of the petition, there was no request or demand for any investigation that
was brought to the President’s attention. Thus, while the President cannot be completely dropped as a
respondent in a petition for the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data merely on the basis of the
presidential immunity from suit, the petitioner in this case failed to establish accountability of the President, as
commander-in-chief, under the doctrine of command responsibility.
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Compliance with technical rules of
procedure is ideal but it cannot be
accorded primacy
Among the grounds cited by the CA in denying the petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and
habeas data was the defective verification which was attached to the petition. In Tagitis,35
supporting affidavits
required under Section 5(c) of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo were not submitted together with the petition
and it was ruled that the defect was fully cured when the petitioner and the witness personally testified to
prove the truth of their allegations in the hearings held before the CA. In the instant case, the defectiveverification was not the sole reason for the CA’s denial of the petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo
and habeas data. Nonetheless, it must be stressed that although rules of procedure play an important rule in
effectively administering justice, primacy should not be accorded to them especially in the instant case where
there was at least substantial compliance with the requirements and where petitioner himself testified in the
hearings to attest to the veracity of the claims which he stated in his petition.
To conclude, compliance with technical rules of procedure is ideal but it cannot be accorded primacy. In
the proceedings before the CA, the petitioner himself testified to prove the veracity of his allegations which he
stated in the petition. Hence, the defect in the verification attached to the petition. Hence, the defect in the
verification attached to the petition was deemed cured.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration is DENIED WITH
FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
7. Gamboa vs. Chan
G.R. No. 193636 July 24, 2012
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner,
vs.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT.
WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court) filed pursuant to Rule
191 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data,
2 seeking a review of the 9 September 2010 Decision in Special Proc.
No. 14979 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Laoag City, Branch 13 (RTC Br. 13).3 The questioned
Decision denied petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data.4
At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa) was the Mayor of
Dingras, Ilocos Norte.5 Meanwhile, respondent Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was
the Officer-in-Charge, and respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was the Chief of the
Provincial Investigation and Detective Management Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office.6
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275
(A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the
Country."7 The body, which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa Commission,
8 was formed to investigate
the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May
2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the future.9 Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the
Zeñarosa Commission released and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report entitled "A
Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against Private Armies’ Report to the President" (the
Report).10
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Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP –Ilocos Norte) conducted a
series of surveillance operations against her and her aides,11
and classified her as someone who keeps a
PAG.12
Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP –Ilocos Norte forwarded the information
gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission,13
thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of
individuals maintaining PAGs.14
More specifically, she pointed out the following items reflected therein:
(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion regarding the status of PAGs in the
Philippines.15
(b) The Report stated that "x x x the PNP organized one dedicated Special Task Group (STG) for each
private armed group (PAG) to monitor and counteract their activities."16
(c) Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a tabulation generated by the PNP and captioned as
"Status of PAGs Monitoring by STGs as of April 19, 2010," which classifies PAGs in the country according
to region, indicates their identity, and lists the prominent personalities with whom these groups are
associated.17
The first entry in the table names a PAG, known as the Gamboa Group, linked to herein
petitioner Gamboa.18
(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the PNP, to wit:
The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference held in Malacañang on March 24, 2010
at which time, the Commission was also asked to comment on the PNP report that out of one hundred
seventeen (117) partisan armed groups validated, twenty-four (24) had been dismantled with sixty-
seven (67) members apprehended and more than eighty-six (86) firearms confiscated.
Commissioner Herman Basbaño qualified that said statistics were based on PNP data but that the more
significant fact from his report is that the PNP has been vigilant in monitoring the activities of these
armed groups and this vigilance is largely due to the existence of the Commission which has continued
communicating with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and PNP personnel in the field to
constantly provide data on the activities of the PAGs. Commissioner Basbaño stressed that theCommission’s efforts have preempted the formation of the PAGs because now everyone is aware that
there is a body monitoring the PAGs movement through the PNP. Commissioner Lieutenant General
Edilberto Pardo Adan also clarified that the PAGs are being destabilized so that their ability to threaten
and sow fear during the election has been considerably weakened.19
(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the PNP:
Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which is truly reflective of the
situation in the field, the PNP complied with the Commission’s recommendation that they revise their
validation system to include those PAGs previously listed as dormant. In the most recent briefingprovided by the PNP on April 26, 2010, there are one hundred seven (107) existing PAGs. Of these
groups, the PNP reported that seven (7) PAGs have been reorganized.20
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of the Report
naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG.21
Gamboa averred that her
association with a PAG also appeared on print media.22
Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone who
maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded
to the Zeñarosa Commission.23
As a result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the
enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as well as her
supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to harassment and police surveillance
operations.24
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa
filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their
capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.25
In her Petition, she prayed for the following reliefs: (a)
destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b) withdrawal of all information
forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage done to her honor; (d) ordering respondents
to refrain from forwarding unverified reports against her; and (e) restraining respondents from making baseless
reports.26
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The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled to RTC Br. 13, which issued the
corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after finding the Petition meritorious on its face.27
Thus, the trial court (a)
instructed respondents to submit all information and reports forwarded to and used by the Zeñarosa
Commission as basis to include her in the list of persons maintaining PAGs; (b) directed respondents, and any
person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist from forwarding to the Zeñarosa Commission, or to any other
government entity, information that they may have gathered against her without the approval of the court; (c)
ordered respondents to make a written return of the writ together with supporting affidavits; and (d)
scheduled the summary hearing of the case on 23 July 2010.28
In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted within the bounds of their mandate
in conducting the investigation and surveillance of Gamboa.29
The information stored in their database
supposedly pertained to two criminal cases in which she was implicated, namely: (a) a Complaint for murder
and frustrated murder docketed as NPS DOC No. 1-04-INQ-091-00077, and (b) a Complaint for murder,
frustrated murder and direct assault upon a person in authority, as well as indirect assault and multiple
attempted murder, docketed as NPS DOCKET No. 1-04-INV-10-A-00009.30
Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to comply with the following
requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the manner in which the right to privacy was violated
or threatened with violation and how it affected the right to life, liberty or security of Gamboa; (b) the actions
and recourses she took to secure the data or information; and (c) the location of the files, registers or
databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or
information.31
They also contended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Data, being limited to cases of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, was not the proper remedy to address the alleged
besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa.32
RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010, dismissed the Petition.33
The trial court
categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the
Report, constituted a violation of her right to privacy, to wit:
In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of persons maintainingPAGs, Gamboa’s right to privacy indubitably has been violated. The violation understandably affects her
life, liberty and security enormously. The untold misery that comes with the tag of having a PAG could
even be insurmountable. As she essentially alleged in her petition, she fears for her security that at any
time of the day the unlimited powers of respondents may likely be exercised to further malign and
destroy her reputation and to transgress her right to life.
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise undisputed that there was
certainly intrusion into Gamboa’s activities. It cannot be denied that information was gathered as basis
therefor. After all, under Administrative Order No. 275, the Zeñarosa Commission was tasked to
investigate the existence of private armies in the country, with all the powers of an investigative bodyunder Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987.
x x x x x x x x x
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa alleged as she accused
respondents, who are public officials, of having gathered and provided information that made the
Zeñarosa Commission to include her in the list. Obviously, it was this gathering and forwarding of
information supposedly by respondents that petitioner barks at as unlawful. x x x.34
Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed the Petition on the ground that
Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that the subject information originated from
respondents, and that they forwarded this database to the Zeñarosa Commission without the benefit of prior
verification.35
The trial court also ruled that even before respondents assumed their official positions,
information on her may have already been acquired.36
Finally, it held that the Zeñarosa Commission, as the
body tasked to gather information on PAGs and authorized to disclose information on her, should have been
impleaded as a necessary if not a compulsory party to the Petition.37
Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24 September 2010,38
raising the following
assignment of errors:
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1. The trial court erred in ruling that the Zeñarosa Commission be impleaded as either a necessary or
indispensable party;
2. The trial court erred in declaring that Gamboa failed to present sufficient proof to link respondents as
the informant to [sic] the Zeñarosa Commission;
3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;
4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zeñarosa Commission to [sic] the PNP asalleged by Gamboa is an assumption;
5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct to PNP as an agency.39
On the other hand, respondents maintain the following arguments: (a) Gamboa failed to present
substantial evidence to show that her right to privacy in life, liberty or security was violated, and (b) the trial
court correctly dismissed the Petition on the ground that she had failed to present sufficient proof showing
that respondents were the source of the report naming her as one who maintains a PAG.40
Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful order, fulfilling the mandate to
dismantle PAGs in the country should be done in accordance with due process, such that the gathering and
forwarding of unverified information on her must be considered unlawful.41
She also reiterates that she was
able to present sufficient evidence showing that the subject information originated from respondents.42
In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data, this Court is
called upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right to privacy; second, explain the writ of habeas data as an
extraordinary remedy that seeks to protect the right to informational privacy; and finally, contextualize the
right to privacy vis-à-vis the state interest involved in the case at bar.
The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a constitutional
right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc,43
thus enunciated:
The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a
long way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical
submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to
privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense
must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if
it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom." As a
matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the most comprehensiveof rights and the right most valued by civilized men."
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his
personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. xxx.
x x x x x x x x x
x x x In the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas, speaking for five members
of the Court, stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in
the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition
against the quartering of soldiers ‘in any house’ in time of peace without the consent of the owner is
another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the ‘right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ The
Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: ‘The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people." After referring to various American Supreme Court decisions, Justice Douglas
continued: "These cases bear witness that the right of privacy which presses for recognition is a
legitimate one."
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x x x x x x x x x
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always
included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of
the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government.
Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute
state. In contrast, a system of limited government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to theindividual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this
private sector — protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has become
increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age —
industrialization, urbanization, and organization — operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate
intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life
marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."44
(Emphases supplied)
In Ople v. Torres,45
this Court traced the constitutional and statutory bases of the right to privacy
in Philippine jurisdiction, to wit:
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized
and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1)
of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed
by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process oflaw, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
x x x x x x x x x
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as may be
provided by law.
x x x x x x x x x
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that
"every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and
other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into
the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for
damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of
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letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of
secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of
privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and
the Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the
privacy of certain information.
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is
justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. x x x.
46
(Emphases supplied)
Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or
constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks,47
this Court underscored that
the right to privacy is not absolute, viz:
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to
state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution,
guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every
invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In
Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the people to access information on matters of public
concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we
declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest.
Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement
of the individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in
this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions
adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose
constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative investigation.48
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the courts are
required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy
may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.
The Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right
to the truth and to informational privacy.49
It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding
oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order
to achieve unlawful ends.50
It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted,
there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security
on the other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:
Habeas data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and jurisprudence. Considering
that even the Latin American habeas data, on which our own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds
its origins from the European tradition of data protection,51
this Court can be guided by cases on the protection
of personal data decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Of particular note is Leander v.
Sweden,52
in which the ECHR balanced the right of citizens to be free from interference in their private affairs
with the right of the state to protect its national security. In this case, Torsten Leander (Leander), a Swedish
citizen, worked as a temporary replacement museum technician at the Naval Museum, which was adjacent to a
restricted military security zone.53
He was refused employment when the requisite personnel control resulted in
an unfavorable outcome on the basis of information in the secret police register, which was kept in accordance
with the Personnel Control Ordinance and to which he was prevented access.54
He claimed, among others, that
this procedure of security control violated Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights55
on the right
to privacy, as nothing in his personal or political background would warrant his classification in the register as a
security risk.56
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The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information relating to the private life of
Leander, coupled with the refusal to allow him the opportunity to refute the same, amounted to an
interference in his right to respect for private life.57
However, the ECHR held that the interference was justified
on the following grounds: (a) the personnel control system had a legitimate aim, which was the protection of
national security,58
and (b) the Personnel Control Ordinance gave the citizens adequate indication as to the
scope and the manner of exercising discretion in the collection, recording and release of information by the
authorities.59
The following statements of the ECHR must be emphasized:
58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, inparticular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, inter alia, the Gillow judgment of
24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 22, § 55).
59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities enjoy a margin of appreciation, the
scope of which will depend not only on the nature of the legitimate aim pursued but also on the
particular nature of the interference involved. In the instant case, the interest of the respondent State
in protecting its national security must be balanced against the seriousness of the interference with the
applicant’s right to respect for his private life.
There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting national security, for
the Contracting States to have laws granting the competent domestic authorities power, firstly, to
collect and store in registers not accessible to the public information on persons and, secondly, to use
this information when assessing the suitability of candidates for employment in posts of importance for
national security.
Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr. Leander’s legitimate interests
through the consequences it had on his possibilities of access to certain sensitive posts within the public
service. On the other hand, the right of access to public service is not as such enshrined in the
Convention (see, inter alia, the Kosiek judgment of 28 August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20, §§ 34-35),
and, apart from those consequences, the interference did not constitute an obstacle to his leading a
private life of his own choosing.
In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of appreciation available to the
respondent State in assessing the pressing social need in the present case, and in particular in choosing
the means for achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national security, was a wide one.
x x x x x x x x x
66. The fact that the information released to the military authorities was not communicated to
Mr. Leander cannot by itself warrant the conclusion that the interference was not "necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security", as it is the very absence of suchcommunication which, at least partly, ensures the efficacy of the personnel control procedure (see,
mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Klass and Others judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 27, § 58).
The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before the issue of the Ordinance
of 1969, including the Chancellor of Justice and the Parliamentary Ombudsman, considered it desirable
that the rule of communication to the person concerned, as contained in section 13 of the Ordinance,
should be effectively applied in so far as it did not jeopardise the purpose of the control (see paragraph
31 above).
67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion that the safeguards contained in
the Swedish personnel control system meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2).
Having regard to the wide margin of appreciation available to it, the respondent State was entitled to
consider that in the present case the interests of national security prevailed over the individual
interests of the applicant (see paragraph 59 above). The interference to which Mr. Leander was
subjected cannot therefore be said to have been disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
(Emphases supplied)
Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the right to
privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the determination of whether
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the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this case entails a
delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest
involved.
The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis-à-vis the interest of the state to dismantle
private armies.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not
recognized by the duly constituted authority.
60
It also provides for the establishment of one police force that isnational in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police
commission.61
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a
legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling
them permanently.
To enable the Zeñarosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the powers of an
investigative body, including the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence
relevant to the investigation and use compulsory processes to produce documents, books, and records.62
A.O.
275 likewise authorized the Zeñarosa Commission to deputize the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the
National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other law enforcement agency to
assist the commission in the performance of its functions.63
Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a) enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the protection of lives and properties; (b) maintain peace and order and take all
necessary steps to ensure public safety; and (c) investigate and prevent crimes.64
Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and functions
accorded to the Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of
maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities.65 One of those individuals is hereinpetitioner Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the Report
listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the
forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or
threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body
specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the
Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the former’smandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.
Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the PNP released information to
the Zeñarosa Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity
to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an
inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and investigation.1âwphi1 Additionally, Gamboa
herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which was used to update information on individuals
associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the field.66
Thus, safeguards were
put in place to make sure that the information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.
Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court declines to make any further
determination as to the propriety of sharing information during specific stages of intelligence gathering. To do
otherwise would supplant the discretion of investigative bodies in the accomplishment of their functions,
resulting in an undue encroachment on their competence.
However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in existing law and
jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these investigating entities that
information-sharing must observe strict confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released exclusively to
the authorities empowered to receive the relevant information. After all, inherent to the right to privacy is the
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freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such
a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities."67
In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its confidential
nature.1âwphi1 That it was leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even warranting reproach.
But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended
disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her
reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper.
Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her
inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment
and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations
conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials,
they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the
alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of
information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data
must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979
dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the
privilege of the writ of habeas data, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.