Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No. 9269

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

BANGLADESH

SECOND AGRICULTURAL TRAINING PROJECT(CREDIT 1396-BD)

DECEMBER 28, 1990

Population and Human Resources DivisionAsia Country Department IAsia Regional Office

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir ofrcial d. ties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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Currency

Currency Unit = Bangladesh Taka (Tk)Crore Taka = 10 million TakaUS$1.0 = Tk 32.27 (June 1989)

ABBREVIATIONS

AMDP - Agricultural Management Development ProgramATI - Agricultural Training InstituteBAU - Bangladesh Agricultaral UniversityBS - Block SupervisorsCERDI - Central Extension Resources Development InstituteDAE - Department of Agricultural ExtensionDAEM - Directorate of Agricultural Extension and ManagementDOT - Division of TrainingFAO - Food and Agricultural OrganizationHAITI - Higher Agricultural In-service Training InstituteIDA - International Development AssociationMOA - Ministry of AgricultureNTC - National Training CouncilO&M - Operation and MaintenancePCR - Project Completion ReportPEW - Planning and Evaluation WingPIW - Project Implementation WingPP - Project ProformaSAR - Staff Appraisal ReportTEB - Technical Education BoardUNDP - United Nations Development Program

Fiscal Year (FY)

July 1 - June 30

FOR OFCIAL USE ONLYTHE WORLD BANK

Washington, D.C. 20433U.S.A.

Office of OitfecgtwCeealOptatbns Evaluatuin

December 28, 1990

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on BangladeshSecond Agricultural Training Project (Credit 1396-BD)

Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled"Project Completion Report on Bangladesh - Second AgriculturalTraining Project (Credit 1396-BD)" prepared by the Asia RegionalOffice with Part II of the report contributed by the Borrower. Noaudit of this project has been made by the Operations EvaluationDepartment at this time.

Attachmant

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYPROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

BANGLADESH

SECOND AGRICULTURAL TRAINING PROJECTCREDIT 1396-BD

Table of Contents

Page No.

Preface ................. iEvaluation Summary ................. iii

PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROK BANK'S PERSPECTIVE

Project Identity .................. 1Project Background ................. 1Project Objectives and Description ...................................... 2Project Design and Organization ......................................... 3Project Implementation .................................................. 4Project Results ......................................................... 8Project Sustainability .............. ................................... 10IDA Performance ......................................................... 10Borrower Performance .................................................... 11Project Relationship .................................................... 11Consulting Services ..................................................... 12Project Documentation and Data .......................................... 12

PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE

Confirm the Adequacy and Accuracy of the Factualinformation contained in Part III ..................................... 13

Evaluation of Bank's Performance and Lesson Learned. .................... 13Evaluation of Borrower's Own Performance and Lesson Learned ............. 13The Major Lesson Learned ............ ................................... 13

PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION

Related IDA Credit ...................................................... 15Project Timetable ....................................................... 16Credit Disbursements .................................................... 17Project Implementation .................................................. 18Project Costs and Financing ............................................. 19Project Results ................... 21Status of Covenants ................... 22Use of IDA Resources ................... 23

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only ir. the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

BANGLADESH

SECOND AGRICULTURAL TRAINING PROJECTCREDIT 1396-BD

PREFACE

This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Second AgriculturalTraining Project in Bangladesh, for which Credit 1396-BD in the amount of SDR 7.60million, equivalent to US$ 8.10 million, was a2proved on July 7, 1983. The Creditwas closed on June 30, 1989, six months behind schedule. Of the total credit amount,SDR 3.20 million was disbursed, equivalent to US$ 4.35 million, and the lastdisbursement was on December 1, 1989. A balance in the credit account ofapproximately SDR 4.40 million (US $ 3.75 million) was canceled on March 5, 1990.

The PCR was prepared by Staff of the Bangladesh Resident Mission, CountryDepartment 1, Asia Region (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III) and theBorrower (Part II).

Following the extension of the closing date by six months to June 1989,preparation of this PCR started in August 1989. The PCR is based, inter alia, on theStaff Appraisal Report; the Development Credit Agreement; supervision reports;correspondence between IDA and the Borrower; and internal IDA memoranda.

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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

BANGLADESH

SECOND AGRICULTURAL TRAINING PROJECT(CREDIT 1396-BD)

EVALUATION SUMMARY

1. Proiect Obiectives (Section C) The main objective of the SecondAgricultural Training Project was to assist the Government in improving the qualityof middle-level agricultural training. In addition, the project was designed to: (i)improve the planning, management and coordination of all middle-level trainingprograms and of higher-level in-service training programs of the Ministry ofAgriculture (MOA) in conjunction with the creation of the Division of Training (DOT)under the Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE); (ii) support the Government'scareer development strategy for Block Supervisors (BS) of the extension service; and(iii.) extend for another year the ongoing Agricultural Management DevelopmentPrograms.

2. Implementation Experience (Section E) There were a number of criticalvariances in project implementation. These were: (a) vacancies in AgriculturalTraining Institute (ATI) instructor posts; (b) non-implementation of HigherAgricultural In-service Training Institute (HAITI) Training Program; (c) shortage ofDOT management staff; (d) non-implementation of the fellowship program; (e)inadequate utilization of technical assistance; (f) inadequate operation andmaintenance budget for ATIs; (g) non-implementation of operational guidelines for ATIfarms; and (h) lack of quarterly reports.

3. Results (Section F) The project did not fully achieve its four objectives,mainly because the inputs provided to meet the objectives were inadequate and/orprovidea toward the closing of the project. The conclusions in this section aremostly based on project implementation analyses reported in the previous paragraph.

4. Since the ATI Tracer System, which was designed to obtain feedback on theadec uacy of ATI courses, was not carried out, it is difficult to assess the degreeto which the training provided under the project was effective in improving thequality of middle-level training, which was the project's first and main objective.However, there are a number of factors that indicate that the first objective was notfully met. First, a large number of ATI instructor posts were vacant for most partof the project. As a consequence, the ATIs had to combine class sections resultingin as many as 80 to 90 students per class compared to the planned 50. Further, theavailable teachers had to teach courses for which they were not prepared or trained.This problem was acute for the fisheries, livestock and home science/managementsubjects. Second, mainly as a result of the vacancies, the ATI iinstructors training

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on teaching methods and on subject matter areas was not conducted as planned. As ofDecember 1986, only 54% of the instructors had received training in teaching methods.Training on subject matter mainly started in late 19.7 and, till project closing,about 65% were trained in only 5 out of the 11 subjects. Third, to assist the ATIteachers in following the revised curriculum prepared by consultants and implementedfrom July 1986, 11 instructors' training manuals were developed. The manuals were,however, distributed to the ATIs only in early 1988, or at the end of the project.Fourth, of the 25 manuals for the BS, only 14 were finalized and distributed to theATIs, the bulk of them in the second halI of 1988. In June 1989, IDA agreed to aPlanning Commission proposal to utilize funds from the Extension and Research IIProject to produce the remaining 11 manuals; this, however, is yet to be implementedby DOT. Fifth, the ATI farms were not operated efficiently because the operationalguidelines, which were issued in April 1986, could not be fully followed due toinsufficient O&M budgets and failure to appoint a farm development consultant.Sixth, the books and journals and training equipment for the ATIs were also procuredand distributed in late 19$8. Seventh, of the 12 mini-buses provided for theATI/HAITI to transport stuC..nts to research stations and demonstration sites, onlyfour could be prc^:ured because of a Go)vernment restriction on purchase of mini-buses.In June 1988, IDA agreed to a DOT proposal to procure jeeps instead of minibuses, butit was not implemented.

5. The second objective, relating to strengthening DOTs training managementfunctions, was also not fully met due to the following factors. First, the DOT wasnot supported by adequate and specialist staff. Second, the planned technicalsupport to DOT was not adequately provided. Third, the planned fellowships for DOTstaff were not implemented.

6. The construction of the HAITI training center and the development of theHAITI curriculum became irrelevant to the third project objective--the formulationof a career development plan for middle-level agricultural technicians--due tochanges in eligibility requirements for higher studies and non-implementation of theHAITI program.

7. The fourth objective relating to the extension for one year of theAgricultural Management Development Program (AIMDP) was satisfactorily carried outunder the project as planned and completed by June 1984. The project envisaged thatthe local AMDP instructors would fully take over the management of AMDP after theconsultants' services ended. This, however, was not achieved due to lack of trainingfunds.

8. Although the project did not fully achieve its objective of improving thequality of the middle-level technicians, in terms of numbers of trainees trained itdid generally achieve its targets (para 33).

9. Proiect Sustainability (Section G) The two major benefits expected fromthe project were improved farmers' skills and knowledge and better quality researchas a result of better trained agricultural staff. Since the training of BlockSupervisors was less effective than anticipated, it must be assumed that the projectcontributed only partially to the attainment of the expected benefits. In fact, thepresent view is that the BS cadre is still lacking the skills needed for effective

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extension and further training and reorganization of the extension system are bein.gproposed under an Agricultural Support Services Project.

10. Lessons Learned (Sections H & I) The lessons learned mainly deal withimplementation. These are as follows: (a) IDA missions should have reported thestatus of previous missions' recommendations, and followed-up as necessary; (b) atappraisal, the linkage between HAITI and training of BS at BAU should have been morecarefully examined; (c) in April 1986, when IDA informed the Government that it wouldconsider suspension of disbursements if ATI vacancies were not filled by April 30,1986, it could have used that opportunity to press the project authorities to submitquarterly reports; (d) given the management problems encountered by DOT, IDAmissions, particularly in October 1985, should have pressed for the appointment ofthe management consultant for DOT; (e) based on experiences gathered under the FirstAgricultural and Rural Training Project, the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) should haveprovided quarterly report formats and guidelirtes for the operation of ATI farms; (f)the Ministry of Agriculture and its Division of Training should have made seriouseLforts to act/follow-up on the assurances provided to IDA missions; (g) DOT shouldhave appointed a management consultant in 1985 to address its management issues; DOTshould also have implemented its August 1987 proposal to recruit an ATI Tracer SystemConsultant and a Monitoring and Evaluation Consultant; and (h) the Ministry ofAgriculture should have provided adequate and specialist staff to DOT to enable itto efficiently carry out its assigned functions.

PROJECT COtLETION REPORT

BANGLADESH

SECOND AGRICULTURAL TRAINING PROJECTCREDIT 1396-BD

PART I: PkOJECT REVIEW FROi BANK'S PERSPECTIVE

A. Proiect Identitv

Project Name : Second Agricultural Training ProjectCredit No. : 1396-BDRVP Unit : Asia RegionCountry : BangladeshSector : Agriculture

B. Proiect Background

1. Agriculture Sector Develovment Objective. The primary objective of theGovernment's Second Five-Year Plan (FY80-85) was to achieve self-sufticiency infoodgrains by increasing production from about 14 million tons in FY81 to 20 milliontons by FY85. The FY85 production target was eventually not achieved and theshortfall was about 3.8 million tons. During the second year of the Project, theGovernment initiated tLie Third Five-Year Plan (FY86-90), in which it again emphasizedthe attainment of the food self-sufficiency objective by the terminal year. At thetime of appraisal, it was envisaged that one of the means to achieve increasedproduction would be through dissemination of advice on improved agriculturalpractices to farmers. The main constraint to providing the needed advisory servicesto farmers was the shortage of appropriately trained middle-level agriculturaltechnicians, the majority of whom were Block Supervisors (BS), or the lowest-levelextension staff of the Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE) (para 3).

2. Middle-level Agricultural Traininp, System: Middle-level agriculturaltraining is conducted at 11 Agricultural Training Institutes (ATIs) under the DAE ofthe Ministry of Agriculture (MOA). Normally, there are two types of middle-leveltraining: pre-service and in-service. The pre-service training is a two- yeardiploma course offered to Secondary School Certificate (SSC) holders (after gradeten). The in-service training is of a shorter duration - generally two to four weeks- and is provided to serving BSs to upgrade their skills and knowledge. However,under the Project a special one-year in-service upgrading course was introduced forthose middle-level agricultural technicians of MOA who were either partially trainedor totally untrained. The one-year course was designed to upgrade those middle-levelagricultural technicians to the level of ATI graduates (para 3).

3. Policy context. The Project was developed to assist the Government inimplementing recent policy decisions on middle-level agricultural training. Thepolicies were as follows. First, all training activities would be conducted by theDivision of Training (DOT) under the reorganized DAE. The DAE, previously theDirectorate of Agricultural Extension and Management (DAEM), was reorganized in July

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1982 following a Government promulgation to consolidate, streamline and improve theextension services to farmers through the progressive m -ger of extension-orientedagencies into one department. In the event eight agencies were selected, of whichonly six were merged; the extension services of the Cotton Devel.opment Board andthose of the Bangladesh Water Development Board remaained independent. Second, of theeight instructor posts in each ATI (increased to nine by the Government beforeeffectiveness of the Project), four would be senior instructor posts. A.. earlierdecision in October 1978 to downgrade all ATI teaching posts from senior to 4uniorinstructor levels had a negative effect cn middle-level training, as all instructorstransferred to the extension service of DAE in order to retain their status andperquisites. Third, because of the recent unification of extension services, the ATIcurriculum needed to be substantially revised. Fourth, as part of the Government'scareer development strategy for the BS, a Higher Agricultural In-service TrainingInstitute (HAITI) would be cstablished to train BSs, who would be eligible forpromotion, and to provide training to selected ATI graduates to qualify them foradmission to the Bangladesh Agricultural University (BAU). Fifth, the ATIs would beprovided with sufficient and appropriate reading and reference materials.

C. Project Objectives and Description

4. Project Obiectives. The main objective of the Project was to assist theGovernment in improving the quality of middle-level agricultural training. Inaddition, the project was designed to: 'i) improve the planning, management andcoordination of all middle-level training programs and of higher-level in-servicetraining programs of the Ministry of Agriculture in conjunction with the creation ofthe DOT under the DAE; (ii) support the Government's career development strategy forblock supervisors of the extension service; and (' ) extend for another year theongoing Agricultural Management Development Program.

5. Proiect Description: The project provided for:

(a) improving the quality of middle-level agricultural training through:(i) improvement of ATI farms; (ii) appointment of 3 additional ATIinstructors for each ATI, two at senior level, and 4 additionalsenior instructors for the Central Extension Resources DevelopmentInstitute (C T-DI); (iii) procurement of train4ng materials, librarybooks, equipment, furniture and vehicles; (iv) construction of staffhousing; (v) production and distribution of agricultural manuals forATI teachers and students; and (vi) establishment of an ATI teacherstraining program at the CERDI;

(b) constructing and equipping of a new training center (HAITI);

(c) technical assistance, consisting of: (i) 228 man-months offellowships for teaching staff of ATIs, CERDI and HAITI in teachingtechniques and subject matter areas, and for DOT staff in themanagement and supervision of agricultural training programs; and(ii) 136 man-months of consultants' services, 88 man-months of whichwould be financed by IDA and 48 man-months by United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP), to be executed by Food and Agricultural

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Organization (FAO) through its on-going Strengthening the

Agricultural Extension Services Project (SAESP) (Details in paras 17-19). The SAESP also provided technical support to an on-going IDA

Extension and Research II (E&R II) Project.

D. Proiect Design and Organization

6. Project DesiRn. The p.oject was preparod in September 1980 under the World

Bank FAO Cooperative Program and appraised by IDA in February 1981. Hiowever, after

appraisal the Government started the reorganization of the extension service (para

3) and the modification of its policies on middle-level agricultural training. In

November/December 1982, IDA mounted a post appraisal mission to incorporate the above

developments in the design of the Project. The task manager for the project was Mr.

Severino Santos and the Division Chief at the time of appraisal was Mr. C. P. R.

Nottidge.

7. The timing of the project was appropriate as it followed the First

Agricultural and Rural Training Project (Cr. 621-BD), which closed in December 1983.

That project provided, among other items, the construction and equipping of new and

renovated ATIs, pre-service training for BS, and technical support on management of

agricultural and rural development projects through the AMDP. While the project had

accomplished its primary goal, which was the establishment of an infrastructure for

agricultural training, it had not improved the quality of the ATI training programs.

This issue was addressed in the design of the second project.

8. In retrospect, with the exception of the HAITI program, the overall design

was appropriate. The HAITI program was not implemented since the training was

redundant for admission to the Bangladesh Agricultural University (BAU) (para 14).

9. Project OrRanization. The overall implementation of the project was the

responsibility of the DOT with the assistance of the Project Implementation Wing

(PIW) of the MOA. In particular, day-to-day management of project activities was to

be conducted by DOT for training aspects, and by PIW for physical implementation,

accounting and procurement matters. The project organization was appropriate except

for the project accounting function assigned to PIW. In MOA's other on-going

extension and training projects, PIW was responsible only for accounts for the

physical components it implemented. The accounts for the other components-staff

salaries and training coets - were maintained by DAF. Following an administrative

order by the MOA in November 1985, PIW's accounting function was shared with DAE,

which wa! made responsible for all accounting matters related to ATI operating costs,

staff salaries and trainee stipends. Two missions - April 1986 and December 1986 -commented on the split in the accounting function and recommended that PIW maintain

the project accounts to keep track of transaction and expenditures of the project as

a whole and to check disbursement backlogs. The FY 86 Government audit of the

project reported that although DAE had maintained up-to-date project accounts and

records, it had not maintained a separate project account. This was complied with

in FY 87. In retrospect, the split did not affect project implementation. The

concerns expressed by the two missions were mainly management issues and could have

been addressed if there had been a proper project monitoring system in DOT (para 22).

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E. Project Implementation

10. Variarnces. There were a number of critical variarnces in projectimplementation. These were: (a) vacancies in ATI instructor posts; (b) non-implementation of HAITI Training Program; (c) shortage of DOT management staff; (d)

non-implementation of the fellowship program; (e) inadequate utilization of technical

assistance; (f) inadequate operation and maintenance (O&M) budget for ATIs; (g) non-implementation of operational guidelines for ATI farms; and (h) lack of quarterly

reports. The following paragraphs describe these and other variances in proiectimplementation, and discuss the project risks.

11. Delay in Credit Effectiveness. The Credit was signed on August 31, 1983and was to become effective on November 30, 1983. In fact it only became effectiveon March 29, 1984, after two postponements requested by the Government. The maincause of the postponements was the delayed approval of the Proiect Proforma (PP)

defining the project components, categories and costs by the Government.

12. Vacancies in ATI Instructor Posts. Of the 12 sanctioned instructor posts

at each of the 11 ATIs, a large number of vacancies persisted during the first twoyears of the project. The vacancies fluctuated from 50% in November 1984 to 45% in

October 1985 to 60% in March 1986. The vacancies were mainl caused by two factors.First, due to limited ATI posts, ATI instructors who were eligible for promotion hadto be transferred to other departments of DAE. Second, there was a sho.tage ofSubject Matter Specialists/Subject Matter Officers in DAE and ATI staff were postedto fill them.

13. In March 1986, IDA expressed concern to the Government about thevacancies, which affected tha quality of ATI training. IDA indicated that, becauseof the serious and protracted nature of the problem, it would consider suspension of

disbursements if the vacancies were not filled by April 30, 1986. An IDA mission inApril 1986 confirmed that the vacancies had been filled from existing DAE staff.

Although the situation had improved, the December 1986 mission reported 20% vacanciesand the rate fluctuated between 10 and 15% till project completion. In retrospect,given that tt:e ATI vacancies were eventually filled from the existing DAE staff, theGovernment could have done this a year earlier based on its assurance given to the

February 1985 supervision mission.

14. Non-Implementation of HAITI Training Program. The HAITI training was notimplemented even though the construction of the HAITI training center was completed

in late 1.987 and a curriculum for the BS training was developed by DOT, withassistance from consultants of the UNDP/FAO project. In early 1985, as an interim

arrangement, 113 promotee Subject Matter Officers (from BS cadre) completed aspecially designed six-month course at the Tejgaon ATI. The August 1987 mission

reported that BS training was expected to start from January 1988. A probable reasonfor non-implementation of BS training was a Government plan to introduce a three-yearATI diploma course which would address the career development demands of the BS (para27). Regarding the training of BS at BAU, the February 1985 mission reported that

BAU could admit only those BS who were Higher Secondary Certificate (HSC) holders(after grade 12), and who had completed a one-year HAITI course. The BS were not

admitted to the BAU and the HAITI program was not implemented. The February

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mIssion's report was not in conformity with the decision taken at a meeting in MOAin October 1983, in which BAU was also present. At that meeting it was decided thata selected number of BS, who were HSC holders and who were nominated by DAE, wouldbe admitted to the BAU. For those BS, the one-year HAITI course was redundant sincethe HSC was the minimum educational qualification required for admission to the BAU.The BAU requirement meant that the career development plan for BS would not apply tothose who were SSC holders, irrespective of their time in service. After theFebruary 1985 mission there was no follow-up by IDA and DOT. The HAITI now functionsas an ATI but has only nine sanctioned instructor posts compared to 12 in the ATIs.Since its inception. HAITI has conducted on an intermittent basis only short term in-service training for the BS. In retrospect, the linkage between HAITI and thetraining of BS at BAU was not appropriate. The linkage apparently was not carefullyexamined at appraisal.

15. Shortage of DOT Management Staff. The Staff Appraisal Report (SAR)envisaged that the DOT would be strengthened by two Assistant Directors, fiveTraining Specialists and three Manpower Development Specialists (MDS). Thesepositions were never established. IDA supervision missions did not report on thissituation until December 1986 when the Supervision mission recommended appointmentof an MDS in DOT. MOA agreed to this but did not implement the decision and nofollow-up was done by subsequent missions. One of the reasons for the lapses inproject monitoring by DOT was the shortage of appropriate staff.

16. Non-Implementation of the Fellowships Pro,ram: None of the fellowshipsprovided for the ATI, CERDI and HAITI teachers and DOT management staff wereutilized, mainly due to: (i) procedural delays in obtaining clearances from theNational Training Council, (NTC), which is responsible for approving all foreigntraining programs for government personnel; and (ii) lack of serious efforts by theMOA ind DOT. The proposal for fellowships was submitted by DAE to the NTC throughthe MOA in June 1985, but it had to be resubmitted a number of times because ofchanges in formats and procedures by the NTC. The August 1987 supervision mission

expressed concern at the delays and recommended that the MOA and DOT obtain thenecessary clearances from the NTC by September 1987. In the event the NTC clearanceswere not obtained, MOA and DOT were requested by the August 1987 mission to explorethe possibility of having the needed training in suitable local institutions. TheMQA and DOT did not make any such attempts. The June 1988 mission reported that theCERDI staff had been trained under a British Technical Assistance program. Thatmission also reported that all other training requirements of the project-trainingof female instructors in home management and the training of DOT staff in trainingmanagement - were to be provided for under the Extension and Research II Project.However, that training is yet to be implemented.

17. Inadequate Utilization of Technical Assistance. Of the 24 mm ofconsultants services provided to assist DOT to plan and manage middle-levelagricultural training, only 12 mm of a local consultant services were utilized. Areview carried out by IDA and DAE in November 1984 decided that the consultant'scontract should not be extended for another year since the Director of DOT was thenfound capable of carrying out all DOT activities without assistance from aconsultant. The review, however, recommended that, in the event that the Director ofDOT would need consultant services, a consultant would be recruited. In retrospect,

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the IDA/DAE decision was not a correct one since, after termination of the contract,two of the consultant's major outputs, i.e., the quarterly report format and aproposal for establishing an ATI Tracer System to obtain feedback on the adequacy ofthe ATI courses from the ATI Graduates were not followed-up by DOT. In August 1987,DOT submitted a proposal to IDA to recruit two consultants: (a) six mm of expatriateservices for establishing an ATI Tracer System; and (b) ten mm of local expertservices for establishing and implementing a system for monitoring and evaluation ofATI training. IDA approved DOT's proposal but it was not implemented.

18. Another four mm of consultants services provided to conduct an in-depthstudy of the in-service training program of MOA were not utilized. The study wasexpected to enable DOT to coordinate all training activities and needs of MOA.However, in February 1985, MOA decided that coordination would be split between DOTand the Trainin6 Wing of the Bangladesh Agricultural Research Council. MOA'sdecision seems to have been logical since DOT's main function was to plan andcoordinate training of only extension personnel. Another 60 mm of consultantsservices (revised to 50 mm) provided to implement the Agricultural ManagementDevelopment Program (AMDP) by June 1984 were fully utilized. The project envisagedthat the local AMDP instructors would fully take over the management of AMDP afterthe consultants' services ended. Although, in June 1984, under a MOA order, anAgricultural Management Development Unit was created at CERDI with two localinstructors, the Unit could not operate due to lack of training funds, a problemwhich also affected CERDI's other training programs. IDA missions proposed to DOT torevise the Project Prof orma to allow IDA funds to be used for conducting the trainingprograms. IDA's proposal was accepted by MOA/DOT but not implemented.19. The 48 mm of consultants services provided by UNDP were subsequentlyrevised to 110 mm, of which 66 mm were local and 44 mm were expatriate services. Dataon the actual utilization of mm are not available in DOT and IDA records, nor couldthey be obtained from UNDP/FAO because the mm were amalgamated with the consultancyservices provided to the Extension and Research II Project. It is assumed that,except for 12 mm for an ATI Farm Development Consultant, the total allocation waslargely used. The UNDP/FAO consultants services were provided to assist DOT incurriculum development, ATI/CERDI teacher training, female BS training in homescience/management and agricultural manual production. The consultants provided goodsupport to the project but their outputs could not be fully used because ofadministrative and procedural problems, such as vacancies in AT.s, non-implementationof HAITI and delays in manual production. (para 29).

20. Inadequate Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Budget for ATIs. The Projectprovided funds for incremental O&M costs during the project period. Except forsalaries and stipends, adequate O&M funds were not provided to the ATIs. In FY87,each ATI, on average, received Tk. 0.8 million compared to an estimated requirementof Tk. 1.4 million. The December 1986 mission recommended that the ATIs be permittedto retain their sales proceeds from farms to finance 0 & M costs instead of havingto deposit them to the Treasury. Preliminary calculations made by that missionindicated that it could be done. The MOA agreed to examine the recommendation withthe Ministry of Finance after r' eiving a proposal from DAE providing sufficientjustifications. The DAE proposal .s not prepared and no follow-up was done by IDAand DOT. In retrospect, given that, as a matter of fact, this sort of retention isnever sanctioned, the IDA missions should have pressed for adequate budget

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allocations and the issue raised with Government at a main level. During Creditnegotiations, the Government provided an assurance that sufficient 0 & H funds wouldbe provided annually after completion of the Project. In FY90, each ATI will receiveon average, Tk. 0.15 million compared to an estimated requirement of Tk. 1.5 to Tk.1.7 million. The proposed Agricultural Support Services Project will provide O&Mfunds for the ATIs.

21. Non-implementation of Operational Guidelines for ATI Farms. To improve thepractical training of ATI students, a criticel need, the project was to finance theestablishment and/or the improvement of irrigation and drainage systems and of farmlayouts. In addition to offering a general prescription on improvement of ATI farms,the Project could have provided detailed ATI farm development guidelines. This wouldhave been useful since, under the First Agricultural Training Project, one of thereasons for poor performance of the ATI farms was lack of management know-how to putthe land under cost-effective production. Based on IDA supervision missions'

recommendations, the DOT and the ATIs, with assistance from the FAO/UNDP consultants,

developed Guidelines on ATI Farm Development in April 1986. The December 1986

mission reported that the implementation of the guidelines was hampered due to lack

of an adequate O&M budget and delays in recruitment of an ATI farm development

consultant. The next mission in August 1987 reported the status of civil works under

the farm development component but made no reference to the implementation of the

guidelines and the recruitment of the consultant, who eventually was not recruited.

22. Lack of Quarterly Reports: Quarterly reports for project activities were

never submitted by DOT, contravening Section 3.04(b) of the Development Credit

Agreement (DCA). Quarterly report formats were developed by the DOT management

consultant in May 1984 and approved by all concerned - IDA, DAE and MOA - by January

1985. Fowever, the formats were not used by DOT, the probable reason being the

termination of the consultant's contract on January 31, 1985 (para 17). The next IDA

supervision mission, in October 1985, made no recorded reference to those formats.

Instead, that mission proposed new formats. However these too, despite several

reminders by IDA, were not used by DOT. Following concerns expressed by the February

1986 mission, MOA entrusted the coordination of quarterly reporting of all

agricultural projects to the Planning Cell of the Ministry, which was to be assisted

by consultants in developing standard formats. This decision was not implemented by

the MOA, and, after the December 1986 mission, there was no further follow-up by IDA.

Thus the only reports on the DOT component were ad hoc status reports prepared for

IDA missions. PIW submitted a monthly report to IDA/MOA, which showed the status of

physical progress of civil works and procurement in percentage terms. In late i987,

PIW submitted two quarterly progress reports to IDA, whose presentation was similar

to the monthly report.

23. Extension of Closxng Date. The original Credit closing date was December

31, 1988 but, at the Government's request, it was extended by six months mainly to

complete procurement of outstanding project components, namely books and journals,

vehicles, and manuals. Only the books and journals were procured within the extended

period (para 29).

24. Low Credit Disbursement. Of the total Credit SDR 7.6 million (US$8.1

million), or 42%, was disbursed in SDR terms and 54% in US$ terms (Table 3, Part

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III). The main reasons for low credit disbursement were non-implementation orinadequate utilization of project components, e.g., fellowships, technical assistanceand manuals production) and depreciation of the Taka.

25. The absence of any meaningful quarterly reporting progress system showingachievements against targets, reasons for deviations and plans for the next quarter,led to poor monitoring of project activities. In retrospect, it would have beenuseful if the formats were developed at appraisal and used during projectimplementation.

26. Non-Implementation of Annual Proiect Evaluation During Creditnegotiations, an assurance was obtained from the Government that it would cause DOTto conduct annual evaluations of the outcomes of the project. This was not compliedwith. During project implementation only one evaluation was carried out, and thatwas by the Planning and Evaluation Wing (PEW) of DAE in July 1985. The quality ofthat evaluation was good and the report contained a number of useful recommendations,such as expeditious filling of ATI posts and procurement of tiaining materials andproduction of manuals. The evaluation should have continued but there was no follow-up by IDA aftor the October 1985 mission . In retrospect it was not appropriate tohave assigned DOT, which was responsible for implementation of the project, to do itsown evaluation, especially when there existed an Evaluation Wing in the DAE to dosuch evaluations of agricultural projects.

27. Project Risks. The only risk identified at appraisal was the possibilityof recurrence of student strikes due to the Government's decision not to lengthen thetwo-year ATI course to three years, since the two-year period was considered adequateto procuce qualified ATI graduates. The rationale for the three-year demand was toentitle the ATI graduates to a salary level equal to that of diploma graduates in theengineering field, who undertake three years of training. To address the issue ofcareer development of the ATI graduate, and hence of their salary levels, the projecthad proposed the establishment of HAITI. During project implementation the three-yeardemand was raised twice, the first time in la:.e 1984 and the second in late 1986,which led to a series of strikes. The three-year demand was eventually approved bythe Government in March 1988 and implemented from July 1989 in four ATIs. Of theremaining seven ATIs, two are engaged in in-service training of BS and five would beused for conducting one-year upgrading course for the two-year ATI diploma holders.The responsibility for implementing the three-year program has been entrusted to theTechnical Education Board (TEB) under the Ministry of Education. The ATIs, like thevocational institutes, are affiliated to the TEB, and the DOT is represented as amember in a number of committees, such as curriculum and admission.

F. Proiect Results

28. Proiect Obiectives: The project did not fully achieve its four objectives,mainly because the inputs provided to meet the objectives were inadequate and/orprovided toward the closing of the project. The conclusions in in this section aremostly based on project implementation analyses reported in the previous section.

29. Since the ATI Tracer System, which was designed to obtain feedback on theadequacy of ATI courses, was not carried out, it is difficult to assess the degree

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to which the training provided under the project was effective in improving thequality of middle-level training, which was the project's first and mairi objective.However, there are a number of factors that indicate that the first objective was notfully met. First, a large number of ATI instructor posts were vacant for most partof the project. As a consequence, the ATIs had to combine class sections resultingin as many as 80 to 90 students per class compared to the planned 50. Further, theavailable teachers had to teach courses for which they were not prepared or trained.This problem was acute for the fisheries, livestock and home science/managementsubjects. Second, mainly as a result if the vacancies, the ATI instructors trainingon teaching methods and on subject matter areas was not conducted as planned. As ofDecember 1986, only 54% of the instructors had received training in teaching methods.Training on subject mattar mainly started in late 1987 and, till project closing,about 65% were trained in only 5 out of the 11 subjects. Third, to assist the ATIteachers in following the revised curriculum prepared by consultants and implementedfrom July 1986, 11 instructors' training manuals were developed. The manuals were,however, distributed to the ATIs only in early 1988, or at the end of the project.Fourth, of the 25 manuals for the BS, only 14 were finalized and distributed to theATIs, the bulk of them in the second half of 1988. In June 1989, IDA agreed to aPlanning Commission proposal to utilize funds from the Extension and Research IIProject to produce the remaining 11 manuals; this, however, is yet to be implementedby DOT. Fifth, the ATI farms were not operated efficiently because the operationalguidelines, which ware issued in April 1986, could not be fully followed due toinsufficient O&M buugets and failure to appoint a farm development consultant.Sixth, the books and journals and training equipment for the ATIs were also procuredand distributed in late 1988. Seventh, of the 12 mini-buses provided for theATI/HAITI to transport students to research stations and demonstration sites, onlyfour could be procured because of a Government restriction on purchase of mini-buses.In June 1988, IDA agreed to a DOT proposal to procure jeeps instead of minibuses, butit was not implemented.

30. The second objective, relating to strengthening DOTs training managementfunctions, was also not fully met due to the following factors. First, the DOT wasnot supported by adequate and specialist staff. Second. the planned technicalsupport to DOT was not adequately provided. Third. the planned fellowships for DOTstaff were not implemented.

31. The construction of the HAITI training center and the development of theHAITI curriculum becr ' irrelevant to the third project objective--the formulationof a career develop- plan for middle-level agricultural technicians--due tochanges in eligibility requirements for higher studies and non implementation of theHAITI program.

32. The fourth objective relating to the extension for one year of theAgricultural Management Development Program (AMDP) was satisfactorily carried outunder the project as planned and co. ..eted by June 1984. The project envisaged thatthe local AMDP instructors would fully t ke over the management of AMDP after theconsultants' services ended. This, howeve., was not achieved due to lack of trainingfunds.

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33. Impact of the Proiect on Human Resources Development: Although the projectdid not fully achieve its objective of improving the quality of the middle-leveltechnicians, it did generally achieve its quantitative training targets. Regardingpre-service training. 3.523 graduatec;, which was about 90% of the appraisal estimate.Data on the number of ATI graduates employed by the research institutes and by theprivate sector is not available in the Division of Training. It is assumed that,because of vacancies in the BS posts. virtually all the ATI graduates joined the DAEas BS. Regarding upgrading training, 3.329 completed the program, or about 70% ofthe appraisal estimate. Of the total trained under the upgrading course, 93% wereBS of DAE. Another 1,200 sugar extension workers, who were expected to be trainedat the ATIs, were trained by the Sugar Research Institute (Table 4, Part III).

G. Project Sustainabilitv

34. The two major benefits expected from the project were improved farmers'skills and knowledge and better quality research as a result of better trainedagricultural staff. Since the project did not fully achieve its objectives, it mustbe assumed to have contributed only partially to the attainment of the expectedbenefits. In fact, the present view is that the BS cadre is still lacking the skillsneeded for effective extension, and further training and a re-organization of theextension system are being proposed under an Agricultural Support Services Project.

H. IDA Performance

35. Malor strenzths and Weakness. IDA fielded ten supervision missions in thesix-year disbursement period. The missions were technically strong and there wasgood staff continuity between missions. From February 1985, IDA decided to supervisethe Project simultaneously with two related on-going projects E&R II (Cr. 1215-BD)and Agricultural Research II (Cr. 1455-BD). Although the joint supervisionarrangement was not consistently followed, it did contribute to a betterunderstanding and coordination of the related activities, particularly the UNDP/FAOtechnical assistance support provided to Second Agricultural Training and E&R IIProjects. A major weakness, however, which must have contributed to the failure toachieve objectives, was the lack of consistent follow-up of previous supervisionmissions' recommendations (Section E)

36. Lessons Learned. All the lessons mainly deal with implementation.

(a) IDA missions should have reported on the status of previous missions'recommendations, and followed-up as necessary.

(b) At appraisal, the linkage between HAITI and training of BS at BAU shouldhave been more carefully examined (para 14).

(c) Given the management problems encountered by DOT, IDA missions,particularly the October 1985 one, should have pressed for theappointment of the management consultant for DOT (para 17).

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(d) Given the experience gathered under the First Agricultural TrainingProject, the SAR could have provided guidelines for the operations of ATIfarms and quarterly report formats (paras 21 and 22).

(e) In April 1986, when IDA informed the Government that it wouldconsider suspension of disbursements if ATI va^ancies were notfilled by April 30, 1986, it could have used that opportunity topress the project authorities to submit the quarterly reportsregularly (para 22).

Based on the lessons learned under this project, the proposed AgriculturalSupport Services Project (FY92) will address the management problems of DAE byseconding a full-time expatriate Training Coordinator to the Department. This postwill be backed up by short-term consultants to strengthen the downstream trainingactivities at ATI level. Further, management training will be provided for seniorDAE staff. Moreover, to address the issue of inadequate O&M budget for the ATIs, theproposed project will provide funding for the rehabilitation of DAE's trainingfacilities and equipment. Finally, to enhance the teaching skills of ATI staff, theASPP will have a training of trainers program.

I. Borrower Performance

37. Malor Strength and Weakness. There was good continuity in the post of theProject Director (PD). Of the two PDs, one retired in December 1984 and the othercontinues to be in post. A major weakness was the lack of follow-up on assurancesprovided to IDA missions (Seetion E).

38. Lessons Learned. The following lessons, similar to the ones reported inpara 36, may be learnt from the experiences in the project.

(a) The Government - MOA and DOT - should have made serious efforts toact/follow-up on the assurances provided to IDA missions.

(b) DOT should have appointed a management consultant in 1985 to address itsmanagement issues. DOT should have implemented its August 1987 proposalto recruit an ATI Tracer System consultant and a Monitoring and Evaluationconsultant (para 17)

(c) The MOA should have provided adequate and specialist staff to DOT toenable it to efficiently carry out its assigned functions (para 15).

J. Project Relationship

39. The Bank's relationship with the Government and the cofinancing/executing agencies - UNDP/FAO - was good.

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K. Consulting Services

40. The consulting services were satisfactory, but their outputs could not befully used because of administrative and procedural problems (paras 17 to 19).

L. Project Documentation and Data

41. The SAR refers to a set of working papers and tables in Annex 8 but it doesnot provide any details on their contents. It would have been useful had workingpapers been printed and circulated to the DOT and been available to IDA supervisionstaff. Particularly had the documents included guidelines for the operation of theATI farms and quarterly report formats.

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PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE

A. Confirm the Adequacy and Accuracy of the Factual Information Cor.tained in PartIII.

42. The d -aft project completion report shows that the information included inthe report, except in para. 22, are relevant and are in conformity with theactivities of the project. As regards para 22 lack of quarterly reports, the actualposition was as follows: The quarterly report in a format covering the component-wise activities of the project for the quarter ending in December 1984 and March 1985were sent to RMB by DOT. subsequently as decided in the wrap up meeting said reportwas sent to RMB through MOA on a quarterly basis up to the quarter ending in March1987.

B. Evaluation of Bank's Performance and Lesson Learned.

43. The relation of the Borrower with the Bank personnel was very good. TheBank made review of the project activities in a scheduled manner at an interval ofsix to eight months. This length of time for review was appropriate.

44. The major lesson learned was that the overall communications between theBank and Borrower regarding the continuous project implementation report and follow-up should be strengthened.

C. Evaluation of Borrower's Own Performance and Lesson Learned

45. The major components of the project like revision of curriculum for pre andin-service training, procurement of books and equipment, preparation of ATI FarmDevelopment Guide and conducting pre and in-service training were completed duringthe project period. The procurement of vehicles and production of agricu-turaltraining manual could not be made in full because of delay in the fulfillment ofadministrative formalities, similarly, fellowship program and technical assistancecould not be fully utilized.

46. The following shortcomings were observed during the implementation of theproject.

(a) There was no training budget of CERDI and the operation and maintenancebudget of ATIs was inadequate;

(b) HAITI concept for training BSs at BAU in the under graduate.

D. The Major Lesson Learned

47. While preparing Staff Appraisal Report, attempt should be made to identifythe project component keeping in view the project objective and the financialinvolvement, so that it does not create difficulty in reflecting the same in the PPand ADP as well. More stress should be given on continuous evaluation and monitoringof the new project activities in a planned and regular way.

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PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION

1. Related IDA Sredit

Credit/ Purpose Year of Status CommentsTitle Approval

Credit To facilitate 1975 Completed in The project had621-BD agricultural pro- December, 1983, accomplished itsFirst duction by allow- two and a half primary goal,Agricul- ing farmers a more years after the which was thetural and effective service original establishmentRural through the provi- closing date. of an infra-Training. sion of qualified structure for

and competent exten- agriculturalsion field staff training, but itand cooperative had not improvedworkers. the quality of

the ATI trainingprogram.

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2. Prolect Timetable

Date Date Date

Item Planned Revised Actual

Id.ntification 05/80

Preparation 09/80 09/80

Appraisal Mission 1. 02-03/81 02-03/81

Appraisal Mission 2. 10-11/82 11-12/82 2

Credit Negotiations 11/30/81 04/11/83

Board Approval 02/23/82 07/07/83

Credit Signature 08/31/83

Credit Effectiveness 11/30/83 03/29/84

Completion Date 06/30/88 06/30/89 12/31/89

Closing Date 12/31/88 06/30/89 06/30/89 3

IDA postponed further processing of the project to incornorate the results

of the Government's decisions to reorganize the extension service and tomodify its policies on agricultural training.

2 The approval of the Project Proforma (PP) was delayed by the Government.The PP is a Government document, which defines the project components,categories and costs.

3 At the Government's request, the Credit was extended by IDA for sixmonths, mainly to complete procurement of books and journals, vehicles and

manuals. Only the books and journals were procured within the extendedperiod.

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3. Credit Disbursements

IDA Fiscal Year Disbursements (US S Million)and Semester Estimated Actual Actual Z of

Cumulative Cumulative Estimated

1983/84 12 0.35 0.24 69

1984/85 1 0.85 0.41 482 1.65 0.61 37

1985/86 1 2.45 1.91 782 3.20 2.08 65

1986/87 1 4.00 2.44 612 5.15 2.83 55

1987/88 1 6.30 3.16 502 7.25 3.72 51

1988/89 1 8.10 4.33 532 8.10 4.33 53

1989/90 1 8.10 1 4.35 2 54 3

1 In SDRs, it was equivalent to 7.60 million.

2 The final disbursement was on December 1, 1989. In SDRs, the totaldisbursement was equivalent to 3.20 million. At appraisal US $ 1.00 =Tk. 24.50.

3 In SDRs, the actual disbursement was 42% of the estimated project cost.

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4. Project Implementation

Appraisal Actual (orIndicators/Unit Estimate PCR Estimate)

A. Staffing (No)1. ATI instructors 121 X 101 22. CERDI instructors 4 4

B. ATI Trainina (1984-89) (No)

1. Two Year Diploma 3,914 3,5232. One-Year Upgrading 4.665 3,329 '

C. Fellowships (Man-months)

1. ATI 132 0 4

2. CERDI 48 0 43. HAITI 12 0 44. DOT 36 0 4

D. Technical Assistance (Man-months)

1. DOT - Planning 72 NA 52. HOA - Training needs 4 0 6

3. Management Training 60 50

E. Procurement (No)

1. Mini Buses 12 42. Manuals 25 143. Books/Journals (S) 100 100

F. Civil Works (No)1. ATI Staff Quarters 669 50

2. HAITI 1 1

G. Disbursements (US $ Million) 8.10 4.35

Subsequently revised to 132 for 11 ATIs.

2 In 1988, Dinajpur ATI was converted into a college; therefore 12 instructor posts were

reduced.

3 According to DOT, this number was adequate to meet the demand for one-year upgrading course.

One of the reasons for the differences was that about 1,200 participants from the SugarResearch Institute (SRI) did not participate; they were trained internally by SRI.

4Not implemented due to procedural delays.

5 Of the 24 man-months provided by IDA, only 12 man-months of local consultant's serviceswere utilized; the remaining 48 man-months, later revised to 110 man-months, were providedunder the UNDP/FAO project. Data on the actual utilization of man-montehs are not availablein DOT and IDA records, but it is assumed that, except for an ATI Farm DevelopmentConsultant, the total allocation was largely used.

6 Not implemented by DOT.

7Eight could not be procured because of a Government restriction on procurement of mini-busec

8 IDA agreed to a government request to produce the remaining 11 manuals under the E&R IIProject; this is yet to be implemented.

9 Subsequently revised to 50, based on a survey by PIW and DOT in project year one.

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5. Pro1ect Costs and Financing

A. Prolect CoSts(US $ Million)

AppDratealEgatiuat. ActualProject component 1.9ralTT 6 tLocarTorelgn

Costs MNc5L.S Coots Total Cost. Exchant Costs Total

1. IMPROVIN0 QUALITY 0FMIDDLE LEVEL TRJUIN40

a) Prseervic. and 3.13 1.48 4.61 2.93 0.36 3.29nrvics

Tr sin1n Progr

b) Agril. Manual. 0.20 0.19 0.39 0.50 - 0.50c) Inotructors Training 0.06 0.19 0.25

Sub-Totcl 3.39 1.86 5.25 3.43 0.36 3.79

2. Higher Agril. Inseivic. 0.76 0.59 1.35 1.14 0.04 1.18Training Prograu

3. Training Kanageunt 0.07 0.71 0.76 - - - Iassistance

4. Agril. Managemnt 0.06 0.18 0.24 - 0.22 0.22Dvt. Training

Total base coots 4.28 3.34 7.62 4.57 0.62 3.19

5. Contingenciess

a) Unforeen 0.43 0.33 0.76 - -b) Price Escaltio - 1.02 0.51 1.53 - -

Total Froject cost 5.I3 4.1a V.SI 4.a .6Z 5.1S

1 Data could not be provided because of lack of record on actual utilization of UNDPTechnical Assistance funds - US$ 0.40 Million.

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B. Project Financing(US$ Million)

Source Planned Credit Final ZAgreement

IDA expenditureCategories

1. Civil Works and Furniture 1.64 1.46 892. Farm Development 0.76 0.74 973. Vehicles, Equipment 0.68 0.49 72

and Books4. Manuals Production 0.35 0.50 1.3

5. Fellowships and LocalConsultants 1.19 0.36 30

6. Expatriate ConsultantServices 0.58 - -

7. Staff Salaries. Stipendsand Operating Costs 2.23 0.80 36

8. Unallocated 0.67 -

Total IDA 8.iJ 4.35' 54

Co-financing Institution (UNDP)

1. Expatriate ConsultantServices 0.4LU 2

Total UNDP 0.40

Domestic (GCOB) 3

1. Civil works and Furniture 0.29 0.18 622. Farm Development 0.08 0.07 883. Vehicles, Equipment & Books - 0.08 -4. Staff Salaries, Stipends

and Operating Costs 0.95 0.51 545. Unallocated 4 0.09 -

Total Domestic 1.41 0.84 60--------------------------------------------------------------------- __---

Total Project Costs 9.91 5.19 52--------------------------------------------------------------------- __----

A balance of SDR 4,401,409 million (approximately US $ 3.75 million equivalent) wascanceled on March 5, 1990.

2 Data not available (Table SA).

i ncludes US $ 0.42 million for taxes in planned credit agreement.

4Includes physical contingencies only.

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6. Proiect Results

D. Studies

Purpose asStudy Defined at Impact

Appraisal Status of study

1. In-service training To develop a Not conducted 2

programs under the proposal toMinistry of Agri- enable DOTculture (MOA). to effectively

coordinate allin-servicetrainingprograms of theMOA.

Tables A (Direct Benefits), B (Economic Impact) and C (Financial Impact) were not prepared since noquantifiable benefits were provided at appraisal.

2 In February, 1985 MOA decided that NOA in-service training would be coordinated by DOT and theTraining Wing of the Bangladesh Agricultural Research Council.

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7. Status of Covenants

DCA Section Brief Description of Covenants Compliance Remarks

Carry out the Project with due Partial ATI Instructor posts were not filled.3.01(a) diligence and efficiency, and In April 1986. IDA informed the

provide funds, facilities, government that it would considerservices and other resources suspension of disbursements ifrequired for the project. vacancies (602) were not filled by

April 30, 1986. As a result,vacancies improved but fluctuatedbetween 10-202 till projectcompletion.

3.02(a) Employ consultants on terms and Partial Planned consultancy provisions wereconditions satisfactory to the not fully utilized.Association.

3.04(b) Furnish at regular intervals No At Credit negotiations, this covenant(lii) information concerning the was interpreted as submission of

project its costs, benefits, quarterly progress reports. Thisand goods and services covenant was not complied with by DOT.provided.

3.04(b) Conduct a yearly evaluation of Partial Only one evaluation was done for the(iv) the out-come of the project and period July 13a3 to June 1985.

furnish report to IDA not laterthan six months after the endof each fiscal year.

3.04(d) Provide a project completion Yes Part II of the Project Completionreport to IDA. Report has been submitted.

3.05 Provide funds for operation and Partial Adequate O&M funds were not providedmaintenance (O&M) of physical to ATIs and CERDI.facilities.

3.06 Establish: (a) three additional Partial Posts were established but vacanciesposts, two of which shall be of in ATI and CERDI instructor posts weresenior level; and (b) four reported by supervision missions.senior instructors for CERDI.

3.07 Furnish to IDA for comments, Partial Curriculum for (a) was finalized incurricula for (a) training March 1986 but not implemented.middle-level staff for Curriculum for (b) was not prepared aspromotion to higher positions; per advice of Bangladesh Agriculturaland (b) for admission to University.university.

3.08(a) Appoint staff of DOT, ATIs, Yes DOT and CERDI directors, and ATI andHAITI and CFRDI as counterparts HAITI principals vere designated asof the consultants to be counter-parts.employed under the project.

3.08(b) Prepare and implement a five Partial Plan was prepared in 1983 and revisedyear training plan. in 1985. Training was not fully

conducted according to plan.

4.01(c) Furnish to IDA audited accounts Partial Audit reports on Statements ofwithin nine months of the end Expenditures were submitted within theof FY (by March 31) due date. Audit reports on annual

accounts were generally submittedlate.

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8. Use of Bank Resources

A. Staff Inout.(Staff weeks)

Stage ofProject Cycle Planned Revised 1 Final

Identification/ - - 58.5

Preparation(LENP)

Appraisal - - 68.8

Negotiations - - 2.1

Supervision - - 62.5

PCR - - 3.2

Total 195.1

Not available

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B. Missions

Stage of Month/ No. of Days Specialization Performance Rating Types ofProject Year Persons in Field Represented Status Problems

Cycle

Identification 06/80 2 NA 2 Agr. EducatorArchitect

Preparation 09/80 3 21 Agr Train/Ext SpecAgr EducatorEconomist

Appraisal 1 02/81 3 28 Agr. EducatorEconomistArchitect

Appraisal 2 12/82 2 18 Agr. Educ.Agriculturist

Supervision 1 03/84 2 2 Agr. EducatorArchitect

Supervision 2 04/84 1 2 Agriculturist 1

Supervision 3 11/84 1 7 Agr. Educator 1

Supervision 4 02/85 1 18 3 Agriculturist 2 4 MT

Supervision 5 11/85 1 NA 2 Agriculturist 2 MFD

Supervision 6 03/86 1 17 3 Agriculturist 4 5 MFD

Supervision 7 04/86 1 12 Agr. Educator 2 MD

Supervision 8 12/86 1 20 Agriculturist 2 MFD

Supervision 9 08/87 1 12 Agr. Educator 2 MD

Supervision 10 06/88 2 8 Agr. Educator 1Economist

I H - Managementt S- *chnical; P * Availability of lund.; and D * Dvelopmnt impact.

2 NA - Mot Available

3 Slaultaneous supervision of three related IDA-sealeted projects Second Agricultur*l Training. Erztenion and ResearchII and Agricultural Research II - conducted by *taff of tbh Resident Mission in Bangladeah.

4 Supervisions I to 4 were based on old Form 590 fomat; I-problem free or minor probless. and 2-moderate problems.Supervision 5 onwerds were based on nw form 590 format; -none or sinor problem 2-moderate problms; -soderrteproblems; 3-major problem which are being addressed adequately. and 4_a3r probles icb *r not being sddresoedadequately and which require further action by Borrower/implementing Agency.

S The rating was 4 becauoe of serious vacancies in ATI instructor posts. IDA recomended suspension of disbursemnts ifthe vacant poets were not filled by April 196. An April 30. 1966 supervision mission confirmd that the posts had beenf illed.