Worldviews and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East

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Worldviews and Turkishforeign policy in the Middle

East

Meliha Benli Altunk

AbstractTurkish foreign policy in the Middle East has become highly contestedin the last two decades. The changes in the international and domesticenvironment have led to the emergence of competing ideas as to the ele-ments of Turkish foreign policy in this region. This article argues thatthese ideas ultimately represent worldviews as they start with differentassumptions about what Turkey is, what the basis of Turkeys interestand involvement should be in this region, to what extent Turkey should

engage the Middle East, and what the threats and/or opportunities ema-nating from the region are. Each of these worldviews has been institu-tionalized to some extent. I conclude that these worldviews continue toco-exist and compete with each other in Turkish foreign policy today.

Keywords: Turkish foreign policy, Turkey in the Middle East, world-

views.

Since the late 1980s, Turkeys Middle East policy has been transformedfrom a relatively stable policy dominated by fairly established norms andprinciples into a more contentious and pluralistic one. The resulting de-bate has been engaged with by an increasingly complex bureaucracy, po-litical parties, as well ideas generated in the press, think tanks and publicopinion. Most significantly, different branches of the state have pursuedtheir visions of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East through a pub-lic debate, rather than in a classic bureaucratic politics fashion largely

taking place behind closed doors. This was mostly due to the fact thatthese debates are intertwined with domestic power struggles and identity

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New Perspectives on Turkey, no. 40 (2009): 171-194.

Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University, 06531, Ankara, [email protected]


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politics in Turkey. Especially a number of aspects of Middle East policyhas become an arena to settle scores between different institutions ofpower as well as political parties; they have become part of a larger de-bate about who Turkey is and should be.1To what extent should Turkeybecome involved in the Middle East? How to best deal with opportuni-ties and/or threats emerging in the region? What should the strategiesbe? To what extent could and even should Turkey reconcile its interestsand policies in the Middle East with that of its historic foreign policyorientation, namely the relations with the USA and the EU? The differ-ent responses to these questions have, in fact, fostered in Turkey a debateinvolving the foreign and security policy establishment and the politicalparties, as well as the public at large.

From a broader perspective, recent developments include the weak-ening of the traditional perspective on Turkeys Middle East policy andthe emergence of increasingly strong alternative viewpoints, made pos-sible by the disappearance of Cold War parameters and the transfor-mations in domestic politics. Therefore, even though these perspectivesmay sometimes converge on different policy issues, ultimately they aredifferent in terms of their assumptions about and thus prescriptions forTurkish foreign policy in the Middle East. In other words, these perspec-

tives are worldviews, assumptions which include images of other actorsin the world, causal beliefs of how they interact with one another andprescriptions about appropriate courses of action.2 Following Doylessuggestion that these worldviews parallel major theoretical approaches,3I argue that they contain assumptions and prescriptions similar to dif-ferent theories of international relations.

Two stylized positions can thus be identified in this debate aboutTurkish foreign policy in the Middle East. First, there is the neo-tradi-

tionalist perspective, which contains realist assumptions and prescrip-tions. This position departs from the traditional line of the Cold Waryears in advocating active engagement with the Middle East, in responseto increased perceptions of threats from the region. Part of the civil andmilitary bureaucracy, political parties like the Republican Peoples Party(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party (Mil-liyeti Hareket Partisi, MHP), as well as part of the intellectual elite seemto adopt this worldview. Second, there are alternative perspectives which

1 Among other foreign policy issues, especially Turkeys relations with the EU have such a character, butthis is beyond the scope of this article.

2 Thomas S. Mowle, Worldviews in Foreign Policy: Realism, Liberalism and External Conflict, PoliticalPsychology24, no. 3 (2003): 562.

3 Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace(New York: Norton, 1997), 36.

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entail liberal and constructivist arguments, basically criticizing the tra-ditional and neo-traditional approaches, not only seeing them unfit forthe international and regional realities of the contemporary world, butalso as flawed. I will discuss these alternative perspectives through threerepresentatives: Turgut zal of the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi,ANAP), the prime minister (1983-1989) and president (1989-1993)at a very critical time of global and regional changes; smail Cem of theDemocratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP), one of the longest-serving foreign ministers from 1997 to 2002; and the ruling Justiceand Development Party (Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi, AKP), especiallyin terms of the ideas of Professor Ahmet Davutolu, the chief foreignpolicy advisor to the prime minister and the main architect of the AKP

governments policy towards the Middle East.4

History: Turkeys Middle East policy during the Cold WarTurkeys decision to take its place in the western bloc with the advent ofthe Cold War had a significant impact on Turkeys Middle East policy.In the 1950s, Turkeys brief activism in the region was clearly definedwithin the context of Cold War politics and determined by the westernblocs security perceptions in the region namely the containment of

the Soviet Union and Arab nationalism, as well as the protection of ac-cess to Middle Eastern oil. Malik Mufti has pointed to a debate, some-what similar to the one that the Turkish elite engages in today, amongthe main actors of Turkish politics in the 1950s, particularly on the issueof the extent of Turkeys involvement in Middle East politics.5Mufti hasidentified two doctrines represented by smet nn, the leader of theopposition party CHP, and Fatin Rt Zorlu, the Foreign Minister ofthe ruling Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) government. In oppo-

4 Although Turgut zal and smail Cem were affiliated with political parties, the ANAP and the DSP,respectively, they were individually influential in developing new perspectives on the region. In fact,there were at times differences between them and their parties. For instance, zals policies towardsthe Gulf Crisis in 1990/91 were criticized by some of his colleagues in the party and the cabinet. Thesedifferences culminated in the resignations of Foreign Minister Ali Bozer on 11 October and DefenseMinister Safa Giray on 19 October 1991. See, Mustafa Aydn, Ten Years After: Turkeys Gulf Policy(1990-1991) Revisited(London: Frank Cass, 2002). The disjuncture between smail Cem and his partyand even its leader Blent Ecevit was also quite pronounced. The party was closer to neo-traditionalistviews on several foreign policy issues. It is known that Cem was not on Ecevits cabinet list as foreignminister when he formed the government in 1997. He became foreign minister when the submitted

list was changed as a result of the discussion at the presidents office. Can Dndar, Ben Byle VedaEtmeliyim(stanbul: Bankas, 2008), 198-200. In any case, Cem was forced to share the foreignpolicy portfolio with State Minister kr Sina Grel who was closer to the nationalist camp.

5 Malik Mufti, From Swamp to Backyard: The Middle East in Turkish Foreign Policy, in The MiddleEast Enters the 21st Century, ed. Robert O. Freedman (Gainsville: University Press of Florida, 2002),82-86. I would like to thank Sabri Sayar for directing my attention to this article.

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sition to the nn Doctrine, Mufti has argued that the Zorlu Doctrinewas characterized by engagement rather than reserve; alignment rath-er than neutrality; flexibility rather than rigid adherence to the statusquo; and, finally, linkage rather than compartmentalization.6

In line with the Zorlu Doctrine, Turkey thus became quite activein Middle East affairs in the 1950s during the time of the DP govern-ments. Turkey was involved in the western proposed regional arrange-ments, such as the stillborn Middle East Defense Command and laterthe Baghdad Pact of 1955. As one of the founding members of the pact,Turkey was very active in trying to enlist Arab members and thus an-tagonized Egypt and its allies. In 1956, Turkey voted against Algerianindependence in the UN General Assembly. In 1957 and 1958, Turkey

threatened Syria with the use of force, since it perceived the internal de-velopments in that country as a Soviet plot. In 1958, Ankara entered asecret alliance, the so-called Peripheral Pact, with Israel and allowed theUSA to use the ncirlik airbase for its intervention in Lebanon.

Although one can identify a few similarities between what Mfticalls the Zorlu Doctrine and the alternative perspectives emerging afterthe Cold War, especially in terms of engagement and activism, there arealso significant differences. The main difference is that, unlike the post-

Cold War alternative perspectives, the DP governments engagement inthe Middle East was very much based on a power politics approach.The DP government perceived the Middle East in the Cold War con-text and identified threats coming from the region. Thus, it engaged inbalancing behaviors, including the threat to use force. Furthermore, theDP governments Middle East policy was an extension of its desire toprove useful to the western alliance.7Thus, Turkey was involved in theMiddle East as part of the western security system.8The post-Cold War

alternative perspectives, on the other hand, first aimed to go beyond re-alism; second, they tried to balance the regional policy with that of therelations with the West, but aspired to see Turkey as an actor on its own

6 Ibid., 82.7 The Foreign Minister of the first DP government, Fuat Kprl (1950-56), explained: We believe that

the defense of the Middle East is absolutely necessary for the economic and strategic defense of Eu-rope. Consequently after joining the Atlantic Pact, Turkey will perform in an effective fashion her rolein the Middle East and will be ready to enter into negotiations with the interested parties in order toundertake the necessary common measures. See, Kemal H. Karpat, Turkish and Arab-Israeli Rela-

tions, in Turkeys Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950-1974, ed. Kemal H. Karpat (Leiden: Brill, 1975),115-16.8 Again unlike Turkeys current activism, Turkeys activism during that period was perceived negatively

in most of the Arab countries. Arab nationalists organized street demonstrations during the visit ofPrime Minister Adnan Menderes to Damascus and Beirut where he issued invitations to join the pact.Ibid., 118-19.



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right; and, finally, they put more emphasis on opportunities rather thanthreats.

In any case, from the mid-1960s onwards Turkey reverted to one ofthe main principles of Turkish foreign policy namely, the policy ofequidistance. This policy not only meant to balance Turkeys ties withthe West and the Middle East, but also to keep Turkey at an equal dis-tance to parties in regional conflicts. During these three decades, the fol-lowing principles guided Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East: Tur-key was in favor of the status quo. Maintaining the borders in the regionand respect for territorial integrity became the cornerstone of Turkeyspolicy. Similarly, Turkey favored a regional balance of power based onmulti-polarity and, thus, opposed any single countrys dominance in the

region. Finally, the Turkish foreign and security elite defined the MiddleEast as an unstable and conflict-ridden region and tried not to get en-tangled in regional conflicts.9

Behind these principles, one entrenched norm continued to guidethe dominant perspective among the foreign policy elite: Whether Tur-key opted to become active or not, it did not consider itself part of theMiddle East sub-region. The Middle East represented what Turkey was,and not what Turkey wanted to be. Four-hundred years of common his-

tory thus constituted a factor that separated Turkey from the region.The popular imagery characterized the Arabs as back-stabbers, refer-ring to the collaboration of Arab nationalists with the British againstthe Ottoman Empire during World War I, in the hope of establishingan independent Arab state after the war.10However distorted these per-ceptions were, they nevertheless colored the context in which TurkeysMiddle East policies were decided. Turkey-Middle East relations werealso affected by the Turkish Republics identity as a secular state engaged

in a project of westernization. The Turkish Republic from the begin-ning adopted very strict laicism as one of the main principles of the re-gime and continued with the objective of westernization not only in itspolitical and economic forms, but also in terms of cultural transforma-tion. The Turkish elite considered its quest for modernization definedas westernization as a path that gave Turkey its distinctiveness and thusseparated it from the Middle East. Therefore, identity issues were basedon differences rather than commonalities, emphasizing Turkeys laicist

9 Thus, in Malik Muftis characterization, Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East reverted to the nnDoctrine after the 1960 military coup. For more on this period see, Philip Robins, Turkey and theMiddle East(London: Pinter Publishers, 1991), 66-67.

10 Dietrich Jung, Turkey and the Arab World: Historical Narratives and New Political Realities, Medi-terranean Quarterly 10, no. 1 (2005).

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nature within that context. In the realm of security, on the other hand,Turkey again located itself outside the Middle East. Ankara was quitedisturbed by the rise of Arab nationalist regimes in the late 1950s and1960s, as it shared the western blocs perception that they were proxiesof the Soviet Union. Similarly, Turkey did not want to become involvedin regional conflicts, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Iran-Iraqwar. Although Turkey shared common concerns with pro-western statesin the region, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, even these common securi-ty perceptions did not garner very close cooperation with them. Turkeysmembership in the NATO, in addition to being a strategic choice, wasalso a logical consequence of the countrys westernization. However, since the mid-1980s Turkeys foreign policy has increasingly

become a contested arena, as different perspectives began to compete witheach other. The reasons for this evolution are to be found on three levels:international, regional and domestic. On the international level, the sys-temic change of 1989 has had a profound impact on Turkey and unveileda new context to re-think Turkish foreign policy. As Saunders argues, amajor international transition triggers a domestic struggle to redefine stateinterests and reshape understanding of the international system.11Theend of the Cold War with its new sources of uncertainties and also op-

portunities challenged the traditional paradigm of Turkish foreign policyand led to the surfacing of strong alternative viewpoints. The emergenceof new possible areas of influence around Turkey also led to the re-emer-gence of a historical/cultural dimension in Turkish foreign policy andfreed the country from the shackles of the Cold War. Thus, the changes inthe international system provided a context for re-thinking foreign policy. Turkey had to live through the seismic changes in the internationalsystem together with a similar transformation in the Middle East in

the context of the Iraqi crisis. Particularly the regionalization and in-ternationalization of the Kurdish issue as a result of this crisis suckedTurkey into regional politics. The Iraqi issue has been fundamentallylinked with the national-identity debate in Turkey, with respect to theacknowledgement of Kurdish identity. The question of how to deal withsuch a significant challenge has led to a debate among different state andsocietal actors.

In fact, domestically Turkey entered a new period in which signifi-cant challenges to the Republican regime emerged. The rise of politi-

cal Islam and Kurdish nationalism led to debates about the state and

11 Phillip C. Saunders, Foreign Policy and International Transition: The Case for Foreign Policy Para-digms (paper presented at the International Studies Association, 40th Annual Convention, Washing-ton, 16-20 February 1999).



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state-society relations. The domestic discussions articulated themselvesin foreign policy issues. The economic and political reform process thataccelerated from the 1980s onwards provided the context for an inten-sification of these debates. The weakening of traditional political divi-sions, particularly left and right, led to the emergence of identity-basedconflicts. Through their extensions in the Middle East, the debates andstruggles about political Islam and Kurdish nationalism were inevitablyintertwined with debates about Turkish foreign policy in the MiddleEast. On the other hand, as a result of the acceleration of political andeconomic modernization in Turkey, as well as the decline of Arab na-tionalist norm in regional politics, Turkey has begun to be perceivedmore positively in the region.12This has led to the emergence of new

opportunities for Ankara.Overall, the challenges and opportunities that emerged in the inter-

national, regional and domestic contexts led to a battle of ideas abouthow to respond to this new environment. Under these circumstances,old perspectives began to be challenged, new ones emerged and, ingeneral, there was a move towards new narratives and perspectives inTurkish foreign policy in the Middle East. Therefore, competing visionsemerged, accompanied by a re-evaluation of Turkish foreign policy.

These perspectives now influence policy-making institutions and actorsas well as opinion-makers. In what follows, I will identify and describetwo main competing visions of Turkeys relations with the Middle East namely, neo-traditional and critical alternative worldviews.

The neo-traditional imagination of the Middle East: What are thethreats and strategies?The first prevalent worldview is the neo-traditional perspective which

evolved largely from the dominant view of the Cold War years. Dur-ing most of the Cold War years, this approach opposed involvement inMiddle Eastern affairs. Subsequently, however, as a result of the devel-opments in Turkey and in the region, the traditionalists came to un-derstand that they could no longer ignore the Middle East, which fromtheir perspective had become a major source of threat to Turkish nation-al security. But the neo-traditionalists continue to disregard a sense ofcultural identification with the region and do not accord much value tohistorical relations. Especially as a result of domestic polarization, refer-

ences to the Ottoman past in the context of foreign policy are sometimes

12 Meliha B. Altunk, The Possibilities and Limits of Turkeys Soft Power in the Middle East, InsightTurkey10, no. 2 (2008).

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regarded as part of attempts to undo the Republican project. Similarly,an emphasis on Islam as a unifying factor could be interpreted as a wayto dilute Turkeys secular character.13

This perspective perceives the Middle East from a realist power poli-tics point of view. Issues of territoriality and sovereignty constitute thebasis of Turkeys engagement with the region. The emphasis is almostentirely on security issues, and the Middle East is identified as a sourceof threat to Turkeys vital interests, and not as its cultural hinterland.The developments in Iraq and the rise of Kurdish nationalism, as wellas the increasing power of political Islam are considered a threat toTurkeys national security emanating from the region. These issues areidentified through a zero-sum-game framework. As far as instruments

are concerned, they mostly consist of military means, such as militaryalignments and the possible use of force. Ultimately, their attitude canbe summed up as involvement driven by security needs. They have nodesire to be a part of the Middle East, or to be an actor in the region, aslong as no threat emanates from the region. The securitized understand-ing of the Kurdish issue and its extensions in the Middle East are themain reason for their interest in the Middle East.

Turkey, as they see it, has been sucked into the Middle East primar-

ily because of developments in Iraq. Thus, neo-traditionalists approachthe Middle East through the lens of the Kurdish issue, and this issuebecomes a yardstick to judge relations with third countries. This per-spective tends to emphasize the red lines that should not be crossedin Iraq.14These red lines include: the establishment of an independentKurdish state in Northern Iraq; the threat to the safety of the Turkmenliving in Iraq; and any change in the status of Kirkuk. Similarly, Turkeyshould not tolerate giving the PKK a free hand in Iraq in its war against

Turkey. The neo-traditionalist perspective favors the use of militaryforce if these red lines are violated.15

Unlike in the earlier Cold War period, the proponents of this perspec-tive now largely believe that Turkish interests in the Middle East diverge

13 The neo-traditionalists are very skeptical of promoting Turkey as a model to the Islamic world. Thisis seen as a project supported by the USA to turn Turkey into a moderate Islamic country, meaninga dilution of Turkeys laicism. Similarly, the model argument signals an identification of Turkey withthis region. From this perspective, Turkey has nothing to do with the Middle East and is very different

from the countries of the region, mainly because of its laicism. See Ibid. Also see, mer Tapnar, AnUneven Fit? The Turkish Model and the Arab World, (August 2003), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2003/08islamicworld_taspinar/taspinar20030801.pdf.

14 These red lines were mentioned in a leaked document prepared during Ecevits government in 2003. BillPark, Turkeys Policy Towards Northern Iraq: Problems and Perspectives(London: Routledge, 2005), 24.

15 Ibid.



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from those of the West, especially of the USA. In fact, neo-traditionalsbelieves that after the end of the Cold War the USA is out to reshapethe map of the Middle East and thus has become a revisionist power.Such a policy, through a possible establishment of a Kurdish state in theregion, is perceived to target Turkeys territorial integrity as well. The 2003 Iraq War, in fact, divided the neo-traditionalists. Somehave argued for Turkeys involvement in the war, in the hope of gain-ing opportunities in dealing with the threats emanating from NorthernIraq. Turkeys cooperation with the USA would have meant Turkishmilitary involvement in the northern regions, which would in turn havehelped Turkey to curb the presence of the PKK there, as well as prevent-ing the establishment of a Kurdish state. Especially the military seemed

to adopt this position. Others argued for non-involvement, as they wereskeptical of US aims. Deniz Baykal, the leader of the opposition partyCHP, which voted no to the 1 March motion that would have allowedfor Turkish-US cooperation in the war, argued that the adoption of themotion by the parliament would have opened the way for US militarypresence in Turkeys Kurdish areas as well. Instead, Baykal advocatedTurkeys unilateral military intervention in Northern Iraq:

The US would come and enter Baghdad from 10,000 kilometersafar, but we could not send forces to a place 40 kilometers from us todefend Turkey. Is this acceptable? We proposed this, but the govern-ment would not do it. This was a grave mistake [] If we had donethis when necessary, they neither could have put a hood over the headof Turkish soldiers,16nor could the demographic structure of Kirkukhave been changed this way.17

After 2003, the neo-traditionalists sense of threat emanating fromNorthern Iraq increased as the Iraqi Kurds consolidated their powerwithin the emerging system in Iraq. Within this context, the neo-tradi-tionalists argued that Turkey should adopt a hard-line policy towardsthe Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). They not only opposedany kind of dialogue with the KRG, but also advocated military inter-vention. It was argued that Turkey should take control of parts of Iraq to

16 This refers to what is known as the Sulaimaniya Incident in Turkey. In July of 2003, eleven members ofthe Turkish Special Forces in Sulaimaniya were taken from their headquarters by American soldiers,with hoods on their heads, and detained for two days. This event was considered a big humiliation inTurkey and led to the further deterioration of Turkish-American relations.

17 Deniz Baykals Speeches at the Parliamentary Group CHP official website at http://www.chp.org.tr/index.php?module=chpmain&page=show_speech_speech_id, Accessed on 1 November 2008.

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minimize the degree of freedom of movement allowed to the PKK. Theneo-traditionalist perspective was further hardened when PKK attacksescalated and the Iraqi Kurdish leaders adopted a dismissive attitudetowards Turkey.

The 2007 parliamentary elections dramatically telescoped these divi-sions. During the election campaigns, the CHP and the MHP pushedfor a military intervention in Northern Iraq and criticized the governingAKP for not doing so. The division on the issue resurfaced after theelections, when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan told journaliststhat Turkey would develop relations with the Iraqi Kurds if this wouldbring benefits and peace to all concerned. Joint Chief of Staff GeneralYaar Bykant responded again through the media that there could

be no dialogue with them, as long as they continue to harbor the PKK.It was also reported that the civil bureaucracy remained divided on theissue.18

Alternative perspectives: What are the opportunities and strategies?Alternative perspectives started with a critique of traditional foreignpolicy in the Middle East and advocated a new perspective instead. Thetraditionalist perspective has been criticized for being too isolationist

and passive, especially failing to read the new realities of the post-ColdWar era. Thus, one of the basic premises of these critical perspectives isto call for a proactive policy in the Middle East. In addition, they empha-size, albeit to varying degrees, historical and cultural ties between Turkeyand the Middle East. Unlike in the traditionalist and neo-traditionalistperspectives, history and culture are important factors in Turkeys rela-tions with the region. Identity issues, especially Islam and a shared his-tory, bring Turkey closer to the region and most of the regions countries

closer to Turkey. The idea of neo-Ottomanism, which can be defined inforeign policy as the belief that the Ottoman past constitutes not only anasset but also an obligation for Turkey to be more involved in the formerOttoman space as well as in solving regional problems, is common toall alternative perspectives.19Similarly, unlike the earlier Islamist andleftist perspectives, all critical views aim at reconciling Turkeys MiddleEast policy with that of Turkeys western orientation, again to varying

18 Semih diz, Talking about Talking to the Iraqi Kurds, Turkish Daily News, 1 March 2007. Eventuallya compromise was reached when Turkey, as a result of a new understanding with the USA on 5 No-vember 2007, re-started its military interventions in Northern Iraq in pursuit of the PKK. In the wakeof US plans for withdrawal, Turkey then launched a new opening to the KRG.

19 It can be argued, however, that the AKPs neo-Ottomanism has more emphasis on an Islamic charac-ter than the other two perspectives.



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degrees. Despite these intersecting ideas, I will discuss alternative per-spectives through three representatives and argue that there are also dif-ferences between them (Table 1).

zals liberal functionalism

Turgut zal, first as the prime minister of the ANAP governments andlater as president, was very much involved in international issues andelaborated a new vision for Turkish foreign policy. In general, zal wascritical of traditional foreign policy. For him, Turkish foreign policy hadbeen largely reactive and cautious. Instead, a proactive and risk-takingattitude was needed. He believed that, if you dont take any risks, youcannot win anything.20According to zal, these changes in Turkish

foreign policy were necessary in a rapidly shifting post-Cold War era inwhich Turkey had to re-define its place and start thinking outside thebox. Thus, zals approach to foreign policy was based on his belief thatit was necessary to depart from established policies, to take calculatedrisks, and to search for new alternatives and options.21

When it came to the Middle East in particular, zal saw for Tur-key more opportunities than threats. The most important opportunitieswere economic. zal constructed an important part of his foreign policy

on economics. This sometimes created uneasiness in the foreign policyestablishment in Ankara. Once he responded to a journalists criticismon this issue by stating that in the foreign policy of a country the weightof the economy is 80 percent.22

This perspective was also functionalist in that it emphasized the im-portance of the advancement of economic relations with Middle Eastcountries as a panacea for resolving political problems and achievingpeace. It argued that Turkey could advance its economic ties, particularly

trade relations, with Middle Eastern countries and that, if there werepolitical problems, these would eventually be resolved by building onsuch trade relations. As part of his vision, zal in fact came up with sev-eral policy initiatives towards the region, which aimed to facilitate tech-nical and economic cooperation in the region. A very typical exampleof this was the so-called Peace Pipeline initiative of 1986, which aimedto provide the waters of the Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers in the Turkish

20 President Turgut zals Discussion Session on the Gulf Crisis with Representatives of Press Repro-duced in Mahmut Bali Aykan, Trkiyenin Kuveyt Krizi (1990-1991) Politikas(Ankara: Foreign PolicyInstitute, 1998), 118.

21 Sabri Sayar, Turkey: Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis, Middle EastJournal46, no. 1 (1992): 18.

22 Hasan Cemal, zal Hikayesi(Ankara: Bilgi, 1990), 294.

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Mediterranean region to the Middle East through western and easternpipelines. Similarly, zal attached great importance to the developmentof trade relations with neighboring Middle East states. This was indeeda corollary of the kind of liberal economic policies that Turkey was im-plementing domestically under his leadership. The Arab world was seenas a promising market for the developing Turkish industry.

zal also emphasized a shared Islamic identity in Turkeys relationswith the Middle East, but more as an instrument to bolster Turkeysrole in the region. Indeed, zal promoted that the Islamic world shouldadopt secularism, liberal democracy and a pro-western outlook.23Forzal, Turkey was a bridge between Westen and Islamic civilizations:

The Turks living in this territory for a thousand years have inheritedsome part of culture of every civilisation which flourished here sinceprehistory. They have evolved a synthesis derived from the culturallegacy of Anatolia, from the culture they brought with them fromCentral Asia, and from the Muslim religion. Their talent for synthe-sis and their ecumenical character have enabled them to blend thesethree strands together.24

Turkeys cultural and historical connections to the Middle East in gen-eral were seen as useful as a foreign policy instrument to turn Turkeyinto a regional power. This would not only mean further economic pos-sibilities for Turkey, but also elevate Turkeys importance in the eyes ofthe West in the rapidly changing strategic environment of the post-ColdWar era. zals perspective was very much utilitarian in the sense that it per-ceived Turkeys relations with the Middle East as part of Turkeys interest

in advancing its relations with the USA and the EU. Hence, the themeof Turkey constituting a bridge between the two worlds, bringing theWest to the Middle East and vice versa, was quite dominant in this per-spective. zal also did not shy away from getting involved in inter-Arabpolitics. He advocated closer ties with states closer to Washington, suchas Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In this context, Turkey played a positive rolein the return of Egypt to the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC),and the two countries even conducted symbolic joint military exercisesin the eastern Mediterranean.25zal also favored developing relations

23 Berdal Aral, Dispensing with Tradition? Turkish Politics and International Society during the zalDecade 1983-93, Middle Eastern Studies37, no. 1 (2001): 76.

24 Turgut zal, Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey(Nicosia: Rstem, 1991), 345.25 Mehmet Barlas, Turgut zaln Anlar(stanbul: Sabah, 1994), 289.



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with Israel, again in the context of Turkeys ties with the USA and forutilizing the pro-Israeli lobby in the USA to neutralize the anti-Turkishlobbies in Washington. zals policy during the Gulf Crisis of 1990/91 signified how he per-ceived Turkeys Middle Eastern relations in the context of Turkeys rela-tions with the West.The crisis was seen as an opportunity for Turkey toprove its value as a strategic asset to the West once again. Thus, Turkey

joined the coalition effort by closing the two oil pipelines from Iraq, pro-vided bases for air operations against Iraq and massed forces along theIraqi border. zal did want further involvement in the conflict, demon-strating that he was not reluctant to participate in intra-Arab conflicts.26Yet, his aspirations in this regard had to be toned down, mainly due to

opposition from the civil and military bureaucracy and political parties,including his own. zals policies towards Iraq after the end of the war better demon-strate his bold style. When the refugee crisis in Northern Iraq erupted,zal took the initiative and asked for UN help, which led to the forma-tion of Operation Provide Comfort. Then he perceived the retreat ofIraqi sovereignty and the emergence of Kurdish nationalism as an op-portunity to project Turkeys power outwards.27zal sent advisors to

meet the Kurdish leaders in Iraq and allowed the two parties, the KDP(Kurdistan Democratic Party) and the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurd-istan), to open bureaus in Ankara. Their leaders, Masoud Barzani and

Jalal Talabani, were given Turkish diplomatic passports, which allowedthem to freely travel during the 1990s. Turgut zal was critical of the bureaucracy, as he perceived it as animportant obstacle to the changes he wanted to introduce in foreign pol-icy. He criticized the Foreign Ministry for being excessively pro-status

quo. He said: Bureaucracy would not take risks domestically or exter-nally. Politicians who are elected can take risks. The Foreign Ministrybelieves that if we stuck out our neck, they would definitely hit us. Ac-cording to the Foreign Ministry, in making policy, first we should watchwhat others are doing and then take an average position. Following oth-ers is considered being smart.28According to zal, this was the Inntradition, which was conservative and almost obsessed with the mainte-nance of status quo. He believed that this perspective was still dominantin the civilian and military bureaucracy. Instead, he favored Atatrks

26 Philip Robins, The Foreign Policy of Turkey, in Foreign Policies of Middle East States, ed. RaymondHinnebusch and Anoushirivan Ehteshami (London: Lynne Reinner, 2002), 327.

27 Mufti, From Swamp to Backyard, 95.28 Barlas, Turgut zaln Anlar, 117-18.

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approach which he considered more active. After all, he argued, Atatrk,when the conditions were suitable, acquired Hatay, revised the Mon-treaux Regime and took the side of Britain and France against Italy andGermany.29

Cems social democratic constructivism

smail Cem of the DSP, known as one of the ideologues of social de-mocracy in Turkey and one of the prominent figures in the Turkish cen-ter-left, served as Foreign Minister from 30 June 1997 to 10 July 2002.In his first press conference as Foreign Minister on 14 July 1997, Cemannounced that we have begun the process of constructing and imple-menting a new foreign policy.30Like other critical approaches, Cems

vision was based on the critique of traditional foreign policy, whichwas characterized as being bereft of a historical dimension, lackingdepth with respect to time and breadth with respect to space, and hav-ing an inadequate approach to culture.31 Cem argued that, althoughTurkey possesses an extraordinary background of culture and civiliza-tion, it consciously [] deprived herself of her cultural assets in theirentirety.32Thus, he said,

[f ]or Turkey, the way forward particularly in foreign policy re-quires a new awareness of her own identity and history, of her assetsand shortcomings. A nation, whose foreign policy is alienated fromits own cultural roots and historical past [as Turkey has long been],cannot be a serious player on the world scene. Furthermore, in suchan environment of alienation, it becomes possible for political and in-tellectual elites to develop colonial mindsets, even in a country thathas never at any time in its long history been a colony.33

This shortcoming in traditional foreign policy, according to Cem, pre-sented itself more acutely in the Middle East in particular, where a com-mon and positive experience of centuries was disregarded and short-term antagonisms were played up. This then was transformed into a

justification to keep at a distance a region and a people whose significancefor Turkeys interests is in fact paramount.34Similarly, Cem argued that

29 Ibid.30 smail Cem, Turkey in the New Century(Nicosia: Rstem, 2001).31 Ibid., 2-10.32 Ibid., 11.33 Ibid., 1.34 Ibid., 8.



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the tradition of thinking in terms of fundamental choices, such as Islamversussecularism, also led to a perspective that associated foreign policyinterests in the Middle East with Islam or Islamization.35

These problems required a reshaping of Turkish foreign policy. Sucha reshaping meant a newly defined strategy based on the goal of becom-ing a world state; emphasizing Turkeys dual identity as a Europeanand an Asian country; having a strategic vision; and an ideological andconceptual renewal of Turkish foreign policy. Like zal, Cem also em-phasized the importance of being assertive. Specifically in his Middle East policy, Cem focused on four specificelements: first, the importance of utilizing the historical and culturalassets of Turkey when it comes to this region; second, emphasizing Tur-

keys identity as multi-civilizational; third, focusing on the importanceof Turkey as a role model in this region in terms of its achievements;and, finally, improving relations with the neighbors and, in general, rec-onciling with the Middle East.36Within this general perspective, Cemargued that Turkey had to move beyond the bridge metaphor, as it wasinadequate for the twenty-first century during which Turkey is movingto become a destination country.37

During his term as Foreign Minister, Cems ideas were translated into

the following specific policies: first, in line with the DSPs traditionalregion-based foreign-policy approach, Cem sought to improve Turkeysrelations with its Middle Eastern neighbors. This was a challenging task,as these relations (with a few exceptions) had hit the bottom by then. Likezal, Cem tried to solve Turkeys conflict with Syria through dialogue.A senior diplomat from the Middle East desk was sent to Damascus inMarch of 1997, in order to convey the message of restarting the dialogueto solve bilateral issues, particularly Turkeys accusation of Syrian sup-

port to the PKK. As a result, Cem met with his Syrian counterpart inDoha during an OIC meeting. After the meeting, Cem emphasized theimportance of developing economic relations between the two countries:First we should examine what we can do economically between the twocountries. Once the countries become interdependent economically therest the resolution of political problems become easy.38The immediateconsequence of this meeting was that Syria withdrew a resolution criti-cal of Turkeys policy on the utilization of Euphrates and Tigris Rivers,

35 Ibid., 15.36 Ibid., 237.37 Ibid., 42.38 Meliha B. Altunk, Gvenlik Kskacnda Trkiye-Ortadou likileri, in En Uzun On Yl, ed. ule Kut

and Gencer zcan (stanbul: Boyut, 1998), 346-47.

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whichit had planned to introduce in the meeting. In general, however,the relations between the two countries continued to deteriorate, untilthey came to the brink of war in October of 1998. After the resolutionof the conflict over Syrian support to the PKK in the Adana Agreement,the government worked hard to develop close relations with Syria. Cemdeclared: We look forward to a new understanding of neighborhood.Both Syria and Turkey have great interest in forging new political andeconomic relations.39

Similarly, the government soon after coming to power started open-ing up to Iran. Cem met with the Iranian Foreign Minister at the UN;they both decided to appoint ambassadors to posts that had been vacantfor some time. The two countries also initiated an institutionalized dia-

logue through security meetings.40The military criticized the ForeignMinistrys efforts to establish relations with Iran and Syria, countries de-clared as supporting terrorism against Turkey. Furthermore, the militaryseemed to be disturbed about the potential negative effects of this newopening on Turkeys relations with Israel. During his visit to Israel, Cemresponded to this criticism: You know that certain circles in Turkey saythat our relations with Israel are hindered by our efforts in searching forbetter bilateral relations with neighboring countries, but, quite the con-

trary, this was declared untrue by the Israeli Prime Minister himself.41

A more significant initiative during Cems tenure was the Neighbor-hood Forum Initiative, a plan to ease the tension arising from the situa-tion in Iraq in 1998. To promote this idea, Cem started a regional tour,including Jordan and Egypt. The initiative failed, however, when theSaddam regime refused to cooperate.42Yet, it represented an approachthat underlined the importance of a regional perspective and confidence-building measures in dealing with regional conflicts like Iraq.

During Cems tenure, Turkey also became more eager to play therole of facilitator in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. President SleymanDemirel became a member of the Mitchell Commission, which wasestablished in October of 2000 as an inquiry commission by the US-sponsored Sharm al-Sheikh Conference after the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada. In April of 2002, Cem, together with the Greek ForeignMinister George Papandreou, visited Israel as well as Yasir Arafat whowas under house arrest in his compound in the West Bank and urged

39 Cem, Turkey in the New Century, 86.40 Ibid., 347.41 Alparslan Esmer, Israel Asks Turkey for Active Role in Peace Process, Turkish Daily News, 8 July

1998.42 Dndar, Ben Byle Veda Etmeliyim, 220-35.



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Israelis and Palestinians to follow the example of reconciliation betweentheir two countries. Based on the belief that the partition model of Ottoman times couldbe beneficial, Cem also initiated a study to explore the use of the Ot-toman archives concerning Jerusalem.43In order to position Turkey asa facilitator, he also tried to introduce some balance into Turkeys rela-tions with the Arab world and Israel. However, Turkeys influence over-all remained limited. As to his attempts to increase Turkeys third-partyrole in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Cem admitted that they were not veryinfluential: We couldnt make wonders but there were times that weintervened.44

Similar to zal, Cem also put an emphasis on becoming more active

in the OIC. This led to the convening of the OIC-EU Joint Forum:Civilization and Harmony in stanbul in February of 2002. Turkeysactivism in promoting a harmony of civilizations was seen as vital inthe post-9/11 era. Cem realized the dangers, but also the opportuni-ties for a country like Turkey in a world increasingly characterized byidentity conflicts. Turkeys activism in this area was in line with Cemsunderstanding of Turkeys identity. For Cem, Turkey had multiple civili-zational identities, and this was seen as an asset rather than a weakness.

Finally, Cems vision of Turkeys foreign policy in the Middle Eastwas very much in harmony with Turkeys relations with the West. Infact, he was at the same time one of the most pro-European figures toemerge from the Ecevit government.

The AKPs conservative constructivism

The AKP, which evolved from Turkeys Islamist movement, has devel-oped a new vision of Turkish foreign policy in general and Middle East

policy in particular after it came to power in 2002. This new foreign pol-icy vision has been articulated in different forums by Ahmet Davutolu,who became the chief foreign policy advisor to the prime minister. Hisideas are also available in his earlier writings. Like other critical perspec-tives, this new vision of Turkeys foreign policy started with a criticismof the traditional one, which was characterized as defensive, static andpassive. As specifically related to the Middle East, Turkeys tradition-al approach was influenced by Turkeys alienation and to some beingtorn about the culture of the region and regional balances, as well as

prejudices about the Arab image that was put at the center of foreign

43 Ibid., 215.44 Ibid., 213.

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policy making, which made it impossible for Turkey to catch up withthe developments in the region.45In fact, the Turkish Republic, in thetradition of being squeezed between absolute domination and absoluteabandonment,46turned its back on the Middle East after losing theseterritories.

Instead, the AKP claimed to develop a new regional vision originat-ing from historical responsibility and experiences and based on consis-tent principles.47From this perspective, history and culture are seen inpositive terms that not only make it easier for Turkey to be involved inthis region, but actually compel Turkey to be part of the Middle East.Turkeys historical and cultural identity has been articulated based onits geography and imposes on the country a central role in this region. In

the words of Davutolu, Turkey has historical, strategic and geographicdepth in the Middle East.48As such, Turkey not only holds a centralposition, but also has it in its best interest to engage in this region. Thisengagement, however, should be dynamic and pro-active as well as An-kara-centered, meaning that it should not only be an extension of Tur-keys relations with the West.49In this context, Davutolu has also beencritical of Turkeys role as a bridge, as such a role embodies passivityand dilutes Turkeys central position in the Middle East.

The AKPs perspective on the Middle East has been translated into dif-ferent policies. First, in line with one of the main foreign policy principlesidentified by the party, the government sought to have zero problems withits neighbors in the Middle East as well. In this context, Turkeys relationswith Syria have improved further,50and Turkey has become more posi-tively engaged with Iran. The strategic environment that emerged in theregion after the Iraq War of 2003 has also pushed these countries closerto Turkey, but the AKP government also made conscious efforts and took

initiatives to develop relations further. The AKP government has alsotried to be innovative concerning Turkeys policy towards Iraq and aimedto go beyond the highly securitized perspective only focused on what washappening in Northern Iraq. The government has aimed to foster Tur-keys relations with the Sunni and Shiite groups and played an important

45 Ahmet Davutolu, Stratejik Derinlik(stanbul: Kre Yaynlar, 2001), 59 and 409.46 Ibid., 53.47 Party Program available at http://www.akparti.org.tr/beyanname.doc : 160-161, accessed on Decem-

ber 12, 2008.48 Davutolu, Stratejik Derinlik.49 Interview with Ahmet Davutolu, CNN Turk, Erisi Dorusu, broadcast on 12 December 2006.50 For the impressive improvement in Turkish-Syrian relations see, Meliha B. Altunk and zlem Tr,

From Distant Neighbours to Partners? Changing Syrian-Turkish Relations, Security Dialogue37, no.2 (2006).



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role in convincing some of the Sunni groups to participate in parliamen-tary elections.51As to the Kurdistan Regional Government, despite thedomestic opposition, it has advocated engagement and dialogue from thebeginning. In fostering ties with its neighbors, this perspective has alsoemphasized economic ties and interdependence. Such an approach alsosuits a major constituency of the party, namely the burgeoning Anatolianbusinesses, very much in tune with globalization, yet highly conservativein their social outlook. Thus, Turkey has sought to improve its econom-ic relations not only with Syria and Iran, but also with Iraq, particularlythe Kurdish areas in the north. In addition, the government has aimed toreach beyond the immediate neighbors and improve economic and politi-cal relations with the Arab world in general.52

Second, the AKPs vision includes more institutionalized regionalengagement. The initiative of Iraqs Neighbors Forum, which meets atthe level of foreign and interior ministers, aims to tackle the Iraqi issueson a regional basis and foster confidence-building measures in the re-gion. Similarly, the AKP government has put a lot of emphasis on Tur-keys activism in the OIC; as a result, the Turkish candidate, Ekmeleddinhsanolu, was elected Secretary General in 2004 and re-elected againin 2008. Since then, Turkey has become particularly active in promoting

reform in this organization.53

Another important aspect of the AKPs vision about Turkeys MiddleEast policy has been the eagerness to play third-party roles in regionalconflicts. Turkey has become more willing to play a constructive role inthe Arab/Palestinian-Israeli conflict by utilizing its relations with bothparties. Furthermore, the government has also invoked the Ottomanpast in getting involved in regional conflicts. Referring to the conflictover Jerusalem, Davutolu has argued that no political problem in the

region can be resolved without Ottoman archives that Turkey inheritedbut did not pay due respect to.54Similarly, Turkeys involvement in theLebanese conflict included references to the Ottoman past.

In the AKPs vision of Turkish foreign policy towards the region, Tur-key is portrayed as a soft power, a model to the region. Turkey becomes

51 Turkey organized a meeting in stanbul with the participation of four top Sunni leaders and the USambassador to Baghdad. Hrriyet, 5 December 2005.

52 Ahmet Davutolu, Turkeys New Foreign Policy Vision, Insight Turkey10, no. 1 (2008): 82. Based on

a transcript of a CNN Turk interview with Ahmet Davutolu on 2 January 2008.53 Davutolu criticized Turkeys low-level participation in the secretariat of the organization before andargued that psychological and diplomatic unpreparedness led to the failure of Turkeys previous at-tempt to have a candidate for the post of Secretary General during Cems tenure in 2000. Davutolu,Stratejik Derinlik, 264.

54 Ibid., 333.

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an object of attraction with its political and economic transformationsand as a country that brings together Islam and democracy. As AbdullahGl, currently the president, wrote when he was Foreign Minister:

The Turkish experience might serve as a source of inspiration forcountries in the region. We have sought to achieve democracy, civilrights and liberties, respect for the rule of law, civil society, trans-parency, and gender equality. Our experience proves that nationaland spiritual values can be in perfect harmony with contemporarystandards. We believe that integration with the world is not possiblewithout harmonizing values and traditions with modernity. The al-ternative to this path is isolation and desperation.55

Related to this perspective is the re-definition of Turkeys identity inthe AKPs vision. Traditionally, Turkey has defined itself as a modernsecular state with its ideological commitment to the West. The AKP, onthe other hand, has developed a new and rival identity of Turkey, withparticular implications for Turkish foreign policy towards the MiddleEast. This new definition emphasizes Muslim and democratic identityand places Turkey in a different civilization that is, Islamic and

yet in harmony with western civilization. This is a dramatically differentdefinition of Turkeys identity. It not only deviates from the traditionalperspective, but also goes further than other critical approaches, such asTurgut zals and smail Cems, which aimed at reconciliation betweenTurkeys western and eastern identities and presented them as an asset.This approach also seemed timely within the cultural/security frame-work of the post-9/11 world. In fact, Davutolu has argued that in thenew era marked by the aftermath of September 11, an accurate redefini-

tion of Turkeys position is urgently needed. Turkeys new position hasboth an ideational and a geographical basis.56Finally, as with other critical perspectives, the complimentary nature

between AKPs new vision and Turkeys western orientation is an im-portant element. In this respect, the AKPs policies contain some ambi-guity. On the one hand, the AKPs vision is complimentary to Turkeysrelations with global actors. As for the EU, the commission progressreports attest to this compatibility.57As for the USA, the general eager-

55 Abdullah Gl, Turkeys Role in a Changing Middle East Environment, Mediterrannean Quarterly15,no. 1 (2004): 6.

56 Davutolu, Turkeys New Foreign Policy Vision, 78.57 Commission of the European Communities, Turkey- 2007 Progress Report, SEC (2007) 1436, Brus-

sels, 6 November 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/turkey_



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ness of the AKP government to have close ties with the USA also hasled to efforts to harmonize with US policies in the region. On the otherhand, the AKPs vision of Turkey as playing a more independent rolein the region, as well as specific policy initiatives such as talking toHamas and the Sudanese government, or close relations with Syria andIran have led to some criticism both in the USA and the EU.

ConclusionThe transformations in the international system as well as the domesticchanges have led to an increasing debate about Turkish foreign policyin the Middle East. The emerging worldviews represent elements of re-alism, liberalism and constructivism. Each of these worldviews has its

shortcomings. The sole emphasis on security leads to the securitizationof Turkish foreign policy towards the region, which leaves little room forother foreign policy tools. The neo-traditionalist perspective is also nar-rowly focused on Iraq and the Kurdish aspect of the Iraqi question. Thiscauses a limited understanding of Middle Eastern issues and misses theinterconnections between different dynamics and actors in the region,with influences on the Iraqi issue as well. The general lack of under-standing and the appreciation of the complexities of the region further

complicate the problem. These limitations, coupled with historical dis-interest in this region, have made it difficult for the neo-traditionalists todevelop a coherent Middle East policy based on a long-term vision. The narrow liberal functionalist perspective suffers from the op-posite, since it undervalues the political and security aspect. In fact, itcan be argued that historically functionalism has not worked well in theMiddle East. Political problems need to be solved first; Turkish-Syrianrelations are a good example of this. Although the two countries have

encountered great economic opportunities, economic relations betweenthe two countries could only develop after they resolved their politicalconflict in 1998. Similarly, the Peace Pipeline initiative, which was foundfeasible, mainly failed because of political reasons. Finally, the constructivist vision of Turkey is based on a critique ofthe concept of utility-maximizing (either security or economic) perspec-tives that are at the core of realist and liberal analyses. Instead, it focuseson the importance of independent influence of intersubjectively sharedvalue-based behavior. As such, the constructivist perspectives have their

weaknesses as well. First, the constructivist perspective has to face therealities of interest-based politics. Some of the opportunities and limita-

progress_reports_en.pdf, Accessed on 15 January 2009; 84.

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tions in the implementation of policies clearly emerged due to the chang-es in strategic environment as well as the existence of economic interestsrather than identity politics. Second, like previous Islamist discoursesconcerning the region, too much emphasis on history can be seen as neo-Ottomanist and thus hegemonic. Such a perspective is bound to createunease among the countries in the region.

Notwithstanding these weaknesses, realist, liberal and constructiv-ist worldviews are dominant among policy- as well as opinion-makersin Turkey today. The neo-traditionalist perspective is more influencedby realism, whereas liberalism and constructivism are more prevalent inalternative perspectives. What is the relationship between the three? Itcan be argued that they are competing, but at the same time co-existing

and at certain points balancing each other. Therefore, it is interestingto look at the relationship of these three perspectives at different junc-tures and in different cases. Sometimes one perspective may be moredominant than the others. For instance, if we broadly look at post-ColdWar history, from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, it was largely theliberal perspective that dominated, but realist elements were competingwith it as well. A typical example is Turkeys policy towards the Iraq cri-sis, when zal and his associates advocated their liberal vision which in

turn had to be scaled down as a result of opposition from other politicalparties, the bureaucracy, and even from zals own party. During theremaining years of the 1990s, it was largely the realist perspective thatdominated, but there was a one-year episode of the Islamist WelfareParty government during which again there was some competition withthe realist perspective. In the 1990s, the traditional power politics ap-proach dominated Turkeys relations with the region. Ankara re-definedits strategy and identified the Middle East as the number-one source of

threat to Turkey. In the late 1990s, the coalition governments ForeignMinister smail Cem tried to implement a new vision, yet restrained itsimplementation due to coalitional and bureaucratic politics. After 2002,with the AKP government the constructivist perspective has dominat-ed, but there are also elements of the liberal perspective in the AKP andthe constructivist perspective competing with the realist perspective ofother institutions, mainly the military, and political parties.



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cade 1983-93. Middle Eastern Studies37, no. 1 (2001): 72-88.Aydn, Mustafa. Ten Years After: Turkeys Gulf Policy (1990-1991) Revisited. London: Frank Cass, 2002.Aykan, Mahmut Bali. Trkiyenin Kuveyt Krizi (1990-1991) Politikas. Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute,

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193

Table 1Comparison of alternative perspectives

zal/ANAP Cem/DSP Davutolu/AKP

Importance of history andculture

Relativelyimportant

Important Very important

Compatibility with the West Very important Very important Important

Civilizational aspectBridge between

civilizations

Multiplecivilizational

identities

Islamiccivilizational

identity

Involvement in regionalconflicts Important Important Very important


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TURKEY Park, Bill. Turkeys Policy Towards Northern Iraq: Problems and Perspectives. London: Routledge, 2005.

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