World Bank Document - Documents & Reports · Document Of The World Bank ... 1987 JS$ 1 = So.Sh....

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Document Of The World Bank FOR OMCIAL USE ONr Rep No. 12093 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT SOMALIA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCEFOR THE BAARDHERe PROJECT (CREDIT 1856-SO) JUNE 28, 1993 MICROGRAPHICS Report No: 12093 Type: PCR Agriculture and Environment Operations Division Eastern Africa Department Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized

Transcript of World Bank Document - Documents & Reports · Document Of The World Bank ... 1987 JS$ 1 = So.Sh....

Document Of

The World Bank

FOR OMCIAL USE ONr

Rep No. 12093

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SOMALIA

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE BAARDHERe PROJECT(CREDIT 1856-SO)

JUNE 28, 1993

MICROGRAPHICS

Report No: 12093Type: PCR

Agriculture and Environment Operations DivisionEastern Africa DepartmentAfrica Regional Office

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY EQUWALENS

1987 JS$ 1 = So.Sh. 105.21988 US$ 1 = So.Sh. 170.51989 US$ 1 = So.Sh. 490.7

ABBREVIATIONS

GOS GovLllment of SomaliaGTZ German Aid AgencyIDA International Development AssociationMJVD Ministry of Juba Valley DevelopmentUSAID United States Agency for International Development

GOVERNMEN FISCAL YEAR

January 1- December 31

FOR OMCIAL USE ONLYTHE WORLD BANI

Washington, D.C. 20433U.S.-

Office ox' Director-GeneralOpefatons Evaluation

June 28, 1993

MEMORANDUM TO EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDEN.

SUBlJECT: Project Completion Report on Somalia - TechnicalAssistance for the Baardhere Project (Credit 1856-SO)

Attached is the Project Completion Report on Somalia - Technical A.istance for theBaardhere Project (Credit 1856-SO) prepared by the Africa Regional Office. Part II of this report,normally preparea by the Borrower, is missing because of the political disruption in Somalia.

The main objective of this IDA project was to provide technical assistance (TA), mainly viathe financing of studies and expatriate advisors, to the Ministry of Juba Valey IDevelopment(MJVD) with a view to completing preparation/design of the Baardhere Project (The BaardhereProject involves the construction of a large dam, with related hydropower and irrigation facilities,in the Juba Valley of Somalia). The IDA TA project also had an institutional development (ID)component (mainly training) aimed at strengthening MJVD's capacity to manage projectimplementation.

According to the PCR, the TA project was on the whole successful because it did in factachieve its main objectives of determining the feasibility of the Baardhere Project and completingits preparation. A twinning arrangement between MJVD and an engineering services organizationwas evidently a successful one, and the studies, training and other activities were carried outexpeditiously. The near-term institutional development impact is rated as partiaL In the event,however, deteriorating conditions in Somalia completely halted work on the Baardhere Project

While it is unusual for a Bank/IDA project to warrant an overall rating of satisfactory eventhough sustainability of benefits is unlikely, this is such a case.

Because of abnormal country circumstances, it is understandable that the PCR should notbe complete. However, even making allowances for these circumstances, a number of importantissues related to Borrower involvement in project preparation, "ownership" and lessons learnedcould have been treated more thoroughly.

Given country conditions, no audit is planned at this stage.

Attachment

I This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the r smance of their official duties. Itscontents may not otherwise be diclosed without World Bank authorization.

FOR OFICIAL USE ONLY

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SOMALIA

TECHNICAL ASSISrANCE FOR THE BAARDHERE PROJECT(CR.1856-SO)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pame NoC8fu .............. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . i

EvluatonSummary iii

PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE .. IP,ojectIdentity .. 1Background .1. Projec Objectives and Description .. 2Projec Design and Organization .. 2Project Implementation ..... 2Projec Results .. 3Sustainability .. 3IDA Performance .. 3Bonower Perfrmance .. 4ConsWting Services .. 4Project Relationship .. 4Project Documentation and Data .. . 4Lessons Learned .. 4

PART U: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE .. 6

PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION .. 71. Related IDA Credits . 72. Poject Thetable .. 83. Credit Disbursement .. 84. Projet Implemetaon .. 9S. Project Costs and Financing .. 106. Project Results .. 117. Status of Covenas .. 138. Use of Bank Resoure .. 14

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the performanceof their official duties. Its contents mny not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SOMALIA

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE BAARDHERE PROJECT(CREDIT 1856-SO)

PREFACE

This is the Project Completion Report for Technical Assistance for the Baardhere Project inSomalia for whirb C.redit 1856-SO in the amount of SDR 4.3 million (US$5.5 million equivalent) wasapproved on December 1, 1987. Due to the civil war in the country the project was suspended in March1991, nine months before the official closing date of December 31, 1991. SDR 1.1 million remainsundisbursed. The last disbursement was made on April 30, 1991.

Parts I and m of the report were prepared by the World Bank's Agriculture and EnvironmentOparations Division, Country Department II, Africa Regional Office. A draft could not be sent to theBorrower for comment.

Due to the security situation in Somal!a, no field visits could take place. The report was basedon the President's Report, Development Credit Agreement, supervision reports, correspondence betwecnthe Bank and Borrower, and internal Bank memoranda.

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PROJECT COMPLEION REPORT

SOMALIA

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE BAARDHERE PROJECT(CRlDfT 1856-SO)

EVALUATION SUMMARY

Introduction

1. At the time of project formulation, only 8.5% of Somalia's cultivable land was cultivated, withwater being the main constaint. Studies showed that new irrigation investments would ensure asustainable anual growth in crop production of about 5%. The construction of a multipurpose dam onthe Juba River at Baardhere was identified as the main potential for irrigation and hydropower. IDA andseveral other donors financed preparation of a number of pre-;nvestment studies but in 1987, an IDAmission to Somalia fund that the preparation process was encountering serious issues from lack ofcoordination and supervision. The mission proposed a technical assistance credit to assist in completingpreparation of the Baardhere Project.

Project Objectives

2. By providing technical assistance and training, the project was to strengthen the institutionalcapacity of the Ministry of Juba Valley Development (MJVD) to complete the preparation of theBaardhere Project and to determine its feasibility and financing so that a sound decision could be takenabout implementation. The project included the remaining studies and specialist inputs needed tocomplete preparation of the Baardhere Pioject, and was to strengthen MJVD's capacity to make asignificant contribution to the project's implementation in the event of a decision to proceed.

Project lmplementation

3. The credit became effective April 1, 1988. MJVD signed a contract establishing a twinningagreement with an engineering services organization. The arrangement was to enable the Somalis tobenefit from the agency's experience, facilitate the recruitment of short-term specialists, provide Somalistaff with short-term on-the-job training, and support MJVD's capacity to administer and superviseconsultants engaged in planning and design. Ihe final team comprised three Somali specialists (teamleader, irrigation engineer, and economist), and two expatriate specialists from the twiming organization(dam and specifications engineer). Project vehicles, office equipment, furniture and supplies wereprocured. Review of contractor applications to qualify for the civil works construction followed soonafterwards. A total of 13 trainees were placed in overseas MSc courses and 11 project staff participatedin short-term training in various countries.

4. One problem encountered by the project was the lack of counterpart funds for operating costs.To overcome the problem, the Credit Agreement was amended to include a new category of expenditurefor opeaing costs so that IDA funds could be .-eallocated for this purpose. To completf the

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environmental work and training program, GOS requested a one-year extension of the credit closing dateto December 31, 1991, which was granted by IDA. However, shortly afterwards, the Government wasoverthrown and the Bank group suspended all credits to Somalia. A number of suppliers could not bepaid for goods delivered because there was no govermnent to authorize disbursement.

Projedt Results

5. The Project achieved its objectives of completing the preparation of the Baardhere Project anddetermining its feasibility. Reports produced covered topics such as: drainage and salinity control,hydrological sedimentation and water quality, ro^kfill embankment alternative design, power optimization,economic and macroeconoinic analysis for the dam project, surveys of bench mark on the dam site,tender documents, and prequalification for civil works contractors. Those studies concluded that the damwas an ecoaomical solution for water and power provision in southern Somalia. Other studies addressedcrucial issues related to the construction of the dam: riparian rights, resettiement, health hazards, wateruse legislation, land tenure legislation, refugees, environment.

Sustainability

6. Since the Baardhere Project is not expected to take place in the foreseeable future, the technicalassistance credit will not have any sustainable impact on the country.

Lessons Learned

7. Due to the civil war, disbursement could not be completed and a number of goods suppliers whohad not taken insurance against the political risk were not paid by either the Government (which nolonger existed to issue withdrawal applications from the credit) or their country's export credit insurance.In view of the worsening political situation of the country, and anticipated evacuation of internationalpersonnel, IDA might have instructed the resident mission and the last supervision mission to concentrateon the project's financial management, including reconciliation of the special account, and clearingoutading payments so that they could be settled before the country plunged into anarchy - the uniquelydramatic and lasting nature of which was admittedly difficlat to predict. This is a major lesson to belearned by IDA and suppliers of goods and services in countries experiencing serious social and politicalinstability.

PROJECT COMPLErION REPORT

SOMALIA

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE F'OR THE BAARDHERE PROJECT(CR.1856&SO)

PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE

Project Identity

Name Tecbnical Assistance for the Baartdere ProjectCredit Number 1856-SORVP Unit Africa RegionCounty SomaliaSector/Subsector Agriculture

Background

1. Of the 638,000 sq km of Somalia's land area, only 13% is suitable for cultivation. Ot this, only8.5% was cultivated at the time of project formulation, with water being the main constaint. Studiesshowed that n irrigation investments would ensure a susainable amnual growth in crop production ofabout 5%. At the time of project formulation, the constuction of a multiprpose dam on the Juba Riverat Baardhere was identified as the main potental for irrigation and hydropower. The Baardhere Project,a complex and costly operation etimated at $300 million, was part of Somalia's public investmentprogram and a key component of the national development strategy for both the agriculture and powersectors.

2. Various feasibility stdies carried out in the 1970s had reconfirmed the priority of the BaardhereProject. These studies were completed for constuction of a concrete dam. IDA agreed to assist theGovernment of Somalia (GOS) in completing project preparation and, subject to appraisal findings, tofinance the project with other donors. In preparation for this, IDA financed studies of future institutionalarrangements, flood protection and resettlement needs, USAID financed an environmentai and socialassessment, and GTZ carried out a master plan for development of the Juba Valley. Detailed design foran alternative rockfitl dam was also undertaken with Chinese assistance.

3. Almost all the water flowing ia the Juba River in Somalia is derived from its catchment area inEthiopia and partly in Kenya. To assess whether the proposed Baardhere Project would be adverselyaffected by water use in Ethiopia, IDA requested Ethiopia to provide details of its water use plans withinthe Juba River catchment, and contracted consultants to update an earlier review of likely future use ofJuba River water within Ethiopia. This review, together with other studies conducted by variousconsultants, concluded that even reduced flows of up to 33 % would be unlikely to jeopardize the project'sviability.

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Project Objectives and Descriptlon

4. Project Objectives. By providing technical assistance and training, the project was to strengthenthe institutional capacity of the Ministry of Juba Valley Development (MIVD) to complete the preparationof the Baardhere Project and to determine its feasibility and financing so that a sound decision could betaken about implementation. The prk jee Icluded the remaining studies and specialist inputs needed tocomplete preparation of the Baardhere Project, and was to strengthen MJVD's capacity to make asignificant contribution to the project's implementation in the event of a decision to proceed.

5. Project Description. The main project component was the establishment of a Core AdvLtoryTeam within MJVD, consisting of six qWiified Somali sponalists and three expauiate resident advisors,supported by short term consultants. Tne advisory team was to assist MJVD in supervising consultantsstudies and completing preparation of the Baardhere Project and its appraisal by IDA and other donors.The project was to provide funds for technical assistance, training, vehicles, transit accommodation andstorage, firniture and equipment and incremental operating costs.

Project Design and Organiation

6. IDA involvement in the Baardhere Project began in 1983, whea the proposed Juba Valleydevelopment program was under review. Later on, when the selection of the dam was reconfirmed asa priority, IDA fmanced several studies leading to project preparation. In March 1987 an IDA missionvisited Somalia to supervise the preparation of the Baardhere Project, and found that the preparationprocess was encountering serious issues, inparticularunsatisfactory supervisionofthepreparationprocessand weak donor coordination by GOS. In its Aide Memoire the mission proposed a technical assistancecredit to assist in completing preparation of the Baardhere project. The proposal was in line withGovernment's desire to complete preparation of the project.

7. The technical assistance project was negotated in Washigton in October 1987. The negotiationsdid not result in any changes in the project. IDA financed US$5.5 million out of a total project cost of$5.8 million. The project was to be implemted over a 30 month period by MJVD. Duringnegotiations, it was indicated that, subject to progress of the technical assistance project, appraisal of theBaardhere Project could take place at the end of 1988.

Project Implementation

8. The Credit became effective April 1, 1988. The hiring process for the advisory team startedpromptly thereafter. MJVD negotiated a contract estabishing a twinning agreement with an engineeringservices organization. The arrangement was to enable the Somalis to benefit from the agency'sexperience, facilitate the recruitment of short-term specialists, provide Somali staff with short-term on-the-job training, and support MJVD's capacity to administer and supervise consultants engaged in planningand design. IDA cleared both the agreement and the experts proposed by the agency. In May 1988 GOSappointed a Somali expert as team leader. By October 1988 the expatriates were in place, and M1VDhad already started interviewing Somali candidates for the economist and ifrrigation engineer posts. Oncefully established the final team comprised three Somali specialists (team leader, irrigation engineer, andeconomist), and two expatriate specialists from the twinning organization (dam and specificationsengineer).

9. The Advisory Teau began the procurement process in August, 1988. By October of that yearthe project vehicles had already arrived 'n Mogadishu. Office equipment, finxiture and supplies, wereprocured locally. Review of contractor applications to qualify for the civil works construction followedsoon afterwards.

10. Selection of suitable candidates for training under the Credit started soon after effectiveness. Atota of 13 trainees were placed in overseas MSc courses in various disciplines. At the same time, aprogram of short term training for 11 project staff was carried out at universities in several countries.A six-month course to improve English language proficiency of project staff was completed in 1990.

11. One problem encountered by the project was the lack of counterpart funds for operating costs.To overcome the problemn, the Credit Agreement was amended to include a new category of expenditurefor operating costs so that IDA funds could be reallocated for this purp-4se.

12. To complete the environmental work and training program, GOS requested a oneyear extensionof the credit closing date to December 31, 1991, which was granted by IDA. However, shortlyafterds, the Government was ovehrown and the Bank group sus.oended all credits to Somalia. Theproject could not be completed and no follow up was possible on the Baardhere Project.

Project Rults

13. The project achieved its objectives of completing the preparation of the Baardhere Project anddetemining its feasibility. From April 1988 to December 1990, various consulting groups producedreports related to Baardhere Project preparation, including topics such as: drainage and salinity control,hydrological sedimenation and water quality, rocdfihl embankment altenative design, power optmizaton,economic and macroeconomic analysis for the dam project, surveys of bench mark on the dam site,tender documents, and prequalification for civil works contractors. Those studies concluded that the damwas an economical solution for water and power provision in southern Somalia. Other studies addressedcrucial issues related to the construction of the dam: riparian rights, resettlement, health hazards, wateruse leglation, land tenure legislation, refugees, environment.

14. The advisory team was actively involved in supervising and coordinating the various consultinggroups and donors, and in reviewing all the studies produced by consultants, including the engineeringstudies, the economic analysis of the proposed project, tender documents, prequalification of contracts,and supervision of tendering procedures. The advisory team reached the conclusion that all the studiesproduced left no doubt as to the economic feasibility of the Baardhere Project.

Susanability

15. Since the Baardhere Project is not expected to take place in the foreseeable future, the technicalassistance credit will not have any sustainable impact on the country.

IDA Performance

16. After many years of discussions and investigations into the feasibility of the dam, it becameevident that lack of supervision and coordination had become a major cause of delay. The Associationtherefore identified the need for technical assistance to speed up preparation of the Baardhere Project.

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The project was simple and well designed, and was processed quickly. During implementation, there wasconstant dialogue with the Government and clse correspondence with the project team. The performanceof supervision missions and the Bank office in Mogadishu was satisfactory.

17. A total of four supervision missions were fielded between April, 1988 and November 1990, withgood staffing continuity. After the initial period of project implementation, when efforts were put on theestablishment of the advisory team, supervision missions focussed on the completion of the preparationstudies for the Baardhere Project as described above, and on outstanding issues associated with theconstruction of the dam, such as riparian rights, resettement and environmental aspects. The lastsupervision mission was carried out in November, 1990. It reported a deterioration of the securitysituation in the country. Extensive areas had become inaccessible, and there was a high incidence ofviolence, with little or no law enforcement. In retrospect, the mission should have concentrated onsupervising the project's financial management, including reconciliation of the special account andclearing outstanding payments to suppliers. This could have reduced the number of suppliers that couldhot be paid for goods delivered once there was no longer a government to authorize disbursement. Thissituation, which would have been difficult to predict, still prevails at the time of the writing of this report.

Borrower Plerformance

18. Borrower performance was satisfactory especially in light of the political and securitydeterioration during project implementation. The lack of counterpart funds was a major problem but allother credit covenants were in compliance.

Consulting Services

19. The performance of the advisory team was good. In a letter to the Minister oV National Plannng,dated November 1988, IDA praised the advisory team for the progress it was making in completingpreparation of the dam project, and for its diligence in preparing monthly reports that were said to bemost informative and useful to all potential donors.

Proje Relationship

20. IDA's relat;onship with MIVD and other parts of Goverament was good.

Project Documentation and Data

21. The credit agreemen: and Memorandum of the President provided an adequate framework forreview of project implementation. The studies conducted under the project were available in the Bank'sfiles.

Lessons Learned

22. Due to the civil war, disbursement could not be completed and a number of goods suppliers whohad not Laken insurance against the political risk were not paid by either the Govermment (which nolonger existed to issue withdrawal applications from the credit) or their country's export credit insurance.In view of thi worsening political situation of the country, and anticipated evacuation of internationalpersonnel, IDA might have instmcted the resident mission and the last supervision mission to concentrate

on the project's financial management, including reconciliation of the special account, and clearingoutstanding payments so that they could be settled before the country plunged into anarchy - the uniquelydramatic and lasting nature of which was admittedly difficult to predict. This is a major lesson to belearned by IDA and suppliers of goods and services in countries experiencing serious social and politicalinstability.

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PART U: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE

Due to the civil war, Parts I and m could not be sent to the Borrower for comment.

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PART m: STATICAL INFORMATION

1. Related IDA Credits

Credit 1tle Purpose Year Sta

Farahaane Irigation Increase production of food and cash 1989 SuspendedRehabilitation Project crops on about 5,600 small privateCr.2063-SO farms through improvement of the(US$ 28.5 million) irrigation system and water use

efficiency. Establish effectiveirrigation management and introducewater charge as a cost recoverymechanism to ensure the sustainabilityof the rehabilitation program.

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2. Project Timetable

Date Planned Date Revised not Actual

Identification 3/1987 - 3/1987

Preparation 5/1987 - 5/1987

Appraisal - 6/1987

Credit Negotiation - - 10/1987

Board Approval - - 12/1/1987

Credit Signature - - 1/4/1988

Credit Effectiveness - - 4/1/1988

Credit Closing 1211990 12/1991 1/ 12/1991

Credit Completion 1991 2/

1/ One one-year extension granted by IDA

2/ All operations in Somalia suspended

3. Credit Disbursement ($ million)

Year Appraisal Estimaes ActualCumulative % of Total Cumulative % of Total

1988 1.25 23 2.14 39

1989 3.61 66 3.29 60

1990 5.07 92 3.95 72

1991 5.50 100 4.26 77

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4. Project Inplementation

Indicators Planned Actual

Recruitment of core advisory team leader and staff 1/1988 1988

Recruitment of resident advisors for core advisory 1/1988 1988team

Studies

Engineering services and document revision(Documents and specifications for civi works and 2/1988 1988power)

Power optimzaton2/1988 1988

Review of Ongoine Studies

Review findings of agricultural, environment,resettlement, institutional, and power studies 3/1988 1988

Analysis of project costs, financing, andimplementation arrangements 4/1988 1988

Assistance During Project Processing

Assistance during donor appraisal and negotiationprocedures and coordination between donors 1/1988 to 7/1990 done

Contacts with panel of experts 1/1988 to 12/1990 done

Trainin

No.of staff receiving training n.a. 145

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S. Project Costs and Finandng

A. Project Costs (US$ M)

Item Appraisal Estimate Actual a/l ___________________ Local Foreign Total l

Technical Assistance 0.02 2.54 2.56 l

Training - 0.72 0.72 _ _ _ _l

Vehicles, Furniture, Equipment 0.04 0.34 0.38 _ _l

Civil Works 0.06 0.17 0.23 l

Operational Costs 0.10 0.15 0.25 _ l

Contingencies 0.02 0.37 0.39 _ l

Refinancing of PPF and SPPF - 1.25 1.25

| Total 0.24 5.54 5.78

a/ Due to the civil war in the country, no information on actual costs could be obtained.

B. Projecd Fluadng (VS$ M)

Source Appraisal Estimate Revised a/ AcWal

IDA CreditCBS, MOGAD. AC 1185 0.20Civil Works 0.23 0.23 0Veh. Furn. Equip. 0.38 0.38 0.32Technical Assistance 2.57 2.42 1.86Training 0.73 0.73 0.63Operating Costs 0.15 0.13Reflnancing of PPF&SPPF 1.25 1.25 1.12Unallocated 0.34 0.34 0

Total 5.50 5.50 4.26

Government 0.28 0.28 n.a.

Total 5.78 5.78 n.a.

at Revised as of June 1989.

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6. Project Results

A. Training

Disciplines No.ofStaff

Overseas graduate study Engineering, Economics, 13(2 years) Irrigation, Geology

Overseas short term Project analysis, 11training (6 months or less) Dam construction and

operation,Irrigation construction,Resettement,Adminisrfion of multi-purpose projects,Monitoring and evaluation

On-henjob traiing inSomalia 121

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B. Studies

T itle Putpose Status Impact

Baardheere Dam Provide techrucal information Completed Modified or substitutedProject Design necessary to understand the in 4/1987 the corresponding contentStudies: Design design of revised project of the project designReport Addendum components. report.

Baardheere Dam Revise the cost estimate Completed Provided revised total costProject Tender document. in 1211988 of the project and theDesign: Cost Estimate costs of each

implementing stage andvarious contracts.

Homboy Area and Update the feasibility studies Completed Reviewed various issuesSmallholder Banna conducted in the past in light in 4/1987 of the project includingCultivation in the of the changed conditions in cropping pattern, farmLower Iba Valley the Juba valley. budget, irrigationand Assessment of efficiencies, agriculturalAgricultural Benefits: services, laborHomboy Feasibility availability, floodStudy protection and drainage

facilities, training,environmental problems.

Study for Verify that the Baardheere Completed Recommended that theOptimization of power component is in 9/1988 power component of thePower Facilities economically attractive Baardheere Dam Project,Daraasadda addition to the electric system being by far moreWanaajinta Qalabka of Somalia; optimize the economic than anyTamarta electro-mechanical thermal addition to the

installation, the reservoir electric system, shouldlevel and operation, be implemented as soondetermine the corresponding as possible; the maximumenergy production, evaluate normal water level in thethe effect of possible futre reservoir can, with certainwater abstractions from the reservations, be risen toJuba river upstream of the but not higher than 144 mBaardheere Dam. a.s.1.; the power facilities

should be implemented inl ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~two stages.

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7. Status of Covenants

Covenant Status

3.01(a)&(b) Compliance.Government commitment to projectimplementation.

3.03(a) Compliance.Establish within MJVD a core advisory teamby 1/1/1988.

3.05 Compliance.Submit training plan for approval.

~|§ 4.01(b) Compliance with delay.Furnish audit report. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

4.01(c) Compliance.Maintain project expenditure records.

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8. Use of Bank Resources

A. Staff Inputs

Actvbt IyD Staff Weeks Per PY87 88 12 2Q 91 2Z

Identification/ 31.6 31.6 - - - - -

Preparation

Appraisal 6.1 3.2 2.9 - - - -

Negodations 3.5 - 3.5 - -

Supervision 21.0 - 5.5 5.1 6.7 3.5 .2

PCR 6.0 - - - - - 6.0

Total f MA I2 5A fid 11

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B. Mison Data

No. of Staff Special-D$eL ZEro Week iZ Ss Irmnd Pmoblets

Identification 3/1987 4 31.6 a,e,i,sPreparation

Appraisa 6/1987 3 6.1 gf,e

Supervisionl 5/1988 3 5.5 a,g 2 2 0

Supervision2 10/1988 1 1.1 a 2 2 F

Supervision3 11/1989 2 6.7 f,g 2 2 F

Supervision4 11/1990 2 3.5 f,g 2 2 0

Specialization codes: a=agriculturalist, e=economist, f=financial analyst, g=engineer, i=lrrigationspecialist, s=sociologist

Problems: F=financial, O=other

Status: 2=moderate

Trend: 2=stationary