World Bank Report Final

76
MALAYSIA Court Backlog and Delay Reducon Program A Progress Report August 2011 Poverty Reducon and Economic Management Sector Unit East Asia and Pacific Region Document of the World Bank

description

Transcript of World Bank Report Final

MALAYSIACourt Backlog and Delay Reduction ProgramA Progress Report

August 2011

Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector UnitEast Asia and Pacific Region

Document of the World Bank

Acronyms and Abbrevations

AGC AttorneyGeneral’sChambersB/F BalanceForward(pendingcasestransferredfromoneyeartothenext)C Civil(abbreviationfortables)CD CompactDiscCLE ContinuingLegalEducationCJ ChiefJusticeCMIS CourtManagementInformationSystemCMS CaseManagementSystemCMU CaseManagementUnitCOA CourtofAppealCr Criminal(abbreviationfortables)CRT CourtRecordingandTranscriptionDfID DepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentDNAA DischargednotAmountingtoAcquittalDPP DeputyPublicProsecutorGOM GovernmentofMalaysiaICT InformationandCommunicationTechnologyIEG IndependentEvaluationGroupIT InformationTechnologyJL Service JudicialandLegalServiceKL KualaLumpurL/A LeavetoAppeal(abbreviationfortables)MJU ManagingJudgeUnitMIS ManagementInformationSystemNCC NewCommercialCourtNCvC NewCivilCourtNEAC NationalEconomicAdvisoryCouncilNKRA NationalKeyResultsAreasPEMANDU PerformanceManagementandDeliveryUnitRM MalaysianRinggitROL RuleofLawUSAID UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopmentUSD UnitedStatesDollar

Acknowledgements

ThisreportwaspreparedbytheWorldBankinresponsetoarequestfromtheMalaysianJudiciaryundertheFee-basedServicearrangement.ItisintendedtobeanobjectiveassessmentoftheFederalCourt’srecentreformprogramaimedatreducingcasebacklogsandimprovingefficiencyinthejudicialservices.ThereportwaswrittenbyLinnHammergrenconsultant)underthedirectionofYasuhikoMatsuda(Sr.PublicSectorSpecialist,EASPR,andTaskTeamLeader)andoverallsupervisionofMathewVerghis (LeadEconomist forMalaysia,EASPR)andRob-ertTaliercio(LeadEconomistforPublicSectorManagement,EASPR).ThepeerreviewerswereDavidBernstein (Sr.OperationsOfficer,INTSC)andBarryWalsh(LEGJR).

TheteamacknowledgesthegenerouscooperationextendedtotheBankmissionsbytheFederalCourtaswellastheNationalEconomicAdvisoryCouncilandtheEconomicPlanningUnit.ItisespeciallygratefultoChiefJusticeZakiAzmiforfacilitatingthemeetingswithintheJudiciaryandwithotherorganizations;tohisassistant,MohdAizuddinbinZolkeply for settingupappointmentsandaccompanying theconsultant toallmeetings; tootherJusticesoftheFederalCourtandespeciallyChiefJudgeofMalaya,ArifinZakaria,andJusticesJamesFoongYuen,RausSharif,AbdullHamidEmbong,andSuriyadiHalimOmarfortakingpartininterviewsandensuringthattheirstaffwasavailable;tomembersoftheCourt’sadministrativeofficesandespeciallyHashimHamzah,ChiefRegis-trar;totheregistrarsandjudgesoftheKualaLumpurandShahAlamHighCourts;andtomembersoftheNationalEconomicAdvisoryCouncil,theLegalAffairsDivisionandthePerformanceManagementandDeliveryUnit(PE-MANDU)ofthePrimeMinister’sDepartment,andthePresidentoftheBarCouncil,RagunathKesavan.

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVESUMMARY ....................................................................................................................................... i

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................. 1

CHAPTERI:BACKGROUNDONMALAYSIA,ITSLEGALSYSTEMANDJUDICIALORGANIZATION ......................... 2

CountryBackground........................................................................................................................................ 2

JudicialOrganization,Staffing,andResourceAllocations ............................................................................. 3

CHAPTERII:THEREFORMPROGRAM:2008TOPRESENT .................................................................................. 15

ReformHistoryandOverviewofObjectives................................................................................................... 15

Strategy ......................................................................................................................................................... 17

ReformComponents ..................................................................................................................................... 19

NextSteps ..................................................................................................................................................... 36

AdditionalReformElementsoutsidetheCourtProgram ............................................................................. 37

Corruption ..................................................................................................................................................... 42

CHAPTERIII:ACHIEVEMENTSOFTHE2008-2011REFORM ............................................................................... 43

KeyIndicatorsofResultsasUsedInternationallyandasAdaptedtotheMalaysianProgram ..................... 44

OtherFindings ............................................................................................................................................... 56

FurtherRecommendationsasRegardsFurtherDataCollectionandStatisticalReports................................ 59

CHAPTERIV:LOOKINGAHEAD ........................................................................................................................... 61

AreasAlreadyTargetedtoCompletetheFirstPhaseReformsandforWorkonthe

ProposedSecondPhase ............................................................................................................................ 61

AreasSuggestedforImmediateAttentionorforInclusioninFuturePrograms ........................................... 64

SuggestionsforAdditionalIn-DepthStudiesandAssessments .................................................................... 70

AdministrativeTribunals(andOtherNon-JudicialDisputeResolutionForums) ........................................... 74

ConclusionsonNextSteps ............................................................................................................................ 75

CHAPTERV:INCONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 77

REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................................... 80

List of Figures

Figure1:BasicStructureofFederalJudiciary ....................................................................................................... 5

Figure2:ComparisonofDisposalofA-TrackCases,HighCourtCivilDivision,KL ................................................ 53

Figure3:ComparisonofDisposalofT-TrackCases,HighCourt,CivilDivision,KL ............................................... 53

Figure4:ModesofDisposalforKLNCCCases,September-December,2009 ...................................................... 57

Figure5:PercentageofPostponementsbyParties,CriminalCases,KualaLumpur, SessionsCourt,July2010 ................................................................................................................................. 58

Figure6:PercentageofPostponementsbyParties,CivilCases,KualaLumpur,SessionsCourt,July201 ........... 58

List of TablesTable1:JudicialPositions,AuthorizedandFilled,asof2011 .............................................................................. 6

Table2:ComparisonofJudges-to-PopulationRatio,SelectedCountries ............................................................ 7

Table3:BudgetsforJudiciary,2008-2011,inRM ................................................................................................ 12

Table4:ComparisonofPEMANDUBacklogReductionTargetsfor2010andCourtBacklogStatistics (ViolentCrimesOnly) ....................................................................................................................................... 41

Table5:BackloggedPendingCasesforAllCourts,Endof2009and2010;Numbersof“Backlogged”Cases (thosefiledbefore2009)StillinCourtroomFiles ............................................................................................ 46

Table6:AgeingListsbyYear–AllTrialCourts,CivilCases,2009-April2011 ....................................................... 47

Table7:EndofYearAgeingLists-AllTrialCourts,CriminalCases,2009-April2011 .......................................... 48

Table8:ClearanceRatesforCourtsbyInstance,for2007-2010 ......................................................................... 49

Table9:ComparisonofCarryover,NewFilings,andDispositions–AllCourts,2009-April2011 ........................ 50

Table10:MonthlyPendingCases-NewCommercialCourt,KualaLumpur,September2009-April2011 .......... 55

Table11:MonthlyPendingCases-NewCivilCourtKualaLumpur,October2010-April2011 ............................ 56

i

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

F i

iF i

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

ThisstudyreviewstheinitialresultsofeffortsbytheFederalCourtofMalaysiatoimprovejudicialperformance,1.especiallyintheareasofbackloganddelayreduction.ItwaswrittenattherequestoftheCourtandwasintendedto evaluate progress to date, suggest how theprogrammight be improved, andprovide recommendationsonfurtheractionsinaproposedsecondphasereform.TheworkisbasedondocumentsandstatisticsmadeavailablebytheCourt,twoweeksoffieldwork(January2011)inPutrajaya(theFederalGovernmentAdministrativeCenterand seat of the Federal Court and Court of Appeal) and the High Courts in the two largest court complexes,KualaLumpurandShahAlam,andafollow-upvisit inMay2011todiscussthepreliminaryconclusionswiththeJudiciaryandalso toupdatematerialon this rapidlymovingprogram.While intendedasanexternal reviewofthe Malaysian Judiciary’s recent reform efforts, the study describes a model and lessons applicable to courtsystemselsewhere that are facing similar problemsorwishing to improveother aspects of their performance.

Background

Malaysiaisamiddle-incomecountryofroughly28millioninhabitants,locatedinSoutheastAsiaandcomprising2.WestMalaysia(ontheMalayPeninsula)andEastMalaysia(thenorthernportionoftheislandofBorneo).Itisafederationof13states,ofwhichonlytwo(SabahandSarawak)areinEastMalaysia.ItisaconstitutionalmonarchyandparliamentarydemocracyfollowingtheWestminstermodelandisfederallyorganized.TheFederalConstitutionisthesupremelawoftheland,buteachstatehasitsownconstitution.TheMalaysianKing(Yangdi-PertuanAgong)istheheadofstate,andiselectedfora5-yeartermfromamongthenineMalaysianstateswithRulersbythissamegroup.TheKingistechnicallyresponsibleforappointingthehighestlevelgovernmentofficials(includingsuperiorcourtjudges),butindoingsohastraditionallyfollowedtheadviceofthePrimeMinister,pursuanttothelatter’sconsultationswithothergroups,asdefinedintheFederalConstitution.

Malaysia’s courtshaveaunitary,not federalorganization.Therearealso statecourts thatuseSyariahand3.traditionallawandareregulatedbystatelaw.Withintheformal(Federal)courtsystem,thereisoneFederalCourt,oneCourtofAppeal,andtwoHighCourts,oneforWestMalaysiaandoneforEastMalaysia.Theirmembersconstitutethesuperiorcourtjudges,whoafter2009arenominatedbyaJudicialAppointmentsCommission, introducedinthat year to address complaints about the insufficient transparency andpoliticizationof the formerprocess. Asecond,largergroupofsubordinatecourtjudgescomprisesthoseassignedtomagistrateandsessionscourts.Theyaredrawnfromagovernment-wideJudicialandLegalService,whosemembersmaybeassignedtolegalpositionsinanyofthethreebranchesofgovernment,andtraditionallyrotatedamongthem.Thisinter-branchrotationislesscommontoday,butwithinthecourts,JLServicemembersaretypicallyrotatedbetweenadministrativeandjudicialpositions,oftenbeginningasaseniorassistantregistrar,thenmovingtoapositionasamagistrate,deputyregistrarorapurelyadministrativejob(e.gintheStatisticsUnit)andthenbacktoanassignmentasajudge.Membersofthisgroupdonotautomatically rise to thesuperior courtsand in factmust resign fromthe JLService inordertobe considered for aposition there. This two-part career systemdoespose certainproblems, includingmostrecently,theFederalCourt’sabilitytonegotiatesubstantiallyhighersalariesonlyforthesuperiorcourtjudges.StaffbelongingtotheJLServicewasnotaffectedastheirremunerationsareregulatedbygovernment-widepolicies.

ii iii

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

ii iii

Court organization and procedures follow common4.law practices, and cases in all but the Federal CourtandCourtofAppealareusuallyheardbyasinglejudge.AppealsfromthesubordinatecourtsareheardbytheHighCourts,inadditionaltotheirnormalworkloadoforiginaljurisdictioncases,whilethosefromtheHighCourtgotothe Court of Appeal, which like the Federal Court doesoperateinpanels.Thetotalnumberofjudgesisunusuallylow,evenforacommonlawcountry,butJudicialandLegalServicesstaffassignedtocourtroompositionsalsodoessomeprocessingofcases.Whenthisgroupisincluded,thejudge-to-populationlevelrisesfrom1.5to2.4per100,000inhabitants. Moreover the state courts (Syariah andtraditional)aswellasasystemofadministrativetribunalstake up somedemand. In any event, judicial caseloads,whilesubstantial,arenotlargeenoughtoexplaindelaysandbacklogs,andthereformdescribedhereinhas thusworkedonaddressingotherfactorsaccountingforthem.

Asidefromproblemswiththelowstartingsalariesof5.JudicialandLegalStaff,theJudiciaryseemswellfunded,anduntilagovernment-widebudgettighteningexercisein2011,usuallyreceiveditsrequestedallocationoffunds.Judicial administrative offices handle allocations for“emoluments” (salaries, benefits, and allowances) andoperating expenses, but not development (investment)expenditures. Since 2003, the courts’ developmentbudget is managed by the Legal Affairs Division of thePrime Minister’s Department, a situation the Judiciaryfinds inconvenient largely because it has little sayin the design, placement, and construction of courtinfrastructure,thetraditionaluseofthesefunds.Certainproblems encountered in the recent IT contracts mayalsobeattributedtothispractice,although it ishardtosaywhethertheJudiciarywouldhavedonebetter.IftheJudiciaryobtainscontrolofitsdevelopmentbudget,itwillhavetostaffupforthispurpose.Thecourtsalsogeneratesubstantial income for theTreasury in the formoffinesandfees,butthesuggestionthattheyretainallorapartofthismeritsfurtherstudy.

The Reform

Sincethelate1980s,Malaysia’sJudiciaryfacednearly6.twodifficult decades inwhich its reputation forprobityandspeedydeliveryofdecisionsdeclineddramatically.Inlate2008,withtheappointmentofanewChiefJustice,itbeganareformprogramaimedinparticularatthesecondproblem,throughadelayandbacklogreductionexercise,andindirectly,atthefirst,bymorecarefulmonitoringof

judges’ productivity. Although the Chief Justice and theheadsoftheAppealandHighCourtscanrecommendthata judgebe removed, theapproach takenwas toup thepressureforproductivityinthehopesthatthiswoulddriveoutthelesscommitted.Whilecorruptiondoesnotappeartobethemajorcomplaintofcourtusers,thereformprogramalso worked to target and eliminate what does occur.

Theprogramdrewonsomelesssuccessfulexperiences7.attemptedearlierinthedecade,andwasfurthershapedbyindividual judges’exposuretosuccessfulprogramsinothercommonlawcountries.Thereformteam(theChiefJustice,thePresidentoftheCourtofAppeal,ChiefJudgesheadingthetwoHighCourtsandothermembersoftheFederalCourt)focusedtheireffortsonafewofthemostcongestedjudicialcenters,andespeciallyontheCivilHighCourt Divisions in Kuala Lumpur and Shah Alam. Overthe period from late 2008 to the present, the programwas gradually expanded to other High Courts in WestMalaysia.EastMalaysiahaditsownprogram,whichwascoordinatedtoalargeextentwiththeWestMalaysiaeffort.

Theprogram’sbasiccomponentswerethefollowing:8.

An inventory of cases held in courtroom files(a)throughout the country (not just limited to thetargetedcourts)andthecreationofimprovedphysicalfilingsystemssoasnottolosethisinformationortoallowcourtstoagainlosetrackoftheircaseloads.The purging of “closed cases” and the separation of(b)inactive (“hibernating”) cases for rapid closure orfurther processing (depending on the interest of the parties).Targetsweresetfortheeliminationofoldercases.Theinitialgoalwastheterminationofallcasesover a year old by end of 2011 (currently revisedtomid-2012) for High Courts in target districts, andguidelinestothiseffectforothercourtsatallinstancesanddistricts.Introduction of “case management” (pre-trial(c)processing of cases). This was accompanied by thereorganizationofHighCourt judgesandstaff in thetarget centers and the designation of “ManagingJudges” to oversee the exercise.1 The initialreorganizationtookstaff(deputyandseniorassistant

1 Managing judges were selected from among the core reformgroup,butastheystillhadtoperformtheirnormalduties(onthecourts to which they were assigned) they delegated day-to-dayoversighttootherofficialswhointurnreportedtothem.

ii iiiii iii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

registrars)outofthecourtroomstowhichtheyhadbeenassignedandputthemintoaManagingJudgeUnit (MJU) foreachHighCourtDivisionwhere theyhandled preliminary matters and also closed casespartieswerenolongerinterestedinpursuing.Introduction of a “tracking system” to facilitate the(d)closure of older cases. This involved separation ofcases or issues that could be resolved on the basisof affidavits (the A Track) and those that requiredfulltrials(theTTrack).JudgeswereassignedtooneortheothertrackandweregivenweeklyquotasofcasesbytheMJU.Introduction of Court Recording and Transcription(e)(CRT) equipment for most of the courts in WestMalaysia;thisisstillunderwaybutbeganassoonastheITcontractwasawarded(mid2009).Development of an automated Case Management(f)System (CMS) which automated some manualprocesses,providedcourtsandcourtcomplexeswithregistries of case filings and events, and introducedmodulestohandlee-filing,programmingofhearings,and the like. This was done, along with other ICTelements, under a contract with a single vendor forWestMalaysia.EastMalaysiawhichhadstartedearlierwithautomation,usedanother vendor todevelopasimilarsoftware.Installation of the CMS (henceforth, CMIS(g) 2) in thetarget judicial centers (partially installed by endJanuary,2011,withfullinstallationscheduledforendJune,2011).Creation,mostnotablyinKualaLumpur,ofHighCourt(h)Commercial Divisions to handle more specializedmatters (Intellectual Property, Islamic Banking, andAdmiralty). The first two had been created prior tothe reform,but they, like thenewAdmiraltyCourt,were also given targets for speedier processing ofcases.Intargetcenters,creationof“new”courts(specialized(i)High Court divisions in Civil and Commercial Law,called the NCvC and NCC, respectively) to handlerecentcasesandtheirreorganization,eliminatingthetwotracks(notneededanylonger)andtheexternal

2 ThevarioususesofCMSarealittleconfusing.Itisappliedtopre-trialprocessingofcasesaspracticedbytheMJUs, to thetypeofsoftwaredevelopedbythetwofirms,andhasbeenadoptedbythecontractorFormisasthenameforitsownversion.Forthisreason,the term CMIS (Court Management Information System) will beusedbelowtorefertothetype of systembeingdevelopedbythetwosoftwarefirms,FormisandSAINS.

ManagingJudgeUnit(JMU),butleavingjudgeswithtargetsforproductivityanddelayreduction.Oncethebacklog is eliminated, all courtswill follow theneworganizationandprocedures.Therearemanyotherelementsintheprogram,some9.

ofwhichhaveadvancedmorethanothers.Theyincludean effort to encourage mediation of civil cases (so faronlypartlysuccessful,butitusuallytakesawhileforsuchpracticestogaintractionwithlawyersandtheirclients);thedevelopmentofanautomatedqueuingsystemunderthe IT contract in West Malaysia whose purpose is toimproveschedulingofhearingsandreducetimewastedby lawyers in awaiting hearings that never occur; ane-filingsystem(whichcameon line forKualaLumpur inMarchandbyMayhadbeeninstalledinPenangandShahAlam)whichshouldalsosavetimeforlawyerswhowillnolongerhavetotakedocumentstocourts;andefforts(sofarimpededbybudgetarylimitations)todevelopabetterjudicialtrainingprogram.

Despite the emphasis on IT, and the two large10.contracts with vendors (totaling USD 43 million), mostof the documented progress to date had depended on manualmethods.Exceptformoniesexpendedonstate-of-the-art manual filing cabinets and the CRT program,thereformreliedoninducingmoreanddifferenteffortsfrom staff. Critical to the latter have been the settingandresettingofproductivitytargets,theuseofmanuallycollectedstatisticstomeasureprogress,andtheirconstantvettingbytheseniormembersofthereformteamledbytheChiefJustice.3

If both of the IT contracts fully deliver on what11.theyhavepromised, thenewprocedures and reportingpracticesthattheJudiciaryintroducedatthestartofthereformwill be completely automated, thereby reducingthe tedium and probable delays caused by manualprocessing of records. For example, programming ofhearingswhichcourtroomadministrativestaffoftendoesusinglargepapercalendarswillnowbenearlyautomatic.TheCRTequipmentshouldspeeduphearings,andwhilethe queuing system and e-filing largely benefit lawyers,both also eliminate a certain amount of back officeprocessing and its potential for generating delays anderrors. At the courtroom and court complex level, theinstalledCMISincludesahistoricalregistryforeachcase,

3 Other members involved include the two Chief Judges and—ManagingJudges.

iv v

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

iv v

which is used to generate thebasic reports sent to thecenter,aswellasthedailyreportssuppliedbyeachjudgeoncasemovement.4BytheendofthecurrentITcontracts,the courtroom level registries should pick up nearly 75percentofallcasesfiledbecauseofthefocusonthemostcongesteddistricts,andifnotunderthevendors’currentscopes of work, then in a future contact, they could beusedtocreateaglobalintegrateddatabase(toaccompanytheglobalcentralizedlibrary–accessibletoallauthorizedcourtstaff–ofallelectroniccasefiles).Whenthedatabaseisdeveloped,thecurrentregistriesshouldbemodifiedtoeliminatetheirsurfeitoftextentries(asopposedtocodedones).Thiswillfacilitateanalysisofitscontents.

Whatever thenextsteps, theCourt’sStatisticsUnit12.willhavetobestrengthenedandlessrelianceplacedontheJudicialandLegalServicestafftemporarilyassignedthere.It is also likely, given the short timeframe inwhich theoverallcontractsaretobecompleted,thatthecontractorsand the courts will have to spend at least a year (andprobablymore)working out the inevitable problems inthesystem.Betterconfigurationmanagement5mighthaveavoidedsomeproblems,butevenunderidealconditionsnewsoftwaresystemsalwaysrequireconsiderablepost-installationreadjustment

Results

Theaimsofthefirststageprogramweretoreduce13.backlog and delay in processing cases. Owing to thelackofanautomateddatabaseand,inthebeginning,ofmuch automation beyond word processing, the Courtmonitoredprogresswithitsownvariationsontheusualcourt efficiency indicators. For backlog reduction theCourtusedtwomeasures:

End-of-yearcomparisonsofcasescarriedovertothe(a)nextyear,startingwithabaselinefortheendof2008;adeclineinthenumberofcasescarriedoverindicatesadeclinein“backlog.”An ageing list, tracking the years of filing for cases(b)remaining in the inventoryofeachcourt.Thegoal isto eliminate older cases so that any carryover (and

4 Thiscouldbethebasisforthecreationofaglobalregistryandanautomateddatabasederivedfromit.5 Configurationcontrolormanagementistheprocesswherebytheclientand thecontractordevelopabasicagreementon thecon-tentsofasystemandtherebyavoidaddingsubsequentdetailsorevenfunctionalitiesthatconflictwiththeinitialspecifications.Suchadditions,unlessminor,arebestleftforalaterversion.

carryoverisinevitableeveninthemostefficientcourts)wouldonlyberecentlyfiledcases.

In combination, the two measures provide ample14.evidencethattheeffortshavebeensuccessfulinadvancingtheirgoals.Theinitialinventories(basedonstatisticsalreadykeptbytheCourt)indicatedacarryoverfrom2008to2009 of 422,645 cases in the High, Sessions, and Magistratescourts;byMay2011,thecarryover(tothenextmonth)wasonly162,615orroughly38percentoftheinitialfigure.Sincetheinitialcarryoverwasprobablyunderestimatedandwasunauditedunlikethemorerecentfigures,thepercentageoftheactualreductionmaybestillgreater.Insomesense,theCourtundercutitsownmeasureofsuccessbycountingoldercasesdiscoveredinsubsequentinventoriesas“newentries”ratherthanasbacklog.However,thisonlyaffectsthepercentageofbacklogreduction,notthetotalofcasesdisposedorcarriedovertolateryears.

Ageinglistsalsoshowasubstantialreduction(varying15.bycourt)intheolderpendingcases,thusindicatingthatthecarryoverislargelynewcases(aswouldbeexpectediftheprogramisworking).Theageinglistsareimportantin demonstrating that the courts havebeen eliminatingoldercases(thebacklog)atasignificantrate,ratherthansimply,asprobablyhappenedbefore,onlyprocessingtheeasynewfilings.Thedatashowsthatthetotalnumberofcasesfiled in2009orearlierstillbeingprocessed intheHigh,SessionsandMagistratesCourts(country-wide)haddropped from 192,569 in December 2009 to 15,497 inMay2011.Asofthelatterdate,amongthecountry’s429sessions and magistrates’ courts, 120 were completelycurrent–processingonlycasesfiledin2010and2011.

Delayreduction ismoredifficult tomeasurewithout16.an automateddatabase (and sometimes evenwithone).Lacking this tool, the Court’s strategy has been to settargetsforcourts–theprocessingofallnewcaseswithinagiventime(usually9to12monthsdependingonthecourtandmaterial)–andmonitorcompliance.Results indicatetheprogramisworking,especiallyinthenewcourts(NCCandNCvC)wheremonitoring is facilitatedby theprocessusedtodistributecases.Onceanewcourtissetupineitherthecommercialorthecivilarea, it receivesallnewcasesfiledduringthenextfourmonths.Afterthis,anothercourtiscreated(withjudgestransferredfromtheoldcommercialorcivilcourts,astheyrunoutofwork)toreceivethenextroundofcases,whilethefirstcourtprocesseswhatentered

iv viv v

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

earlier.6TheJudiciarynowtracksandproducesreportsandtablestocheckwhethereachcourtismeetingitstargetofprocessing all its allotment within nine months of the cut-offdate.DatapresentedinChapterIIIdemonstrateboththeprogressandthemonitoringmechanism.Sinceneitherthemanualnorcomputerizedsystemtracksthedurationofeachdisposition,thetargetisasortofaverage.Somecasesmaytakeayearandotherssixmonths,butsolongas90percentofthemareclosedin9months,theperformanceisdeemedsatisfactory.SincetheircreationtheNCCsandNCvCshavebeenreducingtheircaseloadsatafullyadequatepaceandinfactareaheadoftheschedule.Thegrowingnumberofcourtsthatarefullycurrent(i.e.,nolongerhandlingcasesentered before 2010) also indicates (logically) that theirdispositiontimeshaveimprovedaswell.

Theprogramhasalsobeensuccessfulindiscouraging17.someof theusual causesofdelays–andespecially thefrequent adjournments of hearings. Adjournmentsare not systematically monitored, although they areincluded in the daily reports. However, the pressureon judges tomeet theirquotasappears tobe sufficientincentiveforthemtobefirmonhearingandtrialdates.

Additional Reforms

Three of these, not undertaken by the Judiciary,18.deserve consideration by either the Court or by thegovernment.Thefirst involvesgreaterattentionto legalassistance,whichuntilnowhasbeenentirelyinadequateinitscoverage.Forcapitalcases,thegovernmentcontractslawyers to represent defendants. Its Public Defenseprogramoffersassistancetoindigentclientsincivil(largelyfamily)cases.While it isnot legallynecessary tohavealawyer represent one in court either as a complainantor a defendant,Malaysia’s legal system is too complexforalaypersontonavigateeasily.Themajorconcernatthemoment is the largenumberofcriminaldefendantswhogounrepresented,evenincasescarryinglongprisontermsiftheyareconvicted.TheMalaysiaBarAssociation(which covers lawyers on the Peninsula) has providedadditionalserviceswithacombinationofprobonowork

6 Theprocesscanbestoppedafterthecreationoffourcourts,withthereceptionperiodbeingcutbackto3months.Thiswouldallowa rotationwherebyacourt spends threemonths receivingcases,andspends9monthsprocessingthem.Thisisaprettyunusualap-proachanditprobablywouldnotworkwellinotherjurisdictions.It isnot clearwhether itwas inventedwith themonitoring issuealreadyinmind,orwhethermonitoringhassimplybeenadaptedtothisformat.InanyeventfortheNCCandNCvCithasworkedwell.

foractualdefenseandthecreationandoperationof14legalaidclinics(whoseadministrativecostsaresubsidizedthrough barmembers’ fees). However, the head of theBarCommission(theexecutiveboardoftheAssociation)estimates that 80 percent of those on remand and 95percent of those actually tried still lack representation.ThePrimeMinisterrecentlyagreedtofinanceaprogramwhereby the Association would set up an independentfund to expand the services. This funding would stillnot cover the entire demand, and the plan is to focuson persons in police and prison remand as those most likely tosufferunnecessaryabuse.7TheFoundation, theNationalLegalAidFoundation,waslaunchedbythePrimeMinisterinMarchandhasbegunitswork.

A second program, operating out of the Prime19.Minister’s Department as part of the PerformanceManagementandDeliveryUnit(PEMANDU),focusesonamulti-institutionalapproachtocrimeprevention.Mostofitsactivitiesandsuccesses(especiallyinreducingreportedpettystreetcrime)involvethepolice,butthecourtsarealso included in its planning group, and committed toreducingbacklogincriminalcasesover2010.Thecourtsmet the PEMANDU target of processing 2,000 violentcrimescasesduring2010,andmadeheadwayinmeetingan“internaltarget”ofreducingbackloggedviolentcrimescasesby90percent.8AsthePEMANDUbackgroundstudymakesclear, reducingcrime levels inMalaysia (notveryhigh to start, but nonetheless a popular concern) willrequireactionsbyaseriesofinstitutions,andisprobablylessaproblemofthecourtsthanofcertaindeficienciesintheorganization,deploymentandoperationsofthepoliceand prosecution. Some of these have been resolved;otherswillrequirefarmorework.

A third additional reform that merits consideration20.coincides with PEMANDU’s other undertaking whichinvolvesamulti-institutionalprogramtoreducecorruptionofvarioustypesatalllevelsofgovernment.InsupportofthePEMANDUefforts,theJudiciarycreated14sessionscourtstospecializeinthisarea.TheChiefJusticealsosettargetsforthesejudges–allcasesresolvedinunderayear.Resultsinthisprogramhavenotbeenreportedasthefirstyear(2010)wasdevotedtosettingupvariousnewmechanismandpractices.

7 NoinformationwasavailableontheSarawakandSabahbaras-sociationsandany similarplan theymighthave forwardedorbefunding.8 The“internaltarget”wassuggestedbyPEMANDU,butdroppedinfavorofthe2,000violentcrimesprocessed.

vi vii

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

vi vii

Looking Ahead: Recommendations to Improve the First Phase of the Judicial Program, Advance the Second Stage, and Provide Better Information for Improved Planning

22. Areas Targeted by the Courts to Complete the First Phase Program: TheseincludeseveralpendingtaskstheJudiciaryalreadyhasonitsradar.

Expansion of measures already undertaken to the (a) rest of the courts: The reform’s initial focuswasonthe busiest court centers and on their High Courtsin particular. High Courts in other districts andsubordinate courts throughout the country havereceived some attention, but not as systematically.A plan is now needed to make them full-fledgedparticipants intheprogramand,not incidentally, toexpandthevariousITelementstothem.Integration of the mainland program with those in (b) Sabah and Sarawak: There are two separate issueshere. The most obvious is ensuring an adequateinterface between the two CMIS so that the datafrombothcanbeusedtocreatecomparablereportsandanalysis.Thesecond is furthercoordinatingthetworeformstrategies,whichseemtohavesomewhatdifferent contents, although the mainland reform(thatoriginatingwith theFederalCourt) appears tohavebeenadoptedinlargepartinEasternMalaysia.Further development of the CMIS as a fully functioning (c) MIS:TheCMISasitwillbedevelopedbytheendofthe existing Formis contract still lacks a centralizedregistryofallcasemovementsandanaccompanyingglobal data base (incorporating the kinds of rawdata now managed by individual courts).9 Even atthe courtroom or court complex level, the Formisregistrystillhastoomanytextentriesandalsodoesnot capture some information (gender and othercharacteristicsofparties,amountclaimed,andsoon)thatwillberelevanttofutureanalysis.Thisisnormal,and infactrecommendedasafirststep,andastheJudiciarybeginstousethesystem,itmayitselfrequestadditions. However, to accelerate the process, it isrecommended that additional international advicebe sought, from countries that have created globaldatabases and actively use them to analyze courtperformance. In constructing adatabase, courts (orother government agencies for that matter) often

9 The system constructed in Eastern Malaysia by another firm(SAINS)couldnotbeobservedandthusthecommentsheremayormaynotapplytoit.

consider only the information they always receivedmanually;recognizingthatanautomated,web-basedsystem can do much more, can take considerabletime,andsometimesneverhappens.Creation of a centralized database in the Court’s (d) Statistics Unit and incorporation of inputs from both CMIS and non-CMIS courts: One surprising findingwas that the Statistics Unit was still receiving andprocessingstatisticsmanually,evenaslateastheendofMay2011.However,thevendorinsisteditwouldprovidesoftwarebythetimethecontractends,whichwouldallowtheUnittoreceiveandprocessstatisticalreports from the CMIS courts automatically. This isstillnotthetypeofdatabaseneeded(withrawdataascontents),butitwouldbeastepinthatdirection.UntilallcourtshavetheCMIS,somemanualprocessingwillstillberequired,andtheUnitwillhavetoworkoutitsownmethodologiesforinputtingandharmonizingthestatisticsprovidedbythenon-CMIScourts.Standardization of the Statistical Indicators Used (e) to Monitor Performance: One of the problemsencountered in preparing overview tables for thisreport was a tendency for individual reportingunits (courts and court divisions) to organize datadifferently. This is not unusual when performancemonitoring begins, and seems to be on its way toresolution. However, greater uniformity among theindicators allowing more precise comparisons across thesystemandovertimewouldbeadecidedplusfortheJudiciary’sselfmanagementandforitsabilitytoreportitsresultstoothers.Exceptfortheinitialshortcount in the first inventory, the problemhas neverbeen inaccuracy,but rather lackofcomparabilityofreports.Further procedural change:(f) As a common law system,Malaysia has been able to rely extensivelyon the Judiciary’s ability to alter practices throughmodifications to its own rules and additionaldirectives. However, some proposed changes will require modifications to existing laws, inadditiontothosealreadyunderconsiderationbytheGovernment.Training:(g) ThisisahighpriorityitemfortheJudiciary’ssecond stage program and the discussion in its report on the initial reforms (Federal Court of Malaysia,2011) mentions several variations, including aprogram for judges and an Institute for all legalprofessionals(theMalayanAcademyofLaw).Trainingis important, but often involves investing largeamountsoffundsonactivitieswithlittleornoimpact

vi viivi vii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

on performance because of inadequate design anddelivery(andnotbecausetraining isnotneeded). Itisthusrecommendedthatbeforeseekingfunds,theJudiciaryandotherproponentsdoathoroughstudyoftrainingneeds(seebelow)andalsoinvestigatethefundingimplicationsofanyspecificproposal.

22. Areas Suggested for Immediate Attention or for Inclusion in Future Programs

Build up IT capacity to attend hardware and develop (a) software: The Judiciary currently has roughly 30 ITpersonnel, all located in Putrajaya and at least halfofwhomarequalifiedtorepairhardwarebutnottodo software development.Whatever happens fromnow on, it needs more people simply to do basicequipment maintenance, and should think abouta decentralization plan. Further changes will hingeonhowthecourts intend todoadditional softwaredevelopment.Atpresentthevendorsownthesourcecodes,whichgivethemtheupperhandinanyfuturenegotiations. The Judiciary has three basic optionshere,eachwiththeirownimplicationsforpersonnelneeds: maintain the current situation (and thusonly add personnel to repair hardware); negotiatea transfer of the source codes and build up its ITpersonnel tomanage furtherdevelopment;orbuildupitsITpersonnelsotheycan,inthenextfewyears,“retro-engineer” theprogramanddevelopsoftwaretheJudiciaryownsandcancontinuetodeveloponitsown.AlthoughcostseemstobealesserconsiderationinMalaysia,itwouldbewelltocostouttheoptionsovertimeandoptiontwoinparticularwouldbebestadvancedonthisbasis.Move toward a central database comprising raw data (b) on case filings and movements, increase and codify the data captured, develop polices on access to the CMIS databases, improve the virtual archives, and update internal procedures accordingly: If, as wasreportedinthesecondvisit,theCMISwillnotincludea centralized database, the Judiciary may need tolet a second contract for its development, and inthe process, spend more time reviewing the typesof data that should be included (and codified). It isassumedthatthecontactorshaveprovidedadequatebackup and anti-virus protection, but there will bestillmoreneedfordecisionsregardingaccesstothedatabaseandtheprotectionofinformationnotonlyfrom manipulation but from those who might useit to undesirable ends. It appears there is still little

consideration of these issues. Moreover, a shift toe-filingandelectroniccasefileswillrequiremodifyingbackofficeprocedurestofacilitatehandling.Develop a judicial planning capacity and review (c) current administrative arrangements: Whether or not it issuccessful inregainingcontrolof its investmentbudget,andcertainlyifitdoes,Malaysia’sJudiciaryisreadytomovebeyondtheoldadministrationashouse-keeping model to more proactive forms of judicialmanagement.Thereformalreadyrepresentsstepsinthisdirection,butthefurtherneed istoreorient itsadministrative offices accordingly, and especially toensureamuchtightercoordinationamongplanning,budgeting,personnelandstatistics.Consider alternatives to the Judicial and Legal Service (d) that would give the Judiciary (and prosecution) its own specialized personnel: This is already underdiscussioninternally,butitwouldhelptoanalyzeandraisetheissuesmoreexplicitly.Thiswouldbeafirstmovetowardasinglejudicialcareer,incorporatingalljudgesfromthemagistrateleveltoatleasttheHighCourtsandpossiblybeyond.Itcouldalsohelpresolvethe salary problem of the lower-level judges andadministrators and allow a more strategic approach todesigningcareerpaths.Consider development of court administration as a (e) separate judicial career: Thisisafollow-onsuggestionto the prior point and stresses the importance of endingrelianceongeneraliststafftocarryoutwhatshouldbe increasinglyspecializedwork.JudicialandLegalServicestaffservinginadministrativepositions(within courts and in the general administration)appeared to be hard workers but especially as theJudiciary moves into more modern and proactivemanagement modes, it will need personnel whohonetheirexpertiseoverdecades(andnotjustafewyears).

23. Suggestions for Additional In-Depth Studies and Assessments: Not all of these would be done by the courts, but those that would not are suggested because of the broader range of problems already being attacked in the overall sector.

Study on training needs and alternatives for meeting (a) them: TheJudiciarydesirestodomoretrainingandeventodevelopitsowninstitutetothisend.However,based on lessons learned from decades of donorsupportforcoursesthatseemtodolittlegood, it isrecommendedthatafirststepbeathoroughstudyof

viii ix

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

viii ix

currenttrainingneeds–notintermsofwhatpeoplewouldliketolearn,butratherintermsofareaswhereit appears that significant problems are created byinsufficientknowledgeandskills.Moreover,intermsof problem solution, no training should be doneuntil a list of additional mechanisms to ensure itsapplicationisdeveloped.Theresultsmayindicatethatatpresenttime,amajortrainingeffortisnotneeded,orperhapsthatifitis,itshouldbecoordinatedwithotheron-goingprograms(forexamplewithwhattheJudicialandLegalServicecurrentlyprovidesinitsownInstitute).Study on the situation of the legal profession and (b) its possible liberalization: Liberalization has beensuggestedasasolutiontoatleasttwoproblems(poorqualityoflocal lawyersandlowsalariespaid)neitherof which is adequately documented. Moreover theterm“liberalization”hasatleasttwomeaningsinthiscontext–allowingnon-lawyerstoperformlegalworkandfacilitatingtheperformanceoflegalworkbynon-Malaysianlawyers.Bothproposalscouldbebeneficial,butbeforeanysolutionisadvanced,itisalwaysagoodidea to define the problem. It is thus recommendedthatresearchbeconducted(probablybysomeotherinstitution than theCourt itselfas this isnot reallyacourt responsibility) to explore the hypothesizedissuesaswellasseveralothers.Oncetheproblemsaredefined,thenliberalizationorsomeothersolutioncanbeapplied.Analysis of the organization, distribution, and working (c) methods of the public prosecution (DPPs): ThePEMANDU background study and observations byotherintervieweesrecognizeweaknessesinthepublicprosecution. Not all crime reduction will be a resultof improved prosecutorial methods or even betterprosecutorialcoordinationwithpolice(anotherproblemmentioned), but it certainlywould be helped, and aswith other topics, any solutionwould require amoresystematicanalysisoftheproblemsandtheircauses.Study on unmet dispute resolution needs:(d) ThiscouldbedonebytheJudiciary(inlinewithitsproposedsecondphaseemphasisonimprovingqualityofperformance)or by some other entity. Courts and other disputeresolution forums do not seem overtaxed withdemand,but thismayonlybebecause theydonotrespond to people’s real dispute resolution needs.The concern is that unmet needs could result inescalating conflicts and people using less desirablemechanisms to dealwith them (e.g. taking the lawinto theirownhands).Therewasno indicationthat

this is an imminent threat inMalaysia, but itmightbe inmore restricted areas, and in any case, if noturgent, this kind of study (forwhich there arewelldevelopedprotocols)mightthusbeconsidered.Study on administrative tribunals (and other non-(e) judicial dispute resolution mechanisms): Here thequestion iswhat kindsof conflicts thesealternativemechanismsattract, howwell theydealwith them,and whether they have their own issues of delay,congestion,orinadequateresponses.Ajusticesysteminvolvesmorethanthecourts,andthesealternativeservices caneither reduce theburdenon the latterby providing satisfactory resolution of conflicts orincrease it, by aggravating disputes, sending thosethat can go there to the courts for resolution, andotherwiseperforminginadequately.Thereisnothingto indicate that these are urgent issues, but if thegovernmentisinterestedinfindingouthowcitizens’disputesarehandled,ifatall,itshouldputthisonitslistofitemstoinvestigate.

Lessons Learned from the Malaysian Experience

The Malaysian Judiciary’s recent program offers24.an interesting model for other countries attempting abacklog and delay reduction program, and in fact forthosepursuingothergoalsintheirreforms.TheMalaysianmodelisnotradicalinitscontentsomuchasinitsabilitytofollowbestpractices,somethingwhichfewcountriesinitspositionmanagetodo.Someofthekeylessonsincludethefollowing:

Areform’ssuccessislargelyconditionedbytheability(a)ofitsleaderstoidentifyproblemsanddefineconcrete,measurable goals for resolving them.A reform thatsimply aims at “improving performance” withoutdefining specific targets is less likely to accomplishanything.Quantificationisimportant,nomatterhowobjectivesarefurtherdefined.Increasing efficiency is a good start, representing a(b)sortof“low-hangingfruit”inthegoalhierarchy.The reform implementation followed logical steps.(c)One preliminary step usually recommended, athoroughassessmentordiagnosticofthejudiciary’ssituation, was skipped in Malaysia. However, theCourt’s working hypothesis, that there was delayandbacklogthatcouldbeeliminatedratherquickly,was based on prior, if less systematic, observationby the reform leaders (and especially the ChiefJustice).Besides, thewaythereformwasorganized

viii ixviii ix

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(thesequence)meantthattheearlystepsservedtoverifythehypothesis.Hadtheinventoriesdiscovered,contrary to expectations, that all pending caseswererecentonesandmoreoveractive,theprogramwould have needed modification. Furthermore,there was constant monitoring of progress which inter alia allowed the identification and resolutionofadditionalproblemsalong theway.Thus, for thereform’s immediate purposes a further diagnosticwasprobablynotneeded(itwouldonlyhaveaddeddelaysandpossiblyweakenedtheinitialconsensus),but others contemplating similar programs shouldnotassumethisappliesequallytothem.Afirst,essentialstepinanyreformistoputorderto(d)what is thereandestablishasystemformonitoringperformance. Neither one requires automation,although the monitoring system can certainly beimprovedonceICTisintroduced.Withoutorderandwithout information, itwillbeverydifficult toplan,implement and measure the effects of any furtherreform efforts.While seemingly simple minded, aninventoryofcasesandanimprovedfilingsystemareessentialpartsofthe“puttinginorder”phase.Onthebasisofboth thesesteps,courts,or for thatmatteranyagency, canmostprobably substantially reduceexistingworkloadsandsofacilitatefurtherreform.Atrackingsystemisarecommendedmeansforfurther(e)reducingbacklog,althoughthisdoesnotnecessarilyhavetobeidenticaltowhatMalaysiahasintroduced.Thelogicbehindanysuchsystemistoseparatecasesby the levelofeffort required for their resolution–in the futurea similar logic canbeapplied tomoresophisticatedformsofdifferentialcasemanagement.

Once the low-hanging fruits have been harvested,(f)thenextchallengeistodefinethefurtherdirectionsofreform.AlthoughMalaysiacanstillspendseveralyearsperfecting thefirst stage, it iswell-advised toconsider where it will go next and how it will getthere.Courtsareonlyonepartofa justicesystem,andas(g)the PEMANDU study clarifies in the case of crimereduction,manyotheractorsareinvolved.Muchthesame is trueofmoreordinarydispute resolutionasdiscussed in theprior sectiononadditional studies.Whenattention isnotpaidtotheseotheragencies,and comparable reform programs established, theimpactofeventhebestcourtreformwillbelimited.Itiseasiertocarrythisalloutwithsubstantialfunding,(h)buttheMalaysianexperienceshowsmassivefundingisnotalwaysnecessarytomakesignificantimprovements.Manyofthemeasures introducedbytheCourtwereaccomplishedwithfewadditionalfunds.

Committed leadership is essential, and it is also25.important to ensure such leadership persists over thelonger run.Broadening the reformteam(to include thePresidentoftheCourtofAppealandthetwoChiefJudgesaswellasothermembersoftheFederalCourt)aswasdoneinMalaysia is thusa recommended strategy. Elsewherereformshaveprogressedwithonlyonehighlevelleader,buttheyareeasiertoreversewhenonepersonistheonlymajorsourceoftheirmomentum.

x 1

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

x 1

x 1x 1

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Thisstudy,commissionedbytheGovernmentofMalaysia(GOM)anditsJudiciary,comesatapropitiousmoment1.intheevolutionofjudicialreformprogramsworldwide.Followingovertwodecadesofconcerteddonorandcountryfinanced judicial reforms in low-andmiddle-incomecountries, there isadisturbingtendencytoconcludethatsucheffortsarerarelyworththefundsandlabor invested inthem.10Thisreactionismostpronouncedwithinthedonorcommunity,manyofwhosemembersseemtobeturningtoother,relatedactivities(e.g.“citizensecurityprojects”ofonetypeoranother).Butthereisalsoevidenceofcitizensandtheirgovernments’increasingdoubtsastowhatthemuchvauntedreformshaveaccomplished.Moresystematicstudiesfinancedbydonorstoreviewtheirownprojectsandworldwidetrendsgiveslightreasonforcontradictingtheseperceptions.ArecentWorldBankreviewofadvancesmadebymiddleincomecountriesoverthepastdecadefindsthemleastnotableintheareaof“governance”includingjudicialreforms(WorldBank,IEG,2007).AUSAIDsponsoredreviewofitsownprojects’advancesin“DemocracyandGovernance”foundRuleofLawtobetheareawhereimpactswerenearlyinvisible(Finkeletal,2008).11

ThepresentstudyreviewsareformdesignedandimplementedbytheMalaysianJudiciaryduringtheperiodfrom2.late2008toearly2011.Althoughconductedoveraveryshortperiod,thisreformhasbeenabletoproduceresultsrarelyreachedeveninprogramslastingtwoorthreetimesaslong.Itthusprovidesacounter-exampletocontemporarypessimismaboutthepossibilityofthejudiciaryimprovingitsownperformance.Moreoveritdidsoinacountrywhichfacesmanyof theusualcontextualobstaclessaidtohave inhibitedreformelsewhere.Thereareotherexamplesofreform“successes”buttheyeitherinvolveverytargeted,andoftenterritoriallylimitedexperiments(seeWalsh,2010)orifaccomplishedonabroaderscalewereaidedbycircumstancesnotlikelytobereplicatedelsewhere.12

Thereportisdividedintofivesections.AfirstchaptergivesintroductorybackgroundonMalaysia,itslegaltradition3.anditscourtsystem.Itisintendedforreadersnotfamiliarwiththesetopics.Asecondchapterdiscussesthereform,its development, objectives, components, and likely future directions as well as some additional related activitiesundertakenbyothergovernmentagencies.AthirdchapterreviewstheachievementsoftheFirstPhaseReform,andafourthdiscussessomegapsstilltobecovered,examinesaseriesofbroaderpolicyalternativesthecourtsandthegovernmentasawholemightconsider,andidentifiesareaswherefurtheranalyticworkmightbedone.Afinalveryshortchapterreviewsthelessonslearnedthatmaybeusefultoothercountriescontemplatingasimilartypeofreform.

10 HighIncomeCountriesfacetheirowncriseshere,butithaslesstodowiththepotentialformakingimprovementstoordinaryperfor-mancethanwithquestionsdealingwiththeroleofnationaljudiciariesinthe“newnormal”postglobalsocieties.11 TheauthorsdidnotehoweverthatthemethodologyusedandtheemphasisonhumanrightsasaproxyforROLmayhavebeeninad-equatetocapturechangeinthisareainparticular.12 Walsh’sworkcommissionedbytheWorldBankandDfIDidentifiedexamplesofsuccessful“activities”inseveralAfricancountries,butnoneofthesecouldbeconsideredafullreform,andmostpresentconditionsoffairlyprecarioussustainability.Othercountryexamples(Chile,Singapore;seePrillaman,2002andDuce,2010ontheformerandMalik,2008onthelatter)mustberegardedasfairlysuigeneris,tookmoretime,and,despitethecharacterizationofferedbyMalik,aredifficulttoconsider“judiciallyled.”

2 3

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

2 3

CHAPTER I

Background on Malaysia, Its Legal System and Judicial Organization

Country Background

Malaysiaisacountryofroughly28millioninhabitants,locatedinSoutheastAsia,andcomprisingWestMalaysia4.(ontheMalaypeninsulabetweenThailandtotheNorthandSingaporetotheSouth)andEastMalaysia(thenorthernportionoftheislandofBorneowithpartsofIndonesiatothesouthandBruneitotheEast)AlthoughEastMalaysiaislargerinterritory(200,000asopposedto120,000squarekilometers),roughly79percentofthepopulationresidesinWestMalaysia.Malaysiaisafederationof13states:11statesand2territories(thecitiesofKualaLumpurandPutrajaya,theoldandnewcapitals,respectively)inWestMalaysiaand2states(SabahandSarawak)andoneterritoryinEastMalaysia.ItisaformerBritishcolony.Asapreludetoindependence,theFederationofMalaya(ineffectpresentdayWesternMalaysia)wasformedintheaftermathofWorldWarII.TheFederationachievedindependencein1957,andwiththe1963additionofSarawak,Sabah,andSingapore,wasrenamedMalaysia.Singaporesubsequentlywithdrewin1965.

Present-dayMalaysiaisasolidlymiddleincomecountry,withanestimatedpercapitaincomeofroughlyUS$7,000.5.Itisamulti-ethnic,multi-cultural,multi-linguisticnation.Malaysconstituteabout58percentofthepopulation,Chinese28 percent, Indians 7 percent, and aboriginal groups, about 2 percent.Malaysia is a constitutionalmonarchy andparliamentarydemocracy, following theWestminstermodel.UnlikeGreatBritain (but like IndiawhoseconstitutioninfluencedMalaysia) it has a written federal constitution which is the supreme law of the land. The constitutionestablishesIslamastheofficialreligionbutalsoguaranteesfreedomofreligion,aswellasstipulatingsuchotherrightsaslibertyoftheperson,tobeinformedofthereasonsforarrest,accesstolegalcounsel,releasefromdetentionwithoutunreasonable delay, protection against retrospective criminal laws anddouble jeopardy, equality before and equalprotectionofthelaw,freedomofmovement,speech,assembly,andassociation,andtherightnottobedeprivedofpropertywithoutadequatecompensation.Thedeathpenaltyisapplicableforsuchoffensesasmurder,drugtrafficking,possessionofunlicensedfirearmsinasecurityarea;andthedischargeofafirearminthecommissionofanoffensewithintenttocausedeathorpersonalinjury.Individualstateshavetheirownconstitutionswhichmustcontaincertainprovisionsasrequiredbythefederaldocument.

TheMalaysianKingorYangdi-PertuanAgongistheHeadofState.HeiselectedbytheRulersofthenineMalay6.stateswithRulersfromamongtheirownmembers;theseelectionsareheldeveryfiveyears,meaningthattheofficerotatesamongthenineRulers.ThenineRulersandtheGovernors(Yangdi-PertuaNegeri)oftheotherfourstatesformaConferenceofRulerswhichservesasahigh-levellinkbetweenthestatesandthefederalgovernment.WhiletheYangdi-PertuanAgong“rulesbutdoesnotgovern,”heofficiallyappointsthehighestlevelgovernmentofficials,includingtheheadsandmembersoftheFederalandAppealsCourt.However,inthesecasesheistofollowtheadviceofthePrimeMinister,pursuanttothelatter’sconsultationwiththeChiefJustice,andsinceitsfoundationin2009(seebelow),theJudicialAppointmentsCommission.Constitutionally thatadvice ismandatory. Similar conditionsapply to theKing’snamingofallotherjudges.

2 32 3

CHAPTER I : BackgroundonMalays ia , I ts Legal SystemandJudic ia l Organizat ion

Judicial Organization, Staffing, and Resource Allocations

Legal Tradition and Multiple Sources of Law

Thecourtstobereviewedherefollowcommonlaw7.procedures.Thefourmainsourcesoflawarewrittenlaw,commonlaw,IslamicorSyariahlaw,andcustomarylaw.Whilepracticedduring thecolonialperiod (andthus forover200years),Englishcommonlawandrulesofequitywere formallyadoptedunder theCivil LawActof1956.Both have been further developed by the Malaysiancourtsinaccordwithlocalcircumstances.WhileaheadoftheEnglishinalreadyabandoningsomeoftheirquaintertraditions(bothwigsandsomehonorifictitlessuchashislordshiporherladyshiptorefertojudges),theMalaysianshaveheldontothewritsystemmuchofwhichtheEnglisheliminatedwiththeWoolfreformsof1999.13 While legal representation is not required for a court appearance,thismakes itadvisable touseanattorneyasonly thosetrainedinthelawcaneasilymaketheirwaythroughtheexisting rules and terminology. Higher court judges areapparently well read in English and other common lawcountrycaselaw,andoftenreferenceitintheirdecisions(Chan,2007).

AlthoughthemajorityofthepopulationisMuslimand8.Syariahisrecognizedasasourceoflaw,itisappliedonlyin“personalmatters”tofollowersofthefaithwhochoosetousetheSyariahcourts.InWesternMalaysiacustomarylaw hasmultiple origins –Malay customary law, Hindulaw,andSyariahlaw.InEasternMalaysiacustomarylawincludesMalaycustomarylaw,nativecustomarylaw,andChineseandHinducustomarylaw.

13 Withincommonlaw,awritisajudicialordertoperformaspeci-fiedactionorallow it tobedone.Underawrit system,plaintiffshavetobeginmostcourtactionsbypetitioningfortheappropriateformof “originalwrit,” ofwhich there is aneverexpanding vari-ety.Withthe1999WoolfReforms,theEnglishsystemwasgreatlysimplifiedandmost civil actionsnowbeginwitha “ClaimForm,”therebyreducingthedangerofhavingaclaimrejectedbecauseofpetitioningforthewrongformofwrit.Thisisalsofareasierforthelaypersontounderstand.TheU.S.abandonedwritpleadingasthenormfarearlier,andreserveswritsforextraordinaryactions(e.g.awritofcertiorari,whereby,attherequestoftheparty,anappel-latecourtagreestohearanappeal,andthusordersthelowerlevelcourtto“certifytherecord”andsendittothehighercourtwhichwillreviewit).AlthoughinMalaysiancourts,mostcivilcasesbeginwith only oneof four types ofwrits (andusuallywith a “writ ofsummons”),“itisimportanttousetheappropriatemodebecausethecourthasdiscretiontosetaside,inpart,theproceedingscom-mencedbythewrongmode”(WanArfahHamzah,2009;307).

General Organization

AlthoughMalaysiaisafederation,itsfederalcourts9.are organized as a single unitary system. The FederalCourt(originallySupremeCourt)andtheCourtofAppealare seated in the Federal Government AdministrativeCenter,Putrajaya,butoperatenationally–withpanelsofCourtofAppealjudgestravelingtoSabahandSarawaktohearcases.TherearetwoHighCourts–oneforWesternMalaysiaandtheotherforSabahandSarawak–eachwithitsownChiefJudge.Collectivelythisgroupisreferredtoas the superior courts, and its judges are appointed bymechanisms different from those for the subordinatecourts. Both processes are discussed below.High Courtjudgeshearcasesindividually;othersuperiorcourtssitinpanels.

The subordinate courts (staffed by “magistrates”10.but for the purposes of this report also called judges),are organized into sessions courts and the lower levelmagistrates courts. Their judges are drawn froma poolof legal officers, the Judicial and Legal Service, whosemembers staff legal positions throughout the threebranchesofgovernment.IntheJudiciarytheseindividualsalsoholdadministrativeandquasi-administrativepositions(registrars14ofvariouskindsandotherrelatedjobs)andintheoryaresubjecttoperiodicrotationstolegalpositionselsewhere in thegovernment.Moredetailsaregiven inthesectionbelowonstaffing,butitdeservesmentionherethattheJudicialandLegalServicecareerdoesnotextendtosuperiorcourtjudgeshipsandthattobeconsideredforone of these positions, the candidatemust resign fromtheJudicialandLegalService.

Followingconventionalpractices,thejurisdictionsof11.eachsetofcourtsaresetbytheConstitutionandsecondarylaw.Theyhingebothonsubjectmatterandseverityoftheoffenseorsizeofcivilclaim.HighCourtsweretraditionallydivided into Criminal and Civil Divisions, but recentlytherehasbeenatrendtogreaterspecialization,especiallythrough the creation of civil “Sub-Divisions.” Individualsessions and magistrates courts may also specialize atleastbycriminalandciviljurisdictions,althoughinoutlyingregionstheytendtohearbothkindsofcases.Allinstances

14 The term“registrar” is used for a varietyof positions, rangingfromthatoftheChiefRegistrar(ChiefAdministrativeOfficerforthecourts)throughtheregistrarswhoserveacourtadministrator-likefunction for court centers anddivisions todeputyand senior as-sistantregistrarswhohandlepre-trialmattersandalsoadjudicatesimplecases.

4 5

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

4 5

havesomeoriginal jurisdiction,butmostoftheworkoftheCourtofAppealregardsappealsfromtheHighCourtdecisions. The High Court work involves both originaljurisdictioncases(e.g.,criminalcasesinvolvingthedeathpenalty)andappealsofsessionaswellasmagistratecourtdecisions, rulings of administrative tribunals and othernon-judicial bodies. The figure 1 below illustrates thegeneralorganizationofthefederalsystem.

Therearealsostatecourtsoutsidethissystem–Syariah12.and traditional courts – and a series of administrativetribunals. Decisions of administrative tribunals may beappealed(asspecialpowerscases)totheordinarycourtsonly on the bases of due process and other proceduralirregularities.TheJudiciarynormallydoesnotreviewthesubstantive content of their decisions. Ordinary courtinvolvement inSyariahandtraditionalcourtdecisions isstillmorelimited,largelyrelatedtoissuesofjurisdiction.Neithertheadministrativenorthestatecourtsarecoveredin this report as they were not affected by the judicialreformprogram.Thedetailsofstatecourtoperationsandcompositionareforthemostpartdictatedbystate,notfederallaw.

Figure 1: Basic Structure of Federal Judiciary

Staffing

Foritsgeographicsizeandpopulation,Malaysiahas13.arelativelymodestnumberofjudges.Therearecurrently120 superior court positions, of which 91 are occupiedbytenuredjudges.Theirnumberissupplementedby42temporarily appointed judicial commissioners whomayeventuallybeappointedtopermanentpositionsoncethelatterbecomeavailable.Maximumnumbersof superiorcourt judges are set by the Constitution (Articles 122,122A,and122AA),buttheuseofjudicialcommissionerstofilladditionalslotsisnot.Thenumbersof“subordinatecourt” judges are not constitutionally limited. They areset by secondary law and they currently include 132sessionscourtjudges(157authorizedpositions)and152magistrates(193positions).Thesenumbersareaugmentedbysome260JudicialandLegalOfficerswhoworkincourtsatalllevelsasdeputyorseniorassistantregistrars,usuallyafterhavingfirstservedasamagistrate.

Table 1: Judicial Positions, Authorized and Filled, as of 2011

JudgesAuthorized Positions

Filled Positions

FederalCourt(includesCJ,PresidentofCOAand2ChiefJudges)

15 11

CourtofAppeal 32 25

HighCourt 73 55

JudicialCommissioners NA 42

SessionsCourts 157 117

MagistratesCourts 193 165

OtherJudicialandLegalServices

343 266

Total 813 681

Source:FiguresprovidedbyChiefRegistrar’sOffice.

Measuredagainstitspopulationofroughly28million,14.thisgivesaratioofjudgestopopulationofbetween1.48and 2.42 “judges” per 100,000 inhabitants, dependingon whether members of the Judicial and Legal Serviceassignedtothecourts,butnottothebench,areincluded.Sincemost,butnotallofthemperformjudicialduties(pre-trialcasemanagement,administrativeclosuresofcases,somedecisionsonaffidavitcases)theyprobablyshouldbecounted,buteventhentheratioisverylowascomparedtocountriesatacomparablelevelofdevelopmentwithin

Fedaral Court

Court ofAppeal

High Court ofMalaya

Sessions Courts

Magistrates Courts

Magistrates Courts

Sessions Courts

High Court ofSabah

Sarawak

4 54 5

CHAPTER I : BackgroundonMalays ia , I ts Legal SystemandJudic ia l Organizat ion

andoutsidetheregion.15Malaysia’s“statecourts”takeupsomeoftheslackasdotheadministrativetribunals,butonlyfordisputesthatnaturallyfallintotheirjurisdictions,asnearlyallcrimesandamajorityofcivildisputesdonot.Forcomparison’ssakethefollowingtableshowsthejudgeper population ratio for a number of civil and commonlaw countries.16 The ratio solely aims at tapping intoonedimensionof theefficiencyofhumanresourceuse.Moreover,theratioalonegivesnoindicationofwhetherthereare“enough”judgesfortheworkloadtheyhandle.

Table 2: Comparison of Judges-to-Population Ratio Selected Countries

Country Judge per 100,000 inhabitants

Argentina 11.2

Australia 4.4

Colombia 9.2

EnglandandWales *3.5

Ethiopia 3.1

France 9.1

Germany 23

Malaysia 1.5 – 2.4

RussianFederation 24.2

Spain 10.7

Thailand 6.8

Sources:forArgentina,UnidosporlaJusticia,2006(datafrom2005);for Australia, Walsh (2008; 2006); for Colombia, CEJA, (2010) (datafrom 2009); for Ethiopia,World Bank, (2010) (data from 2009); forEurope, CEPEJ (2010) (data from 2008) except for Germany (CEPEJ2008); for Thailand, www.lawcouncil.asn.au/shadomx/apps/fms/fmsdownload.cfm)/*Notcountingroughly30,000layjusticesofthepeace

Althoughithasbeenargued(Walsh,2008)thatcivil15.lawcountriestendtohavemorejudgesbecausemoreofthemsitinpanels,thepanelmodeislesscommonfortheLatinAmericancountriesshown(ArgentinaandColombia)

15Singaporeappearstohaveonlyaslightlyhigherratio,butitspop-ulationiscompressedintoaverysmallarea,roughly3.5timesthesizeofWashingtonD.C;Malik,2007;516 This is the most important distinction among legal traditions,separatingmuchofEurope(anditsformercolonies)fromthe“lesscommon”commonlawtraditionwithitsrootsinEnglishlaw.

wheremostcasesareheardbyasinglejudge.17Moreover,although up-to-date figures could not be located, twoAsian countries commonly counted as in the civil lawtradition, South Korea and Japan, also have relativelylow ratios–2.7and2.3per100,000 in1995and1999,respectively(GalanterandKrishnan,2003;99).However,athirdAsiancountry,withacivillawtradition,Thailand,currently(2009)hasaratioof6.8.18 IInshort,thejudge-to-populationratiosdonotappeartobecloselycorrelatedwitheitherlegaltraditionorregion.19

The table demonstrates the range of variations in16.thejudge-to-populationratiosinseveralcountries,butitbearsemphasizingthatthereisnomagicformulaastotherightnumberof judges– if judgescanhandle thecasesassigned in a reasonably efficient fashion (as they nowappeartobedoinginMalaysia),thenumberwouldseemtobeadequate.Manycountrieswithmuchhigherratiosand much lower individual caseloads than in Malaysiacannot keep up with their work, suggesting that muchdependsoninternalorganization,procedures,willingnesstocounterlawyers’dilatorypractices,andhowcaseloadsare filtered.20 Also as Galanter and Krishnan (2003; 97)note, litigation rates (which should be linked to thenumberofjudgesneeded)tendtobelowerincountrieswith younger populations (e.g. India). In the table, thetwocourtsystems,bothwithcommonlawproceedings,withratiosnearlyaslowasthatofMalaysia(EnglandandWales,andEthiopia)seemtohaveanadequatenumberof judges to keep abreast of demand. However, forEnglandandWalestheexplanationliesintheadditional30,000justicesofthepeacewhocurrentlydecidenearly95 percent of criminal cases as well as handling some familyandjuvenilemattersandprocessingmoreseriouscriminalcasesbeforetransfertotheprofessional judges(Grove,2002;alsoCEPEJ,2010;122).InEthiopia,becauseofthecountry’slowlevelofdevelopment(andprobably

17 This is also true ofmanyWestern European countries, wherepaneledjudgesarereservedformoreseriouscriminalandhighervaluecivilcases–theequivalentofthoseheardbysinglejudgesinMalaysia’sHighCourt.18 www.lawcouncil.asn.au/shadomx/apps/fms/fmsdownload.cfm)/19 GalanterandKrishnan(2003)alsoshowa10.4ratiofortheU.Sin1998,roughlytheaverageforWesternEuropeancivillawcountries.20 This is true, for example, of Colombia,where current averagecaseloadsare500-600newentriesperjudgeandwhereaccumulat-ingbacklogremainsaproblem(InterviewsandCEJA,2010).DataavailablefromCEJA’sbiennialreportsalsoindicatesthatinmuchofCentralAmerica(exceptCostaRica)andtheAndeanregionofSouthAmerica(exceptChile)newfilingsperjudgeareatthatlevelorlow-er,withaccumulatingbacklogsbecausejudgescannotkeepup.

6 7

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

6 7

itsyoungpopulation),courtuseislimitedandamajorityof the population relies on traditional mechanisms.But the Ethiopian federal and regional courts have alsoconducted a recent reform to ensure what does reach themisprocessedrapidly(WorldBank,2010).

Afurther interestingdetailonstaffingisthereason17.given for the gap between “allocated” positions andthoseactuallyfilled.AccordingtotheheadsofthejudicialFinancialandPersonnelDepartments,thedifferenceisnotaresultoftheexplanationsoftenencounteredelsewhere–fundingshortagesorlackofqualifiedcandidates–butratherareflectionoftheJudiciary’sownpersonnelpolicies.New subordinate courts (and thus judgeships) may becreatedbythe legislature(inresponsetotheJudiciary’srequests)prior toactualneed,asa sortof cushion,buttheJudiciaryonlystaffsthemasrequiredbyrealdemand.Between2009andApril2011, theFederalCourt in factclosed9High,4Sessions,and23Magistratescourtrooms,transferring judges to other jurisdictions (where the“courtroom”wasthecourt)orpositions.Wheredemandisverylow,itmayalsohaveonejudgecovertwoormorecourtsindifferentlocations.21

18. Superior Court Judges: Officially “judges” are onlythoseonthebenchofthesuperiorcourtsandthusholdingoneofthefollowingpositions:

ChiefJusticeoftheFederalCourt•PresidentoftheCourtofAppeal•ChiefJudgeoftheHighCourtinMalaya•ChiefJudgeoftheHighCourtinSabahand•SarawakJudgesoftheFederalCourt•JudgesoftheCourtofAppeal•JudgesoftheHighCourt(includingJudicial•Commissioners)

Under Article 123 of the Federal Constitution, the19.basicqualifications forappointment toanyof the threesuperior courts are being a citizen of Malaysia and forthetenyearsprecedingtheappointmenthavingbeenanadvocatebeforeany(orall)ofthosecourtsoramemberoftheJudicialandLegalServiceoftheFederationoroftheLegalServiceofoneof thestates,orsomecombinationoftheabove.Theprocessbywhichjudgesareappointed

21 Boththeheadsofthepersonnelandfinancedepartmentscon-curredthatthegovernmentwouldmakeavailablefundsasautho-rizedpositionswerefilled.

remains influx.Thecreationofa JudicialAppointmentsCommissionin2009followingyearsofcomplaintsaboutalackoftransparencyintheappointmentprocessshouldchangetheappointmentprocesssubstantially.AlthoughtheYangDii-PertuanAgongmadetheofficialappointment,andtheConstitutionandsecondarylawlaidoutacomplexprocess of consultations, it was generally believed thatmost of the decision lay with the PrimeMinister andthatintimespast,politicalconsiderationshadweighedin too heavily, leading to a series of complaints aboutthe quality of the bench and a rapid turnover in ChiefJusticessince1996.

The Judicial Appointments Commission’s members20.include the Chief Justice as chairman, the President oftheCourtofAppeal,theChiefJudgesoftheHighCourtsof Malaya and Sabah Sarawak, a Federal Court judge(appointed by the Prime Minister) and “four eminentpersons,whoarenotmembersoftheexecutiveorotherpublic service, appointed by the Prime Minister afterconsulting the Bar Council of Malaysia, the Sabah LawAssociation, the Advocates Association of Sarawak, theAttorneyGeneraloftheFederation,theAttorneyGeneralof a State legal service or any other relevant bodies”(JudicialAppointmentsAct,II:5:1,a.).AstheCommissionisverynew,itistooearlytodeterminewhetherithasmettheexpectations.Howeverallthoseinterviewedforthisstudyagreedthatitrepresentedadecisiveimprovementinthesystemfornominatingjudges.

Onceappointed, judgesholdofficeuntil theageof21.retirement–currentlysixty-sixyears–withapossibilityofa six-monthextensionuponapprovalby theYangdi-PertuanAgong.Judgesmayresignvoluntarilyatanytimeor may be dismissed for breach of the code of ethics(followingitspassagein1994andsubsequentamendmentin 2009)or for “inability… todischarge the functionsofhisoffice”(Article125(3).22Thisdecisionisbasedonthefindingsofa special tribunalconvened for thispurpose,andcomposedof“notlessthanfivepersonswhoholdorhaveheldofficeasajudgeofthesuperiorcourts”(Article125of theConstitution).Procedurally,dismissalsarebythe Yang Dii-Pertuan Agong pursuant to the request ofthePrimeMinisterorChief Justice (inconsultationwith

22 The provision cited applies to members of the Federal Court(whichincludesthePresidentoftheCourtofAppealandtheChiefJudgesofthetwoHighCourts).Itisalsoapplicabletoothersupe-riorcourtjudges,exceptthatconsultationswiththerelevantheadoftheircourt(PresidentofCourtofAppealorChiefJudge)arealsorequired.

6 76 7

CHAPTER I : BackgroundonMalays ia , I ts Legal SystemandJudic ia l Organizat ion

theformer.However,dismissalofjudgesonthebasisofethicsviolationsappearsraretonon-existent–nocaseswerementionedintheinterviewsanditappearsthatthemajorcriticismofsomejudgesappointedduringthecrisisperiodhasmoretodowiththeirinsufficientdedicationtotheirwork.

22. Judicial and Legal Service:23 Subordinate CourtjudgesandmanyadministrativeandquasiadministrativeofficialsaredrawnfromtheJudicialandLegalService,agovernment-widepoolofqualifiedlawyerswhomayservenotonlyinthejudiciarybutalsointheAttorneyGeneral’sChambers (and thus most commonly as Deputy PublicProsecutors, DPPs), as legal advisors in the executiveandaslegislativedraftsmen.EntranceismanagedbytheJudicialandLegalServiceCommission.24Onceadmitted,anofficermayintheorybeplacedinanyofthesepositions,andwillbesubjecttofrequentrotations.Inrecentyears,there has been a tendency formembers to stay in oneagency,buttoberotatedamongpositionsthere.

Within the Judiciary there seems tobean informal23.but predictable “career path” for Service memberswhich involves alternating positions on the bench withadministrative or quasi-administrative duties.Most firsttime entrants are typically named as a senior assistantregistrar, then moving to a position as a magistrate,deputy registrar or a purely administrative role (e.g.in the StatisticsUnit) and thenback toassignmentas asessioncourtjudge.Itbearsnotingthatmanyofthehighlevel administrators of the Judiciary (for example theChiefRegistrar,ineffecttheChiefAdministrativeOfficer)are members of the Judicial and Legal Service. WhilemembershipintheJudicialandLegalServiceconstitutesonemeansoffulfillingtherequirementsforappointmentas a superior court judge, this is hardly automatic andmanyJudicialandLegalServiceofficersendtheircareerswithoutjoiningthesuperiorcourtbench.

23 WhilethelawreferstostateJLServices,representativesoftheFederalJLServicesaidtheydidnotexist.24 Thecommissionwasbrieflyeliminated in1960butsince1963has functioned tocontrolentry to theService.TheService isan-otherEnglishinheritanceandcomparablebodiesarefoundinothercommonwealthnations.However,thecreationofasinglepoolofqualifiedlawyersforallbranchesofgovernmentseemstobelesscommonnow,andthis,plustheimplicationsforjudicial indepen-dence given the inclusion of Executive Branchmembers, has in-spiredcallsforchangeinMalaysia.

The concept of rotation among judicial positions is24.favoredbymembersoftheServiceandapparentlybytheJudiciaryasawhole.However,therehavebeennumeroussuggestionsthattheJudiciary’sServicebeexclusivetothatentity(i.e.norotationtoothergovernmentagencies)andpossiblybelinkedtoasinglejudicialcareer.Thismightalsofacilitatethesolutionofanotherproblem–theextremelylowsalariesforthoseatthebottomofthescale.Currently,when benefits and allowances, which add another RM800,arenotconsideredtheRM1,984(roughlyUS$661)earnedmonthlywouldmakethemeligible for legalaid!Afterthreeyearstheemoluments(salariesplusbenefitsandallowances)risetoRM4,400(US$1,467),andattheupper levels reachRM25,000 (US$8,333),but someofthoseinterviewedbelievedthattheinitialamountsmaydiscouragegoodcandidatesandmoreovercouldincreasevulnerabilitytobribetaking.25Inanyevent,becausethisis a nation-wide service,when the current Chief Justiceobtained a 40 percent increase for the superior courtbench,hecoulddonothingabouttherestofthejudicialandadministrativeemployees.AsaresultinitialmonthlyemolumentsforsuperiorcourtjudgearenowRM29,700(US$10,000),ortentimestheinitialJLServicelevel,andrisetoRM55,000(US$18,300).

InitialappointmentsofJLServicememberstopositions25.within the Judiciary and their subsequent transfers toother judicial positions follow their own process,whichisnotentirelytransparent.Formally,sessioncourtjudgesare appointed by the Yang Dii-Pertuan Agong on therecommendationsoftheChiefJudgeoftherelevantHighCourt. Magistrates in territories are appointed by theYangDii-PertuanAgong,and in statesby the respectiveRulersorGovernorsontherecommendationoftheChiefJudge. In practice, a series of interviews (bothwith theCommissionforinitialentryandwiththeaffectedagency,and in the caseof the Judiciary, theChiefRegistrar, forplacement) play amajor role. Itwas also reported thatseveralagencies,mostcommonlytheAGC,firstcontractindividuals, who subsequently may seek entry to theService and from there pass back to the contractingagency. In theoryany subordinate court judge couldbedismissed by the YangDii-Pertuan Agong for any or noreason,but thesedecisions, like thoseonappointmentsandtransfersdoubtlessdependlargelyorentirelyontherelevantjudicialauthority’sdiscretion.

25 Nonetheless,itwasreportedthatapplicationsforadmissiontotheServiceareontherise.

8 9

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

8 9

Whoever participates (and conceivably this varies26.across the system) the larger question regards thecriteriaonwhich thesedecisionsaremade.Therewereindications thatneither theaffected individualnor theirimmediate superiorweighed in thatmuch; therewere,for example, some complaints from office heads aboutlosing valued employees because of transfers. Theemployeesthemselvesdidnotindicatethattheyhadanypart in the decisions. Clearly a bit more transparency,andpossiblyadifferentsetofcriteriamightbeused,butthatmightbedifficulttointroducesolongastheJudicialand Legal Services is a government-wide organization.ShouldtheJudiciarybeabletocarveout itsowncareerservice, itwouldbebetterabletoestablishaconsistentandtransparentsetofrulesformovementupthecareerladder, one consistent both with the interests of theemployeesandwiththeneedsof theorganization.Still,withtheexceptionoftheofficeheadswhosuddenlylostavaluedemployee,nooneamongthepotentiallyaffectedintervieweeshadanycomplaints.

27. Other Staff: According to the Court’s Office ofPersonnel, apart from the superior court judges, totalstaffingis5,123persons(with5,561positionsauthorized).Of this number, roughly 4,446 hold administrative andsupportpositionsoutsidetheJudicialandLegalServices.Theyincludelargelyclerks,interpreters,andITpersonnel.Thestaff-to-judgeratioremainsfairlymodest–1to6.6.26 Typical courtroomstaffing is relatively limited– rangingfromtwotofiveprofessionalorsemi-professionalassistants(deputyandseniorassistantregistrars,interpreters,andaclerk)plusonenonprofessional employee todo routinetasks.Thereformmeasurestemporarilytransferredsomecourtroomstafftothecentralcasemanagementarea,butitappearsthatfutureplanswillreturnthemtothejudges.Giventhegenerallyhighqualityandgoodpreparationofthestaff,thecurrentratiosdonotseemtobeaproblem.Regions (e.g.LatinAmerica)withfarhigherratiosrarelyseemtogetasmuchoutoftheirrelativelylesspreparedbutfarmorenumerousstaff.27

26 ItshouldberememberedthatweareincludingJudicialandLegalServicepersonnelasjudges,afactwhichreducestheratioconsid-erably.27 Based on data for Paraguay (World Bank, 2005a) andMexico(Hammergrenetal,2009).

Financial and Other Administration

TheJudicialBudgetisdividedintothreeparts,twoof28.themmanagedby the Judiciary itself. Thedevelopmentbudget (largely for construction, but also IT contracts)ishandledbytheLegalAffairsDivisionwithinthePrimeMinister’sOffice.

Expendituresforemoluments(salariesandallowances)29.for superior court judges are charged directly to theFederalConsolidatedFund.Therequestedallocation(partoftheChargeVote)isnotsubjecttodebatebyParliament.However,actualdisbursementsandexpendituresmaybelessthanwhatisauthorizedasthelatterisbasedonthenumber of seated judges aswell as thosewhose hiringis anticipated. An apparently overly ambitious estimateof new appointments caused real expenditures in 2008to be only 68 percent of allocations. Similarly in 2010,expenditureswere74percentoftheamountauthorized.Again, the reason is that the anticipated appointmentsweredelayedandforthisreasontheexpenditureswerelessthanwhatwasrequested.

All other recurrent costs including emoluments 30.for subordinate court judges are issued through theannual Supply Bill, and are reviewed by the legislature.Emolumentsarealwaysauthorizedandpaid(evenwhenas in 2008, expenditures are slightly more than theallocation), but other parts of the request may be cut,as they were for 2011, as part of an across-the-boardbelttighteningmeasure.Overthefouryearsofbudgetsreviewed(2008-2011,thelatteronlyforallocations),thepercentageaccountedforbysalariesandallowancesintheSupplyVoteportionhasrisenfrom47to57percent.WhentheChargeVote (superior court judges’ emoluments) isadded, the percentage going to personnel ranges from55(2008)to68percent(2011).Giventhatexpenditureson infrastructureand IT contractsarenot included, thisisa relativelymodestpercentageascomparedtoCEPEJ(2010; 25) figures from Europewhich include both andshowedsalariesasaccountingfor25percent(Ireland)toover90percent(Greece)oftotalexpenditures,withmostcountriesinthe60-80percentrange.Asnoted,Malaysia’sJudiciary currently hasmore allocated positions than ithasmanaged to fill, and the 10 percent cut in its 2011SupplyVotebudgetmaystrengthenitsapparentresolvenottoaddemployeeswhomaynotbeneeded.As it is,thecut representssomedrasticreductions inother lineitems,andputsadamperonplanstoincreaseitstrainingactivities,forexample.

8 98 9

CHAPTER I : BackgroundonMalays ia , I ts Legal SystemandJudic ia l Organizat ion

It also should be noted, in line with comments31.madeintheJudiciary’srecentpublicationonitsreforms(Federal Court ofMalaysia, 2011; 177-178), that its useof itsoperatingbudget is somewhat constrainedby thefact that the Controlling Officer for these expendituresis the Chief Secretary to the Federal Government. Thismeans that the latter, and the Treasury, must approvemany specific expenditures for items beyond salaries,rentals and allowances, a requirement which the ChiefRegistrar’sOfficedescribesasonerousandthecauseofmanydelays.

TheDevelopment Budget is no longermanagedby32.the Judiciary, but since 2003 has been handled by theLegalAffairsDivisioninthePrimeMinister’sDepartment.Amountsallocatedrosesubstantiallybetween2008and2010,as shown in the tablebelow.Partof the increaseis accounted for by the two large IT contracts (totalingRM130,000,000or roughlyUS$43.3million)which theDivisionalsomanagedfortheJudiciary,inaroledescribedbybothpartiesas“projectmanager.”

Typically, however, the major portion of the33.Development Budget has gone into new infrastructure,with 60 buildings scheduled for construction between2005and2010.TheDivisionhassincebeenaskedtouseatwo-yearplanningperiodandthereareothersignsthatitmay have to cut back on its former ambitious plans.Except for their role in developing the IT contracts, theJudiciary and its Chief Registrar’s Office have very littleinputtotheseplans,andastheynote,“nodirectroleinthe planning, implementation, architectural design, andeventimingoftheCourts’developmentandinfrastructuralprojects” (Federal Court of Malaysia, 2011; 106). Thisdoesnotappeartobeadesirablesituation,especiallyassomeoftheinfrastructureprojectsseemtobedecidedly“overbuilt” for local needs. In fact itwas reported thatthe courts are now renting out space in some of the

underutilized buildings to other government agencies(includingtheAGC’sDPPs28).

ItalsobearsmentioningthattheJudiciarygenerates34.substantial income for the Public Treasury in amountsfallingnotfarshortofallocationsforitsoperatingbudget.AccordingtoCourtsources,in2008,revenuesfromfines,penalties and administrative and court fees totaled RM216,767,600. For 2009 theywere RM 251,984,023, andthe estimated amount for 2010was 257,541,586. Thesemonies are not retained by the courts but are creditedto the Federal Consolidated Fund. Although this is notthecaseinMalaysia,somecourtsinothercountrieshavearguedthattheyshouldretainallthesefunds,inadditiontotheirnormalbudgetaryallocations.Amongdonorsthisissometimesseenfavorablyasawaytomakethecourts“self-financing.” However, before any one jumps to theconclusionthatthepracticeshouldbeadoptedinMalaysia,itisworthashortdiscussionoftheprosandcons.

Firstandforemost,whencourtsmakethisargument35.(astheydo inmanycountries) theyseemtoforgetthattheyarenottheonlypublicagenciesgeneratingfunds.Iftheydeservetokeepwhattheytakein,wouldonewantto make the same argument for the tax and customsagencies, for prosecutors and police going after stolenassets or confiscating properties and bank accountsbelonging to convicted white collar criminals? In somecases, in the formofan incentive, theseotheragencies(especiallyinvestigativepolice,asattheU.Sfederallevel)

28 Apotentialdownsideofthisarrangementistheriskofcollusion,orat leasttheappearanceof lackofsufficientindependence,be-tweentheprosecutorsandthejudiciary.However, italsohastheadvantageofplacingseveralcriminaljusticeinstitutionsinonespot(agoalsoughtinothercountries,especiallyinLatinAmerica).Themorecertainproblemisthatthebuildingsforwhateverreasonex-ceedcurrentneedsandthusthatfundsmightbebetterinvestedinotheractivities.

Table 3: Budgets for Judiciary, 2008-2011, in RM

Budget 2008 (expended) 2009 (expended) 2010 (expended) 2011 (allocation)

“Judicial” 48,057,607 69,618,937 80,188,525 100,000,000

Operating 275,808,037 318,463,936 315,862,662 285,000,000

Development 108,843,714 130,679,343 239,866,000 NotAvailable

Source:ForJudicialandOperatingbudget,figuresprovidedbytheChiefRegistrar’sOffice;forDevelopmentBudget, FederalCourtofMalaysia(2011).

10 11

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

10 11

are allowed to retain a part of what they recuperate(oftentocover investments to improve theirwork),butthe incentive argumentworks better there as it appliestotheirprincipalfunctions.Collectingfinesandfeescanhardly be regarded in the same fashion for the courts,although admittedly for courts that are very carelessaboutcollections,thismightbeameansofencouragingthemtobelessso.29

Second, even as an incentive, there are several36.downsidestothispractice.Itcancreateperversebehaviorand a distortion of work practices, leading membersto be overly aggressive in their work, or alternativelyexceedingly permissive, as is the case when courts canchargebytheactionandthusmightpermitunnecessarymotionsandappealssimplybecausetheygeneratemorefunds. In the case of fees there are also access issues– andpolicieswouldbeneeded to ensure theydid notexclude those unable to pay. Finally, letting agencieskeep their “own funds” complicates rational budgetingbothforthebenefittedagency(whichmaytendtoregardthisasawindfall)andforthegovernmentasawhole.Inshort,forcourts(andconceivablyforotheragencies)thepracticeisofquestionablevalue,evenif,astheJudiciaryhasproposed,theretainedfundsareonlyaportionofthetotalandmoreoveraretargetedforaspecificuse(inthiscasetraining).Whatisimportantisthatthegovernmentrecognizethatcourtsdogeneraterevenueandthatthisis thus onemore reason to ensure they have sufficientbudgetstodotheirworkwell,andsoattractmoreusers.

Untilthebudgetcutsof2011,theMalaysianJudiciary37.appearedtohaveamplefundingtocarryout itsnormalactivities.Whetherthesubsequentcutbacksinsomelineitemswillpresentproblemsremainstobeseen.Arguablyitmightbeabletodobetterprogrammingofthenon-fixeditems,buttherealissueistheDevelopmentBudgetanditsnearlynon-existentcoordinationwiththecourts’ownplans.Wereitagainbegivencontrolthisbudget,astheJudiciarywouldlike,theCourtwouldhavetodoitsownstaffinguptoensureadequateplanningandsupervisionofimplementation.Anintermediatesolutionmightbetolet Legal Affairs continue to manage the infrastructureprojects, but have the Court plan them. This, however,wouldstillrequiresomestaffingupastheJudiciarydoesnot have the engineers or architects needed for this

29 Thisisbecausetheirprimaryfunctionisresolvingdisputesbyap-plyingthelaw–collectionoflegalfeesandfinesinmanycountriesisnotevendonebythecourts.

purpose.Ontheotherhand, if,astheJudiciaryappearstobelieve, the infrastructure investmentsareexcessive,allowing the Judiciary tohaveasayover theuseof theDevelopment Budget could free up moneys for otherneeds,includingforthetrainingprogramitwouldliketointroduce. Inparallel, the Judiciarywouldbeadvised tostrengthen itsownplanningcapacity. Itcurrentlyseemsto do quitewell in transferring, adding and subtractingpersonneltomeetshort-termneeds,butasitmovesintoasecondstagereform,itwillrequiremoresophisticatedapproaches taking into account more variables thanshort-term growth in demand and developing a seriesofalternativescenariosbasedondifferingmedium-termforecastsandgoals.

10 1110 11

CHAPTER I I : The Reform Program: 2008 to Present

CHAPTER II

The Reform Program: 2008 to Present

Reform History and Overview of Objectives

HistoricallyMalaysia’s Judiciary, often trained in England and accustomed to the traditional Britishmanner of38.operations,wasalwaysconservativeinoutlook,butuntilthe late1980swasgenerallyregardedasrelativelyhonestandreasonablyindependent.Thatjudgesdidnotrulecontrarytogovernmentpreferenceswhensuchissuesarosewaslargelyamatterofsharedvalues,notofpoliticalcompliance.Accordingtosomesources,Malaysianjudgesdidexerciseaconsciousamountof“judicialrestraint,”preferringnottosecondguessexecutiveagenciesortheFederalandStatelegislaturesintheexerciseoftheirconstitutionallydefinedfunctions(Chan,2007).However,thisisalsoverymuchinlinewiththeEnglishtradition,wherebyjudicialreviewofexecutiveactions,policies,andlawswassimilarlyconstrained.

It is generally agreed that since the late 1980s, the Judiciary as awholewent through nearly two decades of39.decliningperformanceanddecreasingpublicconfidence.Casescommonlytookunpredictablelengthsoftimetoresolve,dependingonthedispositionofthejudgeandtheactionsexercisedbythelawyers.Eachjudgeoperatedinrelativeisolation,leadingtoconsiderablevariationeveninhowcaseswereprocessed,andanoftendisorganizedmanagementofinternaladministration.Forexample,whenthecurrentChiefJusticeandhisteamvisitedaseriesofcourtroomsinlate2008,theyfoundthefilesincompletedisarray,piledeverywhereinsideandoutsidethecourtroom.

The litanyofcommoncomplaints isnot thatdissimilar fromthose found inmanyothercountriesandregions:40.politicizationofappointmentsanddecisions,corruption,inefficiency,delays,disorganization,inadequateandusuallyunreliableperformancestatisticsorevencountsofpendingcases,arbitraryandoftenunpredictabledecisionsaswellashandlingoffilings(whichmightbereturnedbecausetheadmittingofficerdidnotlikethewayanamewasspelled),disorganizedfiling“systems”,andagenerallypoorpublicimage.Thesecomplaintshadbeenbuildingoverthe20yearsfollowingthe“judicialcrisis”inpartinresponsetoconcernsaboutexternalinterferenceandinpartasaresultofthegrowingdemandforquickerandbetterqualityresponses.

Priorto2008,therehadbeensomeattemptstoreversethissituation,buttheydidnotprosper.Therewereafew41.importantlegalchanges,suchasthe2000introductionofpre-trialcasemanagementintotheRulesoftheHighCourt.Thismovewasintendedtotakecontroloftheprogressofacaseoutofthehandsoftheattorneysandgiveittothecourt,therebyreducingagooddealofunnecessarydelay.Unfortunately,itappearednottohavehadmuchimmediateimpact.

Theminimalimpactwasnotforlackoftrying.Duringtheperiodbetween2002and2005,thecourtsmadeafirst42.stabatimprovingtheirefficiency.Reportedly,theproponentswerelargelyHighCourtjudges,andtheseriesofChiefJusticeswerenotactivelyinvolved.Therewasthuslessareformprogramthanaseriesofpilotefforts,manyofthembasedonpracticesthejudgeshadseeninothercountriesduringvisitsandinternationalseminars.Theyincludedafirsteffortatautomationbeyondtheuseofcomputersassimplewordprocessors.InSabahandSarawak,afirmwashiredwithlocalfundstodesignanautomatedcasemanagementsystem,whichafterbeingappliedin11pilotcourtroomswasabandonedasa“failure.”TheexperienceisnotunusualincourtautomationanditislikelythatthefailurewasasmuchtheresultofminimalsupportfromtheJudiciaryitselfasofanyflawsinthesystem.Inanyevent,thesoftwarecontinuestobeusedinsomecourtstothisdaypendinginstallationofthatdevelopedunderoneofthetwo(FormisandSAINS)contractsnowinforceforWesternandEasternMalaysia,respectively.

Additionally,apracticewhichwouldbeadoptedinthecurrentreforms–thedesignationof“managingjudges”43.tooverseetheworkoftheircolleagues--wastriedout.Thoseinvolvedintheexperimentreportthatthesemanagingjudgesoftenhaddifficultyestablishingmanagementauthorityovertheotherjudgesbecausetheywereusuallyselected

12 13

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

12 13

fromamongjudgesatthesamelevel.Themajorobstacle,it is generally agreed,was the lackof support from topmanagementbecausetheysimplyhadnointerest.

Thus, while the current reform program was not44.withoutprecedents,itwasonlyinOctober2008,whenthecurrentChiefJustice,TunZakiTunAzmi,wasappointed,that thosewithin the courtswhowanted reformfinallyfound their champion. The Chief Justicewas unusual inhavingcomefromoutsidethecourtsystem(with22yearsinprivatepracticeorworkingasagovernment lawyer),andexperiencingarapidrisetothetop.AppointedtotheFederalCourtinSeptember2007,withintwomonths,hewasdesignatedPresidentoftheCourtofAppealwherehebegananinternalreform,aimedatorganizingtheCourt’sarchivesandeliminatingdeadpendingcasesor“backlog”astheCourtpreferstocallthem.30Usingtechniques(aninventory of pending cases, reorganization of the filingsystem, and targets for closingor processing theoldestfiles) which would later be applied system-wide, thenumber of pending cases over two years old fell from8,000 to about 1,600within the first 11months of theChiefJustice’stenure.

InOctober2008,inspiredbyhissuccessintheCourt45.ofAppealsandmotivatedbyhisexperienceontheothersideofthebench,ChiefJusticeZakimetwithothersuperiorcourtmembers,andespeciallyhiscolleaguesontheFederalCourt,todiscussareformprogram.Eventsmovedrapidly,andbylate2008,hehadconvincedthePrimeMinistertoputmoneyintotheeffort,securingRM69million(US$23million)foranautomationprogram.31 While a contract was letinmid2009,theChiefJusticeandhisteamhadalreadygoneaheadwithsomeearlysteps–undertakingamanualinventoryofthelargestmainlandHighCourts,reorganizingtheirfiles,andbeginningabacklogreductionprogram.Thiswouldmean that by the time automation came on line,thenumberofpendingcases tobedealtwithwasmuchreduced and the courts finally had an accurate manualregistryofalltheircaseloads.

30 Technicallyspeakingitwouldbemorecorrecttocallthis“pend-ing caseload carriedover fromone year to thenext,” asbacklogreallyrefersonlytothatportionthathaveexceededthelegaltimelimits for their processing. Sinceno such limits exist inMalaysia,real“backlog”doesn’texisteither.However,thatistoofineapointtomake, and inanyevent, thetime limits imposed less formallythroughcourtdirectivescanservethatpurposeaswell.31 Theamountwassubsequently increasedtoRM100million,orUS$33million,withanotherRM30millionorUS$10millionfortheseparateSabahandSarawakcontract.

Strategy

In the following sections the individual reform46.componentsarediscussedbutabriefreviewoftheoverallstrategyisprovidedfirst.Theinitialgoalofthereformwastoreducebacklogandaccelerateprocessingofnewcases.Itwasdecided to focuson theHighCourts in thecourtcentersreceivingmostcases.Thecentersselectedvariedovertime,andnowincludeKualaLumpur,ShahAlam(thecapitalofanadjoiningstate),Selangor,andinsomesensea part of metropolitan KL, but which also was knownas the “black hole” because of the notorious levels ofdisorganizationanddelay),Penang,JohorBahru,andIpoh.Putrajaya, the seatof theFederal andAppellate courts,wasalsoincluded,andovertimeafewotherdistrictshavebeenadded.SabahandSarawakstartedalittleearlier(thecurrentChiefJudgewasappointedin2006andacontractwithanotherfirmwasusedforautomation).

Althoughtherewasanearlyinterestinautomation,47.the necessary delays in letting a tender, choosing afirm and allowing the contractor to develop a productmeantthatforthefirstyearmuchoftheworkwasdonethroughmanualprocesses.Whetherornotthiswasalsoa strategy (or just necessity) itwas an excellentway tobegin. With allowances for some overlap of phases (and the understanding that the main project wasapplied to Western Malaysia with Sabah and Sarawak followingsimilarprocessesbutwiththeirowntimetable),the steps, roughly in the sequence theyoccurred,were asfollows:

An inventory of cases held in courtroom files(a)throughout the country (not just limited to thetargetedcourts).Thepurgingof“closedcases”andtheseparationof(b)inactive (“hibernating”) cases for rapid closure orfurther processing (depending on the interest of the parties).Targetsweresetfortheeliminationofoldercases.Theinitialgoalwastheterminationofallcasesoverayearoldbyendof2011(currentlyrevisedtomid2012)forHighCourtsintargetdistricts,andguidelinestothiseffectforothercourtsatallinstances.Thisisexplainedindetailbelow.Introduction of “case management” (pre-trial(c)processingofcases)andatrackingsystemtoadvancethebacklogreductionprocess.ThiswasaccompaniedbythereorganizationofHighCourtjudgesandstaffinthetargetdistrictsandthedesignationof“ManagingJudges”tooverseetheexercise.

12 1312 13

CHAPTER I I : The Reform Program: 2008 to Present

Introduction of Court Recording and Transcription(d)(CRT) equipment for most of the courts in WestMalaysia;thisisstillunderwaybutbeganassoonasthecontractwasawarded(mid2009).Development of an automated Case Management(e)System (CMS), including a principal module andmodulefore-filing.Installation of the CMS (henceforth, CMIS(f) 32) in thetarget districts (partially installed by end January,2011,withfullinstallationscheduledforendJune).Creation, most notably in Kuala Lumpur, of High(g)Court divisions to handle more specialized matters(Admiralty,IntellectualPropertyandIslamicBanking).Thefirst twohadbeencreatedprior to the reform,butthey,likethenewIslamicBankingDivision,werealsogiventargetsforspeedierprocessingofcases.Intargetdistricts,creationof“new”courts(specialized(h)HighCourtdivisions)tohandlerecentcasesandtheirreorganization,eliminatingthetwotracks(notneededanylonger)andtheexternalcase-processingunit,butleavingjudgeswithtargetsforproductivityanddelayreduction.Againthisisexplainedindetailbelow.

When told this was a “textbook case” of how to48.conductaprogramtoreducejudicialbackloganddelay,theChiefJusticeaccuratelypointedoutthat“thereisnotextbook”whichtheCourtcouldrelyontoguideitsreformplanning.However,althoughthiswasadmittedlyatrialanderrorprocess,theCourtdrewonexperiencesithadseenelsewhere in refining its homegrown reform strategy.33 Thus,inaperiodofslightlymorethan2years,theMalayanJudiciaryhasdesignedandconductedamodelprogramand one that merits study by those contemplating anyreform.Therehavecertainlybeenafewminormissteps,andthesehavealreadybeencorrected.TheJudiciaryhasalso adopteda seriesof additional innovativepractices,onlyasampleofwhichcanbecoveredhere.

32 ThevarioususesoftheacronymCMScreatessomeconfusion.Itisappliedtopre-trialprocessingofcasesaspracticedbytheMJUs,tothetypeofsoftwaredevelopedbythetwofirms,andhasbeenadoptedbyFormisas thename for itsownversion.For this rea-son, thetermCMIS(CourtManagement InformationSystem)willbeusedbelowtorefertothetype of system beingdevelopedbyFormisandSolsis.33Singapore’searlierandmoreslowlyimplementedreform(Malik,2007)wasobviouslyanexample(andachallengeinasmuchasMa-laysiaseemstoseeSingaporeasanobviouscompetitor),butvisitstoothercommonlawcountriesalsoproveduseful.

There are three remaining questions, but none of49.them detracts from the progress made. They are alsoaddressedinmoredetailinlatersections:

Howwilltheprogrambeextendedthroughtherest(a)ofWestMalaysia?Thisislargelyaquestionoftiming(and funding)but as the initial program focusedonthemostcongestedcourtdistrictsfirst,itscompletereplicationisnotsourgent.How will the Sabah and Sarawak program (and(b)especially its IT system) be joined to the WesternMalaysiamodel?34

What will be the next stage? The first phase (“the(c)reform”) laid an excellent base for some sort ofsecondphaseprogram,butsofartherehasbeennotimetofocusonitinanydetail.Inanyevent,finishingand making necessary readjustments to the firstphasewill probably take severalmore years, givingthecourtstimetoreflectontheaimsandcontentoftheir second phase program. These readjustmentsmight include strengthening the Judiciary’s own ITDepartment.

Reform Components

TheMalaysianreformwassofast-movingandsowell-50.integratedthatitisdifficulttoseparatethecomponents.Thediscussionbelowthusdoesnotquitematchthestepslistedabove,butstillattemptsachronologicalordering.

Case Inventory (File room audit) and Improved Filing System

Based on his successful experience in the Court of51.Appeal,thefirststepundertakenbytheChiefJusticewastocallforaninventoryofallcasesheldincourtroomsandtheestablishmentofabetterfilingsystemineach.Courtswereprovidedwithnewfilecabinets,butotherwisethiswasano-costprocessdependingontheeffortsofexistingstaff.Indoingtheauditandthereorganization,casesweredividedintothreecategories–thosethatwereeffectivelyclosed,thosethatwere“hibernating”(inactiveandthuspotentiallysubjecttoclosure),andtheactivecases.Thelattercategorywasdividedbyyearsandputintothenewlyorganized archives with a manual system for ensuringthattheremovaloffilesforwhateverpurposewouldberecorded – thus making it easier to retrieve them and

34 Lackoftimehasprecludedfullyaddressingthisquestioninthisreport.

14 15

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

14 15

alsoavoidingintentionalorunintentionalfileloss.Closedcasesweresenttothepermanentarchives(ordestroyed)andinactiveorhibernatingcaseswereseparatedfortheirown follow-up. They were also divided by year as thetargetwastoeliminatetheoldercasesfirst.

Theprocesswas,asallparticipantsadmit, far from52.perfect,andwhensubsequentinventoriesweredonelaterin2009and2010,itoftendevelopedthatmanycaseshadbeenmissed. Thus thenumberof pending cases in anycourt might suddenly increase by substantial amounts.Thisisnotunusual,especiallywhencourtroomstorageoffilesisverydisorderly(anditcertainlywasasdocumentedinthebefore-and-afterphotoskeptbytheCourt).Judgesorstaffmayhavetakenfileshome,storedthemintheirdesksorunderpapers,orplacedthem inotherunlikelylocations.35Additionally,asaresultoftheaudit,filesmightbe transferred fromone court to another and thus notcapturedbythereceivingcourtinitsinitialcount.Despitesuchsetbacks,theinitialexercisesignificantlydecreasedthe number of cases held within courtrooms and gavejudgesandstaffsafarbetterideaoftheirrealworkload.

The inventory isanabsolutelyessentialfirststep in53.anydelayandbacklog reductionprogram,and it is alsocriticalforanyotherreformgoal.However,becauseitisboring,timeconsuming,anddoesnotfeatureadvancedtechnology,itisoftenresisted.Italsoisoftenpostponedon the mistaken assumption that it can only be donefollowing the introduction of automated systems. Thisbeliefisnotonlyerroneous,butcanalsoleadtoperverseresults.Ifaninventoryandthesubsequentorderingandinitial purging of cases are not done first, automationbecomes much more difficult. This is first because anytypeofautomatedregistrywillhavetoincludecasesthatshouldhavebeenclosedalready,andsecond,becausetheinformation collected during the inventory on caseloadcomposition and procedures and practices that causeunnecessary bottlenecks will not be available to guidesystemdesign.

35 In one such inventory conductedby anoutside firm in a Cen-tralAmericandistrictcourt,oncethefirmthoughtithadfinished,someoneopenedabackroomonlytofindhundredsofadditionalfiles.

Equally critical is the immediate introduction of an54.improvedcourtroomfiling systemso that thingsdonotrevert to theirprior state.36Again thiscanfirstbedonemanually,asitwasinMalaysia,byusingcardsandcheck-outliststoensurefilesremovedfromthestorageroomcanbe readily located.Although theoverall reform focusedonasmallernumberofcourtdistrictsandcourtswithinthem,theinventoryandimprovedstoragesystemswereintroducednationally,andallcourtsreceivedmodernfilecabinetstoensurecasescouldbestoredproperly.

Case Management and Tracking system

Initial purging focused on removing closed files,55.but a better systemwas needed to handle the inactivecases. This combined a more systematic approach tocasemanagement (here understood as the preparationofcasesforthejudgewhowoulddecidethem)withtheintroductionofa“trackingsystem.”

56. The Tracking System: Contrary to ordinary usage,inthecontextofjudicialreformprograms,casetrackingdoesnotmean“followingcases”butratherdividingtheminto categories for separate treatment. This is usuallybased on the anticipated amount of work or type oftreatment theywill require. It is also called differentialcase management although that term often involvesmore sophisticated differentiations than what was firstintroducedinMalaysia.

Thetrackingsystemdrewonaseriesofobservations57.madebytheChiefJusticeandothersinhisreformgroup(essentiallyamajorityofFederalCourtjusticesaswellasthePresidentoftheCourtofAppealandtheChiefJudgesof the two High Courts). Judges handling civil mattersinparticularcommonlyhavetwotypesofcases–thoserequiringthepresentationoforalevidence,andthusfulltrials,andthoseinvolvingonlytherevisionofdocuments(trial by affidavit). The latter category includes bothprincipal cases and interlocutory motions and appealsconnected toanothercase (whichmayhavehadorwilleventually require a full oral hearing or trial). Becauseaffidavit cases can be handled more quickly, judgesfacedwith aquantityof both types tended to focuson

36 Inseveraldonor-sponsoredreforms,stand-aloneinventories(nofollow-up)havebeenconducted,but this implies that the“snap-shotview”ofcaseloadswillbeoutdatedassoonasitiscompleted.Ifone isgoingto takethetimetodoan inventory, itonlymakessensetointroduceanimprovedfilingandcaseregistrysystemim-mediately,andneitheronerequiresautomation.

14 1514 15

CHAPTER I I : The Reform Program: 2008 to Present

theaffidavitcases,postponingthose involvingfull trials.Although also affecting affidavit cases (as regards bothdocument submission and the final short hearings), thepracticeofleavingfull-trialcasesforlaterwasencouragedbythetendencyoflawyerstorequestpostponements–becausetheywerenotready,becausetheirwitnesseshadnotappeared,becauseofschedulingconflictsandsoon.

Thus, in continuing with the backlog reduction58.program (beyond what could be done by eliminatingclosedcases),thereformersdecidedtodividejudgesandcasesintotwo“tracks”–theAtrack(affidavitcases)andtheTtrack (casesrequiringanoral trial).37Theprincipaltrackingsystem(AandTtracks)wasintroducedgraduallyover2009and2010forcivilandcommercialdivisionsofHighandsomeSubordinateCourts:

Kuala Lumpur High Court (Civil and Commercial•Divisions)February3,2010ShahAlamHighCourt,July1,2009•GeorgetownHighCourt,October1,2009•Georgetown and Butterworth Subordinate Court,•October15,2009JohorBahruHighCourt,November2,2009•Johor Bahru Subordinate Court, November 16,•2009Malacca, Seremban andMuar Courts, January 1,•2010IpohHighCourtandSubordinateCourt,January15,•2010AlorStarHighCourtandSubordinateCourt,March•1,2010

59. Case Management: The tracking system notonly involved dividing the judges; it also required areorganization of staff. Deputy and senior assistantregistrars who had been assigned to individual judgeswereputintoaManagingJudgeUnit(MJU),usuallyonefor each Division. Performance in each district (state)wassupervisedbyaManagingJudge.Mostofthe lattercame from the Federal Court, but Appeal Court Judges

37 TherewasalsoathirdM(formiscellaneous)trackcoveringap-plicationsinvolvingoralandaffidavitevidenceforappealsandFLJC(family, land, judicial review, and companywindingup) cases. Itsusewas limited toShahAlam,asan innovationof theManagingJudgeoverseeingthatcomplex,whofoundthisthemostpracticalwayofdealingwiththatcenter’slesscomplexorganization,ascom-paredtoKualaLumpur,andthefactthattheseareastendedtobehandledbyonlyonejudge(thusmakingdualtracking–theAandTsystem–lessfeasible.).

andtheHighCourtChiefJudgeswerealsoassignedtothisrole.SincetheManagingJudge(whoalsoperformedhisotherdutiesinwhichevercourtonwhichhenormallysat)wasnotalwayspresent,adesignated“managingdeputyregistrar”or inonecasean“organizing judge,”selectedfromamongtheHighCourtjudges,supervisedday-to-dayoperationsforeachMJUandthecourtsitserved.Thelatterofficers“fixed”cases(assignedthemtojudges),scheduledhearings and trials, and generally tracked performance.TheMJUsreportdirectlytotheChiefJudge.

In the MJU, staff prepared cases for handling by60.judgesineitherofthetwotracks(orinthethirdMTrackwhereitexisted),ensuringthatthepartieshadsubmittedthe necessary documentation, lists of witnesses, andarranged for summonses for the latter. They could alsoclosecasesadministratively(forlackofactionorexpirationofthetimelimits),encouragesettlement,andmakebasicdecisions on pre-trialmatters (although these decisionsmight be resubmitted by the parties to the relevantjudge). It is well to remember that asmembers of theJudicialandLegalService,thedeputyandseniorassistantregistrarsusuallyhadworkedasmagistratespreviously.Thisprocess,nearlyentirelyeffectedthroughCourtRulesand Federal Court directives and circulars, was resistedby some judgesbecause it tookpre-trialmattersoutof

Use of Court Rules to Enforce Faster Case Processing

Like other common law systems, Malaysia relies on Court rules (in its case developed by a Rules Committee, pursuant to Section 17 of the Courts of Judicature Act) to define many details (including timing of case events) usually set out in procedural codes (which require leg-islative enactment) in civil law countries. In many com-mon law developing countries, the Rules may exist but are not enforced. In Malaysia, the Court took full bene-fit of their presence in its reform, and also used a series of directives (for example those setting targets for new case processing times) to supplement them. Among other details Malaysia’s High Court Rules set deadlines for dates of hearings and also give the “court” the abil-ity to decide on adjournments. These two items have been critical for speeding up processing of new cases. This is a matter of discipline, not law (as Court Rules in other common law countries often include similar pro-visions), and both judges and lawyers have simply had to toe the line.

16 17

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

16 17

their hands, and by many lawyers, because it imposedstrictdeadlinesandusuallykepttheminthedarkaboutwhichjudgewouldhearthecaseuntilafterthepre-trialmanagementwhenthecasewasfinallyfixed.However,itprovedextraordinarilyeffectiveinmovingaheadbotholdandnewcases.

61. Further Court Reorganization: Trackedcasesinitiallyincludedbothpendingcasesandnewentries,butastherewas a further emphasis on eliminating the older cases,thiscouldhavecreateddelays inprocessingnewfilings.While twosetsofgoalswereestablished–one relatingtothegradualeliminationofoldercasesinbatches(firstthoseenteredbefore2005,thenbefore2008andsoon)andtheothertoresolvingallnewcaseswithinfixedtimelimits(alwaysunderayearforfulltrialcasesandlessforaffidavitcases),itwasapparentlythefirstthatgotpriority.Ageing liststhusonlywentbyyearofentryanddidnot“age”newcasesbymonths.However,anysuchproblemwassooneliminatedbyastillnewerpolicy,adoptedfirstinKualaLumpurandtheninShahAlam.ThisentailedthecreationofNewCommercialCourts(NCC)andthenNewCivilCourts(NCvC)whichweretoreceiveonlycasesfiledaftertheircreation.As thebacklogwasreduced, judgesfrom the two other tracks were transferred to these new courts (physically located in the same buildings –this was a change of nomenclatures and also of working rules,notof location)alongwith thedeputyandseniorassistant registrars no longer needed in such quantitiesin the Managing Judge Unit. The new model will thusreturn to the former courtroom organization, allowingeachjudgetohandlebothAandTtrackcasesandhavingcasemanagementdonebytheirownstaffratherthanbyaseparateunit.This isnotquitefullcircleasjudgeswillnowhavetargetsforcaseresolutiontimes.IntheNCCandNCvC,theoverallgoalistoresolveallcasesin9monthsorless.AsdiscussedinChapterIII,thisgoalhasbeenmet.

This entire process (tracking and reorganization)62.was most fully developed in the Commercial and CivilDivisionsoftheHighCourtsinthefivetargetcenters.Onlya fewsessioncourtsadoptedthetrackingmodel,and itapparentlywasnottakentotheremainingcourtcentersforanylevelcourt.However,ifinaslightlydilutedform,thepracticeswereimitated,andmoreoverthesametargetsappliedacrossthecourtsystem–reductionofbacklogsothatbymid2012,therewouldbenopendingcasesmorethanayearold,andspeedierprocessing(withthetargetdurationsreducedoverthecourseofthereform)forcivilandcommercialcasesinparticular.

63. Application to Criminal Cases: As discussed in a later sectionontheseparatecrimereductionprogram,effortstoapply thesegoals tothecriminalcaseloadhavebeensomewhat less successful. Backlog has been reduced ifnotasdramatically,andthereareinstructionsforlimitingadjournments and setting time limits for preparatoryactivities.However,theJudiciaryasawholefeelsitcannotbeasstrictwiththesemeasuresincriminalmattersbecauseofthevaluesinvolved.Theseincludebothaninterestinfacilitating prosecution and in giving the defendant anopportunity to organize his/her defense; both partiescommonlyencounterproblemsingettingtheirwitnessestocourt,andthelatter’sabsenceisacommonjustificationfor adjournments. Moreover, except for interlocutorymotionsandappeals, criminal casesarenotdecidedonaffidavitsbutratherrequirefulltrials.Whentherecentlyenacted plea bargaining measure is implemented, thelengthoftrialscouldbesubstantiallyreducedandmanyof the factors contributing to their duration (failure ofwitnessestoappearforexample)eliminated.38

Asregardscriminaljusticeafewadditionalcomments64.are in order. First while there are some very old casesin the backlog, they are few in number and themajorcomplaintaboutcriminaljusticeisnotdelaybutrathertheverylownumberofcrimessuccessfullyinvestigatedandadjudicated.TheanalysisprovidedbythePrimeMinister’sPerformanceManagementandDeliveryUnit(PEMANDU)(2010) indicates that of the 2.5million crimes reportedin2009,lessthan10percentresultedinthechargingofasuspectandonly5.6percentreachedaverdict.Figuresforthe40,738violentcrimesreportedwere13.7percentresulting inachargeand8.1percentreachingaverdict.Verdictsincludednotonlyconvictionsandacquittalsbutalso DNAA (discharged not amounting to an acquittal)whichistosaythecasewasclosedwithoutaverdict,butmightbereopenedlater.However,mostofthis isnotaproblem of the courts but rather of the police and theprosecutors.Thecourtsonlygetinvolvedonceasuspectischarged.Thelargerproblem,intheeyesofthepublic,is the ineffectiveness of the police and the prosecutionwhichresultsinonlyfewofthecrimesactuallyreachingthecourts.Thesameanalysisdidnotethat judgeswereresponsible for23percentof theadjournments (addingto delays and probably the chances of an eventual

38 Thelawhasbeenenacted,butitsimplementationhasbeende-layedbecauseofconcernaboutsomedetails.

16 1716 17

CHAPTER I I : The Reform Program: 2008 to Present

DNAA) but also recognized that the courts had alreadymadesignificantstridesinendingthatpractice.StatisticssuppliedbytheCourtindicatethatbymid-July(sixmonthsintotheprogram),judge-causedpostponementswereat18percent.39

Second,asregardstheentirecriminaljusticesystem,65.thereareample criticisms,notnecessarily sharedby thewiderpublic,of itshard-on-crimeapproach,especiallyasregardstheseverityofpenalties,theinadequatesupplyoflegalassistance,andofcoursethelargenumberofdeathpenalty cases (roughly30amonthheard).However, thisapproachisbasedonlaw,notjudicialpreference(althoughjudgesseemedconvincedofitsnecessity).Finally,criminalcases represent only a fraction of overall workload. Thiscould change if some of the additional crime reductionmeasures are successful (see section below on thePEMANDUprogram),butuntilitdoes,anyefforttoreducecourt backlog will logically emphasize the non-criminalcases,firstbecausetheyareamajorityandsecondbecausethecomplaintsaboutdelayarefocusedthere.

66. Additional Variations:TheprocessdescribedaboveisbasedonobservationsandinterviewsinthemaincourtcomplexesinKualaLumpurandShahAlam.Thesearethelargestandmostorganizationallycomplexjudicialcenters,andtheyfeaturemultipleSub-DivisionsfortheirCivilHighCourt as well as greater specialization of their sessionscourts. Since someof these specializedSub-Divisionsorcourtsincludedonlyonejudge,itwasimpossibletocreatetwojudicialtrackstohandletheircases.Thiswasoneofthe reasons for the introductionof theMTrack for theso-calledFLJC(Family,Land,JudicialReviewandCompanyWinding-up)casesintheShahAlamcourts.Nonethelesstheresultshavebeenpositiveandthesingle-judgeHighCourtDivisionhandling familymatters inKuala Lumpur,forexample,wasresolvingnearly2,000affidavitandfull-trial casesayearandhadkept thecarry-over fromoneyeartothenextataconstantandreasonable500cases.

Thiswas also trueof the three additionalDivisions67.located in Kuala Lumpur – Admiralty, IntellectualProperty, and Islamic Banking – as well as the Special

39 “Judgecausedadjournments”areoftenaresultofajudgebeingilloronmaternityleaveandthefailuretoappointasubstitute.TheJudiciaryhasaddressedthisissuebysendingaseniorassistantreg-istrarordeputyregistrarasasubstitute.Inothercountries(WorldBank,2010onEthiopia)italsocoversinstanceswhereajudgede-clares an adjournment because of not being preparedor for an-other,non-specifiedreason.

PowersDivision of theHigh Court. The latter (RKK) is amulti-judgeDivision.IthearscivilappealsfromtheKualaLumpur subordinate courts, issues relating to the LegalProfession Act, and judicial review applications againstadministrativedecisions.InJanuary2009,itsbacklogwasdescribedas“alarming”andmoreoveraffectedthefinaldispositionofcasesinthesubordinatecourtsawaitingitsdecisions. Rather than dividing cases into tracks (whichmadelittlesenseasthesewerelargelyaffidavitcases),itsjudgeswereeachassignedadailyquotaofcases,workinghours were extended to Saturdays, and adjournmentswerestrictlymonitored.BySeptember2010,thenumberofpendingcaseshadbeen reducedby two-thirds, from3,759to1,228.

It is likely, but would have to be verified through68.site visits, that other districts had their own variations,butallsharedthesamegoalsofreducingbacklogandsoimprovingtheageinglist(overtimefewerandfewercasesfrom prior years) and accelerating the handling of newcases..Itwasreported,however,thataso-called“Blitz”wasexercised inmanytargetedcenters (e.g.ShahAlamand Penang). This entailed sending judges from otherdivisionstoassistjudgesdoingcriminalappealsfromthesubordinatecourtstoclearallthependingcases.40

40 AWorldBankstudy(2004)reportedasimilarexerciseinBrazil.

An Alternative and Less Successful Approach to Backlog Reduction

In two Latin American countries with problematic civil backlogs (Peru and Colombia), the Judiciaries chose to create special, single-judge courts to handle older cas-es, transferring them from the most congested regular courts. No initial inventory was done, no targets were set, and the results have not been carefully monitored making it difficult to evaluate their success. However, anecdotal evidence suggests it has been limited. Among other reasons this is because, as a Peruvian observer noted, the judges transferring their cases now have less reason to work faster, and the temporary judges in the new courts, interested in keeping their jobs, have little incentive to process their caseloads rapidly. Both countries already had considerably more judges than Malaysia (although Peru has about the same size popu-lation) and individual workloads, to the extent they can be estimated were at (Peru) or below (Colombia) the Malaysian levels at the start. Both countries use panels of judges for more complex cases, but most of the con-gestion arises in single-judge “courts.”

18 19

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

18 19

TheCourtofAppealandtheFederalCourtwerenot69.excludedfromtheprocess.Withintheformer,fourspecialpanelsweresetuptofacilitateearlydisposalofpendingcivil andcriminal cases.The fourthand lastpanelhearsappealsfromtheNewCommercialCourtstoensurethattherapidprocessingintheHighCourtisnotdefeatedbyaslowappellateprocess.Althoughcasesarefixedtopanelsearlieron,themembersofthepanelsrotateandarenotassignedtill thecase is ready tobeheard.Thispracticeis intendedtoreduceanyeffortby lawyers to influencetheirdecisionsortowithdrawthecasesotheycangeta“betterpanel.”Late“fixing”ofcasesformulti-judgeHighCourtdivisionsispracticedforthesamepurpose.

70. Results: More specific information and statisticsontheresultsofthisandthepriorexercisearegiven inthechapteronachievements.BytheendofApril,2011,pendingcasesinallcourtshadbeenreducedbyroughly66 percent (see next chapter for details). The courtshavecontinuedtoreducetheamountscarriedoverandmoreoverhavemaintainedaclearancerateof100percentorhigher.Monitoringofcaseloadsanddispositionrateshasbeenfurtherrefined,althoughstillhavingtobedonemanuallyforthemostpart.

Thishas,however,affectedtheworkloadsoftheCourt71.ofAppealandmostprobablywillhaveasimilareffectonthe Federal Court because as more cases are decided,moreappealsareentered.Thus,whereasappealsfiledattheCourtofAppealin2006totaled2,368,in2009,theyreached5,045andin2010,totaled6,412.Leave-to-appealfilingshavelikewiseincreaseddramatically–1,052entriesin2009and1,711in2010.Consequently,thenumberofpendingcivilandcriminalappealsintheCourtofAppeal,afteraninitialreduction,hadreached10,209bytheendofApril2011–ascomparedtothe9,714pendingattheend of 2008. Nonetheless most of the COA’s pendingcasesasofApril2011werefrom2009and2010.Pendingcivilappealsasoftheendof2010includedonly204civiland72criminalcasesfrom2007orearlier.

As compared to backlog reduction programs72.conducted in other countries (see box), and usuallydependingonthecreationofspecial“backlogreductioncourts”andtheadditionofmorejudges,Malaysia’sresultshavebeenfarmorepositiveandarealsomonitoredanddocumented (something often lacking in other backlogreductionprograms,althoughseeWorldBank2010andWalsh2010onacomparableexperienceinEthiopia).

Additional Personnel Policies

The reform did not hinge on the usual “first step,”73.addingjudges,butitsoonbecameobviousthatmorewouldbeneeded.FortheHighCourtsthisposedaproblemastheyalreadyhadthemaximumnumberofjudgesstipulatedbytheConstitution.Thisproblemwasresolvedbytheuseofshort-termJudicialCommissioners.Theseindividualswerenot assigned to special courts (as in the Latin Americancases),butrathertoordinaryduties,usuallyinauthorizedbut unfilled High Court positions. Their performance isalso monitored and over time, the best performers aregivenpermanenttenure,thusallowingforthepromotionofsomeexistingHighCourtjudgestotheCourtofAppeal(wherethenumbersarestillundertheconstitutionallimitand moreover, caseload has increased). As numbers ofsubordinatejudgesarenotsimilarlylimited,someadditionswere made here. However, additions are based on ananalysisofcaseloadsandatleastelevensubordinatecourtshave also been closed for lack of demand. Thus, despitetheadditionofjudicialcommissioners(manyofthemonlyintendedastemporaryappointments)thereformhasreliedmoreonincreasingefficiencythanincreasingpersonneltomeetitsgoals.

The emphasis on increasing efficiency meant that74.the incentive structures had to be modified, as therewas no guarantee that judges and registrars wouldsimply leaptothechallenge.Onewayofdoingthiswasthroughtherequirementfordailyandmonthlyreportsoncaseloadmovement. The daily reports from each judgego directly to the Chief Justice whomonitors a certainportionofthemastheycomeinandcommunicatestheproblems to the respectiveManaging Judgeas theyarenoted.Themonthlyreportsarepublished(nolongerwithnamesonthem,butjudgescanstillseewheretheystandcomparatively).ManagingJudgesmakeperiodicvisitstocourtstodosurprisechecks,andalljudgesarealsogivenaseriesoftargets,allofwhichwerediscussedinperiodicjudiciary-wide conferences. Common targets includethoseforreducingbacklogsandfortheresolutionofnewcaseswithinfixedtimelimits.Additionally,astheprogramhas gone on, judges in the track system are allocatedspecifiednumbersofcasesonaweeklybasis,basedonestimatesastoreasonableamounts.Therehasalsobeenamorerecentattempttoweightcases(basedonrelativecomplexity) so as to ensure more uniformity in thecompositionofcaseloads.Inthenewcivilandcommercialcourts,thepracticehasbeentointroducethecourtstwo

18 1918 19

CHAPTER I I : TheReformProgram:2008to Present

at atimeand let the registrar assignall incoming casesarrivingduringafour-monthperiodtooneortheother,usingtheweightingsystemaswell.

Use of Specialized Courts

In contrast to practices in other common law75.countries (the U.S, England),Malaysia seems to have apreference for specializedcourtsand this is reflected inthe overall reform program. The Commercial and CivilHigh Court Divisions were already standard and CivilCourts in Kuala Lumpur also has a Family Division. InKualaLumpurtherewerealreadyadditionalDivisionsforIntellectualPropertyandIslamicBankingmatters.AnewAdmiraltyDivisionwas created in2010.TheadditionoftheNewCommercialCourts (NCC)andNewCivilCourts(NCvC),whiletemporary(asoverthelongerruntheywillbetheonlyCommercialandCivilDivisions),followsonthetraditionifforslightlydifferentreasons.SpecializationismostpronouncedintheHighCourtsinthemostcongesteddistricts, and there even subordinate courts are furtherspecialized–forexampleinKualaLumpur,incorruption,money laundering, immigration, narcotics, intellectualproperty, various banking offenses, and claims in tort.Elsewhere, magistrates, sessions and even High Courtsmayhearallmannerofcases,astheyaretoofewtomakespecializationfeasible.

One further note on specialized courts merits76.attention. TheMalaysian system of rotating judges andespecially those in the subordinate courts seems toemphasize specialized courts but generalist judges. Thisin some sense may contradict the principal argumentforspecialization–thedevelopmentofexpertiseonthetopic–sincea judgewhosits in thecriminaldivisionofaHighCourtoneyearmayserveinafamilydivisionthenext.Thesameistrueofstaffwhoalsorotate.Therearedoubtlessotherorganizationaland logistical advantagestomaintaining specialized jurisdictions (e.g. the greaterease of tracking caseswhen there is less variety in theissuesandbasicprocedures).However,itwouldbehardtoarguethatthesehavetodowithjudgesorstaffspendingyearshoningtheirexpertise.Thisapparentcontradictionmeritsmore attention. Except inmatters like admiraltylaw, intellectual property, Islamic banking or complexwhitecollarcrime,itisdoubtfulthatthemajorityofcasesrequireanyspecialkindofknowledge.Judges,however,seemto likethesystem,reporting(in interviews)that itgivesthemagoodoverviewofallkindsofcases.

Other Measures to Improve Performance and Eliminate Some Traditional Vices

Someofthemostimportantmeasuresherehavebeen77.thetighteningup,throughtheissuanceofcourtdirectivesof timeframes for lawyers’ provision of documentsessentialtodecisionsonbothaffidavitandfulltrialcases.Thishasbeenthecruxofthecasemanagementprocessandtheefforttopreparecasesfortheirhearingbyjudges.Additionally, courts, through theirmanaging judgeunitshave taken amore systematic approach to 1) assigningcasestojudges;2)schedulinghearingsandotherevents(which lawyers ignore at the riskof a casebeing struckoutor sufferingadefault judgment); and3) settingandtracking performance targets. It bears emphasizing thatuntil nowmost of this has been donemanually as therelevant automatedmodules are still not in place.Onlyperformancemonitoringnowusestheautomatedsystem (and only at the courtroom or MJU level41), but caseassignmentsandschedulingmuststillbedonewithmanual

41 WhiletheJudiciaryhasaCaseManagementUnit(CMU)attachedtoitsStatisticalOffice,itreliesonthemanualcompilationofstatis-ticssuppliedbyindividualjudgesortheMJUs.Contrarytowhatitsnamesuggests,theCMUdoesno“managing”butratherhelpstheCourtgetanoverviewofoverallsystemprogress.

Setting Targets for Case Processing

In addition to the targets for backlog reduction, the courts have been given targets for processing new cases. These are moving targets – changed (and often pushed up) on the basis of experience. Among those applied to the New Commercial Courts (NCC) in late 2009 were the following:

Processing of documents on day of filing•Return date within 3 months for writ summons•Hearing date for Winding up petitions within 2 •months of filingFor other cases, case management within 2 weeks •of filingHearing date for A Track cases before Judge within 2 •months of filingFull trial (T Track cases) scheduled and completed •within 9 months of filing.

Other, more recent targets for other jurisdictions include:

Termination of corruption cases within one year •Termination of uncontested divorces within 2 weeks.•

These targets affect both judges and lawyers, and judges’ compliance with them is closely monitored.

20 21

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

20 21

tools.ThiscomplicateslifefortheManagingJudgeUnits(MJUs)andespeciallyforthemanagingdeputyregistrars, buttheresultsdemonstratethatitisindeedpossibleandthusafurtherlessonforcourtswhoclaimnothingcanbedone“untilthemachinesandsoftwarearrive.”

The Judiciary has also sought to overcome minor,78.butirritatingdelayscausedbythedifferentrequirementsplacedbyjudgesandtheirstaffasregardsordinaryfilings.Lawyers not familiar with the quirks of a judge or his/ herstaffmightfindtheirpapersreturnedforcorrections.Standardizedformshavebeenintroduced,andagreementsreached(andrecorded inadatabase)astohowjudges’nameswillbeentered.Thisbecamenecessarybecauseofthemanyhonorifictitlesusedanddifferingpreferencesas to where they would be placed. Finally, there havebeen attempts to encourage judges to write shorteropinions;thisisaperennialproblemformanycourts,andisusuallyhardtocombatbecausejudgesfeelitinterfereswiththeirindependence.Resultswerenotreported,butseveral of those interviewed noted that setting of thetargetsforprocessingcasesmaybeasufficientincentiveon itsown,aswritingoverly longopinions clearly takes moretime.

Procedural Changes

The reform to date has not relied on extensive79.changes to laws regulating procedures. One of themost important, the introduction of casemanagement,had been adopted in 2000 as noted above although itseffective implementation only began with the currentreformanditsextensiontopre-trialmattersforcriminalcaseswasarecentaddition.Pre-trial“casemanagement”did exist for civil cases, but it was subject to the samedelays the reform has targeted for elimination. Courtpublicationsandintervieweesmentionedcasesthathadbeen“managed”20or50timeswithoutgettingtotrial.Aspartofthereform,thecourtshave,eitherbymodificationof their Rules or the issuance of circulars, tightened upsome of the timeframes for lawyers’ submission ofdocuments and taking of other actions in the pre-trial(casemanagement)stageandhaveotherwiseworkedtoensurethatpre-trialpreparationmovesrapidlyandthatlawyersdonotarriveonthedayofapre-trialaudience,hearingortrialwithanotherrequestformoretime.Forexample,thewitnessstatementisnowusedincivilcasesasasubstituteforalengthyexamination-in-chief.Amongthe further changes tobe implemented, someofwhicharestillunderconsideration,arethefollowing:

Adoptionofpleabargainingforcriminalcases;(a)Simplificationofintroductionofevidenceforcriminal(b)cases – in essence the admissibility of writtendocuments for the evidence-in-chief (initial witnesstestimony)asalreadyallowedincivilcases/Further simplification of the High Court and(c)Subordinate Court Rules to increase efficiency andmakeforanew“friendlier”courtprocedure;andIncrease in the jurisdiction of the session and(d)magistratescourtstoreducecasevolumeintheHighCourts.

The lack of reliance on extensive legal change,80.alongwiththedecisiontomoveaheadwithbackloganddelay reduction programs before the ICT systemsweredeveloped,isanimportantaspectoftheMalaysianreform.Courts that have chosen the contrary path often spendunproductiveyearswaitingfortherightlawsandtherightsystem to be installed. Procedural changes (requiringlegislative enactment) can help, but as Malaysia’sexperienceamplydemonstrates,itisfarmorepracticaltoattempttargeted,asopposedtoholistic,change,tomakewhatchangesarepossiblethroughlessformalrulesanddirectives, and to base whatever changes are formallyadoptedonampleinformationonrealperformanceandifpossiblepilotedtesting.

Mediation

One immediate result of the greater emphasis on81.movingcasesaheadandsettingfirmdatesforsubmissionofdocuments,otherpre-trialmatters,andfullhearingsandtrialshasbeenatendencyoflawyerstoseethebenefitsof out-of court-settlement or court-annexedmediation.Mediationhasbeenwidelyused inroadaccidentclaimsat the session courts. On several occasions judgescommentedthatwhenfirmdatesaresetandthepartiesandtheirlawyersknowtheywillberespected,“theirpalmsbegintosweat”andtheystarttoseetheadvantagesoftakingthelesscomplicatedroute.Thissometimesmeanswithdrawingthecomplaintorgoingforasettlementwiththe other party. However to facilitate matters, in April2010, the Judiciary introduced the possibility of court-annexedmediationforcommercial,family,andothercivilcases.Astheconcernedstakeholdersarestilldebatinganewmediationlaw,advancestodatehavebeenthroughless formal arrangements,making the servicesavailableand encouraging lawyers and unrepresented parties touse them. The Court’s reading on this is that inasmuchas mediation depends on a decision by the parties, a

20 2120 21

CHAPTER I I : TheReformProgram:2008to Present

law,whilehelpful,isnotrequiredforittobeused.42Thepractice is new, but given Malaysia’s apparently highlypracticalapproachtosuchissuesitseemsunlikelyitwillbechallengedlegally.Ofcoursepartiescanalwaysdecidenot to comply with a mediated agreement, but that isalso true of amore formal judgment. In court-annexedmediation,anysettlementwouldinfactconstituteacourtorder andwould be enforceable as such.Whether thiswillputcompliance ratesat thesame levelof those forjudgmentsremainstobeexplored.

InMalaysia, court-annexedmediation is done by a82.judge, although usually not the judge who would hearthe case. Theone exceptionwas the FamilyHighCourtinKualaLumpur,butonlybecauseithasonlyonejudge.However,shoulddisputants inthatcourtdesireanotherarrangement, mediation can be transferred to anotherjudge. Global statistics on mediated cases were notreported, but numbers of those formally mediated (asopposed to informal settlements) still appear tobe lowalthoughthesystemdoesworktotheextentofreachinganagreement for thosewhochoose it.TheCommercialDivision of the Kuala Lumpur High Court reported a 50percent success rate (agreements reached) for the onemonth covered. The Family High Court Judge for KualaLumpurclaimedthathersuccessratewasabout75percent;thenumberofcasesmediatedwasnotprovided.Formalmediationremainsa fairlynewconcept inMalaysiaanditisthusnotsurprisingthatuseratesremainlow.Thereis also the issue of whether parties to the agreementsreached throughmediationwill understand they are asmuchcourtordersasaformaljudgment.

Thecourtshaveconductedtrainingonmediationand83.iftheycontinuetopromoteit,thenumbersofmediationsconductedshouldincreasesubstantiallyovertime.Inmanycountries,fee-basedandfreemediationcentersareusedmoreextensively,oftentoheadoffcasesbeforetheygettocourt,orsoonafterfiling.Somecountriesevenmakethisamandatorypre-conditionforfurtherconsiderationbythecourt,althoughthispracticehasmanycritics.43InMalaysia,itappearsthatthecourtswillurgemediationonlyafterthepre-trial case management. This takes advantage of thesocalled“sweatypalmssyndrome”butearliermediationwhethercourt-annexedornotmightalsobeconsidered.

42 TheJudiciaryisconsideringintroducingpleabargainingincrimi-nalcasesinthesameway,whilethenewlawremainsunderreview.43 This is because compulsorymediation can become simply an-otherobstacle to justice,especiallywhenoneorbothpartiesdonotwanttouseit.

Creating a Specialized Resource Center (Training)44

TheJudiciaryhasattemptedtomakeimprovements84.here, but budgetary constraints have been a problem.The roughly RM 400,000 (US $133,300)made availableannuallyfortraininghasallowedtheholdingofworkshopsandshortcourses,buthasnotpermittedthedevelopmentof a permanent training program. Fortunately, poorlypreparedjudgesdonotappeartobeanissueinMalaysiaand courses have thus been able to focus on exposingjudges to skills and concepts critical to the reforms. Asdiscussed in a later section, the Judiciary has proposedsetting up a permanent program, but this will requirefurtheranalysisofneedsandcertaindecisionsastocareertrajectories.45

Expanding Use of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) to Support Case Management, Facili-tate Filings, and in Court Hearings

Most of the following discussion is restricted to85.activities conducted in West Malaysia. The programconducted in Sabah and Sarawakwas not reviewed. AsnotedithasitsownITcontractwiththefirmSAINS,andstarted slightly earlier. It shares the same goals as theWestMalaysiaprogramandappearstohavemadesimilarprogress,perhapsduetoitsfarlesscongestedcourtsandconsequently lesser problems with backlog. In fact itscourtsmaybestillmoreup-to-dateatpresent,becausetherewaslesstoupdatewhentheybegan.

86. Court Recording and Transcription System (CRT):Thetotal being spent on ICT under the twomain contracts(with Formis and SAINS) is RM 130 million or roughlyUS$43million.Of thisRM100million is for Formis andRM30millionforSAINS.Bothcontractscoverthecreationof a Case Management System (CMS or perhaps moreappropriately CMIS, Court Management InformationSystem46)butinWestMalaysia,theFormiscontractalsoincludes moneys for the creation of a Court Recording

44 Whenasked,noneof the likelypartieshadany ideawhatwasmeantbya“specializedresourcecenter.”Itwasthussurmisedthatthisreferredtotraining.45 TheJudicialandLegalServicehasitsowntraininginstitute,butitdoesnothaveaprogramforsuperiorcourtjudges.TheInstituteoffersanobligatoryorientationcoursefornewJLServicemembers,andalsooffersroughly25shortcoursesayearaimedatJLServicemembersworkinginthecourts.Itsprogramsarealsoopentocon-tractedcourtstaffevenbeforetheyapplyfortheservice.46 Asnotedabove,thetermCMIShasbeensubstitutedforCMStoreducesomesourcesofconfusion.

22 23

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

22 23

andTranscriptionSystem(CRT).Thispartwasdonefirstandwill result inthedeliveryofaudiovisualsystemsforrecordinghearingsto387courtrooms–asofearly2011,300 had already received the equipment. The rationalebehindthisactivitywasthedelaycausedbyjudgeshavingto take notes on proceedingswhichwould become theofficialrecordoftheircontent.Thiscreatedconsiderabledelayandalsodidnotproduceentirelyaccuraterecords.An earlier experiment with real-time transcriptions bycourt reporters did notwork inWestMalaysia becauseof language difficulties – proceedings are conducted inEnglish,alanguageinwhichthosedoingthetranscriptionswere not always completely fluent. East Malaysia hasfewerproblemswiththisarrangementanditapparentlycontinues to use court reporters’ transcripts. This hasadvantagesforcriminalcaseswherethelawstillrequiresthecourtstoprovidewrittentranscriptstotheattorneys(meaning that theaudio-video recordingsmust laterbetranscribedbycourtstaff).However,thisisnotrequiredforcivil cases,although the lawyersdoobject that theyneed this service to be able to review the court recordquicklyandsocomplywiththe14daydeadlineforfilinganappeal.

Theaudiovisualequipment is standalone,meaning87.that at present, the recorded transcript (a CD) is stillstoredintheequipmentinstalledineachcourtroomwithcopiesbeingmadeanddeliveredtotheattorneysattheendofthetrialorhearing.47Eventually,acentralstoragemechanism will be needed, but so far the collectionof recorded transcripts (the CDs) does not exceed thecapacity of the courtroom facilities. Judges interviewedin Kuala Lumpur, Shah Alam and Putrajaya were quitepleased with the arrangements, although some ofthemseemednotfullyfamiliarwithallofthefunctionalpossibilities–forexampletheirabilitytotypenotesintotheaudio-visualrecordingfortheirownfuturereference.Noteswouldnotbevisible inthecopiessuppliedtotheattorneys.Therecordingsystemisnearlyfullyautomatic,using4camerasandfocusinginitsvideoportiononthepersonspeaking.Itisthusoperatedbyordinarycourtroomstaffanddoesnotneedaspecialtechnician.Noproblemswithequipmentwerereportedandthejudgesconcurredthat it allowed them to conduct hearings and trials much morerapidly.

47 ItbearsnotingthatjudgesinMalaysiadonotsharecourtroomssothereisnoproblemwithmixingCDsfromonejudges’hearingswiththosefromanother.

Courtsarealsoexperimentingwithotheraudiovisual88.tools. Becauseof the largedistances in Sabah Sarawak,some hearings and witnesses’ testimony are done byvideoconferencing.InWestMalaysia,thereareon-goingexperimentswith teleconferencing tohandle somepre-trialmatters.Thisavoidshavingpartiesandtheirattorneysgo to the courts for relatively simple hearings.Most ofthisisnotcoveredundertheITcontractsbutratherisaseparateinitiativeofthecourts.

89. Queuing System: A second element, introduced inthe larger court complexes in Western Malaysia is theelectronicqueuingsystem,intendedtofacilitateholdingofhearingsbyregisteringthearrivalofattorneys,onthedaytheeventisscheduledandlettingthemknowwherethey stand in the queue. Once registered at the court,theycanalsoleaveandcallinusingSMSortextingfromtheirmobilephonestoverifythetimetheymustreturnforthehearing.Attorneysarrivingforacasemanagementor chambers matter register at the court building, andwhenbothpartieshavecheckedin,thehearingisplacedin the next slot in the queue. If one lawyer arrives andtheotherdoesnot,theformercanseekouttheregistrartodeterminehowtoproceed.Hearingsarescheduledfor

A Further Note on Unique Numbers, E-files and E-archives

As anyone who has searched their paper and e-files for a document knows, both processes can be equally frus-trating. As paper files are converted to electronic for-mat, there will be a need to develop a good e-archiving system. This is one of the reasons the unique number becomes important, as it should allow the case to be re-trieved wherever it is located. However, judges, courts, and the entire court system will need to ensure their e-archiving system is as easy to use as the current physi-cal files. Paper files have one advantage here – they are easy to see, and as was done in the physical backlog reduction program, can be moved into piles, or even separate rooms to facilitate processing, In a virtual fil-ing system, this is also possible, but software must be modified for this purpose. Since none of those inter-viewed mentioned the virtual archives, it is a good bet these will need more work. The front-end of the process (e-filing) has received most attention, but now the back-end should get still more emphasis so that the courts are not swamped with millions of electronic files with inadequate means of navigating through them.

22 2322 23

CHAPTER I I : TheReformProgram:2008to Present

themorning,butpreviouslytherewasnowayofknowingwhenorwhetherahearingwouldbeheldowingtotheabsenceofoneorbothattorneys.Thisproblemhasnowbeen resolved. Attorneys interviewed in Kuala Lumpurwerenot surehowmuchtime this saved them,butdidappreciatethetransitionfromtheformerchaosandtheopportunitytodootherworkwhilewaiting.Althoughlessnecessaryinsmallercourts,thesystemwillbegraduallyexpandedtothem,becauseofthebenefitsforbothstaffand lawyers. It eventually canbeused for trials aswell(wherethepresencenotonlyofthelawyers,butalsoofother parties is required). Similarmechanisms are usedinother judicial systemsandareoftenpartofa reformprogram. However, the Malaysian version is especiallysophisticated because of the combination of electronicschedulingwiththeattorney’sregistryoftheirpresence.This avoids the problem of “definitive” scheduling ofa hearing which will be postponed because one of thelawyershasnotappeared.

90. Automated CMIS and E-Filing: The most complexpartoftheICTcontract,andonestillunderdevelopmentin West Malaysia, is the creation of an automatedcase management information system with its variousmodules.Afirstmodule,alreadyinstalledbutstillhandledpartly manually, registers the initial civil filing, entersthe pertinent information into an electronic database,assigns a casenumber, andadds scanned copiesof theaccompanying documents. It also calculates fees andonce these are paid (in the same building), issues awritofsummonsfordeliverybytheattorney(or ifs/hewishesby thecourt foranadditional fee). There isalsoa comparable model for criminal cases, but it was notexamined for thisassessment.The initial version,whichrequired manual transfer of the relevant data to thecourtdatabase, isalreadybeing replacedwith“internetfiling”whichprovidesformstothefilerfromwhichdatacanbeextracted automatically. Itwas reported that 40firms were already using this method, although it wasintroducedbetween the initial fieldwork in January andthefollow-upvisitinMayandrequiresseveraladditionalstepstobetakenbyanypotentialuser(e.g.registrationofdigitalsignature).

OneofthefewproblemsobservedisthattheCMIS91.willcontinuetousetheoldermethodforassigningcasenumbers, meaning that cases do not receive a uniquenumber(whichistosayonenotsharedbyanyothercaseeverregisteredanywhereinthecourtsystem).Currently,numbersareuniquetoeachintakecenterbutnotsystem

wide.48Thesituationcouldberemediedbychangingtheformulaforcreatinganumber(andthusaddingacodefortheintakecenterorcourtwhereitenters)orbywaitinguntilthesystemgoesfullyonline,inwhichcase,thesequentialnumberwould incorporatetheuniverseoffilings.Giventhatallcourtswillnotgoonlineforsometime,theformersolutionismostpractical(andinfacthasreportedlybeenpartiallyadoptedasan“invisible”numericaladdition tothebasic casenumber).49Uniquenumbersareessentialfortrackingacaseinitstrajectory,howeverconvoluted,through the entire court system; they should thus beretainedevenwhenacaseistransferredtoanothercourtor instance for whatever reason (although the secondcourt or instance may assign an additional number foritsownbureaucraticpurposes).However,suchthoroughtrackingisreallyonlypossiblewithafleshed-outCMIS,forwhichreasonitsimportancewasprobablynotrecognizedinthelatter’sinitialdesign.50

Until now the entire process of admitting and92.registeringacasehadbeendonemanually,andalthoughtheadmittingclerksareextremelyefficient,additionaldatahadtoberecordedmanuallyandalldocumentswentintoaphysicalfile.ItistheintentoftheCourtandthesystemdesignersthatbytheendofthecontract(June30,2011),mostofthesestepswillbeautomatedandforthosewhochosetoe-file,alldocumentationwillbeentereddirectlyintoanelectronicfilewithnoneedforpapercopies.Forthosepreferringtobringtheirfilingsdirectlytothecourt,theprocesswillstillbemoreagile,butdatawillhavetobe entered and documents scanned by the court staff.E-filerswillalsobeabletopaytheirfeesbyinternetusingacreditcard.Whethere-filedorphysicallydeliveredtothecourts,thecasefilewillbeelectronicandpapercopiesofdocumentswillnolongerberetained.Currentlybarcodesareplacedonwrittensubmissionsfortheireasierlocation

48 Thecurrentsysteminvolvesthreenumbers–onefortheyear,onefortheissue(e.g.violentcrime,uncontesteddivorce,civilinter-locutoryappeal),andasequentialnumberapparentlycorrespond-ingonlytotheyear(notthesecondissue-specificfigure).Abetter,butnomorecomplicatedsystemwouldfeaturetheyear,thecourtorintakeoffice,andthesequentialnumber,basedonboth.Afourthfigure,correspondingtothegeneralmatter(Civil,Family,Commer-cial,Criminal,etc)couldbeadded,butunlessincorporatedinthenumericalsequence,isreallynotnecessary.Itmight,however,helpinorganizingthee-archive.49 Whythenumberremains“invisible”couldnotbeexplained,butmayhavebeeneasierforthevendortoadd.50 The“invisible”numberwasalsoaddedafterthefirstfieldwork,possibly in reaction to the lengthy discussions about its impor-tance.

24 25

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

24 25

inthefilesalthoughthisobviouslywillnotbeneededoncefilesarecompletelyautomated.Theperceivedadvantageofthissystem,asidefromsavingspace(andtrees)isthatthefilewillbeaccessibletomanyuserssimultaneously,thussavingthetimeofcirculatingitamongthem,oronlyof locating it for transmission to the immediate user.However(seebox),forthistohappen,thevirtualarchivemayrequirefurtherorganization.

It is the e-filing and electronic case files that have93.captured most attention, but another very importantaspectoftheCMISshouldbethecreationofanelectronicdatabaserecordingkeyinformationandmajoreventsforeach case (another reason for emphasizing the uniquenumber). This is different from the electronic case filesand registries although its contents would be basedon data entered there. The files will include scanneddocuments and eventually may be linked to the CDrecordingsofhearings.Thecurrentregistrieskeptatthecourtroomand court complex levels are largely recordsofcaseevents(schedulingandminutesofhearings,basicinformation taken when the case is filed, and so on).Becauseofthelargequantityoftextentries,theydonotpermit much quantitative analysis, but can be used togenerate preprogrammed reports. The database shouldcompriselargelycoded(nottext)entries,replicatingwhatisintheregistries,butalsoallowingfree-formanalysisatthelocalandcentrallevels(whereanalystscanfocusonsystem-wide performance trends). It is thus a vital toolin courtroom and systemmanagement. Theweb-baseddesign would allow considerable additional analysis forthosewithaccesstoit.Accesspolicieswillofcoursehaveto be developed, not only to protect the data enteredbut also the privacy of parties. Since the Court tracksperformance through reports generated at the courtroom orDivisionlevel,usingstatisticsgeneratedthere,itisnotapparent that it hasmuch interest in a global databaseor understands its future uses; those interviewedwerenot sure the database in fact formed part of the initialcontract.TheChief Justicehasaskedthe ITDepartmenttocompileitsownExceldatabaseusingthedailyreportsfromeachjudge,butthismeasureisreallynotasubstituteanditisunclearhowitwillbeused–possiblytolimitthemanual compilation of global statistics which inevitablyproduceserrors.

94. Further Use and Limitations of the Existing CMIS Database: IncourtswiththeCMISalreadyinstalled,staffin thecourtroomand in the respectiveManaging JudgeUnitsandRegistrar’sofficesuseitsdatabase,thoughstill

inrudimentaryform,togeneratetherequireddailyandmonthlyreportsoncaseloadmovementandtootherwisemonitorhowcasesareprogressing.Unfortunately,asofMay2011,thecentralStatisticsUnitdidnothaveitsownversionofthedatabaseandthusstillreceivedreportsinwritten form and then had to enter data and calculatethe global statistics manually. However, the Formisrepresentatives reported that the Unit would have itsowndatabaseapplicationbyJuneandthuscouldreceivedata from CMIS courts electronically. If this is done, itmeans that the Statistics Unit could generate reportsautomaticallywithouthavingtodomanualcompilations.For non-CMIS courts, data will still be processed andenteredmanually.

It now seems unlikely that even with web-based95.connections to the CMIS courts, what the contractor isoffering(basedontheinitialcontract)constitutesaglobaldatabaseinstalledintheStatisticsUnit.InsteadtheUnitwillstillbeworkingwithaggregatedataevenfromCMIScourts. Ideally, its database would codify informationmanaged at the courtroom level and thus offer anenormouspotentialfordoingfurtheranalysis,nolongerlimitedtothereportsnowcreated.ThiswouldcertainlyhelpwiththesporadicrequeststheUnitgetsforanalysisnot already contemplated. Depending on the codifiedelements of the database, a good deal more analysiswouldbepossible.Beyondthis,theUnitwouldbeabletoconductdatamining,alessdirectedcrossingofvariablestoseewhatpatternsemerge.Allofthiscouldandshouldbecloselycoordinatedwiththebudgetary,planning,andpersonnel offices because of the potential impact onfuturedevelopmentplans.However,evenwithwhatnowappearstobeadatabasecomprisingaggregatestatistics,its full utilization will require several additional steps,as discussed in more detail in later sections. The mostimportant of these involves upgrading of the StatisticsUnit.Mostofthestaffiscurrentlyinvolvedinmanualentryofdataandcalculationofbasicstatistics.Thiswillonlyberequiredinthefuturefornon-CMIScourts. Insteadstaffwillnowneedastrongerbackgroundinstatisticalanalysisasappliedtojudicialmatters–althoughthatapplicationwillhavetobedevelopedonthejob.

Ifnot in thecurrentcontract, then ina futureone,96.theJudiciaryisadvisedtobeginworkontheconstructionof a real global database integrating the partial onesinstalledwithineachcourtorjudicialcomplex.Thiswouldconstituteanextremelypotentinstrumentformonitoringand analyzing performance as well as for doing future

24 2524 25

CHAPTER I I : TheReformProgram:2008to Present

planning. The current program has functioned well onthe basis of the existing approach and themanual (butsoontobeautomatic)compilationofglobalstatistics,butfurtherreformswouldbemuchaidedbytheadditionofaglobaldatabasewhichreallyshouldbethecoreofanyCMIS.Possiblyusingadditionaltechnicalassistanceforitsdesign,thefollowingstepsshouldbeincorporated:

Expansion of the information included in the(a)decentralizedregistriesanddatabasestoincorporatemore details and characteristics of interest and toenterasmuchaspossibleincodifiedform.Improvedauditingofdataentries.Entriesarealready(b)audited but this will become still more critical asadditionalusesarefoundforthecontents.Movementbeyondthetraditionalreportsdeveloped(c)when this kindof analysiswasnotpossible. This isalwaysaproblemwhendatabasesarecreatedastheusualtendencyistothinkintermsofthereportsthatwere formerlydevelopedmanually. Itusually takesawhileforuserstorecognizethattheycannowdomuchfineranalysis–forexample,reportsonaveragenumbers and lengths of adjournments, globally, bydistrictandbyjudge.Thisprocesscanbeacceleratedbybringinginexpertswhohavedonethisworkwithothersystems.

97. Future Adjustments to the Entire ICT Package: Finally, itshouldberecognizedthattheCMISandotherICT elements as delivered at the end of contract willrequirefurtheradjustments.Theautomatedcomponentwas developed extremely rapidly and there are manydetails requiring attention (e.g. storage of CRT audio-visual transcripts or CDs, improvements to the virtualarchive, access policy for the CMIS database, gradualphase-outofcertainelementsaddedovertheshortrunthat many no longer be required with the movementtoa fullyelectronicsystem.Two itemsherearethebarcodesusedtoidentifydocumentsandtheentirephysicalfiling system, including the space it currently occupies).Moreover,almostinevitablysomeaspectsofthesystemwill require more work, either because they do notfunction as intended or because the intentions weremisguided. System development has been complicatedbytheabsenceofadequateconfigurationcontrol,eitherbecause neither party understood its importance, orbecausethecontractorwaswillingtobemoreflexibleinacceptingconstantchangesandadditionsthanisnormallythecase.

Configurationcontrolormanagementsimplymeans98.imposinga cut-offpointon system requirements– “wearebuildingWord6,andanythingbeyondthatgoesintothenextversion,Word7.”51AsoflateJanuary2011,twomonths before the contract was to end (and before asubsequentno-costextension),therewerestillon-goingdiscussions,forexample,onwhat informationwouldbeautomatically exchanged with other agencies (police,prosecution,prisons,andthebar).Apartfromlastminutecrises(e.g.,thereportthatthepolicehaddecidednottoparticipateintheexchange),theissuehereisthatconstantrevisions to basic functionalities or the details of theirdesigncanproducetheirowncontradictions.Allofthiswillneedtobesortedoutinthefollow-oncontract,andthepartiesshouldreallytry,duringthefirstyear,todedicatetheir efforts to that, systemmaintenance, training, andexpansionofthesystemasistootherjurisdictions.Addingmore functional elementsor enhancements during thatearly period will only complicate the production of asystemthatworks.Futurecontractstodevelopadditionalapplicationsoranyoneelsecontemplatinganewsystemshould thus take configuration management moreseriously–thisisfairertothecontractor,butitalsocanshortenthetimeneededtomakereadjustmentslater.

Except for the absence of a global database, what99.hasbeenaccomplishedandwhatispromisedbytheendof the contract constitute thebasic elementsof a goodmanagement information and electronic processingsystem. Although the price seems high, this may bewarrantedby the speedwithwhich theproductwas tobe delivered. Moreover, the winning contractor wasselectednotonlyonthebasisofthequalityofitssystem(developed during a three month trial period in whichfour firms participated) but also its price, which wasthe lowest offered.52 Those attempting to replicate theMalaysianexperiencecoulddoubtlessnegotiateabetterdeal,especiallyiftheyarenotsoconcernedwithdeliverywithinonlytwoyears,butgiventheavailabilityoffundsandtheurgencyofcompletingtheproject,thereislittletocriticizehere.TheCourtcouldhavedemandedthesourcecodefortheCMIS,andmorewillbesaidaboutthislater.However,itsnoninclusion(alwaysthepreferenceofthe

51 Anyoneinterestedinknowingmoreaboutconfigurationcontrolcanaccessanumberofdocumentsbysimplysearching for“con-figurationcontrol”ontheinternet.Theconceptwasdevelopedforengineeringproducts(includingsystemsdesign)butit isprobablyapplicabletoanytypeofcontract.52 InfactthehighestbidwastwicethatofFormis.

26 27

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

26 27

contractorforobviousreasons)appearstobethedecision,notof theCourt,butof theLegalAffairsDivisionof thePrimeMinister’sOfficewhichhandledthenegotiations.

Next Steps

Ensuring continuity in the reform vision and100.approach is critical in sustaining and deepening thereform’s accomplishment so far. Since the reform hasbeenimplementedbyateam,mostofwhomwillremainintheFederalCourtevenaftertheChiefJustice’sretirement(September2011),itseemsunlikelythathisexitwillresultinasuddenlossofreformmomentum.Butreformsdonotsustain themselves. They require continued leadershipandmanagement.Asthecurrentteamisaware,therearethreecriticalstepsrequiredtokeepadvancingandcementthechangesalreadymade.Thereisalsoafourthstep,notcurrently contemplated, that shouldbeexplored. Theseactionsprobablyshouldbepursuedsimultaneouslysoasnottolosemomentum.

Further expansion of the program elements (and(a)especiallytheelectronicsystems)tocourtsnotalreadycovered. This is already contemplated althoughtheremaybeaneedforamorespecifictimelineandsequencingof theexpansionofcoverage.Both thisandthenextstepareexpectedtobecoveredunderasecondcontractorcontractswiththefirmshiredtodotheautomation.Readjustments to and further development of the(b)new instruments and processes. This involves bothorganizational changes (use of managing judges,creationofthenewcivilandcommercialcourtsandthe anticipated elimination of the tracking systemas currently organized) and the new automatedinstruments.The latter,alongwithordinary systemmaintenance,isapparentlycontemplatedunderthesecondcontractorcontracts.Theconnectionofthetwo CMIS will also be needed. Without that step,developingglobalperformancestatisticswillremainverycomplicated–theJudiciarymaywanttobringinsomeoutsideexpertsforadviceonthisprocessasneitherSAINSnorFormishasalongexperiencewithjudicial automation, and both they and the courtsmay thus overlook some important aspects. This isstandardprocedureandshouldnotberegardedasathreatbyeitheroftheprincipalcontractors.Thegoalisnottoturntheircontractsovertosomeoneelse,

butsimplytoensurethatwhatisdonenextiswhatismostneeded.53

Development of a longer term plan for improving(c)courtperformance.Whilemembersofthecoreteam(Chief Justice and others) have forwarded ideas astoasecondphase(FederalCourtofMalaysia,2011;168-179), they do not as yet constitute amedium-termstrategicplan.Thisstepwillbeinherentlymoredifficult than the first stage because of potentialdisagreements among other stakeholders, if notwithin the team, as to priorities and the potentiallossofoneenormousadvantageenjoyedinthefirststage–aconsensusonmeasurableobjectiveswhichnearlyeveryoneagreedwerecritical.Theproposednewemphasison“quality”doesnotlenditselfeasilyto the identification of benchmarks and targets,exceptasregardsthedeliveryofinputs(legalchange,thedevelopmentofoneormoretraininginstitutes,andsoon).Nordoesitaddressspecificrecognizableproblems of interest to those outside the courtsystem.Thus,itwillbeimportantforthoseinvolvedtogivemorethoughttothespecificserviceproblemstheyproposetoresolveandcouchtheirplansintheseterms.Ofcoursetheymaynegotiatefundsforsomeoftheseinputsanyway,buttheirargumentswouldbemuchstronger,andtheirlonger-termimpactsmuchgreateriftheycouldbasetheirrequestsongoalsasconcreteasthoseusedinthefirstphaseprogram.Creation of a real CMIS database integrating and(d)improving the databases already managed at thecourtroom,Division, or court complex level. This isnotontheJudiciary’sagenda,butasnoted,itisreallythecoreofacompleteCMISandfurthermorewillbeessentialinplanningthenextstageprogram.

Additional Reform Elements outside the Court Program

Unlikereformsattemptedinothercountries,usually101.withmorelimitedresults,theMalaysianjudicialprogramlimiteditsearlyeffortstoasinglegoal–backloganddelayreduction.Thisis,assuggestedabove,hardlythelimitsofits vision, but this single-minded focus over the shorterrun is arguably a part of the explanation of its success.

53 Inanyevent,anoutsidefirm thatmade recommendations forthepurposeofcapturingthecontractwouldbecommittinganactofgrossconflictofinterest.

26 2726 27

CHAPTER I I : TheReformProgram:2008to Present

Backlog, the primary target, has clearly been reduced,anddelayreductioneffortsfocusedonthetargetedHighCourts(themostcongestedones)appeartobeworkingaswell.Themuchtouted“holistic”reformswithmulti-yearprogramsaimedatamuchbroaderseriesofgoalsrarelyadvance any of them significantly, and as the reformcommunityisbeginningtoadmit,itmaywellbewisertoproceed by parts.54 Certainly the Malaysian experiencearguesforthatapproach.

Nonethelessthecountrydoesfaceotherproblems102.with its justice sector, and fortunately, the governmentin coordination with other agencies has been able toaddresssomeofthem.Noteworthyherearethreeareas:legal assistance (access to justice); crime control, andanti-corruption.Progress inall of theseareaswill affectcourt operations, and to the extent its cooperation hasbeencalledon,theJudiciaryhasbeeninvolved.However,as regards its owndirect promotionof these andotherobjectives, it has left them,wisely it would appear, forlaterstagesofreform.

Legal Aid and Access to Justice

Malaysiadoeshavealegalaidprogram,butitcomes103.nowherenearcoveringtheneedforsuchservices.55Untilveryrecently(March2011),theStateonlyprovidedfreelegal assistance (by contracting independent attorneys)todefendants incapitalcaseswhocannotprovide theirownandthroughitsPublicDefenseOfficetosomepartiesincivil (family)cases.This issupplementedbypro-bonoworkbymembersoftheMalaysianBar(oneofthethreebodiesoflegalpractitionersinMalaysiabutonlycoveringthosepracticingonthemainland;theothertwoaretheSabah Bar or Sabah Bar Association and the SarawakBarorAdvocatesAssociationofSarawak56).Withannualcontributionsofabout$25fromeachofitsmembers,theBar Council (the governing body for theMalaysian Bar)finances14 legalaidcenters,payingstaffandoperating

54 SeeUSAID(2010)foradiscussionofitsstrategicframeworkforROLprogrammingwhichrepeatedlyreferstotheneedforaholisticvision.Sincealldonors(theWorldBankandUSAIDincluded)devel-opprogramsforatimeframeofatmaximumfiveyears,theadviceaboutbeingholisticpresumablyreferstothisperiod.Inanyevent,itisacommoncriticismofdonor-driven(andsomecountry-driven)reformsthattheytrytodotoomuchintoolittletime.55 ForacomparisonofthesituationsinSingaporeandMalaysiaandofjudicialviewsonthesame,seeChan,2007.56 Since representatives of the other two associations were notinterviewed, it is not known what kind of pro bono work theysupport.

expensesfromthisfund,butdependingonprobonoworkbybarmembers for actual legal services.Despite theseadvances the potential demand is far greater. The BarCouncil Presidentnotes that35,000peoplehadalreadybenefitedfromtheprogrambutthat80percentofthoseonremandand95percentofthosegoingtotrialstillwerenotrepresented.57

TheGovernmentandthePrimeMinisterinparticular104.arenowtakingstepstoresolvethissituationbyfundingaprogramproposedbytheBarCounciltosetupaprivatefoundation to attend to some of the needs. This newentity, the National Legal Aid Foundation, was createdinMarch2011andisnowfunctioning.CurrentfundingistheequivalentofUS$2–3million,whichtheBarCouncilPresidentestimatescanbeusedtoattendtotwoissuesinparticular,policedetaineesandthoseonremand(inpre-trial detention). TheCouncil believes these are the twomosturgentproblemsbutthatovertimemorefundscanbeobtainedtowidentheprogram’sreach.

Itmeritsmention that thePEMANDUprogramon105.crime reduction (see next section) also emphasizes theneed to provide more legal counsel to defendants incriminal cases. Consistent with this thinking, the ChiefJusticehasalsolobbiedwiththePrimeMinistertoincreasethefeespaidtolawyerscontractedbythegovernmentforthispurpose.Itisgenerallyagreedthatoneofthereasonsforthesmallsizeofthecriminaldefensebaristhatthisisnotaverylucrativeprofession.Hencepayingcontractedattorneysmoremightbothattractmorecandidatesandalso entice better qualified ones. The Judiciary has alsotaken its own steps to ease things for unrepresented defendants,includingtheissuanceofappointmentcardstothosenotheldonremand,showingthedataforthenexthearingalongwith“astrictwarningonpostponementsinMalay,English,Chinese,andTamil”(ZakiAzmi,2010;28).Itmightwanttoconsidersomesortofinformationservicefor unrepresented defendants, or parties to any case,althoughtheretheissuealwaysismakingitcleartouserswhere the service stops (does not extend to providingrepresentation, although it does give information onalternativesources).

57 Atasessionscourt,adefendant,who,whileoutonbail,wasfac-inga14-yearprisonsentenceiffoundguiltyofchargesofrobbery.Hehadnoattorneyandseeminglylackedthemeanstohireone.

28 29

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

28 29

Crime Prevention

Compared to worldwide trends, Malaysia’s crime106.rates are quite low. Homicide rates are about 2.3 per100,000 (2010), below the East and Southeast Asianregional averageof 2.8 per 100,000 and theworldwidefigure (unfortunately only updated to 2004) of 7.6 per100,000.58 It bears mentioning that East and SoutheastAsiaisoneoftheleastviolentregionsintheworld–thismay make it a better comparator than say Central orSouthAmerica(for2004,29.3and25.9respectively;theCentralAmericanfigurehas increasedsince thenas theregionhassomeoftheworld’smostviolentcountries).59 Homicideratesareusuallyconsideredthebeststandardfor comparison as homicides are more likely to berecordedbythepolicethansay,pettystreetcrimes.Theyandotherviolentcrimes(armedrobbery,rape,andsoon)arealsomostlikelytoattractpublicattentionandthusademandforgovernmentattentionalthough increases innon-violentstreetcrimecanalsocontributetothefeelingofinsecurity

These facts aside, there is no doubt that the107.Malaysian population regards crime and a perceived(and to some extent real) increase in its incidence asproblematic.Asurveyfundedbythegovernmentin2009foundthatcitizensconsideredcrimesecondonly to theeconomic situation as a source of concern (PEMANDU,2010). A fairly recent independent academic study ofcrime trends, covering the period from 1980 to 2004(AmarSinghSidhu,2005)doesfindthatonapercapitabasis“IndexCrime,”60aconceptalsousedbyPEMANDU,

58 These and other figures on crime, unless otherwise indicated,are taken fromWikipedia (“ListofCountriesbyHomicideRates,”basedonavarietyofofficial sources)as theyappear tobemostrecent and also cover the last decade.Moreover they trackwellwith the less recentUNODCfigures (only to2007-2008) foundatwww.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicides.59 Use of regional neighbors is recommended for comparisonfortworeasons.Citizensaremore likelytobeawareoftrends inneighboring countries than of those halfway around the world.Furthermore,therearevariousregionally-specificfactors (history,culture, socio-economic characteristics, cross-border migration)thatarelikelytoinfluencecrimelevels.ItisnoaccidentthatevenCentralAmerica’slowcrimecountries(Nicaragua,CostaRica)havehomicidelevelshigherthanSoutheastAsia.60 Astheauthornotes,thisisatermadoptedbytheinternationalpolice community to facilitate comparisons. “Index crimes”constituteallcrimethatoccursonaregularbasisandhassignificantimpacts. Inasmuch as regular and significant are determined bycrimepatterns ineachcountry, there is somecountry-to-countryvariationastothespecificcrimesincluded.

did increase, from 510 to 612 per 100,000 over the 24years,andthatviolentcrime,whilestillrepresentingonly15percentofthetotal,hadincreasedmorerapidlythanproperty crime. The trajectory of property crimes was moreerratic,andtheyshowedpeaksduringtheeconomiccrisis.Violentcrimeontheotherhandseemstoshowasteady, if not dramatic, increase over the period. Asopposedtopropertycrime,itsgrowthrateisalsohigherthanthatof thepopulation.However, the increasesareallwithintherangewheretheymightbeexplainedonlybybetter reporting systems, something that is alwaysaproblemininterpretingthesestatistics.

Becauseofitseffectoncitizenwell-being,andalso108.ontheeconomy(forexampleontourism,costsofdoingbusiness,andsoon),crimereductionwasthusincludedasoneofthe6NationalKeyResultsAreas(orNKRA)intheGovernmentTransformationProgram.ThePEMANDU isresponsible forplanningandtracking thesixNKRAs,setoutacrimereductionstrategyandtargetsforthisprogramin2009.Thebaselinefigurescorrespondto2009,buttheprogram was conducted in 2010 with results reported in early 2011. Targetswere set by aworking groupwhichincludedmembersoftheJudiciary.

According to PEMANDU reports, nearly all of the109.targetsweremet,someofthematfarhigherlevelsthanprojected. Themost impressive achievementswere thereductionofreportedstreetcrimes(35asopposedtothetargeted20percent)andIndexCrimes(15asopposedto5percent) and the increase in citizen confidence in thepolice (55.8 as opposed to the target of 35.8 percent).Consistent with the requirements of crime prevention,the program incorporated several agencies, and muchof itswork (and itsmost significant successes) involvedactivitieswiththepolice(targetingofhotspots,placementof more police on the street, enlistment of civilianvolunteers to accompany police on patrols, tracking ofpoliceperformanceatthestationlevelwithrewardsforthosewiththebestresults,andsoon).Theprogramalsoinvolved communitypreventionpolicies (better lighting,forexample)whichweresomewhatinhibitedbypoliticalconflicts within and with municipalities, and efforts toimprove police-prosecutor coordination (reportedly stillfacingproblems).

Asregardsthecourts,effortsmirroredandinsome110.sensewereprecededbyjudicialprogramstoreducebacklogand speed up processing of cases. However, they alsoextendedtoactivitiestheJudiciarycouldnotundertakeon

28 2928 29

CHAPTER I I : TheReformProgram:2008to Present

itsown–forexample,suggestions(notyetadopted)astohowtoensurewitnessesarriveforhearingsandtrials,effortstopreventdouble-schedulingofdefenseattorneysandtoincrease the number of attorneys available, amendmentoftheCriminalProceduresCodetoallowpleabargaining(under consideration), and escorting of defendants tohearings by prison staff, not police. In all therewere 28recommendations, some of which had already beenadoptedbythecourts(e.g.earlierstartinghours),someofwhichappearnottobeinconformitywiththeJudiciary’sownreforms(e.g.,recommendationsastoincreasesinthenumberofjudgesinspecificareas),andamajorityofwhichreally depended on actions by other parties (the police,prisons,prosecutors,defense,andwitnesses)

The specific target set for the courts (once again111.with participation of judicial actors)was the processing(bringingtotrial)of2,000violentcrimecasesin2010.TheJudiciarymetthisgoalbytrying2001cases.Anadditional“internal target” was the reduction of the backloggedviolent crime cases (estimated at 2,820 in 2009) by 90percent in the sameperiod.61 Thedata sourceonNKRAachievements in 2010 (PEMANDU, 2011) unfortunatelydid not include a report on progress on the courts’ backlogreductiontargets,butagainthiswasalessformalgoal.

The Judiciary’s own statistics (provided by the112.Statistics Unit and, up to September 2010, reported inFederal Court ofMalaysia, 2011) indicate that theHighCourts,sessionscourts,andmagistratescourtsallachieveda clearance rate of 100 percent or more for criminal cases during 2010, but show a reduction in pending cases(anythingcarriedovertothenextyear)onlyinthesessionscourts(1,700cases)andthemagistratescourts(14,083).

61 Thetargetforbacklogreductionvariesfromafinalfigureof1,000to278to180withinthesamepresentation,butthe278numbercoincideswiththetotalssetforindividualcourts.

Ageingreports (showingpendingcasesbyyearoffiling)for 2010 do indicate movement toward the “internal”PEMANDU target, although not full achievement. Thetarget consideredas “backlog”any caseenteredbeforeJanuary2009,whichby theendof2010would thusbeover two years old. The ageing lists still include a fewveryold cases,but forviolent crimes littlebefore2006.The following chart comparesactual achievementswiththe status quo ante and the PEMANDU targets. It wascompiledonthebasisofthePEMANDUprojectionsandstatisticsprovidedbytheJudiciary’sStatisticalUnit.

The figures above should be considered as113.approximationsas the Judiciary’s statisticsdonotalwaysseparate what PEMANDU has categorized as violentcrimes.Accordingtojudgesinterviewed,reducingbacklogand acceleratingprocessing of criminal cases has provedespeciallydifficultgiventhetendencyofbothprosecutorsand defense counsel to request adjournments (generallybecausetheirwitnesseshavenotshownup),andthejudges’unwillingnesstorefusetheirrequestsandeitherdecideonthebasisofpartialevidence(ineffectdefault judgments)or dismiss cases as DNAA (discharged not amounting toacquittal),anobjectivethePEMANDUplanalsoshares.

AstheextensiveanalysisunderlyingthePEMANDU114.recommendations (based on judicial statistics and aworkshopwithjudicial,prosecutorialandpolicepersonal)indicates and the further 28 recommendations suggest,the problem is very complex. The targets set for theoneyearperiodmaythusnothavebeenrealistic.Whileeliminating older cases is a goal shared by the courts,theadditionaltargetoftrying“2,000moreviolentcrimecases”isnotnecessarilyconsistentwithit,asanincreaseinviolentcrimesorinindictmentsforthesecasesmightallow it to bemet by focusing only on new entries. Infact the sessions courts registeredmore violent crimesentering in2010 than the totalamountof “backlog.” In

Table 4: Comparison of PEMANDU Backlog Reduction Targets for 2010 and Court Backlog Statistics (Violent Crimes Only)

CourtInitial Backlog as

defined by PEMANDUPEMANDU Target for end of 20101

Real Backlog (Court statistics but using PEMANDU definition) by

Dec. 2010

High Court 204 20 136

Sessions Courts 1233 123 486

Magistrates Courts 1383 138 233

Sources:PEMANDU2010forinitialbacklogandtarget;JudicialStatisticalUnitsforachievementsbyendDecember,2010.

30 31

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

30 31

anyevent,althoughthecourts’focushasbeenmoreoncivil cases, they have done what they could to reducecriminalcasebacklogandspeedupprocessing,andtheirachievements here, if not quite as significant as in thenon-criminaljurisdiction,arenonethelessnoteworthy.

As regards the overall anti-crime strategy it is115.generally consistent with the usual recommendations.Theonlyexceptionmightbetheuseofcivilianvolunteersto assist police which would doubtless raise questionsabout vigilantism in some quarters. However, the testis reallywhat resulted inMalaysia and so far there areno complaints registered. Putting 50 times the numberofpoliceinBukitBintang(anareaofKualaLumpurwithmany five-star hotels and shopping centers, frequentedby tourists) may well have reduced street crime there,but it seems to be a bit of overkill. Also the reportedreduction in street crimes in particular is so large as toraise questions about the police possibly manipulatingdata (or alternatively those outside Bukit Bingtang nolonger having police to whom to report crime). Finally,thepreventivemeasuresdonot includeefforts toworkwithgroups,andespeciallyyouthatrisk,somethingthatmightbecontemplatedinasubsequentstage.Whilethemore usual criticism of contemporary crime preventionprograms is that they are too heavy on similar softmeasures, theMalaysianvariationmighterron thesizeofitspolicecomponent.Theemergingconsensusamongexperts inthematerial (Fruhling,2009;BermanandFox2010)isthatbothmeasuresworkbesttogether.

Corruption

CorruptionisasecondNKRAthatalsoinvolvesthe116.courts.Ithasnotprogressedasfarasthecrimereductionprogram,but the Judiciaryhasdone itspartbycreatingfour High Court Sub-Divisions and 14 sessions courtsspecializing in corruption cases.Amendmentswerealsomade to the criminal procedures code to help accelerate corruptiontrialsandtheChiefJusticeissuedacirculartothejudgessettingatargetforallcorruptioncasesbeingprocessedinayearorless.Otheractions(awhistleblowerprotectionactwhichwentintoforceinDecember2010,apublicdatabaseonoffenders,anelectronicprocurement“portal,”strengtheningofcomplianceunitswithinotheragencies)donotinvolvethecourts.Sofarthemostconcreteresults are Transparency International’s findingofmorepublicconfidence ingovernmentanti-corruptionefforts.ThePEMANDUpresentation(2011b)onachievementstodatedidnotincludespecifictargetsbeyondthesettingupofthevariousfacilitatingmechanisms.

30 3130 31

CHAPTER I I I : Achievements of the2008-2011Reform

CHAPTER III

Achievements of the 2008-2011 Reform

Inthischapter,thereform’sprogressinadvancingitsprincipalgoalsisevaluatedthroughstatisticsmadeavailable117.bytheCourt’sStatisticsUnit.Fromthestart,theprogramhasusedsuchstatisticsbothasatooltoencouragejudgesandtheirstafftoimprovetheirworkprocessessoastoreducebackloganddelayandtomonitorperformance.Therelianceonstatisticsforthesepurposesisactuallynotausualapproachinmanyreforms.Courtsoftenspeakofreducingdelayorbacklogastheirprincipalobjectives,butastheyhavenowaytomeasureeitherthepointfromwhichtheyarestartingorhowfartheyhaveprogressed,andoftenmakenoefforttodevelopone,itislittlesurprisethattheirreformsareoftenconsideredfailures–whichtheymayormaynotbe,butthereisnowayofknowing.Measuringprogresswithnumbersisreallyasignofseriousnessofintent,andthustheMalaysianapproachishighlycommendable,especiallybecauseuntilpresentdaymostofthestatisticalreportshadtobegeneratedmanually.62ThisisstillthesituationfortheStatisticsUnitalthoughthecourtswithCMIScannowusethesoftwaretoproducetheirownreportsandtotracktheirownperformance.Theirabilitytodososhouldgeneratefarfewererrorsbothintheirownrecordsandinwhattheysubmittothecenter.Thisisanadvanceinitself.

The Judiciary has devoted considerable effort to documenting its advances in reducing backlogs and more118.recently,inacceleratingtreatmentofnewcases.Theearlyresultsarealreadyavailableinseveralofitsownpublicationsandpresentations(Seeforexample,FederalCourtofMalaysia,2011;ZakiAzmi,2010).Internalreportsareupdatedconstantlynotonlytoreflectbutalsotoreconfirmtheiraccuracy.63Forthepresentwork,theStatisticsUnitprovidedconsolidateddatathroughApril2011.Becauseacentraldatabasestilldoesnotexist,therearelimitationsastothetypeofanalysisthatcanbedone.Butforpresentpurposes,thestatisticsprovided(thesameonestheJudiciaryuses)arequiteadequatetocaptureoveralltrendsaswellassomedetails.Thereisnoreasontoquestiontheiraccuracy,andinitsownreports,theCourtconsistentlycallsattentiontothefew(early)figuresitbelievesmaybeindoubt.

ItdoesbearmentioningthattheCourt’suseofstatisticstodemonstrateadvancesasopposedtoproducingthem119.isaworkinprogressandstillremainsthelessimportantofthetwoapplications.Theissueisessentiallythefollowing:theCourthasfocusedontheuseofdataandstatisticalmonitoringtoestablishtargetsandensurejudgesaremeetingthem.Asindicatedbytheglobalreports,nowcompiledmonthly,andthedaily,monthly,andannualreportsfromindividualcourtsandevenjudges,thismethodhashadanenormouspositiveimpact.Nonetheless,thereportsfromindividualunitsinparticulararelessadequateasameansoftrackingoverallimprovements,andintheircurrentform,donotlendthemselveseasilytothispurpose.TheCourt’sownpublicationonthereform(FederalCourtofMalaysia,2011)isfilledwithsuchtables,butforanybutthemostavidconsumerofjudicialstatistics,theyareaveryindirectmeansofgraspingtheoverallstory.Thisfactdidnotdetractfromthereform’sprogress.Itisonlyaproblemasonewishestodemonstratethatprogressinaglobalfashion.SomerecommendationsaremadeattheendofthischapterastohowtheJudiciarycanservebothendssimultaneously.Theglobalviewislessimportantfornudgingjudgesahead,butitisimportantforoverallplanningandfurthermoreforpresentingtheJudiciary’sresultstoabroaderpublic.Thisisoneofthereasons,althoughalessimportantone,fortheinsistenceinthepriorchapteronthecreationofaglobaldatabase.

62 This isanotherexcuseofferedbycourts thatchoosenot tosethard targetsordevelopmeansofmeasuring them.Theyclaimtheycannotdosowithoutcomputersandoncetheygetthecomputersandsoftwareitoftenresultsthatthisisnotapartofthesoftware’sfunctionalities.63 Itshouldberecognizedthatnotallchangestopastdatarepresentcorrectionsofpasterrors.Casestatusisamovingtarget,andifacaseconsideredclosedisreopenedorsenttoahighercourtonappeal,thenitsstatuschangesfrom“disposed”toactive.Thisistrueofallcountriesthatkeepstatisticsandcanbeveryfrustratingespeciallywhenitmeansthatacourtthatwascurrentnowhasanolderactivecase.SeeWorldBank(2010)foradiscussionofsimilarissuesraisedinEthiopia.

32 33

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

32 33

Key Indicators of Results as Used Internationally and as Adapted to the Malaysian Program

Conventionally, several indicators are used to120.assessjudicialperformanceandthustomonitorbacklogand delay reduction programs of the type undertakenin Malaysia as well as other trends. Any evaluation ofperformance typically uses several of them as eachprovidesonlyapartialviewofwhatisoccurring(NationalCenterforStateCourts,2007).

Judicial productivity – caseloads per judge or case(a)dispositionsperjudge,annuallyorforshorterperiods.Comparisons across systems are difficult becausemanyfactorsdeterminea“reasonable”caseload,butinanygivensystem,increasesinperjudgecaseloadsand especially number of dispositions would be apositivesignClearancerates–casesdisposed(bywhatevermeans)(b)overnewfilingsforeachyearAveragedispositiontimesforcasesclosed–casescan(c)begroupedbycategoriesforgreaterdetailAgeinglists–showingageofactivecaseload,oftenby(d)groupingcasesintocategories(e.g.lessthan30dayssincefiling,30-60daysandsoon)Number of cases pending with a duration of more(e)thantwoyears.

Sometimes the size of backlog or annual carryover istrackedaswell,especiallyintheearlystageswhereitmaybequitelarge.

TheMalaysianJudiciaryusesaslightlydifferentset121.ofindicatorsbasedonitsownexperienceandgoals:

Pendingcaseloadcarriedoverfromoneperiodtothe(a)next,sometimesdifferentiatedbyageofcases—thiswas especially important for the goal of reducingbacklogandthuscasesfiledinearlieryears.Ageinglists–trackingabsolutenumberofcasesstill(b)activebyyearoffiling.Thisisanindirectmeasureofdelay aswell, especially if categories are refined tothemonthratherthantheyearoffilding.For the new courts (NCC and NCvC), progress in(c)disposing of new caseloads within the targeted timelimits.Thisisaproxyfordispositiontimes.Itistrackedbutnotassystematicallyforothercourts.Itisfacilitatedbythewaythenewcourtsareorganizedwhichinitselfisunusualandisfurtherexplainedinalatersection.

As regards the conventional indicators, the122.Malaysian Judiciary uses neither clearance rates norjudicialproductivity.Italsodoesnotusetimetodisposition.However,theindicatorsithasselectedmanagetocapturethese concepts less directly. The exclusion of themoreconventional performance indicators is most probablyexplained by the fact that the interest since 2008 hasbeen in tracking reform progress, not in assessingoverallperformance.Otherwiseitishardtoexplainwhyclearance rates and productivity (time to disposition isanother,moredifficultmatter)arenotmonitoredastheyare theeasiest indicators to calculate. In fact, the tableon clearance rates presented below was calculated bytheauthorusingthedatasuppliedbytheStatisticsUnit.Average disposition times cannot be calculated but atleast for the new courts, the Judiciary’s proxy indicatoris adequate for now.Moreover, the Court’s tracking oftheageof theactivecaseload forall judgesdoesgiveagoodideaofhowcurrenttheyareontheirwork(andthuswhethertheyaregraduallydecreasingthelikelytimetoresolution). Up to the present the Judiciary’s indicatorshaveserveditwell,firstformotivatingjudgesandsecond,for monitoring progress towards its goals. However,as it achieves its initial targets, itmaywant to considermodifyingsomeofthemandperhapsaddingothers.Forexample, ageing lists by year of filing will become lessuseful as older cases disappear in the initial cleanup.After that, it will be necessary to introduce some finercategories,eitherbymonthoffiling,orbypercentageofcases fallingwithin certain time limits (1month, 1 to 2monthsandsoon).Theuseofclearanceratesmightalsobeconsidered,firstbecausetheyareeasilycalculatedandsecond because they can indicate where problems aredeveloping. However, these are lesser details, and theJudiciaryitselfisalreadymodifyingandaddingindicatorsfor better reform monitoring. Without a professionaljudicialstatisticiantohelp,theMalaysianreformershavedevelopedagoodsetofindictorsformeasuringtheirownprogressandastheyaddnewgoalstheyshouldbeabletodothesameaswell.Overtime,however,theymightwant consideradopting someof themoreconventionalperformancemeasuresespeciallybecausesomeoftheirindicators were developed to evaluate targets that areclosetobeingmet.

Program Results Measured Against the Results Indicators

Ageing lists were not systematically compiled123.by the Judiciary until late 2009. Prior to that date, thebacklog reduction targets worked with cut-off dates,

32 3332 33

CHAPTER I I I : Achievements of the2008-2011Reform

first for the rapid closure of all cases filed before 2005andmorerecentlybefore2009.Thus,thefollowingtableuses the previous format, monitoring decreases in thenumbersofactivecasesfiledbeforethe2009cut-offdate.This information isnowcollectedonamonthlybasis. Itbearsnotingthatthecasestrackedarethosethatweredefinedasbacklogat thebeginningof2009–and thusthose thatwere at least a year old then andwould betwoormoreyearsoldin2010.Asthebacklogreductionprogramproceeds,thetargetwouldhavetobereset,butthismethodologyisreallyanartifactoftheearlyreformdays,andquite likelywillbeabandoned in favorof realageing lists. In thisandall the tablesandfiguresshownbelow, East Malaysia is included as well. This suggeststhatwhateverdifferences theremaybe in thewayEastandWestMalaysia record data, the basic statistics arecommontoboth.

Astheabovetabledemonstrates, theprogramto124.disposeolder caseshasbeenextremely successful. Thisbecomes especially apparent with the adoption of realageing listswhich trackallactivecasesbyyearoffiling.The courts now track and producemonthly reports onthesestatisticssincetheoldercut-offdatemethodologyisnolongerasusefulandbecomeslesssoastheoldercasesdisappear.ThefollowingtwocompositeageingtablesfortrialcourtswerethuskindlyassembledbytheStatisticsforthisreport.BecausetheJudiciary’smovementtowarditsgoal(ofnocasesmorethanayearold)acceleratesmonthbymonth,courtstaffinsistedthatthreeperiodsbeshown

–endof2009,endof2010,andendofApril2011.Theunconventionaladditionofaquarteryearturnedouttobeimportantasevenwithinthattimeperiod,thereweresignificantreductionsinthenumberofoldercases.Tables6and7,covering thesameperiod,make itclearerhowthepurgingofoldcasesisoccurring.

As the two tables show, even within this 27125.month period, the Judiciary has attacked the backlogsystematically, starting with the closure of the oldestcases andmoving up to themore recent ones: Table 5demonstrates much the same thing, but without thislevel of detail. As a consequencemany courts are nowcompletely current – as of April 2011, 120 of the 429sessions and magistrates’ courts were only processingcases filed in 2010 and after. This has been easiest intheciviljurisdictionbecausejudgescanbestricteraboutdisallowing adjournments and stretching deadlines, theperennialrequestsoflawyers.Inthecriminaljurisdictionasexplained inChapter II, theytendtobemore lenientout of a wish to give both prosecution and defenseadequate opportunity to present their cases. However,evenwith this said, it is evident that all three levels oftrialcourtshavebeensuccessfulinclearingoutnearlyalltheveryoldcasesandaregraduallyworkingtheirwaytothelessexaggeratedlyoldones–thegoalbeingtohavenoactivescasesoverayearoldbymid-2012.A furthernoteisdueonthescatteringofveryoldcases,especiallyintheciviljurisdiction.Theseareusuallycasesthepartieshave reopened, orwhere theyhave submittedmultiple

Table 5: Backlogged Pending Cases for All Courts, End of 2009 and 2010; Numbers of “Backlogged” Cases (those filed before 2009) Still in Courtroom Files

Court Cases As of 12/2009 As of 12/2010

Federal Court

Civil 39 14

Criminal 36 18

Leaveapplication 42 28

Court of Appeal (pre 2008 cases only)

Civil 2,888 204

Criminal 260 72

High CourtCivil 44,873 9,738

Criminal 3,514 542

Sessions CourtsCivil 61,659 10,947

Criminal 9,377 2,984

Magistrates CourtsCivil 71,681 1,173

Criminal 53,087 8,243

Source:DataprovidedbyStatisticsUnitofFederalCourt

34 35

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

34 35

Table 6: Ageing Lists by Year – All Trial Courts, Civil Cases, 2009-April 2011

Year of FilingHIGH COURT SESSIONS COURT MAGISTRATE’S COURT

2009 2010 April 2011 2009 2010 April 2011 2009 2010 April 2011

PRE 1990 10 6 6

1991 8 3 3

1992 2 7 1 2

1993 4 1 1

1994 9 8 7 1 1

1995 14 3 1 1

1996 25 9 7 4

1997 29 6 7 4

1998 50 13 10 12 1 1

1999 66 26 20 10 1 1 1 1

2000 256 35 20 68 6 1 3

2001 343 87 52 128 14 8 3

2002 604 144 73 332 23 6 12

2003 972 261 152 577 29 5 47

2004 1503 401 197 1060 39 19 109 3

2005 2179 480 285 2120 126 28 249 8

2006 3016 738 475 3339 237 58 511 21 3

2007 4710 1117 826 5870 577 172 1251 41 6

2008 8673 2354 1711 11995 2500 747 4169 201 128

2009 22400 4039 2789 36135 7394 2935 65324 898 245

TOTAL 44,873 9,738 6,642 61,659 10,947 3,980 71,681 1,173 382

2010 23901 9931 36894 15588 65618 5447

2011 11681 26978 48369

TOTAL 28,254 46,546 54,198

Source:StatisticsUnitofFederalCourt

interlocutoryorfinalappeals.Asnotedaboveanyoftheseoccurrencescanchangeanapparentlydisposedcasetoanactiveone, thereby frustratingtheeffortsateliminatingolder cases entirely from the active list. There are bynowveryfewofthesecases,buttheyaretheonesthatseemdestinedtostaythereforever.However,abacklogreductionprogramshouldnotbeevaluatedbythesefewoddcases(unlessofcoursetheyaremuchmorecommonthanshownhere).What is important is thatthebulkoftheoldercaseshavenowbeenpermanentlydisposedand

thateveninthethreemonthsof2011,thenumbershavegonedownevenfurther.

Clearance rates could also be calculated from126.availablestatisticsforallsuperiorandsubordinatecourtsthroughDecember2010.Thecalculationissimple–CasesOut/Cases In during any given period. Where there issignificant backlog it should be over 100 percent if thebacklogistobereduced.

34 3534 35

CHAPTER I I I : Achievements of the2008-2011Reform

Table 7: End of Year Ageing Lists - All Trial Courts, Criminal Cases, 2009-April 2011

Year of FilingHIGH COURT SESSIONS COURT MAGISTRATE’S COURT

2009 2010 April 2011 2009 2010 April 2011 2009 2010 April 2011

1998 1

1999 8 4 4

2000 1 1 11 2 1 4

2001 1 9 2 34 7 7

2002 6 1 30 1 1 58 2 2

2003 17 1 72 4 4 170 8 3

2004 53 5 1 174 30 11 498 7 2

2005 70 9 6 325 55 14 1474 41 9

2006 125 7 9 596 91 35 2975 118 13

2007 249 27 20 1155 203 75 6363 389 94

2008 503 87 57 2182 799 365 10815 2162 601

2009 2490 404 227 4814 1793 955 30696 5509 1976

TOTAL 3514 542 321 9377 2984 1465 53,087 8243 2707

2010 2771 1679 5014 2622 20677 6116

2011 1738 2904 14059

TOTAL 3,738 6,997 22,882

Source:StatisticsUnitofFederalCourt

Table 8: Clearance Rates for Courts by Instance, for 2007-2010

Court Material 2007 2008 2009 2010

Federal CourtCivilAppeals NA 95.8 94.8 225.6

Criminal NA 45.6 94.0 123.4

Leavetoappeal NA 121.7 100 90.7

Court of Appeal Civil 75.0 91 92 99.7

Criminal 52.0 98 63 45

High Courts Civil 77.8 93.3 133.3 130.3

Criminal 89.0 96.6 118.8 101.4

Sessions Courts Civil 96.5 115.4 114.1 110.6

Criminal 91.9 99.3 98.1 105.3

Magistrates Courts Civil 89.4 104.5 119.9 103.6

Criminal 98.0 98.0 110.7 118.4

Source:CalculatedonthebasisofdataprovidedbyStatisticsUnitofFederalCourt

36 37

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

36 37

Three trendsmerit mention here. First clearance127.rateshaveimprovedconsiderablyovertheperiodcovered,in some cases reaching levels far above 100 percent.However,oncethebacklogreductiongoalsaremet,theywill logicallydrop,aswithoutasizablebacklog itwillbehardforcourtstoscoremorethan100percent.Second,andsomewhatironically,itistheFederalCourtandCourtofAppealthathavehadthemostproblematicclearancerates,although the formerseems tobe improvingnow.TheCourtofAppeal’sfigurescouldresultfromthegreaternumber of cases being processed and thus appealed inthe lower instance courts, but theremay be additionalproblems,andaneedforfurtherorganizationalchangeaswell.Thismeritsexploration.Finally,Table8suggeststhatclearance rateswere not that low inMalaysia even pre-reform,exceptforcriminalcasesintheCourtofAppealinparticular.Ifthisisalongertermpattern,backlog(pendingcasescarriedovertothenextyear)wasaccumulating(asitwouldforanythingunder100percent),butnotthatrapidly.Historicalstatisticsonaccumulatedbacklogorcasescarried

over from one year to the next (Table 9) support thisinterpretation,butitishardtobedefinitiveherebecausethepre-2009 inventorywasvery inaccurate.Nonethelesswewill use the 2008 figures as a baseline since there islittle alternative. It is likely that the carryover from2008to2009(allcases,includingthosefiledsometimein2008)wasfarhigherthanshownbelow,butasthesubsequentfiguresareaccurate(exceptforthefactthatoldercasesnotcapturedintheinventoryhavebeenenteredasnewfilings)thismeansthatrealbacklogreductionmaybeevenhigherthanthebaselinewouldshow.

Thus,withthatsingleexception,whichaffectsonly128.the baseline, Table 9 below is an accurate reflection ofprogressinreducingtheinitialcarryoverdespite,asalsoshown,atendencyfornewfilingstoincreasethecaseloadeachyear.Thusjudgesarenotonlyreducingbacklogbutalso working on new cases so as not to create a new backlogofmorerecententries.

Table 9: Comparison of Carryover, New Filings, and Dispositions – All Courts, 2009-April 2011

Court Case TypeBalance

Forward from 2008

Closed/ New Entries 2009

Closed/New Entries 2010

Closed/New Entries thru April 2011

Balance Forward to May 2011

FederalCourt

Cv 53 55/58 79/35 24/36 57

Cr 103 172/183 179/145 89/77 97

L/A 154 374/375 419/462 241/179 242

CourtOf Appeal

Cv 8,832 4,054/4,385 5,553/5,572 2,203/1,637 8722

Crl 882 417/660 382/840 305/247 1487

L/A 0 569/1,052 1,548/1,711 526/453 697

HighCourts

Cv 93,523 96,168/72,148 100,425/77,053 28,858/23,000 28,254

Cr 4,544 6,629/5,580 7,117/7,125 2,409/2,408 3,738

SessionsCourts

Cvl 94,554 160.906/141,031 176,880/159,942 58,134/53,884 46,546

Cr 8,750 31.247/31,856 27,418/26,037 13,945/12,941 6,997

MagistratesCourts

Cv 156,053 367,138/306,246 338.890/327,045 113,037/100,246 54,198

Cr 65,221 159,392/144,048 205,334/173,417 44,506/39,782 22,882

Sub-TotalTrialCourts

422,645 831,480/700,909 856,064/770,619 260,889/232,261 162,615

Total 432,669 827,121/707,622 864,224/779,384 264,177/234,890 173,917

Source:StatisticsUnit

36 3736 37

CHAPTER I I I : Achievements of the2008-2011Reform

According to thesedataprovidedby the Judiciary,129.totalpendingcasestransferredfromoneyeartothenextwere422,645in2009,andcasesenteringoverthenext27monthstotaled1,703,784.(Toavoiddoublecountingonlytrialcourtnumbersareused– i.e.,excluding theFederalandAppealCourts).64Thismeansthattheoriginallypendingcaseload (422,645) was equal to roughly 57 percent ofaverage annual filings (average new entries, or 735,764)for 2009 and 2010. Not knowing the normal timing offilingsitishardtosaywhetherthosein2011willbehigherthanthepriortwoyears,butitseemslikely.Comparedtoresultsfromothercountries,reducingapendingcaseloadrepresentingabouthalfofnormalannualfilings isnotanimpossibletask,butitstillwouldrequireanextraordinaryefforttoeliminateitentirely,andconsiderablededicationtoreduceit,ashappenedhereto38percent(162,615)ofitsformerlevelwithin27months,especiallyasthecarryoverincorporatesnewfilings(whichappeartobeincreasing)aswellasoldercases.Sinceitislikelythattheinitialnumberof cases transferred forward from2008wasevenhigher(and not captured in the first inventory) the results areprobablyanevengreaterreduction.Thisdoesnotchangewhat the courts disposed (although it would affect andprobablyimprovetheclearancerates65).Itonlymeansthatmanyofthecasesdisposedafter2009shouldhavebeeninthebacklogratherthanthenewcasescategory.

We leave the tracking of delay reduction for130.processingofnewcasestoalatersectionasithasbeendonesystematicallyonlyfortheNCCandNCvC.However,theabovediscussionshouldmakeitquiteclearthatthe27-monthprogramhasbeenquitesuccessfulinreducingbacklogandnearlyriddingthecourtsofcasesfiledpriorto theearly2000s. It shouldalsodemonstratewhy it isimportant to use a series of indicators rather than a single one.Reductionofoldbacklog(tables5,7and8)couldhavebeenaccomplishedattheexpenseofasubstantialportionofnewcases,whichmighthavebeenleftsittingwhilethejudgespurgedtheolderactiveones.HencetheneedforTable9demonstratingthequantityofnewentriesandtheeffects onoverall carryover.Disposal or clearance rates

64 Sincenearlyeverycaseentering theFederalCourtorCourtofAppealoriginatesinatrialcourtandstillfiguresinitscount,num-bersfromtheformertwocourtsarenotincluded.65 Thisisbecauseclearanceratesdonotlookatwhatisdisposed,butarecalculatedonlyascasesclosedovernewentries.Hence,ifthenewentriescategoryissuddenlyexpandedtoincludeoldinven-tory,theclearancerateswouldbereduced.Ifacorrectionismade,andclearance ratesarecalculatedonlyagainstnewentries, theywouldrise,aswouldlikelybethecasehere.

(thetermstendtobeusedinterchangeably)alone(Table6)alsogiveapartialpictureasevenarateof100percentcouldbebasedonlyonreducingtheoldercaseload,andespeciallywherenewfilingsare increasing could simplygenerate a “newer” backlog. Thus with this series oftables,itbecomesstillmoreclearthatifnotreachingitsgoaloftotalcurrency(notlikelyinsoshortatimeandwithso many older cases to be eliminated first), Malaysia’sJudiciaryhasmanagedtoeliminatealargeportionofagedcases,reduceitscarryoverfromoneyeartothenext,andfor the most part maintain a clearance rate of 100 percent or higher in a period of only 27 months. Table 9 alsodemonstrates the sizeof newfilings versusdispositionstogivesomeideaoftheconditionsunderwhichthishasbeendone.Definitively,thecommonargumentthatthecourts can only bring themselves up to date by closingtheirdoorstonewcasesandonlyfocusingonbackloghasbeendisprovedbyMalaysia(asitprobablyshouldbeforvirtuallyeverycountry).66UsingstrategiessimilartothoseappliedinMalaysia,courtscanattendtonewcasesatthesametimetheyareeliminatingolderones,andtheycandosotoproduceanoverallreductioninthependingcasecarryoverfromoneyeartothenext.Thus,thestatisticalresultsareimportantnotonlyforMalaysiabutforothercountrieswithsimilarproblemsandsimilargoals.

Thereareseveralotherproblemsintrackingoverall131.progressastheStatisticsUnithasalreadynoted:67

First, the baseline data (for January, 2009 and(a)earlier)wasneveraudited,andvirtuallyevery tabledisplayingitaddsthatcaveat.Thefirstinventoriesdidnot capture all the caseload held in the courts for the reasondiscussedinthepriorchapter.Itisimpossibletogobackandcorrectthefigures,butthesituationisfurthercomplicatedbythenextpoint.Second,betweenearly2009andthepresent,courts(b)doing follow-up inventories have discovered casesnotcapturedintheinitialexercise.Insomeinstances

66 No one seems to know where this myth originated, but it isfound inproposals fromalldonorsand incourts’explanationstotheirgovernmentsastowhythesolutionmustbebasedonnewfundsandnewjudges.67 BeforetheStatisticsUnitprovidedmostofthetimeseriesdataandtablesforthisreport,effortstodothisonthebasisofthepar-tialreportsinitiallymadeavailabledidrevealsomeproblems,manynowresolved,withtheJudiciary’searlierrecordkeeping.Thisrefersnottotheaccuracyofthecount,butrathertowhatisbeingcount-ed,anditbecameapparentthatsuchbasicconstructsas“backlog,”carryover,andthelikevariedsomewhatfromreporttoreport,evenwhencompiledintheStatisticsUnit.

38 39

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

38 39

(e.g. the Shah Alam High Courts), the number of“missing”caseswasquitelarge.Forlackofanyeasyalternative,theyhavesimplybeencountedas“newfilings”intheyearstheyarediscovered.68Thussomeoftheapparentlydramaticincreasesinfilingsin2009and2010donotrepresentnewcasesbutratheroldcasesnotcapturedintheinitialcount.Third, counting the“newlydiscoveredoldcases”as(c)“new” cases artificially inflate the number of newentries. This clearly affects the clearance rates asmeasuredforthesecourts,eventhoughtheiractualcapacityforclearingcaseswouldbehigherthanthedatashow.Fourth,itsimilarlyaffectsthecalculationsofbacklog(d)(or pending caseload) reduction inasmuch as the“backlog” (cases transferred from prior years) wasdoubtlessunderestimatedinthebeginning.Thus,realreductions in pending caseload are probably higherthancalculatedhere.

For theCourt’s goal of reducingbacklog, noneof132.thisreallymatters,andtheglobalrunningaccounts,andthemorespecificonesforindividualcourts,weresufficienttokeepjudgesandstaff’snosestothegrindstone.Itdoesmake itdifficult tocapturetheoverallaccomplishmentsaccurately, and as noted, undoubtedly underestimatestherealamountofbacklogreduction(giventhattheinitialinventorywasfarfromcomplete).ThisismostevidentatthegloballevelforHighCourts,sessionsandmagistratescourts. Accounting for Federal Court and Court ofAppeal cases is more accurate, and the only problemsencounteredthereweresomenon-standardizedreportingmechanisms–forexample,therestrictingofageingliststo casesfiled twoyearsprior to thefinal cut-offofend2010.ForaJudiciarywithoutstatisticians,theMalaysiancourtshavedoneverywellinusingstatisticstopushtheirreformgoalsahead.

A Closer Look at the Tracking System and its Impact on Delay Reduction and Productivity

Since the impact on delay, the second objective133.oftheMalaysianprogram,canonlybeinferredfromtheindicatorsusedabove,itwillbeimportanttoseehowthe

68 There doubtless were better (but far more time consuming)means to dealwith this problem, but the Judiciary’s primary in-terestwasadvancingthebacklogreductionprogram,andforthatpurposethismeanswasasgoodasany.Itisonlyinattempts,likethepresentone,totrackoverallprogress,thatthesolutionposesproblems.

Judiciary has handled this. Increasing productivity wasneveragoal(oraproblem69)butgivenitsadditiontomostperformancemeasurementexerciseswewillexamineitaswell.TheregistrarsanddeputyregistrarsinKualaLumpurandShahAlamHighCourtshavecompiledanextensivesetofmonthlyandannual reportsonprogressbecausetheywerethefirstcenterstoadoptthenewmechanismsand because they are the most congested (and in thecase of Shah Alam, formerly the most disorganized).Someof themost interestingof these reports track theprogress in raising judicialproductivityovertime.Whenthetwo-tracksystemwasintroduced,productivity(casesresolvedperjudge)wentup,butasthetwochartsbelowindicate, ithas continued to increase since then.This isthecombinedresultoftargetsettingandmonitoring,andof the judgesandstaff’sability touse thevariousdelayreductionmechanismsmore effectively.Many of thesemechanismswillbecarriedoverintothenextstage,whenjudges,ratherthanaseparateMJU,willberesponsiblefordoingtheirowntrackingandtheirownstaff.

These figures require a little explanation. Both134.showsignificantincreasesintheabsolutenumberofcasesresolvedeachmonthbutasthisisoccurringthenumberofjudgesassignedtoeachtrackischanging–intheATrackreducedfrom7to2andintheTtrackincreasedfrom7to8.Thusthefactthatoverallmonthlydispositionshavegoneupsignificantly inboth tracksmustbe interpretedin light of this change since it is the per judge numberthat taps productivity. Themost dramatic change is forthe T-Track judges. Their numbers havebeen increasedby one judge, but this hardly explains theirmultiplyingtheirproductionandproductivityoverthe2008baseline.Increases are equally, if not more, significant for theA-Trackgiventhatthenumberofjudgesdecreasedfrom7in2008to2in2009and2010.Ofcourseduring2008,eachjudgewashandlingbothtypesofcases,thetracksnothavingbeenintroducedyet.Separatingthetracksallowedthetwogroupstofocusonlyononetypeofcaseandeachjudgewasabletoprocesssignificantlymorecasesunder

69 It was not a problem because the average annual filings anddispositionsper judge tended tobeon thehigh side inMalaysia(apparentlynearing2,000annuallyor1,000ifallJudicialandLegalStaffisconsideredtobejudges).Theissuewasonlythatmorecasesenteredthanweredisposed,andtheprogramaimsateliminatingthatgap,thecauseofbothcongestion(backlogaccumulation)anddelay.However,asthefollowingdiscussionindicates,thedelayandcongestion reductionmechanismshave also increasedproductiv-ity (not entries per judge,which the court does not control, butdispositions).

38 3938 39

CHAPTER I I I : Achievements of the2008-2011Reform

Figure 3: Comparison of Disposal of T-Track Cases, High Court, Civil Division, KL

Source:StatisticsUnit

Figure 2: Comparison of Disposal of A-Track Cases, High Court Civil Division, KL

Source:StatisticsUnit

40 41

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

40 41

thissystem.Thequestionandthechallengeforthecourtsarewhether,oncethefinalmodelisintroduced(alljudgesagain handling both tracks), productivity can remainmoreor lessat current levels.A slightdeclinemightbeanticipated, asmanyof the casesdisposed in2009and2010were“inactive”andthuslentthemselvestoquickerresolution.Inanyevent,foranyonedoubtingthebenefitsoftrackingasabacklogreductionmethodology,thetwocharts(andcomparableonescompiledforotherDivisionsanddistricts,thoughnotreportedhere)makeitclearthatthemethodhasworked.

Productivityisanindirectwayofgettingatdelay.It135.alsowasneveranofficialreformobjective,andinfactthetwofiguresaboveweretheresultofsomeonedoingsomeunprogrammed analysis (the equivalent of data mininghadtherebeenadatabasetomine).Higherproductivity(morecasesprocessedperjudgewithinthesameperiodoftime)mightimplylessdelayalthoughtheconnectionisnotautomatic.Forexample, judgesmightbeprocessingmore cases because they are receivingmore, and thus

intermsoftimetodisposition,running faster tostay inthesameplace.Inanyevent,theMalaysiancourtshavenotattemptedto tracktimestodisposition,but insteadhaveusedaproxyindicatorbasedonasystemofcaseloadquotasandtimelimitsforprocessingthem,whichismostdevelopedinthenewcourts.Theapproachisfacilitatedbythewaythesecourtsarebeingsetup–sequentially,withafirstcourt(usingjudgesfromthenowlessburdened“old courts”) set up to receive all in-coming cases overa period of 4months, afterwhich it spends the rest ofthe year processing this caseloadwhile a secondnewlycreated court begins receiving input over the next fourmonthsandsoon.Onthebasisofthissystem,newcourtjudges know they are expected to process their threeto fourmonths’worthofcaseswithin9months.This isrelativelyeasy to trackandTables10and11showhowitisbeingdoneandwithwhatresults.Inbothexamples,theNCCandNCvCareinKualaLumpurandasthetablesshow, these courts are even aheadof their schedule indispatchingtheirnewcaseloads.

Table 10: Monthly Pending Cases - New Commercial Court, Kuala Lumpur, September 2009-April 2011

YearMonthly

Registration

NCC: Monthly Pending Cases

Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mac Apr May Jun July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mac Apr

2009

Sep 289 282 252 174 114 88 76 39 26 15 4 4 4 3 2 2 1 0 0 0 0

Oct 389 372 334 259 131 99 77 48 32 15 5 3 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0

Nov 328 306 277 237 103 74 53 34 12 5 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0

Dec 363 342 308 266 145 90 57 40 19 11 5 3 1 1 0 0 0 0

2010

Jan 289 285 255 168 127 105 76 62 41 31 17 10 9 8 8 6 5

Feb 299 287 252 160 139 88 70 62 37 26 22 14 8 7 5 3

Mac 426 412 355 273 201 161 136 87 58 41 29 13 10 9 8

Apr 370 356 336 241 170 125 85 52 39 30 16 5 2 2

May 367 348 308 232 168 124 84 59 40 29 21 15 14

Jun 361 341 296 235 148 108 86 54 37 26 18 8

July 345 327 265 199 119 90 67 50 39 29 16

Aug 352 339 306 210 116 84 61 48 42 35

Sep 317 288 227 127 86 51 26 13 5

Oct 345 315 254 163 94 52 26 8

Nov 357 327 274 148 104 71 45

Dec 369 360 293 172 98 59

2011

Jan 336 329 259 135 78

Feb 222 215 149 78

Mac 362 340 234

Apr 315 292

TOTAL 6801 282 624 814 992 1049 1086 1167 1215 1339 1326 1351 1392 1316 1224 1173 1213 1144 998 964 890

40 4140 41

CHAPTER I I I : Achievements of the2008-2011Reform

Sinceonlythenewcourtsfunctioninthisfashion,136.tracking compliance with case-processing deadlines in other courts will be more difficult and will requiremonitoring disposition times because each courtwill receive its cases over an entire year. Given theMalaysians’ creativity in designing indicators to matchtheir objectives, they probably will be able to find onehere.Stillatthisstagetheymightwanttoconsidergoingback to the conventional, if only tomake their processmore intelligible to outsiders (eitherwithin the countryor internationally).Theymayalsowanttospeedupthecreationofadatabasethatwouldfacilitatemonitoringandmeasurementofdelay.Thesearestepsforthefuture,butgiventhespeedwithwhichtheJudiciaryisadvancingonthefirstobjectives,thefuturemaynotbethatfaraway.

Other Findings

Although the Judiciary has largely used the data137.collectedasanincentiveforjudgesandtheirstaff,thereis some additional analysis which throws light on whatnormallyhappenstocasesandhowthebackloganddelayreductionprogramhasaffectedit.

One early finding reported in Zaki (2010) was the138.relatively low number of cases registered in the KualaLumpurNewCommercialCourt(NCC)thatgotofulltrialwithwitnesses.Insteadasshownbelow,while1.3percentgotofulltrial,themajorformofdispositionisadefaultjudgment,followedbyajudgmentafterahearingwithoutwitnesses.

Table 11: Monthly Pending Cases - New Civil Court Kuala Lumpur, October 2010-April 2011

YearMonthly

Registration

NCvC, Kuala Lumpur: Monthly Pending Cases From Oct 2010 to Apr 2011

Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mac Apr

2010Oct 610 503 258 174 77 32 27 18

Nov 515 386 235 134 88 37 27Dec 576 503 257 158 67 40

2011Jan 615 461 255 125 75Feb 387 324 165 100

Mac 635 536 265Apr 600 453

TOTAL 3938 503 644 912 929 857 957 978

Source:StatisticsUnit

Figure 4: Modes of Disposal for KL NCC Cases, September-December, 2009 Source:ZakiAzmi,2010;36

42 43

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

42 43

Figure 5: Percentage of Postponements by Parties, Criminal Cases, Kuala Lumpur, Sessions Court, July 2010

Source:ZakiAzmi,2010;21

Figure 6: Percentage of Postponements by Parties, Civil Cases, Kuala Lumpur, Sessions Court, July 201

Source:ZakiAzmi,2010;21

Since the chart shows the results in Kuala Lumpur139.for 2009, after theNCCwas created, there is noway totell whether similar results applied for commercial cases before then or for all civil cases more broadly. Perhapsthe stringent policies onmeeting casemanagement andtrial deadlines were having an effect never seen before.However,studiesinothercountriesalsosuggestthatfewcivilcasescometofulltrial,althoughitmaytakefarlongerforthemtobedisposedbyothermeans.Absolutenumbersare not included in the chart, but between September

andDecember 2009, 1,369 caseswere entered and 377weredisposed.Twojudgesreceivedandheardthecases.ByAugust2010,only18oftheinitialfilingshadnotbeendisposed,asignificantresultintermsnotonlyofeliminatingnewbacklogbutalsoreducingtimestodisposition.

Anotherfindingfromthisearlyperiodregardsthe140.effectiveness of the policy on limiting adjournments,especiallythosecausedbyjudgesthemselves.

42 4342 43

CHAPTER I I I : Achievements of the2008-2011Reform

ByJuly,2010,thecourtshadalreadyimprovedon141.their 23 percent judicially-caused adjournment rate forcriminalcasesasreportedinthePEMANDUbaselinestudy,andbylate2010,theyweredoingstillbetter.Incivilcases,judge-caused adjournment has nearly disappeared, butpostponementsofalltypesremainaproblemforcriminalcasesinparticular.Sinceadjournmentsremainageneralconcern for both types of cases, systematicmonitoringprobablyshouldbedoneonseveralbases:

Overallnumberofadjournmentswithineachreporting(a)periodbymaterial(atleastcriminalandcivil),judge,court,districtandsystem-wideAverage number of adjournments per case,(b)disaggregatedinthesamemanner.Average length of postponements disaggregated as(c)above.

All of these additional studies had to be done142.through sampling. With a real database these andother studies could be conducted directly off it by anenhanced Statistics Unit. This is already occurring inother countries, including some far less advanced thanMalaysia.(SeeWorldBank,2010onthecreationanduseofanintegrateddatabaseoncaseevents inEthiopia). Itmaybedifficult todo, at least in this greatdetail, untilthe CMIS is installed, but if the latter does not includeinformation on adjournments, this should be one ofthe first additions in the new version. The Chief Justicedoes receive information on adjournments in the dailyreportssubmittedbyeachjudge,butitappearsthatthisinformationisnotfullyrecordedinanygeneraldatabase.

Further Recommendations as Regards Further Data 143. Collection and Statistical Reports

ThereislittletocriticizeaboutthewaytheJudiciary144.wentaboutorganizingandtrackingitsreform.Itsuseofstatistics to setandmonitor targets isexemplary in thejudicialworldandexplainsagoodpartofthesuccess inreducingbacklog,eliminatingveryoldcases,andas theexamplesfromtheNCCandNCvCdemonstrate,reducingdelays for new entries. Inasmuch as the author’s initialeffortstoproduceglobalsummarystatisticsforthepresentreportreplicatedmanyoftheproblemscurrentlyfacedbytheStatisticsUnit(e.g.,needtoconvertaseriesofpartialaggregatestatisticsintoasingleglobalsummary;lackofadatabaseandthustheneedtodocalculationsbyhand),thisexperiencehasinspiredaseriesofshort,mediumandlongtermrecommendations.

First,allaggregatestatisticssubmittedtotheStatistics(a)Unitshouldbeenteredintoitsowndatabase(orevenanExcelsheet)sothatfurthercalculationscanbedonemoreeasily.Sofaraspossible,theStatisticsUnitshouldavoidhavingtodothesewithhand-heldcalculatorsasthatonlyincreasesthechanceoferrors.Second, there isapparentlystill some lackofclarityas(b)regardsafewbasicconcepts–mostimportantly,whatthe ageing lists contain. Some of those initiallymadeavailableforthisreportonlycapturedcasesfiledoneortwoyearsbefore.Othersincludedallcasesfiledintheprioryeareveniftheyarenotcarriedovertothenext.Whateverwasdonebefore,atthisstageintheprocess,it would make most sense to include in the lists all cases carried over, even those from the year immediatelyprior,solongastheyearoffilingisnoted.Third, there is not much sense in going back to(c)recalculateoldstatistics (andthustrytogetabetterfigureoftheinitial–2008orendof2008–backlog).However, from 2011 onward, all the basic statisticsmentionedaboveshouldberegisteredasaccuratelyaspossible,and“quickanddirty”solutionslikecounting“discovered”casesasnewentries,strictlyavoided.Finally,untilnowtheJudiciary’suseofstatisticshasfocused(d)on two applications: setting targets and monitoringcompliance.Inbothcasesindicatorshavebeentailoredtotrackreformgoals.Asthesegoalsaremet,theCourtwill have to readjust the measures (e.g. introducingmoredetailedageing lists)andmaywant toaddnewones, but it should also consider two further uses ofstatistics:todetectandanalyzeadditionalperformanceproblems(e.g.theCourtofAppeal’sapparentdifficultyinkeepingupwithitscaseloadasreflectedinitslowerclearance rates) and to facilitate budgeting, planning,andthedesignofthesecondstagereforms.Forthesetwo additional applications,movement toward a realglobaldatabasewillbeessential.

These suggestions are a natural follow-on to the145.Judiciary’s initialsuccessandameansofensuring itwillbe equally successful in maintaining the improvementsalreadymade,especiallyasitmovesintoasecondstageofreform.Globalreportswerenotanecessaryaspectofmonitoringthefirstphase.Inthefuture,however,globalaswellascourtroomstatisticswillbetheJudiciary’scoretool in taking its program forward. For that purpose,it will need to ensure that results tracking is pursued in a consistent form from one year to the next. It is thusessential, as expanded in the following chapter, that itstrengthen its Statistics Unit and add personnel with astrongerbackgroundinthematerial.

44 45

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

44 45

CHAPTER IV

Looking AheadThishasbeenanextraordinarilyrapidreformprogram,andastheJudiciaryiswellaware,whathasbeendone146.

todatedoesnotrepresenttheendoftheprocess.However,theCourtisalreadylookingahead.InrecognitionoftheJudiciary’scurrentthinkingofthenextsteps,thefollowingdiscussionofgapsandadditionalmeasuresisdividedintotwosections:

WhattheJudiciaryalreadyproposestocompletethefirststageandmoveintoPhasetwoofthereform(a)Additionalactionsitmightwanttoconsiderforfuturework(b)

Athirdandfinalsectionreviewsadditionalstudiesandresearchthatmightbedoneinsupportoftheprogramor147.ofinitiativessuggestedbyotheractors.

Areas Already Targeted to Complete the First Phase Reforms and for Work on the Proposed Second Phase

Expansion of Measures Already Undertaken to the Rest of the Courts

TheJudiciarydesignedthereformtofocusfirstonthebusiestcourtcenters,KualaLumpur,ShahAlam,Penang,148.JohorBahru,andIpoh,aswellasPutrajaya,theseatoftheFederalandtheAppellateCourts.TheinitialemphasiswasontheHighCourtsinthefirstfiveareas(Putrajayahasnone)andthepriorityareashavebeengraduallyexpandedtotheirsubordinate–sessionsandmagistrates—courts.Thisisareasonablestrategyeveninitslesserattentiontothelargenumberofsubordinateandmagistrate’scourtslocatedelsewhereinthefivestates,aswellastheHigh,sessions,andmagistrates’courtsintheremainingstates.Asdiscussedbelow,SabahSarawakconstitutesaspecialcase.

Alloftheseothercourtshavebeenincorporatedintheprogramtotheextentthattheircaseloadsanddisposition149.ratesarealsosupervisedandtheyareencouragedtofollowthesameguidelines.However,withtheexceptionoftheCaseRecordingandTranscription(CRT)System,theyhavenotbeenincludedintheautomationprogram,noraretheybeingassystematicallymonitored.Thusthenextstageofthereformwillrequireexpansionofitsfullcontenttotheremainingcourts,butastheirshareofthecaseloadisfarsmaller,thisisnotasurgentasweretheareastargetedinthefirststage.

Expansionwill requireasecondcontractwiththe initialvendor inWesternMalaysia (presumablythevendor150.coveringSabahandSarawakisalreadycommittedtocoveringitscourts).Thiswillbeadifficultcontracttonegotiateastheinitialone(notincludingthesourcecode)ineffectgivesthevendoranenormousadvantage–thecompanyownstheCMISsoftware,andiftheJudiciarywantstoexpandits installationitpresumablywillbeonthevendor’sterms.Muchthesameistrueofasecondorpossiblyjoinedcontractformaintenanceandfurtherdevelopmentofthesystemoverthenexttwotothreeyears.AfterwardstheCourtwillhavetodecidehowitwillproceed.

Integration of Mainland Programs with Those in Sabah and Sarawak

EastMalaysiaanditsChiefJudge(whowasappointedin2006)introduceditsownautomationprogram(developed151.byadifferentfirm,SAINS)andbacklogreductioneffortsbeforetheFederalCourt.AlthoughcoverageofthereformeffortsinSabahandSarawakwasbeyondthescopeofthisreport,thereareafewinnovationsinSabahandSarawakworthnoting,andrequiredorallowedbyitsspecialcharacteristics–useofmobilecourtsandvideoconferencingtoprovideservicestofarremovedareas,andanearlyadoptionofawrittentranscriptionssystem(althoughCRTequipmenthasalsobeenprovided)madepossible(asitwasnotelsewhere)becausestaffhiredforthispurposewasmorefluentin

44 4544 45

CHAPTER IV: LookingAhead

English.CourtsinEastMalaysiawereneverascongestedas in the West and thus started the process with less backlog.Mostof themarenowcompletely current (i.e.theiroldestcaseswerefiledin2010).

As regards the first phase program, the only real152.issueishowtheSabahandSarawakCMISwillbemergedwith that developed under the larger Formis contract.Thiscouldbeaconcernintermsofreportgenerationandtheeventualcreationofaglobaldatabaseallowingdataminingandotherunprogrammedanalysis.But it shouldbe resolvable so long as those in charge recognize thatthesethreefunctionalitiesarecritical.

Further Development of the CMIS as a Full MIS

TheCMIS,asitwillbedevelopedbytheendofthe153.Formis contract, constitutes a good basic courtroom orcourtcomplex-levelregistryoncaseactions.Althoughnotcontemplated under the current contract, it should notbetechnicallydifficult,especiallygivenwebconnections,to integrate the individual registries into a single globalversion and use this to create a global database at thecentrallevel.70However,eachexistingregistrycontainsasignificantmeasureoftextentries(notsuitableforanalysis),andalsodoesnot recordsomecasecharacteristics thatwillbeimportantforfurtheranalysisofpossibleproblemssuch as gender of parties, differentiation of types oforganizationalparties(asidefromwhatcanbesurmisedfrom the typeof caseor court), amount requestedandawarded,whetherornotthepartyhaslegalrepresentationandsoon.Startingwithrelativelysimplerdatacaptureisactuallyarecommendedpathforreformimplementation.Attempts to start with the capture of more detailedinformationoften run intoproblemsofpoordataentryoran inadequate identificationofwhat isneeded.Theyalsocanleadtoendlessdiscussionsovercategorizationofvariables.71Therefore,itisrecommendedthatsucheffortsstartlessambitiouslyandgrowovertime.

70 Thedatabaseisseparatefromtheregistrybutiftheregistryiscorrectlydone(usingcodes,nottext)thecreationofthedatabaseshouldbevirtuallyautomatic.71 ThiswasapparentlythecaseinBrazil.WhentheWorldBankre-searchteamendeditsfieldwork inmid2004,theFederalJudicialCouncil(theexecutivesecretariatoftheFederalJudiciary)hadbeenengagedforoverayearinmeetingswithrepresentativesofthefiveregionstotrytoreachconsensusonasingleclassificationschemeforrecordingcriminalandcivil issues. Inretrospect itwouldhavebeenbettertodevelopasinglesetofcategoriesandthenletthefiveregionsdiscussthem.

AstheJudiciarybeginstousetheCMISdatabase(s),154.not only to track individual cases, but also to identifyproblemsthroughmoresophisticatedanalysis,itwillneedtoaddinformationtothatwhichisalreadyenteredandtomodifyentrysoastodevelopagreaternumberofcodedvariables (thosewhich canbemanipulated statistically).According to thecontractor interviewed for this review,this is not a technical challenge although itwill requiretheJudiciary’sdecidingwhat itwantsaddedandhow itwantsitcode.72ItisnotfullyapparentthattheJudiciaryrecognizes this need and potential. So far its notion ofwhichdatashouldberegisteredtendstobeshapedbythestatisticalreportsformerlycollectedmanually.Obviously,an eventual global, web-based system allows for muchmoreanditwouldbeimportanttoraiseawarenessofthispossibility and the advantages of acting on it. It is thusrecommendedthatinternationalexpertsbebroughtintodiscusstheissueswithcourtleadership.

Creation of Centralized Database in the Statistical Unit and Incorporation of Data from CMIS and non-CMIS Courts

One of the surprising findings of the fieldwork155.wasthatthecentralStatisticalUnitstillreceivesalldatain hard copy and enters them manually, making manycalculationswithhandheldcalculators.Althoughcourtswith theCMIS installedcangenerateallof therequiredreportsautomatically,compositereportsmustbecreatedmanuallyatthecenter.Accordingtothevendor(Formis)thesituationwillchangesoon,andthecentralStatisticalUnitwillhaveaglobaldatabasecomprisingthestatistics(butnot the rawdata)managedby the individualCMIScourts.ForcourtswithoutCMIS,datawillcontinuetobeenteredmanuallyandalsoinaggregateform.Atpresenttherearenootherdifferences,butif,underthepresentoraseparatecontract,aglobaldatabasecomprisingrawdata from the automated courts is constructed, it willallowthefollowing:

Data provided by CMIS courts (a set of entries for(a)everycase)couldbeanalyzedindependentlyatboththe courtroom and central levels, to provide, forexample, average times to resolution by court, bytypeofcase,bytypeofpartyandsoon.

72 Unlessthecontractorhasdonesomethingveryoddwiththepro-gram,thereisnoreasontobelievethiscouldnotbedone.Infact,agradualexpansionoftheitemsregistered(andcoded)isusuallyrecommendedtoavoidspendingenormoustimeupfrontindevel-opinganexhaustivelist.

46 47

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

46 47

Thissametypeofanalysiscannotbedonebyorforthe(b)non-CMIScourtsastheywillonlymanageaggregatestatistics. What they don’t calculate themselvescannotbecalculatedatthecenter.Datamining–randomanalysisofdisaggregateddata(c)toidentifysignificantpatternsandrelationships–willonlybepossiblefordataprovidedbytheCMIScourts.However, it shouldbe startednonetheless as thesedata still represent a significant portionof all casesandtosomeextentrepresentaspecialuniverse–themostcongestedcourts.73

Until the integration of the local databases can156.be accomplished, as does not appear to be the short-termplan,theStatisticalUnitwillbemanagingtwosetsof aggregate statistics, one entered manually and theotherautomatically.Thiswillatleastallowittoproduceglobal reports without the use of manual calculators,but otherwise offers few advantages. Once a databasereceiving raw data from the CMIS courts is installed, itwill have tomanage two types of data, raw data fromtheCMIScourtsandaggregatestatisticsfromthecourtswithout the installed system. However, since the CMIScourtshave thehighest caseload, theadvantagewillbetheability todomoresophisticated typesofanalysisofthedatatheysupply.DatafromtheSabahandSarawakCMISwillalsohavetobeincorporated,andtotheextentpossible, harmonized with the contents of the centraldatabase.

Further procedural change

The Judiciary has a list of targeted changes it is157.promotingandthosenotalreadyapprovedappeartobeonthewaytoenactmentbythelegislature.However,overtime,itislikelytofindstillmorelegalchangesthatwillbeneeded.Itappearsthatconductingsuchmodificationstobasic laws isnotthatdifficult inMalaysiaandmoreoverthat there isapotential for tryingout thechangesonapilot basis. This is usually recommended, but often notpossible,aseven thebestanalysismaystillnotcaptureallthepotentialconsequences,someofwhichmayprovemoredisruptive than the legal provision they sought tooverride.

73 ItwasestimatedforexamplethatKualaLumpuralonecapturesabout28percentofallcases,morethanSabahSarawak.

Training

ThisisahighpriorityitemfortheJudiciary’ssecond158.stage program and the discussion in its report on the initialreforms(FederalCourtofMalaysia,2011)mentionsseveralvariations,includingaprogramforjudgesandanInstituteforalllegalprofessionals(theMalaysiaAcademyof Law). Training is important, but as discussed in thesectiononneededstudies,itofteninvolvesinvestinglargeamountsoffundsonactivitiesthathavelittleornoimpactonimprovingperformance.Moreover,thereisalongandnotveryillustrioushistoryofcountriesordonorsfundingmammothtraininginstitutesthatcannotbesustainedoverthelongerrun.Itisthusrecommendedthatbeforeseekingfunds,theJudiciaryandotherproponentsdoathoroughstudyof trainingneeds (seebelow)andalso investigatethefundingimplicationsofanyspecificproposal.SincetheCourt is thinkingbeyond judicial training, the suggestedstudyonthelegalprofessionshouldalsoberelevant.

Areas Suggested for Immediate Attention or for Inclusion in Future Programs

Thefollowingideasarecurrentlynotcontemplated159.bytheCourtbutaresuggestedhereasdesirablemeasuresfortheJudiciary’slonger-terminstitutionaldevelopment.Some of these, such as those related to the IT issues,maybecriticaltocompletionofthefirstphaseprogram,whereasothersareintendedtostrengthentheJudiciary’sowncapacityforinternalmanagement.

Build up IT Capacity, Attend Hardware and Develop Software

As opposed to the following items, this one160.deservesurgentattention.Itshouldnotwaitforasecondphase program. According to the estimates of the ITdepartment, the Judiciary has roughly 30 IT staff, halfof them technicians (largely responsible formaintaininghardware)andtherestdoingtraining,programmingandsystems analysis to some unknown degree. They areall located in Putrajaya. Moreover, they are subject totransferanywhereinthepublicsector(belonging,liketheJudicialandLegalstaff,toageneralcivilservicecareer).Thissituationneedsreviewandseriousmodification.

First, 30 technicians located in the central office161.are insufficient even for ordinary hard and softwaremaintenance.Admittedly,withgoodinternetconnections,

46 4746 47

CHAPTER IV: LookingAhead

a certain amount of assistance can be provided at adistance,buttheCourtwillstillneedtodecentralizethisservice given the current and probable future levels ofautomation.Moreover, local staff can be trained to doordinaryrepairs,buteveninacountry“wherenolocationismorethanfivehoursaway”fromthecapital,therewillbe timeswhen the insufficiencies of trained generalistsand the travel delays will cause productivity problems.Certainly more technicians will be needed and theyprobablyshouldbedecentralized,thoughdeterminationof their exact numbers and locations requires a moredetailedanalysisthanpossibleinthisassessment.BuildingupITcapacityclearlyshouldbeapriorityoftheJudiciary,andifneedbe,negotiatedquicklywiththelegislatureandexecutive.

Second, while technicians are probably inter-162.changeable (so thatonewhofixedcomputers, scannersor video equipment in an executive office should havelittleprobleminfixingtheminthecourts),programmersand system analystsmay be anothermatter, especiallyasthecourtsbegintodeveloptheirownapplications(orfindawaytobuythesourcecodesofthetwocompaniesdeveloping CMIS – more on that below). The policy oftransferring staff from one agency or even one branchof government to another needs revisiting– and in thecaseofITthisisespeciallyimportantasagenciesdevelopor have developed their own specialized (proprietary)software.Courtautomationmayusethesamelanguagesandplatformsasthoseinothersectors,buttheunderlyinglogic of their organization is different.74 The quantity ofstaffneededhingesonathirdissueaselaboratedinthenextparagraphs.

Third, the IT contracts for developing the CMIS163.did not involve transfer of the source codes, necessaryto make any changes to the applications. This is oftenthe preference of the firms contracted as it virtuallyguaranteesthemsteadyincomefortheforeseeablefuture.Anytimeanyonewantsamodification,theyneedtopaythecompanytodoit.75Theusualvendorargumentthatthe CMIS is the company’s “intellectual property” rests

74 ThisarguablyhascontributedtoproblemswithcourtautomationinMexico(Hammergrenetal.2009)andtheauthoralsoobservedacourtCMISdevelopedinEcuadorbyexpertswithpriorexperienceinbanking.Unfortunately,theneedsofbanks(alltransactionsre-portedimmediatelytothecenterandthecenter’sassignmentofasingleaccountnumber)arenotthoserequiredbyjudiciaries.75 Italsomeansthecompanycansellamodifiedversionofthesys-temtojudiciariesinothercountries.

onvery shakyground.Whenanapplication (or for thatmatterareport,likethepresentone)isdevelopedunderacontract,generallyownershiprightsaretransferredtothecontractingagency,whowillofcoursepayaccordingly).IntheLatinAmericanregion,wheretheexperiencewithautomation began twenty years ago, this was not theinitialpractice,butovertime,competitionhasdrivenmostvendorstoincludethesourcecodeintheirdeliverables.Withoutthesourcecode,theneedforalargejudicialITdepartmentdecreases,butwithit(orwithitsanticipatedhandover)alargerandmorehighlytechnicaldepartmentwillbenecessary.Athirdoption,alsorequiringastrongIT department, is for the latter to “retro-engineer theprogram,”whichistosaythatafteracertainamountofexperiencewiththecompanyproduct, theJudiciary’s ITstaffdevelopstheirownversion,withanyimprovementsseenasnecessary.ThishasbeenafrequentdevelopmentinLatinAmerica,inpartbecauseofperceivedeconomies,andinpartbecauseoflongertermdissatisfactionwiththeinitialproduct.

Given the existing weakness of the Judiciary’s IT164.department,nothavingthesourcecodeatthemomentisarguablynotaproblem.However,theCourtshouldbegintoconsideritsfuturestrategy,basedonthreeoptions:

Continue present practices – let the company(ies)(a)keep the source code(s) and rely on them for anyfuturemodifications. This implies a continuation ofthe existing contracts (for systemmaintenance andfurther adjustments) and only a modest expansionoftheJudiciary’sownITdepartment,largelytomeettheneedsofequipmentmaintenance.Negotiateatransferofthesourcecode/swhileatthe(b)sametimebuildingupitsITdepartmenttoensureitcanmanageit/themConsiderthecurrentcontractsasacceptableforthe(c)timebeing,butenhanceitsownITcapacitysoastobeabletodevelopitsownapplications,orinalaterphase,workwithasecondgenerationofcontractedsoftware, this time with the delivery of the sourcecodeincludedinthecontract.Dependingontheskillsofthenewadditions,theymaybeabletoadvancetheneededintegrationofthelocaldatabasessomethingapparentlynotincludedintheFormiscontract.

The real issue here is not whether the initial165.contractshouldhaveincludedthesourcecodesbuthowthe Court wants to manage its IT development in the

48 49

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

48 49

future.Giventhecountry’sfinancialsituation,costsmaybetheleastimportantconsiderationalthoughcostingouttheoptionsoverthenexttenyearswouldnotbeabadidea,andwouldalsoallowittobargainmoreeffectivelywiththevendors. It iswell torememberthatthe lifeofanyspecificsoftwareprogramishardly infiniteandthatmanyjudiciaries,aswellasotheragencies,havechangedcompanies, software, or both in less than a decade.Softwaremaylastsomewhatlongerthancomputers,butinIT,changeistheonlyconstant.

Further Development of Policies on Access to the CMIS Database and Improvement to the Virtual Archive

Intermsofsystemsecurity,entrytothesystem(to166.enter dataor on a read-only basis) is already regulatedby user identity and passwords. However, considerablymoremayberequired.76Theotherconcernshavemoreto do with protecting party privacy, especially, but notexclusively in cases involving sensitive matters. Eachcountryneedstodevelopand implement itsownpolicyhere as what is regarded as “sensitive” is culturallydetermined in part. Over the longer run, it would bedesirable to make the database (or as in the presentversion,databases)availabletooutsideresearchers,butthismayrequirecleaningitofanyinformationthatcouldbeusedtoidentifyparties.Researchersinanyeventareusuallynot interested inwhosuedwhom,but rather inlargercategoriesofcases(e.g.,banksversusindividuals;individuals versus government agencies). This is not anurgentconsiderationbutovertimeshouldbetakenintoaccount.ItbearsmentioningherethatCostaRica,whichhasanexcellentdatabaseandmakesitwidelyavailable,is now discovering thatmuch of the informationmadeavailable constitutes an invasion of privacy. In othercountries the names of employees involved in labordisputeshavebeendownloadedroboticallytocreatelistsofworkersone“shouldneverhire.”

The issue of the virtual archive was explained167.abovealongwiththeneedtointroduceuniquenumbersfor all cases. It appears neither one is getting sufficientattention at present. If they are not included in thecurrentITcontracts,bothshouldbeincorporatedinanyamendment. Alternatively a separate contract could be

76 Noinformationwassupplied(orrequested)onadditionalsecuri-tymeasures–althoughoneassumesthatboththoseandadequateoff-sitebackuparetakencareof.

lettodevelopthevirtualarchive,althoughwithvendor’sretention of the source code this may not be feasible.Formisiscreatingacentralizedarchiveofelectroniccasefilesandmayhaveaddedthe“invisiblenumber”referredto above once it realized the confusion that would begenerated because the “visible” numbering systemwillincludeduplicatenumbers.However,therewasnofurtherindicationofthecreationoftoolstoalloweasynavigationofthecontents.

Development of a Planning Capacity and Its Impacts on the Current Administrative Arrangements

As noted above, the Judiciary’s current adminis-168.trative arrangements appear sufficient for its presentneeds. However as it moves to the next stages ofreform, itwill requireamoresophisticatedapproachtoidentifyingandproposingalternativesolutionsforfuturedevelopments.Thisisespeciallyimportantasbeyondtheexpansionand refinementof the current reform (whichcouldeasilytakethreetofiveyears)thefuturedirectionsarenotatallclear.

TheCourthasanew“PlanningOffice,”butitappears169.tofocuslargelyontrainingneeds.TheJudiciary’sStatisticalUnitischargedwithcollectingstatisticaldataandreportsfrom individual courts and producing the basic reportsoncourtoperations.Once theCMIS is fullyoperational,much of this can be done automatically and the staffassignedtodothemanualkeyingandreportproductionwillberedundant.Thetwoofficesarementionedtogetherbecausearealplanningofficewillneedstatisticstodoitswork,andthusmayeitherbemergedwiththestatisticalofficeorbeaprimaryconsumerofwhatitproduces(notonlyreportsbutalsovariouskindsofanalysis).Thetwoofficescurrentlydonotcoordinatewitheachotherorwithfinancialorpersonneladministrationofficesandneitherofthelatterappearstodomuchforwardplanning.Moreoverthe Judiciary’s development budget is largely out of itshands,managedbytheDivisionofLegalAssistancewithinthePrimeMinister’sOffice.Withinthecourtsystem,mostof the key administrative positions are held by JudicialandLegalServicesOfficersoralternatively,bymembersofagovernment-wideadministrativeservice–interviewssuggested,forexample,thatforthoseattheapexoftheadministrative officers, any further promotions wouldrequirechangingtoanotheragency.TheCourtreportedthatithadchangedITdirectorsseveraltimesoverthelastfewyears.

48 4948 49

CHAPTER IV: LookingAhead

For a court system with no reform aspirations,170.the current arrangementsmaywell work. But they areevidentlyincompatiblewithamoredynamicapproachtoorganizationaldevelopment.Itisthusrecommendedthatthecourtsseekawaytodooneormoreofthefollowing,requiring both structural changes and alterations in thecareerpathsofthoseinkeypositions:

CreateaPlanningOfficestaffedby individuals trained(a)in planning techniques (use of statistics to makeprojections, development of alternative scenarios forresourcedeployment,multi-yearbudgetingandsoon).Reconfigure the Statistical Unit and staff it with(b)individuals trained in basic statistical analysis. PhDsinstatisticswillnotbeneeded(and in factmaynotbedesirable) but thosewho candopolicy-orientedanalysiswillbeadecidedplus.Thisisprobablynotajob for JudicialandLegalServiceOfficers,especiallyif theyrotate inandoutwiththetypical frequency.However, assigning a judge or two to the unit, orcreatinganadvisoryboardcomposedofjudgesmightbeconsidered.Strengthen the coordination among the Planning,(c)Statistical, Financial Management and HumanResourcesUnitssothattheycancollectivelydetermineshort,mediumandlong-termscenariosforresourceneedsanddeployment.RegaincontrolofitsDevelopmentBudget,oratleast(d)theabilitytoprogramit. IftheLegalAffairsDivision(ofthePrimeMinister’sOffice)wantstocontinueasa“projectimplementer,”thatmaywork,butitshouldnotdotheJudiciary’splanningforit.In thecaseofalladministrativeunits,findawayto(e)keepkeystaffandgivethempromotionsorraisesinplace rather than losing them to the current career trajectory. End dependence on Judicial and LegalServicestaffforthesepositions,whichbyrightsshouldbejudicial-administrativecareersontheirown.

This is an ambitious program, and unlikely to be171.accomplished in one fell swoop. The difficulty of theundertakings (and their removal from judicial control)increasesasonereadsdownthelist.Thelasttwoitemsinparticularwillrequirechangesingovernmentpolicy,buteventhefirstthreewillbelesssuccessfulifthesechangescannotbeleveraged.

Alternatives to the Judicial and Legal Service That Would Give the Judiciary (and Prosecution) Its Own Specialized Personnel

The quality of the Judicial and Legal Service staff172.and their ability to carry out a number of non-judicialfunctions appear to be quite high. Staff defended thecurrent system,which over the course of their careers,mayassign themnotonly to judicial andadministrativepostswithin the courts, but also to apositionas aDPP(prosecution),inothergovernmentagenciesoreventhelegislature,asagoodwayof:

Gettinganoverviewoftheentirejusticearea;•Lettingthemlearnanumberoffunctionsand•skills;andProvidingjudiciallyknowledgeablepeopleto•performadministrativerolesinthecourts.

Theironlycomplaintswerethelowstartingsalaries.173.Sincethisisanationalservice,theJudiciaryhasnocontroloverthesalaries,explainingwhy,whentheChiefJusticesuccessfully lobbied for a 40 percent increase in thesalaries of superior court judges, the subordinate courtjudgesandotherJudicialandLegalpersonnelassignedtothecourtscouldnotbeincluded.Certainlycompensationfor this group should be reconsidered, especially at thelowerend,andifitiseasiertodothisbyseparatingthoseassignedtothejudiciaryfromthegeneralpool,thatalonecouldbeasufficientreasonfordoingso.

Apart from the salary issue, there are additional174.reasons for seeking this separation. For thetimebeing,the system (government-wide reach, frequent rotationswithin and among agencies) seems to work well, butoverthelongerrunthereareclearlycoststoencouragingpeople to jump from one position to another so thatwhateverexpertisetheydevelopinthefirstpositiontheymayneveruseagain.Moreoverthatsameexpertiseislostwhenanewpersonoccupiesthepost.Forexample,theJudicialandLegalServiceofficerwhoheadstheStatisticalUnitclearlyhadorhasdevelopedanappreciationfortheuseofstatistics,butwhensheleaves,herreplacementwillhavetoredevelopthoseskillstofunctionaseffectively.Inaddition,thepracticeclearlysetsalimitonhowexpertanyonepersoncanbecome.TheCourthasalreadyrecognizedthat they need statisticians in the statistical unit and ismakingplanstohireone,butthisoneexampleseemstoberepeatedinother,non-administrativeareasaswell.

50 51

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

50 51

Forexampleitwasmentionedthatthesometimes-175.difficult relations between police and prosecutors areprobably aggravated by the fact that the police havemuch more experience in investigating a case thanwould a prosecutor, even one at a high JS level, whospenttheearlierpartofhercareerinthejudiciaryorasa parliamentary drafting officer. Good prosecutors, likegoodpolice,arenotformedinafewyears,butratheroveramuchlongerperiod.

Theuseofspecializedcourtsandtheargumentfor176.their creation – that a judge becomes familiarizedwiththe topic and can decidemore wisely and rapidly as aresult–seemstofallapart inthefaceof thepreferencefor generalist judges, who might spend a few years inone specialized court, and then move on to another.Thevirtuesofbroadexposure(althoughneversobroadasinMalaysiawheretheJSmayserveinallbranchesofgovernment, albeit not so frequently now as formerly)hasbeenrecognizedinotherjudicialsystems(e.g.FranceandGermany)andinotheragencies(USforeignservice)by rotatinganew recruit through severalpositions,butthenhavingthemchoosethecareerpaththeywillfollow.InseveralEuropeancountries,veryjuniorjudicialrecruits,orthoseinatrainingprogram,mayworkasassistantstoprosecutors,judgesorevenpublicdefenders,butthenarechanneledintoonecareerstreamortheother.Malaysiamaywant to consider this example as an alternative tothepresentsystemalthoughsincetheJudicialandLegalService is a government-wide program, the decisionwill not correspond only to the courts. However, otheragenciesmayfindthemselves inthesamepredicament,limited as to the degree of specialized expertise theirpersonnelcandevelop.

Development of Court Administration as a Separate Judicial Career

Theotherarea stillmoreaffectedby thepractice177.is the administrative offices of the courts. In the US,Canada,AustraliaandEnglandandWalesandincreasinglyin other countries, court administration is a specializedcareer, combining knowledge of judicial practices (butnot necessarily a law degree) with a strong formationin management. Practitioners of this career, and of itsvarious sub-specialties, are increasingly graduates ofspecializeduniversitydegreeorcertificateprograms,andmoreoverareexpectedtosharpentheirskillsonthejob.Acourtadministratorresponsibleforoverseeinganentirejudicial systemwill normallyhave comeup through the

ranks,havingentered,postuniversitytraining,atalowerlevel,possiblyworking ina local court,orhandlingonlyfinancialorpersonnelmatters.True,manyofthosenowholdingthehighestpositionsmayneverhavestudiedthespecifictopicintheuniversity(absentanysuchprogramswhentheystarted)buttheyoftenhaddegreesortrainingin more generic management, finance, or personnelmanagement. Theyare rarely ex-judges although in theUS in some complex court systems, there may also bea judge (called an “administrative judge”) assigned tooversee theirwork, but certainly not to do it.Malaysiaappearsreadytoconsiderthisalternativealthoughitwillcertainlytakeawhileto introduce,andwillalsorequirechangestotheJudicialandLegalcareersystem,at leasttotheextentofeliminatingrotationofitsmembersintoadministrative positions. As regards other professionalstaffnotrecruitedfromtheJudicialandLegalcareer(e.g.ITpersonnel)asimilarproblemexistsandtheyreputedlyrotatethroughtheentirepublicsector,sothatagain,thechances of developing their expertise as applied to thejudicialsystemisagainlimited.

Suggestions for Additional In-Depth Studies and Assessments

Thissectionofferssomesuggestionsonadditional178.in-depthstudiesandassessmentstoaddressthepotentialmismatchbetweensupplyofjudicialservicesandmanifestorlatentdemandforjustice.Thecourtsappeartobedoingfine,buttheirsmallsizesuggestseitherthatMalaysiahasaremarkablysmallnumberofjusticiabledisputesorthatcitizensresolvetheirconflicts inothervenues(ornotatall);thustheissueiswhetherthefullrangeofalternativesis adequate. Except for the first itemon training, theseadditional studies are less immediately relevant to thejudiciary’s own reformprogram,butmaybeof interestto thegovernment in assessing theeffectivenessof theoveralljusticesystemandsuchissuesascrimereduction,violence prevention, and economic growth. The courtsseemtobeplayingtheirrolequiteeffectively,butotheractorsandagenciesmaynowneedmoreattention.

Training Needs and Alternatives for Meeting Them

The judiciary currently has a limited budget for179.trainingandmostofwhatoccursunderthatrubricinvolvesshort courses and large meetings (judicial conferencesand seminars). There isnoentry levelprogram fornew“recruits” to the Judicial and Legal Service, but nonespecifically for those then assigned to the courts. For

50 5150 51

CHAPTER IV: LookingAhead

moreexperienced lawyers named to the superior courtbenchorrecruitedasjudicialcommissioners,theJudiciaryhasnoprogram–andthatmaintainedbytheJLServicewould not apply. There is apparently no requirementfor Continuous Legal Education (CLE). Actual trainingsponsoredby the Judiciary appears tobe somewhat adhoc,constrainedbybudgetsandalsobytherecruitmentpractices and rotation of staff to different positions. Insomesense,rotationisregardedastraininginasmuchasindividuals rotated from one position to another learnrelevantskillsonthejobandalsodevelopwhattheycalla“multi-tasking”orientationoragreaterappreciationforthedifferentrolesnecessarytocourtfunctioning.

More systematic training will require a higher180.budget,butitscreationalsofacessomeunusualstructuralimpediments–theinternallogicoftheJudicialandLegalServicesmodel. So longas thismodel remains inplace,itwill affect the kinds of training that can be done. Anargument could be made for an entry level course forJudicialandLegalofficersstartingjudicialservice–mostcommonly as senior assistant registrars – and possiblyfor thosemoving up to the next logical position – as amagistrate, deputy registrar, or administrator. Howeverafterthatitishardtosaywhatkindoftrainingmightbeneededunderthecurrentsystemoranymodificationofitlikelytoberealizedoverthenextfewyears.

Trainingisalwayshighonjudicialwishlistsbutmuch181.ofit,accordingtoevaluationsdoneinothercountries,haslittleimpactonthequalityorquantityofservices.77Thisisnotbecausetrainingisnotimportant,butratherbecauseit is so often poorly designed and organized. Hence afirst step inestablishinga trainingprogramshouldbeathorough evaluation of the situation of performance,identificationofhowtrainingmightimproveitandatthesametime,specificationoftheadditionalmeasuresthatwouldbeneededfortrainingtohaveitsdesiredimpact.Few training programs start in this fashion which is the primeexplanationforwhysomanyofthemproducelittleimprovement.Insteadthefocusisusuallyonthesizeofthebuilding,wherewewillplaceit,whowillteach,andwhowillbethedirector.Asregardsbuildings,thecourtscouldprobably startwithsomeof thecurrentlyunusedspace

77 AnunreleasedreviewofWorldBankjudicialreformsthusfoundthatintheprogramevaluations,trainingoftenreceivedthelowestgradeamongall components. Someproblemsencountered– forexample,donor-fundedtrainingactivities thatcollapsedoncethedonorleft–areunlikelytoaffectMalaysia,buttheimpactonser-vicesneedsconsideration.

orthatfreedupbytheeliminationofphysicalfiles.Overthe short run that shouldbeadequateand longer-termdecisions canbemade later, on thebasis of theearlierresults.Directorsandinstructorsareanotherproblembutwhile thedirectorshouldbe full-timewithsomesortoftenure(thusmakingtheselectionofthecandidatemorecontroversial) instructorsshouldbehiredonapart-timebasisforspecificcourses,orwherepossible,bejudgesinpractice.Theneedsassessmentshouldalsocovervariousscenarios for starting and developing the program,including with each estimated start-up and recurrentcosts. Initial programs could alsobe conducted throughan existing law school, thereby reducing start-up costsuntilfinalplanscanbedeveloped.

Thereal issueshavetodowithcontent,andhere182.boththeinitialneedsanalysisandthecourts’personnelpolicies come into play. Some of the suggestionsmadeabove as regards separating the Judicial and LegalServicesOfficersassigned to the courts (or the creationofaseparatejudicialcareerstaff,aproposaltothiseffectalreadyhavingbeenforwardedbythejudiciary)orcreatingacourtadministratoraswellasjudicialadministrator(forotheradministrativetasks)careertrackwouldalsoaffectlong-term planning. Over the immediate run, however,theproposalsandthestudyshouldaddresscurrentneeds,especiallyasregardsthreetypesoftraining–entrylevel,general continuing education for those in service, andveryspecializedcoursesonissuesaffectingonlyalimitedrangeofcases(e.g.coursesforthosehearingcorruptionissues where a knowledge of money laundering, basicaccountingandsoonmaybeneeded).Itisrecommendedthat the study be done by a multi-disciplinary teamincludingmemberswithexperienceinorganizingtrainingprogramsaswellassubstantiveexperts.

Situation of the Legal Profession and Its Possible Liberalization

The topic of liberalization of the legal profession183.was raised by a few of those interviewed and has alsobeen under discussion in the press, although furtherdescriptionsoftheaimsandcontentofanysuchmeasurevariedamongthefewintervieweeswhoreferencedit.Ontheonehand,itisusedtorefertolooseningoreliminatingthe restrictionson legal practice inMalaysiaby lawyersfromothercountries.Ontheother(NEACinterviews), itreferredtoallowingnon-lawyerstohandlecertainkindsoflegalworkandthuscreatingalargerpooloftalentonwhich users could draw. In explaining their proposals,

52 53

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

52 53

the two groups did agree on a few aspects of the current situationtheyregardedasproblematic.

First, the quality of legal education and thus of184.lawyers in the country leaves much to be desired. Aproliferation of law schools and the popularity of thediscipline may also be producing an overabundance oflawyersaswellasoftraineeswhostopshortofadmittancetothebar.Manyofthosewhoareadmitted(anestimated60percent)operateindividually;therearefewlawfirmsandeventheyarerelativelysmall.

Second,itwassaid(butcouldnotbeverified)that185.feesforlegalserviceswerelow,andthatasaresultsomeofthebestlocalcandidateswenttoothercountries(e.g.Singapore) topractice.Moreoversincecriminalpracticeis still less remunerative, the criminal bar remains verysmall.78

Third, while no interviewee referenced this point,186.it is likely thatmost lawyers reside, as they tend to doeverywhere,inthemajorcitiesandthustheremaybeashortage in certain parts of the country. Thus althoughlegal representation is not required to go to court,the shortage of lawyers in many areas may constitutea further restriction on expressed demand. It bearsmentioningherethattheMalaysianbar,lawschools,andtheJudiciaryhavecontinuedwithaveryformalsetoflegalprocedures,partsofwhichhavealreadybeeneliminatedinEngland (themultitudeofwritsandother formalitiesunintelligibletothelayperson).Henceseekingtoconductacasewithoutalawyercouldbeadauntingandprobablynotveryproductiveproposition.Judgescanofcoursebetrainedtodealwithunrepresentedclients,butsofar,thatpracticeappearsnottohavebeenadoptedinMalaysia.

Liberalization will not be a panacea for all the187.problems facing the legal profession. However, thedecision on whether to liberalize should be based onananalysisof the largerpublic interest,andnot justonthe impact of livelihoods of legal professions. And thebenefits to theeconomyas awholeofhavinghigh-endlegalserviceswouldbeconsiderable.

Noonewantsunqualifiedlawyersperforminglegal188.work,buttheremaybetypesofworkcurrentlymonopolized

78 ItbearsnotingthatthecurrentChiefJusticewasapplaudedbytheBar Council for lobbyingwith the PrimeMinister to increasefeestoattorneyshiredbythegovernmenttodothiskindofwork.

by lawyers which could be done by an appropriatelycertifiedparalegalorsomeonefromanotherprofession.Itwouldthusbeimportanttoexplorethepotentialhere.FacilitatingtheprocessforallowinglawyerstopracticeinMalaysiaonthebasisofadequatecertificationinanothercountrycouldalsohavebenefits,especially,assuggestedabove, inraisinglocalstandards,andnotincidentally, inpromotingtheformationofmulti-nationallawfirms.Sucha measure should be quite consistent with Malaysia’sintentiontoattract internationalbusiness.Thepresenceof foreign law firms and lawyers is likely to raise legalstandards, raise fees and remuneration in some sectorsandspurinvestmentsinMalaysiabyfirmsthatrequirehighqualitylegalservices.Ontheotherhand,liberalizationislesslikelytoimprovethecriminalbarandothermeasuresneed to be considered to improve them. Liberalizationisalsolikelytoincreaseinequalityasthesalariesofbestpaidlawyersarelikelytoincreaseveryquickly.

Theexperienceofthemanufacturingsectorwhere189.Malaysiahasliberalizedisinstructive.ThearrivalofMNCshelpedupgradeMalaysia’smanufacturingsectorinshortorderandwasthebasisforasubstantivetransformationofMalaysia’seconomyandsuccess in reducingpoverty.Servicessuchasthelegalprofessionhavebeenalaggingsectorastheyremainedunliberalized.

It is recommended that amore detailed study on190.the local legal profession be done for the purpose ofbetterunderstandingtheissues,theirunderlyingcauses,and most importantly the impact, not just on lawyers’livelihoods but on the functioning of the justice systemandthequalityofservicesprovidedtoalltypesofactualandpotentialclients.

Analysis of the Organization, Distribution and Working Methods of Public Prosecutors (DPPs)

ThisisnotastudytheJudiciarywouldfinance,but191.havingitdoneandhavingitsrecommendationsadoptedwould have important effects on court performance.The study done by PEMANDUas a prelude to its crimereduction program suggests a number of areas wheremorefocusedresearchwouldbeuseful.Amongthem,thedelaysattributedtotheprosecutorsseemtorequiremoreconcertedattention,asopposedtothetargetedremediesoffered.Otherintervieweesprovidedfurtherdetailsthatcouldnotbeverifiedbutdoindicatethepossiblepresenceof more fundamental structural problems calling fororganizationalreforms,possiblyalongthelinesofwhatthe

52 5352 53

CHAPTER IV: LookingAhead

Judiciaryhasalreadydone.Ontheonehand,referencesweremade toprosecutorsbeingoverburdened, andonthe other, to their already large number (as one judgesaid, “more than judges”). One interviewee noted thatprosecutorssometimesrequestadjournmentsbecause,forwhateverreason,theyhavehadnotimetoreviewthecasefiles;howeverthesameintervieweenotedthatprosecutorswereveryreluctanttoprovidefulldiscovery(informationonevidence)tothedefenselawyers,andthatthisinturnmightprovokethelatter’requestofapostponement.Obviouslythere are some problems althoughwith the informationprovided itwas impossible to assess their dimensions orbroaderimpact.

Basedonexperienceelsewhereitisnotuncommon192.tofindthatprosecutorialagencies,likecourts,oftensufferfromcounterproductiveorganization,illogicaldistributionof staff, and unnecessarily complicated working rulesthat make it difficult for them to use their resourceseffectively.Thusitisrecommendedthatthissituationbeexplored,ideallyusingateamofexpertswithexperienceinmoreefficientagenciesfromelsewhereinthecommonlaw world. Rather than focusing on investigation andotherskillstraining(asisoftendoneinthesestudies),thestudy should concentrate on internal organization andprocedures,includingdistributionofstaffandmechanismsforassigningandmonitoringwork.ItisnotknownwhethertheDPPhasitsown“CMIS”toregistercases,recordtheirprocessing, and generate management reports. If not,one should clearly be introduced. Coordination withthepoliceshouldalsobecoveredas it isaproblemtheresolutionofwhichmayrequiremorethanthepunctualremediesprofferedbyPEMANDU.Thesuggestionimplicitinsomeofthediscussions,thatthesolutionistoaddmoreprosecutors,maybecorrect,butbeforeanymoveismadein that direction, these organizational and proceduralissuesshouldbeanalyzedthoroughly.

Unmet Dispute Resolution Needs

This is the current state-of-the-art term for this193.type of study. The preferred methodology is based onthat developed by Hazel Genn (1999) in England, andsubsequently applied both by Genn (1999) and othersin other countries. Essentially the interest here is in 1)identifyingthetypesofconflictscommonlyencounteredbythepopulationasawholeandspecificgroupsorstratawithinit;2) identifyingthemechanisms(includingdoingnothing) theyuse fordifferent typesofdisputes;and3)determining how they fare in resolving them and with

whatimpactontheirlives.Thistypeofstudy,essentiallya rathercomplexsurveyaskingrespondentsabout theirown experience, can be relatively expensive, especiallyin a country as linguistically and culturally diverse asMalaysia.Moreover,notallattemptstodothishavebeensuccessful.79However,innocountryintheworld,andmuchlessinMalaysiawithitsseverallegaltraditions,docourtsresolveallproblems.Therefore,itbecomesimportanttoknowwhetherincombinationwiththealternativestheyare adequately addressing disputes that could escalateintomoreviolenceorotherwisenegativelyaffectcitizenwell being. The issue is thus less whether people taketheirdisputestothecourtsthanhowandwhethertheyfind means to resolve them. Knowing this can allowcountries to planmore adequately their investments indisputeresolutionmechanisms,determiningforexamplewhether to try toexpandaccess to thecourts, improvethe performance of various alternative mechanisms,or even attackmore directly certain sources of conflictso that theydonot require theuseof any such forum.Examples of the latter might include expanding publicservices to groups and communities at risk, improvingthe performance of administrative agencies that seemto produce conflicts based on poor service provision orunnecessarilycomplicatedrulesforaccessingitandsoon.ThuswhileinmanyLatinAmericancountries,poorservicebysocialsecurityagencieshasbeenaddressedbycreatingspecialcourtstohandletheresultingdisputes(seeWorldBank2004onBrazil),thebetterroutemightbetoimproveagencyperformance.

Itisentirelypossiblethatastudyofthissortmight194.find that the Malaysian population as a whole anddistinctive groups within it (entrepreneurs, the poor,certain ethnic collectivities) are entirely satisfied withthealternatives,butifthereareexceptionstothatrule,itwould bewell to identify themnow so as to be abletodevelopreasonableremediesforaddressingthem.Forthecourts,oneconclusionmightbetocreaterealsmallclaims courts (as opposed to the small claims proceedings currently applied bymagistrates courts), to ensure thatjudges are trained to dealwith parties not representedbylawyers,ortosimplifyproceedings(andlanguage)so

79 TheSouthAfricanLegalAidSocietyattemptedonerecentlywithdisappointingresultsbecause(asreported inprivatecommunica-tionswiththeauthor)ofmethodologicalproblemswiththesample.Abbreviatedformshavealsobeenincludedinnationalhouseholdsurveys (RepublicofKenya,2006)withsome interestingfindings.Adopting this mechanism might be a quick way of determiningwhetheramoreextensivestudyisneeded.

54 55

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

54 55

thatprose(self)representationismoreeffective.Italsomight develop that the courts are doing fine, but thatmoreattentionisrequiredtoothermechanismsthatarenotperformingaswell.

Administrative Tribunals (and Other Non-Judicial Dispute Resolution Forums)

Thiscouldbeafollow-uptotheunmetneedsstudy195.or might be conducted independently. Malaysia has aseriesofadministrativecourts–forlabor,housing,socialsecurity, and fiscal (taxation) matters among others.The direct intersection of the tribunals with judicialwork occurs largely in the context of the potential forappealing their decisions on the basis of constitutionalandlegalviolations(notsubstance).Judicialreviewcasesrepresent a significant but not overly large portion ofcivil cases; however the way statistics are kept do notallowadistinctionbetween these cases and thosefiledbygovernmenttocollecttaxesandfees.Intheoryawell-functioningadministrativelawsystemshouldreducecourtcongestionbyprovidingsatisfactoryresponsestocitizensand thereby discouraging appeal to the courts. Thereisno reason to conclude that this isnot the case, sincewhere appeals are allowed, there will always be someusemadeofthem,andthenumbersofsuchappealsarenotdramaticinMalaysia.Nonetheless,itmightbewelltoreviewperformanceofthesetribunalsasregardsoverallusersatisfaction(byinterviewingusersandalsoreviewingcases sent to court on appeal to determine whether therearepatternshere),organization,caseload,delaysinresolvingcases,andthesizeandcompositionofthecarry-overfromoneyeartothenext.Inshort,anysuchstudycould replicate much of the judicial reform program,startingwithacaseloadaudit,andthencontinuingastheresults of that exercise indicate. Similar exercisesmightbedonefortheSyariahandtraditionalcourts,butthesemightbemorecontroversial,andunlesstheunmet-needsstudy or other information already indicates seriousproblems,couldbedeferredforanothertime.

Conclusions on Next Steps

AlthoughtheJudiciaryisalreadylookingaheadtoits196.phasetworeform,itwill(orshould)beengagedinperfectingitsfirststageprogramforthenextfewyears.Thestrategyofmovingaheadwithallduespeedhasproducedimportantresults, but to ensure those results aremaintained (andexpandedthroughouttheentirecourtsystem)moreworkwill inevitablyhavetobedone.Mostof theearly results

werenotICTdependent(althoughclearlyhavingcomputershelpedthecourtsintheirmanualtrackingandgenerationofstatistics).NowthattheCMIS iscomingon line, itwillbeimportanttoensurethatitsuseconsolidatestheearlyadvances.Thismeans,interalia,anemphasisonbuildinguptheCourt’sITandStatisticalUnitsaswellasfindingwaystointegratethethreesourcesofdata–theFormisandSAINSsystemsandthemanualinformationthatwillcontinuetobesuppliedbysomecourtdistricts.Eventually, it impliesthe constructionof an integrateddatabase incorporatingand improvingthesystemsmanaged in individual courtsandcourtcomplexes.

Two types of activities will be essential for the197.Judiciary’ssecondstageprogram–thestrengtheningofitsadministrativeofficestofeatureafocusonplanningasopposedtoordinary(house-keeping)administrationanda series of studies to explore areas (especially training)whereitbelievesitwantstowork.Manyjudiciaries,afterfirstfocusingonefficiency,thenattempttomovetotheissuesofquality(astheMalaysiancourtsappeartowanttodo),butthistransformationisdifficultbecause1)itismuch harder to operationalize objectives and developmeans formonitoring theirachievementand2) there ismorelikelytobedisagreementastopriorities.80Thereisatendencyinthesereformstoturntoafocusoninputs(atraininginstituteorprogram,anoutreachprogramfordisadvantaged groups, the creation ofmore specializedcourts,andsoon)withouteverdefiningtheimprovementin services to be achieved. Malaysia’s courts avoidedthis vice in theirfirstphaseprograms; it is tobehopedthattheycancontinuetodoso.Thelow-hangingfruit–efficiency–posesfewerproblemsinthatsense.Therearecriticsofefficiencyasagoal,buteventheycannotdisputehow its advance should be measured. In discussingqualityofperformance, thedisputesare likely tobe farmoredivisive.Inshort,asecondphaseprogramposesasecondsetofchallenges,andthecourtsshouldprobablytaketheirtimeindecidinghowtheywillovercomethem.Inthemeantime,thefirstphaseishardlycomplete,andif thenext steps– toensureadvancealreadymadeareretained–are lessexciting thanthefirstones, theyarenoless important.Takingthemwillalsoprovidetimetoreflectonwhatshouldbedoneafterwards.

80 ForexampleCEPEJ(seereportscited)isnowengagedineffortstoproduce“quality”courtsystemsintheEuropeancountriesitcovers.Thisisinresponsetoconcernsthattherehasbeentoomuchempha-sisonefficiency,anargumentsometimesheardinMalaysia(althoughlargelyfromlawyerswhoresisttheemphasisontimeliness).

54 5554 55

CHAPTER V: In Conclus ion

CHAPTER V

In Conclusion

Thislastsectionexpandsonanideaforwardedintheintroduction,thevalueofreviewingtheMalaysianreform198.asanexample,modelandsourceoflessonsforotherwould-bereformers.ThemoststrikingaspectoftheMalaysianexample is theamountaccomplished in very littletimeandmoreover the fact that thiswasdonebefore the largeinvestmentsinICTcameonline.Thisisnottodiscreditthelatter,butsimplytopointoutthatthereisnoneedtowaitforICTortolamentthelackoffundstofinanceitinordertoproducesomeimportantresults.Insummarythelessonsderivedfromtheexperienceareasfollows:

A reform’s success is largely conditionedby theabilityof its leaders to identifyproblemsanddefine concrete,(a)measurable goals for resolving them. A reform that simply aims at “improving performance”without definingspecific targets is less likely to accomplish anything.Quantification is important, nomatter howobjectives arefurtherdefined.Increasingefficiencyisagoodstart,representingasortof“low-hangingfruit”inthegoalhierarchy.(b)Thereisalogicalprogressiontoreforms,andtheMalaysianjudiciaryrecognizedandactedonthisprinciple.Itmay(c)behardforreformerstogetexcitedaboutsomeofthepreliminarysteps(e.g.casefileinventories),butiftheyareskippedreformswillfounder.Onepreliminarystepusuallyrecommended,athoroughassessmentordiagnosticofthejudiciary’ssituation,was(d)skippedinMalaysia.However,thePEMANDUcrimereductionprogramdidbeginwithadiagnosticandothershavebeenrecommendedinthepresentreport.Itdoesnotappearthatthejudiciary’sreformwasadverselyaffectedbythisshortcut,butthereweresomeadditionalspecialcircumstances.First,theCourt’sworkinghypothesis,thattherewasdelayandbacklogthatcouldbeeliminatedratherquickly,wasbasedonprior,iflesssystematic,observationbythereformleaders(andespeciallytheChiefJustice).Second,thewaythereformwasorganized(thesequence)meantthattheearlystepsservedtoverifythehypothesis.Hadtheinventoriesdiscovered,contrarytoexpectations,thatallpendingcaseswererecentonesandmoreoveractive,theprogramwouldhaveneededmodification.Third,therewasconstantmonitoringofprogresswhichinteraliaallowedtheidentificationandresolutionofadditionalproblemsalongtheway.Thus,forthereform’simmediatepurposesafurtherdiagnosticwasprobablynotneeded(wouldonlyhaveaddeddelays andpossiblyweakened the initial consensus), butothers contemplating similarprogramsshouldnotassumethisappliesequallytothem.Afirst,essentialstepinanyreformistoputordertowhatisthereandestablishasystemformonitoringperformance.(e)Neitheronerequiresautomation,althoughthemonitoringsystemcancertainlybeimprovedonceICTisintroduced.Withoutorderandwithoutinformation,itwillbeverydifficulttoplan,implementandmeasuretheeffectsofanyfurtherreformefforts.It isgenerallyrecommendedthatpriortoautomation,courts improveandsimplifytheirworkprocesses.This is(f)advice that fewheed, butwhether as a conscious strategy or simply a question of necessity, this did occur inMalaysia.Thisleftthecontractorwiththetaskofautomatinganalreadyimprovedprocess,facilitatinganddoubtlessacceleratingactivitiesthathadbeendonebyhand(e.g.programmingofhearings).HowflexibleCMS(theFormissoftware)willbeasregardsfuturechangesremainsunclear,butithascertainlydoneagoodjobofautomatingtheimprovedmanualproceduresaswellasaddingitemslikeinternetfilingandCRTthatcouldonlybedonewithICT.While seemingly simpleminded,an inventoryofcasesandan improvedfilingsystemareessentialpartsof the(g)“puttinginorder”phase.Onthebasisofboththesesteps,courts,orforthatmatteranyagency,canmostprobablysubstantiallyreduceexistingworkloadsandsofacilitatefurtherreform.A trackingsystem, likebutnotnecessarily thesameas that introduced inMalaysia isa recommendedmeans for(h)furtherreducingbacklog.Thelogicbehindanysuchsystemistoseparatecasesbythelevelofeffortrequiredfortheirresolution–inthefutureasimilarlogiccanbeappliedtomoresophisticatedformsofdifferentialcasemanagement.

56 57

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

56 57

Judiciaries often underestimate the importance of(i)havingaglobaldatabasewithrawdata(asopposedto statistics), and here theMalaysian courts are noexception.Theyhavedoneanexcellentjobofutilizingbasicstatisticstoencouragejudgestoimprovetheirwork,butthecontinuingabsenceofaglobaldatabaseisaconcern.TheabsencedoesnotlimittheJudiciary’scurrentplans,butitwillimpactontheformulationofthenextstages.Oncethelow-hangingfruitshavebeenharvested,the(j)next challenge is todefine the furtherdirectionsofreform.AlthoughMalaysiacanstillspendseveralyearsterminating the first stage, it will need to considerwhereitwillgonextandhowitwillgetthere.Courtsareonlyonepartofa justicesystem,andas(k)the PEMANDU study clarifies in the case of crimereduction,manyotheractorsareinvolved.Muchthesame is trueofmoreordinarydispute resolutionasdiscussed in theprior sectiononadditional studies.Whenattention isnotpaidtotheseotheragencies,and comparable reform programs established, theimpactofeventhebestcourtreformwillbelimited.It is easier to carry this all out with substantial(l)funding,butmanyofthemeasuresintroducedbytheCourtwereaccomplishedwith fewadditional fundsandothers(theICTcontracts)couldbesimplifiedandthus the overall costs cut back. Thismight producelessdramaticallyrapidresultsbutovertimethesametypesofimprovementsshouldbepossible.

Committed leadership is essential, and it is also(m)importanttoensuresuchleadershippersistsoverthelonger run.Broadening thereformteam(to includethePresidentof theCourtofAppeal, the twoChiefJudgesandmoremembersof theFederalCourt)aswasdoneinMalaysiaisthusarecommendedstrategy.Reforms have progressed with only one high-levelleader,buttheyareeasiertoreversewhenthatisthemajorsourceoftheirmomentum.

Theseareonlya fewof the lessons thatmightbe199.derivedfromtheexperience.Afurtherrecommendationisthatcountriesembarkingonjudicialreforms,especially,butnotsolely thusemphasizingefficiency, takeacloserlookattheexperience,ifpossiblebyvisitingtheMalaysiancourtsandtalkingwith theparticipants.TheMalaysiansdesignedtheirprogramonthebasisofmanysuchvisits,and theexperience clearlypaidoff. They selectedwhattheysawworkinginothercountriesandthentailoredtheapproaches to their own situation. Successful imitationwithaneyetoappropriatemodificationsallowedthemtomoveaheadwithextraordinaryspeed.Thus,afinallessonistolearnfromothers,andsototakeadvantageofbeingalate-comerbybuildingonexistingexamples.Thosewhoare only starting or who are revising “failed programs”shouldtakeheed.

56 5756 57

REFERENCES

REFERENCESArfahWanHanzah.2009.AFirst Lookat theMalaysian

Legalsystem.ShahAlam:OxfordFajar.AmarSinghSidhu.2005.“TheRiseofCrimeinMalaysia:

AnAcademicandStatisticalAnalysis,” Journalof theKualaLumpurRoyalMalaysiaPoliceCollege,No4.

Berman, Greg and Aubrey Fox. 2010. Trial and Error inCriminalJusticeReform:LearningfromFailure.Wash-ingtonD.C.:TheUrbanInstitutePress.

Chan,GaryK.Y.2007.“TheRightofAccesstoJustice:Ju-dicialDiscourse inSingaporeandMalaysia,” inAsianJournalofComparativeLaw,2:1,Article2.Availableathttp:llwww.bepress.com/asjcl/vol2/iss1/art2

Duce, Mauricio. 2010. “Diez años de reforma procesalpenalenChile:Apuntessobresudesarrollo,logrosydesafíos,”inChile,MinistryofJustice,Diezañosdelareformaprocesalpenal:Desafíosdelnuevosistema.Santiago:191-234.

FederalCourtofMalaysia.2011.TheMalaysianJudiciary:APerspective.KualaLumpur:MPHGroupPrinting.

FederalCourtsofMalaysia,CourtofAppeal.N.d.“CourtofAppeal.”PowerPointPresentationonbacklogre-ductionresults,onfilewithauthor.

______,Kuala LumpurHighCourt,CommercialDivision.2009. “Tracking System, Commercial Division as at31.12.2009”.. Power Point presentation on filewithauthor.

______,KualaLumpur,HighCourt,FamilyDivision.2011.“ComparisonofFamilyCourtStatisticin2010,”PowerPointpresentationpreparedforandonfilewithau-thor.

Finkel,StevenE,AnibalPérez-Liñán,MitchellA.Seligson,andC.NealTate.2008.“DeepeningOurUnderstand-ingoftheEffectsofUSForeignAssistanceonDemoc-racy Building: Final Report,” Vanderbilt UniversityLAPOPandUSAID,January28.

Foong, James.2002.Malaysian Judiciary:ARecord.Sec-ondEdition.PetalingJaya,Malaysia:SweetandMax-well,Asia.

Fruhling,Hugo.2009.“LaPolicíayelControldelDelito,”unpublished draft report for the Inter-AmericanDe-velopmentBank,onfilewithauthor.

Galanter,Marc and Jayanth K. Krishnan. 2003. “DebatedInformalism: LokAdalats and Legal Rights inModernIndia”inErikG.JensenandThomasC.Heller,BeyondCommonKnowledge:EmpiricalApproachestotheRuleofLaw.Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress;96-139.

GennHazel.1999.PathstoJustice:WhatPeopleDoandThink about Going to Law. Oxford: Hard PublishingCompany.

Gillen,Mark.2002.“Malaysia,”inHerbertM.Kritzer(ed.),Legal Systems of theWorld: A Political and CulturalEncyclopedia,Vol.3:955-964.SantaBarbaraCalifor-nia:ABC-CLIO.

Grove, Trevor. 2002. TheMagistrate’s Tale: A FrontlineReportfromaNewJP.London:Bloomsbury.

Hammergren, Linn,withwith SteveUrist, CarlosGrego-rio,andOscarFlorez.2009.Diagnósticodelasituaciónmexicanaenlamodernizacióndelossistemasdejus-ticia,reportpreparedfortheAsociaciónMexicanadeImpartidoresdeJusticia.

HamidahMohamedDeri.2010.“TheMalaysianJudiciary:Reforms implementedto improveefficiency.”PowerPoint presentation forAPECWorkshoponEnforcingContracts,Seoul,June21-22.

Malik,Waleed.2007.Judiciary-LedReformsinSingapore:Framework,Strategies,andLessons.WashingtonD.C:TheWorldBank.

National Center for State Courts. 2007. InternationalFramework for Court Excellence. Available at www:courtexcellence.com.

PEMANDU.2010.“Crime–ViolentCrimeBacklogLabPre-sentationtoChiefJusticeTunZaki,”PowerPointpre-sentationonfilewithauthor.

______. 2011a “National Key Result Area – ReducingCrime: Brief Background, 2010 Achievements and2011Targets,”Cabinet Presentation, January27, onfilewithauthor.

______. 2011b. “The Government Transformation Pro-grammeandtheNationalKeyResultAreaofFightingCorruption.” Cabinet Presentation, on file with au-thor.

Prillaman,WilliamC.2000.TheJudiciaryandDemocraticDecayinLatinAmerica.Westport,Connecticut:Prae-ger.

Republic of Kenya, Governance, Justice, Law and OrderSector(GJLOS)ReformProgramme.2006.NationalIn-tegratedHouseholdBaselineSurvey,September.

Walsh,Barry.2008.“JudicialProductivityinIndia,”Inter-nationalJournalforCourtAdministration,I:1,January,pp23-30.

______.2010.InSearchofSuccess:CaseStudiesinJusticeSectorDevelopmentinSub-SaharanAfrica.Washing-tonD.C:theWorldBank.

58 59

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA

58 59

WorldBank.2004.MakingJusticeCount:MeasuringandImprovingJudicialPerformanceinBrazil.Washington,D.C.:TheWorldBank,ReportNo.32789.

_____.2005a.BreakingwithTradition:OvercomingInsti-tutionalImpedimentstoImprovePublicSectorPerfor-mance.WashingtonD.C.:TheWorldBank,ReportNo.31763-PY.

_____.2005b.DoingBusiness in2005:RemovingObsta-clestoGrowth.WashingtonD.C:TheWorldBank,theInternationalFinanceCorporation,andOxfordUniver-sityPress.

______. 2010. Uses and Users of Justice in Africa: TheCaseofEthiopia’sFederalCourts,WashingtonDC:theWorldBank.

WorldBank, IndependentEvaluationGroup (IEG).2007.“Development Results in Middle-Income Countries:AnEvaluationoftheWorldBank’sSupport.”Washing-ton,D.C:TheWorldBank.

UnidosporlaJusticia.2006.InformaciónyJusticiaII:Da-tos sobre la justiciaargentina.BuenosAires:KonradAdenauer.

USAID.2010.GuidetoRuleofLawCountryAnalysis:TheRule of Law Strategic Framework. Washington D.C:USAID,January.

ZakiAzmi.2010.“OvercomingCaseBacklogs:TheMalay-sianExperience,”paperpresentedtotheAsiaPacificCourtsConference.

Laws

CourtsofJudicatureAct,1964(asamendedto2010)CriminalProcedureCode,Act593(asatJanuary1,2006)FederalConstitution(asatMarch1,2010)GovernmentProceedingAct1956 (Act359)and Judicial

Proceedings (Regulation of Reports) Act 1962 (Act114)(AsatMarch10,2009)

JudicialAppointmentsCommissionAct2009(Act695)PenalCode,Act594(asamendedtoJanuary1,2006)RulesoftheHighCourt,1980(asamendedto2010)Subordinate Courts Act 1948 (Act 92) and Subordinate

Courts Rules Act 1955 (Act 55) (as amended to July15,2010)

PERSONS INTERVIEWED

Federal Court, Court of Appeal and High Court PresidentsZakiAzmi,ChiefJusticeArifinZakaria,ChiefJudge,HighCourtofMalayaJamesFoongChengYuen,JusticeoftheFederalCourtRausSharif, JusticeandManaging Judge (KualaLumpur,

SerembanMalacca,NorthernJohore)AbdullHamidEmbong,JusticeandManagingJudge(Shah

Alam)SuriyadiHalimOmar,JusticeandManagingJudge(Kedah

andPerlis)

Federal Court, Office of Chief RegistrarHashimHamzah,ChiefRegistrarZamriBinMisman,DeputyDirector(Management)R.RajasundramDeputyDirectorFinanceLimFookYin,SeniorAssistantDirector(Finance)AsrulNizamAsat,ITOfficerHashizaAlmadKhan,ITofficer

Federal Court, Administrative OfficesNurul Nusna Binti Awang, Head of Case Management

UnitMohdAizuddinbinZolkeply,SpecialOfficertotheChief

JusticeFadzilatulIsmaAhmadRefngah,HeadofStatisticalUnitNourulFitriHamdan,SpecialOfficertotheDeputyChief

RegistarHusnaDzulkifly,OfficeofCasemanagementUnit

Court of AppealAzimahBintiOmar,Registrar

Kuala Lumpur High CourtYeoh Wee Siam, Judicial Commissioner, Family Court,

HighCourtMohamadAriffbinMdYusof,HighCourtJudge,NCCNoraidaSulaiman,ManagingDeputyRegistrarforNCvCFatimahRubi’ah,ManagingDeputyRegistrar,forOCvCHamidah Binti Mohamed Deril, Deputy Registrar High

CourtNazriIsmail,DeputyRegistrarforCivilHighCourtsMohdbinIsmail,SeniorAssistantRegistrarforCivilHigh

CourtsAdira Adnan, Senior Assistant Registrar for Civil High

CourtsOngWeeChing,Registrar,SubordinateCourt

58 5958 59

REFERENCES

Shah Alam, High CourtMohtarudinbinBaki,SeniorHighCourtJudgeNurchayaHajiArshad,HighCourtJudgeZalehabintiYusof,HighCourtJudgeTasnimbintiAbuBakar,DeputyRegistrarforCivilHigh

CourtRameshGopalan,DeputyRegistarforCriminalHighCourtKBElinaHongTzeLan,SeniorAssistantRegistrarMisliaMohdAris,RegistrarforSubordinate

Judicial and Legal Training InstituteAzianbintiMohdAziz,Director-General

National Economic Advisory CouncilProf.DatoNormaMansor,SecretarytotheNEACMaryArtylanFernandez,ExecutiveDirector(Economics)JamesLidiMathew,DeputySecretariat

Prime Minister’s DepartmentMahzumbintiArifin,DeputyDirectorGeneral(Planning

andDevelopment),LegalAffairsDivisionSyedMohamedBinKoyakutty,LegalAffairsDivision,

DirectorofPlanningKhairulizamOthman,LegalAffairsDivision,Chief

Assistant DirectorSamalaaa/pPerumal,LegalAffairsDivision,SeniorAssist

Director MohdAstaAli,LegalAffairsDivision,ICTStaff(Asst.

DirectorChungKuetPing,LegalAffairsDivision,AssistantDirector

(Projectimplementation)AdelineLee,SeniorManagerPEMANDU

Bar CouncilRagunathKesavan,President

FormisMahSlewKwok, ExecutiveViceChairmanandChief Ex-ecutiveOfficerMahXian-Zhen,PersonalAssistanttotheChiefExecutiveOfficerLimPuayAun,SeniorManagerPhilipNg,AssistantManagerLauKhekHui,AssistantManager

60 PB

Court Backlog and Delay Reduct ion ProgramMALAYSIA