World Focus February 2016xaam.in.pdf
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WORLD
FOCUS INDOCENTRIC FOREIGN AFFAIRS MONTHLY JOURNAL
Volume XXXVII Number 02 February 2016
WORLD FOCUS takes up every month one
ternational issue and gives an analysis of its various
pects by persons well known for their
ecialisation in the subject. The issues covered are
pical or near topical, but of an abiding interest.
he analysis is simple enough to interest even an
itiate to world affairs, but without sacrificing depth.
he aim is to present an Indocentric view on a
articular issue currently facing the world.
pinions expressed in the articles are personal views
f the author and in no way reflect the opinion of
World Focus. The author is solely responsible for e contents in his/ her article and the World Focus
kes no responsibility in this regard.
he Contents of this magazine cannot be reproduced
any form with out prior permission from World
ocus. Any legal issues pertaining to World Focus
ill be settled in NCT region of Delhi only.
nsolicited articles will not be returned or
knowledged. World Focus reserves the right to
dit articles for brevity and clarity before publication.
dited, Owned, Published and Printed byKishore Babu from B-49 (Ground Floor), Joshi Colony, I.P.
xtension, Delhi-110092 at Meenakshi Press, 4857/24, First
oor, Ansari Road, Dariyaganj, New Delhi - 110002
tal no. of pages 140, including Covers
opy Right : World Focus
ur Address:
orld Focus
-49, (Ground Floor) Joshi Colony,
P Extension
elhi - 110092, India el. / Fax : 22246905, Mobile No. 8130754555mail: cnfworldfocus@gmail com
This issue on Terrorism and Geopolitics presents some uni
cases and challenges. It shows us that terrorism has been o
resorted to in the contemporary world and the nation states
finding it as a menace that is spiraling out of bounds. While
method of terrorizing innocent citizens anywhere in this wor
deplorable, the frequency with which the attacks are taking p
presents all the more challenges. Dealing with it has been onminds of all the policy makers and extra efforts are being
forward to handle the situation when the terror strikes occu
While terrorism itself is quite appalling, carrying it in the nam
God and religion is one of the most absurd things that is happen
around the world. We all have been taught since our childh
that peace brings happiness and multiple advantages. It prom
universal brotherhood, harmony, goodwill and faith, thus mak
it one of the most required and most sought after virtu
Therefore, attacks on humanity, especially in the name of Gand religion, seem not only illogical but also unwarranted. Th
is a good old adage: life is an echo, give the best and the b
gets back to you. Similarly, love begets love, peace begets pe
and hate begets hate.
The region of West Asia has been under a constant turm
Differences of all sorts exist in this region. At the same time
region offers profound opportunities and gains; it is oil rich
shares its resources with the world and is one of the most sou
after regions for forging meaningful relations. It is to be nothat it has been battered with internal differences between
members and have become prone to extra-regional interferen
Syria and Iraq present a grim picture of horrific incidents
have been against humanity.
It is the time the world unites against the unwanted elem
that terrorise people and try to bring governments under t
control through dreadful means. There is need for be
coordination amongst members so that these dreadful incid
do not proliferate and harm people further. The resultant eff
of the disturbances in this area stunt not only their democr
growth but also hurt their economic well-being and culture.
in the best interest of the region and the world if it rema
peaceful and progressive.As the world is moving ahead, w
we need is not violence. All we need is peace and its perman
existence. The geopolitics of the West Asian region poses m
challenges. It is for the world to make a united forum and add
this menace and settle it once and for all. Religion should
used to bring peace, not war and violence.
G . Kishore BabuEditor
Bhabani DikshitManaging Editor
Stuti S. MandalaAssociate Editor
EDITORIAL
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Terrorism & Geopolitics
Violence and Terrorism in West Asia: Implications for India’s Security
rof. A.K. Pasha.....................................................................................................................5
Central Asia: Problems and Struggle to Escape Being ISIS Target
rof. R.G.Gidadhubli...............................................................................................................11Terrorism and Geopolitics in West Asia
Anil Kamboj, Inspector General (Retd).....................................................................................17
Navigating Terrorism Labyrinth
rof. Snehalata Panda............................................................................................................24
Terrorism and International Order
rof. Manas Chakrabarty.......................................................................................................30
SIS: The Geopolitics of Terrorism
rof. Rajesh Dogra................................................................................................................35
Recent Indo-Pak Engagement on Terror and the Pathankot Attack :mplications for India
Dr. Sabita Harichandan..........................................................................................................43
Changing Geo-Politics of Central Asia: It’s Susceptibility to Terrorism
Dr. Alok Kumar Gupta...........................................................................................................51
Understanding International Terrorism: Geopolitics and Beyond
Dr. Arunoday Bajpai..............................................................................................................60
Understanding Terrorism and Geopolitics in West Asia
Dr. Sudhanshu Tripathi..........................................................................................................66
The Rise of Islamic State and Evolving US StrategyDr. Monish Tourangbam and Aersh Danish..............................................................................73
Geography, Politics and Terror at Play: Case of Northeast India
Dona Ganguly........................................................................................................................79
Pathankot Airbase Attack and India’s Fight Against Terrorism
Dr. Deepak Yadav..................................................................................................................85
ndo-US Cooperation on Countering Terrorism: Zero – Tolerance
Dr. Sanghamitra Patnaik .........................................................................................................90
Geopolitics of Counter-Terrorism in Afghanistan: SCO’s Strategy is in QuestionDr. Bawa Singh......................................................................................................................97
Reflecting on the Dynamic Geopolitics of Northeast India:
A Contemporary Perspective
Bipasha Lakra......................................................................................................................104
Analysis of the Growing Strategic Threat of ISIS Rebellion in Iraq and Syria
Dr. Chanchal Kumar .............................................................................................................110
Misconception of Islamic Terrorism in the World: A Case of Da’esh
Dr. Saleem Ahmad ................................................................................................................117
Nuclear Terrorism in the Indian Subcontinentouradeep Sen...................................................................................................................123
i O i C i C i A i i
Contents
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Violence and Terrorism in West As
Implications for India’s SecurProf. A. K. Pa
In contemporary West Asia, terrorism
ormally brings to our attention the mindless violence
ommitted by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria [ISIS]
nd elsewhere in the region and beyond. In addition
omb blasts in Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain,
Yemen, Libya, Turkey, and growing violence in Syria
nd Lebanon remind us of indiscriminate terrorism.
Many have condemned terrorist attacks on US and
rench marines in Lebanon in the early 1980’s when
eace keeping forces from these and other countries
were stationed in and around Beirut soon after theraeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. Lebanese
resident Basher Jamayil and Lebanese Minister
lias Hobeika and others were killed in 1980’s as
so Rafik Harriri former Lebanese Prime Minister
nd many Lebanese journalists and leaders. Other
mportant leaders in West Asia like UN
epresentative Count Bernadette, King Abdullah of
ordan, King Feisal of Saudi Arabia, Anwar Sadat of
gypt and Yitzhak Rabin of Israel have also beenictims of terrorist violence. Many such violent
ttacks targeting prominent people and large number
f innocent civilians can be cited as evidence for
revalence of terrorism in West Asia.
In the context of contemporary West Asia,
ne has to honestly address the legitimate anger and
enuine political despair which provide fertile ground
or terrorists to exploit. US approach to West Asia
specially due to US support to Israel which has beenonsistently rejecting UN Resolutions on the issue of
withdrawal from occupied Arab lands and expecting
ull compliance/strict implementation of UN resolution
y Iraq, Libya, Iran, Sudan and other Arab/Islamic
ates as also threat of unilateral military action for
ny defiance. It should also be noted that “the ability
f the US to persuade peoples and governments in
West Asia to effectively reject terrorism has been
gnificantly undermined”.
To throw more light on thissue one has to look at the recent past history of the
egion and recall that the West perceived Arab
1950’s and 1960’s “as the primary destabili
political force in the region (West Asia) and vie
Islamic groups, especially those supported by frie
governments as more desirable and more stabilizi
Israel viewed PLO as a threat to its security
encouraged Islamic groups in Gaza and West B
which led to the emergence of Hamas and Isla
Jihad, which have used violence on a bigger s
compared to the PLO. Many in West Asia, how
see the operations of Hamas, Hezbollah and Isla
Jihad not as terrorism but as acts of national liberaThe aim of the Palestinian groups is viewe
legitimate i.e. liberation from Israeli occupat
especially from the clutches of an enemy which
vast military capability. Thus, suicide bombi
terrorism is seen as a powerful weapon of the w
desperate, and helpless facing a far stronger
vicious enemy.
The suicide bombings as a method of poli
violence did not materialize at the push of a bu
It took several years before it was put to freq
use. Its genesis can be traced to the failure to
the Israeli military to redeploy its military fo
stationed in Palestinian territories – a key failur
the 1993 Oslo Accords. The Palestinian Author
(PA) failure to secure the redeployment an
guarantee Israel’s security demands led to poli
factions opposed to negotiations and disposed tow
suicide bombings gaining popularity. Under artiof the Oslo accords, the PA was allowed to estab
“a strong police force”, while Israel would cont
to carry “the responsibility for overall securit
Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their inte
security and public order”. Although the sharin
security responsibilities between Israel and the
was working well with minor problems until A
Sharon of the Likud Party became Israeli Pr
Minister in February 2001, but faced with moun problems even the US (CIA) intervention coul
make the mechanism work The creation of
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with a mandate in Palestinian populated area (Areas
A) of the West Bank has been irrevocably
ndermined. Similarly, the territorial division of the
West Bank that resulted from the Oslo process – the
reation of Areas A, B and C – is no longer relevant
o the reality in the West Bank and Gaza. Thus, there
only one area and that area is controlled by the
DF without Palestinian intermediaries. The Sharon/
etanyahu governments determined that Yasser Arafat and the structures he represented – PLO and
he PA - are no longer diplomatic or security partners.
Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas failed to play the role
utlined for them, and so they are no longer
relevant”. As Haaretz reported on April 14, 2002,
he logic of Sharon’s plan was this : a military defeat
would convince the Palestinians and the international
ommunity to leave these security zones, including
major population centers, under effective Israeli
ontrol for many years.”
The establishment and expansion of Jewish
ettlements led to widespread violence against the
ettlers. Since the Oslo accords, successive Israeli
overnments continued to build new Jewish
ettlements and expand existing ones where the
umber of Jewish settlers doubled since 1993. The
0 largest settlements in West Bank and Gaza in 2002
ad 138,660 settlers. Also the 20 smallest settlementsn 2002 had 2,261 settlers. By 1993 there were
2,750 housing units in the Jewish settlements
ompleted since 1967 when Israel captured these
alestinians lands from Egypt and Jordan. Since the
slo accords, according to one study 20,371 new
ousing units have been constructed representing a
2% increase in eight years from what had been built
ver roughly a quarter century. About 10 lakh ie one
million Israeli settlers now live in some 300 settlementshat dot the occupied Palestinian lands and are linked
o one another by means of 450 kms of highway and
bypass” roads which also serve to isolate Palestinian
opulation centers from one another turning them
nto Bantustan- like little islands. The rapidly
ncreasing Jewish settler colonies strengthened the
olitical power of those Palestinians who rejected the
slo Accords. Israel expected full cooperation from
A irrespective of their colonial/expansionist policies
nd what effect these negative policies were havingn popular Palestinian support for PA. Whereas the
enormous time to resolve the thorny Palestinian-Is
dispute, the new Bush administration since 2
adopted a ‘hands-off’ approach and wanted both
parties to resolve their problems bilaterally. But t
was a crucial difference. Whereas Clinton w
talk to Yasser Arafat and other Palestinian lead
along with the Israeli leaders, George W Bush ign
Arafat and built up close ties with Israeli Pr
Minister Ariel Sharon. The Bush administraappeared to side with Sharon who argued that Is
would not talk to the PA until there is a “comp
cessation of violence”. The September 11, 2
attacks on World Trade Center and the Penta
gave Israeli leaders a unique chance to win
support for their war against the Palestinians. Sh
was hopeful that he would make Israel a partner
the US in the war against international terrorism
The US administration very quickly real
that Israeli PM Sharon tried to take advantage o
9/11 events to push forward his own agenda aga
the Palestinians. Colin Powell made it clear
“Israel will not be part of any anti- terror mili
action” against Afghanistan or elsewhere. The
administration realized the significance of Arab sup
in its war against terrorism. To win over the A
Islamic world and the Palestinians US President B
called for the establishment of a Palestinians with East Jerusalem as its capital in September 2
More and more Israeli leaders began to fear tha
US is getting closer with the Arab states and
Palestinians in the anti-terror war with Israel b
seen as a burden or ignored. This led to strain in
Israeli ties and ultimately Sharon had to express re
for provoking this public row.
Whereas Bush invoked international juto justify the war in Afghanistan but the same stan
of justice to the Palestinians was not applied. E
though Yasser Arafat was the first Arab leade
denounce the September 11 attacks but when A
faced Israeli attacks the US squarely blamed the P
leader for his predicament as “largely of his
making” and openly ignored/sidelined him and ca
for the election of new Palestinian leadership.
result its Arab/Muslim allies in West Asia find t
ability to delegitimize terrorism undermined. Ahave seen earlier, soon after the 9/11 events the
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he Al Qaeda net work with its attack on Afghanistan.
Although Al Qaeda appears to have been disrupted
s its members were either killed, imprisoned or they
ed to safer places, but terrorists means have
ncreasingly become legitimate and popular in the
erceptions of most people in West Asia. It is
nteresting to note that those carrying out terrorist
cts in West Asia and elsewhere (not just Al Qaeda)
re claiming to do it in the name of Islam. If seenbjectively Islam is not central to the terror issue,
though one cannot say that religion plays no role.
ome groups in the West Asian region may be
angerous not because of their Islamic character but
ue to their violent methods and intolerant ends. The
ctions of a few (misguided) radical Muslims should
ot be seen as a general phenomenon flowing from
lamic faith. It is interesting to note that Hezbollah,
amas and Islamic Jihad were treated by the US as
ocal movements fighting against occupation, and not
s part of the global terrorist networks like the Al
aeda and so not included in the list of 27 terrorist
rganizations whose assets were frozen by the US
ongress. Early resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian
sue is crucial to avoid the specter of terrorism
preading worldwide. Here it must be mentioned that
US state Department reports had identified that West
Asia was not the leading region in the number of
rrorist incidents throughout the 1990’s. It was alsoot the leading area as far as the number of attacks
gainst US targets was concerned. Five years before
he 9/11 incidents terrorism in West Asia had
gnificantly declined every year and by 2000 West
Asia had emerged as a region with the fewest terrorist
ttacks of any around the world except North
America. This global trend must be kept in mind to
ounter the futile attempt to link Islam with terrorism.
Since the secular groups could not recruit
he number of members as the Islamic groups did, no
wonder they began to emulate the suicide method.
The suicide bombing phenomenon has thus become
ecularized.” This is born out of the hopelessness
nd humiliation at the hands of Israeli and other
ppressors. Since the Islamic doctrine prohibits
uicide, the perpetrators and their sympathizers may
ave used religion to suit their ends. It must also be
ressed that suicide bombing are not confined tolamic groups in West Asia. Suicide bombings have
by the Japanese in the Second World War and by
Tamil tigers in Sri Lanka and elsewhere.
Dilip Hiro in his book War without End
the ongoing war on terrorism “is a war without e
He emphasizes the need to go to the root caus
terrorism, and argues that US threats to Iraq
established government amounts to terror. Accor
to him, “Americans always blame others, nthemselves. Whatever happens to America, it is
own fault. Americans won’t like to hear that.
war (on terrorism) will go on because of the defin
Bush has put on it. He himself is threaten
established governments:” so long as anybod
terrorizing established governments, there need
be a war”. More and more people in West Asia
believe that their governments due to the authorita
nature of the political system and also under
influence cannot do anything to relieve t
humiliation and improve their lot. Hence
emergence of more radical Islamic groups w
employ suicide bombings. Moreover the sec
groups also follow this strategy under popular sup
According to one writer, “suicide bombings take
because they free the desperate from the nee
rely on governments. Rather than being spons
by states, this form of violence challenges sta
Lack of democracy and suppression of poliopposition driver people to join groups and repres
alone cannot eliminate terrorism. “Any succe
counter terrorism strategy must thus address
the opportunities available to militants and the l
of their motivations”.
Undoubtedly movement towards democ
reforms, new innovative methods for econo
cooperation and evenhanded policies on the AIsraeli conflict and towards the WANA region
whole would go a long way to turn people away f
terrorism and violence as it will inspire hope f
better future as the region has witnessed revoluti
coups, several wars, unprecedented viole
insecurity and instability for several decades du
external interventions and internal mismanagem
despotism. Hence state terrorism and cou
terrorism have become vicious cycle with action
reaction before Israel and the Palestinians and gradually spreading to other parts of the world.
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ndian interests in West Asia: For India, West
sia and North Africa in general and the Gulf region
n particular are important for a number of reasons.
irst, nearly 80 per cent of India’s oil and gas imports
ome from the region and the demand for it is growing
8-10 percent annually with domestic oil production
radually declining. India annually imports oil and
roducts to the tune of billions of dollars. Any
isruption of supplies or increase in prices due toncertain security situation in the region will/has
dversely affect Indian economy both in the short
nd long term. Secondly, nearly seven million [70
kh] Indians are gainfully employed in the Gulf region
who send over $50 billion dollars annually as
emittances. Not only this foreign exchange is
gnificant but the Indian workers safety and security
of prime importance to India. Indian labor is
rowing in GCC States. Thirdly, the region is
mportant in terms of trade especially exports (over
8 percent of India’s total) which fetch us valuable
oreign exchange [over $200 billion]. Fourthly, the
WANA region is also becoming increasingly important
or India’s food security due to large imports of
hemical fertilizers, phosphate especially from Jordan,
Morocco, Oman, Egypt and other countries of
WANA. Besides these factors investments from the
egion both official and private are significant for the
ndian economy. Also a large number of Indian public-rivate companies are engaged in lucrative joint
entures and in building various projects and their
rofits are important. Therefore, not only for the above
easons, but also security and stability in the entire
WANA region is very important for Indian interests.
It must be noted that US/Western and Israeli
olicies in the region and also growing differences
mong the regional states are creating instability and pposition groups are increasingly using violence and
error groups are growing due to US-Israeli
omination of the area through its military/naval
resence as also control of oil resources and blind
upport to Israel. In countries like Egypt, Jordan,
audi Arabia and other GCC states such policies are
ncouraging religious extremism and many people are
mbracing terrorism and groups may resort to greater
iolence/terror in future not only against the US/West/
rael but also against US friends in the area. Sinceulk of the Indians live and work in GCC states which
where US influence is predominant, hence s
Indians are likely to be influenced due to moun
extremism preached by certain groups.
The large scale purchase of arms by oil
states in the Gulf region would not only lead to pres
on India’s defense budget but also may lea
presence of foreign military advisers especially f
Pakistan in these states and probable transfeweapons to states hostile to India. According
recent US report there has been a shift of focus
terrorism form West Asia to South Asia. Altho
there has been open cooperation with Israel in
field of agriculture now there is growing tendenc
talk more openly about defense/security coopera
As part of the Make in India project, the N
government has eased restrictions on defe
manufacturers especially foreign who are willin
set up R&D and factories in India. Many Israeli f
like Aerospace Industries and Rafael are intere
in setting up manufacturing units in India. The
proposal to build Barak air missiles to be exporte
foreign countries. Israeli defense minister visite
the first time in 2015 for air show in Bangalore. T
is no doubt about Israeli technological lea
agriculture, water and cancer treatment, sp
research and defense but trade which was $
million in 1990s has increased to about $4.5 billio2014-15 as compared with over $200 billion with o
WANA states. In 2016 there is even talk about Is
PM Netanyahu and PM Modi visiting each oth
also to accelerate the FTA and push trade to
billion in future. It has also become obvious that
Israel and the Palestinians are incapable of reac
a solution to their conflict, which very often threa
peace and security in the WANA region. More
other regional problems and contentions issuesgetting interlined with this problem thereby po
greater danger of terrorism acquiring a much la
regional dimensions, and perhaps transnati
dimensions as well. Since India has come to estab
good relations with the US, UK, Russia, France, I
and other countries, it has become imperative to
an external solution to the vexed Israeli-Palesti
conflict. Any delay in the resolution of this con
has the potential to adversely affect peace, secu
and stability in the WANA region with conseqimplications for India.
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Although India has had historical ties with
yria/Iraq and now vital interests in the Gulf region,
ny support to new US military adventure against
yria/Iraq would in the short run only make the US-
UK-Israel happy but in the long run have adverse
onsequences both on India’s domestic and foreign
olicies as also alienate India from the masses in the
WANA region. Our support to Egypt during the 1956
uez Crisis is still fondly recalled by Arabs all over he region. India must be with the people of the region
nd support their aspirations for greater participation
n the decision making process and the broader issue
f democratic reforms and also safeguard our vital
nterests. India must work with the secular/democratic
orces in the region as also the dominant world powers
which have vast stakes in the region to maintain
ecurity and stability so very essential to protect our
ital interests and also to prevent the spread of
iolence and terrorism from this volatile region to
ndia in future. Hence India needs to enhance its
nteraction with the countries in the WANA but Gulf
egion especially to seek greater role in cooperation
with the states vital to our interests especially to
nhance our oil security. With its abundant oil and
water and human resources and strategic location,
hese states were well on their way to becoming a
major Arab powers, much to the dislike of Israel.
ut since the last 25 years they have suffered mmensely due to war and poor leadership. In the
vent of division of Iraq, the strategic benefits to
rael-Water and Oil will further enhance its power/
nfluence in the region. This scenario apart from
tering the status quo in a fundamental way would
so increase anti-Americanism (which is already
widespread in the region) but in the absence of any
enuine democratic transformation in the Arab world,
espite US promises (in 1991 US promised democraticeforms in the region but did not deliver) to work
eriously for political reforms, political discontent and
eligious extremism may create an explosive situation
n the area as frustrated and angry people feel they
ave been let down by their own rulers. The pretense
emocracy electoral process and rubber stamp
onsultative Assemblies which now exist are no longer
ken seriously by Arab people as they have lost hope
n the ability of the present autocratic rulers to bring
bout genuine democratic change. Saudi Arabia themost conservative Arab country — a close ally of
perhaps the most vulnerable to US manipulation
the post-Iran plus P5+1 nuclear deal scenario of
2015. The US has identified Saudi Arabia as
breeding ground for religious extremism in the re
and the Saudi rulers are apprehensive that the
will keep them in focus until it undergoes b
transformation to satisfy US concerns. No wo
the Saudi rulers have now (after 9/11) taken initia
for democratic transformation in the Arab woFormer Saudi King Abdullah proposed a chart
reform the Arab condition which called for an “
to the silence that has gone on for too long” and
urged “internal reform and enhanced polit
participation (which are essential steps tow
building Arab capabilities and providing condition
comprehensive Arab revival”. If the Arab reg
are reformed, modernized and genuine poli
transformation takes places through which peop
participation in the decision making proces
guaranteed under constitutional supervision, then
regimes can avoid the incoming cataclysmic cha
and effectively marginalize the extremists relig
elements and hence terrorism. In the absenc
this, there could be an upsurge in terrorism not
in the West Asian region but also in South Asia
the West. India should actively encourage the pro
of political change and modernization because o
the Arab regimes become democratic and responto popular demands, not only their legitimacy w
be enhanced but also more significantly t
dependence on outside states especially the US
Russia would come down and this may lea
reduction in outside military and political interven
which has periodically undermined peace, secu
and stability in the region thereby adversely affec
India’s interests as well.
Genuine political reforms would give
politically oppressed people a stake in the runnin
the political system as also much needed poli
stability and smooth transition. The abundan
resources could then be used to advance econo
development so as to engage the Arab people in
process of political and economic progr
Undoubtedly for India the threat of relig
extremism and terrorism from the West Asian re
would be contained it this democratic process tshape. Along with these steps towards democ
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raeli issues would also be debated, discussed, at all
orums thereby allowing Arab countries to take
nitiatives for meaningful steps along with serious US-
raeli steps (which are very essential) to tackle the
rab-Israeli dispute. Both these steps would reinforce
he momentum for change and India could then look
orward to greater peace, security and stability in West
sia in the future. It is far easier to control terrorism
nd religious extremism in liberal democratic politicalystems which have high level of legitimacy and strong
omestic control than the present political set up where
he rulers want to remain in total control of all state
ffairs. The long overdue change has now become
inevitable but if it is not coming soon internal/ regi
terrorism may be directed against such autoc
regimes unwilling or unable to initiate reforms
seen earlier, instability, religious extremism
terrorism in West Asia could spill over into South
as security and stability in both the regions
mutually interlinked through a number of factors.
most credible option to tackle these twin men
which are posing a new challenge to India’s compculture, liberal democratic structures and also nati
security is to adopt a political course that prev
alienation of any segment.
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Central Asia: Problems and StruggTo Escape Being ISIS Targ
Prof. R. G. Gidadhu
Declaration by ISIS that the Central Asian
tates (CAS) will be one of the targets has been amatter of great concern not only for these concerned
ountries but also for those which are closely politi-
ally and economically linked with Central Asia.
ence several questions arise. Why are the CAS
argets of the ISIS and what are the problems facing
he CAS due to this declaration by the ISIS? What
olicy measures are taken by the state authorities of
he CAS to deal with this situation? What are the
erspectives and challenges?
roblems Facing CAS
here are several factors which are contributing to
he interest of ISIS in the CAS. There are five states
n Central Asia which were formerly part of the
ormer Soviet Union-Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
ajikistan,Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. These are
lamic states having close geographic proximity to
yria. While Tajikistan has Persian ethnic identity,l other four CAS are of Turkic ethnic identity.
The CAS have been facing several problems
which are contributing to the prevailing situation.
irstly, a major problem facing the CAS has been
hat these countries have witnessed recruitment of a
arge number of youth who have joined ISIS forces
n Syria and Iraq. Even youth below 18 years are
ttracted to join ISIS, which is a great advantage for
his organization. Hence according to Kyrgyz offi-
al sources the number of its citizens might exceed
00 fighting with extremist militants. A large number
f youth are recruited from other CAS as well. For
nstance, the Kazak foreign minister Idrissov has
ated in September 2015 that an estimated 200
Kazakh nationals were fighting in Syria.
As stated by a Central Asia expert, the Is-
amic State (IS) militant group is notorious for re-
ruiting, training, and exploiting children and teenag-
die waging jihad are especially praised by Isla
groups in Syria. Majority of those recruited are pared to give their life for Jihad.
Secondly, the CAS are witnessing a dee
ing divide in the society between those suppor
secular forces, and those in favour of conserva
section and radical groups. For instance, seeing
rise of Islamic State and other extremist group
recent years, the Tajik authorities have done their
to eliminate outward displays including type of dkeeping type of beard etc. what they see as dan
ous and imported aspects of Islam in recent ye
At the same time, as candidly stated by some
lysts including John Heathershaw, any repressive m
sures could encourage radicalization. It means th
who do not want to be in line with the state-s
tioned guidelines, might go underground and bec
militants.
Tajikistan has been the worst sufferer of m
tancy, civil war and terrorism during the afterma
the breakup of the former Soviet Union, as more
100,000 Tajik citizens have been killed. As opine
Helene Thibault a specialist on Central Asia a
University of Montreal in Canada the situation i
entirely stable even at present. According to
“There are always some fault lines, some regi
where political antagonism, regional antagonism
still there.”
Thirdly, the CAS have been facing m
socio-economic problems after the breakup of
former Soviet Union. For instance, economic co
tion of the CAS has worsened during the last
years. In the case of Tajikistan the growth in G
Domestic Product (GDP) slowed to 6.7 (pc) per
in 2014 from 7.4 percent in 2013 and that it c
drop to 3.2 percent in 2015. Kazakh economysuffered significantly due to decline in oil prices
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015 while it enjoyed high growth rates of 8-9 pc a
ew years back. There is significant decline in indus-
ial and agricultural production. Due to economic
ecline, unemployment has been increasing which is
ne of the major factors used by leaders of IS to
ecruit the unemployed youth. As per some reports,
ne among six persons cannot find job in Central Asia.
n fact a large number of youth from CAS particu-
arly from Tajikistan and Kyrgyz republic were get-ng jobs in Russia during the last about two decades
nd sending money to family members for their main-
nance. A Central Asia analyst Mirzoev has opined
hat due to economic recession in Russia itself, many
ave returned back to Central Asia which has wors-
ned economic and social conditions for a large sec-
on of the population. Denied of jobs many are at-
acted by the IS which not only promises jobs but
so high remuneration for joining the IS.
But in reality contrary to promises made to
he youth, there are reports by some of those who
ave returned from Syria that they were not properly
aid. Their experience might be far from happy as
old to a correspondent by Saidmurat from Jalalbad
n Kyrgyz Republic in September 2015. He became
nvalid as he was badly injured in the fight and is now
ecuperating in a hospital. He is disillusioned as hewas not paid hard cash that he was promised before
oining the IS to fight on the battlefield alongside
abhat al-Nusra, Al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate. More-
ver, living condition was far from satisfactory as
hey were forced to live in cold and dark rooms and
here was not much to eat. He met several persons
om Central Asia and Chechnya. This statement has
een further supported by the head of the Kyrgyz
tate Committee for National Security Kanzharbek
okoev, who has made candid statement ‘that those
who had been recruited to Syria are victims of fraud’.
Fourthly, ISIS has been interested in recruit-
ng not only fighters but also highly qualified persons
om Central Asia. For instance, as reported by
Khusan Mamurov, an analyst with Uzbekistan’s Na-
onal Security Service (SNB) in September 2015 that
S militant group had been recruiting doctors, engi-
eers from the CAS including Uzbekistan. They wereromised high salary ranging from $ 20, 000 to $ 30,000
trolled territory which meant that they will be a
able for long period. But the situation seems t
pathetic. As reported by journalist Jenan Mouss
threatened to confiscate the property of doctors
pharmacists who have left. The SNB analyst
mated that 500-600 people from Uzbekistan are
fighting alongside IS even as reliable data was
available.
Fifthly, indoctrination has been a major
tor in attracting the youth. There are organizat
and also some religious heads that have succe
in this task of indoctrination in the name of Jihad
also reported that some youth from Central Asia
indoctrinated in Chechnya and other Islamic reg
of Russia.
Sixthly, the CAS are also victims of intesecurity threats. For instance, Tajikistan has be
victim of civil war during which several thousand
people were killed. Subsequently there were insta
when few political leaders and officials used
position to acquire wealth by corruption and drug
ficking directly or indirectly supporting criminal
antinational groups threatening the stability of
country. As opined by some analysts, the cas
former Deputy Defense Minister Abduha Nazarzoda was unique since he managed to g
many as 100 armed supporters of the Islamic
naissance Party of Tajikistan (IRTP) and fled to
rugged Romit Gorge area east of the capital
wanted ultimately to overthrow the government
this issue IRTP leader Kabilri who is self-imp
living in exile has refuted these allegations and c
cized Tajik government by skillfully elimina
Nazarzoda. Similarly, Ghaffor Mirzoev was ano
government ally who in 2004 was arrested and
cused of accumulating a large amount of weap
with the purpose of staging a coup d’etat.
Policy Measures by the CAS
The authorities of CAS are taking several po
measures to deal with the problems facing th
Firstly, being worried about recruitment of their
zens, they are taking serious measures including
tencing those found guilty of joining ISIS and puthem for several years in jail. For instance, on
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ational on charges of recruiting youth for ISIS. As
er reports he belonged to the banned Katibat al-
mam al-Bukhari group and he was detained at the
sh airport since he was about to travel to Turkey. A
pokesman for the Kyrgyz State Committee for Na-
onal Security (UKMK) Rakhat Sulaimanov, told on
7th July 2015 that the militants were planning sev-
ral terrorist attacks in the country, including one
gainst the Russian-led Kant military base, inKyrgyzstan’s north, and another targeting mass Eid
-Fitr prayers in Bishkek, thus justifying strict policy
measures to prevent such terrorist acts.
Similarly, on the 30 th September 2015
Kazak’s regional court sentenced 30 year old
razbek Apakashev who was found guilty of being
member of the Tablighi Jamaat group which is
anned in Kazakhstan. Some Islamic groups haveeen under increased scrutiny from the Kazakh au-
horities since a suspected Islamist militant carried
ut the country’s first-ever suicide bombing in the
orthwestern city of Aqtobe in 2011.
Tajik government facing similar problems has
anned its citizens to join extremist groups fighting in
yria and Iraq. In July 2015 as per official sources
20 cases were filed in court against the citizens join-ng the ISIS. Tajik government has serious concern
ecause it has admitted that the number of Tajiks
ghting in Syria and Iraq has grown during
he last couple of years to over 500 as stated by the
nterior Minister Ramazan Rakhimzoda in June 2015.
Tajikistan has become a victim of terrorism
nce in September 2015 there were armed attacks
n the capital. As opined by some analysts, subse-
uently the Tajik government banned the IRPT and
lacklisted by the Court and arrested its leadership.
ut on this issue there seem to be differences as
ome analysts contended that in recent past IRTP
was a moderate Islamic section of society and ban-
ing it might not be proper. A Central Asian analyst
odizoda has been candid in opining that they might
o underground and would be more radical. But on
his issue disagreeing with the views of analysts, the
ajik President Rahmon has been quite frank in ar-uing that rolling back Islamic influence in Tajikistan
lamists and security and stability interest of the c
try. In fact it is appreciable that the Tajik governm
has proposed to give amnesty to those returning f
Syria who have informed the ‘atrocities’ they f
which might deter others joining the IS.
Secondly, authorities in Central Asia have
posed to take serious policy measures being conce
by threats of radicalized youth who ordered to pr
gate to overthrow the elected governments. Fostance, in the first week of December 2
Tajikistan’s regional court of Khatlon sentenced s
youth up to 27 years of imprisonment for being g
of supporting ISIS and publicly calling to overth
the Tajik government. Similarly, the Uzbek auth
ties are concerned about extremist attacks in th
termath of acts of terrorism in many parts of the w
As stated by Bruce Pannier in November 2015 m
than 160 people were detained in Uzbekistan on picion of involvement with the ISIS.
Thirdly, it is a matter of serious concern
the authorities in Central Asia that some officia
high levels have been found to be involved in a
national activities and supporting these terrorist gro
For instance, in July 2015 a former Kyrgyz lawm
belonging to Ak-Jol (Bright Path) party was suspe
of supplying weapons to militants linked to thlamic State group. He was detained while attemp
to fly out of the country.
In Tajikistan also there are a few cases w
Tajiks at high level have joined Islamic State ha
resigned from their official positions in the gov
ment and political parties. For instance, the Tajik
terior Ministry’s Special Forces, Gulmurod Halim
appeared in a video clip saying he had joined th
lamic State extremist group to protest
government’s ban on Islamic dress in schools
offices. Even a more serious case is that of for
Deputy Defense Minister Abdulhalim Nazarzoda,
resigned from his position and actively participate
Islamic State activities against the government
was killed in police operation. He was also allege
be a member of IRPT party which has been ban
in the country.
As stated by Central Asia analysts, the IR
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war, which left tens of thousands dead and more than
million people displaced. It was the only officially
egistered Islamic party in the former Soviet Union,
nd was represented in the Tajik parliament for 15
ears until it failed in elections in March to meet the
hreshold for parliament. But as per official state-
ments due to several alleged terrorist acts committed
y members of IRPT, the government had to take
rong measures on this organization. In fact the de-sion of the court in September 2015 forced the clo-
ure of the IRPT’s Najot (Salvation) newspaper and
anned the distribution of any video, audio, or printed
materials related to the party’s activities. The per-
eption of some international agencies on this issue
eems to be different. For instance, as per reports onnd October 2015 UNHCR expressed reservation
ver Tajikistan’s banning the IRPT and this UN refu-
ee agency has expressed concern over the risk of ncreasing human rights violations in Tajikistan.
Fourthly, the CAS are concerned about cer-
ain political groups that are involved in extending fi-
ancial support to the extremist organizations. For
nstance, as stated officially by the Kyrgyz state,
Ak-Jol party is suspected of financially supporting
members of the Islamic State group targeted in
ounterterrorism raids and providing them with at leastwo Kalashnikov assault rifles. There is a similar case
n Tajikistan where a political unit known as the New
ajikistan movement was found to be involved in fi-
ancial irregularities including support to antisocial
ements. Hence as per reports it was crushed in
013 and the founder of the party has been given 29
ears of imprisonment on charges of financial crimes.
Fifthly, there is genuine concern on the part
f the authorities that some sections of religious heads
n Central Asia are active in propagating extremist
cts. In several cases they are being convicted for
oing so. For instance, on 7th October 2015, a court
n the Osh region of Kyrgyz state found Imam Rashod
ori Kamolov guilty of inciting religious discord and
he possession and distribution of extremist
materials and hence sentenced him to five years in
rison. It is reported that Kamolov, a 37-year-old eth-
ic Uzbek, is the imam at the As-Sarakhsi Mosque inhe Kara-Suu district.
Sixthly, for almost 20 years, authoritie
Turkmenistan have tried to isolate the country
constantly referring to its UN-recognized status
‘neutral country’. But as the country propose
celebrate the 20th anniversary in October 2015,
to worsening security conditions, its policy of “p
tive neutrality” was undergoing a change. Th
mainly due to the fact that events both regionally
globally have started to erode this strategy and crwere appearing. Hence the definitions of “pos
neutrality” needed to be revised.
For instance in October 2015 the situatio
northwestern Afghanistan, in the areas adjoi
Turkmenistan particularly Faryab Province was
ting from bad to worse. In fact since the last
year or so security condition was getting worse
in May 2014 three Turkmen body guards were kiThere was realization of security concern since
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are not members
military bloc and hence cannot depend upon any c
try for their external security threats. In term
defense capability Turkmenistan is worse
Uzbekistan since the Uzbek leadership started bu
ing up its military shortly after becoming inde
dent. But being exposed to threat in 2014 Turk
authorities have been working to build up the arforces and strengthen the presence along the f
tier with Afghanistan. As per some reports from
USA, in March 2015, the Turkmen expressed a
sire to acquire U.S. military equipment and tech
ogy to address threats to their security from Afgh
stan.
Contentions and Contradictions
The state authorities and opposition groups and
ics have differences on security related issues
on activities of organizations. For instance, it is
tented by some critics that there is discontentm
over the increasingly authoritarian style of govern
which is potentially more dangerous since that m
be partly contributing to recruitment for ISIS.
alleged that there is widespread unhappiness
the dire socio-economic situation in Tajikistan a
from lack of political freedom. The Tajik Presi
Emomali Rahmon, who has led Tajikistan since 1has been criticized for his authoritarian-style rule
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the case so far as Uzbekistan is concerned But the
fficial position in Tajikistan is that security and sta-
ility of the country is important and policies are taken
o safeguard national interest. The Tajik government
while allowing religious freedom does not want ex-
rnal elements to influence their citizens. It is con-
nded by some analysts, the president has controlled
lam by keeping the nominally independent Muftiat
which appoints Muslim clerics. Majority of the Tajiksre followers of Hanafi Islam and any other Sunni
ects are considered by the government as detrimental
o social cohesion. Hence as opined by Sojida
jakhfarova the Salafi (Wahhabi) sect of Islam is
fficially prohibited in Tajikistan. The rise of IS and
he recruitment of Tajiks to its ranks has provided
ew opportunities for Tajikistan to link certain brands
f Islam, particularly Salafism, with the IS group and
herefore also with threats to national security. Hences opined by some specialists the government be-
eves that Wahhabis plan to destroy Tajiks’ funda-
mental beliefs of Hanafi Islam and the foundations
f the secular state.
Similarly, as opined by some critics, the Uzbek
overnment had earlier banned Islamic group Hizb
t-Tahrir linking it to Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
MU) and now linking it to ISIS. In the 1990’s inzbekistan the case of Mullah Abdullo was signifi-
ant who formed IMU, which has been designated
y several countries as a terrorist organization. Hence
he Uzbek authorities have taken strong measures
gainst suspected terrorists when 160 people were
rrested having links with this banned groups sup-
orting the cause of the ISIS. But some analysts are
andid in stating that this is overreaction and many of
hem might not belong to the IS. But contrary to the
ate official position, as opined by some analysts Hizb
t-Tahrir has sought to create an Islamic caliphate
ut disavows the use of violence to achieve this goal.
ut from the perspective the national interest the
zbek president Islam Karimov wants to take pre-
entive policy measures. Hence for security reasons
n the spring of 2015, the Uzbek law enforcement
gencies conducted a series of exercises in
zbekistan’s section of the Ferghana Valley, which
a very sensitive region in Central Asia.
In the aftermath of the Uzbek independ
in the 1990’s IMU was one of the oldest organ
tions with aggressive ideology in Central Asia a
also highly controversial. Overtime the leadersh
IMU has changed and according to some analy
has become weaker during the last about a dec
Moreover, the location of IMU has changed f
Uzbekistan to Afghanistan and subsequently to P
stan. Apart from that as opined by analysts there been change in its alliance s from Taliban to ISI
Perspectives and Challenges
In the background of what is stated above, it is wo
while considering perspectives so far as efforts
made to find solution to terrorism and security thr
facing the CAS. Firstly, Council for Security Tr
Organization (CSTO) is a regional organization
by Russia concerning security related issues omember countries. Considering the fact that Tajik
witnessed several terrorist attacks recently an
September 2015 when more than 20 people w
killed including police officers threatening stabili
the country, Vladimir Putin has assured Russian
and support to ensure that Tajik armed forces w
“successfully dealing with the problems that ar
In fact at the CSTO Summit Putin expressed his
cern for likely spillover of violence from Afghaninto Tajikistan and other CAS. As a part of its
port in October 2015 Russian officials have annou
plans to increase the number of troops statione
Tajikistan to 9,000 over the next five years an
provide more military equipment through 2020.
sian media have reported that Moscow is also
pared to grant Tajikistan $1.2 billion in military
over the next few years.
Similarly, at the CSTO summit meeting
in the Tajik capital city of Dushanbe in the sec
week of September 2015 during which the head
Tajikistan and Kazakhstan discussed the need
greater economic cooperation and signed a new “
tegic partnership”. This shows that efforts are b
made by the regional leaders to find solutions to
intraregional differences and problems facing t
including threats to security by terrorist organizati
Similar efforts are being made by the Shanghaioperation Organization (SCO) to deal with the s
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hallenge for both the CSTO and SCO which have
een in existence after the Soviet breakup, to effec-
vely resolve persisting intraregional issues and solve
he security threats facing the CAS at present. On
he 21st December 2015 leaders of CSTO and EEU
met in Moscow during which the Russian presiden-
al aide Yury Ushakov stated that adopting a state-
ment on the fight against terrorism will an important
em of agenda, which is an evidence of the serious-ess of the problem facing all the member countries
ncluding the CAS.
Secondly, it is a matter of great geo-political
gnificance that on the 16th of October 2015, leaders
f the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
gned 17 agreements including a statement on
ombating international terrorism and also an
greement on military cooperation. This is particularlyelevant for the CAS. But CIS has a major challenge
o revive itself and ensure that agreements signed
ecome effective in reality to solve problems facing
he CAS. It is appreciable that during the conference
eld in Kazakhstan, the Russian president Vladimir
utin specifically mentioned that the situation in
Afghanistan is critical and one of the goals of Islamic
rrorists is to penetrate the Central Asian region.
ajikistan and Kyrgyz being neighbor of Afghanistanould be the worst sufferers. But the position of
Uzbekistan is somewhat different. As per reports,
peaking in Tashkent on 1st September 2015 at a
eremony marking the 24 th anniversary of
Uzbekistan’s independence, Islam Karimov was
andid in stating that the Uzbek armed forces will
ever be involved in any military activities abroad.
Karimov’s statement comes five days after the United
tates said it had asked Tashkent to join the
multinational coalition against the Islamic State group.
his assumes significance since the country needs
he support of USA and other powers to contain
rrorist threats for its security. Hence it is to be seen
whether there will be change in the policy of the
overnment as situation changes for worse affecting
he security of the country.
Thirdly, while the CAS are coming close to
ussia, they are moving away from Western countriesnd in some cases closing the military bases which
conflict arising from Afghanistan in the afterma
26/11 attack in New York. For instance, Germ
has to close its base in Termez in Uzbekistan, in 2
USA closed its Kyrgyz base in Manas so also Fr
closed its base in Dushanbe in Tajikistan. This c
be partly because the term of contract was over
partly due to pressure from Russia. But under
prevailing circumstances, it will be a challenge
the CAS to bring about policy revision with regathese military bases by the West from
perspectives of their own security.
Fourthly, the Kazak president Nazarb
during his meeting with Putin in October 2
reiterated the need for a united front against terror
He has also been supportive of the role of Eura
Economic Union (EEU) in dealing with economic
other related issues. “We are proposing the creaof a forum on Islam against Terrorism, and if
receive support this will be the right action to ta
the Kazakh leader said. For the EEU which has b
formed only recently focusing on issues of econo
cooperation, it will be a formidable task and chall
to be an effective organization to deal with tas
combating terrorism in Central Asia.
Lastly, Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister EIdrissov has urged world leaders to unite effor
combat the threat posed by the Islamic State
group. On this issue the Kazakh president Nazarb
has made historic speech at the UN in Septem
2015 highlighting the need to create a Global A
Terrorist Coalition to defeat the threat to the w
He asserted that the conflict in Syria is the gre
challenge which needs to be resolved by
international community. A political settlement in S
is the only way to stop the violence and that the
need to develop universal, anti-terror l
instruments. He reminded the recent UN Secu
Council Resolution on Foreign Terrorist Figh
cosponsored by Kazakhstan. This has to be achie
even as it is a major challenge. It is very impor
that both Russia and the Western powers
particularly the USA have to compromise
collectively take policy decisions, which
challenging task. But there is no alternative to sthe problem of terrorist threats posed by the ISI
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Terrorism and Geopolitics in West AAnil Kam
ntroduction
il has been a major driving force behind foreignnterests, regional and domestic balance of power,
nd territorial conflicts in the West Asia. As a result
f the ‘9/11’ terrorist attacks debates on oil and the
United States’ security agenda have significantly
hifted. If on one side, those opposing US military
nterventionism have argued that the ‘war on terror’
rovided one more convenient cover for a renewed
mperialist oil grab’ in this region; on the other, links
etween oil and terrorism pointed at problems of
overnance in oil-producing countries. As the ‘war
n terror’ became justified as a ‘war of liberation’
gainst oil-funded dictators, the US portrayed its
oreign policy as shifting from ensuring free access
o oil for the world market, to ensuring that oil is
elivering ‘freedom’ to local populations. Although
ngaging the crucial issue of oil governance, there is
et little evidence given the number of war victims
nd potential vested interests that a US policy shift
om ‘free oil’ to ‘freedom oil’ is genuine and viable.
The geopolitical and the security environment
n West Asia have undergone dramatic changes
uring recent years. Before the Arab uprisings,
Afghanistan and Iraq were considered the centre of
he crisis in West Asia, however the Arab movements
d to the emergence of new focal points of crisis in
arious countries of the region, from Syria to Bahrain,
gypt, Libya and Yemen. Great powers and regionalctors not only have not been able to manage these
rises but also have pursued a strategy with zero-
um results. Therefore, the new developments have
nprecedentedly increased tensions between regional
owers.Strategic surprises or unexpected events
ave taken place which had remarkable impact on
he distribution of power at international or regional
vels. For instance, the collapse of the Soviet Union
nd 9/11 can be seen as strategic surprises in theistory which had impact on foreign policy of number
of countries. During the last four years, number
strategic surprises have occurred in the West Aregion, including the Arab uprisings, the civil w
Syria, the rapid domination of ISIS over vast territo
in Syria and Iraq and the Saudi Arabian invasio
Yemen. As this list indicates, recent years h
witnessed many more strategic surprises than
time in the past and have changed the geopoli
situation of the region. Today, it is non-state ac
who have become the main sources of strat
surprises in West Asia in the form of pop
movements or terrorist groups. The change in
sources of strategic surprises has made cr
management much more difficult than the past
has an impact on other parts of the world. Ano
emerging development in the West Asia secu
environment is the rapid and frequent changes in
status quo of the actors which can be call
“changing status.” In other words, the regi
balance of power has become more unstable
earlier periods. The primacy of regional actorapidly becoming unstable and winners are becom
losers. With this in mind, regional actors, facing
increasing fluctuation of balance of power, will
their geopolitical positions unstable. Needless to
preserving the geopolitical interests in the f
balance of power is much more costly than in st
conditions.
Tension in West AsiaThe Sunni-Shiite tension in the Middle East has b
on the rise since the civil war in Iraq that follo
the US-led invasion in 2003. Next were the cla
between Sunni and Shiite militias in Lebanon in 2
while the Shiites in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia step
up their campaign for more political and cultural ri
in the two Sunni-ruled monarchies. To be s
historical animosities do play a part, but contempo
sectarian tension in the Middle East is driven prim by inequality. It typically thrives in environm
h li i h i i
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ave – privileged access to government, wealth or
lace in a nation’s cultural life. The Shiites in Bahrain
want equal access to senior government positions,
while the Sunni minority in Iraq feels side-lined by
he Shiite-dominated central government. But this is
nly one side of the story. Growing level of sectarian
nsion is also closely linked to the regional cold war
etween the Sunni Saudi Arabia and the Shiite power
an: to mobilize regional support, Riyadh presentsself as the protector of Sunni communities, while
ehran seeks allies among the Shiites in Lebanon in
aq.
The wave of anti-government protests that
egan in 2011, known as the Arab Spring, only
xacerbated these fault-lines. Not because the Arab
pring protests were religious in nature, but because
hey threatened to shatter the existing political ordersn the Middle East. This alarms both Saudi Arabia
nd Iran, and Arabs living in mixed Sunni-Shiite areas
nd themselves between a hammer and the anvil.
rouble Spots in West Asia
ahrain: Majority Shiite at 65-70% being ruled by
he Al Khalifa, a Sunni royal family. Most senior
ositions in government and the security apparatus
re reserved for the Sunni minority. The Arab Springas given new life to the mostly Shiite anti-government
movement. Backed by Saudi Arabia, Bahraini
overnment has crackdown on the uprising, accusing
an of inciting the Shiite majority. Bahrain’s largely
hiite opposition continues its struggle against the
unni royal family, even though it has met little
nternational support. Here are reasons why crisis in
ahrain won’t go away:
In response to protests demanding greater
emocracy that began in February 2011, the ruling
l-Khalifa family promised constitutional reform
ut little has been delivered. Even reform-minded
oyals, such as Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al
Khalifa, fear that a rush to democratic reform would
e a start of a slippery slope, allowing the opposition
o one day dispense with the system as a whole. The
l-Khalifa do not claim absolutist, divinely inspired
uthority like the Saudi royals, nor do they presidever a Syria-style one-party system. Bahrain has multi-
remains a highly authoritarian state where ele
legislative bodies hold little control over narrow r
elite. The fact that senior government posts
positions in the security apparatus seem alm
exclusively reserved for Sunnis has always add
distinct sectarian dynamic to Bahraini politics. Fo
part , the government consciously encoura
suspicions of protesters’ alleged loyalties to the S
Iran. Bahraini rulers lack the luxury of abundanreserves to keep the masses happy with mas
welfare programs and cosy government jobs.
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has pledged
billion in budgetary support, but ongoing unre
deepening.
The regime may maintain dialogue
moderate opposition parties, such as al-Wefaq
there is no short fix for income disparities and growsocial tension. The principal safety valve of Kh
rulers is the staunch support from Saudi Arabia
other GCC members who sent troops to Bahra
March 2011 to quell the unrest. The wealthy
monarchies simply cannot allow one of their ow
go down, while the US is reluctant to poke at the
bastion of pro-American rulers in the Middle E
Unfortunately for Bahrainis, the future of their cou
has become firmly embedded in the regional riv between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Bahraini and S
governments have long claimed Iran’s han
domestic unrest, although we have yet to see
solid evidence of that.
Iraq: Sunni Arab minority approximately at 2
Kurds and others 20% are being governed by maj
Shiite Arab (around 60%). Central governme
dominated by Shiite parties, causing resentm
among Sunni Arab groups which controlled the I
state under ex-leader Saddam Hussein. Attack
Iraqi security forces and indiscriminate targetin
Shiite civilians have mushroomed since the withdr
of US troops in December 2011. Extremist S
groups affiliated to Al-Qaeda are trying delibera
to reignite Sunni-Shiite violence to destabilize
state.Al Qaeda in Iraq operates under the umb
of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), a coalition of mil
groups that boast a long track record of fightingUS troops. The worst days of violence in Iraq
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estabilizing factor for Iraq and the wider region. Al
aeda in Iraq is based in the country’s north-west,
n area populated predominantly by Sunni Arabs, who
eld top government positions under former president
addam Hussein. ISI thrives on local resentment of
he Shiite-dominated government in the capital
aghdad, blamed for lack of economic development
nd jobs in this part of Iraq. ISI’s traditional base is
mall Sunni towns in the Anbar province, but itsnofficial capital is now Mosul, Iraq’s third largest
ty. Since late 2011, ISI has been extending its
perations from Anbar into neighbouring Syria.
ISI has its roots in the Sunni Islamist
nsurgency that emerged after the US-led invasion
f Iraq in 2003, when dozens of armed groups
eclared a jihad, a holy war, against the new Shiite
overnment and all foreign troops. Indiscriminatettacks on Shiite civilians triggered a de facto civil
war in mixed Sunni-Shiite area. Main Sunni jihadist
roups formally joined forces under the ISI umbrella.
Although not all of these groups were affiliated with
Al Qaeda, ISI leadership under the notorious Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi (killed 2006) swore its allegiance
o Osama bin Laden, making the militant coalition an
fficial Al Qaeda branch in Iraq. US troops
uccessfully recruited leading Sunni Arab tribes intohe so-called “Awakening Councils” to fight against
Al Qaeda, after religious extremists alienated the local
opulation with their brutality and fanaticism. ISI lost
round in the Anbar province and became increasingly
eliant on foreign jihadists. Iraqi security forces won
he war against the militants, but many Sunnis now
eel side-lined by the government. ISI is tapping into
his discontent, linking new recruits with old militant
etworks under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-
aghdadi.
ISI wants to establish an Islamist state
ncompassing all of Iraq, based on Al Qaeda’s strict
nterpretation of the Sunni doctrine. ISI’s more
mmediate and more realistic objective is to regain its
ormer strongholds in Anbar province and establish
ear territorial control with parallel government
ructures. To this end, it tries to reignite sectarian
onflict and destabilize the Iraqi state. Research byAND National Defense Research Institute in late
from selling stolen goods, including construc
equipment, generators, and electrical cables. Loo
and extortion is also being carried out. Besides
now that it has captured number of oil fields,
selling crude oil and earning millions of dollars.
The media outreach has a strong secta
tone, posing ISI as a protector of Iraqi Sunnis ag
both the Shiite Iran and the US. This gives ISI (Isla
State of Iraq) a distinctly local brand, althoughgroup still threatens to strike at targets in the
Europe and other parts of the region. Violence
increased sharply since the withdrawal of US tro
in December 2011, with at least one large-s
attack per month. ISI is systematically subduing l
government structures in its north-eastern strongh
while trying to discredit the central governmen
orchestrating regular bombings in Baghdad.
Islamist group appeals to low-income Shiites wnetwork of charities. Its armed wing has fou
against the government forces, rival Shiite gro
and against Sunni militias.
Kuwait: Kuwait is ruled by a Sunni royal fam
where the Sunnis consist of almost 70% of
population and rest are Shiites. Sunni-Shiite relat
are markedly better than elsewhere in the Per
Gulf, although Shiite politicians complain of anti-S prejudice. Shiites form part of the merchant elite
have their representatives in Kuwait’s v
parliament. Fortunately, in Kuwait sectarianism
always been a non-starter. Though aware of secta
differences, these were never highly politicized.
Shias in Kuwait has been an integral part of soc
before there was even a polity to speak of. T
make up roughly one half of the country’s merc
class. Unlike in Bahrain, the Shia hold h
government positions and 9 of Kuwait’s 50 ele
members of parliament are Shia. Although s
neighbourhoods are becoming more homogeno
Shiite, contrary to the situation in Bahrain, the
majority of Sunnis and Shia live beside each othe
and have for decades as houses generally stay w
families. Simply put, the Shias are fully Kuwaiti
have long been regarded as such by the governm
and Kuwaiti Sunnis.
There are two issues for which talking h
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nd loyalty. Polemical comments about shiites have
layed into deliberate othering tactics in efforts to
rive a wedge between Sunni and Shiite communities,
nd have unfortunately been picked up by the masses.
etting aside the historical fact that many Kuwaitis
f Arab origin are Shia and Kuwaitis of Persian origin
re Sunnis; many programs are propagating an idea
hat Shia have Iranian origins and are thus an alien
resence.
Anti-Shia sentiment has come at a time for
he Shia in Kuwaiti national politics, as they must juggle
heir relations with the populous and the government,
who are themselves at odds. The ruling family, with
whom they have a very good relationship, continues
o front a very unpopular prime minister, leading to
ountless stalemates within parliament. Although
hiite MPs are now in solidarity with those who wisho oust the “corrupt” prime minister, the initial
eluctance of some to do so (and potentially jeopardize
elations with the ruling family) was identified as proof
hat the Shia does not really want what is best for
Kuwait. Kuwait will not become Bahrain in terms of
utright violence, but if media in Kuwait continues to
raw lines in the sand between the sects, these lines
ould very well become perforations over time and
erhaps more quickly if tensions in Bahrain continueo escalate.
ebanon: In a country where the Shiites consist of
40%, Sunnis 20% of the total population and Small
Alawite community which has settled in the northern
ty of Tripoli. (Though no official census since 1932
as been conducted), top positions in government are
ivided strictly along the confessional lines. Shiites
re only entitled to the position of the parliament
peaker, but they control by far the strongest armed
militia (Hezbollah). The uprising in Syria has greatly
xacerbated sectarian tension in Lebanon. Lebanon’s
unnis sympathize with, and in some cases aid, the
argely Syrian rebels, who are setting up a base in
orthern Lebanon. The Shiite Hezbollah is allied to
he Syrian regime and is backed by Iran. Violence
as flared in Tripoli between Sunnis and a local Alawite
minority which sides with the Syrian regime.
The impact of the Syrian uprising on Lebanon
No other two Arab countries have their destinie
closely intertwined, and no country in the region
divided on the issue of the Syrian uprising as Leba
Overwhelming support for Syrian government co
from the close alliance between Assad and Hezbo
the main Lebanese Shiite party. Vast majorit
Lebanese Sunnis sympathize with the largely Su
led uprising in Syria. The Christians are div
between political parties that rely on Assad’s supand those strongly opposed to Syria’s influenc
Lebanon. The stakes are high for Hezbollah w
controls the largest and best-equipped armed f
in Lebanon. Meanwhile, Syrian refugees, a
deserters and rebel groups stream to the largely S
northern Lebanon, where they can count on substa
local support. But pro-Assad Lebanese groups
unlikely to sit back and watch the area becom
rear base for Syrian rebels, making northern Lebaa proxy battleground of the Syrian conflict.
Saudi Arabia: The Shiite minority about 10-
populates the oil-rich Eastern Province. All po
rests in the hands of Al Saud, a Sunni royal dyn
The government is cracking down on largely peac
Shiite protests for greater religious and cult
freedom and better access to governm
employment. State officials blame Iran for the unalthough there is yet no evidence of Tehr
involvement. It is the richest State in the region
Syria: The majority is of Sunni Arab (around 7
and the Alawite are in minority (10-15%). Ru
Assad family belongs to the Alawite minority
offshoot of Shiite Islam. Alawites control top posit
in the army and the intelligence apparatus. A
core, the civil war in Syria is not a religious con
The dividing line is one’s loyalty to the Ass
government. However, some religious commun
tend to be more supportive of the regime than
others, fuelling mutual suspicion and relig
intolerance in many parts of the country.
Syria is an Arab country with a Kurdish
Armenian minority. In term of religious identity, m
of the Arab majority belongs to the Sunni branc
Islam, with several Muslim minority groups assocwith the Shiite Islam. The Christians from diffe
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opulation. The emergence among the anti-
overnment rebels of hardliner Sunni Islamist militias
ghting for an Islamic state has alienated the
minorities. The outside interference from the Shiite
an and the Sunni Saudi Arabia makes matter worse,
eeding into the wider Sunni-Shiite tension in the
Middle East. President Bashar al-Assad belongs to
he Alawite minority, an offshoot of Shiite Islam
pecific to Syria (with small population pockets inebanon).
The Assad family has been in power since
970 and although it presided over a secular regime,
many Syrians think Alawites have enjoyed privileged
ccess to top government jobs and business
pportunities. After the outbreak of the anti-
overnment uprising in 2011, the vast majority of
Alawites rallied behind the regime, fearful of iscrimination if the Sunni majority came to power.
Most of the top rank in the army and the intelligence
ervices are Alawites, making the community as a
whole closely identified with the government camp
n the civil war. A majority of Syrians are Sunni Arabs,
ut they are politically divided.
True, most of the fighters in the
pposition Free Syrian Army come from the Sunnirovincial heartlands, and many Sunni Islamists don’t
onsider Alawites as real Muslims. The armed
onfrontation between largely Sunni rebels and the
Alawite-led government troops has led some
bservers to see Syria’s civil war as the conflict
etween Sunnis and Alawites. Most of the regular
overnment soldiers fighting the rebels are Sunni
ecruits (though thousands have defected to the
pposition), and Sunnis hold leading positions in the
overnment, the bureaucracy, the ruling Baath Party,
nd the business community.Some businessmen and
middle class Sunnis support the regime because they
want to protect their material interests.
The war in Syria has attracted number of
ountries. Russia and Iran are supporting President
ashar al-Assad. The US is supporting the Sunni
ebels. To create more confusion, Germany, France
nd Britain are fighting and trying to destroy the ISIS.ussia says that it is also fighting against the ISIS
rebels. ISIS has been created out of the Sunni re
in Syria and Sunni rebels from Iraq with its le
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. They have been joine
highly radicalisededucated and technically qualif
trained youth from different countries. These per
are motivating, brain washing and radicalising
youth from all over the world through their so
networking and propaganda, to join the IS in S
for what they call as Jihad. Large numbers of yfrom all over have been joining the IS. Most surpri
was that the Muslims from European countries h
joined the IS. About 1200 trained fighters f
Columbia have travelled from such far off count
join the IS. We can say that while communica
technology has done wonders, it has also ena
terrorist networks to encrypt their communicat
effectively. Due to the fighting in Syria thousand
Syrian have fled the country and have entEuropean countries as refugees creating a big c
and economic crisis in Europe.
Yemen: Zaydis, a Yemeni offshoot of the S
Islam, form around 45% of the population, the
are Sunni. Political alliances are built primaril
regional/tribal loyalties and commonality of inter
rather than religious affiliation. Religious differe
never played a central role in Yemeni politics.long-serving President Ali Abdullah al-Saleh
himself of Zeydi extraction. However, a rebe
against the state by a Zeydi clan, the Houthis,
the menace of Al Qaeda-affiliated Sunni extrem
has the potential to exacerbate religious fault-li
This rebel has attracted number of countries
have jumped into the fight. Iran is supporting Hou
with arms equipment and other aid. Whereas
Sunni dominated countries like Saudi Arabia
supporting the Sunni clans with all the aid
equipment. India and number of other countries h
pulled out their citizens from Yemen. This has
attracted number of radicalised Islamist groups
have also jumped in. People have been fleeing f
Yemen to other neighbouring countries.
Global Fight Against Extremism
During 2015 Islamist terrorist activities has been
and grim. In any given month, people have been kin the name of a pernicious ideology. This sprea
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he Islamic State in Iraq and Syria; it has become a
lobal problem. For that reason, the international
ommunity needs a comprehensive strategy to defeat
lamist extremism—one in which force, diplomacy
nd development work together to achieve a more
able world. The most urgent pillar of this strategy is
ismantling the Islamic State, which must be
iminated not just in Syria and Iraq, but also in Libya
nd everywhere else. All the countries must do whatnecessary to defeat a group that has seized territory
n five countries and declared a new state ruled by
anatical ideologues