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The World Bank

FOR OMlCIAL USE ONTY

A1 ; 1tt)1' 1 t ' } 1 f1 i t }] T Report No. 10178

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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

SENEGAL

URBAN MANAGEMENT AND REHABILITATIONTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT

(CREDIT NOS. 1458-SE AND SF-13)

DECEMBER 5, 1991

Infrastructure Operations DivisionSahelian ')epartmentAfrica Regional Office

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used bY recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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EXCHANGE, MUT

Monetary unit - CFA franc (CFAF)US$1 - CFAF 325

WEIGHTS AND HEASUREMENTS

Metric system

FISCAL YEA

States and local governments -- July 1-June 30

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BC/MEQ Bureau de Circulation, Ministere de l'EquipementTraffic Bureau, Ministry of Equipment

BHS Banque de l'Habitat du SenegalHousing Bank of Senegal

BOM/SGPR Bureau Organisation et M6thodes, SG Presidence de laRepubliqueOrganization and Methods Office, General Secretariat of theOffice of the President of the Republic

CIDA Canadian International Development AgencyCUD Communaute Urbaine de Dakar

City of DakarDCH/MUH Direction de la Construction et de l'Habitat/MUH

Housing and Construction Department/MUHDCL/MINT Direction des Collectivit6s Locales, Ministere de

l'InterieurLocal Government Department, Ministry of the Interior

DEP/MEQ Direction des Etudes et de la Programmation/MEQStudies and Programming Debarment/MEQ

DEPS/MPC Direction des Etudes et de la Programmation Sectorielle/MPCStudies and Sectoral Programming Department/MPC

DGPB/M1UH Direction Gestion du Patrimoine BAti/MUHState-Owned Properties Management Department/MUH

DUA/MUH Direction de l'Urbanisme et de l'Architecture/MUHUrban Development and Architecture Department/MUH

FAC Fonds d'Am6nagement [sic) et de CooperationFAHU Fonds pour l'Amelioration de l'Habitat et de l'Urbanisme

Housing and Urban Development FundFECL Fonds d'Equipement des Collectivites Locales

Municipal Infrastructure FundGTZ German Cooperation AgencyIDA International Development AssociationMEF Ministry of the Economy and FinanceMEQ Ministry of EquipmentMINT Ministry of the InteriorMPC Ministry of Planning and CooperationMUH Ministry of Urban Development and Housing

OHLM Low-Cost Housing OfficePATREU Urban Management and Rehabilitation Technical Assistance

ProjectPDES Economic and Social Development PlanPDU/Dakar Urban Development Master Plan for the Dakar RegionPIC Plan d'Investissement Communal

Community Investment Plai.PTIP Three-Year Public Investment PlanSDE Secretariat d'Etat A la Decentralisation

State Secretariat for DecentralizationSENELEC Soci:te Nationale d'Electricite

National Electric Power CompanySGPR Secretariat General de la Pr6sidence de la R6publique

General Secretariat of the Office of the Pr'-ident of theRepublic

SICAP Societe Immobiliere du Cap-VertCap Vert Real Estate Company

SNHLM4 Societe Nationale d'Habitations a Loyers ModeresNational Lnw-Cost Housing Company

SONEES Societe Nationale d'Exploitation des Eaux du SenegalNational Water Company of Senegal

STCUD Services Techniques de la Communaut6 Urbaine de DakarTechnical Department of the City of Dakar

TG/Dakar Controller General of Dakar/HEFUMDP Urban Management and Development ProjectUNDP United Nations Development Programme

THE WORLD BANK FOR OFmFCIAL USE ONLYWash.r,gton. D.C. 20433

U.S.A

Office of Directm.CeniealOpetatumis Evaluation

December 10, 1991

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on SenegalUrbau Mana'ement and Rehabilitation Technical Assistance Project(Credit Nos. 1458-SE and SF-13)

Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "Project

Completion Report on Senegal - Urban Management and Rehabilitation Technical

Assistance Project (Credit Nos. 1458-SE and SF-13)" prepared by the Africa

Regional Office with Part II contributed by the Borrower. No audit of this

project has been made by the Operations Evaluation Department at this time.

Attachment

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by .ecipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORTSENEGAL

URBAN MANAGEMENT AND REHABILITATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT(CREDIT NOS. 1458-SE AND SF^13)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PROJECT REVIEW

PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

A. Project Identity .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1B. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . 1C. Project Identification and Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . 2D. Project Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3E. Project Description ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3F. Project Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5G. Project Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6H. Project Results ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8I. Project Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11J. Bank Performance ...................... . 12K. Borrower Performance ... . . . . . . ..........................13L. Relationship Between the Borrower and the Bank ... . . . . . 14M. Consulting Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14N. Project Docsmentation ................... 15

PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . 16

A. Overview .. . 16B. The World Bank and Senegal ................. . 16C. The Project Unit and Problems of Coordination . . . . . . . . . 17D. The Steering Committee ................... . 18E. The Monitoring Committee .................. . 18F. The Technical Director ................... . 18G. The Planning Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18H. DCH (Construction and Housing Department) . . . . . . . . . . . 19I. Urban Development and Architecture Department . . . . . ... . . 20J. Strengthening of the DGPB (State-Owned Properties Management

Department) ........................ ... .. 20K. SICAP (Socidtf Immobiliere du Cap-Vert) and SNHLM (Societ6

Nationale des Habitations A Loyers Mod6ros) . . . . . . . . . . 20L. SCAT-URBAN (Central Land Development Agency) ... . . . . . .. 2iM. The Traffic Bureau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21N. Local Government Department . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . 210. CUD (City of Dakar) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22P. CIDA (Canadian International Development Association) . . . . . 23

PART III: Statistical Information (not dictated yet)

PART IV: Annex

Annex 1: Detailed Analysis of Project Implementation

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.


URBAN MANAGEMENT AND REHABILITATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT(CREDIT NOS. 1458-SE AND SF13)

Preface

1. This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the UrbanManagement and Rehabilitation Technical Assistance Project which on July 20,1984 was accorded two IDA Credits totaling US$6 million and equivalentrespectively to US$3.048 million (1458-SE) and US$2.952 million (SF-13-SE).The Credits were closed on December 31, 1989 (originally scheduled completiondate: December 1988) and the funds fully disbursed.

2. The current project follows the 1972 Sites and Services Project(Credit 336-SE) and the 1980 Urban Sector Study (1061-SE) and is the Bank'sthird sectoral undertaking in Senegal. The project also received support fromCIDA, in an amount equivalent to US$0.213 million, disbursed fully by theclosing date of the Credit.

3. Parts I and III of the PCR were prepared by the SahelianInfrastructure Division of the Africa Regional Office. They are based, interalia, on the President's Report, Credit Agreements, supervision reports,correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower, analysis of the mainbackground documentation for the project and interviews with those involved inidentification and implementation. Part II was prepared by the Borrower inFebruary 1991.

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URBAN MANAGEMENT AND REHABILITATION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT(CREDIT NOS. 1458-SE AND SF-13)

Evaluation Summary

A. Background

1. With the limited resources of the agriculture sector a constraintto steady growth, Senegal opted for diversification of its economy and growthof export-oriented light industry. As the success of that strategy dependedon numerous factors, including the existence and maintenance of urbaninfrastructure, the Bank decided to provide support in the form of financingof a management and rehabilitation program. Owing to its key role and thelimited potential of medium-term development in the regional poles, effortswere concentrated initially in the Dakar region.

B. Project Objectives

2. Undertaken as a pilot project, the operation aimed both to clarifyissues relating to the macroeconomic environment of the urban sector and toimprove management in Dakar as regards both housing and public services. Thelong-term objective was to improve the country's economic performance by(i) stimulating public savings and (ii) improving administrative efficiency.The short-term objectives were (i) better allocation of resources throughefficient investment planning; (ii) formulation of a housing and developmentpolicy that is more costly to the public coffers: and (iii) maintenance of thecurrent level of urban services and redeployment of local responsibilities.

C. Project Implementation

3. With implementation overseen by the Ministry of Planning andCooperation, the project involved several ministerial departments in carryingout complex tasks that required extensive expertise. To a large extent itused the services of outside specialists, involving a real transfer oftechnology and the active supervision of a Steering Committee ensuring liaisonand the compatibility of activities.

4. At the start of the project, the partial implementation of theaction program envisaged by the Credit Agreements resulted in an acuteshortage of precise guidelines partially responsible. for the emergence ofconflicts and sectoral interests. In addition to these adverse effects, therewere the consequences of a deterioration in the technical and financialoperations of public services. These two aspects slowed down projectprogress. Lastly, the scarcity or reduced availability of human resourcesprevented the objectives as a whole from being achieved within the expectedtimeframes.

D. Proiect Results

5. Despite the difficulties, the results of the project aresatisfactory. There is no doubt that the more comprehensive approach to urbanproblems, rehabilitation of municipal management and formulation of a newhousing policy helped restore local budget equilibria and restart thedecentralization process. They lastly made possible the identification of an

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urban management development project which, as a logical extension of thecurrent project, is extending its effects and consolidating its achievements.

6. Enhanced intersectoral relations and the gradual adoption by thepublic entities of the concepts and methodologies tested by the projectconstitute solid bases for building on the first results. Their management bypersonnel with redefined missions and tools should not be subject to any majorchallenge. They still are nevertheless highly contingent upon (i) anydeterioration in public finances and (ii) the introduction of institutionalreforms.

E. Bank Performance

7. In general, the Bank's involvement in the preparation, appraisaland supervision of the project was significant in helping to improve the urbansector and municipal management. However, the overestimation of results ofthe economic recovery program during identification, reduction in supervision(as compared to projections) and the premature intermingling of activitieswith the identification of a subsequent urban project had negative effects onthe rate of implementation and the achievement of the initial objectives.

F. Borrower Performance

8. The performance of the project beneficiary is satisfactory as awhole, especially given the ambitious nature of the undertaking and thecontext of financial belt-tightening that significantly increased the risks.Nevertheless, the delays in establishing the conditions for implementation,lack of a coordinating body and prolonged vacancy in technical managementprevented the Borrower from meeting all of its commitments.

G. Main Lessons

9. The main lessons to be learned from the project are as follows,the first three relating to the Bank and the others to the Borrower:

(a) Ongoing and regular supervision are apparently both key to thesuccess of a project in a sensitive sector;

(b) As regards the resolution of matters linked-to policy and theformulation of basic approaches, more realistic timeframes shouldbe planned, as early as the identification phase;

(c) The multisectoral dimension of certain projects and large numberof parties involved require procedures and regular assessmentsbased on prior contractual commitments and sanctioned by thegradual disbursement of credit proceeds;

(d) In order to avoid any risk of misunderstanding or overlapping ofjurisdiction, the use of a team approach to management must beaccompanied by preliminary in-depth consultations that result interms of reference detailing the prerogatives of each party;

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(e! As early as the identification phase, the technical executingagencies must be involved in project formulation. To that end,they must strengthen their design capability and streamlineadministrative procedures;

(f) The provision of counterpart funds for minimal operation of theservices involved in a project is the best guarantee forsatisfactory preparation and implementation.

SENEGAL

URBAN MANAGEMENT AND REHABIlITTIONTECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT

(CREDITS 1458-SE & SF413)


PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE

A. Project Identity

Title: Urban Management and RehabilitationTechnical Assistance Project

Credit Nos.: 1458-SE and SF-13

Sector: Urban Development

Borrower: Republic of Senegal

Executing Agency: Ministry of Planning and Cooperation

Cumulative Amount ofIDA Credits: US$6 million

Government input: US$0.65 million

B. Introduction

1. Like other developing countries, Senegal is undergoing rapidurbanization and, despite a population that is still for the most part rural,the primary sector now accounts for only 30% of GDP. Moreover, its limitedresources will not allow it to maintain satisfactory and sustained growth.

2. In order to correct this adverse situation, Senegal opted fordiversification of its economy and the development of an export-oriented lightindustry. Dependent on numerous factors, the success of this strategy is alsocontingent upon the existence of infrastructure and the efficient provision ofbasic services such as communications, transportation, housing, water supplyand sanitation. Consequently, although the revitalization of agriculture is apriority in the country's recovery, the efficient management of the urbanareas vital to a healthy economy has become a major factor in the adjustmentprocess under way.

3. In 1984 the Dakar region alone accounted for 90% of industrialoperations, 87% of jobs in the modern sector and most of the road networks andskilled labor in the country. It furthermore was home to 60% of its urbandwellers, whose increase was estimated at 6% per year and associated with asignificant shift toward relatively undeveloped areas lying beyond the urbanperiphery. Lastly, it accounted for 60% of the country's wealth.

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4. Given its key role in the national economy and the limi.teddevelopment potential of the regional poles over the medium run, the Stateinitially decided to mobilize the resources necessary for industrialexpansion, to concentrate its efforts on the rehabilitation of Dakar and toseek better management of available resources, Their growing scarcity overseveral years' time had resulted in a steady decline in per capita urbaninvestment (under the Sixth Plan reaching only 54% of its previous level) andkeener intersectoral competition, reflected in a chronic infrastructuredeficit. The lack of a Llear-cut strategy and definition of responsibilities,poor labor and management relations and inappropriate action hadsimultaneously exacerbated the dysfunctions of the urban system.

5. Acting against this background, the main government bodiesresponsible fc'r urban development and housing encountered the samedifficulties as the public sector as a whole regarding performance inmanagement, technical expertise, productivity and the setting of priorities.The Borrower's strategy, which gave priority to prestige programs, proved tobe ineffective and the operations of its agencies, whose production never metmore than 10% of needs, were sharply curtailed. This collapse, although duein part to the fact that especially advantageous financing conditions were nolonger available, led in particular in a normative and unrealisticinfrastructure policy given affordable demand. There was also sharpdeterioration of the banking system and, despite promising savings, a cutbackin the operations of the Banque de l'Habitat (BHS).

6. Lastly, Senegal's economic and financial crisis threw municipalinstitutions into disarray, particularly in Dakar. The reform of theMunicipal Code, transferring the bulk of the responsibility for maintaininginfrastructure and services to the local communities, was not accompanied bysignificantly increased resources or authority. At the same time, fasterdemographic growth, intensive or inappropriate use of insufficient andunevenly distributed infrastructure as well as a shortage of expertise for thetechnical and financial implementation of newly identified tasks, largelyexacerbated the deterioration in services and poor municipal management.

C. Project Identification and Preparation

7. The Bank's involvement in the study and resolution of urbanproblems began in 1972 with Credit 336-SE to finance a first Sites andServices Project in Dakar. From the outset, the Bank was concerned with theappropriateness of its efforts in an essentially agricultural country wherethe economic envircnment was hardly receptive to innovative urban policies.It nevertheless entered into an agreement with the Government to produce14,000 serviced lots in Dakar, 1,200 in Thies and to seek (i) withdrawal ofthe Borrower from the direct financing of housing and greater access to free-hold housing; (ii) increase in diversified supply and expansion of demand; and(iii) replicability of sites and services projects and the establishment ofinstitutions able to manage their development. The October 1983 CompletionReport concluded that despite difficult circumstances, the project, closed in1981, had been implemented successfully, the numerous urban policy problemsyet to be resolved notwithstanding.

R. To that end senegal had in 1980 obtained assistance from h \ tostudy the urban sector and identify the main problems. Following anidentification mission in 1982, a memorandum on the urban sector confirmed thekey role of Dakar within thp export-oriented industrial apparatus that Senegalwas seeking to develop and established the maintenance and then growth ofbasic urban services as prerequisites and factors in the success of thatpolicy. In conclusion, it stressed the importance and necessity of structuralchange and reforms to rehabilitate the urban sector gradually and achieve theobjectives. With the support of IDA (Credit 1061-SE) and to clarify thethrusts of its recovery strategy, the Government -- through the Ministry ofPlanning and Cooperation -- asked a Steering Committee assisted by aconsultant to finalize the objectives of the Urban Management andRehabilitation Technical Assistance Project and identify the means for itsimplementation,

9. Undertaken on a pilot basis, the project was to simultaneouslyclarify matters relating to the macroeconomic environment of the sector as awhole and improve management in Dakar as regards both housing and publicservices. The studies and works aimed at grappling with the region's mostpressing problems as well as enabling the Government to take sectoral actionmore consistent with the ongoing adjustment process. Appraised in July 1983,the Project was the subject of a Bank President's Report in March 1984 andCredit Agreements 1458-SE and SF-13 were approved on April 17 of that year.Several rounds of negotiations were opened to mobilize cofinancing for theproject. They were however unsuccessful, with the exception of the CIDAcontribution to the road traffic component (Can$250,000) and GTZ financing ofa supplementary urban rehabilitation project (Dalifort Project).

D. Project Objectives

10. The long-term objective of the project was to support improvementsto Senegal's economic performance by stimulating public savings and improvingthe efficiency of public entities responsible for the provision andmaintenance of urban services and housing. The short-term objectives involved(i) allocation of scarce public resources to urban areas, through efficientinvestment planning; (ii) formulation of an urban development and housingpolicy based on the appropriate utilization of those resources;(iii) maintenance at the current level of existing urban services in Dakar;enabling the local authorities to better plan maintenance and rehabilitationoperations and increase the mobilization of potential resources with a view toimproving the services rendered.

E. Project Description

11. The Project involved numerous public, parapublic and privateparties in often complex tasks and ambitious objectives. In order tofacilitate execution but without jeopardizing their high degree ofinterdependence, it included the following components:

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Part A: 6L,an investment planning and programming:

(1) Monitoring Committee: technical assistance to the SteeringCommittee responsible for (i) preparation, (ii) start-up of theProject and (iii) technical monitoring over the life of theProject;

(2) Seventh Plan: preparation of the urban sector investment programof the Seventh Plan based on (i) the carrying out of amethodological study to formulate guidelines for appraisal andselection of projects and for monitoring their physical andfinancial implementation; (ii) completion of the Dakar RegionUrban Development Master Plan and identification of urbandevelopment and rehabilitation projects to be included in thePlan; and (iii) completion of the Cap Vert transportation plan andplanning of sector investments.

Part B: Housing and Urban Policy

(1) liousi g Finance, based on (i) affordability analysis (includingcalculation of costs and prices of subsidized housing) andexisting mechanisms of resource mobilization and low-cost housingfinance (of which BHS policy and procedures) and (ii) formulationof recommendations aimed at improving resource mobilization andutilization and at increasing private sector participation in thefinancing of low-cost housing;

(2) Management of State-Owned Properties through (i) analysisState-owned properties and related charges and (ii) formulation ofrecommendations on means to reduce subsidies and to increase rentcollection by parapublic housing companies and the centralgovernment;

(3) Rehabilitation of OHLM and SICAP based on (i) a diagnostic study;(ii) recommendations and (iii) a timetable for implementing therecommended actions aimed at improving the financial andmanagerial performance of the companies and at redirecting theiractivities to more clearly defined commercial targets;

(4) Land Development Agency: feasibility study for the establishmentof a parapublic enterprise for the servicing of urban land withinfrastructure for residential, commercial and industrial use;

(5) Design Alternatives for Land Development: study of alternativedesigns for land development at different service levels andformulation of recommendations on standards and pricing policiesdesigned to make service land affordable to the target population;and

(6) Preparation of Pilot Projects, to be planned as part of theestablishment of a land development agency based on (i) afeasibility land development study for one or two sites in Dakar

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and (ii) detailed design and engineering of an infrastructurerehabilitation plan for part of central Pikine.

Part C: Municipal Policy

(1) Municipal Organization and Management centered around (i) analysisof relationships between the Borrower's central government and thecommunities in the Dakar region and the allocation of authoritywith respect to the delivery of land development services;(ii) identification and implementation of actions to improvemunicipal administrative and fi.nancial management; (iii) identi-fication of new financial resources and local tax collection, inparticular property taxes and (iv) analysis of the operatingprocedures of the Borrower's Fonds d'Equipement des Collectivit6sLocales and its suitability as a financing in.strument formunicipal works projects;

(2) Maintenance and technical services with (i) identification ofrehabilitation and maintenance works and equipment required tomaintain and modernize infrastructure in Dakar; (ii) establishmentof a system to plan and program the maintenance of infrastructureservices equipment, in particular the purchasing of equipment andspare parts; and (iii) establishment of a cost accounting andannual budgeting system for Dakar's Technical Department;

(3) Traffic management: after the establishment of a traffic bureauwithin the Ministry of Equipment the Project called for(i) preparation of a priority action program for trafficmanagement to improve circulation for pedestrians, vehicles andbuses as well as access to and circulation within central Pikineand (ii) implementation and monitoring during the first year of atraffic management program for Dakar, including the surfacing offootpaths and paving of roads to simple design standards to allowbus access, junction improvements and provision of traffic signalsand traffic control measures;

(4) Training piogram: (i) identification of technical andadministrative personnel (in Dakar) and establishment of apriority training program and (ii) training of municipal personnelthrough short-term traineeships, seminars and workshops.

F. Project Organization

12. The Borrower entrusted project oversight to the Ministry ofPlanning and Cooperation and in virtue of Side Letter No. 4. to the CreditAgreements involved the following entities in the implementation of thevarious components:

A. Urban investment planning and programming

(1) Consulting service MPC Monitoring committee(2) Methodological study MPC DEPS

(3) Urban development plan completion MUH DUH(4) Transportation plan completion ME DEP

B. Housing and urban policy

(1) Housing finance MUH, MEF, DCH, BHS(2) State-owned properties management MUH, DGPB(3) OHLM/SICAP rehabilitation SGPR, MEG, MUH, DUA, DCH(4) Land development agency SGPR, MEG, MUH, DUA, DCH(5) SDEU pilot operations MUH, SDEU, DCH

C. Municipal policy

(1) Finance and oiganization MEF, SDE, TG Dakar, DCL(2) Maintenance and technical services MEF, SDE, CUD, ME, DCL(3) Traffic bureau ME, BC(4) Training of municipal staff SDE, CUD, DCL

This list of tasks and the diversity of entities involved fullyreflect the institutional complexity and wide range of expertise required forproject implementation.

13. In sectors where the Borrower was experienced (formulation ofmaster urban development and transportation plans and formulation of a housingpolicy), brief technical assistance was provided to improve existingtechniques. In areas where the Government was less experienced and proceduresno longer suited the rehabilitation strategy advocated by the Government(investment programming, municipal management and maintenance, trafficmanagement, establishment of a development agency), resident specialists werecalled in. Particular attention was paid to the selection of consultants(individual meetings), identification and additional training of counterpartstaff for the efficient transfer of technology and, once the project wascompleted, a continuation of the activities by the Government. This approachand the number and nature of agencies involved required that the technicalassistance be provided at different levels of intensity; for the TechnicalDepartment, varied expertise and for the Steering Committee constantavailability for supervision and decision-making.

14. A key element, the Steering Committee included a representativefrom each entity involved in execution. It was responsible for an analysis ofimplementation reports and studies as well as the formulation ofrecommendations to the ministries and agencies involved in the actions to beundertaken to improve urban management. Supported by a consulting firm(EPEVRY) for the monitoring and supervision of all project components as awhole, in conjunction with the technical and administrative departments it wasto develop indicators that would show what progress had been made and to issuethe quarterly progress reports. Its success depended in large part on theacceptance by the public services of the theoretical underpinnings of theproject and incorporation of measures proposed for the running of theGovernment.

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G. Eroiect Implementation

15. The expected benefits of the project resided primarily in animprovement in investment planning, formulation of urban policy andinstitutional performance, as prerequisites for better management in the CapVert region. The introduction of these measures was not to incur anyadditional expenditures over the short run but was to generate additionalresources and better employment of public funds. Initially, in order toensure the development of an appropriate institutional and policy framework,improve government performance and facilitate implementation of the variouscomponents, the Project was to integrate the activities of the Borrower'soffices with the technical assistance provided by outside consultants andsupervision by the Steering Committee.

16. Despite the specifics of each component, implementation can bebroken down into three major phases:

(a) The first phase (1985 and 1986) was devoted primarily to the studyof measures that would improve urban management and theformulation of specific proposals for the implementation of theBorrower's policy;

(b) The second phase (1986 and 1987) essentially involved theidentification of priority projects aimed at achieving theforegoing objectives and that could be implemented as part of aBank-supported urban project;

(c) Phase three (1987 to 1988) was centered on the design of thenecessary additional studies, resolution of institutional ortechnical/financial prerequisites of the Project and consolidationof previous progress.

17. The Credit Agreements (Side Letter No. 6) called for a 10-pointaction plan to finalize the taking of necessary decisions for the start-up oftechnical assistance and to measure general project performance as regardsimplementation. In June 1985, the date of the first supervision mission, thedegree of compliance with the plan was deemed to be very low, with theexception of (i) the audit of the OHLM accounts; (ii) formal establishment ofthe traffic bureau; (ii) [sic: ? iii] the interim report on the Cap Verttraffic plan; and (iv) the interim report on the Dakar urban developmentmaster plan. The planned actions ran into major implementation delays thatcould not be totally attributed to the postponed implementation of theproject.

18. Moreover, since the identification phase the operating technicaland financial conditions of the public entities had deterioratedsignificantly, primarily because of the measures adopted regardingrestrictions on public operating expenses as well as poor resourceutilization. This had led to a critical shortage of funds and a virtual totallack of means. Even if it had wanted to, the Government was not able to honorin full its commitments with regard to the physical implementation of theproject and effective mobilization of resources. This was true primarily for

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the transportation and municipal components and, to a lesser extent,investment programming, housing policy and project unit. Duringimplementation, they all ran into significant shortages with regard tologistics (facilities and/or technical means) and marked financialdifficulties regarding counterpart funds (operating of services andcofinancing of priority actions).

19. As regards human resources, in several sectors the project faced ashortage or limited availability of personnel (transportation, municipal andinvestment programming components). In this respect, the newness of theconcept, introduction of a project structure within the normal operations ofthe Government and the very modest compensation in view of the professionalprofiles required, led to disaffectation on the part of local counterparts andslow Government involvement. In addition, a lack of familiarity with theSenegalese context on the part of certain consultants, the fact that previoussectoral approaches were only partially taken into account and the specificnature of a public sector in a developing country occasionally prevented asatisfactory level of integration of technical assistance within the plannedtimeframe. In view of this experience, the necessary correlation between themeans implemented and expected results was not made. At least, it does notseem to have been reflected in practice. Remedial measures would neverthelesshave permitted greater participation and rigor on the part of theadministrative and technical departments. The major efforts made in thisregard by project management during a seminar (June 1985) concluding thestart-up phase did not produce the expected effects.

H. Project Results

20. In general, the results of the project can be consideredsatisfactory in relation to its objectives. Owing to its extensive scope andthe diversity of studies (five main components and 30 subcomponents), only themajor achievements will be mentioned briefly. Physical progress and thedetailed sectoral results are given in Annex 1.

21. It is premature to assess the project's impact on economicperformance, as numerous macroeconomic aspects have not been evaluated.Nevertheless, the more comprehensive approach to urban problems, bettermunicipal management and formulation of a new housing policy clearly have beenbeneficial in restoring local budget equilibria and restarting thedecentralization process. These improvements, resulting in part from acomprehensive strategy and more consistent investment, were made possible onlyby defining the urban sector itself and its hinterland. The comprehensiveapproach and analysis of inter- and subsectoral relationships have produced,in addition to modeling attached to the national planning system, a morebalanced approach to the sector and the start of a fertile dialogue amongministerial departments. The changes in the master plans (urban development,transportation, sanitation, etc., plans) bear witness to the progress made.It is nevertheless unfortunate that the involvement of the local governmentsin the design of central services is still limited.

22. Because of previous reservations, decentralization and return tothe local governments of the full exercise of their powers required the

elimination of many institutional, financial and technical requirements. Fromthe institutional standpoint, an exhaustive analysis of the relationshipsbetween the local governments and the State, city of Dakar and publicutilities led to a reformulation of the prerogatives and role of each party.Conducted jointly with the financial and technical research, the approach wascharacterized by considerable concern for feasibility. Several of the ensuingrecommendations were taken into account (deconcentration, cooperation betweenlocal governments and central services), while others (local taxation, inter-community solidarity, etc.) that were more complex to implement were examinedby the DC..

23. The role of that supervisory body was redefined and its missionadapted to the objectives of more decentralized management. In that respect,its involvement in the identification and later implementation of recoverystrategies for the 12 communities in the interior heralded the start of apractice involving more design and coordination than control. Moreover, therole of the DCL in meeting the requirements for establishing municipal creditattests to that new approach and the gradual move toward financial autonomyfor the local authorities.

24. In view of those new local responsibilities, the prolongeddeterioration and ultimately sudden collapse of municipal finances, the onlyalternative was drastic rehabilitation. The project permitted theimplementation of effective rehabilitation measures. Based on more realisticmanagement and monitoring tools, the preparation of truly balanced budgets andrealistic priority-setting with regard to operating expenditures are twosignificant results from the financial standpoint.

25. Control of the charges induced by the Technical Department, inparticular through employment quotas (15% reduction in the number of CUDstaffers) was accompanied by greater mobilization of local resources, as wellas the communities' own receipts received directly (market tax, advertising,fiscal minimum), along with property taxes and retail licenses. Theestablishment of a Receipts Division, better information to the public atlarge and introduction of computerization permitting the monitoring oftaxpayers was also beneficial. Thus, Dakar, which in 1984 had a budget ofCFAF 4 billion, was able in 1987 to balance more than CFAF 8 billion inexpenditures. This good performance nevertheless is partially due to theoffsetting of public debts and gradual depreciation (at the rate of CFAF 300million per year) of the former Dakar commune.

26. As regards the services rendered to the population, changes in thebudget enabled the Technical Deparzment to replace obsolete and inoperativemunicipal services, and resume the urban services programming and managementprocess. Supported by project expertise, that gradual resumption in activitywas physically reflected in the rehabilitation, maintenance and cleaning ofroads and partial rehabilitation of State-owned properties. Following adiagnostic study of all insufficiencies, this was made possible only through asweeping reorganization and implementation of a two-year priority action planinvolving regulatory and budget as well as technical issues.

- 10 -

27. Although recovery was limited by a shortage of means, gainingcontrol of the operating budget nevertheless made it possible to resume thefinancing of vital investments. Far from responding to real needs, operatingexpenditures from 1984 to 1988 increased slowly but steadily from CFAF 235million to CFAF 561 million. This modest result which is highly dependent onoverall equilibrium is nevertheless still considerable.

28. Lastly, the new vitality in Dakar's public services led, followingthe eventual transfer of technology, to the involvement of local officials intraffic and transportation policies managed by a Traffic Bureau. Receivingsupport from CIDA, with vital expertise and tools, the project made itpossible to update the traffic plan, ensure its management and prepare thepriority actions. Gradually incorporated within the Government, the newstructure is today managing urban traffic.

29. In order to ensure their sustainability, the foregoing objectivesincluded a major component for "human resources management and training."Although that component was fully implemented for staff of the Traffic Bureau,the accompanying recasting and reorganization of municipal services was onlymodest. Delays in the identification of personnel and needs, late adoption ofpriority actions for the medium run and the reduced operating capability ofthe municipal unit were responsible for the very partial implementation ofprograms. The results from the standpoint of training can be considered weak.

30. Despite the establishment of an Urban Development Division, theslow deployment of municipal services and decision to use sectoral supervisionfor the project undermined involvement of the local authorities inimplementing the housing policy and urban development components. This isregrettable, as local officials often need to ensure in full or in part thefinancing of infrastructure and support the recurrent maintenance charges.

31. As part of the new housing policy, the housing finance analysiswas the first overall look in Senegal at the sector and remains a point ofreference for any sectoral research. It largely helped formulate theproduction system for low-cost housing, evaluate affordable demand, means offinancing and mechanisms for mobilizing resources and savings. The proposals(technical and financial standards, construction price series, self-construction assistance) helped reduce certain constraints on the sector andprompted the BHS to develop new products for both utilization and resources.

32. To safeguard fragile budget equilibria and reduce or reallocateits resources, the State took measures to improve the management of itsproperties and the public real estate companies. In the first case, thepartial implementation of a decade-long program based on improved management,elimination of the convention system and a refocusing of activity on itsproperty resulted in savings of CFAF 1.5 billion per year. In the secondcase, the diagnostic study of dysfunctions and formulation of severalmanagement scenarios finally led the companies to recovery measures (SICAP) orto finalize a contrat-plan (SNHLM) with the State. Nevertheless, the mountingdelays and the persistence of behavior that ran counter to the objectives ofthe urban policy delayed the impact of that component.

- 11 -

33. As regards land development, the establishment of an urbandevelopment company (under private law) and the resolution of the requirementsgoverning its activity are positive results of the project. That mixedcompany responds to the dual need to increase the offer of lots free of taxeson publicly-owned land and to ensure the integration of the various urbanfunctions. Acting on behalf of the State, its role is to carry out andpromote priority actions under Dakar's urban development plan. To that end,it uses the principles of incremental development on the basis ofinfrastructure grids leading to subsequent improvement at less cost. Theproject also helped carry out the prefeasibility studies for the 10-yearactivity program that would make it possible to satisfy 25% of affordabledemand each year. The technical studies of a first 100-ha operation andaccess to BHS financing ensure that it will be immediately operational. Thisresult was nevertheless obtained only at the cost of a partial trade-off ofthe project's social objectives and a general raising of infrastructurelevels.

34. The findings of those studies lastly made it possible to identifyand prepare an Urban Management and Development Project receiving assistancefrom the Bank. A logical extension of the Urban Management and RehabilitationTechnical Assistance Project, it is consolidating its achievements andprolonging the effects.

I. Proiect Sustainability

35. The Bank's macroeconomic and long-term concerns, which were moreinstitutional than physical, did not fully satisfy the aspirations of theBorrower. Moreover, the project and its changes cannot reasonably be expectedto be fully effective solely during implementation. To ensure greatersustainability, the Bank had recommended that a National Urban DevelopmentCommittee be established with extensive jurisdiction and decision-makingpower. That body, which was not established, could have both capitalized onthe experience of the project and unified future sectoral strategies.

36. However, the enhanced intersectoral relationships, taking intoaccount the needs of urban development and decentralization as well as thegradual adoption by government offices of the concepts and methodologiestested under the project, are solid bases that can ensure maintenance and insome cases an improvement of the results already reaped. In general, theseinvolve (i) better municipal management; (ii) the ongoing reorganization ofpublic services and the urban transportation policy; and (iii) moreappropriate mechanisms for housing programming and finance. There should beno major challenge to their management by personnel with refined tools formore clear-cut tasks.

37. The continuing nature of the actions taken was also strengthenedby the project, although it is highly contingent on the following conditions,whose emergence or worsening would be very detrimental:

(a) further deterioration in public finances, undermining -- owing tothe negative effects on local budgets -- the ability to provide

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services. In this respect, the sharp budget cuts (40%) may have anegative effect in FY90-91;

(b) overlapping of institutional (establishment of new localgovernments) and administrative (organization of ministerialpowers) reforms could result in disorganization and prevent theattainment of the medium- and long-term management objectives;

(c) testing by the civil service of a voluntary departure policy,which, despite its positive effects on the wage bill, couldultimately deprive the State and local communities of some oftheir most experienced higher-level staff.

J. Bank Performance

38. The Bank's involvement in the preparation, appraisal andsupervision of the project largely helped improve the urban sector andmunicipal management in the Dakar region. In addition, IDA's help in settingup the project and its implementation clearly led to a more fruitful dialoguebetween parties who often had sectoral and hence narrow outlooks.

39. In general, the Bank's efforts were satisfactory and projectdesign good. Following two urban projects, the Bank was seeking toconsolidate the achievements and carry out a more ambitious pilot projectinvolving a greater number of parties and executing agencies. Owing to thehigh risk of such an undertaking, the Bank had recommended supervision of 70weeks, which is substantial for a project normally implemented over 30 months.In fact, the reduction in supervision (in relation to appraisal projections)and very limited use of expertise significantly undermined the quality ofmonitoring.

40. The intermingling beginning in April 1986 of supervision taskswith the identification of a subsequent urban project also interfered with thetime spent on meeting the first objective. To meet all performance targetsunder the project, it would have clearly been more advisable to planpreparation and then the effectiveness of the new credit agreement inaccordance with a timetable that safeguarded the completion of the currentproject. Moreover, the turnover of project officials, in the wake of internalreorganization, a lengthy interruption in 1988 and a lack of regular analysesof general project performance also weakened the effects of supervision.

41. More fundamentally, it appears that the Bank allowed, without atrue objective basis, the project to be based on overestimated results fromthe Senegalese economic recovery program. In this respect, the limited numberof effectiveness requirements and conditions is significant. Although it madeit possible to shorten the duration of preparation and facilitatednegotiations, this merely postponed the emergence of certain problems. Thefirst supervision missions found progress on certain actions decided betweenthe parties to be poor. Subsequently, the Bank seems to have demonstratedoptimism that did not take into account the real conditions surroundingproject implementation. Closer supervision would have unquestionably helped

- 13 -

correct the gaps and led to prompter decisions more consistent with the CreditAgreements.

42. On the basis of this experience, the Bank can draw three mainlessons from its involvement. First, it appears that the ongoing nature andregularity of supervision are two key conditions for the success of a projectin a sensitive sector. Secondly, as regards the resolution of policy-relatedissues and the formulation of basic orientations, the timeframes must be morerealistic than those planned in the initial timetable. Thirdly, themultisectoral dimension and greater number of administrative entities involvedrequire specific procedures and regular assessments based on prior contractualcommitments that are sanctioned by the gradual disbursement of the creditproceeds.

K. Borrower Performance

43. Overall, the performance of project beneficiaries can beconsidered satisfactory, especially given the fact that a delicate approachwas used. Project risks lay primarily in maintaining government commitmentsto manage urban growth efficiently, in the smooth running of the SteeringCommittee to ensure liaison between the authorities or government officesinvolved in urban management and lastly in the real compliance of publicagencies with the comprehensive policy adopted. In a context of economic andfinancial belt-tightening and a worsening of resource constraints, these risksdid materialize in part during implementation.

44. In this respect, despite the concern for efficiency demonstratedby project management, the prolonged vacancy in the technical department didnot enable the Borrower to (i) ensure regular accounting of the actionsundertaken and the quality of studies carried out; (ii) meet its commitmentswith regard to technical and financial progress reports (quarterly and six-monthly); or (iii) develop indicators to assess project performance inrelation to its environment.

45. From the standpoint of economic analysis, the Borrower largelyoverestimated the achievements of the medium-term recovery plan (PALM). Inpoint of fact, the critical situation (both structural and financial) of thepublic entities involved in the project was not reflected in realisticprojections. This error led to an underestimation of the difficultiesencountered in meeting the political, institutional and financial conditionsrequired for smooth implementation.

46. Moreover, implementation of the short-term plan called for by theCredit Agreements based on 10 priority action3 was late and limited. With theexception of several technical measures, the implementation of that plan wassuch that it was not possible to finalize the decisions vital for making bestuse of the technical assistance or to measure the general performance of theproject through its implementation. This general situation, exacerbating thedeficient decision-making in municipal management and sharing of responsi-bilities in urban and transportation policy, caused a significant lack ofprecise guidelines from the outset, triggering conflicts of jurisdiction andoften holding the project back. On this last point, the extent to which the

- 14 -

executing agencies agreed with project design and their commitment to therequirements and objectives must be questioned.

47. The Borrower could draw three main lessons from its involvement:

(a) The use of a team approach to management and consultation bodiesmust be accompanied, to avoid any misunderstanding or overlappingof jurisdiction, by in-depth preliminary dialogue that producesterms of reference detailing the prerogatives of each entity;

(b) The technical executing agencies must be involved in projectformulation starting with the identification stage. To that end,they must strengthen their design capability and streamlineadministrative procedures; and

(c) The provision of counterpart funds for minimal operations of thetechnical entities of a project ensures good physical preparation,efficient implementation and satisfactory results.

L. Relationship Between the Borrower and the Bank

48. The President's Report bears witness to the particular attentionpaid by both parties to project preparation, as they wished to avoid thedifficulties encountered under the Sites and Services Project. To that end,the formulation of macroeconomic and sectoral objectives, the expectedbenefits, roles and responsibilities of the management bodies, executingagencies and technical assistance were first examined by in-depth studies,resulting in lasting dialogue between the Bank and the Borrower.

49. Moreover, project monitoring and the frequency and nature offinancial and technical reports kept the Borrower sufficiently involved in theprocess as a whole. With the exception of specific contradictions inherent inpolicy management, the objectives were viewed similarly by the two parties.

50. The innovative concept and establishment of good relations withthe Borrower made possible a fruitful undertaking in the urban sector. Oftenperceived as an intermediary between prerogatives and sectoral interests, theBank demonstrated adaptability and flexibility in resolving complex issues.In most instances, the necessary compromises were found.

M. Consulting Services

51. The project relied on technical assistance from outside experts.Depending on the extent of the Borrower's sectoral experience, that technicalassistance took the form of short-term missions, advisory assistance or theinvolvement of resident specialists. In the case of studies and management,the services to be provided had institutional, technical and financialaspects.

52. During the first quarter of 1985 (February), five study contractswere given to the consultants responsible for technical assistance, relatingto the following project components and groups:

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- Project steering EPEVRY- Urban investment programming CEGIR- Urban development and housing policy OTUI- Municipal policy BCEOM- Transportation policy LAFERRIERE

53. For the project as a whole, the expert services were found by theBorrower to be good and of a high professional level. For the most part theywere provided in a timely manner, although those involving (i) investmentprogramming; (ii) the feasibility of development operations; and (iii) thetraining plan experienced delayed implementation because of the approvalprocedures. The preparation of a subsequent urban project and extension ofthe project's mission in certain cases prompted the Borrower to strengthen andprolong the missions. This was particularly true for the housing, municipalpolicy and transportation components.

54. The transfer of technology was real and of a satisfactory qualityfor the components as a whole. Cooperation between consultants andbeneficiaries was often fruitful and well integrated. Exceptions would be the"investment programming" and "project steering" components, the first neverhaving truly been integrated into the Planning Department and the secondhaving prematurely ended.

N. Project Documentation

55. As an appraisal report was not issued for the project, thePresident's Report was the basic document used in implementing the operationsby component and for supervision. It became evident during implementationthat a more detailed document highlighting the major focuses would haveprovided a better understanding of approaches and helped the supervisionmissions.

56. Moreover, despite their regularity, the supervision reports wereoften incomplete and gave limited data on general project performance. Thatsituation was particularly problematic as the Borrower did not carry out theplanned technical evaluations.

16 -

REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL

URBAN MANAGEMENT ANI. EHABILITATION TECHNICAL ASSIT1.NCE PROJECT

(CREDITS 1458-SE AND SF-13)


PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE

A. Overview

57. On July 20, 1984, the Senegalese Government and the World Banksigned two Credit Agreements totaling about CFAF 2.6 billion to finance theUrban Management and Rehabilitation Technical Assistance Project (Second UrbanProject), as a follow-up to the Bank's initial activities in the urban sectorrelated to sites and services.

58. The project was an integrated operation consisting of fourcomponents, with activities concentrated in the Dakar region, whichencompasses the city of Dakar and the adjacent communes. Such a project mightseem to pose complex problems as regards the coordination of the variouscomponents and sector policies, and this was in fact the case. It entailed awide range of issues, from macroeconomic analysis to municipal finance, andspanning urban development, housing finance, transportation planning, andtraffic management.

59. The studies performed as part of the project provided thenecessary framework for developing an overall urban strategy, and addressedthe most urgent problems facing the capital. The Project also included anaction plan based on proposed courses of action to be adopted by theauthorities for improving the context for the implementation of a new urbanpolicy.

B. The World Bank and Senegal

60. Attention was drawn to the need for possible World Bank action inthe urban sector as a result of a meeting held on January 18, 1983 at theMinistry of Planning and Cooperation to discuss the institutional andfinancial aspects of the Cap Vert Urban Development Master Plan.

61. In July 1983, after a second World Bank mission, agreement wasreached on an analysis of urban sector problems and the terms of reference forstudies and other activities, to be part of an urban project financed by theWorld Bank. The Bank's first mission (for identifying an appropriate sphereof activities in the urban sector) took place in February 1983.

62. After signature of the Credit Agreements, the World Bank sent onlytwo missions exclusively for the purposes of supervision. These were in June1985 and January 1986. This was because the terms of reference for thevarious studies and services had been clearly defined by the parties. From

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then on (i.e. from the May 1986 supervision mission), identification of theUrban Management and Development Project was easy.

63. By the end of the supervision mission by Messrs. F. Pechon andP. Blanchet (November 21-29, 1988), all components of the Project had beencompleted, aside from the preparation of designs for SCATTURBAM and a study ofSICAP. At each stage, the supervision missions and the harmoniousrelationship between Senegalese and World Bank staff enabled progress on thecomponents to be assessed and the necessary guidelines and instructions to beissued. In fact, the views of the World Bank and the Senegalese Governmentwere identical throughout project implementation.

C. The Project Unit and Problems of Coordination

64. The project unit was accommodated in the Ministry of Planning. Itsuccessfully supervised all the project components, in accordance with theCredit Agreements and World Bank guidelines and in line with Senegaleselegislation. The project unit was the main interlocutor for the World Bank.The technical executing agencies were responsible for ensuring the properimplementation of sector policies in the various components, in cooperationwith the consulting firms.

65. Although overall the project objectives of preparing studies andundertaking activities leading to the identification and implementation of theUrban Management and Rehabilitation Project were achieved, the Project didsuffer from the following shortcomings:

(a) There was no clear definition in any terms of refsrence of theoperational relationship between the project unit and thetechnical executing agencies, and this often led to conflictsregarding their respective jurisdictions.

(b) In the first year of implementation, the staff of the project unithad not been trained in the procurement and accounting proceduresprescribed by the World Bank and the Senegalese Government. Thetechnical assistance provided by EPEVRY was not very effective.

(c) There was a clear need for a project monitoring and supervisionagency at national level, similar to the Steering Committee thathad successfully overseen the negotiations.

66. This is to be regretted, because there were undeniable links amongthe various components:

(a) It is impossible to establish a fiscal cadastre without firstdrawing up and implementing an urban development plan.

(b) The design and implementation of the transportation and trafficplan and the urban development plans are inextricably linked.

(c) Municipal capital investment is an integral part of urbandevelopment plans, and must be coordinated with them.

18 -

Consequently, the links among the various modules should have beencoordinated.

D. The Steering Committee

67. In February 1983, a Steering Committee consisting ofrepresentatives of all the ministries concerned with the urban sector wasestablished. Discussions between the World Bank and the Steering Committeeled to an agreement in March 1983 on the terms of reference for a preliminarystudy.

68. That preliminary study, supervised by the Steering Committee, wasprepared by a team of Senegalese specialists from the public and parapublicsectors and French staff from EPEVRY. The interim report produced by the teamin Match 1983 and the final report in July 1983 provided a basis fordiscussions between the Senegalese Government and the World Bank.

E. The Monitoring Committee

69. The Monitoring Committee for the project was really a continuationof the Steering Committee. It was established in February 19C3 to serve as aninterlocutor for the World Bank. It included representatives from all of thetechnical executing agencies for the various components, and from the otheroffices involved in the Project.

70. The Monitoring Committee was therefore established, chaired by thePlanning Director of the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation, and composed ofrepresentatives of the Ministries of Decentralization, Planning andCooperation, Urban Development and Housing, Equipment, Economy and Finance,and the Interior, together with representatives of SOTRAC, SONEES, SENELEC,and the city of Dakar. It was to examine project studies and reports andrecommend the appropriate measures for achieving project objectives.Unfortunately, the Committee met only twice, at the beginning of the Project,and the components were simultaneously implemented by the various agencieswithout any contacts or intercommunication among the various parties.

F. The Technical Director

71. The Ministry of Urban Development and Housing was to assist theMinistry of Planning in coordinating the Project. It therefore appointed asenior official to be the Technical Director of the project unit. However,the Technical Director was almost never available, and this, combined with thehigh turnover of appointees, was detrimental to consistency and progress.

G. The Planning Department

72. It is only recently that the Planning Deparcment has begun toaddress the urban sector explicitly, as a resuit of the Urban Management andRehabilitation Technical Assistance Project (second phase). The studiesundertaken in this component provided a clearer view of the sector, andimproved overall and regional planning. The data produced for the studies of

- 19 -

urban centers meet the needs of planning specialists dealing with thepreparation, selection and prioritization of investment projects.

73. In addition, the information in the studies provides anopportunity for refining the assessment of community needs and the productionapparatus, and can thus facilitate the formulation of urban policy.Nevertheless, a number of problems arose and affected the development andcoordination of the component. Technical assistance -- planned to last twoyears -- was delayed. so that achievement of the various objectives wasuncoordinated. In particular, computerization became the final step in theprocess, and the planned transfer of technology was not possible.

74. In addition, action on this component was sometimes indecisive, somuch so that it was very difficult to provide even a minimum of satisfactoryworking conditions when technical assistance was introduced. In practice,informal contacts proved more important than the formal relationships,particularly because none of the planned coordinating mechanisms reallyworked.

75. Because of this problem and the imminent end of the technicalassistance contract period for this component, the Planning Department, incooperation with the two project experts, prepared a further project entitledAm6lioration de 1'Inc=gration de la Planification Nationale et Urbaine(Enhanced Integration of National and Urban Planning), the purpose being toconsolidate the achievements of the component and properly integrate thefunctions and results of urban capital investment planning into the overallplanning system. In August 1988, the project documentation was submitted toCIDA, together with an application for financing.

H. DCH (Construction and Housing Department)

76. Under the "housing policy" component, a price series forconstruction was prepared and technical assistance provided for the DCH. Asupport program was formulated for the Department, so that this instrumentcould be made permanent and disseminated. It consisted of the following:

(a) introduction of the necessary provisions for periodically updatingprices;

(b) management and dissemination of the series within the constructionsector;

(c) development of the series, in particular by incorporating buildingrehabilitation and plot servicing;

(d) establishment and management of the BNPC (National Bureau ofConstruction Prices).

77, There was no follow-up to the proposal, and it can therefore beconsidered that so far the study has not had the effect it deserved, in lightof the importance of the work and the advantages it would provide forestablishing standards in the construction sector.

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I. Urban Development and Architecture Department

78. The study on the preparation of infrastructure standards had areal impact on the approach adopted by the Urban Development and ArchitectureDepartment. The study had direct effects on the planning of SCAT-URBAM landdevelopment operations. More generally -- and although the direct impactcannot be quantified -- consultations with the offices responsible for urbandevelopment most certainly contributed toward bringing about the followingchanges:

(a) The inclusion of the concept of incremental plot servicing in thenew Urban Development Code.

(b) The infrastructure grids previously adopted for urban developmentplans (i.e. for Dakar) have now been adjusted in light of the needfor savings.

(c) Infrastructure costs are taken into account in detailed urbandevelopment studies.

(d) Methods are being sought for recovering development costs, even inthe case of publicly-owned plots.

J. Strengthening of the DGPB (State-Owned Properties ManagementDepartmentl

79. So far, this program, which required a commitment of CFAF 4.3billion over four years, has not been established. Nevertheless, a number ofrelated projects have been launched. First, measures have been adopted forpreventing further renting and making housing no longer subject to specialagreements. This has produced budget savings of about CFAF 1.5 billion.Another important item is the FAC-supported Projet d'Assistance a la Gestiondu Patrimoine BAti (State-Owned Properties Management Assistance Project),providing for the establishment and computerization of management, togetherwith a maintenance plan.

K. SICAP (Socift6 Immobiliere du Cap-Vert) and SNHLM (Societ6Nationale des Habitations a Loyers Moderes)

80. The identification of measures for increasing the efficiency ofthe planned housing policy included action involving SICAP and the formerOHLM. Various scenarios for the future of those enterprises were proposed,including decreasing the government share in their management or developingthem further, with -- in the case of SICAP -- some form of privatization.Consideration of these scenarios served to assist the two agencies in thepreparation of recovery plans.

81. SICAP and SNHLM are currently implementing strategic recoveryplanE. In any case, the studies prepared in connection with this component ofthe project have been very profitable, and have produced positive effects forrecovery in this sector of housing production. Nevertheless, since the entiresystem of housing finance is now geared toward ownership, these agencies now

21 -

depend for their survival on the development of promotion activities.However, over the long term their stock of rental properties may disappear.

L. SCAT-URBAM (Central Land Development Aaencyl

82. It was unanimously acknowledged that the system of housingproduction was facing a bottleneck with regard to the servicing of plots thatwould be affordable to all segments of housing demand, particularly plots forself-construction. It was therefore decided to establish an agency fordeveloping sites "that could attract a major part of the land market by beingoffered in significant numbers at competitive prices and with considerablybetter conditions as regards title and infrastructure" than the existingmarket.

83. The preparation mission for the establishment of the Agency tookplace within the framework of the project unit for the Urban Management andRehabilitation Technical Assistance Project. SCAT-URBAM was established inJune 1988 to provide builders (i.e. public and private promoters),cooperatives and individuals with standardized plots that had been servicedand rationalized from the viewpoint of land use and the inclusion of thenecessary elements for an urban center (i.e. productive activities, schoolsand other community facilities).

(a) As regards the first point, the procedures for establishing theagency were not easy, particularly with respect to the capitalstock contributed by private stockholders. This explains thedelay in the establishment of SCAT-URBAM, which was in June 1988,a full year after the end of the preparation mission.

(b) As regards the second point relating to the land developmentoperations, the orders declaring such operations to be in thepublic interest and approving detailed Urban Development Planswere issued within the normal timeframe, but were sometimesconsidered extreme.

M. The Traffic Bureau

84. The Traffic Bureau was established in April 1985 and isaccommodated in premises rehabilitated by the project unit, which provided itwith the necessary equipment for start-up. Although there have been misstepsin staff hiring, the Bureau now obviously has competent staff for performingits functions. It consists of two units: the information and data managementunit and the studies and monitoring unit. Since being established, the Bureauhas undertaken various important activities, but a regular budget allocationmust be provided to enable it to continue operating.

N. Local Government Department

85. The following proposals submitted by consultants have beenimplemented:

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(a) The ministry's ex-ante supervision now means that the communesprepare realistic budgets based on properly rationalized items.

(b) The establishment of municipal income units has improved thecontrol of directly collected municipal revenues (i.e. from realestate sales and property income).

(c) As a result of the computerization of municipal revenue collectionin Dakar, recoveries and the positions of taxpayers in arrears cannow be more satisfactorily monitored.

(d) A number of problems are hindering the repayment by CUD of thedebts owed by the former Dakar commune (identified in anotherreport), because CUD is having to meet other expenditures.

86. The terms of reference for technical assistance provided for thefollowing two items, which have been produced:

(a) a diagnostic study of the Department with respect to itsorganization and the application of effective mechanisms, methodsand procedures;

(d)[sic] a study on the introduction of municipal credit.

Some technical assistance activities could not be properly performed,particularly those relating to training and to increasing the efficiency oftax collection.

0. CUD (City of Dakar)

87. The proposal that the membership of the CUD Committee be increasedwas implemented, and the 1990 reform expanded the number of commune delegatesto CUD from 10 to 15 (i.e. 5 for Dakar, 3 for Pikine, 3 for Guediawaye, 2 forRufisque and 2 for Bargny).

88. The proposal to re-establish the maintenance of certain urbanservices relating to safety continues to be important. CUD is responsible formaintaining street lighting and public toilets.

89. The lighting system has recently been extended to the road leadingto the airport, the highway, and the eastern Corniche. CUD's TechnicalServices Department is currently discussing an appropriate system for managingpublic toilets.

90. It has been proposed that a system be introduced for preventingwastage of drinking water from standpipes, since these involve great expenseto the communes. A start has been made on this proposal with the developmentof individual connections and the idea of introducing payment for the use ofstandpipes. Other proposals regarding the collection of household waste andthe supervision of public utilities (i.e. SENELEC, SONEES, SONATEL and SIAS)continue to be very important.

- 23 -

91. Technical assistance made it possible to perform an in-depthdiagnostic study of STCUD (CUD's Technical Services), which were lamentablyunderequipped and overstaffed. Loans made under the Project have made itpossible to repair the equipment that could be salvaged and to acquire otheressential items. Although the personnel did not receive the training that wasoriginally platned, over this period CUD management hired STCUD staff of ahigh standard.

P. CIDA (Canadian International Development Association)

92. Cofinancing from CIDA consisted of a grant of Can$250,000 to coverthe final activities of the consulting firm providing technical assistance forthe Traffic Bureau.

- 24 -

PART m: STATISTICAL INFQRMATION

A. Bank Lending to the Urban Sector

Table 1: Bank Lending to the Urban Sector

Credit Title Year Approved Amount

336-SE Sites and Services 1972 US$8 M

1061-SN Urban Sector 1980 US$5.3 M

SF-13-SE UMRTAP 1984 SDR 2.8 M

1458-SE UMRTAP 1984 SDR 2.9 M

1884-SE UMDP 1988 SDR 32.5 M

2075-SE AGETIP/PWEP 1989 US$20 M

93. The Goverment of Senegal asked IDA to help it solve the various problemsencountered in shifting from State-controlled urban development and housing to a moredecentralized policy open to the private sector. In that context, Credit(s) 1458-SE and SF-13essentially mark the start of a new role for the State; the Credits helped in implementing thenew policy and reducing the drain of urban development on the public coffers. In thatrespect, the project largely contributed to the birth of the Urban Management andDevelopment Project.

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B. Er.Qim akh

Table 2: Principal Dates in the Life of the Project

Item Programming Revision Actual

First mention of the project 1982 _ 02/83

Project appraisal 07/83 07/83 10/04/83

Negotiations 11/83 11/83 03/03/84

IDA President's Report - 03/27/84

Board Approval 01/84 02/84 04/17/84

Signature of Credit Agreements 03/84 03/84 06/20/84

Effectiveness of Agreements 07/84 07/84 11/19/84

Closing date 12/31/87 12/31/88 12/31/89

End of operations 12/31/89 06/30/90 06/30/90

Comments on oroiect management timetable

94. The project was appraised in October 1983. Negotiations were held in Parisin the first week of March 1984 and the IDA Board approved the operation on April 17,1984. Despite this rapid succession of the various phases of project preparation, there weresubsequent delays. Thus, despite the urgency that the Government stated it accorded theoperations, project signature took place three months late and effectiveness five months afterthe initially scheduled date. The possible reasons for these delays are linked primarily to thenewness of the undertaking, gaining familiarity of Bank procedures as well as administrativered tape in satisfying the conditions for effectiveness. The closing date was extended by oneyear and a second request made for a further extension. The Bank refused to extend theclosing date a second time, but authorized disbursements on operations already committed foran additional period of six months. Because of that measure, the last activities (involvingassistance to the land development agency) could be completed on June 30, 1990.

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Table 3: Technical Assistance Timetable

Project Component Projected Actual Duration

Urban InvestmentProgramming 09/85 to 07/87 01/86 to 10/88 15 months

Housing and UrbanDevelopment Policy 03/85 to 10/87 03/85 to 06/89 20 months

Transportation Policy 04/85 to 04/87 06/85 to 11/88 19 months

Municipal Policy 03/85 to 03/87 03/85 to 12/87 09 months

Project Oversight/Management 03/85 to 10/87 03/85 to 01/86 N/A

Comments on the physical implementation timetable of the proiect

95. A comparison of the planned and actual dates of physical implementationshows, on average for the main components of the project, a delay of more than one year.The lag for the urban development component alone (regarding land development) was inexcess of two years. Although planned from January 1985 to December 1987, the projectwas actually executed from March 1985 to December 1988, when virtually all tasks identifiedby the terms of reference had been completed. The studies or actions yet to be completed orundertaken were finished in June 1990, i.e., 30 months after the date set by identification or18 months beyond the initially scheduled closing date set in the Credit Agreements (December31, 1988). These last works were completed in tandem with the effectiveness of theAgreement for the Urban Management and Development Project (November 3, 1988).

C. Credit Disbursements (in thousands of USS)

Table 4: Schedule of IDA Disbursements under Credits 1458-SE & SF-13

Am,. - . _ ,Cumulative

Expenditu AcalIDA Fiscal Ycar Appraial Commimded % Appmial Expenditure %

1984 - 105.40 1.5% 105.40 1.5%

1985 1,500.00 2,476 33% 1.500 2,582 34.5%

1986 1,500.00 1,914 25% 3,000 4,495 60%

1987 2,000.00 1,713 23% 5000 6.209 82.5%

1988 1 ,000.00 741 10% 6,000 6,951 93%

1989 5 541 7% - 7,493 100%UWOWW~~~~~

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Table 5: Consolidated situation (in thousands of US$)

Fisca Year Appmial Revixion Expendiures Disburanwm %Cornunittd Disbursed

1984 .105 105 1.26%

1985 1,330.00 1,330.00 2,585 1,422 17.10%

1986 1,660.00 1,660.00 2,135 1,011 12.10%

1987 1,660.00 1,960.00 2,020 2,489 29.90%

1988 1,330.00 1,565.00 930 2,307 27.70%

1989 670.00 808.86 556 644 7.70%

1990 . 354 4.20%

TarAL 6,650.00 7,323.86 8,333 8,333 100%

Comments on disbursements

96. All proceeds of Credits 1458-SE and SF-13 were disbursed under the projects.The credits were utilized rapidly, as in year one 34% of the funds were used. During thesecond year 25% was used and the pace was sustained in the third year (23%). 82.5% of thefunds under the two credits were disbursed by the end of the third year.

D. Proiect implementation

Table 6: Utilization of credit proceeds (in thousands of US$)

SUMMARY OF THE UTILIZATION OF IDA FUNDS BY COMPONENT

Ref. COMPONENT 1985 18 1987 198t 1989 TOTAL

a Invec4nen Progamnming 179 183 134 11 - 509

b Urban and Housing Policy 938 573 634 350 350 2,847

c Trnaportton 404 353 488 332 167 I,747

d Municipal Policy 798 739 353 21 23 1,937

e Projet Unit 260 64 I10 25 452

Total 2,582 1,914 .713 741 541 7,493_~--

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(a) UTLIZATION OF CREDfT SF-13 BY COMPONENT

Ref. COMPONENr 1985 1986 1987 198 1989| TOrAL CR.SPF13

a Invtment Progrmniing 145 183 134 11 . 475

b Urbn and Housing Policy 61 _ 350 311 722

c Tmanportion 294 345 477 332 167 1 618

d Municipal Policy . 320 164 21 11 518

c Project Unit 131 11 143

Total 571 921 776 716 491 3 478

(b) UTILIZATION OF IDA CREDIT 1448 BY COMPONENT

Ref. COMPONENT 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 TOTAL CR. 1458

a Invcument Progrmmning 33 - . 33

b Urban and Housing Policy 938 512 634 . 39 2 124

c TMportaion 110 7 11 129

d Municipal Policy 798 419 189 . 11 1 418

o Project Unit 128 52 102 25 . 308

Total 2 010 992 936 25 50 4 015

Table 7: Rate of Credit Utilization by Component

(a) Annual utilization

Ref. COMPONENT 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

a Inveutmett 9.59% 7.83% 1.60% -

Progmmming 6.96%

b Urban and Housing 36.36% 29.96% 37.02% 47.21% 64.72%Policy

c Transportation 15.68% 18.44% 28.53% 44.88% 30.98%

d Municipal Policy 30.94% 38.64% 20.65% 2.88% 4.28%

e Project Unit 10.07% 3.37% 5.97% 3.41% 0.02%

Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

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(b) Rate of utilization throughout the life of the project

Ref. COMPONENT 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 TOTAL

a Inve1amt Progrnming 3526% 36.04% 26.36% 2.34% . 100%

b Urban and Housing Policy 32.97% 20.15% 22.27% 12.30% 12.32% 100%

c Txnportation 23. 16% 20.21% 27.97% 19.05% 9.61% 100%

d Municipal Policy 41.24% 38.19% 18.27% 1.10% 1.20% 100%

o Project Unit 57.51% 14.26% 22.61% 5.60% 0.03% 100%

Cogments on credit utilization

97. During the first two years of the project, efforts focused on formulating thehousing policy and technical assistance to the municipalities (technical services and financialmanagement). During the second half of the project, the 'housing" portion of the componentreceived even greater attention, whereas the "transportation" part was fully developed.

E. rgiect costs

Table 8:

Item (in millions of USS) Appraisal Revision Actual

Total project cost (USS million) 6.650 7,323.86 8,333

Overrun or reduction (in %) __ 11% 24.8%

Amount of credits (US$ million) 6.000 6,000 7,493

Disbursed _ 8,333

Canceled ___

Utilization 100%

Economic rate of return N/A

Financial performance _ good

Comments on the variation in project costS

98. Financial commitments were greater than the amount of the initial credits.Essentially, this was due to the magnitude of fluctuations in the exchange rates and a lack offorward-looking management of commitments and regular monitoring of accounts. Otherfactors included, in particular:

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* the original orders, which had neither been properly evaluated or delivered ontime;

e additional project activities, with the Bank's approval;

* the belated taking into account of the consequences of revaluing and revisingthe costs of the services provided by the various consulting firms, especiallyin view of the fact that project implementation continued far beyond the initialtimeframe.

F. Project financdin

Table 9: Origin and Distribution of Resources (in thousands of USS)

GapSource Credit Appraisal Revision Disbursement (+ or-)

I Credits SE 13 3,048.00 3,048.00 4,015 967

IDA SF 1458 2,952.00 2,952.00 3,478 526

2 Local Senegal 650.00 650.00 623 -27

3 Cofinancing CIDA 213.86 213.86

TOTAL 6,650.00 6,863.86 8,333 1,466

Credits on the origin of funds

99. The gap between the approved and revised amount results from an additionalCIDA funding (Credit 2437-SE) entitled a "bridge credit" for Can$250,000 (Agreement ofOctober 28, 1987).

The projected financing plan for the project was revised to allow time for theadditional works necessary for the completion of the various components. In addition,because of a first contribution from CIDA the transportation portion could be extended, withcounterpart funds making it possible to cover the amounts committed. The gap indisbursements and identified costs is about 25%, essentially attributable to wide swings in thevalue of the SDR during project implementation.

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Table 10: Breakdown of Credits by Category (in thousands of USS)

SUMMARY OF THE ALLOCATION OF IDA PROCEEDS BY CATEGORY OFEXPENDITURE

Ref. CATEGORY OF EXPENDITJUR 1985 1986 1987 i988 1989 TOTAL

I CivilWorik s . 320 - 28 349

2 Equipment, Matrials and Supplies 59 437 236 148 S0 932

3 Three Consulting Service. 2,465 1,435 1,063 593 462 6,019

4 Taining 21 41 6 . . 130

S Micellaneous 36 25 - - 62

Total 2,582 1,914 1,713 741 541 7,493

(a) ALLOCATION OF THE PROCEEDS OF IDA CREDfT SF-13 BY CATEGORY OFEXPENDITURE

Ref. CATEGORY OF EXPENDITURE 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 TOTALCr. SF 13

1 Civil Works . 320 . 28 349

2 Equipmet, Mteriab and Supplies = 415 115 124 = 655

3 Three Consulting Services 571 506 340 591 462 2473

4 Trining .- - -

5 Miscellaneous . . .-

Totwl 571 921 776 716 491 3 478

(b) ALLOCATION OF THE PROCEEDS OF CREDIT 1458 BY CATEGORY OFEXPENDITURE

. .... _._- inn-m*

Ref. CATEGORY OF EXPENDITURE 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 TOTALCr. 1458

1 Civil Work . - -

2 Equipmcnt, Materials and Supplies 59 22 120 23 50 277

3 Three Consulting Sevices 1,893 928 722 1 3,545

4 Training 24 41 68 | 130

5 Miscllaneous 36 25 * - 62

| Total 2,010 992 935 24 50 4,015

-32 v

Table 11: Annual credit utilization by category

Rat CATEGORY OP EXPENDiTURE 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

1 Civil Works _ 18.70% 5.28%

2 Equipment, Mearials and Supplies 2.30% 22.87% 13.79% 19.99% 9.35%

3 Consulting Service 95.47% 74.95% 62.05% 80.01% 85.38%

4 Tmining 1.30% 2.14% 3.90% ._ _

5 Micellmncoua 0.80% 1.50% __ _

ToWa 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

Comments on allocations by category

100. Project funds were largely (more than 80%) allocated to cover expendituresassociated with technical assistance experts. The equipment acquired by the project was forthe most part rolling stock for the city of Dakar.

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G. Con=aual Qsmimnla

Table 12: Commit in Side Letter No. 6 to the Credit Agreexents

Reference Nature of the Commitment Status

A - (I) a OHLM Audit before 30/0911984 Satisfied 05/15/1985

A - (1) b Notification by September 30, 1984 of measurestaken or to be taken to inprove the urvey ofclainm on plots nd the etablishment of housingloasu Satisfied 0511511985

A - (2) Notifation by Septemb4r 30, 1984 of meamiretaken or to be taken to improve the mnobiizaionof municipal resours Satisfied 11/30/1984

B - (1) EsAblishmnt of the Traffic Bueau by Septenber satisfied by 11/30/198430, 1984 _

B - (2) Decision of the Government by December 12,1984 regarding the split of responsibilitiesbetween the centrml govenumcnt and Dakar forinfrsuctur management and mintAennce Decision not taken

B - (3) Dei ion of the Government regarding the Decision not takentrunsportation plan before December 31, 1984

B - (4) Amendment prior to December 31, 1984 of BHS Satisfied, but the ttutes were notmatet to allow for loans to non-wage ermers amended to achieve the project

objectives

B - (5) Decision of the Goverment on the detailed UrbanDevelopment M"ter Plan pnior to March 31, Deciuon not taken1985

B- (6) Recommendations prior to June 30, 1985 on waysto reduce subsidies to State-owned propeities andMTimprve rent coUoction Satisfied by 7/30/1985

B- (7) Propoal of the Govenmwent on the FECL prior toJune 30, 1985 Satiosied in June 1987

B - (8) Establishment of an urban land developmentagency prior to March 31, 1986 Satisfid by May 28, 1988

Comments on contractlal commitments

101. Few conditions were set for credit effectiveness and these presented .o realdifficulties. This situation had been designed so as not to delay project implementation.Nevertheless, it became apparent that the lack of consideration or underestimating ofinstitutional, financial and technical prerequisites ultimately only postponed the emergence oftrue problems. The following table shows that important decisions from the regarding thegeneral urban policy remain unresolved, primarily in terms of the allocation of responsibilitiesand guidelines for the Transportation and Urban Development Plans.

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H. Resources allocated to the Eroject

Table 13: Utilization of Human Resources (in number of weeks)

Project Cycle Estimated Revised Actual

Prior to appraisal 12 12 12

From appraisal to Boardapproval

20 27.4 27.4

Froli Board approval toeffectiveness

3 3.6 3.6

During supervision____________ ____________35 43* 43

TOTAL 70 86 86

D During supervision, of the 43 weeks recorded, 28 weeks were used for missions.

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Table 14: Missions

Misnion Month/year No. Weeks No. Persona No. Man-weeks Date of Report

(i) Project Prpaation _

Identification 01/83 1 1 1 02/15/83

Prpation 3/83 1 2 2 03/18/83

Appraiml 07/83 2 2 4 07/29/83

Negotiaion 03/84 1 2 2 03/04/83

TOTAL 15 7 9 1(ii) Project Supervision

Supervision 1 06/85 1.5 2 3 07/01/85

Supervision 2 01/86 1.5 2 3 02/07/86

Supervision 3 05/86 2 2 3 06/18/86

Supervision 4 01/87 1.5 2 2 02/09/87

Supervision 5 05/87 1 1 1 05/09/87

Supervision 6 06/87 1 1 1 07/07/87

Supervision 7 11/87 1 1 1 11/06/87

Supervision 8 04/88 1.5 1 1 05/07/88

Supervision 9 06/88 2 2 3 07/06/88

Supervision 10 11/88 1 2 2 11/29/88

Supervision 11 10/89 1.5 1 1.5 10/27/89

Supervision 12 02/90 2 2 4 03/06/90

Supervision 13 06/90 1 1 1 06/22/90

Supervision 14 10/90 1 1 1 10/15/90

TOTAL 19.5 28

Comments on supervision missions

102. The supervision missions, beginning in May 1986, were for both the currentproject and also for the identification of the UMDP. Beginning in November 1988, themissions were concerned primarily with implementation of the UMDP and secondarily thecompletion of the current project.

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I. Proie studi§

Table 15: Project Studies

1. URBAN INWSTMENT PROGRAMMING (CEGIR)

t. Urban investment progmmuing 07/1985 05/1986 10 month.

II. HOUSING POLICY (OTUI)

A. HOUSING POLICY

1. Housing funac 10/1985 0211986 04 mon.

2. Price setting 05/1987 10/1987 05 moe.

3. Publicly-ownod renta 10/1985 0211986 04 moc.propertie_

4. Public real estatecompanies 02/1986 05/1989 39 moe.

B. URBAN DEVELOPMENT POLICY

1. Prefeuibility of 10/1985 0211986 04 moe.operat one ._._. .

2. Euabliuhmet of urban land 10/1985 02/1986 04 moe.dev. co.

3. Infraructure levels 07/1985 02/1986 07 mor.

4. Feasibility of operations 10/1987 11/1990 31 moe.

5. Resaucturing of Pikine 10/1987 11/1986 N/A

C. ADDITIONAL STUDIES

. Abilitation of Dakar 06/1986 06/1986 00 moe.markets ,_._

2. Identification Third Urban 12/1986 01/1987 01 mo.Projoct

3. Prefeasibility ofoperation - Lat Dior 06/1987 06/1987 00 moe.

4. State-owned properdes 12/1987 12/1987 00 moe.

HI. TRANSPORTATION POLICY (LAFERRIERE)

1. Updaing of truwpoAondiagnostic studies 10/1985 03/1986 05 moe.

2. Updating of Traffic Plan07/1985 08/1985 01 mo.

3. Progrmnuning and Budgetingof Plan 11/1985 N/A

4. Programning briefsplan implermntation 02/1986 N/A

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5. PDC PhtaJ 1: Pnory Pln 02/1986 05/1986 03AP)

6. P of 03/1987 11/1988 21 mos.

_7. Ealuaion of PAP actions 03/1987 11/1988 21 mo.

Table 15 (continued): Project Studies

STUDY IPlauned Implemnentatton Actual Implementation Duration

IV. MUNICIPAL POLICY (BCEOM)

1. Institutional context 05/198S 09/1985 03 mos.

2. Local fianames 06/1985 07/1985 01 mos.

3. Technical deparments 0/19S 08/1985 00 nwo.

4. Tmining dignostic 06/1985 04/1988 28 mos.study . _

5. Municipal credit 07/1986 06/1987 11 mos.

V. ADDMTIONAL STUDIES

1. Generl diagnostic studyof DCL 05/1987 N/A

2. Rehabilitation prognunfor 12 Comumune

12/1988 N/A

VI. PROJECT MANAGEMENT

1. Project progres reports01/1986 N/A

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ANNEX 1

Detailed Analysis of Project Implementation

1. Essentially aimed at measuring the impact of objectives regardingmanagement, innovative investment policies or the strengthening of administrative andfinancial services through technical assistance, the evaluation of the project is complex, unlikeinvestment programs whose results are often more tangible. Exacerbating this difficulty, thelarge number of components (5) and subcomponents (30), scope of study and diversity oftasks could result in an overly general evaluation - masking significant implementationdisparities or failure to satisfy objectives - or, on the contrary, in a straightforwardchronology devoid of analysis. In order to report in detail on the rates of implementation,degree to which the government offices integrated the concepts advanced, benefits reaped andinsufficiencies observed, the following analysis will first discuss each component and then themajor events that had a significant impact on the implementation of the components as awhole. With a similar concern for clarity, this part will be limited to the impact of theproject on government agencies and parapublic companies.

1. URBAN INVESTMENT PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING

A. Objectives

2. The main objective of this component, for which implementation wasentrusted to the Quaternary Sector Unit of the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation, was todevelop, in terms of planning, the notion of the urban sector and to establish, as part of amacroeconomic development strategy, the conditions for efficient management. Morespecifically, it aimed at formulating a methodology and information analysis system permitting(i) identification of the sector, its components and their reflection in the public investmentpolicy; (ii) compatibility of programmed investments in accordance with national, regional,subsectoral and financial criteria or characteristics; and (iii) the selection and prioritization asregards allocation of resources as well as the monitoring of projects included, in accordancewith refined modalities. Lastly, with regard to the previous experience in national planning,the study was to make it possible, during the revision of the Seventh Economic and SocialDevelopment Plan (1985-1989) to test the methodology and structure adopted. To that end,the project included a three-month study phase and technical assistance over two years.

B. Benefits Induced by the Component

3. During the first phase, the proposals and analysis of urban investments madeduring the previous decade (1975-1985), made it possible, although belatedly, to design afunctional planning and programming model along with a data base characterized by its scope,pertinence and reliability. That work, expanded to the problems of institutional focusing,identification of sources and data processing as well as issues of economic analysis and projectimpact led, through its actual proposals, to a better definition and more selective assessmentof Senegal's urban system in its globality and complexity. Moreover, the innovative lightthrown on the notion of the urban sector, the hinterland and the interactions of the system

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with its subparts was one of the major achievements of this component and helped in theredistribution of the scope of three-year public investment planning. Despite delays inimplementation and the revision of objectives that followed, project technical assistance underthe projects to the Planning Department was beneficial in continuing during the second phasesectoral analyses, strengthening the new data base and the statistical processing of theinformation collected. At the same time, the examination of the investment planning andmonitoring processes were carried out in conformity with the terms of reference.

4. In general, implementation of the component resulted overall in a greaterunderstanding of the sector, formulation of proposals to improve planning and theestablishment of an information system meeting the needs of urban planners. With a view toconsolidating the achievements of the component, the executing agency had sought CIDAassistance in 1988 to continue the studies aimed at improving the integration of national andurban planning. Despite the promising nature of the results, the proposal went no further.

C. Weaknesses

5. The delays and the Government's recasting of the national planning systemmade it impossible to either analyze or capitalize on the many results, og to incorporate theproposals for the 1987 Three-Year Public Investment Plan. This partial success is apparentlydue to the vagueness of the terms of reference and their unsuitability to a rapidly changingcontext which hindered the development of the model within the desired timeframe. Thisproblem, corrected in January 1986 by the Borrower and the Bank for a long time preventedthe Planning Department, which was simultaneously heavily involved in the recasting of thenational planning system, from achieving objectives in which it perceived itself uninvolved.

6. This relative disaffeciation and reservations as to the benefits of the proposedconcept and the tool are undoubtedly partially responsible for the insufficiency or lack ofhuman and logistical resources provided for component implementation. Established in aclimate of moroseness, the late provision of technical assistance to project management, and,consequently, poor integration of experts within the executing agency did not promote thetransfer of technology or training of counterparts. In this regard, the reduced activity of thecoordinating entities (technical committee and department) and their little involvement insettling disagreements between the planning and project departments did not help eitherdissipate the mutual misunderstandings or curb the gradual erosion of the technicalpartnership. Certain objectives such as the identification of selection criteria and formulationof the means for monitoring programmed projects were only partially satisfied. Still others,owing to the departre of the technical assistance experts and the limited availability of stafffrom the Quaternary Unit, had to be dropped altogether. This last point is particularly truefor the analysis of the sectoral data that had not been processed and the taking into account bythe 1987-1990 PTIP of works published too late.

7. Moreover, the desirability of establishing an urban planning unit within theDepartnent having the real means or capability of strengthening the Quatemary Sector Unitwas apparently not perceived. This is unfortunate, given the key role that such an entitycould have played in the development of interior cities. Moderately equipped with the vitalmeans for carrying out that task, the executing agency does not seem to have been able to useor disseminate the information that it had or still has. In that respect, the negative effects ofthe voluntary departures under the recent administrative reforms on the availability and

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mobility of Department staff throw doubts upon its current ability to maintain and develop thetool that it designed.

H. HOUSING AND URBAN POLICY

General Objectives of the Comnonent

8. The Ministry of Urban Development and Housing had technical oversight forthis component which, for reasons of a functional nature rather than those related to itsobjectives, was broken down into the following on studies:

(a) Housing policy

(i) study on housing finance;

(ii) technical assistance for training and changes in housing prices;

(iii) study on the management of publicly-owned rental properties;

(iv) study on the organization of parapublic real estate companies.

(b) Urban policy

(i) prefeasibility urban operations study;

(ii) study on technical assistance for the establishment of a land development agency;

(iii) study and formulation of infrastructure standards;

(iv) feasibility study for land development in Cap Vert;

(v) study for the restructuring of central [irrfguliarJ Pikine.

(c) Additional responsibilities

(i) study on the management of State-owned properties;

(ii) additional technical assistance for the land development agency;

(iii) prefeasibility study for the development of Camp Lat Dior.

9. Together, these tasks were to be the basis for a housing and urban policy centered onthe more rational use of resources and redeployment of govermnent efforts to assist greater numbersof beneficiaries. Owing to the many parties involved and unlike other components, technicalexpertise was not physically placed with any specific structure. With the exception of the assistanceto the land development agency and, to a certain extent, the Housing and Construction Department,this component was most often executed on time and in the form of missions or studies. It did not

-41 -

run into the difficulties inherent in the establishment of a unit or incorporation into a pre-existingstructure. On the date of effectiveness, implementation was nevertheless subject to the resolution ofseveral conditions, including the audit of the public construction companies and the finalization of theDakar urban development plan.

Housing Policy

Husin_ FinanC

A. Qbiectives

10. With a view to bettering the system for producing low-cost housing, the study aimedat identifying affordable demand, analyzing the means of financing self-construction, mobilization ofresources and savings, participation of the primary banks and proposing of possible improvements.


11. As the first overall look at the sector, the study is still today a reference for anyresearch regarding the housing sector. By compiling basic economic data, it made possible a reliableevaluation of affordable demand (with the exception of the rental market), an analysis of supply andexamined in detail the phenomenon of self-construction in its physical, land and financial aspects. Itmoreover was the basis for an exhaustive table of the financial mechanisms and institutions involvedin housing finance and resource mobilization, which was used in making proposals to improve thechannels for collecting savings and the conditions for real estate credit and to optimize theinvolvement of the public sector from the institutional and fiscal standpoints. The recommendationshelped mitigate and eliminate the constraints on the sector. What holds for the State is no longer truefor the BHS which, for several years, had been developing a strategy that tended to give priority todevelopment programs, self-construction and assistance to individuals rather than planned housing orassistance with materials. Beyond its traditional products (twinned credits), with a view to greatercreditworthiness of the borrowers, the institution thus had proposed since 1989 a savings plan (planprtvisionnel d'dpargne - PPE) which provides eligibility, after two years of savings, to credit forhouseholds that do not have wage income. Foregoirn the advantages of the past, it is also striving toincrease the number of small loans.

Training and Housing Prices

A. Qbjectives

12. This component, for which the DCH had technical oversight, sought to assess,through various promotion operations financed by the Government or the BHS, the pertinence andefficiency of the technical and financial standards determining the eligibility of housing for financingassisted.

B. Induced Benefits of the Component

13. Following an analysis of housing cost prices, the component made it possible topropose reference prices more consistent with the realities of the sector. In addition, at the request ofthe developer and to substitute for the establishment of a construction price observation system, a

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price series was formulated, including some 2,000 price factors. This computerized tool was to makeit possible, through the existence of a reference system, to establish a common language amonggovernment officials and professionals, to provide the latter with better background information andto assist artisans and contractors in setting their prices.

14. Continuing a study begun by UNDP and the DCH, the component helped identify thetechnical prerequisites for the establishment of the Low-Cost Housing Assistance Office (Bureaud'Assistance I l'Habitat Social - BASHO) and was valuable in developing for self-builders severalmodel documents assisting in tie design, appraisal and monitoring of operations (technical andinstitutional as well as financial aspects). The share of self-construction in housing production (85%)and the Government's policy supporting the cooperative movement made it possible to measure moreaccurately the advantage to the Government of such a management tool.

C. Wealesses

15. Given the interest manifested by the ministerial departments and professionalsinvolved in the formulation phase, it is unfortunate that sufficient financial and human resources werenot made available to maintain, update and disseminate the tool. Unmanaged since 1988, the impactof this study on construction standards is modest.

Management of Publicly-Owned Rental Properties and State-Oned Properties

A. O iectives

16. As public companies were studied elsewhere, the analysis focused on theidentification, means of occupation, cost and possible rehabilitation of State-owned real estate. Itsscope was limited to its goods and fixed assets subject to the convention system, administered by theDGPB and used as housing or offices by the occupants. *The study did not seek to formulate ageneral housing policy, but, owing to the magnitude of public funds allocated (CFAF 7 billion peryear, of which 4.5 to properties subject to the convention system), to the rehabilitation of public finances.


17. After having a first diagnostic study in 1985 and proposed recommendations, in 1987the study began to measure the impact and refine the terms of a 10-year rehabilitation program basedprimarily on an improvement in management and maintenance procedures, new emphasis on its ownproperties and an abandonment of the gcovention and svstem, the eviction of those without the rightto occupancy, amendment of the housing law, strengthening of services, implementation of amaintenance plan and lastly the construction of a government building. The Bank, anticipatingfinancial assistance to the program, did not respond favorably. Since that time, various measures toend the convention system and ensure regularization have led to budget savings of CFAF 1.5 billionper year. In tandem and with FAC assistance, the DGPB has launched a 'State-owned propertiesmanagement assistance project" and the partial rehabilitation of the existing stock (300 units).

A. Objective

18. The confirmation of the housing policy based on priority for self-construction, supportfor access to ownership (BHS) and segmentation of the production system profoundly altered the

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climate faced by the public construction companies. Moreover, given the dual constraint of anunfavorable financial context and poor management, SICAP and OHLM saw their activities steadilydecline, their financial situations deteriorate and their role as a catalyst for low-cost housingthreatened. In order to preserve precarious equilibria and redefine a realistic strategy, It becamenecessary to embark at once on a process of forward-looking analysis that could lead to the signatureof a cgntrat-ln with the State. To that end, three scenarios were formulated for each company bythe project. Simulating the downstream effects of contraction prior to liquidation and lastly possibleredeployment, they proposed, in addition to improving management performance, the followingmeasures: (i) restructuring and reduction of operating expenditures; (ii) partial (SICAP) or total(OHLM) sale of rental properties; (iii) resumption of lease-purchase promotion activities for SICAP;(iv) withdrawal from the construction sector for OHLM; and (v) unsubsidized development of sitesand services activities (OHLM).


19. Despite inquiries from the Bank and support provided by the project, it was not until1990 that all documents were finalized. After several unsuccessful attempts involving the Senegaleseauthorities and donors, SICAP justifiably came out in favor of a scaled-down project based on itsendogenous capacity and rehabilitated operations. On the basis of reliable documentation, it seemedto have the resources guaranteeing the maintenance and subsequently growth in its activities, as theresult of the partial completion of a program to sell off the rental properties and pare the wage bill.This rehabilitation program was to be completed during fiscal FY91. Under the express conditionsthat the prerequisites actually be put into practice and the banking system be rehabilitated, thecompany appears able to achieve the reasonable objectives set for itself. To that end it hasconsiderable human resources and experience that should not be overlooked under the pressures ofhasty privatization.

C. Weakesses

20. From 1985 to 1990, there was often no progress in introducing the foregoingrecommendations or formulating realistic rehabilitation programs. The internal constraints orexogenous factors behind this relative disinterest would include the inefficiency of previouscontractual relations with the State, the frequent personnel changes within the supervisory body orOHLM management and the steady decline in financing. SNHLM, which succeeded OHLM in 1988,apparently has not succeeded in improving the situation it inherited. In the years that have elapsedsince that time, even though it does not bear the entire responsibility, the efforts to correct the errorsof a management that incurred operating costs totally inappropriate for the real level of activity andused unreliable accounting procedures were limited. No marked improvement having been made,only recourse to subsidies (concessional loans, contributions of fixed assets, reduced taxation) in theland development activity has made it possible to cover the deficits resulting from its operations in thehousing sector.

21. Apart from the fact that it runs counter to the Government housing policy and hinderstrue competition, the maintenance of such a mechanism, which rewards poor perfornance, has beenone of the major stumbling blocks to an efficiently managed project. In this regard, given thesummary if not concise nature of the provisions, the conxa-plan signed with the State does not seemto reflect either past experience or the need to improve management. Given the unfavorable climatefor sustained State involvement, its implementation seems difficult if not haphazard.

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MI. URBI}N POLICY

General Obiectives

22. Given the poor distribution of public assistance and poor fit of planned housingprograms, the Governrnent had opted to redeploy its efforts, giving support to self-construction,reduction in costs and promotion of urban services suited to the economic and social context. A keyelement of that strategy, the establishment of a land development agency, responded to the dual needto increase the availability of land free of dominial fees and, as regards infrastructure, to ensure theprovision of the various urban services. As a developer acting on behalf of the State, it was to carryout and promote the priority operations of the urban development master plan and, secondarily, tooversee the construction of vital infrastructure. Its scope of action included the development of newurban establishments and rehabilitation of older or spontaneously developed areas. Like publicenterprises or utilities, not having general specifications or standards allowing for the prior definitionof economical operations, the agency had to seek more flexible procedures to gradually satisfy needsand avoid the alternative of everything or nothing (where nothing clearly donminats today). Lastly, itwas to identify, on the previous bases, the prefeasibility of six priority operations under the urbandevelopment master plan, assess their feasibility at minimum cost and satisfy the prerequisites for thelaunching of a first subdivision operation (100 ha) intended in particular for low-cost housing. Tothat end, it received technical and financial assistance under the project, the active support of thesupervisory bodies and various master plans and programming documents prepared by governmentoffices. The project was to last 30 months and concluded with the implementation of the firstoperations. In practice, the achievement of those objectives required more than 60 months.

Prefeasibility of Land Development Operations

A. Qbieixve

23. The Dakar 2010 urban development master plan identified 15 sites for prioritydevelopment. 'Operational program plans," were drawn up for six of them and management ofwhich was temporarily entrusted to the project with a view to eventual execution by the developmentagency.


24. In accordance with the terms of reference, project expertise prepared six prefeasibilitystudies and supplemented, confirmed or altered their objectives. Carried out from May to July 1985,they helped with the financial evaluation of an action program for the land development agency andwere approved in December of that year. Without any power of enforcement, that technical expertisenevertheless enabled the consultant to modify its proposals and helped project management start thefirst phase of the feasibility studies.

25. At the request of MUH and with the approval of IDA, the financial prefeasibility of aluxury housing operation (Camp Lat Dior) was appraised in July 1987. Although not directly aconcern of the Bank, its eventual impact on the results of the land development agency meritedattention. Subsequently incorporated into the portfolio of the infrastructure company, it is notreceiving financial assistance from the Bank.

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C. W

26. The late availability of the PDU program plans (May 1985) and delays in theevaluation of the studies by the Monitoring Committee (six months) caused significant slippage in theimplementation timetable.

Fgrmulalion of afatmcture Standards

A-. Objecties

27. The search for economical and systematic solutions for the gradual construction ofinfrastructure in the areas to be developed or rehabilitated was the objective of this part of the study.The tool to be formulated was not normative but aimed at helping promoters and the users ofdevelopment programs to evaluate the investment, recurrent expenditures and ultimate use. It wasfurther to help restore the dialogue that was all too often lacking with concession holders and permitthe establishment of operating agreements with them.

B. Benefits Induced by the Coronent

28. After analyzing the service levels in various districts, the study proposedinfrastructure grids involving four levels of development, which would make possible subsequentupgrading, in response to general economic conditions. Carried out from March 1985 to February1986, its intermediary paase was approved in January of that year. Describing the problems withcurrent practices (oversizing of road networks and infrastructure reserves, insufficient density of landuse), it proposed a hierarchy of urban spaces, infrastructure and service levels, evaluating theirfinancial implications for the promoters, users and future managers.

29. A tool for programming and evaluating prefeasibility studies, its impact on thedevelopment agency's 10-year activity program was direct and durable. More generally, it helped theoffices responsible for urban development intheir decision-making and led to the taking into accountby the urban development code of notions of incremental infrastructure, development costs and costrecovery.

C. Weaknesses

30. Success among the concession holders seems less evident, as their specifications andsectoral policies remain the measure of their involvement. Lastly, in their initial phase the studies raninto delays similar to those encountered by the prefeasibility reports.

Establishment of a Land Development Aeency

A. Obieives

31. The cornerstone of efforts to offer a significant number of titled and serviced lots at acompetitive price, the agency had the following main responsibilities: (i) design of programs andacquisition of land; (ii) oversight of works and marketing of operations; (iii) cost recovery andreplication of operations. It was estimated that the study phase would take six months. Providedthat the conclusions were favorable, it was followed by the provision of technical assistance which,

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planned to last 18 months, made it possible to refine the orientations of the organization, provide thehuman, financial and technical means and improve the contractual enviroment. In accordance withthe timetable set by the Borrower, the agency was to be established before April 1986 and begin itsfirst operations in November 1987.


32. Prior to the agency's establishment, project expertise confirmed the viability of theconcept and identified (i) the 10-year physical and financial development programs; (ii) legal statusand contractual relations with the agency; (iii) financial arrangements for the operations and projectedoperating expenses; (iv) financing requirements and preferred partners. Commissioned in March1985 and proposed by the monitoring entities, in December of that year the studies were the basis fora decision to establish a mixed company in which the State would have a minority holding and whichwould operate on commercial bases. The institutional and technical prefeasibility analyses werefinalized ir February 1986 and viewed favorably by the Government.

33. As the establishment of private companies did not come under the direct jurisdictionof the Government, an official order issued by MUH in July 1986 established a wprovisional entityprior to the establishment of a land development company." The presumed predecessor of the futureagency, it benefited from project expertise. It assumed its responsibilities and prerogatives during the22 months that it took to satisfy the technical and administrative prerequisites and to set up theinnovative shareholding structure. It lastly complied with the formalities for the establishment of theagency. However, without legal existence, it could not be awarded fixed assets, approve proceduresin its own name or as a result finalize the first operations. With the support of the highestgovermnent bodies, the company was finally established in May 1988, i.e., two years after theinitially scheduled date. Taking over from the preliminary entity and with the support of the project,it could then continue preparation of the first infrastructure operation, for which implementationbegan in 1990.

34. Although the objectives of this part of the study were satisfied as a whole, albeit withdelays, the search for shareholders, performance of the provisional entity and or prudence on the partof the Goverment cannot alone totally account for the delays. The magnitude of the landdevelopment stakes and the persistence of various sectoral strategies and conflicts also seem to havebeen a factors. So as to reduce their impact, recourse to a monitoring and mediation body wasproposed and recently adopted. This is one of the conditions of the agreement signed by thedevelopment agency.

C. W

35. Although the study did not exclude any comparative evaluation of the various legallypossible statuses, it was clearly established by the Borrower that the agency would take the form of anestablishment subject to public control. Its establishment as a national company, with a sites andservices department autonomous of OHLM oversight, seemed to be the best approach. Owing to thewithdrawal of the State (1985-1992 PALM) and the strong reservations (for obvious reasons) on thepart of OHLM, this was however not possible. Going back to the drawing board, in addition to theoperational difficulties that this caused, the government offices were as a result highly distressed.

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36. With limited prerogatives and experience, the provisional entity was to promote in askeptical if not reserved climate an innovative concept that was occasionally poorly understood.Given the strategic nature of this task, it is unfortunate that the staff (with the exception of themission leader and despite clear interest) had no knowledge of the urban sector. It is also regrettablethat the entity could not finalize the draft agreements it had formulated with the municipalities, Cityof Dakar and the concession holders. These various parties, who were to cofinance or maintain theinfrastructure built by the development agency, should have been more involved in the design phase.

Feksibility of Development Operation

A. Objectives

37. The study examined subdivisions intended primarily for the construction of low-costhousing on sites (selected by MUH) covering 100 ha (i.e., about 4,000 plots). it distinguished threephases: (i) urban development study including the identification of primary and secondaryinfrastructure; (ii) study of secondary and tertiary infrastructure, different infrastructure levels, typesand groups of plots; (iii) preparation of bidding documentation and assistance in the evaluation oftechnical and financial bids. Implementation was estimated to take 18 months starting with theapproval of the detailed urban development plans.

B. Benfts Induced by the Component

38. Begun in October 1985, the studies experienced a long interruption from July 1986 toNovember 1988, at which time the project unit notified the experts that phases 2 and 3 were to becarried out simultaneously. These were completed in June 1990, i.e., 30 months behind the initialtimetable. Beyond the details involved in the establishment of the development agency, severalfactors accounted for the delays. The first techniques were probably underestimated; others of a moreconceptual or strategic nature were the subject of a long debate between the Bank, supervisory entitiesand development agency. They could be resolved only at the cost of a partial retreat from the projectobjectives. Compromises fortunately having been reached, this part of the study can nevertheless beconsidered as having overall satisfied the objectives of the terms of reference.

C. Weaknesses

39. Owing to the procedural delays, development plans submitted to the Government inFebruary 1986 were examined in March of the following year. Amended in July 1987, they weresubmitted for an opinion by the ad hoc bodies in January 1988. Altered to reflect the comments madein April then transmitted to MUH, they were reviewed by the Regional Urban DevelopmentCommission in July 1988. Receiving a favorable opinion, a November 1989 decree made themenforceable and authorized the development agency to restart work. In Do way does this three-year-long procedure seem to have been compatible with management by objectives and the financialviability of a development company. Another factor in the delays, the topography and geo-technicalcharacteristics for which the brief had been begun in August 1986 by project management were notavailable until November 1988, at which time the technical studies could be resumed and the firstsubdivision programs begun.

40. The main weakness that arose during implementation nevertheless resides in thechallenging of the role of the development agency, commitments regarding land transfers and the

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level of infrastructure to be constructed. That option, decided on owing to the prime location of thefirst zones to be developed, resulted in prolonged negotiations and implementation delays thatharkened back to the sites and services project and its consequences, leading to a general increase inthe level of services. Although the selection of sites should make possible a future expansion of theclientele base, this general increase in infrastructure levels and its financial implications neverthelessstill temporarily disqualified a large share of the project's target population. This is inconsistent withthe initial concept and the pursuit of expanded access to ownership for those with income below thesixth decile.

Restructuring of Central Pikine

A. Objectives

41. The objective of the component was a detailed study and engineering for an operationto rehabilitate the infrastructure of central Pikine.


42. The component made possible a prefeasibility study involving (i) three types ofdevelopment at different levels; (ii) evaluation of costs and the formulation of various operating andfinancial schemes.

C. Wakpesses

43. The high risk of the recovery arrangements and limited creditworthiness of theintended beneficiaries had suggested during pre-feasibility the likely impossibility of implementationby a developer acting as a delegated principal. As the activities would not have been immediatelyeligible for IDA financing, the Borrower and the Bank agreed in November 1986 to suspend thefeasibility studies. At its request, GTZ was given responsi-bility for implementation, which itsubsequently dropped on behalf of the Dalifor site, which was more consistent with the attainment ofits objectives.

IV. TRANSPORTATION POLICY

A. Objectives

44. Assigned to the Studies and Programming Department of the Ministry of Equipment,implementation of the component called for the establishment of a permanent urban traffic planningentity. Its main responsibilities were (i) updating of the diagnostic study of transportation and thetraffic plan; (ii) programming and evaluation of priority actions under the plan; (iii) design of biddingdocuments; and (iv) monitoring of projects.

45. To that end, it had permanent staff and technical expertise under the project. Inaddition to the foregoing objectives, the experts were to (i) identify all prerequisites for the TrafficBureau; (ii) train local staff and oversee the activities of the newly created entity.

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46. Unlike other project components, this one was subject to prior studies, theorganization of available data and actual establishment of the structure, as well as the provision ofpersonnel and resources for its operations.


47. Gradually integrated into the existing structure, the Traffic Bureau, through its activityand commitment vis-a-vis the supervisory entities, succeeded in establishing credibility andsatisfactory relations with the parties with which it did business and overcoming its initial handicaps.It today is active in traffic management.

48. Internally, the measures regarding organization, training and studies and works madepossible the attainment of the objectives, strengthening of the structure and identification of a moreambitious technical assistance and investment project. The main actions involved (i) updating of theCap Vert traffic plan; (ii) preparation of the priority action plan; (iii) design of the Dakar-Plateurtraffic plan; (iv) evaluation of a junction rehabilitation program; (v) computerization of the sectoraldata banks; (vi) economic modeling and computerization of a resurfacing program; (vii) determinationof the technical aspects involved in the concept of regulation; (vii) [sic) introduction of regulatorymeasures and monitoring of works; and (ix) maintenance of feeder reads.

49. Implementation of the foregoing program was facilitated by continuing technicalassistance until November 1988 and CIDA financial support. That agency, in signing CreditAgreement 1884-SE, extended its support to the Traffic Bureau.

C. Weaknesses

50. At the time of credit effectiveness, the traffic and transportation plan, for which thestudies begun in 1980 had been abandoned in 1982 and resumed in 1984 with assistance from IDA,had not been fully completed. The document, which was to contain the provisions for gradualadaptation of the public transportation system to medium- and long-term demand, was not issued untilMay 1986 and primarily covered the aspects related to the traffic component, at the expense of thetransportation policy. Belatedly completed and to this date not having been approved by thesupervisory bodies, it had little impact on the project.

51. Simultaneously, the turnover of government personnel, scarcity of human resourcesassigned on a permanent basis to the structure (two engineers, involved in other DEP tasks) and theirreduced availability, despite greater interest and investment, exacerbated the previous difficulties.This unfortunate situation was not really resolved vitil the second quarter of 1987, when fourengineers and senior technicians joined the Traffic Bureau.

52. In this respect, the means of the Bureaus's establishment, its inclusion in DEP'sorganization chart and the determination of staffing should have been discussed in greater depth bythe parties. Had that been done, adequate provisions could have been made and the total lack oflogistical needs encountered by the Bureau during its first year of activity remedied. Partiallyresolved during the first quarter of 1986, these physical constraints remained a source of conflictbetween the project and programming officials.

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53. Although their impact on the rate of implementation is indisputable, the problemsdiscussed above as a whole did not definitively compromise the implementation of the component.Nevertheless, however great its success, the existence of a Traffic Bureau detached from the UrbanProject remains precarious. On this point, recent measures decided as part of the administrativereforms are producing as many questions as they are providing answers.

V. MUNICIPAL POLICY

General Qbectives

54. Following implementation in the various regions of Senegal, the 1972 DecentralizationLaw took Dakar, in 1983, of a specific law reorganizing the Cap Vert Region into an UrbanCommunity encompassing three communes (Dakar-Pikine-Rufisque) and regulating their respectivejurisdictions. In May 1985, that reform - the first phase of decentralization - was introduced amidsta profoundly deteriorated context characterized by management liabilities in the neighborhood ofCFAF 20 billion. The financial crisis was accompanied by a disturbing deterioration in administrativeand technical management tools, and the communes were no longer able to provide basic urbanservic-es under satisfactory conditions or even their own proper operations. This particularlyunfavorable climate nevertheless was the background for the establishment of a new municipal teamcommitted to remedying the errors of the past and improving management as part of a return toordinary law and its practices

55. Under the oversight of the Secretariat for Decentralization and later DCL within theMinistry of the Interior and involving numerous government or parapublic entites, the objective ofthe fourth component of the project was primarily to clarify the role of the local communities in anew urban strategy, to seek with them the conditions for their recovery and to identify the means fortheir future participation as major players in the development of the Dakar region. Three major areaswere studied under the project: (i) municipal organization and management; (ii) maintenance andrehabilitation of municipal services; (iii) training of municipal workers.

Municipal Organization and MmnagemeM

Study of the Institutional Context

A. Objectives

56. This part of the study looked at the relations between the central government and localauthorities, in particular the breakdown of power, responsibilities and obligations as regards services.

B. Benefits Induced by the Compnent

57. Owing to its effects on other aspects of the component, the study of relations betweenthe municipalities, City of Dakar, central authorities and parapublic enterprises was a key to themunicipal component. It was accordingly carried out jointly with the work on municipal finances andcommunity services. As regards institutional matters, an exhaustive report finalized in September1980 was the basis for a comprehensive diagnosis of all institutional problems facing the localgovermnents in the Dakar region in the exercise of their prerogatives or powers. Some project

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proposals, available for all studies in December 1989, were taken into account in the second phase ofadministrative reforms. Others, whose incorporation was more complex and part of a growingdecentralization policy, are still being given attention by the government. The methodology andquality of results were such that the government extended, with the agreement of the Association, thatstudy to 13 other communes, of which 6 were regional capitals.

58. The Local Government Department (Direction des Collectivites Locales - DCL), thesupervisory body for local communities throughout the country, was also studied and assessed asregards organization, jurisdiction and location in the general government organization chart.Following a first phase that stressed the inadequacy of available means for the tasks to be carried out,the analysis concluded with the need, as part of deconcentrated management, to reformulate andstrengthen the role of the DCL. Instead of the day-to-day management it now performs, the studyproposed a new form of intervention as regards design, coordination, advisory assistance and training.These could affect on the one hand the regulations for municipal management and on the other theimplementation by the local governments of the State's major directives regarding public finance andplanning.

C. 3Makness

59. It is unfortunate that the DCL's design capability could not be strengthened eitherthrough continued technical assistance or selective recruitment. The gradual correction of thisdeficiency should however be possible under Credit C of the UMDP or at the time of theidentification of a possible fourth urban project.

Taxation and municipal finance

A. Objectives

60. After analyzing the problems, the study sought to identify and implement measures toimprove the financial management of Dakar.

B. Benefits Induced by the CoMnonent

61. In 1985, the financial difficulties facing the local communities seemed deeply-rooted,complex and long-lasting. They were undoubtedly the consequence of a nationwide economic crisisworsened by the effects of administrative reform whose financial provisions seemed ineffective.There was a sever deficit and disarray in both operating and investment financing. The main causeswere: (i) accumulated arrears resulting in growing paralysis; (ii) stagnation in the revenue generatedby a disorganized tax system; (iii) lack of autonomy in the determination of receipts; (iv) limitedeffectiveness of the procedures used for identification of the tax base, tax recovery and allocation ofmunicipal revenue. Simultaneously, despite the political commitment to decentralization reflected inthe legislation, any real transfer of responsibilities and jurisdiction ran into considerable reticencewitiin the government.

62. Following the foregoing assessment, project management decided to give priority, toassociative action rather than theoretical work to help resolve the following important issues:(i) determination and implementation of measures to rehabilitate the financial management of Dakar;(ii) identification of new resources and improvement in the recovery of local taxes, in particular

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property taxes; (iii) optimization of the utilization of the Municipal Infrastructure Fund (Fondd'Equipement des Collectivit6s Locales - FECL) as regards investments.

63. As regards financial rehabilitation, the preparation and execution since 1985 of morerealistic budgets than in the past, design of a recovery plan together with the implementation ofreliable management tools, largely helped the local governments gain greater control of operatingexpenditures as well as increase the receipts directly received by the communes. This progress wasfortunately consolidated by an elimination or reduction in claims by the State through the parapublicenterprises.

64. In addition to the vital management efforts and reliable allocation of municipalrevenue, the success of the recovery effort came from an improvement in collection or newlyidentified resources. On this first point, although this report will not go into detail on the variousworks or studies carried out in conjunction with the technical assistance, as these were part of a"short-term plan to improve collection," the following priority actions or measures were particularlybeneficial to municipal finances: (i) establishment of a Receipts Division; (ii) recasting of theregulatory framework, reorganization of the regulations governing open-air and covered markets andevaluation of management performance; (iii) collection of municipal taxes in areas where collectionhad not been enforced; (iv) continuation -s regards property taxes and the preparation of the technicalbrief of the future tax registry.

C. Weaknesses

65. These first results cannot be considered definitive, as they followed in the wake ofsignificant arrears, large shares of taxes and few appeals, which are all favorable conditions thatwould in the short run change and could be compensated only through rapid rehabilitation of the taxbase or recourse to new fiscal resources. On this latter point, it had been proposed to establish andallocate to the City of Dakar: (i) the professional tax; (ii) a surtax on registration fees; and (iii) afund compensating exemptions accorded under the Investment Code. This recommendation, whichhad the advantage of partially dissociating funding for the City of Dakar from budget results that werestill precarious, was apparently not acted upon. Lastly, the option to expand the tax base wasevidently preferred to increasing the tax burden in a time of economic straits.

66. That improvement is particularly fragile as the debt of the former commune of Dakar,which was analyzed by the project and whose rehabilitation was entrusted to the new city structure, isstill causing numerous concerns. The random mobilization of tax receipts (including amountsreceivable by the former commune) and the magnitude of operating charges, are such that it wouldapparently be difficult to meet commitments.

Municipal InfEaM aure Fund

A. Obiectiv

67. After analyzing the role and operations of the Fund, the study evaluated thedesirability of using it as a financial intermediary for a municipal credit.


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68. As regards infrastructure, because burdensome liabilities did not enable the communestc, meet new repayment charges, it seemed that investment should be limited to their self-financingcapacity and the availability of financial assistance. As the resources of the Fund had not increasedfavorably for several years and the benefits of recovery were expected only gradually, when theSeventh Development Plan began and the PICs formulated, it seemed advisable to study the means forensuring adequate funding. Following that study, as recourse to popular savings was apparently notgoing to be sufficient for the establishment and then the operating of municipal credit, the principle ofgrowth and partial reallocation of the Fund on behalf of the planned institution was adopted by theauthorities. That decision, the proposed action and the determination of its regulatory frameworkwere fully consistent with the objectives of the component and resulted in a cofinancing agreementbetween MDA and the Republic of Senegal.

Maintenance and Rehabilitation of Municipal Services

A. Obiecy

69. After analyzing problems, the study aimed to (i) identify the measures formodernizing and maintaining infrastructure services in Dakar; (ii) propose a management method forthe equipment management of the technical departmnents; and (iii) establish a cost accounting andbudget planning model for the technical departments.

B. Induced Benefits of the Component

70. The picture in 1985 was very different situation from that envisaged by the terms ofreference for the municipal component. In point of fact, it was no longer a matter of adapting theservices to the reforms recently introduced by the Government, but establishing completely newstructures at all levels.

71. Undertaken in an unfavorable institutional and financial climate, the establishment ofmunicipal technical services, a direct consequence of the Cap Vert administrative reform, was lumitedto the mere transfer of a service that only the City of Dakar had in 1982. The legacy and liability ofa steadily deteriorating situation until its collapse in 1983, the Technical Services of the City of Dakar(STCUD) had in 1985 management characterized by (i) unclear distribution of responsibilities amongthe communities and the State; (ii) shortage of operating and investment resources; (iii) poor fit ofstructures to needs; (iv) a plethora of personnel who were unqualified, under-administered and poorlysupervised; (v) a lack of means resulting in inactivity. At the same time, equipment that was obsoleteor out of service (for which a lack of inventory did not hide its scarcity), a shortage (lack offinancing) of raw materials and vital supplies needed for the minimal running of the service andunsuitable premises or those that had not been maintained for several years, constituted the physicalassets.

72. Consideration of the foregoing factors led the parties involved to take action which,initially aiming to identify clearly the delineation of jurisdiction between the State, City of Dakar andlocal communities, would subsequently identify the tasks incumbent on each and result in an eventualreorganization of the technical services. In addition, as the quality of services seemed too distantfrom that ultimately targeted for the objective to be achieved rapidly and economically, it was vital toproceed slowly, stage by stage, setting accessible objectives. To that end, a transitional phase wasrecommended, involving immediate and short-term actions receiving support under the project and

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allowing momentum to grow again, before the establishment of the definitive organization. Therehabilitation period was estimated to take two years. Although this evaluation will not go into detailon the various stages, the programming of actions under the transitional phase, grouped under a"Short-Term Action Plan," made it possible for the project objectives to be attained. Among the mostkey were (i) a survey of municipally-owned properties, both buildings and infrastructure;(ii) rehabilitation of the offices of the technical services; (iii) an inventory and repair of availableequipment and tools; (iv) acquisition of additional equipment and tools; (v) determination ofmanagement procedures for warehouses and inventories; (vi) inventory of available documents andfiles; (vii) organization and regulation of services; (viii) preparation and execution of annual budgets;(ix) canvassing of personnel and identification of training needs; (x) recruitment of fewer but moreefficient supervisory staff; (xi) preparation and adoption of the organization chart for the newstructure; (xii) resumption of maintenance, cleaning and upkeep activities.

73. All these measures made it possible, with the use of basic units constituting theembryo of the future organization, to show concretely the restructuring of the technical services, theircapacity to carry out the responsibilities assigned them and lastly to establish the definitive structure.Also to the credit of the component is the identification of the prerequisites for CIDA and IDAfinancing of another technical and financial assistance project aimed to consolidate the results of thepresent project and strengthen the services.

C. W

74. It is nevertheless unfortunate that the shortage of funds, delays in appointing atechnical director and in resolving administrative procedures or decisionmaking prevented all of therevised objectives from being achieved (establishment of municipal technical services satellite officesand training plan) within the timeframe. Regardless, despite the precariousness of the results whichremain very dependent on the sustained recovery of the local governments the progress accomplishedseems significant given the initial urgency.

Training Pogram

A. Obiecives

75. After identifying the beneficiaries and determining the training program, thecomponent aimed at providing short traineeships, seminars and workshops for the staff in question.


76. As regards personnel management, the implementation of the law reorganizing thelocal governments in the Dakar region resulted in occasionally rash recruitment decisions and hastyreallocation of staff among the newly created entities. In 1985, despite gradual improvement, the newsystem was characterized by a plethora of personnel whose time was not fully occupied and adisorganization of services, owing to the unsuitability of profiles for the positions to be filled andexcessive wage bills given the investment budget availabilities.

77. The correction of the foregoing distortions justified a systematic reformulation of jobdescriptions and an improvement in management for municipal workers. The 'training' aspect of thecomponent therefore called for the design and implementation of a comprehensive plan including

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measures to meet that objective. It sought to rectify over the short run the main deficienciesidentified and over the medium run to carry out more in-depth action for certain categories ofpersonnel affected by the reorganization or the introduction of new management methods and lastly tocombine over the longer run that training policy with a plan for future staffing and careerdevelopment.

78. The proposed action was based on prior identification of the technical andadministrative profiles needed for the operations of the services and called for the adoption of a"priority action plan" where the needs were most pressing. During implementation, the breadth ofthe problems and diversity of situations analyzed led all partners to reformulate the objectives thatcould be achieved by the project as regards both content and targets to make them more flexiblealthough clear.

79. In tandem with the resolution of that prerequisite, the establishment in March 1987 ofa Consultative Committee made it possible to update the sectors of activity, beneficiaries and trainingstreams and to move into a directly operational phase. In October 1987 a priority program wasformalized and several well-focused actions taken on behalf of personnel. Involving the DakarFellowships and Training Department, the BOM and various local training agencies, it targetedSTCUD technical and administrative staff as well as senior managers in the local governments. Atthe same time, the design of a 'medium-term training plan' that was more comprehensive andapplicable to all personnel in the three communes, was finalized in June 1988. With the assistance ofthe local officials and governments, the plan sought to analyze operations, determine the profiles ofkey jobs, draw up reports on personnel status and identify initial training levels of the workers andavailable skills. On the basis of the foregoing, the major thrusts of training by targeted clientele,training themes by division and profile and action programs for training were prepared.

C. Weakn1§ses

80. Implementation of the training component did not make it possible to implement theforegoing plan and hence only partially satisfied the initial objectives. Additionally, the actions of thepriority plan, belatedly identified and carried out in dispersed order, involved only a limited numberof workers. They consequently represented only the start of a true training policy and their impact onoperations is difficult to measure. Significant efforts still have to be made to ensure that training isnot reduced to the consumption of off-the-shelf products proposed by external agencies, but rather istailored to the true needs of the local communities.

Results ofthe Cononent as a Whole

81. Ihe strengthening under the project of the technical analysis and interventioncapability of the governments was for local officials an occasion for successfully turning politicalresolve into reality. This opportunity was seized and, giving priority to specific nature and urgencyof the measures to be undertaken rather than ivory-tower hypotheses, the parties involved in theproject opted for the principle of study/action during which they ensured the smooth integration ofstudies and technical assistance into the operational organization of the services. Although, to variousdegrees, that intervention did not enjoy equal success individually, their joining was a significantcontribution to the decentralization policy proposed by the State. Coming at a key point in thereform, the project provided an excellent assessment of the problems and bottlenecks in the municipalsystem. Furthermore, through progress in administrative and financial management and the proposed

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recommendations and solutions, it largely contributed to the maturation and development of thatpolicy.

V. PROJECT MANAGEUMNT

A. Objectives

82. In accordance with the Credit Agreements, project coordination was one of the twocomponents making up Part A: "urban investment planning and programming." Entrusted to thePlanning Department of the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation, it involved the following entitieswithin a quadripartite body: (i) project management (project unit); (ii) technical department; (iii) amonitoring committee; (iv) technical assistance to the project department. Its main responsibilitieswere: (i) project preparation and startup; (ii) monitoring of project implementation, and, secondarily,(iv) [sic] finalization of the Cap Vert transportation and urban development master plans.

B. Organization of the Comnonent and Benefits Induced

Project Unit

83. Appointed by official order issued by the Minister of Planning and Cooperation, theproject manager split his time equally as the administrator of the credits and project coordinator. Heoversaw the administrative and financial implementation of the project and supervised, coordinated orguided the activities under various components with a view to meeting the macroeconomic andsectoral objectives decided during identification. His management was based on the activity of a"project unit," a small body located on the periphery of the DP/MPC employing four to eight staffers(of whom two managers), primarily responsible for the relations between the Borrower, IDA and thetechnical partners. It operated in this form until November 1988, when Credit Agreement 1884-SEbecame effective, requiring additional humlan and financial resources. As project personnel had noparticular skills in urban planning or management, the technical intervention by the developerrequired the assistance of high-level expertise and the cooperation of the technical department andcommittee. For various reasons explained above, because this latter condition was not resolvedoptimally, the result was both growing isolation of the project unit within the initial apparatus and avirtually unequivocal reinforcement of its decisionmaking role.

Project Technical Deoartment

84. Appointed by official order of the Minister of Urban Development and Housing, thetechnical director, a senior otficial from the Department, was involved in all project components. Hismain responsibilities were to ensure the consistency and the mutual compatibility of action and toevaluate the quality of services provided. A member of the monitoring entities, he helped indecisionmaking and coordinating project directives. Not having any specifically identified personnelto that end, he was assisted by the members of the Monitoring Committee and the experts of theproject unit. The establishment of this key function (a condition for credit effectiveness) assumed thatthe Borrower would ensure, to the extent possible, that the appointed person would stay in thatposition and be genuinely available. In this respect, the numerous changes in personnel within MUHbetween the identification phase and project closing, and the longevity and reduced availability of thefirst people to hold the position made compliance with the commitment impossible. Along with other

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factors, these contributed to poor performance or the prolonged vacancy in the position and markedlyundermined the cross coordination of the studies.

Prolecl Mgnitgring Comnmitt

85. Another condition for credit effectiveness, the Monitoring Committee continued thework of the Steering Committee which in 1983 had identified the urban sector project. Chaired bythe planning director and including representadves from the departvients involved in the project, ithad 20 permanent members, who could receive short-term assistarAce. Its main responsibilitiesinvolved the analysis of the preliminary studies, review of activity reports and formulation ofrecommendations and guidelines for government officials and project experts. They included thedevelopment of indicators to track progress and the drafting of quarterly progress reports. Lastly, amajor interface for the various components, its smooth running determined the compliance of thegovernment offices with the policy, their real involvement in the fonmulation of project concepts andimplementation of measures. During project implementation, its mobilization proved to be complexand inconsistent with the performance objectives. Its size, lengthy procedures and their poor fit withthe rate of the project gradually led to its decline and ultimately a deterioration of its effectiveness.The emergence of disagreements resulting in part from the unclear assignment or responsibilities ortheir overlapping ultimately led to the abandomnent of a structure that had become useless. Meetingon three occasions during 1966, it could not perform in accordance with a team approach and did noteven effectively contribute to project coordination or evaluation.

Technical Assistance to the Project Unit

86. Overseen by the project manager and the technical director, technical assistance wasresponsible for (i) preparation and handling of bid calls; (ii) monitoring and evaluation of contracts;and (iii) programming and execution of technical twinning. Through short-term expertise, theconsultant provided training or informational sessions to strengthen the analysis and decisionmakingcapability of the structure. Technical assistance was provided throughout the life of the project.Although there are no particular comments to be made on implementation of the first phase, theproblems encountered during subsequent stages merit a closer look and more critical evaluation.

87. As regards monitoring and evaluation, the consultant was to regularly evaluate thedocuments produced and measure the efficiency of project activities. Based on his findings, heformulated any recommendations for improvements. The six-monthly report on those activitiesdescribed project progress and supplemented or replaced the reports of the Monitoring Committee,making it a key docunent for the coordination entities. Additionally, the identification of conditionsfor technical twinning between the Borrower (mattre d'ouvrage) and EPEVRY was to result inproposals favoring, on the one hand, the establishment of a bipartite committee that would be thelinchpin for a true urban strategy and, on the other hand, the organization of internships and trainingfor local technicians. In January 1986, when the first studies were evaluated, the decision taken bythe Borrower (maitre d'ouvrage) to end the technical assistance prevented that program from goingforward.

88. As unfortunate as they may seem, it appears that the profound divergences in opinionthat arose between the project unit [sic: managerl and his assistant made any future cooperationimpossible, however desirable it would have been. While the motives for this choice will not be

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prejudged, its adverse effects are undeniable for the technical capacity of the apparatus as a wholeand, despite the efforts taken by the project unit, were never fully overcome.

89. After a year of implementation, the project thus had the real risk of collapsing.Whether due to a choice of strategy or a natural evolution of events, the gradual resolution of theforegoing problems was reflected in a sweeping restructuring of the coordination bodies, greaterverticality of relations between the project unit and the technical partners and lastly concentration ofdecisionntaking power within that structure. It is unfortunate that that revision did not provide theopportunity for [?the provision ofl information in more capsulized form and that it did not make Itpossible to reinforce the vital linkages among the various components vital to an overall approach tothe sector. In this respect, a lack of reporting technique and performance indicators was particularlykey and resulted from the relative disaffection on the part of the technical bodies which, perceivingthemselves as uninvolved in the decisionmaking process, at times had their reservations aboutapproaches whose finality they did not grasp.

90. Despite the reservations that they may have caused or the distortions that could not beavoided, coordination seems nevertheless to have achieved its objectives. It clearly assisted in theidentification of an investment project (within the timeframe) rather than the prolonged exercise ofteam management. Regardless, the results are unquestionably significant given the ambition of theundertaking.

C. Weaknes

91. Although the problems that stalked project coordination from the outset will not bediscussed in detail, it is important to determine their causes which seem to be of different orders, thefirst associated with the normal course of intersectoral action, the second with identification of theproject and the diversity of the stakes. It was unlikely, given the size and administrative complexityof the sector, that the coordinating body (even when it was the predecessor of a national coordinatingbody) would be sufficient in a limited timeframe to unify the sectoral strategies already undertaken.This seems all the more difficult in a context of budget constraints where access to scarce resourcesleads to keener competition. Lastly, coordination should have received particular attention,preliminary in-depth consultation and precise administrative implementation. It appears that duringimplementation this did not occur. Without detailed terms of reference, the unclear delimitation ofthe prerogatives and obligations of each party, the overlapping of jurisdictions and the lack of anyfunctional prioritization exacerbated an already confused situation.

World Bank Document - Documents & Reports · DUA/MUH Direction de l'Urbanisme et de...

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