ThWe World Bank

FMOR CUAL USE ONLY

NICROI!ICHIC COPY

Report No. 10287-UNI Type: (PCR) Report No. 10287

ASFIER-YOU/ X3'1752 / T9 053/ QEDDi

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

NIGERIA

ILORIN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(LOAN 1668-UNI)

JANUARY 30, 1992

Agriculture Operations DivisionCountry Department IVAfrica Regional Office

This docuameat has a restricted distrbution and may be ased by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorizaktion.

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Mamcy Unit:ra(

Exhu. Rats: At ppraisal: US$ - O.65Intevening yea aveage: USS N 1.51Completion yeaw (1988) average: US$1 - N4.54

I metlc ton(Mt) - 2,205 pounds (lbs) or0.9842. long ton

Ilhectare(ha) - 2.4711lacres(ac)I ce (SC) 0.4047 hectare (ha)I kionmur (n) 0.6214 miles (ml)I mile (ml) 1.6093 kilomes (m)

ADP Agrilura Deveopmt ProjectAPMEPU Agriculura Project Monitoring, Evaluation and Planning UnitASP Advanced Service PackageBSP Basic Service PackageFACU Fedwrul Agricultra Coodinating UnitFDA Federal Department of AgricultureFDAR Federal Depatment of Agricultural ReseachFDRD Federa Departmen of Rural DevelopmentFMAWR Federa Ministry of Agriculture and Water ResourcesFMG Federal Military Government of NigeriaFSC Farm Service CenterIPEC Boin Project Executive CommitteeIPMU Iborin Project Management UnitIPTCC lforin Project Technical Coordinating CommitteeIADP hlorin Agricultural Development ProjectIBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,

'Me World BankKWSG Kwara State GovernmentMANR Ministry of Agriculture and Natual9 Resources, Kwara Statemow Ministry of Works, Lands nd Housing, Kwara StateMSADP Multi-State Agricultural Development Project

FISALYEAR

Apr;I 1-Mach 31

FOR OFFICIAL IJU ONLYTHE WORLD BANKWOshnston. D.C. 20433

U.S.A.

O6lc. d1 OkSCtU.GssWrOp00mm 146MM

January 30, 1992

HEMOhMMDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AhD THE PFLSIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on NIGERIAIlorin Aericultural Development Proiect (Loan 1668-UNI)

Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "ProjectCompletion Report on AIGERIA - Ilorin Agricultural Development Project(Loan 1668-UNI))" prepared by the Africa Regional Office with Part II ofthe report contributed by the Borrower. This project has not been auditedby the Operations Evaluation Department at this time.

Attachment

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Tis document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their omcial duties Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY

PROJECT COMPLEIJON REPORT

NIGEIUA

ILORIN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMEN'T PROJECT(LOAN lElUNDI

TABLE OFCQTh3ZMI

Page No.

PREFACE ..................... iEVALUATION SUMMARY .iii

PAR 1-- PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE ......... .......... 1

1. Project Idvntity ........................ ............................ 12. Background .................................................... 1 3. Project Objectives and Components ...................... ................. 24. Project Design and Organization ........................................... 35. Project Implementation .................................................... 56. Project Results ...................... .............................. 77. Project Sustainability .................................................... 88. Bank Performance ....................................... ............. 89. Borrower's Performance .................................................... 910. Consulting Services ............................................. ....... 911. Project Documentation and Data ............................................ 912. Findings and Lessons Learned ............................................... 10

PAT 11: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWEP 'S PERSPECTIVE 1/ ...... 11

ART m: STATISTICAL INFORMATION .13

1. Related Bank Loans .132. Project Timetable .133. Disbursements .144. Follow- )a Project .14S. Project Implemettation .156. Project Cost and Financing .167. Project Results .178. Status of Covenants .189. Use of Bank Resources .21

Map: IBRD No. 1;9d

i/ Contain the Borrower's comments on Pat I of the Draft PCR.

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

NIGERIA

ILORIN AGRICULTURAL P3VELOPMENT PROJECT(LOAN 1668-UNI

PIEEFACE

This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Ilorin Agricultural DevelopmentProject in Nigeria, for which Loan 1668-UNI in the amount of US$27.0 million equivalentwas approved on March 20, 1979. The original closing date for the Bank loan was June 30,1985. The loan was closed on June 30, 1988, after three yearly extensions. The finaldisbursement was on December 22, 1988. Some US$26.7 million was disbursed, and US$0.3was canceled.

The PCR was prepared by the FAO/IBRD Cooperative Programme on behalf of and inconjunction with the Agriculture Operations Division, Africa Country Department IV(Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and E). The Borrower's comments on Part I of thedraft PCR are inciuded in Part II.

Preparation of this PCR is based on a field completion mission conducted in March -April 1990, and the Staff Appraisal Report; the Loan, Guarantee, and Project Agreements;Supervision Reports; correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower; and internal Bankmemoranda.

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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

NIGERIA

ILORIN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(LOAN i668-UNn _

EV-LMUATION SUMMARY

Obiectives

1. The Ilorin Agricultural Development Project (IADP) was the seventh of a series ofenclave ADPs financed by the Bank in Nigeria starting in 1975. The project sought toincrease agricultural production and to improve incomes and living standards of 90,000smallholder families in the central part of Kwara State. In line with the government'sagricultural strategy, the IADP was designed to provide a package of farm support services,including extension advice, and improved seeds and fertilizers. The project aiso included theconstruction and maintenance of rural feeder roads and the construction of 20 farm servicecenters and training facilities for agricultural field and senior staff. In addition, the projectwas to support the preparation of 13 feasibility studies for future agricultural projects.

igementation Exp

2. Project implementation was characterized by the impact of a delayed start-up and aslow pace of execution; chronic delays and inadequacy of counterpart funding; poorcoordination of project agricultural activities; and deficient project managemeni andmonitoring and evaluation. Contrary to planned emphasis, implementation of infrastructureactivities was accorded importance ahead of agricultural services. Actual projectimplementation took about nine years instead of the six years (including one year of pre-project activities) estimated at appraisal. Implementation started after a 4-month delay in thefulfillment of loan effectiveness conditions, but, due to late recruitment of key project staff,the project became operational only about one year later.

3. Loan draw down was slow at the beginning and Federal Government (Flk) fundingwas very often delayed. The contribution by the State Government (KWSG) was erratic andseveral consecutive quarterly payments were not made, reflecting its low commitment to theproject. Lack of government funding was due to the local bureaucracy not sufficientlybenefitting from the strict procurement procedures of the prcject, and also the technicalities inthe release of allocated funds. Funding problems were compounded by the systematic lossesof the heavily subsidized operations of fertilizer distribution, tractor hire and land clearing.By the mid-term review (January 1983) the Bank considered lADP a "major problem project"and put it in a 'care and maintenance status." The Bank missions helped in restructuring theproject, and eased project cash flow problerns by increasing disbursement

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percentage and financing local stwff salaries. Discussions with the Government led toincreasing Federal financing of project costF and limiting state contribution effectively 2o20%.

4. Farmers did not adopt the technical packages as these were not financially viable givenprevailing costs and prices. The appraisal mission did not adequately focus on the macro-economic issues, particularly the implications of the over-valued local currency and cheapfood imports. The macro-economic environment seriously affected competitiveness ofNigerian agriculture and discouraged major investments by farmers in both local and exportcrops. The Bank increased its level of project funding by financing local staff salaries andincreasing tne disbursement percentage for civil works. This was done within the context ofthe unfavorable macro-economic situation and the Government's inability to provide adequatecounterpart funds. The Bank, however, could have sent more frequent supervision missionswith sufficieut technical skills for reorienting the project activities and making the project staffmore effective. Also, the scarcity of relevant technological messages was a major limitingfactor in the impiementation of IADP. The project's expected technological and economicimpact was based on on-station research results that turned uut to be insufficiently relevant tothe economic realities of local farmers to be practicable. Expected yields for both the basicand advanced technological packages depended on a range of inputs which farmers could notbe realistically expected to apply given the unfavorable price environment. Consequently,adoption rates assumed were totally unrealistic. Only fertilizer achieved widespreadacceptability, mainly due to a substantial and continued subsidy. However, it should be notedthat some of the fertilizer might have actually leaked across the country's borders where itfetched higher prices. Fert;iizer used in the traditional system paid-off in the case of maizebut niot in the case of sorghum and millet. in addition to weak extension-research interaction,coordination with other services did not develop. By the end of 1983, no coherentagricultural operational plan to coordinate the various project services had been produced.Lack of appropriate and sufficient training and supervision of the extension staff, coupled withthe insufficient number of extensionists, significantly limited the number of effectively assistedfarmers and the quality of the service itself.

5. Delayed, insufficient and uncertain funding prevented any systematic planning andprogramming of project activities, while reducing and at times paralyzing the actions of thetechnical services. Political interference with project management generated problems withthe selection of personnel and the location of the headquarters. As a consequence, the Maleteheadquarters were never completely built and the project was run from Ilorin. Projectmanagement monitoring (e.g. indicators of project performance, beneficiaries reached, etc.)was not carried out systematically, thus project reporting lacked quality and substance.

Results

6. The project failed to develop a sound agricultural programme to benefit smallholders,the overriding constraint being the poor incentive environment. Their traditional farmingsystems remained basically unchanged. The project area was expected to actually achieveonly 20% of the incremental production that had been estimated in the SAR and this too couldnot be attributed to the project's agricultural services. Actual physical indicators of ruralinfrastructure development show a better resemblance to original targets. IADP hadconstructed or upgraded 355 km of feeder roads, compared with 300 km estimated in theSAR. The project had put infrastructure ahead of agriculture, perhaps because of politicalpressure for roads, but also because the incentive environment for agriculture was not

appropritne. However, the project failed to create the institutional arrangements necessary toguaantee maintenance of the infrastructure. Financial gains of the farmers have come mainlvfrom expanded use of subsidized fertilizer. Satisfactory farmgate input/output ratios achie' 4are becaue of a change in the incentive environment which resulted from the SAPmacroeconomic reform of 1986 rather than from project interventions. The SAR hadestimated the overall Economic Rate of Return (ERR) to be 24%. Data collection efforts tomonitor project impact were quite !imited. A meaningful estimate of the actual financial gainsof the farmers and the overall economic viability of the project is, therefore, not possible.

7. The project, however, represented an important initial developmental effort in thestate. It mobilized important resources in the construction of rural feeder roads and farmservice centers that facilitated farm-to-market transport and the distribution of fertilizer andother farm inputs. Benefits from vehicle and transport cost savings and the increase ineconomic activity arising from better infrastructure could be important in spite of a !ack ofdata. Manpower development through formal staff training, and, most importantly, throughthe assumption of managerial responsibility by the Nigerians after the departure of theexpatriate staff, is a significant achievement of the project. The accumulated experience ofthe project management unit became instrumental in the state-wide expansion of activities ofthe follow-on MSADP II project. The organizational structure and the experience acquired inthe delivery of extension and other services, should prove of great value in improving thedelivery of such essential services to the benefit of Kwara state smallholders.

Sustainabiflt

8. Prevailing economic conditions were not at all conducive to acceptance andsustainability of project initiatives in agriculture, especially for technological packages toincrease and sustain yields and production. While infrastructure construction by the projectwas successful, lack of financial resources militated against sound state-local governmentarrangements for maintenance of rural infrastructure. Thus, any gains achieved at thecompletion of the project could have been quickly lost without the infusion of resourcesthrough the follow-on MSADP II.

Findings and Lessons Learned

9. Some lessons that can be derived from the IADP experience are summarized below:

(a) Political commitment, translated into adequate counterpart funding, is a keyelement for successful planning and implementation. In the absence of suchcommitment, it is doubtful whether significant and sustainable benefits can beachieved. Similarly, the local governments must not only have the resolve,but also the access to resources to undertake rural project infrastructuremaintenance. Institutional arrangements in that direction should be createdprior to construction.

(b) The design and content of an agricultural improvement program must takeaccount of the macro economic situation in the country; if an overvaluedcurrency favors imports over domestic production, farmers would have noincentive to invest in new technology-

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(c) 1echnological packages should reflect farmers' needs within the prevailingsocio-economic framework and agro-climatic conditions. Planning andorganizational arrangements for extension activities should be undertakeni at anearly stage during project implementation, and expansion should be linked tothe generation of relevant messages.

(d) Likewise, implementation of the project should focus first on the developmentof an implementation capacity, comprising managerial skills and the fieldorganization of services. Only after the development of such implementationcapacity should activities targeted at the farmer be implemented in earnest.

(e) Consistent baseline data should be generated at a very early stage of theproject. Management should ensure that systematic efforts for projectmonitoring and evaluation are made throughout implementation.

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

NIGERIA

ILORIN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(LOAN 1668-UNI)

PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE

1. Project Identit

Project Name Ilorin Agricultural Development ProjectLoan Number 1668-UNIRVP Unit AfricaCountry NigeriaSector : AgricultureSub-sector Area Development

2. Ald=gLund

2.1 During the oil boom of the 1970s, agricultural production in Nigeria stagnated.Agricultural growth was about 1% per year while population annual growth was around 3%.From 1970 to 1982 the contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP fell dramatically from45% to 27% and its share of exports dropped from 70% to 2% over the same period. Theperformance of agriculture was, at that time, undermined by disincentives created by the oilboom, which included: (i) the appreciation of the exchange rate; (ii) the enhancedprofitability of investments in non-tradeable commodities and services; (iii) rising wages in thepublic sector and the urban private sector that drained labor from rural areas; and (iv) acorrespording downgrading of the profitability of agriculture. Although the Government inthe late 1970s provided subsidies when farm costs rose above export prices, this failed toencourage farmers to rehabilitate their production.

2.2 It was expected that, as a consequence of rising oil prices, Nigeria would be in acomfortable financial position in the 1980s, while the post-oil era would depend on thesuccess with which imports were replaced by domestic production and non-oil exl;erts werestimulated. Consequently, according to the Fourth National Development Plan, th.-n underpreparation, the next five years would be used to consolidate the nation's economic base andto lay the foundations for balanced long-term economic development. In the agriculturesector, the Government's main objective was to improve the domestic price stability of basicfood crops and to ensure food self-sufficiency. Longer-term objectives included the creationof a prosperous and efficient agriculture, through, inter alia, the development of irrigation andthe expansion of an ADP-based strategy to improve rural infrastructure and promote modemfarming techniques and improved inputs to smallholders. This agricultural strategy was builton the experience of on-going enclave ADPs, whose success encouraged the Nigerianauthorities to extend similar packages of extension, inputs and feeder roads to other states.

2.3 The main thrust of the Bank Group lending in Nigeria at the time had been to supportagriculture and rural development, with particular emphasis on institution-building and

tranfor of technology. These objectives were in consonance with the Federal Government'spriorities. By December, 1978, the Bank Group had provided thirteen loans for agricultureamounting to $292 million (31% of totJ lending). Of these, five loans related to the generalagrictiltural development of target areas and are similar in structure to the project underreview.

3. Project Objectiles and Components

(i) Proect Qbjejye

3.1 The primary objectives of the project were to increase agricultural production and farmincomes and thereby improve the standard of living of the farming population. The project,to be implemented over five years, was designed to benefit some 90,000 smallholder familiesin six local government areas of Kwara state.

(ii) Components

3.2 The project had the following two major components:

(a) Kwara tate Component

Farm and Crop Development

- Increasing production of the major subsistence and cash crops (yam, cassava,sorghum/maize) grown by smallhold_rs on about 74,000 ha by establishing abasic service package (BSP) consisting of improved farming practices, seedsand fertilizer, and extension advice and other services, including Governmenttractor units and promotion of private tractor entrepreneurs;

- Introducing an advanced service package (ASP), including minimum tillageand efficient mechanization, in 12,000 ha;

- Establishing a planning/farm management service to undertake land use and.--servation planning in five selected development areas;

- Establishing a land development unit to clear 9,600 ha of light forests and toconstruct soil conservation terraces (about 4,300 km) to protect the 12,000 haincluded in the ASP;

- Conducting trials to test the introduction of new technology and farmingpractices;

- Providing a seed multiplication service and organizing outgrowers to supplyhigh quality seed to farmers; and

- Establishing a farm input supply system.

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Civil Worlcs

Constructing 200 km of new feeder roads, improving 100 km of existingfeeder roads, and maintaining about 1,000 km of new and existing feederroads; and

Constructing project offices, stores, workshops and staff houses andconstructing 11 and improving 9 Farm Service Centers for distribution ofinputs and services.

Institutional Support

- Providing for 2 management structure with the required technical andadministrative staff, logistical support and funds to implement the project;evaluating project progress and providing guidelines for future projects; and

- Providing funds for both formal and informal training of all levels of staff.

Consultancy

- Providing to Kwara State Government consultant services to assist theMinistry of Agriculture (MANR) to review state agricultural policies andstrategies; provide technical consultancy on agricultural management andintroduction of new technologies; prepare detailed plans for managementtraining and staff development programs; and assist MANR in start-upoperations for the project (60 man-months).

(b) Federal ComDonent

- 'Providing consultant services to assist FMAWR prepare 13 feasibility studiesfor the agriculture and rural sector, including tree crops, food crops,irrigation, marketing and national credit programs. A total of 65 man-yearswas provided for the studies.

4. 'roJect Design and Organization

4.1 The design of the project drew heavily on the experience of the Bank financedintegrated agricultural development projects (ADPs) in Nigeria. These earlier projects wereconsidered successful and the appraisal mission for the project reported the significant gainsachieved in crop production. The preparation of the Ilorin project was, however, based onquestionable data, and that adversely affected the outcome of the project.

4.2 The key e:ements of the project's strategy were the "basic service package" (BSP) ofimproved farming practices and inputs (e.g. planting densities, seeds and fertilizer), and the"advanced service package" (ASP) consisting of tainimnum tillage techniques. Theseinnovations were to be disseminated by an organized system of agricultural services.Supporting rural infrastructure was also to be constructed. The risk of introducing a newtechnique like minimum tillage was recognized at appraisal, but because of its advantage inmaintenance of soil structure and fertility, and erosion control as well as reduced tractor

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utilization, the risks were considered to be fully justified. However, the advanced techniquewhich included adoption by farmers of machines to reduce manual toil, required a higher farmmanagement system which was a vital but difficult ingredient. The sparse population in theproject area was also a hindrance to the delivery of the technical packages. To overcomeinitial managerial constraints of state agricultural institutions, staffing included an importantinput of senior expatriate personnel (such as project manager; and training, evaluation, andland use planning officers). Some of the technology may have not been adequately tested andadapted to thc iocal situation, even though the main reason for the reluctance of the farmers toadopt new technology was the impact of the overvaluation of the local currency on domesticfood prices and food imports.

4.3 The SAR preparation was based on faulty baseline surveys that substantiallyoverestimated key project parameters; e.g. actual number of farm families in the project areawas later estimated at 65,000, instead of 120,000; the cultivated area at 120,000 ha instead of300,000 ha, and the average farm size at 1.6 ha as opposed at 2.5 ha of the SAR. These datainconsistencies represented a major design problem, and significantly reduced the usefulnessof the SAR for project implementation programming and for assessing performance ofphysical and agricultural targets. In fact, a Bank supervision mission in August 1982 hadidentified the lack of a sound agricultural development strategy as a hindrance to projectimplementation. The mission had reported the need to make changes, particularly in adaptiveresearch where the program was not sufficiently relevant to the farming system in the area.The ASP also appeared to be unsuited to Nigerian small farmer conditions. The extensionand commercial services needed to operate more within the focus of the existing smallfarmers' system.

4.4 Since the project embraced a range of activities under the general responsibility ofdifferent ministries, the Ilorin Project Management Unit (IPMU) was created as asemiautonomous management unit within Kwara state's Ministry of Agriculture (MANR).IPMU was accountable to the Ilorin Project Executive Committee (IPEC), responsible foroverall policy and annual work planning and for the appointment of senior staff. IPEC wasch%ir&'* by the secretary of MANR, and included as members the Deputy Secretaries of StateMinistries of Finance, Economic Planning, Works and Transport, Trade, Industry andCooperatives, Locai Government and Community Development, and representatives from the6 local governments and the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources(FMAWR). The Ilorin Project Technical Coordinating Committee (IPTCC) was anotherproject-related entity designed to serve as a local coordinating unit, with representatives of thelocal government councils, project technical staff, and selected farmers. It was to participatein decisions on land use planning and the location of farm service centers and roads.

4.5 The planned organizational structure, though apparently cumbersome, was consistentwith the coordinating ard overall decisior. miaking requirements of the federal, state and localgovernments. Organizaticnal problems resulted not so much from the proposed structure asthe way in which it was implemented and from the lack of government commitment to theproject. Thus, the IPEC was not composed of the expected high level representatives,implying lack of interest of the Secretaries of State Ministries, and hence had little influence.Besides, the IPTCC was never created, thereby reducing the involvement of the localgovernment councils. The lack of incentives for private sector participation in providingagricultural services was duly recognized even before project appraisal. The services were inthe hands of the public sector and it was clear from the outset that the Government would

need to divest itself of development components that can be handled by private enterprise.Towards the end of the project execution, with the active encouragement of the Bank, a largenumber of Farm Service Centers (FSCs) were leased out to the private sector and vehicles ofthe Tractor Hire Unit were sold to private operators.

5. Project Implementation

5.1 Project implementation was characterized by a delayed start-up and a slow pace ofexecution; the pervasively inadequate counterpart funding; the lack of coherence andcoordination of project agricultural activities; deficient project management; and poormonitoring and evaluation. Contrary to the intended emphasis, infrastructure developmentactivities became dominant while agricultural services diminished in relative importance.Actual project implementation took about 9 years instead of the six years (including one yearof pre-project activities) estimated at appraisal. In its comments in paragraph 1.2, Part II, theBorrower points out the improvements in project management at later stages of projectexecution. While agreeing that few impact studies were conducted by the Monitoring andEvaluation Unit, the Borrower maintains that the Unit operated fairly well in conducting manyuseful surveys which contrasts with the Bank's assessment of the operation.

5.2 Implementation started after a 4-month delay in the fulfillment of loan effectivenessconditions, and, due to late recruitment of key project staff, the project became operationalabout one year afterwards. Loan draw-down was slow at the beginning and FederalGovernment (FGN) funding was systematically delayed. Financing by the State Government(KWSG) was also erratic and several consecutive quarterly payments were not made,reflecting its low commitment to the project. In 1984, the State Government initiated aninquiry on the status of the project, and all funding was stopped during the year until after therelease of the panel's report. Funding problems were compounded by the chronic lossesincurred for the heavily subsidized operations of fertilizer distribution, tractor hire and landclearing. In addition, KWSG funding was not entirely incremental. Since the projectincluded a large number of seconded staff whose salaries would have been paid by the Stateeven in the absence of a project, KWSG performance for counterpart funding on anincremental basis was quite poor.

5.3 By the mid-term review (January 1983), the Bank considered IADP a "major problemproject" and put it in a "care and maintenance status." In view of paucity of funds, theproject management curtailed some activities and the Bank missions assisted in restructuringthe project. Discussions with the Government led to increase in Federal financing (25% ofproject cost) and reduction in the state contribution (limited effectively to 20%). A newcategory of loan disbursement was introduced (for the first time in a Bank-financedagricultural project in Nigeria) to cover local staff salaries, equivalent to 27% of the totalloan. The final agreed extension of the loan closing date and reallocations of thedisbursement categories were made to support the transition to the follow-on MSADP IIproject.

5.4 The inappropriateness of technological messages to real-life farming conditions and thefinancial viability of agricultural enterprises was an important limiting factor in attaining theobjectives of the IADP. The project's expected technological and economic impact was basedon on-station research results which turned out not to be applicable in practice. Adoptionrates for both the BSP and the ASP packages were thus overly optimistic. Trials were

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conducted by the project on several varieties of crops, but gave insufficient attention to mixedcropping systems which were the prevalent farming systems in the project area. On-farmadaptive research was not conducted. The only element of the BSP of widespreadacceptability was the use of fertilizer, mainly due to its substantial and continued subsidy.The seed multiplication programme was insignificant. In addition to weak extension-researchinteraction, coordination with other services did not develop.

5.5 Lack of appropriate and sufficient training and supervision of the extension staff,coupled with the inadequate organization and an insufficient number of extensionists,significantly limited the number of effectively assisted farmers and the quality of the serviceitself. Extension contact with farmers did not take place at the required frequency. Onlyabout 10% of area's farmers had contact with extension. Progress in the field of land useplanning, farm management and extension, were seriously hampered by the late arrival ofcrucial supervisory staff. By the end of 1983, no coherent agricultural operational plan tocoordinate the various services had been produced. The farm management unit, created witha staff of only five to provide advisory services to large scale farmers and cooperatives, wasclosed down in 1984 since the concept was not well understood within IPMU. In paragraph1.3 of its comments in Part 11, the Borrower agrees with the assessment of inadequacy intraining and number of extension staff but maintains that the decentralized organization wasappropriate for extension work.

5.6 Fertilizer availability was generally a project constraint. Deliveries were irregular andthe amounts procured fluctuated due to erratic federal government allocations, while thedistributed formulations were not the most appropriate for the area's crops. There was asystematic lack of coordination between extension and commercial services units on fertilizerquantities and formulations required by the farmers. No data from the field was eversystematically generated to estimate local demand.

5.7 The building construction program was drastically reduced and delayed because ofproblems in deciding on the location of the headquarters. The decision on building the Maleteheadquarters was delayed until 1985, and the scope was ever,tually curtailed and limited toworkshops and quarters for the mechanical engineering staff. The road constructionprogramme was carried out without any plan of priorities, although it did achieve itsquantitative target. In contrast, accomplishments in road maintenance were about a quarter ofthose intended. The Borrower agrees with this assessment of the roads programme (para. 1.4of Part II).

5.8 Delayed, insufficient and uncertain funding prevented any systematic planning,budgeting and programming of project activities, while reducing -and at times paralyzing- theactions of the technical services. Political interference with project management generatedproblems with the selection of personnel and the location of the headquarters. Projectmanagement paid inadequate attention to the systematic monitoring of project performancethrough key project indicators (e.g. services and inputs provided, number of farmerscontacted and project impact on agricultural production). The village listings and othersurveys were conducted without any clear management purpose, and their execution was notproperly supervised (See the Borrower's disagreement on this point in para. 1.5 of Part II).The expatriate senior evaluation officer left his post early (1982). In addition, data were notcollected on a statistically sound basis which would have made it possible to identify thedifferential impact of the project on beneficiary groups. Project records and reporting lacked

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quality and substance. The mid-term review was conducted by an academic externalconsultancy which had to carry out its own sample surveys. On the other hand, costaccounting (sources of income and applications of funds) was carried out to professionalstandards. The overall training programme functioned relatively well, despite fundingconstraints. Some staff attended seminars and courses at ARMTI, APMEPU and IITA, whileothers received in-house training. Twenty eight senior staff were sent for training overseas.By 1984, all project units were under the responsibility of Nigerian staff.

5.9 The 1984 report of a panel of inquiry set by the state government to "identify thecauses of the failure of the project to improve smallholder crop production" did not find anyspecific wrongdoing beyond identifying implementation problems, some of which wereinternal and others out of projcct's control: it pointed to "political interference with projectactivities, polarization of activities within the project and inadequate funding". The rephasingof project activities proposed in 1985 by the borrower as a basis for its requests for the firstextension of the closing date included, at the instigation of the Bank, a number of measures toimprove project efficiency and financial rationalization, including a reduced and betterqualified number of extension workers, full cost recovery in land development, the closing of40 FSC in 1985 and examination of the cost effectiveness of the remaining 36 (encouragingincreased use of private entrepreneuts in input retailing), spot improvement and maintenanceof the feeder road network instead of new road construction, and privatization of all tractorsover a period of two years. The revised disbursement schedule (covering the remaining 28%of the original loan amount) contemplated an accelerated implementation pace. However, ittook IADP two additional one-year extensions to draw down most of the rest of the loan.

6. Proect Results

6.1 Owing largely to an unfavorable incentive environment, the project failed to develop asound agricultural programme which brought benefits to smallholders. Their traditionalfarming systems remained essentially unchanged. The project was expected to actuallyachieve only 20% of the incremental production that had been estimated in the SAR.However, no incremental yield or production could possibly be attributed to the project'sagricultural services. And while physical indicators of infrastructure development show someresemblance to the original targets, no institutional arrangements were created which wouldguarantee maintenance. The SAR had estimated the overall Economic Rate of Return (ERR)to be 24%. Inconsistencies in the project management records and reporting, andquestionable data on agricultural output do not allow a meaningful estimation, at projectcompletion, of the farmers' actual financial gains or of the economic returns to the overallinvestment. Farm income increased in response to fertilizer use, but these gains were largelyin response to the continued heavily subsidized fertilizer price. The project targeted theincrease in the use of fertilizer to 14,000 tons per year; the actual amount distributed reachedon average of about half the SAR estimate. Fertilizer outlets reached 81, many more thanenvisioned at appraisal, but their operation was inefficient and became a recurrent financialburden on the project's budget. Since there was a price subsidy of about 70%, some of thefertilizer recorded as sold in the project may have leaked across the country's borders instead.In the same way, the tractor hiring unit never became an efficient or financially viableoperation. It started operations in July 1982 with 80 tractors (20 new) and 80 tractor staffseconded from MANR. While the SAR expectations were to plough and ridge 7,000 ha perannum, the actual average during 1981-86 was of the order of 1,000 ha per annum. Service

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charges were set at about 20% of the real cost of the operation, and the implicit subsidybenefitted mostly medium and large farmers.

6.2 In spite of these problems, the project had the effect of starting rural developmentalefforts in the state. It mobilized important resources for the construction of rural feeder roadsand farm service centers that facilitated farm-to-market transport and the distribution offertilizer. Thus, there were useful gains in vehicle and transport cost savings plus additionaleconomic activity induced by improved infrastructure. Manpower development throughformal staff training, and, most importantly, through the assumption of managerialresponsibility by the Nigerians after the departure of the expatriate staff, was a significantachievement of the project. The accumulated experience of the project management unitprovided an institutional foundation for the state-wide expansion of activities under the follow-on project MSADP II. The organizational structure and the experience acquired in thedelivery of extension and other services has proved to be of value to the Kwara statesmallholders. More recent assessments by Bank missions of overall performance of themanagement of the state-wide ADP is very positive and indicate that it has profited from theIADP. State Government funding constraints, however, continue to pose problems in projectexecution.

7. Proiect Sustainability

7.1 The macro-economic conditions were not favorable to ensuring project sustainability.These conditions later became favorable (subsequent to 1986), and farmers are now readilyadopting the new technologies, resulting in an increase in food production. The project,however, could have been more sustainable if: (i) its technological packages had beentailored to prevailing economic conditions; and (ii) local government prepared for a biggerrole in maintenance of rural infrastructure. With regard to (ii), the project failed to promotebuilding of local government organizations and their capacity through proper staff training.Tractor hire, machinery services and the Farm Service Centres were transferred to privateoperators who are providing a more effective and sustainable service. Any gains achieved atthe completion of the project would almost certainly have been lost without the infusion ofadditional resources under the follow-up MSADP II.

8. Bank Performance

8.1 At the time of Board approval the country's economic prospects were alreadyworsening, and the counterpart funding risks were recognized by the Bank staff as the mainissue. However, the Bank proceeded with a project design which was unduly ambitious. TheBank also assumed that there would be widespread adoption of technologies which had notbeen tested at the farm level in this part of the country. Risks in this regard were not fullyassessed. Bank supervision missions detected early the main political, technical and financialissues and problems, and rated the project accordingly. Improved criteria on cost-effectiveness and other conditions were eventually introduced as a basis for agreements ofloan closing extensions and reallocations of disbursement categories. The Borrower, inparagraph 2 of Part II, states that the Bank supervision missions were below expectation. It istrue that this problem project deserved more resources from the Bank in terms of missioncomposition, with enough technical skills to advise the project staff and at least three visitsper year. This the Bank failed to do. It is not known whether more intensive supervisionwas not accorded to the project because of budgetary constraints within the supervising Bank

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division. The Bank had res,ponded positively to ease the projects' cash flow prob'ems byfinancing 75% of local staff salaries from the loan and increasing the disbursement percentageon civil works from 45% tO 80%. However, in the prevailing macro-econorl:ic situation inNigeria, and the state of the finances of the Government, the Bank's options were verylimited.

9. Borrower's Perfo. mance

9.1 Borrower performance was characterized by delays in the fulfillrnent of conditionsstipulated in the legal documents, mainly those pertaining to timely and appropriate funding.The recruitment and selection of staff was also delayed due to the bureaucratic procedures thathad to be followed. Political interference in the appointment of Nigerian staff in the projectand infringement of the authority of the Project Executive Committee were demoralizing tothe project management. In spite of these problems, the relationship between the Governmentand the Bank was cordial. Loan closing, extension and reallocations of disbursementcategories were conducted under a common understanding of project problems andconstraints, and with a shared objective of accelerating implementation. In paragraph 3 ofPart II, the Borrower attributes some of the delays encountered in the proiect to the Bank'scumbersome conditionalities and the project's design deficiencies.

9.2 Project management's working relationship with both the State and local Governmentofficials was conducive to solving the numerous political problems .that arose. The team spiritwas generally good. The management, however, often failed to plan in advance and alsoprovide a clear sense of direction. Project reporting was unsatisfactory. A satisfactoryaccounting system was set up and procurement of heavy plant and vehicles had taken placecost effectively. Road construction equipment was used in a most efficient manner. Theproject agricultural research station worked well and liaised effectively with other researchstations and project extension staff.

10. Consulting Services

10.1 Data on actual man-months utilization of consultancy services were not provided, buttotal loan disbursement on that category - which also includes expatriate staff salaries andoverseas training - reached US$2.3 million, or 54% of the expected US$4.2 million atappraisal. Similarly, for the feasibility studies of the "federal component", US$3.8 millionwere disbursed, or 79% of the SAR target. The studies carried out under the federalcomponent served effectively as a base for the preparation of the several components offollow-on ADP-type projects. Consultancy services were reported to have been undertaken bypersons with acceptable qualifications and experience. However, due to inadequate traininggiven by expatriates to local counterpart staff, the handing over of responsibility by theexpatriate staff was not smooth.

11. Project Documentation and Data

1. Project covenants were clearly stipulated for effective implementation. The projectand its SAR were, however, based on faulty baseline data, and misjudgments on severalaspects of project design, thereby diminishing the relevance of the document for projectimplementation.

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12. Flndings and Lessons Learned

12.1 Lessons derived from the IADP experience are of relevance to both the Borrower andthe Bank, and these are summarized below:

(a) Political commitment, translated into adequate counterpart fuiding, is a keyelement for successful planning and implementation. In the absence of suchcommitment, it is doubtful whether significant and sustainable benefits can beachieved. Similarly, the local governments must not only have the resolve,but also the access to resources to undertake rural project infrastructuremaintenance. Institutional arrangements in that direction should be createdprior to construction.

(b) The design and content of an agricultural improvement program must takeaccount of the macro economic situation in the country; if an overvaluedcurrency favors imports over domestic production, farmers would have noincentive to invest in new technology.

(c) Technological packages should reflect farmers' needs within the prevailingsocio-economic framework and agro-climatic conditions. Planning andorganizational arrangements for extension activities should be undertaken at anearly stage during project implementation, and expansion should be linked tothe generation of relevant messages.

(d) Likewise, implementation of the project should focus first on the developmentof an implementation capacity, comprising managerial skills and the fieldorganization of services. Only after the development of such implementationcapacity should activities targeted at the farmer be implemented in earnest.

(e) Consistent baseline data should be generated at a very early stage of theproject. Maraigement should ensure that systematic efforts for projectmonitoring and evaluation are made throughout implementation.

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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

NIGERIA

ILORIN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT_ (LOA 1668-UND

EART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE

1. Comment on Analysis Contained in Part I of the Draft PCR

1.1 The analysis on Project Identification, Background, Project objectives and designwhich are contained in paragraphs 1 to 4 are acceptable.

1.2 The statement in paragraph 5. 1. Page 5 of draft PCR that project implementationcharacterized by deficient project management, monitoring and evaluation was correctespecially at the early stage of implementation. Later in the project life the Ilorin ProjectExecutive Committee (IPEC) and Ilorin Project Management Committee (IPMU) made effortsto perform their functions as specified in SAR paragraphs 5.42, 5.43 and 8.03. This isreflected in the number of meetings they convened during the project implementation, whichwere indications of high responsiveness of the organization in the day to day running andcoordination of activities of the project, and in the determination of the overall policy of theproject. On Monitoring and Evaluation, though the Chief Planning Officer was not on boardearly, its activities commenced in 1979/80 with the conduct of thumbnail survey (VillageListing and Baseline Surveys) followed by yearly agronomic surveys which providedassessment of crop yields. The section conducted 28 ad-hoc surveys based on projectmanagement needs. Despite the fact that SAR did not make articulate provision for Planningand Monitoring positions, computer facilities and field staff, the section operated fairly wellwith recommendation from APMEPU. The section, however, conducted little impact studiesas noted in the draft PCR.

1.3 In regard to the statement in paragraph 5.6 Page 5 that inadequate organization wasone of the reasons of poor performance of extension, it should be noted that SAR did notmake any provision on organization set up. However, during the project implementation thesection operated a decentralized organizational system which was found conducive forextension activities. The major problems were insufficient number of extensionists, lack ofappropriate training and absence of proven technology on mixed cropping.

1.4 The statement in paragraph 5.8. Page 7, that the road construction programme wascarried out without any plan setting priorities was fairly correct. Though, the Ilorin ProjectTechnical Coordinating Committee IPTCC which was supposed to integrate the LGCs in theDetermination of road priorities was not formed, there was a Management PlanningCommittee which was charged with the responsibility of drawing up road programs anddetermining road selection and priorities.

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1.5 The statement in paragraph 5.9 Page 7 that the Village Listing Survey was conductedwithout any clear management purpose and that the execution was not properly supervisedwas not correct. The village Listing was conducted to determine the actual number of farmfamilies, settlement pattern, major occupation and availability of infrastructural facilities in theproject area in project year zero. These assisted management in the location of FSCs, ruralroads etc. The survey was conducted under close supervision and technical assistance fromAPMEPU.

2. Bank Performance During Evolution and Implementation of the Proiect

2.1 The Bank supervision missions during implementation of the projects have been belowexpectation in terms of local input and frequency. Later involvement of FACU addressedlocal input problem to a great extent, but Ilorin ADP benefitted very little from thisarrangement as the project had virtually ended. Despite these, the Bank was very helpful andflexible in bailing out the project, especially when counterpart funding proved to be a seriousconstraint.

3. Borrower's Performance

3.1 The PCR on Ilorin ADP is very critical of project performance. The main areas ofadverse comments are delays in loan effectiveness due to delay in meeting the conditionsprecedent to effectiveness and the recruitment of key personnel. As we have stated in otherPCR's, the conditions precedent to project effectiveness and draw down are cumbersome andoften difficult to meet. More than one Ministry at both Federal and State levels wereinvolved and to get all of them to comply with conditionalities took time. In the case ofMSADP II & III, we put in place measures to cut the time but found that delays stilloccurred. The Bank should make the conditionalities less cumbersome in future.

3.2 The Project had design deficiencies particularly in baseline data and assumptions.Thus the Project was unable to attain SAR targets. The Project also took a long time tocomplete. While Federal Government's support for the Project was never in doubt, the StateGovernment's political will to implement the Project was not manifestly strong. It should benoted, however, that the lessons learnt from Ilorin ADP have been considered in preparingthe Statewide Kwara State ADP.

4. Relationship Between Bank and Borrowers

4.1 The relationship was good. Activities were carried out under a common understandingwith shared objectives of accelerating implementation.

Department of AgricultureFederal Ministry of Agricultureand Natural Resources.

28th June. 1991

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

NIGERIA

ILORIN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(LOAN 1668-UNI)---------------------------------------

PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION

1. Related Bank Loans_________ ____________

YEAR OF

LOAN PURPOSE APPROVAL STATUS

Loan 1838-UNI Enclave 1980 Projtct completed

oyo North ADP PCR prepared.

Loan 1881-UNI Statewide 1981 Project completed

Bauchi State ADP PCR prepared.

Loan 1982-UNI Statewide 1981 Project completed

Kano State ADP PCR prepared.

Loan 2733-UNI Multi-state 1986 Ongoing

MSADP I ADP

Loan 2988-UNI Multi-state 1989 Ongoing

MSADP II ADP

2. Project Timetable

Date Date Date

Planned Revised Actual

Identification 10/76

Preparation 2-8/77

Appraisal Mission 11/77

Loan NegotLations 11/78

Board Approval 3/79

Loan Signature 9/79

Loan Effectiveness 17 December 1979 4/80

Completion December 1384 (*) 6/88

Loan Closing 30 June 1985 (*) 6/88

(*) Project loan closing date was extended three times for a

total of 36 months. The last extension was approved to

facilitate the transition to MSADP 1, the follow-on

project.

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3. Di_bsmm

Cumulative Estitnted and Actual Disbursements (USS m.illion}

FY80 EY8 EY82 EX EXPA E8 EY86 FY87 FY88 Ym9

AppraisalEstimate 3.7 12.7 17.7 22.1 25.2 27.0

Actual 0 6 10.1 12.7 16.3 19.S 21.7 23.6 25.0 26.7

Actuals .of Estimate 0% 47% 57% 57% 65% 72% 80% 87% 93% 99%

Date of Final Disbursement: December 22, 1988

4. FoPow-o Pwect

Name: Multi-State Agricultural Development Project II

Loan No.: LN.2988-UNI

Loan Amount/Project Cost: US$85.2 million/US$150.0

Dates of Board Approval and Effectiveness: August 25, 1988/November 16, 1989

Comments: The project would provide assistance to Gongola,Kwar and Niger states and to the Bauchi ADP in(i) strengthening extension services/adaptiveresearch; (ii) supporting small-scale irrigation;(iii) upgrading/maintaining ural roads; and(iv) strengthening of agricultural institutions.The project would also support the Agriculturaland Rural Management Institute (ARMTI).

- 15 -

Agraisal Estimate Actual

(a) Farm and Crop Development

- Improved Farming Practices(Basic Service Package)Area Development (ha) 74,000 0

- Advanced Service PackageArea Development (ha) 12,000 0

- Land Clearing (ha) 9,600 7,000

- Soil Conservation Terraces (km) 4,300 650

- Project BeneficiariesBSP. Small Farmer Families (No) 88,000 35,000

fertilizer users- ASP. Medium Farnwr Families (No) 1,800 6,000

extensionbeneficiaries

ResearchApplied Research Station (No) 1 1

Fertilizer Distribution (tons) 14,000 7,000(per year at full development) (avg. per yr.)

(b) Civil WorksRoads (km)Feeder Road Construction 200 223Road Improvement 100 132Road Maintenance 1,000 261

Staff Houses Construction (No)Senior Staff 15 2Intermediate 79 8Junior Staff 102 20

- Farm Service Centers (No)New 11 50Improved 9 31

- Mechanical Workshop (No) 1 1- Training Center (No) 1 0- Guest House (No) 0 1- Seed Fam Building andother Buildings (No) 5 6

- Officies Floor Space (m2) 2,000 1,586

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6. Prict Coeb ad Fmancinf

A. Proiect Costs(US$ million)

Appraisal Estimate Actual

Local FE Totl ocal FE Total

State Component 34.0 22.4 56.4 34.9 23.0 57.9

Federal Component 3.2 4.8 8.0 0 3.7 3.7

Total 37.2 27.2 64.4 34.9 26.7 61.6

Percent 58 42 100 57 43 100

B. Proiect Financing(USS million)

Estimated Percent Actual Percent

Federal Govermment 17.6 27 17.3 28

State Governent 19.8 31 17.6 29

World Bank 27.0 42 26.7 43

Total 64.4 100 61.6 100

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C. Allocation and Use of Loan Proceeds(US$ million)

First SecondEstimated Revised Revised Actual

Cate2ory Amount 9% A Amount Amount

Buildings, CivilWorks, Furnishings 4.5 17 6.5 0.8 0.79 3

Vehicles, Equip-ment Tractors,Spares 6.6 24 7.6 10.5 11.0 41

International Con-sultants and staffSalaries, OverseasTraining 4.2 16 1.9 1.9 2.3 8

Future Projects,FeasibilityStudies 4.6 17 4.6 3.9 3.8 14

Fertilizer,Chemicals, OtherFarm Inputs 4.9 18 0.9 2.4 1.7 7

Local Staff Salaries - 0 5.0 7.5 7.2 27

Unallocated 2.2 8 0.5 - - 0

Total 27.0 100 27.0 27.0 26.7 100

Comments: Revised allocations took place in January 1983 and June 1987.

7. PtojectResuts

No consistent data are available on direct projectimpact, but, if there was any impact on agricultural output andfanners' income, it was clearly very limited and largely derivedfrom improved infrastructure.

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8. Status of Covenants

Subiect/Covenant &=

FUNDING/COST RECOVERY

LA 3.01 The Borrower to carry out the project in conformity withadministrative, financial and agricultural practices; and to provideprompt/adequate funding/resources to the project.

- Inadequate, Untimely.

LA 3.03 The Borrower to provide-for/pay IPMU quarterly contributions, 3months in advance, based on an approved annual budget.

- Inadequate, Untimely.

PA 2.02 a, ii KWSG to authorize and guarantee overdraft facilities for 6 monthexpenditures of IPMU and to pay quarterly contributions 3 months inadvance.

- Inadequate, Untimely.

PA 2.02 a, iv KWSG to maintain pre-project level of financing in project area, inaddition to IADP requirements.

- Inadequate.

LA 3.04 The Borrower to pay IPMU by Sept. 30 each year advanced ftstimatedsubventions to cover next year's cost of farm inputs/services'subsidies.

- Inadequate.

PA 2.10 b IPMU to sell all inputs (other than those subsidized by the borroweror KWSG) and provide tractor services to farmers at full cost recoveryprices.

- Highly subsidized. Partial cost recovery.

PA 2.10 c Farmers to pay annual land development scheme fees of N15.0, for 3years, and N21.0, thereafter.

- Highly subsidized. Partial recovery.

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PROCUREMENT

LA 2.03 Fertilizer procurement for the project:1. to be separate, identifiable, governed by IBRD's approved

procurement procedures;

2. to be monitored by FMG and the Bank to avoid procurementslippage;

3. within 2 years after the loan signature FMG and .BRD to reviewits procurement procedures.

PA 2.05 b IPMU to request promptly project's fertilizer requirements to CentralFertilizer Unit of FMAWR, an to procure directly other farm inputs.

- Project terminated its direct fertilizer procurement programmeearly during implementation.

STAFFING AND CONSULTANTS

LA 3.02 The Borrower to employ experienced/qualified consultants inaccordance with principles and procedures satisfactory to the Bank.

- Satisfactory.

PA 2.03 a KWSG to employ, inter alia, project staff: Project Manager, ChiefAccountant (condition of effectiveness), and Senior training officer by31 December 1979.

- Delayed selection and hiring.

PA 2.03 b KWSG to promptly recruit IPMU staff and make MANR to second toIPMU requested staff.

- Delayed recruitment.

PA 2.11 c KWSG to transfer responsibilities to IPMU of all agriculturalextension work (by April 1, 1980).

- Satisfactory.

PROJECT REVIEW/MONITORING AND EVALUATION

LA 3.05 FMG, KWSG and the Bank to review and make recommendations forthe future of the project (by 31 December 1982).

- KWSG prepared report by end-1984.

PA 2.07 b IPMU to maintain records/monitor progress of the project and keepaccounts identifying goods/services financed by the loan.

- 20 -

- Accounting statements: satisfactory; project impact recording andreporting: highly inadequate.

PROJECT EFFECTIVENESS

LA 6.01 a-d Execution/ratification of subsidiary loan agreement; IPMU'scommercial bank account established with an initial deposit by KWSGof N$ 1.0 million; IPEC, IPMU, IPTCC duly established; and ProjectManager and Chief Accountant appcinted.

- Severe delays in achieving effectiveness conditions. IPTCC wasnever established.

OTHER

PA 2.11 b KWSG to make available to IPMU 120 ha of land (by 31 December1979).

- Satisfactory.

PA 2.12 KWSG to prepare and agree with the Bank on long-term roadmaintenance plan (by 30 June 1983).

- No plan was ever produced.

- 21 -

9. Uns of(B Rew.

A. Staff Inouts

STAFF INPUTS (Staff Weeks)

FY77 FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FYS5 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89

Preapprsisal 50OAppraisal 50ONegotiations 15I

Supervision 10* 10- J* 11.8 9.9 5.7 11.6 7.7 8.7 5.4 1.0

TOTAL 50* 50* 25* 10' 10 11 .8 9.9 5.7 11.6 7.7 8.7 5.4 1.0

'Tnese are estintates. Actual data are not available.

B. Mission Data

Date No. of Man-day Specializations Performance Types ofMission (molyr) Persons in Field Represented a/ Rating b/ Trend c/ Problems d/

Identification 10/76 4 92 a,bPreappraisal 2/77 S 150 a,d,c,eApprisl 11/77 4 120 a,e,fSupervision 1 6/79 2 6 a,g ISupervision 2 3/80 2 4 d,b 2 2 0Supervision 3 9/80 2 7 a,b 2 2 P,FSupervision 4 10/80 2 12 a,b 2 1 F,TSupervision 5 12/80 2 14 *,c 2 1 F,TSupervision 6 3/81 2 11 b,d 2 2 P,TSupervision 7 6/81 1 5 d 2 1 P.FSupervision 8 12/81 2 12 a,b 2 1 F,TSul,ervision 9 7/82 2 21 a,c 2 1 F,TSupervision 10 2/83 1 14 s,c 3 3 F,TSupervision 11 11/83 1 4 a 3 2 FSupervision 12 8/84 1 8 a 3 2 P,T,FSupervision 13 12/84 1 2 aSupervision 14 2/85 3 6 s,b,b - - P,T,FSupervision 15 6/85 1 4 a 2 2Supetvision 16 8/85 2 10 h 3 e/ -

Supervision 17 1/86 4 20 b,c 3 e/ -

Supervision 18 10/86 2 12 a,i 3 e/Supervision 19 4/87 4 12 a,b 3 e/Supervision 20 6/87 1 7 c 3 e/ -

Supervision 21 11/87 1 2 a 3 e/ -

a/ a - Agriculturist; b- Financial Analyst; c- Agricultural Economist; d- Engineer;e- Commercial Services Specialist; f- Livenock Specialist; g- Personnel/Management Specialist;h- Credit Specialist; i= Operations Assisunt

b/ I - Problem free or minor problems; 2- Moderate problems; 3- Major problems

e/ 'I - Improving; '2 = Stationary; '3 = Deteriorating

d/ F- Financial; M- Management; T- Technical; P= Political; O= Other

e/ New Fofm 590 in use that shows mting for overall status

B1RD 13495

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