World Bank Document · (Agence de la Vulgarisation et de la Formation Agricoles) BNT National Bank...

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The World Bank

FOR OFFCLAL USE ONLY

ReportNo. 12817

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA

NORTHWEST AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PROJECT(LOAN 2502-TUN)

MARCH 9, 1994

Agriculture Operations DivisionMaghreb DepartmentMiddle East and North Africa Regional Office

This document has a restricted distribution and mav be used bv recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA

NORTHWEST AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PROJECT

(LOAN 2502-TUN)

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Currency Unit Tunisian Dinar (TD)Appraisal Year US$1.00 = 0.77 TD

Implementation average US$1.00 = 0.86 TD

Completion Year average US$1.00 = 0.92 TD

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

Metric System

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASAL Agricultural Sector Adjustment Loan

(Pret a l'Ajustement du Secteur Agricole)AFVA Agricultural Extension and Training Agency

(Agence de la Vulgarisation et de la FormationAgricoles)

BNT National Bank of Tunisia(Banque Nationale de Tunisie)

BNA Banque Nationale Agricole

(National Agricultural Bank, BNT's new name following

merger with the Banque Nationale de D6veloppement

agricole, BNDA, in 1989)CCDA Central Agricultural Development Commission

(Commissariat Central de Developpement agricole)

CCGC Central Cooperative for Field Crops

(Coop6rative Centrale des Grandes Cultures)

CRA Local Extension Unit

(Centre de Rayonnement Agricole)

CRGR Rural Engineering Research Center

(Centre de Recherche du Genie rural)

COCEBLE Central Cooperative for Wheat

(Coop6rative Centrale du Ble)

FOR OMCIAL USE ONLYTHE WORLD BANK

Washington, D.C. 20433U.S.A.

Office of Director-General March 9, 1994Operations Evaluation

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on TunisiaNorthwest Agricultural Production Proiect (Loan 2502-TUN)

Attached is the Project Completion Report on Tunisia -NW Agricultural Production Project (Loan2502-TUN). Parts I and IlIl were prepared by the Middle East and North Africa Regional Office. Part11 was prepared by the Borrower.

The project aimed to get large, rainfed, wheat-cum-livestock farms to adopt improvementsalready locally field-tested by agricultural research. T&V-style extension was to be the main tool. Alsopart of the package were improvements to input supply, marketing, milk processing, credit for on-farminvestments, road building, and further research. The project was designed for implementation byexisting governmental organizations with coordination by an implementation unit in the agricultureministry.

During the implementation period, the agriculture ministry, including its extension and researchunits, was repeatedly reorganized. Competition was introduced into marketing and other functionswhich were public monopolies when the project was designed. The project was not adjustedaccordingly. Until late in the period, supervision focussed on disbursements and construction ratherthan on project impact on agricultural production and farmers' incomes. The Borrower lost interest inthe by-then inappropriate project. Government cut its projected financing 68%. 61 % of the Bank loanwas canceled. Belgian support for the successful farm management center, however, expanded.

Except for roads, there is little evidence of impact or reason to infer impact. Extension workersdidn't visit farmers much. Record-keeping was poor and monitoring nonexistent. There is little tosustain. Institutional development has taken a different course from that envisaged by the project.

The PCR is frank and informative. Part II provides technical corrections, and emphasizes thenegative project impact of institutional changes, weaknesses in staffing and in Bank supervision,importance of monitoring and evaluation, and utility of lessons for the subsequent Research andExtension Project. No comments were received from the cofinancier.

No audit is planned.

Attachment

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of theirofficial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

FOR OMCAL USE ONLY


REPUBLIC OF TJNISIA


(LOAN 2502-TUN)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

PREFACE .....................

EVALUATION SUMMARY .............................................. iii

PART I - PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE

1. Project Identity .1

2. Project Background. 1

3. Project Objectives and Description. 2

4. Project Design. 4

5. Project Implementation. 7

6. Project Results .14

7. Project Sustainability .15

8. Bank Performance .15

9. Conclusions and Lessons Learned .16

10. Borrower Performance ..................................... 18

11. Project Documentation and Data ........................... 18

PART II - PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE ........... 19

PART III - STATISTICAL INFORMATION ............................. 24

1. Related Bank Loans .25

2. Project Timetable .26

3. Loan Disbursements .27

4. Project Costs .29

5. Project Financing .30

6. Status of Legal Covenants .31

7. Missions .33

8. Staff Inputs .34

9. Project Results .35

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.


REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA


(LOAN 2502-TUN)

PREFACE

This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Northwest

Agricultural Production Project, for which Loan 2502-TUN in the amount ofUS$15 million was approved on March 14, 1985. The Loan became effective onJune 27, 1986 and was closed six months behind schedule on December 31, 1991.A sum of US$6.2 million was cancelled from the Loan on January 24, 1989 and afurther US$2.9 million was cancelled at Loan closing on May 7, 1992. Actual

disbursements totalled US$5.9 million or 39% of the originally approved Loanamount.

This PCR (Parts I and III) was prepared by the Middle East andNorth Africa Regional Office on the basis of a country visit in May 1992, adraft completion report and progress reports prepared by the Borrower, theStaff Appraisal Report, the Loan Agreement and a study of the files.

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REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA


(LOAN 2502-TUN)

EVALUATION SUMMARY

Obiectives and Description

1. The main objective of the project was to assist Government toincrease production of cereals and livestock products on private farms andproduction cooperatives in the plains of the four northwestern provinces ofB6ja, Jendouba, El Kef and Siliana, to provide for the rapidly increasingdemand for food produce in Tunisia. Increases in production and productivitywere largely to be brought about by improved technologies which had beensucessfully tested in the area (replacing some fallow with forage andintegrating livestock) and the application of more relevant techniques (suchas fertilizer and weed control strategies aimed at the entire, integratedfarming system). This was to be achieved mainly through the reorganizationand strengthening of extension and research services in the project area andimproving supportive infrastructure, provision of training, technicalassistance, studies, livestock services, farm machinery testing and credit foron-farm investments and input resale centers.

2. The project was intended as the first stage of a future nationalprogram for research and extension. A new unified extension service based onthe T&V principles was to be tested under which all extension messages wouldemanate from extension agents located in rural extension centers; extensiondeputies at regional level were to coordinate the extension system fromsubject-matter specialists to field extension agents; and a projectimplementation unit in the CCDA (Central Commission for AgriculturalDevelopment, located at the Ministry of Agriculture in Tunis) was to overseeand coordinate the project's various components and executing entities. Therewere to be no formal institutional links between research and extension butresearch staff would be expected to participate in field trials anddemonstration plots.

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3. In addition to the regular extension activities concerned with

small and medium farmers, the project was to support, with Belgian grantfinancing, the establishment of a farm management center to advise large (over100 ha) farmers and production cooperatives (UCP).

Implementation Experience and Results

4. The project was implemented during a period of considerable

economic and institutional changes in Tunisia: price and policy reforms under

two ASALs, reforms of the credit system under the ASALs and the Fourth

Agricultural Credit Project, and five reshuffles within the Ministry ofAgriculture which included, starting in 1989, a reorganization of agricultural

extension and research, culminating in 1991 with a research and extensionproject. The original design and set-up of the project was no longer validfollowing these changes. As a result, a number of components, most notably,extension and credit, could not be implemented as foreseen and the situation

became aggravated by the declining commitment of the Borrower.

5. The project did not, as originally intended, serve as a model to

help direct the preparation of a National Research and Extension Project.

Planning of the extension service was not based on a prior diagnosis offarmers' varying needs and constraints. The principle of a single line ofcommand from central and regional management to local extension agents was notadhered to as the project tried to superimpose its own extension agenda on theexisting national extension program. In addition to the organizational

problems which worsened with each reshuffle within the Ministry of Agriculture

(para. 4.03 and 5.05), the effectiveness of the extension program was hamperedby lack of well-motivated and trained staff, the absence of links with

research, difficult mobilization of the credit component, due to the existence

of other competing lines of credit, and lack of transportation and othermeans.

6. Consequently, the extension agents had only occasional, irregularcontacts with a limited number of farmers, and contact groups were not usuallyformed; little attempt was made to review whole farms on an agro-economic

basis to help farmers increase their financial income through further

investments, particularly in livestock; feedback from farmers was not sought

and, therefore, the extension agents did not know the impact of their

recommendations on farming systems and behavior.

7. As a result of these shortcomings, as well as three successive

years of drought from 1987-89, the Project fell far short of its objectives inhaving a direct effect on farmer incomes and productivity increases. Giventhe absence of data (para. 6), no economic rate of return calculation was

attempted for the project. On the other hand, the Beja farm management center

which catered to the extension needs of the large farmers was successful and

the Belgian Government has extended its support to the center for another

year.

v

8. In addition, even though most of the physical targets were alsonot achieved due to endless procurement problems, the project has made someimprovements in the services to farmers through the construction of extensioncenters, roads, the provision of research and livestock services, vehicles andequipment. By the end of the Project, only $5.9 million was disbursed (401 ofthe Loan) mainly due to the low utilization of the large credit component.The problems encountered with the extension approach of the Project haveprovided valuable lessons which have been incorporated in the design of theNational Agricultural Research and Extension Project.

Sustainability

9. In order to ensure continuity, effective from Project closing, theresearch and extension activities initiated by this Project were brought underthe umbrella of the Agricultural Research and Extension Project which willcontinue to strengthen research and extension through provision of facilities,equipment, vehicles, staff and training. The creation of lead agencies, AFVAand IRESA, to manage and coordinate research and extension at the center, withplanning, decision making and implementation delegated at field level, willensure the effectiveness and sustainability of research and extensionservices. Emphasis will be placed on improving the quality of extensionstaff, who would be trained to work with groups, and to use mass media andother modern communication methods to reach a wider audience, while reducingcosts. Strong links would be developed between research and extension whowould conduct diagnostic surveys to better target farmers and determine howbest to satisfy their information needs. As farmers increase profits andincome with the assistance of extension staff trained in farm management andeconomics, they would be expected to form cooperatives or associations whichcould, in the long run, gradually take over responsibilities for extension.This would be in line with Government strategy to progressively withdraw fromthe provision of extension services in favor of the cooperative and privatesectors.

Findings and Lessons Learned

10. The project was too ambitious in scope and became impossible toimplement once the institutional structure fell apart. Given that weaknessesin design became apparent from the start, the Bank should have recommended anearly restructuring of the project and cancellation of the credit component.Bank supervision missions focused mainly on procurement and construction ofphysical infrastructure and failed to address at an early stage importantissues of non-compliance with audit covenants and lack of a project monitoringand evaluation system.

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11. The lessons listed below have been taken into account in follow-onprojects, in particular, the Fourth Agricultural Credit Project (completed)and Agricultural Research and Extension Project (ongoing), and the proposed NWMountainous Areas Development project (participatory approach and simplicityof design and organizational set-up) and Agricultural Sector Investment Loan(monitoring and evaluation system). Finally, roads components are, in recentyears, being implemented systematically by the Ministry of Equipment, andincreased attention is being given generally in the Bank to ensuring effectivesupervision of projects.

a) project design should not be over-complex and close cooperationand coordination within and among the various concerned agencies of theBorrower is necessary for effective implementation of multi-componentProjects.

b) extension personnel should be trained to take account ofsocioeconomic factors as well as technical considerations in dealing withfarmers. In addition, money can be saved and the coverage of scarce staffextended by taking advantage of media and other modern communication methods.

c) a strong linkage mechanism between extension and researchinstitutions has to be established and the availability of appropriatetechnology ensured.

d) there is a need to develop a participatory approach to planningwhich promotes analysis, programming and evaluation by farmers, supported byresearchers and extension staff.

e) an appropriate project monitoring and evaluation system has tobe in place from project start-up, to assess project progress and impact, andtake early corrective measures.

f) once again, experience has shown that best practices call fornot including specific credit components in agricultural development projects,but to rely on the rural banking system to finance credit needs under theprojects. In particular, it is counterproductive to have credit componentstargeted to a limited number of beneficiaries in a given area with terms,conditions and lending criteria differing widely from the terms and conditionsof the lead credit system of the country, creating distortions in the creditdistribution and recovery system. This lesson has been incorporated infollow-on agriculture projects, for example, the Gabes Irrigation Projectwhich met its credit needs through the Fourth Agricultural Credit Project.

g) the Ministry of Equipment should be given responsibility forroad components in all sectors.

h) the successful implementation of a complex project requires notonly continuity of staff but the inclusion of a diversity of skills in thesupervision team.


REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA


(LOAN 2502-TUN)

PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE

1. Proiect Identity

Project Name: Northwest Agricultural Production ProjectLoan No. 2502-TUNRVP Unit Middle East and North Africa RegionCountry : TunisiaSector Agriculture

2. Proiect Background

2.01 The Project was identified in mid-1983 by a joint Bank/FAO-CPmission following publication of the Bank Agricultural Sector Survey ofTunisia in September 1982. The Project aimed at contributing to the priorityidentified in the sector study of improving production from Tunisia'sextensive rainfed areas which have considerable unfulfilled potential.Investments in the past had mainly favored irrigated agriculture. As thepossibility for developing new irrigation areas diminished, increasedattention was focused on the development of rainfed agriculture particularlyfor grain and livestock to provide for the rapidly increasing demand for foodproduce in Tunisia. Under the Technical Assistance Project (Loan 2197-TUNapproved in 1982), several strategies were being developed to increaseefficient agricultural production. The Project was to constitute a pilotoperation to test the nationwide implementation of master plans for researchand extension, farm input distribution, farm mechanization, milk collection(prepared separately from the Technical Assistance project). The project wasprepared by the Department of Planning, Statistics and Economic Analysis ofthe Ministry of Agriculture with the assistance of FAO/CP. The project wasappraised by the Bank in January/February 1984, approved by the Board in March1985, signed in April 1985, and became effective in June 1986. It closed atthe end of December 1991, six months behind schedule.

2.02 Policy and Sector Context: In the early 1980's, the need forstrengthening the agricultural sector was demonstrated by the decreasingrelative importance of the sector within the overall economy and theincreasing dependence on imports as a result of the growth in food demandfueled by high Government investment, sharp increases in wages and salaries,and liberal credit policies. Between 1960 and 1988, agriculture'scontribution to GDP had decreased from 24 to 13*, employment in the sector haddropped from 54 to 30' and the proportion of agricultural to all exports from60 to 8%. While these decreases in the significance of the agriculturalsector in the economy were largely due to the growth of other sectors, therate of decline indicated the need for revitalization of the primary

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production sector. The sector's overall performance had also not matched thecontinued growth of public investment in agriculture, particularly in thedecade between 1975 and 1985. The Project was prepared in 1985 and itsimplementation started in 1986. This period concided with the launching ofthe Government's Medium Term Economic Adjustment Program supported by sixadjustment loans between 1986 and 1991. The reform program aimed at makingthe economy more outward oriented, more competitive and increasingly based onthe private sector. The Government concentrated its initial sector levelreform efforts in agriculture with the development of a Medium TermAgricultural Sector Adjustment Program or MTASAP supported by two AgricultureSector Adjustment Loans (ASAL) in 1986 and 1989. The ASALs have focused onprices and input subsidies, liberalization of imports and exports of keyagricultural products, marketing in two principal subsectors (cereals andedible oils), and strengthening of essential Government support services(including credit, livestock services and research and extension). The NWAgricultural Production Project was part of the Government's strategy toachieve production increases by making more effective use of existingresources. However, it was designed at the end of the VIth Plan, i.e. duringa transition period prior to the economic transformation of Tunisia whichbegan under the VIIth Plan. Several of the project components could not beimplemented as foreseen because the nature of the issues and constraints theywere designed to address had changed. The Government's commitment to theproject waned given these circumstances and the disruptions caused by theMinistry of Agriculture's program of decentralization in 1989, which includeda reform of the organization of agricultural extension, followed, in 1991, bya major restructuring of research and extension supported by an AgriculturalResearch and Extension Project.

3. Proiect Obiectives and Description

3.01 Proiect Obiectives: The main objective of the Project was toassist Tunisia to increase production of cereals (mainly wheat) and livestockproducts (chiefly milk and mutton/lamb) on private farms and UCPs in theplains of the four northwestern provinces of Beja, Jendouba, El Kef, andSiliana. The project was to focus on 18 delegations out of 33 in the area andtarget larger farmers with 10 ha or more in contrast to the Northwest RuralDevelopment Project (Loan 1997-TUN) which was, at the time, assisting poorerfarmers in the mountainous zones of the provinces. Since about 60% ofTunisia's total food imports are comprised of wheat, feedgrains, milk andmeat, additional Project production was expected to assist the balance ofpayments. Farm income was also expected to increase. These objectives wereto be achieved by strengthening extension and research in the area andimproving supportive infrastructure.

3.02 Project Description: The Project consisted of the followingcomponents:

(a) introduction of an efficient extension service in theproject area to be managed along the lines of theTraining and Visit (T&V) system, including (i)construction of 18 new and expansion of 15 existingextension centers (CTVs) and provision of equipment,

vehicles and incremental staff for the CTVs; and (ii)establishment of a farm management center to advise largefarmers and UCPs;

(b) rehabilitation and provision of equipment for one animalproduction and two field crop research stations;

(c) construction and provision of equipment, vehicles,incremental staff, operating and maintenance expenses forthree animal health centers, ten dairy cattle artificialinsemination posts, one milk collection center and threeanimal purchase centers;

(d) on-farm testing of new types of farm machinery;

(e) upgrading of approximately 110 km of rural roads andrepairs, culverts and fords for about another 20 km;

(f) provision of local and overseas training for extension staffand a researcher; an advisor for the farm management center;consultant services for extension management, farm machinerytesting, research station development, and implementation ofa monitoring and evaluation system; and studies of thetreatment of straw to improve its value as animal feed, andof the development of service cooperatives in the projectarea;

(g) credit investments for: (i) on-farm development, includingthe construction and improvement of dairies, cowsheds andsheepfolds, the purchase of tractors, implements, cows,rams, ewes and seasonal inputs, and the establishment ofpastures; and (ii) provision of 15 new input resale centers(to supply fertilizer, selected seed, pesticides,herbicides), seven of these centers for the Government'sNational Cereal Board (OC) and eight for servicecooperatives (COCEBLE and CCGC).

3.03 Project Management: The Ministry of Agriculture's CentralCommission for Agricultural Development (CCDA), located at the Ministry'sheadquarters in Tunis, was thought to be the organization best suited tocoordinate activities of the separate agencies involved in each component andwas given primary responsibility for the project. The head of the CCDA, i.e.,the project manager, was to chair a Project coordination committee,responsible for periodic liaison with the various entities involved in projectexecution. Day-to-day management was to be handled by a deputy projectmanager (agricultural engineer) leading a project implementation unit (PIU)within the CCDA, including a chief accountant and an agricultural economist.Field management of the project was to be handled by the regional branches ofthe CCDA--the regional commissions for agricultural development (CRDA)--located in the four provinces. New staff in each CRDA were to include adeputy responsible for extension and for project management and execution, and

an accountant. The deputy was to coordinate the extension system fromsubject-matter specialists to field extension agents. Subject-matterspecialists from the crop production, animal production, the Department ofAssistance to Small and Medium Size Farmers (DAPMEA), and the NationalLivestock and Range Agency (OEP), located at the CRDA level, were to developextension messages, help train extension agents and answer specializedquestions. For farmer contact, one multipurpose extension agent was to dealwith groups of about 250 farmers in place of the old system under whichfarmers were contacted by several crop specific agents.

3.04 Proiect Cost and Financing: At appraisal, total project cost(including taxes and duties of about US$9.7 million) was estimated at US$37.9million, of which $16.8 million was in foreign exchange. The Bank Loan ofUS$15 million was to finance 100* of the foreign exchange cost of the project,excluding seasonal inputs (US$1.6 million) which were to be financed by theNational Bank of Tunisia (BNT), and technical assistance for the farmmanagement center to be financed on grant terms by Belgium (about US$0.2million). The balance of funds was to be provided by the Government, BNT andProject beneficiaries. The Bank Loan was thus to finance 40% of the totalProject cost. It was to be made to the Government and utilized by theMinistry of Agriculture (for extension, research, farm machinery testing,Project management and training, technical assistance and studies), by theMinistry of Equipment (for rural roads), and passed on as a grant to the OEPfor livestock services and under a subsidiary loan agreement to BNT forcredit.

4. Proiect Design

4.01 The Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) did not anticipate any majorproject risks due to the fact that the technology of cereals/livestockintegration to be introduced under the project had been tested at anexperimental and demonstration farm, operated with the assistance of theBelgian aid program since 1969, and that some farmers adopting recommendedcultural practices in the area had obtained substantial yield increases forfield crops and animal products. In addition, the project was to focus onlarger farmers who were receptive to advice.

4.02 The Project risk of low adoption rates of improved technology byfarmers was, however, underestimated. The SAR failed to identify the absenceof a formal linkage mechanism between research and extension as a projectrisk. With the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that the timing ofproject appraisal (1984) was unfortunate, since significant policy andinstitutional reforms took place between 1986 and 1991, which considerablyaffected the Project set-up and its intended objectives. The project designwas also weakened due to the over-emphasis given initially to resolvingcomplex policy issues (milk and meat marketing and fertilizer distributionmargins), delays in preparation of master plans, the top down managementapproach adopted and the inclusion of a credit component which ran contrary toASAL reforms.

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4.03 Prolect ManaQement: The project was supposed to be managed by astable team of experienced and competent staff headed by a director entirelydevoted to the project. However, the team appointed at the CCDA (a projectmanager, deputy project manager, agricultural economist and accountant) didnot have sufficient authority (they were placed at the same level in thehierarchy as the technical directorates), were not assigned exclusively to theproject, and did not have the means (staff, vehicles, telephone) required tosupervise the multiple institutions responsible for project components. Theireffectiveness was hampered by repeated staff changes caused by 4reorganizations of the Ministry of Agriculture 1 and lack of an extensioncoordinator (extension consultants were not hired as covenanted). The firstdeputy project manager, who was an extension specialist, left towards thebeginning of the project and was replaced by an agro-economist. Theagricultural economist and accountant left in 1990 and were never replaced.Initially, there were meetings of the coordination committee to bring togetherthe various technical units, but these were not pursued. In addition, theCCDA was subjected to the bureaucratic restrictions of government ministriesin Tunisia. It had to obtain approval of the national or agriculturalprocurement committee for procurement of goods and appointment of consultants,and was often unable to procure vehicles and other equipment because of importrestrictions. The lack of a coordinating entity for the project led toenormous implementation difficulties.

4.04 Master plans: While the input distribution and milk collectionand distribution studies were completed by appraisal of the project or shortlythereafter, there were substantial delays in starting the preparation ofnational master plans for research and extension and for mechanization becauseof difficulties in recruitment of consultants. Therefore, the projectproposals dealing with research and extension and farm mechanization did notbenefit from the first conclusions of the master plan studies, and the poordesign of these components (particularly research) reflects the lack ofthorough preparation.

4.05 Policy Issues: During project preparation, it was felt that theproject's objectives in increasing meat and dairy production could not beachieved without improved milk and meat marketing facilities. As private and

1/ - In 1987, an extension directorate was created in a new Ministry ofAgriculture and Food Processing while the extension component of theproject was being managed by the CCDA in the Ministry of Agriculture.- In 1988, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Processing was dissolvedand its functions transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture.- In 1989, under the Ministry of Agriculture's program ofdecentralization, the CCDA was abolished and the PIU relocated to theDirectorate General of Plant Production.- In 1990-91, the Agency for Agricultural Extension and Training (AFVA)and the Institution of Agricultural Research and Higher Education(IRESA) were created to streamline research and extension activities atnational level.

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cooperative initiative was not providing adequate services, the project would,through the concerned public agencies, supply the necessary infrastructure.The marketing facilities (milk collection and input resale centers) wouldsubsequently be operated by a service cooperative. Second, duringnegotiations, the Government agreed to take all necessary measures in order toensure that adequate incentives would be given to private dairy processingplants and meat merchants who were faced with unfair competition from thepublic sector and to improve the timeliness of input distribution(fertilizers) to farmers. Targeted objectives were to be pursued under theASALs.

4.06 Under ASAL-II, meat and powdered milk imports were liberalized.The Government also eliminated meat subsidies on its own. The consumer priceof milk remains heavily subsidized and fixed, although in January 1993,through the First Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL-I) and the Economic andFinancial Reforms Support Loan (EFRSL), the subsidy has been extended fromonly reconstituted milk to include local processed milk as well, improving thecompetitive position of local milk. Liberalized fertilizer margins have ledto greater private activity in the market, increasing reliability of supplyfor farmers.

4.07 Government parastatals (the OC and OEP) started to withdraw frominput and marketing activities in 1986 before the necessary incentives hadbeen put in place to attract private sector involvement. The milk collectioncenter was built under the project but not equipped and the animal resalecenters had to be cancelled because no cooperative or private enterprisescould be found to manage them in the absence of the public sector. During theproject, major milk industrial plants continued to have every incentive to buyimported milk powder to produce reconstituted milk because it benefited from alarge subsidy and sold well to consumers. They were thus not inspired todevelop a local milk collection network. The failure of meat productionactivities is more of an enigma as producer prices were liberalized in 1985and rose rapidly after that (at least until import liberalization in 1992).Moreover, the Government does not intervene to purchase meat in the rest ofthe country and its lack of participation in the project area should not havehad an important impact. The region was traditionally cereal and/or muttonproducing, and farmers were not familiar with technical aspects of beefproduction; under the project, moreover, extension messages focused on crops,to the detriment of livestock, and credit was not available as needed. Thesefactors may explain farmers' inability to compete while other regions managedunder similar circumstances.

4.08 Project preparation missions also failed to take into accountthe negative impact on milk and meat production as the Government embarked onits import liberalization program and farmers had to face world prices andlower subsidies.

4.09 Credit: Initially (1985), Bank financing for credit had beenexcluded from the Loan on the grounds that the credit needs of the projectcould be met out of the Third Agricultural Credit Project (Loan 1885-TUN), afuture fourth Line of Credit to BNT, or out of Government's subsidized credit

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program (FOSDA). Another reason for the Bank not to finance credit was theslow progress on agricultural credit issues (interest rates, recoveries) underthe Third Agricultural Credit Project at the time. During negotiations of theNW Agriculture Production Project, the Government committed itself to furtherprogress on these issues. On this basis, it was agreed to include creditfinancing under the Loan. Later, under the Fourth Agricultural Credit Project(Loan 2865-TUN), good progress was made with policy reforms, includinginterest rate adjustment to market rates and phasing out Government subsidizedcredit (FOSDA). However, the credit component as designed under the Projectcontained substantial weaknesses in lending procedures and credit approvalprocess. First, BNT had not been invited to the negotiations of the Loan;thus, the subsidiary agreement signed by Government in October 1986, had to beamended in December 1987, to take into account the revised terms andconditions being worked out under the Fourth Agricultural Credit Project. BNTwas also not given primary responsibility for lending decisions, as the creditscheme was in the hands of Government, and it was expected to administer it asany Government subsidized credit scheme which the Bank and Government hadagreed to phase out. For this reason, and because credit funds were availableunder the Fourth Agricultural Credit Project under improved terms andconditions consistent with ongoing reforms, it had little incentive to use thecredit funds of the project. As reforms proceeded, there was no morejustification for a separate credit component for the project. A decision tocancel about half of the component was, however, only made in January 1989(para 5.17). With regard to the input resale centers, cooperatives or theprivate sector could not be found to manage them in the absence of the publicsector which had withdrawn (para. 5.17) and those directed credit funds werealso not used.

5. Pro-ect Imvlementation

5.01 Due to the time taken to recruit consultants to establish theproject accounting system, Loan effectiveness was delayed by about a year.Other problems affecting project start-up included delays in preparation ofthe sub-loan agreement for credit with BNT and rural road studies, andadministrative procedures which slowed procurement progress and selection ofconsultants. The project never recovered from these initial delays. This wasdue to weak organization and management, a national freeze on staffrecruitment, import restrictions which continued to affect procurement ofvehicles and equipment, and slow and inadequate mobilization of the creditcomponent (para. 5.17). These problems, combined with a devaluation in theDinar, led to a drastic reduction in total project costs (from $38 million to$10 million). In January 1989, a first cancellation of US$6.2 million ($4.5million from the credit component) took place. The project should have beenrestructured at the time and the credit component cancelled. An additionalUS$2.9 million was cancelled at Loan closing, i.e. a total of $9.1 million.In Part II, the Borrower mentions (para. 5) that the Bank refused to honor afew disbursement applications. This was because they (three applications)were received after the closing date.

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5.02 Extension Organization: A major weakness for the extension

program was the lack of an extension coordinator at central level (para. 4.03

and 5.05).

5.03 At regional level, the deputies who were to coordinate extension

were not assigned full-time to the project, since they were also the regional

representatives of the plant production department, did not coordinate their

activities with those of the separate livestock department and, except perhaps

for the deputy in Beja, were occupied by other projects in the area. They

were not successful in providing extension agents with the support of a

multidisciplinary team and forging links with research.

5.04 At field level, the extension agents were involved in other

projects and in a variety of administrative and data collection activities

which took over 70% of their time. They visited farmers occasionally whenever

they had the time and the means of transport.

5.05 The need to strengthen extension coordination at the central level

became important when an extension directorate was formed in a separate

Ministry of Agriculture Production and Food Processing in 1987, while the

extension component of the project was being managed by the CCDA in theMinistry of Agriculture. Although this new ministry was dissolved in 1988,

extension coordination continued to be an issue because of the departure in1988 of the deputy director who was also an extension specialist. Bank

supervision missions made repeated recommendations to appoint, as covenantedin the Loan Agreement, a long-term extension consultant in the project

execution unit to assist with extension organization at field level. However,

project management recruited instead, towards the end of the project, a short-

term extension consultant for training of national staff on extensionorganization, group communications and skills gap analysis. In 1989,following a reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture, the CCDA wasabolished and the project implementation unit was relocated to the Directorate

General of Plant Production which was involved in the preparation of theNational Research and Extension Project. This new decentralized arrangement

worked better because CRDA extension staff were from the Plant Production

Directorate and their commitment to the project grew with their increased

responsibility. Finally, in order to further streamline research and

extension services, the Agency for Agricultural Extension and Training (AFVA)

and the Institution of Agricultural Research and Higher Education (IRESA) werecreated in 1990 at the central level of the Ministry of Agriculture to help inthe planning, control, monitoring and evaluation of research and extension.

5.06 The Extension Approach: The 15 CTVs which existed in the project

area were to serve as pilot units where the new extension methodology was to

be introduced and tested. As a first step, the CTVs were to make a survey of

the area which they covered and select a small number of contact farmers

eligible for support under the project (minimum farm size 10 ha). In

consultation with the farmers, and with the help of CRDA specialists, farm

development plans were to be established and requirements for on-farmimprovements mainly for integration of livestock (stables, sheds, etc.) and

short-term credit identified. Special credit agents in the CRDA were to

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assist farmers with preparation of credit requests and direct them to theappropriate credit institution. Practical demonstrations were to be conductedon these model farms and this was expected to attract the participation ofneighboring farmers. The contact groups thus formed were to be visited by theextension agents every two weeks.

5.07 In reality, the extension methodology consisted of setting upannually 1 or 2 demonstration plots in 1 or 2 farms with input supply providedby the Government. As was the custom during annual fairs organized byGovernment, various farmers from the districts participated in thesedemonstrations about twice during the season seeking advice on harvesting,weed control and fertilizer application. However, demonstrating culturaltechniques in a large plot in one or two areas once or twice a year limitedthe benefits to few farmers. There was little participation of neighbors andcontact groups were usually not formed. The system of supplying farmers withseeds, pesticides and sometimes machinery, labor, was not effective since thefarmer contributed little besides his land and was likely to be passive to thewhole operation. Due to the lack of interaction with farmers, extensionagents did not know how much of the technology was adopted and reasons fornon-adoption. In addition, little attempt was made to review whole farms onan agro-economic basis to help farmers increase their financial income throughfurther investments, particularly in livestock.

5.08 Thus, the T&V approach whereby only a few farmers were contactedwith the expectation that the message would be spread around, did not work.The difficulties in mobilizing the credit component (para. 4.09 and 5.17) andlack of links with research (para 5.18) contributed in large part to this poorperformance.

5.09 In addition to the regular extension activities concerned withsmall farmers, the project included the establishment in Beja of a farmmanagement center to advise large (over 100 ha) farmers and UCPs. Thisactivity was financed by a Belgian Government grant.

5.10 The Beja farm management center was established in November 1986by the ex-project coordinator for the Belgian technical assistance team incharge of the Fretissa project. The Beja center selected farms based on size(100 ha at least) and interested in technical progress and in livestock/cropintegration. The tunisian team consists of eight staff, of which a secretary,a driver, a technician and 5 scientists. The Belgian team consists of 4 ofwhich an agronomist and head of team, a farm machinery, plant production andlivestock specialist. In addition to the experts, the grant financedvehicles, computer hardware and software, 5 short term and 4 long termfellowships. Given the wide area covered by the farm management center,separate small advisory units headed by two agro-economists were establishedin the other governorates, while the main team concentrated on Beja. The Bejacenter also provided equipment and vehicles to the other 3 centers out of thebudget previously allocated for cooperative establishment (para. 5.25).

5.11 During the course of the Project, the Beja center assisted about75 farms of which most were cooperative farms (UCP). Few of the larger

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private farmers requested advice as they were reluctant to release cost andbenefit data. The center assisted farmers with improved farm planning,budgeting, farm machinery operation and maintenance, and advice on culturaltechniques to maximize production (rotating cereals with other crops, betterfarming practices and integrating crop and livestock activities). The teamalso assisted with the preparation of credit requests to BNT. Given the highdemand for its services, the Belgian Government agreed to extend its supportof the farm management center until December 1992. The 1991 annual report ofthe farm management center mentions that livestock activities suffer from thelack of health care, knowledge of techniques, high costs, since most of thepurebred animals are imported, and from the fact that livestock requirescontinuous work while well-off farmers are often absentee farmers.

5.12 Extension Infrastructure and Means: To allow the mobility ofextension staff, the project was to provide 58 cars to staff in the extensioncenters (CTV), the project coordinators at CRDA level and the Beja farmmanagement center, as well as 4 minibuses for the transport of farmers. Dueto procurement difficulties, by the end of the Project, 38 cars and oneminibus were purchased. In addition, 10 tricycles were purchased which, whentested by the CRDAs, were not found to be suitable for the road conditions inrural areas. In Beja, the extension agents had the use of the car 2 or 3 daysa week but the other CTVs had much less access to transport. Furthermore,some of the project vehicles were used by other agencies for non-projectactivities and there were gasoline restrictions. As a result, farmers werenot visited regularly and often did not know the date scheduled for theextension agent's visits. The lack of transport had a negative influence onthe effectiveness of the extension service as a whole.

5.13 Given that certain CTVs were constructed by other projects, only12 (instead of 18) new extension centers were constructed and 13 (instead of15) existing ones were expanded. Some of these extension centers are locatedin rural areas and are called CRAs (Centres de Rayonnement Agricole) todistinguish them from CTVs which are located at the sub-regional or districtlevel and supervise 3 to 6 CRAs.

5.14 The CTVs were also provided as foreseen with audiovisual materialand agricultural equipment for demonstration plots. In addition, althoughnot originally included in the project, the 4 regional soil and conservationunits were provided with equipment in order to help extension staff withdemonstrations to farmers of the benefits of contour strip farming as a meansto reduce erosion, increase moisture retention and increase yields. A total of18,000 ha were treated under the project.

5.15 Extension traininq: The local training of extension agents (45)took place in accordance with the project mainly at the Sidi Thabetagricultural training center. The first training sessions were onagricultural development, planning and credit. Further training sessionsincluded the physical environment, farm management and budgeting,mechanization, communications techniques, extension methodology, farmers'attitudes & objectives. However, most of the training was irrelevant and

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academic since it did not result from diagnosis of farmers' actual problemsand constraints at the field level.

5.16 The overseas training for supervisors and subject-matterspecialists did not take place given the difficulties at the time in obtainingapproval for foreign technical assistance in Tunisia.

5.17 Credit: In addition to the lack of incentives for BNT to use thecredit component of the project (para. 4.09), credit demand by farmers for on-farm investments was low because of the drought of 1988/89 which affectedtheir ability to repay past loans and their willingness/ability to invest,particularly for farm machinery. Despite this slowdown in the rural economy,some cooperatives and large farmers in the project area in good standing withBNT were able to obtain credit under the normal BNT terms and conditions.Some small and medium farmers also benefitted from the FOSDA credit beingphased out. In addition, the credit funds directed to the input resalecenters were not used. This was because of the OC's withdrawal from inputdistribution in conformity with ASAL-I and the indebtedness of thecooperatives CCGC and COCEBLE which made them ineligible at the time forcredit by BNT or any other bank. As of January 1989, as part of the largercancellation of $6.2 million (para. 5.01), loan funds allocated to the creditcomponent were reduced from the original $8 million to $3.5 million.Disbursement of the credit component finally started to pick up when the Bankapproved in November 1990 BNA's 2 request to utilize the undisbursed balanceof funds for credit to refinance loans made for the period 1989 to 1991 tocreditworthy farmers eligible under the Project. By the end of the project, atotal of about $2.7 million was disbursed for credit, i.e. about a third ofthe original allocation. Most of the credit was used for purchase ofagricultural and irrigation equipment.

5.18 Research: In the design of the Project, formal links betweenresearch and extension were not established. There were no contacts betweenresearch and extension and no use of joint field trials as foreseen in theSAR. Research priorities continued to be decided at the central level andwere not tailored to farmers' constraints and needs. This was a major flaw ofthe extension system of the Project.

5.19 The Project was to provide equipment and facilities for theresearch stations in the area, in particular for the animal productionresearch station of the National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRAT)at El Afareg in Beja. The project rehabilitated the El Afareg station byproviding a laboratory building and equipment for crop and pastureexperiments, constructing two small houses for technicians, farm equipment forgeneral farm operations (tractors and attachments), and constructing a wellfor irrigation and cattle. Unfortunately, the rehabilitation of El Afaregstation was not completed by the closing date. There remains construction ofa stable and milking shed which were started in 1990; the lodgings lack waterand electricity; and although there is a lab with equipment, there are no

2/ BNT's new name following a merger with BNDA in 1989.

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scientists to conduct the experiments because of the difficulty to attractpeople to live in isolated rural areas. Due to lack of staff and operatingfunds, the head of El Afareg station was unable to conduct any experimentalwork.

5.20 Farm Machinery Testing: In order to ensure that Project farmersand UCPs are advised of the most appropriate farm machinery to maximimizeproductivity, the Project was to set up a farm machinery testing facility,provide consultants to help choose the type and source of farm implements tobe tested, devise the methodology for on-farm comparative testing andsupervise the implementation of the testing program. The Project was also toprovide for the purchase of the implements to be tested and small equipmentrequired for the testing program. Given the difficulty in recruitingconsultants, a list of agricultural testing equipment was finally prepared incollaboration with CRGR (Centre de Recherche du Genie Rural) by a consultantrecruited by the Bank for the appraisal of the Research and Extension Project.However, due to procurement problems, only a part of the equipment, consistingof a moldboard plow, a disc harrow, chiesel, and 2 cultivators, was purchasedin 1991 for the CRGR at the research station of El Afareg. This wasunfortunate since CRGR had previously done a lot of work and had manyprototypes ready to be made and tested. The experimental work on farmmachinery and implements with particular emphasis on tillage, seeding andfertilizer application will be done under the Research and Extension Projectusing a multidisciplinary approach, involving agronomists, soil scientists aswell as farm machinery specialists.

5.21 Livestock services: As foreseen, the three animal health centersat Dahmani, Testour and Teboursouk were constructed. Only a part of theequipment and 8 of 10 vehicles planned for 8 existing dairy cattle artificialinsemination posts were bought and made available to the centers.The milk collection center was built but not equipped and the animal purchasecenters were not constructed due to the disengagement of the OEP frommanagement of marketing centers, and the problems to find suitable cooperativeor private enterprises to manage these centers, given their lack ofprofitability at the time.

5.22 Roads: Under the Project, 110 km of feeder roads were to beupgraded but this program was reduced to 92 km (39 km Beja, 19 km Jendouba and34 km Le Kef) due to financing of 18 km of roads in Siliana from othersources. The rural roads component was delayed by several factors. The roadsstudy commissioned by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1988 had to be amendedbecause it did not include an economic evaluation, as required in the LoanAgreement, and was then rejected twice by the procurement committee on thegrounds that it was the Ministry of Equipment's responsibility. A technico-economic study was finally prepared and the contract was approved in September1989. Works started in December 1989 but were delayed by land expropriationissues, which had not been taken into account, and by poor weather conditions,particularly in 1990/91. Unfortunately, the poor weather conditions persistedthroughout the period of the extension of the closing date of the Loan, andthus, by the end of the Project in December 1991, works were not completed buthad stopped. While roads in El Kef were practically completed, only about 70W

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of road rehabilitation works in B6ja, and 80W in Jendouba, had been executed.The Ministry of Equipment is expected to complete the works.

5.23 Training, Technical Assistance and Studies: Due to the preferencegiven in Tunisia for local technical assistance, in August 1989, the Bankapproved an amendment of the Loan Agreement whereby consulting services wereto be financed at 100% (instead of 80% local and 100% foreign). However, ofthe original $500,000 allocation for technical assistance, only $94,000 wasdisbursed. The low use of consultant funds is a result of the overall poorimplementation and design of the project.

5.24 The funding for the local training of extension staff and the farmmanagement center was used as foreseen. The head of El Afareg researchstation also underwent training for six months at a research stationdevelopment and management training course in Mexico. However, on his return,this was not followed as planned by a consultancy on establishment of supportstations in Tunisia. In addition, a major project weakness was the lack of along-term extension management consultant to help make the extension serviceoperational.

5.25 Four studies were done under the Project. Two were for the ruralroads technico-economic studies (para. 5.22), the third was to set up anaccounting system for the Project (para. 5.27) and the fourth, not originallyincluded, was for preparation of the Research and Extension Project. A studyof the treatment of straw to improve its value as animal feed was droppedbecause it had been carried out by INRAT, and the study to assist with thedevelopment of service cooperatives in the Project area was to be undertakenby the Ministry of Agriculture with its own funding. Some computer equipmentwas purchased for the implementation of a monitoring and evaluation systemwhich was never established (para. 5.26).

5.26 Monitoring and Evaluation: The agricultural economist in the PIUwas to monitor the physical execution of the project and achievement ofproduction and policy objectives, according to key indicators outlined in thetechnical support volume of the SAR. Due to the departure of the agriculturaleconomist in 1988 and lack of a replacement, no consistent monitoring andevaluation system was developed. The impact of extension could not bemeasured because the pre-project situation had not been assessed and data hadnot been collected in the field. The semi-annual reports submitted by theBorrower were on the status of physical construction, extension training andthe financial accounts of the Project.

5.27 Accounting System: The design of a satisfactory project accountingsystem was a condition of effectiveness of the Loan. After long delays, anaccounting firm was selected and financed a study to set up a system.However, the accounting system was not set up as foreseen due to the lack ofcomputer equipment, and overlapping responsibilities of the accountants in theCRDAs and the chief accountant in the PIU, who left in 1990 before the firstaudit mission took place. A Bank mission in 1990 following up on lack ofaudit compliance helped the PIU to organize their accounts (no separateaccounts were kept for the Project) and the first consolidated audit report

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was prepared in 1991 covering the years 1988-1990. The audit report for 1991accounts was provided in early 1993.

6. Project Results

6.01 The project did not, as originally intended, serve as a model tohelp direct the preparation of a National Research and Extension Project.Planning of the extension service was not based on a prior diagnosis offarmers' varying needs and constraints. The principle of a single line ofcommand from central and regional management to local extension agents was notadhered to as the project tried to superimpose its own extension agenda on theexisting national extension program. In addition to the organizationalproblems which worsened with each reshuffle within the Ministry of Agriculture(para. 4.03 and 5.05), the effectiveness of the extension program was hamperedby lack of well-motivated and trained staff, the absence of links withresearch, difficulty to mobilize the credit component, and insufficientfinancial means.

6.02 Consequently, the extension agents had only occasional, irregularcontacts with a limited nuxmber of farmers, and contact groups were not usuallyformed; little attempt was made to review whole farms on an agro-economicbasis to help farmers increase their financial income through furtherinvestments, particularly in livestock; feedback from farmers was not soughtand, therefore, the extension agents did not know the impact of theirrecommendations on farming systems and behavior.

6.03 As a result of these shortcomings as well as three successiveyears of drought from 1987-89, the Project fell far short of its objectives inhaving a direct effect on farmer incomes and productivity increases (para.6.05). On the other hand, the Beja farm management center which catered tothe extension needs of the large farmers was successful and the BelgianGovernment has extended its support to the center for another year.

6.04 In addition, even though most of the physical targets were alsonot achieved due to endless procurement problems, the project has made someimprovements in the services to farmers through the construction of extensioncenters, roads, the provision of research and livestock services, vehicles andequipment. By the end of the Project, only $5.9 million was disbursed (40W ofthe Loan) mainly due to the low utilization of the large credit component.The problems encountered with the extension approach of the Project haveprovided valuable lessons which have been incorporated in the design of theNational Agricultural Research and Extension Project.

6.05 Crop and Livestock Production: The main effect expected from theProject was an increase in crop and livestock production and farmer incomes.However, the pre-project situation was not known (no diagnostic surveyscarried out) and agricultural statistics in the project area were notmonitored, and thus it is impossible to measure any impact of the Project onagricultural productivity or incomes. Based on data published by theAgricultural Statistics Division of the Ministry of Agriculture, production ofmajor foodgrains and livestock products in the 4 governorates of the Project

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has increased between 1986 and 1991, mainly due to higher yields. However,the Project was meant to cover only a part of the governorates and thus nocomparison with SAR projected increases in production and yields could bemade. In addition, good results during the last two years of the Project canmainly be attributed to favorable climatic conditions compared to four yearsof drought from 1986 to 1989, and it is virtually impossible to separate whatthe Project did from the CRDAs' overall agricultural development program forthe NW area at the time. Due to the absence of data, no economic rate ofreturn calculation was attempted for the Project.

7. Prolect Sustainability

7.01 In order to ensure continuity, effective from Project closing, theresearch and extension activities initiated by this Project were brought underthe umbrella of the Agricultural Research and Extension Project which willcontinue the program initiated of strengthening research and extension throughprovision of facilities, equipment, vehicles, staff and training.Experimental work on various types of farm machinery and implements whichcould not be implemented would take place under the Research and ExtensionProject. Research would continue its work on forage crops, livestock andfield crops complementarity and increased attention would be given to socio-economic aspects in order to provide policy makers, extension staff and thefarming community with cost and benefit data on proposed new techniques andmethods. The new decentralized extension structure with a lean managementteam at the center and planning, decision making and implementation at fieldlevel will ensure its effectiveness and sustainability. Extension staff wouldbe trained to work with groups and to use mass media and other moderncommunication methods to reach a wider audience while reducing costs. Byconducting diagnostic surveys, research and extension staff would identify thevarious categories of farmers and determine how best to satisfy theirinformation needs. In future, as farmers are better able to manage theirassets and make a profit, they could start to become organized as cooperativesor associations and assume increasing responsibility for extension. Thiswould be in line with Government's strategy to increasingly transferresponsibility for extension to the private and cooperative sectors, leavingthe public sector to focus on small subsistence farmers in remote areas whichare likely to continue to need assistance.

8. Bank Performance

8.01 As mentioned earlier, the Project had some serious design flaws(the credit component, in particular). In hindsight, some of the risks whichwere to occur to the Project could have been foreseen and avoided byscheduling the Project at a later date once a dialogue on pricing and policieswas established with Government (after ASAL-I or II). Although theorganizational problems were mostly out of its control, the Bank did notfollow up early enough on some important issues, for example, non-compliancewith audit covenants and lack of a project monitoring and evaluation system.The serious shortcomings of the project were not brought to managementattention until 1991 when a new mission rated the project a "3". Afterappraisal, a mission composed of an economist and financial analyst was

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launched to assist with Project start-up and a total of 16 supervision

missions were led mainly by an agronomist with minimal participation oflivestock, extension or financial staff, and this may have contributed to the

poor performance of those components. The missions concerned themselves

mainly with disbursement, construction of physical infrastructure and

staffing. No attempt was made to assess the project's impact on production

and farmers' incomes, disregarding the analysis of project impact. It wasonly in the last two years of the Project, in the context of the preparationof the Research and Extension Project, that a serious attempt was made to

render the extension service more effective by improvements proposed inextension organization and training. The Bank's decision to extend the Loan

closing date by six months did not allow completion of the rural roads because

of poor weather conditions in winter of 1991.

9. Conclusions and Lessons Learned

9.01 The project was too ambitious in scope and became impossible toimplement once the institutional structure fell apart. Given that weaknessesin design became apparent from the start, the Bank should have recommended anearly restructuring of the project and cancellation of the credit component.

9.02 The lessons which can be derived from the project are the

following:

1) project design should not be over-complex and close cooperationand coordination within and among the various concerned agencies of theBorrower is necessary for effective implementation of multi-component

Projects;

2) more effective use of extension personnel will be possibleonly if they are trained to take account of socioeconomic factors as well as

technical considerations in dealing with farmers;

3) in addition, money can be saved and the coverage of scarcestaff extended by taking advantage of media and other modern communicationmethods;

4) a strong linkage mechanism between extension and researchinstitutions has to be established and the availability of appropriate

technology ensured;

5) there is a need to develop a participatory approach toplanning which promotes analysis, programming and evaluation by farmers,supported by researchers and extension staff. If this is done by homogeneousgroups of farmers, it should result in research and recommendations morerelevant to the needs of all important sub-categories of farmers;

6) an appropriate project monitoring and evaluation system hasto be in place from project start-up, to assess project progress and impact,

and take early corrective measures;

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7) experience has shown that best practices call for not

including specific credit components in agricultural development projects, butto rely on the rural banking system to finance credit needs under the

projects. In particular, it is counterproductive to have credit componentstargeted to a limited number of beneficiaries in a given area with terms,

conditions and lending criteria differing widely from the terms and conditions

of the lead credit system of the country, creating distortions in the credit

distribution and recovery system. This lesson has been incorporated in

follow-on agriculture projects, for example the Gabes Irrigation Project whichmet its credit needs through the Fourth Agricultural Credit Project.

8) the Ministry of Equipment should be given responsibility for

road components in all sectors.

9) the successful implementation of a complex project requires not

only continuity of staff but the inclusion of a diversity of skills in the

supervision team.

9.03 The above lessons have been incorporated in projects which areongoing or under preparation: the NW Mountainous Areas Development Project forlessons 1 and 5 (participative approach), the Agricultural Research and

Extension Project for lessons 2 to 6, the Fourth Agricultural Credit Projectfor lesson 7. The lack of monitoring and evaluation has plagued the majority

of agriculture projects under implementation. The Agricultural Sector

Investment Loan proposes to include a study to establish an integrated

monitoring and evaluation system for the 1994-1996 investment program of the

Ministry of Agriculture. Finally, roads components are, in recent years,being implemented systematically by the Ministry of Equipment (lesson 8) andincreased attention is being given generally in the Bank to ensuring effective

supervision of projects (lesson 9).

9.04 Follow-up on Lessons Learnt: As a result of the reorganization of

the Ministry of Agriculture in 1989, the newly created CRDAs were given alarge degree of administrative, financial and executing autonomy. This will

ensure that development projects in future will have a more decentralized

management and procurement system which should help avoid the bottlenecksencountered by line agencies of the Ministry of Agriculture.

9.05 Following reforms initiated under the ASAL, the Research andExtension Project was prepared in 1990 to further rationalize research and

extension at national, regional and local levels. It proposes to cover the

first five-year phase of a ten-year research and extension program. The major

improvements proposed or undertaken under the Project are the following.

First, lead agencies to manage and coordinate research and extension, IRESA

and AFVA, were established. A major weakness under the NW Production project,which was the lack of an extension unit at CRDA level providing farmers andextension agents with the support of a multidisciplinary team, would be

corrected through the creation of central extension support units (DVPA) in

the 15 governorates concerned by the Research and Extention Project. EachDVPA would have three arrondissements, covering, respectively, plant

production, animal production and financing and credit. In addition, in order

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to relieve extension agents of non-extension related duties, the supervisorystaff (CTV) would be given more of an administrative role withresponsibilities for helping extension agents organize their work andproviding them with technical support. The extension agents would be giventhe single function of transmitting technical information to and from farmers.Strong links between extension and research would be developed so thatfarmers' problems would be taken to research for solution, appropriateresearch programs developed, and appropriate technologies taken from researchto farmers. Following the skill gaps analysis conducted under the NWProduction Project, only highly motivated extension staff with the requiredqualifications would be recruited and trained. An effective monitoring andevaluation system would be established and staff trained in its use.

9.06 With regard to agricultural credit, the Fourth Agricultural CreditProject with BNT/BNA was implemented in a satisfactory manner from 1988 to1991 and it addressed institutional and financial improvements at the level ofBNT/BNA, the lead bank for agriculture in Tunisia. The PCR for this creditproject was issued in June 1992.

10. Borrower Performance

10.01 The Borrower's performance during project implementation was notalways satisfactory. The lack of a coordinating entity with sufficientauthority, including control over budgetary resources, led to important delaysand shortfalls in project implementation. As the project began to beimplemented, and it became apparent that its organization and a number of itsobjectives were in conflict with the Ministry of Agriculture'sdecentralization program and reforms underway under the ASALs and the FourthCredit Project, the Government gave limited priority to the Project whichaggravated already existing procurement and recruitment problems. TheBorrower's compliance with loan covenants was not very good. The requirementto establish permanent posts for extension and key staff in the projectimplementation unit was not met and a first audit report was submitted onlytowards the end of the Project. Monitoring and evaluation was also notcovered.

11. Project Documentation and Data

11.01 The implementation volume of the SAR is voluminous and discussesin detail pricing and marketing constraints for cereals and livestock. Whilethis was useful background information for the preparation of the ASAL-I, itis apparent from reading the SAR that the Project components were hastilyprepared and it is not surprising that at appraisal and during implementationa number of components had to be reduced and/or could not be implemented asforeseen. A major flaw was that the implementation volume included so manymonitoring indicators that it was difficult to isolate which were the mostimportant ones to use in order to follow up on progress with the extensionsystem and adjust it if necessary. No data was thus collected to monitor theimpact of extension. Semi-annual progress reports on the physicalimplementation of the project were, however, submitted to the supervisionmissions.

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REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA


(LOAN 2502-TUN)

Part II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE

- 20 -


REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA


(LOAN 2502-TUN)

Part II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE(Translated from the original French version)

This is Part II of the Completion Report of the NorthwestAgricultural Production Project which constitutes the Borrower's perspective.This Part II is based on the data of a preliminary report prepared by theBorrower and submitted to the World Bank in May 1992, as well as on the PartsI and III prepared by the World Bank and submitted to the Borrower on April23, 1993.

This Part II has been prepared according to the format recommendedby the Bank and includes six paragraphs as follows:

1. Confirmation of factual data contained in Part III

The information presented in Part III of the report correspondswith that of the preliminary report and reflects the Project's real situationat completion. However, the following remarks are made in relation to Table6: Status of Legal Covenants:

Section 3.01 (b)

Annual budget and financing plans were submitted to the Bankregularly and in accordance with the Loan Agreement. Those budgets wereallocated to the Project as planned, except for the budget related to theacquisition of vehicles for the extension component, which was reduced afterrestrictions imposed on vehicle procurement at national level.

Section 3.04 (c)

The coordinating committee was established in accordance with theLoan Agreement and held regular meetings. However, these meetings werereduced following project management changes.

Section 3.05: Employment of management, accounting, and agriculturalConsultants

The following actions were taken in this context:

- organization of a six-month training course for the head of aresearch station in Mexico (CIMMYT Center) on "Research StationsDevelopment";

- a Belgian consultant has been recruited under the BelgianTechnical Assistance to set up the operating methodology of themanagement center, follow-up on actions taken and give technicaland management guidance for the center's activities ;

- a study on the establishment of an accounting system for theProject was undertaken by an accounting firm;

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- Since September 1987, steps were undertaken to recruit anextension management consultant. However, this did notmaterialize and Project management recruited instead an expert inrural communications who prepared a training program andimplemented a training course for 45 heads of local extensioncenters. This course dealt mainly with communication techniquesand extension activities planning.

Section 3.06: Management of the Milk Collection Center

The milk collection center was built but the World Bank did notgive its approval to equip it because of lack of interest of cooperatives orthe private sector to manage it.

Section 3.11

The implementation of the accounting system which had beendesigned by an accounting firm required the acquisition of the necessarymeans, in particular, the applications software. However, the software wasnot purchased given that project management estimated that its cost was toohigh.

2. Remarks on the analysis contained in Part I

Para 4.03 - Proiect Management

The Project was supposed to be managed by a stable team ofexperienced and competent staff; this team was supposed to be assisted by acoordinating committee composed of the various institutions concerned with theProject. However, due to the lack of an action plan defining the role andresponsibilities of each participant, this committee did not have theefficiency required.

Para 4.07

The parastatal agencies (Cereals Agency and National Livestock andPasture Agency) did not in fact start to withdraw from input distribution andmarketing until after 1986. Their withdrawal is not yet completed and theCereals Agency continues, for example, to distribute fertilizers where needed,until such time as the activity can be handed over to the private sector.

Para 4.08

In order to mitigate the negative impact of liberalization ofimported milk and meat on local production, mititgating measures have beentaken by the Government such as the imposition of tariffs as of 1991 onpowdered milk and meat imports.

Para 5.07

In fact, several demonstration plots and information days areorganized annually at the level of local extension centers, which cover cropand livestock production.

Para 5.08

The "Training and Visits" method was certainly not fully adoptedby all the heads of CRAs. However, thanks in large part to the trainingprogram implemented by the Project, some of the heads of CRAs which have thenecessary means were able to apply this method successfully.

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With the establishment of the Agricultural Extension and TrainingAgency, this method will be used by the other CRAs.

Para 5.15: Extension Training

The expert in rural communications prepared a training program forthe extension agents of the Project, which takes into account the trainingdeficiencies and is best adapted to the extension work.

This training was implemented under the form of workshops andpractical sessions attended by all extension agents working in the Projectarea.

Para 6.02

An effort has been made by the Beja farm management center to setup development plans for the large farms concerned by the Project. This taskhas required the participation of a multidisciplinary team at engineer level,and cannot be implemented by the heads of CRAs.

3. Bank Performance

While Bank supervision missions were regular and followed theProject from appraisal to completion, they concerned themselves mainly withdisbursements and construction of physical infrastructure rather than with theassessment of the Project impact on agricultural production and farmers'incomes. In effect, it would have been beneficial for supervision missions toparticipate more efficiently in defining actions to be undertaken annuallywhile insisting on the continuous monitoring and evaluation of Projectactivities.

Moroever, for improved efficiency, the profile of expertsparticipating in the missions should have corresponded to the differentspecialties required to carry out the Project.

4. Borrower Performance

The Project was implemented during a period of profoundorganizational and institutional changes at the level of the Ministry ofAgriculture, which seriously hampered its execution. Nevertheless, theProject was able to realize most of the physical actions foreseen in the LoanAgreement (construction of CRAs, rehabilitation of rural roads, constructionof animal health and milk collection centers, etc..) as well as trainingactivities and certain studies. The lessons learned proved very useful forthe appraisal of the Research and Extension Project.

The lessons to be retained for the future may concern thefollowing aspects:

- for reasons of convenience and management flexibility, specificactions such as rehabilitation of rural roads or construction andequipment of livestock and research facilities should beundertaken directly by the concerned services; credit should begranted directly to beneficiaries;

- 23 -

- the Borrower should provide appropriate training to thetechnicians in charge of Project execution, should ensurecontinuity of staff and a proper match of their skills with thoserequired of the Project;

- the establishment of a monitoring and evaluation system should berequired of all projects.

5. Relationship between the Bank and the Borrower during Project Execution

Relations between the Bank and the Borrower were always friendlyand cooperative. However, the Bank refused to accept a few disbursementapplications, as well as the equipment of the milk collection center.

6. Cofinancier's Performance

Under the NWAP Project (Beja Management Center), the "AgenceGenerale de Cooperation et de Developpement Belge" sends a Belgian consultantevery six months to follow and assess the activities of the Project.

These consultancies should be allowed for Tunisian consultants whocould make a useful contribution to the smooth implementation of the Projectand should not remain the sole right of Belgian consultants.

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REPUBLIC OF TUNISIA


(LOAN 2502-TUN)

Part III: STATISTICAL INFORMAT1ON

TABLE 1 : RELATED RANK LOAS

PROJECT YEAR OF PURPOSE LOAN ANoCET STATUSAPPROVAL

Third Highways 1978 To help Govt. fmptement a nationwide rurat development S 32 mitlion Loan closed 03/31/86. PCR(1601-TUN) program (improvements in rural roads, extension services of which issued 04/88.and technical assistance to the Ministries of Public S 6.7 milLionWorks and Agriculture). cancelled

Third Agricultural 6/80 To increase agricultural production and incomes of small S 30 miltion Closed 12/31/86. PCRCredit Project and medium farmers as well as improve the system of issued 06/91.(Loan 1885-TUN) agricultural credit distribution by strengthening theagricultural credit operations of BNT.

Northwest Rural 1981 First phase of a 15 year program to support rural S 24 million Closed 12/31/89. PCRDevelopment Project development in the depressed Northwest region of of which issued 10/91.(Loan 1997-TUN) Tunisia. S 7.6 miltioncancelled

Fifth Highway Project 1982 Helped Goverrnment continue to provide farmers with S 35.5 mitlion Closed 10/31/91. PCR(Loan 2108-TUN) improved roads, extension centers and farm credit. of which due 06/93.$ 4 millioncanceltled

Technical Assistance 1982 To assist Tunisian Govt. in increasing the number of S 5 million Loan closed 06/30/88. PCR Un(2197-TUN) projects for the 6th Development Plan (1982-86) and in issued 12/90.improving their quality in the areas of agriculture,industry/exports and energy.

Agricultural Sector 1986 Supported the first phase of implementation of Govt.'s $ 150 million Loan closed 06/30/89. PCRAdjustment Loan (ASAL-1) program of agriculture sector reforms, within the issued 01/91.(2754-TUN) framework of a general macro-economic restructuring

program.

Fourth Agriculturat 1987 Promoted development of a financially sound rural credit S 30 miLLion Loan closed 11/91. PCRCredit Project system and financed credit to agriculture in support issued 06/92.(2865-TUN) of the Govt.'s Mediun-Term Adjustment Program (1987-91)

formulated in connection with ASAL-1.

Second AgricuLtural 1989 Supported the second phase of implementation of Govt.'s S 84 million Under inplementation.Sector Adjustment medium-term agriculture sector adjustment program,Loan (ASAL-I1) within the framework of a general macro-economic(3078-TUN) restructuring program.

Agricultural Research 1990 Supports reorganization and strengthening of research S 17 million Under implementation.and Extension Project and extension(3217-TUN)

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Table 2: PROJECTTIMETABLE

PLANNED ACTUAL

Identification 6883

Preparatlon Beginning 9/83

Preparation End 12/83

Appraisal Mission 1184

Follow-up Appraisl 5/84

Loan Negotiations U8/4 1/14 - 1/118/5

Board Approval 3/14/85

Loan Signature 4/85 4/25/85

Loan Effectiveness 8/28/85 e/27/J8

Loan Closing 6/30/91 12/31/91

Project Completion 6/30/90 12131/91

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Table 3: LOAN DISBURSEMENTSA. CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS

(USS Million)

IBRD FISCAL YEAR APPRAISAL ESTIMATE ACTUAL % OF APPRAISALSEMESTER ENDING ESTIMATE

FY 86Dec. 1985 0.30 0.00June 1988 0.45 0.00

Dec. 1986 0.75 0.00June 1987 1.00 0.41 41%

FY 88Dec. 1987 1.50 0.00June 1G88 2.00 0.45 23%6

FY89ODec. 1988 2.00 0.22 11%June 1988 2.00 0.52 26%

FY 90Dec. 1989 2.00 0.43 22%June 190 1.50 0.37 26%

FY 91Dec. 1900 1.00 0.75 75%June 1901 0.50 2.10 420%

FY 92Dec. 1991 0.00 0.28June 1902 0.00 0.30

TOTAL 15.00 5.83 30%

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Table 3: LOAN DISBURSEMENTSB. PLANNED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS BY CATEGORY

PLANNED REVISED 1/ ACTUAL ACTUAL AS %USS MILLION US$ MILLION USS MILLION OF REVISED

Civil Works 3.6 3.6 2.25 63%

Goods 1.7 1.2 0.78 63%

Credit under Part G (i) 8.0 3.5 2.73 78%and G (iii) of the Project

Consultants' Services 0.5 0.3 0.004 31%

Initial Deposit in 0.3 2/ 0.0 0.0Special Account

Unallocated 0.0 0.2 0.0

TOTAL 15.0 8.8 5.834 66%

1/ Original loan amount was reduced by US$6.2 m. as of January 24, 1989.

2/ By amendment of June 22, 1987, the initial deposit of US$0.3 was transferred to theunallocated category and the special account was increased to US$0.8 m. to be used byall categories of the Loan.

29 -

Table 4: PROJECT COSTS (USS MILLION)

ORIGINAL ACTUALVARIATION

(2-1)LOCAL FOREIGN TOTAL LOCAL FOREIGN TOTAL

(1) ( t2)

Extension 1.7 1.2 2.9 1.16 1.09 2.24 -0.6

Research 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.20 0.18 0.38 -0.32

Livestock Services 1.1 0.7 1.8 0.12 0.11 0.23 -1.57

Farm Machinery Testing 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.007 0.007 0.01 -0.38

Rural Roads 2.4 1.9 4.3 2.06 1.40 3.46 -0.84

Project Implementation Unit 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.042 0.041 0.08 -0.11

Training, TA, Studies 0.5 1.3 1.8 0.022 0.18 0.20 -1.58

Agricultural Credit 8.2 6.6 14.8 0.95 2.73 3.68 -11.12

Contingencies 6.5 4.5 11.1 0.032 0.032 -1 1.06

TOTAL 21.1 16.8 38.0 4.58 6.74 10.32 -27.7

NOTE: Local expenditures were converted into US Dollars with the exchange rate of US$1 *0.9 TD.

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Table 5: PROJECT FINANCING

SOURCE PLANNED ACTUALSAR

World Bank 15.0 5.8

Belgium 0.3 ' 2.0

BNA 7.0 0.95

Beneficiaries 3.2 -

Government 12.5 3.52

TOTAL 38.0 12.27

The Loan Agreement was amended on March 7, 1987to reflect an Increase In the amount of the Belgiangrant to FB77,350,000 (about US$2 million).

TABLE 6: STATLIS OF LEGAL COVENANTS

Covenant Loan Subject Deadline for StatusAgreeamt Compliance

Section 3.01(b) Submission of approved annual budget and every year Submitted, but financing inadequate due to lack offinancing plans. Borrower commitment.

Section 3.02(a) Adoption and implementation of action plan on 06/30/85 Series of measures implemented on interest rates andagricultural credit credit recovery under the ASALs and Fourth

Agricultural Credit.

Section 3.02(b) Sub-loan agreement between borrower and BNT for 11/85 Amendment to agreement signed by Government and BNTon-lending of loans proceeds to finance short- in December 1987 did not solve pending issues.term, mediun and Long-term credit.

Section 3.02(c) Sub-Loans to sub-borrowers to be in accordance Eligibility criteria defined, but no specific creditwith satisfactory eligibility criteria and with action plan was ever put into place becausecredit action plan referred to in Section conflicting with on-going rural credit reforms in3.02(a) above. country.

Section 3.03 Borrower to appoint and maintain adequate Not complied with due to overlappingextension staff based on staffing plan submitted responsibilities of extension agents.to Bank.

Section 3.04(a) Appointment of Central Connissioner as Project CCDA was abolished in 1989 and Director of FieldManager and provision of adequate resources and Crops appointed as Project Manager. In 1990, leadstaff to the CCDA for the project. agencies for extension and research, AFVA and IRESA,

were created.

Section 3.04(b) Maintain Project Inplementation Unit (PIU) with Effectiveness Done initially, but staff not permanent and notstaff including Deputy Project Manager, Chief assigned exclusively to the project.Accountant and Agricultural Economist

Section 3.04(c) Establishment of coordinating committee 10/85 Done, however, meetings were held infrequently.

Section 3.04(d) Appointment of regional commissioners as project 10/85 Done, however, regional commissioners hadmanagers. overlapping responsibilities.

Section 3.04(e) Appointment of deputy managers responsible for 10/85 Not done as foreseen because function of deputyextension and project management and of assigned to regional representatives of plantaccountants at CRDA level. production department. Accountants at CRDA worked

on other ongoing projects in the area (see Section4.02(a) and (b)).

Section 3.05 Efployment of management, accounting, and Partially done. However, a major problem was thatagricultural consultants. extension consultants to assist management with

extension program not recruited.

Covenant Lo Sibject Deadline for tusAgreaent I Conpliance

Section 3.06 Agreement with private or cooperative entity for Milk collecting center built, but not equipped dueleasing and management of milk collecting to lack of interest of cooperatives or privatecenter, maximunm five years after center becomes sector to manage it.operational.

Section 3.07 DGPC to furnish Bank with plans for upgrading 06/30/85 Initial study done at effectiveness did not includerurat roads in next year including feasibility and April 30 calcuLation of economic benefits. The study had tostudy and selection criteria (including an ERR) each year be redone and this contributed to the long delay insatisfactory to the Bank. thereafter roads execution.

Section 3.08 DGPC to maintain roads in the Project area. At all times Roads component not completed by Loan closing.Ministry of Equipment to complete and maintain.

Section 3.09 Borrower to take all necessary measures to Dealt with under ASAL I and 11 and later under theensure adequate incentives for milk, meat and SAL I and EFRSL.fertilizer marketing on a least-cost basis tothe Borrower.

Section 3.10 Milk collecting price margins to cover 0 & N Not relevant since animal buying and milk collectioncost of collecting centers; animal buying center centers not supported under project.price margins to cover 0 & M cost from the startand to cover investment cost within 5 years fromstart of operations.

Section 3.11 Measures to start installation of project 03/86 Although accounting firm recruited by effectiveness,accounting system with a view that it be fully accounting system not set up as foreseen due to lackoperational by 03/86. of computer and full-time staff.

Section 3.13(c) Semi-annual progress reporting within two months every 6 months Done except that there was no information onafter each semester. progress with extension and its impact on farmers.

Section 3.13(e) Borrower to furnish completion report. Draft report on physical achievements of projectsubmitted to completion mission.

HSection 4.02(a) Borrow to maintain adequate accounts for the At all times Not complied with - separate accounts discontinuedand (b) project including separate accounts for during implementation by CRDA. This led to the long

statements of expenditure. delay in producing a first consolidated audit report D

and to the difficulty of the final audit mission to cygive an unqualified opinion on the financialsituation of the project.

0

section 4.02(c) Borrower to furnish audit reports of annual Yearly First consolidated report for 1987-90 accounts oaccounts and special account within six months provided November 1991. Audit report for 1991at the end of each year including separate accounts received March 1993.accounts by auditors on withdrawals based onstatements of expenditure. OL

_ AwOc

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Table 7: MISSIONS

STAGE OF MONTH/ NO. OF DAYS IN SPECIALIZATIONS RATINGS NATURE OFPROJECT CYCLE YEAR STAFF FIELD REPRESENTATED PROBLEMS

Identification 07/83Preparation 09183 3 12 Economist

AgronomistLivestock Specialist

10/83 1 6 Research Specialist09/83 4 23 FAO/CP

Final Preparation 11/83 1 20 Economist11/83 1 9 FAO/CP

Appraisal 01/84 2 22 EconomistAgronomist

01/84 2 10 EconomistLoan Officer

01/84 1 8 Economist01/84 1 6 Livestock Specialist02/84 1 10 Consultant

Follow-up Appraisal 05/84 2 10 EconomistFinancial Analyst

Supervision 02/85 3 10 2 EconomistsAgronomist

Supervision 12/85 1 20 Financial Analyst

Supervision 04/88 1 19 AgronomistSupervision 08/86 2 9 Agronomist 2 Management

EconomistSupervision 12/86 1 2 AgronomistSupervision 03/87 1 10 Agronomist 2 ManagementSupervision 02/88 2 12 Agronomist 3 Management

Res. & Ext. SpecialistSupervision 04/88 1 11 a/ ConsultantSupervision 08/88 2 11 Agronomist 2 ManagementSupervision 11/88 1 5 Agronomist 2 Management

Dev. ImpactSupervision 01/89 3 7 b/ Division Chief of

Technical DepartmentFinancial AnalystCredit Specialist

Supervision 04/89 2 16 Financial Analyst 2 ManagementExtension Specialist Dev. Impact

Supervision 0o/89 1 2 Extension SpecialistSupervision 10/89 1 9 Extension SpecialistSupervision 02/90 1 14 Agronomist 3 Management

1 9 Livestock Specialist Dev. Impact1 7 Extension Specialist TA, Financial,

ProcurementSupervision 11/90 2 6 Agronomist

EconomistCompletion 05/92 1 5 Operations Analyst I

a/ of which partly spent on supervision of BNT4.b/ of which spent on general credit issues and PANO credit component.

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Table 8: STAFF INPUTS

PREPARA- APPRAI- NEGOTIA- LOAN PROJECT SUPER-TION SAL TIONS PROCESSING ARIS ADMINISTRATION VISION COFINANCING PCR TOTAL

FY 84 81.6 47.3 0.2 135.1

FY 85 7.3 16.2 9.4 0.3 14.8 48.0

FY 86 0.9 4.4 0.1 5.4

FY 87 0.7 7.4 0.1 8.2

FY8 8 .8 8.8

FY 88 5.3 5.3

FY90 22.3 15.6 37.9

FY 91 7.7 7.7

FY 92 1.9 5.4 7.3

TOTAL 103.9 54.6 16.2 15.6 0.0 1.9 65.9 0.2 5.4 263.7

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Table 9: Project Results

KEY INDICATORS

ITEM UNIT SAR ACTUALTARGET ACHIEVEMENT

A. Staff Reauirements

1. Headquarters No 3 Professional Staff 3 staff not permanently assigned(Project Implementation Unit) to project. Agroeconomist and

accountant left in 1990 and werenever replaced.

2. CRDA deputies for extension + No 1 deputy + 1 accountant in Deputies and accountants notaccountants each CRDA assigned exclusively to the project

with negative consequences.

3. Staff at Sub-regional extension No 66 of which 15 were already in 16centers (CTV)' place at beunning of project.

4. Staff at Local Extension Centers No 48(CRA)_

B. Civil Works

1. Extension Centers No 25(a) BOja 6 5(b) Jendouba 9 4(c) El Kef 9 8(d) Siliana 9 8

2. Construction of Animal Health NoCenters(a) Bqia 2 2(b) Jendouba(c) El Kef 1 1(d) Silinna

3. Construction of Mk Collection No 1 ICenter 1 (El Kef) 1 (El Kef)2

4. Rural Roads' km 110 92(a) Beja 39 39(b) Jendouba 19 19(c) El Kef 34 34(d) Siliana 18

C. Vehicle and EauiomentProcurement

1. Vehicles for Extension Centen No _ B(a) Bqia 11 9(b) Jendouba 14 7(c) El Kef 13 8(d) S;liana 11 14

2. Vehicles for artifial inseminations Nocenters 10(a) BDja 2 1(b) Jendouba 2 2c) El Kef 3 3(d) Siliana 3 2

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Table 9 (Continued)

3. Audiovisual equipment for No 1 set for each CRDA 1 set for each CRDAextension centers

4. Office equipment for extension No 1 set for each CRDA 1 set for each CRDAcenters

5. Office furniture for extension No 1 set for each CRDA 1 set for each CRDAcenters

6. Agricultural demonstration No 1 set for each CRDA 1 set for eacb CRDAequipment for extension centers

7. Equipment for conservation works No 1 set for each CRDA 1 set for each CRDA

D. Credit for: 8.0 million

(a) On Farm Investments USS 6.6 million Total loans given by BNT were S3.2mTD of which $ 2.7m disbursed fromBank loan.

(b) Input Resale Centers USS 1.4 million 0

E. Consultants4 US$ 05 million 0.09 miion

'/ The SAR only foresaw the creation of extension centers at sub-regional level. This is the staffing situation at the end ofthe project. It is unclear as to when the extension agents were phased in.

Ratio of on avenge 1 extension agent to 420 farmers was achieved by the end of the project versus 1 to 250 foreseen atappraisal. Under the Reseamch and Extension Project, the ratio is 1 to 400.

2, Constructed but not equipped.

'I By the end of the project, only roads in El Kef were completed. The Siliana roads were financed from other sources.70% of roads were completed in B"ja, and 80% in Jendouba.

'I None of the studies foreseen were done except for accounting study and roads feasibility study. Oversems training also didnot take place except for training of head of El Afareg station.

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