World Bank Document · 2016. 8. 29. · CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Rupee (Rs.) Rs.1 =...

Document of

The World Bank

FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY

Report No. 13420

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

PAKISTAN

LAHORE URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(CREDIT NUMBER 1348-PAK)

AUGUST 2, 1994

Energy and Infrastructure Operations DivisionCountry Department IIISouth Asia Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Currency Unit = Rupee (Rs.)

Rs.1 = US$0.077 at appraisal (Nov 1982)

Rs.13 = US$1 at appraisal (Nov 1982)

Rs.1 = US$0.040 at project close (Dec 1992)

Rs.25 = US$1 at project close (Dec 1992)

FISCAL YEAR

July 1 - June 30

MEASURES AND EQUIVALENTS

1 millimeter (mm) = 0.0394 inches (in)1 meter = 3.2808 feet (ft)1 kilometer (km) = 0.6214 mile (mi)1 square meter (m2) 10.7639 square feet (sq ft)

1 square kilometer (km2) = 0.3861 square mile (sq mi)1 hectare (ha) = 0.Olkm2 = 2.4711 acres (ac) or 10, 000 sq m

1 Marla = 20.90 square meters or 225 sq ft

1 Kanal = 418 square meters or 20 marlas

1 liter (1) = 1.0567 quarts liquid or

0.2642 US gallon (gal) or0.9081 US quart dry (qt)

1 cubic meter (m3) = 35.3147 cubic feet (cu ft)1 liter per capita 0.2642 US gallons per

per day (lcd) capita per day (gcpd)1 cubic meter per second = 264.1721 US gallons per

(m3/sec) second (gal/sec)1 metric tonne (MT) = 2204 pounds

PRINCIPAL ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

HBFC = House Building Finance CorporationLDA = Lahore Development AuthorityLUDP = Lahore Urban Development ProjectMCL = Metropolitan Corporation Lahore

PUDP = Punjab Urban Development Project

WAPDA = Water and Power Development

AuthorityWASA = Water and Sanitation Agency

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

THE WORLD BANKWashington, D.C. 20433

U.S.A.

Office of Director-GeneralOperations Evaluation

August 2, 1994

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on PakistanLahore Urban Development Project (Credit 1348-PAK)

Attached is the 'Project Completion Report on Pakistan - Lahore Urban DevelopmentProject (Credit 1348-PAK)" prepared by the South Asia Regional Office, with Part II contributed bythe Borrower.

The project focused heavily on capacity building to prepare and implement integrated urbanprograms for improving living conditions of the urban poor through better housing and improvedaccess to municipal services. Project completion was delayed about 4.5 years mainly due to the factthat the project was the first of its kind in Lahore and the implementing agencies were relativelyinexperienced with such an operation. Land acquisition and procurement problems contributed tothe delay as well.

Achievements of the physical components were substantial. Particularly the upgrading of theLahore's historical Walled City was successful in meeting the objectives within the given cost-frameand provided sustained benefits to 70,000 low-income inhabitants of the area. On the other hand,a sites and services scheme faced serious land acquisition and plot allotment problems and is expectedto become fully utilized only some ten years after project completion. The project involved two maininstitutions one of which effectively developed its capacity to plan and execute housing schemes. Theother institution chiefly responsible for maintaining municipal services including solid wastemanagement was slow in introducing expected improvements in its operations.

The project outcome is rated as satisfactory, and its institutional development impact assubstantial. Sustainability of project benefits is rated uncertain as the allocation of sites and servicesplots is still expected to take a long time to complete, and as the capacity to maintain municipalservices remained weak at project completion.

The PCR is of high quality and provides an exceptionally interesting and candid review of theproject's implementation features and relevant lessons. Part II presents particularly interesting andpractical lessons on various aspects of project design and implementation.

The project may be audited.

Attachment (

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients onLy in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without WorLd Bank authorization.


PAKISTAN

LAHORE URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(CREDIT NUMBER 1348-PAK)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .i

EVALUATION SUMMARY ... . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . 1

A. Project Identity.

B. Background.

Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

IDA's Role in the Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Sector Policy Objectives. 2

C. Project Objectives and Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Project Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

D. Project Design and Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

E. Project Implementation. 3

Credit Effectiveness and Project Start-up . . . . . . . . . . 3

Implementation Schedule. 4

Procurement. 4

Project Costs. 5

Disbursements. 5

Credit Allocations. 5

F. Project Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Project Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Physical Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Financial Performance. 6

Impact of the Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Rate of Return Comparisons. 7

G. Project Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

H. IDA's Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

I. Borrower Performance. 9

J. Project Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

K. Consultancy Services. 10

L. Project Documentation and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . 11

A. Introduction.. .................... 11

B. Walled City Upgrading Phase I Component . . . . . . . . . . . 11

C. Gujjapura Site and Service Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

D. Solid Waste Management ................. .. . 15

PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION

Table 1. Related Bank Loans and/or Credits . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Table 2. Project Timetable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Table 3. Credit Disbursements - Cumulative Estimated

and Actual Disbursements (SDR '000) . . . . . . . . . 17

Table 4. Project Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Table 5A. Project Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

5B. Project Financing ..... .. . .. .. . .. .. . . 20

Table 6A. Project Results - Direct Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . 21

6B. Project Results - Economic Impact . . . . . . . . . . . 22

6C. Project Results - Financial Impact . . . . . . . . . . 22

6D. Project Results - Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Table 7. Status of Covenants .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Table 8A. Use of IDA Resources - Staff Inputs . . . . . . . . . . 28

8B. Use of IDA Resources - Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . 29


PAKISTAN



PREFACE

This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Lahore Urban Development

Project, for which Credit 1348-PAK in the amount of SDR 14.8 million (US$16.0

million) was approved on April 19, 1983. The Credit was closed on December31, 1992 after four extensions, 4.5 years behind schedule. At that time 82%of the original credit amount was disbursed. The last disbursement was in

April 1993.

The PCR was jointly prepared by the Energy and Infrastructure Operations

Division Country Department III, of the South Asia Regional Office (Preface,

Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III), and the Borrower (Part II). Part II is

unedited, apart from minor grammatical clarifications, and its contents are

not attributable to IDA.

Preparation of this PCR was started during IDA's final supervision mission of

the Project in January 1993 and is based, inter alia, on the Staff AppraisalReport; Credit and Project Agreements; supervision reports; correspondence

between IDA and the Borrower; and internal IDA memoranda.


PAKISTAN



EVALUATION SUMMARY

Obiectives

1. The basic objectives of the project were to: (a) strengthen the

capacity of local institutions to prepare and implement integrated urbandevelopment programs to arrest the decay in urban living conditions; (b)

improve municipal services and develop strategies to cope with continuing

urban growth; and (c) address the delivery of services and shelter to the

urban poor.The Project comprised the following components: (a) infrastructure

upgrading in the Walled City of Lahore; (b) a sites and services scheme inGujjapura; (c) house construction/rehabilitation loans; (d) solid wastecollection, municipal management and maintenance; and (e) studies.

Implementation Experience

2. The Lahore Urban Development Project, Credit 1348-PAK, (LUDP), the

first IDA-assisted urban development project in Pakistan, was originally

scheduled to be completed by mid-1988, but was eventually closed in December

1992 after four extensions. The civil works at Gujjapura were substantially

completed, the Walled City component was complete and the solid wastemanagement program was fully operational. The housing investment component ofthe project proved unsuccessful and most of the component's funds were

reallocated.

3. The main reasons for the delay were: (a) the relative inexperience

of Lahore Development Authority (LDA) in handling IDA-assisted programs; (b)

serious land acquisition difficulties at the Gujjapura site; (c) indifferent

performance of selected consultants; (d) procurement difficulties; and (e)weak institutional capacity of the Metropolitan Corporation of Lahore (MCL).

Results

4. Despite these difficulties, the project was largely successful inmeeting its principal objective to strengthen the capacity of localinstitutions to prepare and implement integrated urban development programs to

arrest the decay in urban living conditions, to improve municipal services and

to develop strategies to deliver services and shelter to the urban poor. The

physical achievements of the project are very much in line with the appraisal

estimates. The Economic Rate of Return for the project (excluding the solidwaste and studies components) is calculated as about 11%-.

5. The Walled City rehabilitation component was completed within theoriginal cost estimate and provides improved shelter and infrastructure

benefits to some 70,000 residents. The Gujjapura component facilities were

completed in December 1992. LDA anticipates that the allocation of plots to

potential beneficiaries will be completed around 1998.

6. The housing loan component was not successful (utilization was only

15% of the appraisal estimate, and no reimbursement was claimed.) This

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component, implemented through the House Building Finance Corporation (HBFC),

proved difficult due to: the need to alter HBFC's by-laws to permit lending

for house rehabilitation in the Walled City; the lack of interest by potential

beneficiaries; and the late completion of the Gujjapura sites and servicesscheme, which precluded any lending for house construction.

7. After a slow start, implementation of the solid waste management

component improved substantially with the vehicle fleet and workshop becoming

fully operational by the end of the project. Management weaknesses at MCL and

physical problems persisted throughout the project, and support from thecorporation's political leadership was variable due to changing priorities of

the various Mayors elected to office during the project's life. Thesedeficiencies are to be addressed in future IDA-assisted interventions.

8. Deficiencies in the performance of design consultancy services for

the Gujjapura and solid waste management components were addressed by LDA and

by IDA mission interventions. The solid waste management component was

finalized through inclusion of technical experts in the IDA missions. This

strategy, while solving the immediate problem, did not contribute

significantly to the longer term strengthening of MCL.

Sustainabilitv

9. The sustainability of the project depends largely on the successful

operation and maintenance of the upgraded facilities provided. Siteinspection in the upgraded areas of the Walled City and of the MCL's solid

waste collection fleet indicated that these components are maintained

satisfactorily. The sustainability of the Gujjapura infrastructure can only

be assessed in the future after the housing development is complete and thesite is occupied. The sustainability of Government-sponsored sites andservices schemes as a means of low-income housing development has not beendemonstrated, with difficulties of land acquisition, implementation, and plot

sales causing extensive delays before construction of housing by target groups

could commence.

10. With regard to the institutional strengthening of the various

agencies, HBFC benefitted from the project interventions despite the housing

loan component proving unsuccessful. The financial systems installed inLahore with Project-financed assistance have been replicated by HBFC in other

regional offices. LDA has 'learned by doing' during the project and theincreased management skills have been demonstrated through persistent efforts

to complete LUDP and in the ongoing second project (Punjab Urban Development

Project, Credit 1895-PAK). The inherent management weakness of MCL, althoughameliorated by project interventions, persisted through project completion.

Lessons Learned

11. The following lessons may be learned from the LUDP experience:

(a) the time originally allowed for implementation proved grossly underestimated, bearing in mind the social difficulties ofimplementation, the local agencies' inexperience of IDA projects,

and that this was the first IDA urban lending operation in

Pakistan;

- iv -

(b) the difficult problems associated with land acquisition for the

Gujjapura component, and, to a lesser extent, for the solid waste

management component, were not fully appreciated at appraisal;

(c) there is a need for a strategy for land acquisition as this caused

major delays. An option would be to defer appraisal until

executing agencies have "authority to enter" or "possession" which

cannot be challenged in the courts, and until compensation has beenpaid over to the landowners by the government "Collector";

(d) urban projects involving multi-agency execution should include a

mechanism for integrated project monitoring, coordination and

evaluation, perhaps located in the Government Planning and

Development Board ;

(e) the delays with Gujjapura contrasted sharply with the timely

benefits, in terms of improved shelter and basic services, providedunder the Walled City upgrading. Future projects should

concentrate on area upgrading rather than on sites and services;

and

(f) the consolidation of contracts for basic services civil works intointegrated area-based packages principally in order to encourageICB should be reviewed in the context of locally availablecontractor expertise.


PAKISTAN



PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM IDA'S PERSPECTIVE

A. Project Identitv

Name Lahore Urban Development Project

Credit Number 1348-PAK

RVP Unit : South Asia Regional Office,

Country Department IIICountry : Pakistan

Sector : Infrastructure

Sub-sector : Urban Development

B. Background

1. Context. At the time of project preparation (1974-1980), Lahore

faced a substantial and growing shortage of housing and infrastructureservices, particularly for the lower income groups. Some 25-30% of thepopulation lived in slum areas with limited access to infrastructure and

utility services. A further 25-30% (260,000 people) lived in the Walled City

in conditions of severe overcrowding, decaying housing and inadequate urban

services.

2. Studies at that time indicated that high urban land prices,ineffective planning, inadequate supply of serviced land, and lack of access

to established financial markets combined to deny the low-income populationaccess to urban services and housing at affordable prices. A Katchi Abadil'

upgrading program was launched in 1977 by the Lahore Development Authority

(LDA) which had benefitted about 250,000 people in 30 settlements by 1981.

Although the program provided security of tenure, it was not particularly

successful due to poor maintenance and apparent lack of communityparticipation. Furthermore, the existing public sector housing landdevelopment program by LDA proved inadequate to cope with increasing growth indemand (providing about 15,000 serviced plots/year compared with an estimated

demand of some 25,000).

3. Most formal land development in Lahore has been undertaken by LDA

which acts as a planning and development agency. Roads and drainage are

provided jointly by LDA and the Metropolitan Corporation of Lahore (MCL);

water supply by the Water and Sanitation Agency (WASA); electricity, and

street lighting on behalf of MCL, by the Water and Power Development Authority(WAPDA) and gas distribution by SUI Gas Company. Solid waste management, andoperation and maintenance of various urban services, are the responsibility ofMCL. House building is done through the private sector, typically by

individuals using small local contractors.

1/ A Katchi Abadi is a squatter development on Government-owned land.

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4. IDA's Role in the Sector. While earlier IDA lending in Pakistan

contributed to urban growth, efforts to prepare an urban development project

proved difficult. The first proposal, prepared during 1974-75 for the Lyaridistrict in Karachi was appraised but not negotiated, and was eventually

abandoned for reasons related to cost recovery.

5. Earlier IDA involvement in the water supply and sewerage sector was

limited to two projects in Lahore. The Lahore WASA was created and equipped

under the first project in 1967 (Credit 106-PAK), and a second credit of

US$26.6 million (Credit 630-PAK) was approved in 1976. Consultants financed

under Credit 630-PAK (see Table 1) were appointed in 1978 to assist LDA incarrying out urban planning and transportation studies to provide the basisfor the Lahore Urban Development Project, Credit 1348-PAK (LUDP), the first

urban development project to be implemented in Pakistan.

6. Sector Policy Obiectives. Policies to deal with the urban

development problems facing Lahore were initiated as a result of the planning

studies. These included: expansion of the Katchi Abadi program to cover all

remaining Katchi Abadis; low-cost traffic management schemes; an actionprogram for improved land use and investment strategy in North Lahore;

upgrading of high density areas in the city center; and increased supply of

serviced plots, particularly for low-income groups and small businesses.Strengthening the management and resource mobilization capacity of theinstitutions responsible for urban services were key elements of the policy

initiatives.

7. The LUDP was designed to assist in implementing and further

developing these policy initiatives.

C. Project Obiectives and Description

8. Objectives. The basic objectives of the project were to: (a)strengthen the capacity of local institutions to prepare and implementintegrated urban development programs to arrest the decay in urban living

conditions; (b) improve municipal services and develop strategies to cope withcontinuing urban growth; and (c) address the delivery of services and shelter

to the urban poor. To achieve these objectives the project included

integrated physical demonstration schemes, and training and technical

assistance to strengthen the responsible institutions.

9. Project Description. The project included the following

components:

(a) Walled City Upgrading. Infrastructure upgrading covering an area

of about 45 hectares (ha) being about one third of the densely

populated (1,100 persons/ha) Walled City, to benefit around 70,000

inhabitants, mostly in low-income groups. The upgrading included

the provision of sewerage, improvements of water supply, lighting,

street paving, drainage and solid waste, rehabilitation of schools

and provision of community facilities;

(b) Gujiapura Sites and Services. Development of fully integratedinfrastructure facilities in an area of about 225 ha to provideabout 10,000 fully serviced residential plots, of which about 4,000

were for low-income beneficiaries, and some 600 commercial and

-3-

industrial units, with sites for education, health, religious,

cultural and recreation facilities;

(c) House Construction Loan Facility. Provision of investments for

house reconstruction in the Walled City and new development at the

Gujjapura site;

(d) Solid Waste Collection, Municipal Management and Maintenance.

City-wide improvements in collection, transport and disposal of

solid waste through provision of vehicles and equipment, municipal

workshops, transfer stations, and selection of landfill sites; and

(e) Studies. Technical assistance and training related to the physical

components of the project. In addition, the project included

assistance for the preparation of a future urban development

investment program (Punjab Urban Development Project (PUDP), Credit

1895-PAK).

D. Prolect Design and Organization

10. The project was designed as an integrated program to bring about

policy changes and to improve the effectiveness of the main sector

institutions in the Lahore Metropolitan Area. Institution building was a key

objective to be achieved through technical assistance and training, and

through the experience gained by project implementation.

11. An organization, management and finance study was planned for LDA,

the principal implementing agency, to strengthen its capacity to plan, financeand implement similar schemes in future. The upgrading in the Walled City was

designed to improve the living conditions of about 30% of the urban low-income

group in Lahore, and to provide a model for wider replication. The sites and

services scheme at Gujjapura was designed to provide affordable fully serviced

shelter for about 10 of the total need through the project period (1983-87),

and to provide a model for replication. The solid waste component was

designed to improve the environment city-wide, particularly in low-income

areas which would not otherwise be served.

12. LDA was responsible for the Walled City Upgrading and GujjapuraSites and Services components. The solid waste component was executed by the

Metropolitan Corporation of Lahore (MCL). The house building loan facilitywas channelled through the House Building Finance Corporation (HBFC). This

institution was also the financial intermediary for loan funds to LDA for

infrastructure development at Gujjapura.

13. The project was appraised in early 1981. The appraisal report was

updated in late 1982 to curtail the project scope because of IDA allocation

restrictions. The total project cost was US$24 million with an IDA credit of

US$16 million (SDR 14.8 million) to finance foreign exchange and a portion of

local expenditures (representing 67% of total project costs excluding taxesand duties, in accordance with IDA-Government norms at that time.)

E. Prolect Implementation

14. Credit Effectiveness and Project Start-up. The Credit was approved

on April 19, 1983, signed on May 24, 1983 and declared effective on January

-4-

23, 1984 (see Table 2). This delay in effectiveness was due to the default ofLahore WASA in meeting the cost recovery covenant under Credit 630-PAK.

15. Implementation Schedule. The project was originally scheduled tobe completed by June 30, 1988, but only the Walled City component wascompleted within this schedule (see Table 4). The project was extended fourtimes, for a total of 4.5 years, and closed finally on December 31, 1992. Themain reasons for the delayed completion were:

(a) the initial very optimistic estimate of the time required forimplementation;

(b) relative lack of experience by LDA in managing IDA-assistedprograms;

(c) selection of inappropriate consultants for detailed preparation ofthe Gujjapura and solid waste components;

(d) the serious difficulty of acquiring the Gujjapura site, exacerbatedby changes in legislation during the acquisition processculminating in court proceedings and life-threatening civildisturbances which prevented the civil works contractors fromgaining unrestricted access to the work sites;

(e) slow progress on vital construction contracts resulting intermination of contracts and the need for LDA to complete the worksusing other contractors;

(f) preparation of designs for electrical work being unacceptable toWAPDA, caused by consultant inefficiency;

(g) weak institutional capacity of the MCL and the low priorityafforded by it to solid waste management;

(h) frequent management staff changes in the solid waste sector at MCL;

(i) lack of interest by beneficiaries in the Walled City in HBFC loans;

(j) changes required to the HBFC bylaws to allow it to lend forrehabilitation in the Walled City; and

(k) late completion of the Gujjapura site's infrastructure whichprevented disbursement of any HBFC construction investment loans atGujjapura.

16. Procurement. Delays were experienced on the Gujjapura componentdue to the following:

(a) the infrastructure contracts for construction of basic serviceswere not attractive to competent international contractors. Inretrospect, the use of ICB for the type of infrastructure civilworks included in the project proved inappropriate;

(b) the packaging under ICB procedures of the infrastructure works onan area basis resulted in two large contracts, both awarded to a

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single firm. The selected contractor proved unsatisfactory and

after long delays (exacerbated by civil disturbances over land

acquisition), these contracts were terminated. The work was

completed by reverting to LCB sector specific contracts which were

handled satisfactorily by local contractors; and

(c) unsatisfactory procurement of two vital consultancy assignments fordetailed design of the Gujjapura and the solid waste management

components due to the selection of a non-performing firm.

17. In general, procurement followed World Bank guidelines, albeit with

some delays especially in selection of consultancy services.

18. Project Costs. The estimated cost of the project at appraisal was

about US$24 million. The final cost was about US$21.4 million (at the

exchange rate of US $1 = Rs.25 at December, 1992), as shown on Table 5A in

Part III. In rupee terms, referring to Table 5A, the total project costincreased from Rs.312 million to Rs.536 million (72%). This increase is

explained by substantially higher costs for solid waste management equipment

(Rs.177 million compared with Rs.60 million estimated at appraisal), and the

substantial technical assistance costs (Rs.67 million) for future project

preparation and studies which were not identified at appraisal. The increased

cost of the Gujjapura sites and services component (Rs.244 million compared

with Rs.191 million at appraisal) is attributable to higher material costs.

19. Disbursements. The estimated and actual disbursements of the

Credit are given in Table 3 in Part III. The disbursements were delayed due

to: (a) delay in implementation; and (b) devaluation of the rupee against theSDR by about 250% since project appraisal (SDR 1 = Rs.14.05 at appraisal

compared with Rs. 35.5 when the Credit closed in December 1992), which

resulted in less SDR being required, and hence disbursed, to reimburse rupee

expenditure. An outstanding balance of SDR 2.83 million (19% of the Credit

amount) was cancelled.

20. Credit Allocations. The original and revised allocations and

actual disbursements of the Credit are shown in Table 5B of Part III. Theoriginal allocations were revised in mid-1992 to reflect changes resulting

from: (a) slow disbursement of the building investment loan component due to

HBFC lending procedures, unsatisfactory audit statements, and delayed

completion of the Gujjapura component; (b) higher costs than anticipated at

appraisal of solid waste equipment; and (c) additional consultancy services,

studies and training which were identified during the implementation of the

project.

F. Prolect Results

21. Project Obiectives. Overall, the project was largely successful inmeeting its principal objective to strengthen the capacity of localinstitutions to prepare and implement integrated urban development programs toarrest the decay in urban living conditions. The upgrading of infrastructurein low-income areas of Lahore Walled City was particularly successful, beingcompleted satisfactorily within the original cost and time-frame, andcontributing to improved living conditions of the 70,000 beneficiaries in thearea. LDA, as an institution, was strengthened in its capacity to implementfuture projects.

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22. The Gujjapura sites and services component suffered serious delays,

but the infrastructure was completed by the final credit closing date

(December 31, 1992). However, LDA anticipates that the allotment of plots tobeneficiaries will only be completed after a further five years or so. Thus

the effective completion of delivery of plots will not be achieved for some 14years after the beginning of the project. House construction may take a

further 5-10 years. Thus, the Gujjapura component does not compare favorably

with the Walled City upgrading in terms of providing improved shelter and

living conditions within a reasonable time frame, and does not provide a model

for replication.

23. Physical Performance. Apart from the poor performance of the HBFChousing investment component, the physical targets were achieved substantially

as planned at appraisal, although some components were seriously delayed.

24. The estimated and the actual physical performance are compared in

Table 4 in Part III. In retrospect the implementation schedule agreed at

appraisal was over ambitious bearing in mind: (a) that LTUDP was the first IDAurban lending operation in Pakistan; and (b) that the executing agencies werenot accustomed to IDA procedures.

25. The housing loan component was singularly unsuccessful, only 15% of

the appraisal estimate being utilized (but not reimbursed). This was dueprimarily to HBFC's lending conditions which required: proof of ownership;

approved building plans; an unencumbered mortgage certificate; proof of

income; and disbursement of the loan proceeds in arrears of expenditure by themortgagor. This final requirement meant in effect that low-income borrowersneed funds from another source to finance building costs. In the case of theWalled City, the HBFC bylaws had to be changed to allow lending forrehabilitation (as opposed to new construction). At Gujjapura, the latecompletion of infrastructure and delayed plot allotment precluded any house

lending under the project.

26. After a very slow start, towards the end of the project, the solid

waste vehicle fleet, workshops and one transfer station became operational.

Physical problems, notably waste transfer and disposal, and weak management atMCL, persist.

27. Financial Performance. The financial viability of the project was

based on cost recovery through: charges for water and sewage services andproperty tax increases in the Walled City; housing investment repayments; saleof serviced plots and development charges at Gujjapura; and municipal taxes in

the case of the solid waste management component. Water service charges have

been increased regularly and a sewerage charge has been introduced by WASA,

which now recovers the cost of operation and maintenance from revenues withsome contribution towards debt service. Annual rental values (ARVs) have beenrevised at 5-year intervals, thus contributing to the cost recovery of streetupgrading and solid waste management. At Gujjapura, about 30t of the plots(3,300) were allocated by December 1992. LDA anticipates that the remaining

plots would be allotted during the next five years. Clearly the investment

costs of this development will not be completely recovered for some years.

28. HBFC's financial statements were heavily qualified by its auditors

due to accounting weaknesses, and remained in default of the covenantsthroughout the project. This problem was addressed through technical

-7

assistance to HBFC, and had been largely resolved by the closing date.

29. Impact of the Project. The impact of the project was generally

positive, albeit, the project completion was delayed by over 4 years and the

benefits from the Gujjapura component will not be fully achieved for some

years into the future. The actual physical benefits, shown in Table 6A, Part

III, were substantially in line with appraisal estimates. In terms of

institutional strengthening, the project has improved the capability of LDA to

plan and execute sites and services and upgrading projects. HBFC has

benefitted through the introduction of computer based systems for monitoringits loan collection process at Lahore, Islamabad and Karachi Zonal offices,

through portfolio audit and training in financial reconciliation. MCL's solid

waste management organizational structure has been improved to some extent,

but further strengthening and organizational changes are still necessary.

30. Rate of Return Comparisons. At appraisal, economic rates of return(ERR) for the Gujjapura and Walled City components of the project were

calculated as 159 and 27.2% respectively, based on financial development costs

excluding taxes and price contingencies. These two components representedsome 80% of the total project cost at that time. The economic benefits from

the remaining components (mainly solid waste management) were not calculated

at appraisal due to the stated difficulty in quantifying the benefits.

31. The ERR calculation for the Walled City component was predicated on

increased rental values for upgraded properties. While ARVs annual have been

revised regularly every 5 years, due to certain anomalies in assessment thesedid not provide meaningful information to update the ERR calculation. Actual

expenditures were in line with the appraisal estimate and the work was

completed substantially within the original time frame. The results of a data

survey of rental increases after the completion of the upgrading component

indicates property rental increases around Rs.200/month, of which about

Rs.150/month was attributed to benefits arising from the improvedinfrastructure facilities. Therefore, based on this data, the actual ERR for

this component is estimated around 15% depending on the quantification of

benefits (see Table 6B).

32. The appraisal calculation for the Gujjapura site assumed that

benefits from development charges and plot sales would be realized by 1987.

The infrastructure works were completed only in late 1992 at a cost of Rs. 243

million, some 27% above the appraisal estimate. At that time, only 30% of theplots were allocated, and most of the house construction was yet to start.Thus, the benefits of this component in terms of available shelter may only befully realized after a further 5-10 years. Based on the appraisal assumptions

and estimated income from plot sales and development charges, the final ERR is

estimated around 4%, compared with the figure of 15% estimated at appraisal

(see Table 6B). This difference is attributed to: the increase in capitalcosts; the extended implementation period; delays in plot allocation and

sales; and anticipated delays in construction of houses.

33. Combined, the ERR for these components is 11%, compared with an

estimate of 20% at appraisal.

-8-

G. Prolect Sustainability

34. The sustainability of the project infrastructure depends largely onthe successful operation and maintenance of the upgraded facilities provided.

Site inspection in the upgraded areas of the Walled City and of the MCL's

solid waste collection fleet indicate that these components are maintained

satisfactorily. The sustainability of the Gujjapura infrastructure can onlybe assessed in the future after the housing development is complete and thesite is occupied. The sustainability of Government-sponsored sites andservices schemes as a means of low-income housing development has not beendemonstrated, with difficulties of land acquisition, implementation and plot

sales causing extensive delays in the construction of housing by target

groups.

35. With regard to the institutional strengthening of the various

agencies, HBFC benefitted from the project interventions despite the housingloan component proving unsuccessful. The financial systems installed in

Lahore with Project-financed assistance have been replicated by HBFC in otherregional offices. LDA has 'learned by doing' during the project and theincreased management skills have been demonstrated through persistent efforts

to complete LUDP and in the ongoing second project (Punjab Urban DevelopmentProject, Credit 1895-PAK). The inherent management weakness of MCL, although

ameliorated by project interventions, persisted through project completion.

H. IDA's Performance

36. Throughout the project, IDA made a positive contribution to theproject's physical and institutional outcome. Persistent interventions by IDAstaff and interaction with the concerned staff of the executing agencies

enabled this difficult project to achieve a positive outcome (See Tables 8Aand 8B). Close interaction was necessary in view of the inexperience ofagency personnel with IDA funded projects; and in the case of Gujjapura andsolid waste components, the poor performance of the selected consultants.This interaction developed into a close "team work" approach in terms of IDAand executing agency relationships. This approach has benefitted the PunjabUrban Development Project (Credit 1895-PAK) which is ongoing.

37. However, a number of lessons may be learned from the experience onthe project. These are:

(a) the estimate of the time required for implementation was overly

optimistic, bearing in mind the social difficulties ofimplementation, the executing agencies' inexperience of IDAprojects, and the fact this was the first urban lending inPakistan;

(b) the problems associated with land acquisition for the Gujjapuracomponent and to a lesser extent for the solid waste managementcomponent, were not fully appreciated at appraisal;

(c) there is a need for a strategy for land acquisition as this

difficulty caused major delays. It may be that appraisals should

be delayed until executing agencies have authority to enter or

possession which cannot be challenged in the courts, and thecompensation has been paid over to the landowners by the government

-9-

Collector for a substantial proportion of the required land;

(d) similar projects involving multi-agency execution should includeprovision for a Project Management Unit, perhaps located in the

Government Planning and Development Department, for integrated

project monitoring, coordination and evaluation;

(e) the delays with Gujjapura contrasted sharply with the timely

benefits, in terms of improved shelter and basic services, provided

under the Walled City upgrading. Future projects should

concentrate on area upgrading rather than on sites and services;

and

(f) Use of ICB for basic services civil works contracts should becarefully reviewed in the context of locally available contractor

expertise.

I. Borrower Performance

38. Table 7 in Part III contains the review of performance of the

Borrower in response to the covenanted actions in the credit and projectagreement documents. All three executing agencies, LDA, MCL and HBFCexperienced difficulty in submitting audit reports on time. By the end of the

project, LDA was in compliance, and HBFC although in default through project

completion, eventually provided a satisfactory audit report, its difficultiesin this regard being addressed through technical assistance for portfolio

audit and training in financial reconciliation.

39. The progress reporting requirements for the project appear to have

been totally disregarded by MCL and HBFC. LDA was unable to meet itsobligations to HBFC for Gujjapura owing to late completion of this component.

40. After a slow start up, the Borrower's performance was generally

satisfactory. LDA demonstrated persistent determination, and eventually

overcame the very difficult and serious problems encountered over landacquisition on the Gujjapura site. Both LDA and MCL overcame the indifferent

performance of selected design consultants so that physical results were

achieved in line with the appraisal estimates. Solid waste collection inLahore noticeably improved and the whole fleet of waste collection vehicleswas in full operation at the completion of the project. Institutionalweaknesses in MCL still remain, but some headway was made under the project.

41. LDA has demonstrated improved capacity to design and execute urbanrenewal projects. The institutional capacity of HBFC has been strengthened,

although the house investment component of the project was not successful and

funds were subsequently reallocated. Project implementation would have

benefitted from improved project monitoring, coordination and evaluation,perhaps through strengthening the Planning and Development (P&D) Department.The concept of a Project Management Unit was introduced in PUDP, although theunit was not located in P&D, with consequent loss of effectiveness.

J. Proiect Relationship

42. IDA's relationship with GOP/GoPunjab and the executing agencies

remained good throughout the project. Mission interventions were well

- 10 -

received and cordial working relationships established.

K. Consultancy Services

43. with the exception of consultants engaged for Gujjapura design and

the solid waste management study, the performance of consultants under the

project seemed satisfactory (See Table 6D). In the case of Gujjapura, the

deficiencies were addressed by LDA personnel and IDA mission interventions,

thus improving the LDA design capability through learning by doing. The solidwaste management component was ultimately finalized by the inclusion of solid

waste specialists within IDA missions. This strategy, while solving the

immediate problem, did not contribute to the longer-term institutional

strengthening of MCL.

44. In retrospect, the selection of non-performing consultants couldhave been avoided through more rigorous pre-qualification criteria and

analysis of applications when the short lists of firms were prepared.

L. Project Documentation and Data

45. IDA missions were afforded ready access to the available data in

the field. However, the quality of this information varied widely between

agencies. Establishment of a focal point for in-country project managementwould have enabled all the data to be properly coordinated and could have

ensured that the project was monitored on a continuous basis. As it was, theproject expenditures by MCL were not available in satisfactory format even

when the project closed. Similarly, it was difficult to access information

from HBFC. Lack of reporting by these two agencies added to the difficulties

in accessing information on a regular basis.

- 11 -


PAKISTAN



PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE

A. Introduction

1. Borrower's comments are provided for Part II of the PCR separatelyfor the following components:

(a) Walled City Upgrading - Phase 1;

(b) Gujjapura Sites and Services Scheme; and

(c) Solid Waste Management.

2. The following general comments relate to the Walled City Upgrading-Phase 1 and the Gujjapura Site and Services Scheme components:

(a) Adequacy and Accuracy of Information in Part III. (Incorporated.)

(b) Comment on the Analysis in Part I. No comments.

(c) Evaluation of IDA's Performance. The World Bank performance

remained excellent during the evaluation and implementation of theproject.

(d) Evaluation of Borrower's Performance. See following Sections.

(e) Effectiveness of IDA/Borrower Relationship. Effectiveness of the

relationship between the World Bank and the borrower remained quite

satisfactory.

B. Walled City Upgrading Phase I Component

3. The project includes the upgradation of about 1/3 area of theWalled City as Phase I (45 hectares) to provide benefits to 70,000-80,000

people. The main objectives were to:

(a) provide sewerage system;

(b) improve water supply system;

(c) provide brick pavement;(d) improve street light;(e) improve the solid waste collection services.

4. This component of LUDP has been implemented. An amount of Rs.41.63

million has been spent on civil works against an originally estimated amount

of Rs.31 million. Anyhow, the amount thus spent has been regularized and the

revised PC-1 has been approved.

5. In the original PC-1, an amount of Rs.20 million was reserved for

provision of loans for house construction in the Walled City. This amount wasto be utilized through HBFC. They have spent Rs.7.71 millions.

- 12 -

6. Details of the total estimated cost and actual expenditures are

given as under:

-----------Rupees in Millions-------Estimated Actual Cost

Cost

(a) Improvement of solid waste collection services. 2 0.05

(b) Upgrading through provision of sewerage, Leakdetection and replacement of water supplyimprovement of street lighting and upgrading ofschool buiLdings and provision of communitycenters. 31 41.58

(c) Investment houses reconstruction/repair in theproject area. 20 7.71

(d) Preparation of a conservation plan for preservationof historic buildings. 2 1.78

(e) Design and supervision, community development,monitoring and evaluation, training and technicalassistance. 5

Total 60 51.12

7. The upgrading works were executed departmentally through forceaccount and the work was completed during 1987. The project is handed over tothe WASA and MCL, Lahore for operation and maintenance.

Lessons

8. Larger diameter sewer pipes could not be laid due to narrow gallis(lanes) and existing old buildings with inadequate foundations. As such, the

drainage/sewerage network was not very effective. The sewer, being of smaller

diameter, gets surcharged during rains and blockage occurs due to the throwing

of polytene shopping bags in the manholes/pipes. That is why, in the PUDPcomponent of Walled City, pre-cast drains have been provided, with less deepfoundations. Furthermore, in the PUDP system we have provided liftable coversto clean the drains and get rid of the blockages.

9. Water supply lines have also been laid at shallow depth tosafeguard the old building structures. As such, water supply ferrules usually

leak due to traffic impact on the street pavement, causing inconvenience to

residents and danger for the existing old houses. That is why in the PUDP

component of Walled City upgrading, galvanized iron pipes have been providedon the street surface to have quick repair and attending to the visibleleakage quickly.

10. In the LUDP component of Walled City, the HBFC could not fullyutilize the amount allocated for the people as there was an expenditure of

Rs.8 millions against Rs.20 millions. This was due to the fact that the

people did not have complete proprietorship and there was a lengthy procedure

for obtaining an HBFC loan. A number of meetings were therefore held with theHBFC to streamline procedures whereby the dwellers of Walled City could

benefit from the loan facility. This loan facility was, therefore, notincluded in the PUDP component of Walled City. It is proposed that the loan

should be for house repair and not for the house construction/reconstruction

as is a normal procedure of the HBFC. Furthermore, a possibility should belooked into whereby the loan should be disbursed by the HBFC in association

with public representatives and LDA.

-13 -

11. In the LUDP component of the Walled City, down pipes were not

provided. Consequently, the people either did not provide the down-pipes or

provided down-pipes of inadequate sizes and shapes. Thereby, the sewage and

the storm water was dropped onto the street thus causing problem for theresidents. Therefore, in the PUDP component of Walled City, down-pipes with

specials of adequate size and shape have been provided to get rid of theproblem.

12. In the LUDP component of Walled City, insufficient prior survey

documentation was made and photography for the houses having cracks was too

little. Therefore, in the PUDP component of Walled City, the needful has been

done adequately and signatures of the house owners/occupants on houseinventories have been taken to eliminate the possibility of unnecessarily

blaming LDA regarding house cracking.

13. In the LUDP component of Walled City, there was less departmental

contact with the people and public representatives, contrary to what has been

practiced in the PUDP component of Walled City, thus much more satisfaction in

favor of the LDA has been attained in the latter project.

C. Guljapura Sites and Services Scheme

14. This part of LUTP is a housing scheme spread over an area of 224

hectares, planned to provide residential accommodation to about 10,000families. The total cost of the project was Rs.189 million which included

Rs.35 million for house building loans through HBFC. The project cost

increased to Rs.244 million due to delay in completion. The work has been

completed at site on December 31, 1992. Facilities provided under this

project are as under:

(a) Water supply 68.8 km in length(b) Sewerage system 60.9 km

(c) Drainage system 19.3 km(d) Metalled roads 35.3 km(e) Brick paved streets 36.7 km

(f) Electricity 224 hectares

15. Cost of the project increased from Rs.189 million to Rs.244 milliondue to status quo obtained by the local land lords from different courts atdifferent times. Delay in completion and increase in price has beenincorporated in the revised PC-1 which has been approved by the Provincial

Development Working Party (PDWP).

16. In the original PC-1 provision of Rs.35 million was made for HBFC

for house building loans for low income beneficiaries, which could not be

utilized.

- 14 -

17. The detail of cost estimates and actual expenditures are as

follows:

--------------Rupees in Millions----------------Original Revised

PC-1 PC-1

(a) Acquisition of land (224hectares). 8 14.30

(b) Infrastructures, civil works. 133 208.28

(c) House Building Investment forlow income beneficiaries. 35 -

(d) (i) Design and Supervision 9 15.00(ii) Community Development

Monitoring andEvaluation Training andTechnical Assistance. 4 6.00

Total 189 243.58

Say Rs. 244 millions

18. The works were carried out through prequalified contractors of the

World Bank.

Lessons

19. The HBFC loan incorporated in PC-1 for house construction could not

be availed by the individuals for the reason that all the services were to beprovided in running condition only after the completion of the scheme.

Thereafter the individuals abstained from construction of their houses, during

the development of scheme. This reflects that period of HBFC loan to the

individuals for the construction of their houses should be started after the

completion of the scheme.

20. Large herds of buffaloes hindered the progress of the scheme to a

great extent. Hence, there arises the need of the promulgation of such rulesand regulations which can prevent the animals from entering into any under-

execution public residential scheme.

21. The preference for construction of T.S.T. roads in place of brick

paved streets would have played vital role towards the need of the people

according to their demand/requirement of modernization as was experiencedduring construction period in different meetings with local people.

22. All the stay orders, encroachments and any such obstacles should be

cleared before utilizing the World Bank Loan. This could enable the scheme to

proceed smoothly and in-time completion of scheme could be ensured.

23. The drainage system of the scheme was designed by the consultants

relative to the bed of Chotta Ravi drain which has since been silted up to a

large extent with the passage of time, thus making it difficult to accommodate

the drainage of the scheme. Provision in PC-1 should have either been madefor its independent disposal or the rehabilitation of Chotta Ravi drain should

have been made to cater for the flow of the Scheme.

- 15 -

D. Solid Waste Management

24. Project was conceived in 1980 as a World Bank Project under LUDP

Cr. 1348-Pak. The study was carried out by M/s. Indus Associates & the

agreement was signed with the World Bank in 1983.

25. The Project was delayed due to different reasons as narrated in

Para 15, and completed according to the information provided in the Tables 2 &

4 of the Project timetable in the Project Completion Report.

26. The Project financing provision in the agreement for MCL Credit

was:

Local Share = Rs. 30 million

I.D.A. Portion = Rs. 31 million

Total = Rs. 61 million

27. The Project costs in the appraisal are as given in Table 5A.

28. These funds were spent for purchase of equipment and machinery,

storage skips, containers and different type of refuse collection vehicles,

establishment of a modern work-shop, provision of transfer stations, land-fill

site, training and consultancy.

29. Details of some of them are provided in Table 6A, Project Results -Direct Benefits, and Table 6D, Project Results - Studies.

30. Regarding column 3 of Table 6A, Project Results - Direct Benefits,

Solid Waste Management has the following equipment/vehicles & other facilities

in operation:

Vehicles for Supervisory Staff 15

Hand Carts : 2976Modify Vehicles Workshop : 1Transfer Station : 1

Compactor Trucks : 34

Skips : 971

Arm-roll Vehicles : 23

Containers : 200

Garbage Trolley : 1200

Tractors : 4

Bulldozer : 2

31. In Table 6D, Project Results - Studies, under column "C" regarding

the impacts of Solid Waste Management study in Head-I, it is provided that

consultants were appointed with the approval of World Bank and they have done

the job satisfactorily. Whereas we are agreed with all other heads of the

column.

32. Regarding Table 7, Status of Covenants, it is correct that

quarterly progress reports were not submitted due to different reasons,

however audit reports are being prepared which will be submitted to the

Mission soon.

- 16 -

33. Benefits & achievements Overall, the project was largely

successful in meeting its principal objectives, the collection of Solid Waste

is considerably improved under more hygienic conditions. MCL is efficientlyrunning the project and claims the best utilization of funds provided by the

World Bank to improve the Sanitation Conditions.

- Lifting/Dumping of waste capacity has increased from 1300 metric

tonnes (MT) to 2100 MT against total generation of 2600 MT/waste

per day.

- MCL has made available a Land-fill Site at Mehmood Booti which willmeet MCL ten years' requirements of dumping for the Solid Waste.

- (MCL plans) to install Gas Extraction Plant for the generation of

energy from the Solid Waste.

- MCL has a fleet of imported collection vehicles (Compactor Trucks,Arm Rollers etc.) for immediate and regular lifting, dumping of the

Solid Waste.

- MCL has established with the assistance of the World Bank Mission,Auto Workshop equipped with the latest machinery which help high

saving in the maintenance cost.

34. Limitations

- Yet we are not in a position to collect all the waste generated in

Lahore, i.e. about 500 MT/day is yet to collect.

- No standard containers specially made for handling the Solid Wasteof individual (household) units are provided.

- Height of the Containers is high therefore causes problem for

children, ladies and persons of smaller heights.

- Small Containers in more Nos. are moved better.

- Skips, Containers provided are not covered.

- Skips, Containers provided have no places in the master plan of theCity (and) they are placed at road sides causing traffic problem.

- Collection in narrow streets is being done by bullock carts givingvery poor performance, (and) therefore mechanical vehicles must be

provided.

- There is only one Transfer Station which is not sufficient andwhich is not working because of some technical problem presentthere.

- There is no unit for the recovery of the re-cycleable items in theSolid Waste.

- Highly trained and qualified Officers/staff were not available with

MCL at the time to run the project successfully and efficiently.

- Necessary awareness towards sanitation conditions is not

established among the people.

- 18 -

PAKISTAN - LAH4ORE URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1348-PAK)

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT - PART III

TABLE 4. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

-- ---------------------------------------------------- ++ -- -- +--------

ISR+ J 1982 11983 11984 11985 11986 11987 11988 1 1989 11990 11991 11992

INO .! I I I I I I I I I I II…-- I - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -I- - - --I -- - -I - - ---I- - - --I - - -- - --I- - -- -I- - - - -I- - -- -I- - -- -I … …- - - -I …- - -

1 CONSULTANT STUDIES I I I I I I I I I I III IOM&F STUDY LDA I E IE E EEIA A I I I I I I I I IIII I I II II IIII II22FGUJJAPURA EXPANSION AREA I I I II

I ILAD ACQUISITION IE E EEIA A I I I I I I I I I II ISURVEY IE EA Al I I I I I I I I F I JAPPOINTOGENERAL CONSULT IE EA AI I I I I I I I IIII IAPPOINT PROJECT STAFF IE E A Al I I I I I II ITRUNK INFR-ASTRUCTURE I I I I I I III III

I PREPARE DESIGNS E EE I A A IA A I II IF III IPREPARE TENDER DOCUMENTS I I ElI I A A A I I I I III IGO'T/IDA REV/APPROV E I I I A A IA A I I IIIII IINVIT/SUB OF TENDERS I I E I I IA A A IA A A AlA A A AlA A A AlA A A AlA A A AlA A A Al

I AWARD OF CONTRACTS I I E I I I A A IA A A AlA A A AIA A A AlA A A AlA A A AlA A A Al

I !CONST. OF WORKS I I IE E E I II A A AlA A A AlA A A AlA A A AlA A A AJA A A Al

I IHOME BUILDING LOANS I I I I I E E IE E II I I I II ISELECT~ION OF BENEFICIARIES I I E E II A A IA A A AlA A A AlA A A AJA A A Al

J 3JWALLED CITY UPGRADINGI I II IIIIII I

I JAPPOINT PROJECT STAFF IE A E Al I I I I I I I III ITOPOGRAPHICAL SURVEY JEAE Al I I I I I I I I III ISAMPLE SURVEY IE A E Al I I I I I I II IPREPAR-ATION OF DESIGNS IE A EAl I I I I I I I I

ICONSTRUCTION I I E A IE AEAIEA EAIE A EAIE A EAl I I I I

I LOANS FORNHOME RECONSTRUCTION I I EA IE A EAIE A EAIE A EAIE AE Al I I I I II IIMPROVEMENTS SC-I/COMM I I E A IE A E AlE A E Al I I I I I III ICONSERVATION PLAN I E A JE A E Al I I I I I I III IMONITORING & EVALUATION II E A IE A E AlE A E AlE A E Al I I I IIIII I I I III III I14 ISOLID WASTE COLLECTION ANDI I I IIII III

MANAGEMENTI I I I IIIIIII

I JAPPOINT CONSULTANT I ElI I A I I I I I I I I Ii JCONSULTANTS STUDY I IE EE El I IA AA Al I I I I II

I EXPT LISTS & SPECS I I E E El I I IA A A j I I I III IDESIGN CIVIL WORKS I I E EEIE I I IA A F I I I II

I IPREPARE TENDER DOCUMENTS I I EIE E I I I A Al I I I III IINVIT/SUBETENDERS &AWARD I I I E El I I AIAA AAIA A AAIA A AAIAA II

I EQPT DELIVERY/CONSTRUCTION I IE EIE E E EIE E E El I A AlA A A AlA A A AlA A A AlA A I

I IMONITORING &EVALUATION I I IE E EEIE E EEIE E EEIE EE EI A AIA A AAIA A AAIA A AAIA AA AI

I I I I I I I I I I I I I II 5 ISTUDY FOR SECOND PROJECT I I I I E EIE E A AlA A I I I I I I

-- ------------------------------------- ---------------------+----------

+ E : ESTIMATED AT APPRAISAL + +

++ A: ACTUAL + +

I + A: ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DATES IDENTICAL + +

----------------- +------- … + …………+----------------------------- -+-------

/WCS F?)-

- 19 -

PAKISTAN - LAHORE URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1348-PAK)


TABLE SA. PROJECT COSTS

APPRAISAL ESTIMATE ACTUAL COSTS (Note 2)

|SR.1 ITEM I LOCAL FOREIGN TOTAL LOCAL FOREIGN TOTAL

|NO.| I COSTS EXCHANGE (RS.M) (US$M) | COSTS EXCHANGE (RS.M) (US$M) |

| (RS.M) COSTS (Note 1)1 (RS.M) COSTS (Note 3)1

| I (RS.M) I (RS.M)

I 1 |Walled City Upgrading (Note 4) 45.3 5.9 51.25 3.94 51.12 - 51.12

| 2 IGujjapura Site & Services Scheme 136.01 23.56 159.57 12.27 243.58 - 243.58

I 3 ISolid Waste Management 26.67 22.95 49.62 3.82 j 45.22 129.36 174.58

| 4 |Studies j 1.12 0.48 1.6 0.12 30.00 36.61 66.61

- - - - - - -I- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

I 5 |Total Base Cost | 209.15 52.89 262.04 20.15

I 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -I- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

| 6 lPhysical Contingencies 13.78 4.98 18.76 1.44

I 7 |Price Contingencies j 23.9 7.66 31.56 2.43

… -…-… I- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -_I- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

| 8 |Sub-Total | 37.68 12.64 50.32 3.87 369.92 165.97 535.89 21.44

… I---------------------------------- __ ___ _ ___ ____ -- -- - -- - -- - -- -- - -- - -- -

| 9 |Total Project Costs 246.83 65.53 312.36 24.02 369.92 165.97 535.B9 21.44

Notes

1 Exchange rate at appraisal US$1 = Rs.13

2 Actual Costs include contingencies

3 Exchange rate US$1 = Rs.25 (December 1992)

4 Project cost for Walled City upgrading includes an amount of Rs. 7.7 million in housing loans

disbursed by HBFC but not reclaimed from credit funds.

- 20 -



TABLE SB. PROJECT FINANCING

SOURCE PLANNED REVISED FINAL

MARCH, 1992 APRIL, 1993

RS.M US$'000 SDR'000 RS.M US$'000 SDR'000 RS.M US$1000 SDR'000

IDA

Expenditure Categories

1 Civil Works 5,700 7,500 5,627

2 Vehicles/equipment 1,400 3,700 3,695

3 Cons/Training 1,400 3,000 2,646

4 Housing Investments 3,900 400 -

5 Unallocated 2,400 200

Total IDA 208.00 16,000 14,800 297.00 14,800 321.96 15,800 11,968

Government 18.00 18.00 18,00

Lahore Development Authority 56.00 111.00 121.02

Lahore Metropolitan Corporation 30.00 66.00 67.2

House Building Finance Corporation - - 7.71

Total 312.00 24,000 492.00 19,680 535.89 21,436

Exchange Rates

At Appraisal: US$1.0 - Rs.13.0 SDR 1.0 - US$1.081

Revised Project Financing: US$1.0 - Rs.25.0 SDR 1.0 - US$1.42

At Closing: US$1.0 - Rs.25.0 SDR 1.0 - US$1.42

- 21 -

PAKISTAN - LAHORE URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1348-PAK)PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT - PART III

TABLE 6A. PROJECT RESULTS - DIRECT BENEFITSESTIMATED ESTIMATED

APPRAISAL AT CLOSING AT FULLINDICATORS ESTIMATE DATE DEVELOPMENT COMMENTS

1. Walled City Upgrading

Area Upgraded (ha) 45 45 45Improving of Schools 20 8 8 1

Community Centres 2 - - 2

Loans forreconstruction (Rs.M) 35 8 8

Number of Beneficiaries 75,000 75,000 75,000

2. Gujiapura Area DevelopmentArea Developed (ha) 224 213 213

Developed PlotsResidential (Total) 10,000 2,000 10,386 3,4

Low Income 4,000 6,582

Commercial/Industrial 600 Nil 333Recreation Area (ha) 15 2 10 5

Education/HealthFacilities (ha) 15 10 5

Community/Mosques (ha) 15 2 5Exempted (to existing 6

landowners)Number of Beneficiaries 60,000 14,000 70,000

3. Solid Waste ManagementVehicles for Collection,

transport and disposal

of waste 60 - - 7

Vehicles for SupervisoryStaff 15 15 15

Bicycles 100 - - 8

Handcarts 2,000 2,976 2,976Modify Vehicles Workshop 1 1 1

Zonal Vehicle Park 3 -

Transfer Station 6 1 1

Compaction Trucks - 34 34Skips - 971 971 9

Arm roll vehicles - 23 23

Containers - 200 200Garbage trolley - 1,200 1,200Tractor - 4 4 10

Bulldozer - 2 2 11

Comments

1. Fund constraint.2. Sites not available.3. Includes existing development.4. Sites fully developed but not yet sold/allocated.5. Sites reserved but facilities not yet provided.6. Included in total figures.7. Details of vehicles types not given at appraisal.

8. Not provided.9. Miscellaneous equipment not detailed at appraisal.10. Deployed in congested city areas.11. Deployed at landfill sites.

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TABLE 6B. PROJECT RESULTS - ECONOMIC IMPACT

SR.|ECONOMIC RATE OF RETURN |APPRAISAL |ACTUAL

|NO.1 |ESTIMATE I(AT FINAL DEVELOPMENT)

…-…- …--- _ I-- _-- -- -- -- -- -

I 1 lWalled City upgrading | 27.2%1 14.5S1

| 2 |Gujjapura Sites I I I

I I and Services I 15.0%| 4.2%1

I 3 IComponents 1&2 Combined 20.0S1 10.7%1

I - - I - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I

COMMENTS

ERR for Gujjapura based upon estimated schedule for plot sales.

TABLE 6C. PROJECT RESULTS - FINANCIAL IMPACT

|SR.1 FINANCIAL RATE OF RETURN I WITHOUT I FUTURE WITH ACTUAL

|NO.1 I PROJECT I PROJECT I

I I I I II |Not applicable, see text I I

I |in Part I. I I I

I I I I I… I - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I…- - - - I - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- I -

COMMENTS

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TABLE 6D. PROJECT RESULTS - STUDIES

Purpose asdefined at

Studv appraisal Status Agency Impact

A. Walled CityUpgrading

1. Final D/S of Walled Done by LDA LDA Satisfactorydesign and City component "in-house"supervision

2. Conserva- To define Completed LDA Satisfactorytion plan overall

conservationstrategy.

3. Community To define a Completed LDA Satisfactory

development program ofprogram (with communityUNICEF) development

4. Monitoring Monitoring and Completed LDA Satisfactoryand evaluation evaluation of

component

5. Training Local and Completed 1991 LDA Participation byand technical overseas Senior LDA staff inassistance training seminars, short

courses and studytours - of directbenefit to LDA

B. GuliapuraSite & Services

1. Final D/S of Completed 1985 LDA Work unsatisfactorydesign and Gujjarpura due to selection ofsupervision component non-performing

consultants

2. Community To define a Not utilized LDA No impactdevelopment program ofprogram (with communityUNICEF) development

3. Monitoring Monitoring & Done by LDA LDA Satisfactory& evaluation evaluation of "in-house'

component

4. Training Local and Completed 1992 LDA LDA senior Managersand technical overseas participated in shortassistance training courses and study

tours appropriate tothe work in hand, ofdirect benefit to LDA

C. MetropolitanCorporation ofLahore

1. Solid Waste To develop a Completed 1986 MCL Not satisfactory due

Management solid waste to selection ofStudy management inappropriate

strategy for consultantLahore

2. Workshop Not defined Completed 1990 MCL Satisfactorystaff training

3. Solid Waste Not defined Completed 1992 MCL Satisfactory. SeniorDisposal Plan MCL personnel

undertook study toursof solid wastefacilities

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D. Studies

1. Preparation To prepare Completed 1987 LDA Enabled appraisal ofof Second Urban Punjab Urban Punjab UrbanProject and Development Development Projectassistance with Project (Cr. 1895-PAK) in 1987regionalplanning

2. Double Not defined Completed 1989 LDA Satisfactoryentryaccounting

3. Organiza- Not defined LDA Satisfactorytion andadministrativeprocedure,

financial MIS

4. Advisory Not defined 1987 TEPA Satisfactoryservice to LDA

5. Preparation Not defined Completed 1987 TEPA Satisfactoryof maintenanceand rehab. ofstorm drainageand streetlighting

6. Feasibility Not defined Completion TEPA Satisfactory. In& detailed anticipated preparation for futuredesign for Ring March 1993 investment programRoad Lahore

7. Water Not defined Completed WASA SatisfactorySupply computerstudy

8. Lahore Not defined Completed 1986 WASA SatisfactoryUrban DrainagePreliminaryEngineeringStudy

9. Aquifer Not defined Completed WASA Satisfac'-e yStudy

10. Walled Not defined Completed 1992 WASA Drainage InvestmentCity Drainage package preparedImprovementProject

11. Langey Not defined Completed WASA SatisfactoryMandi reservoirinvestigation

12. Financial Not defined Completed WASA Financial modelStudy of WASA prepared

13. Computer Not defined Completed HBFC SatisfactoryTraining for computerizedHBFC billing/collection

system installed atLahore, replicated byHBFC in other Zonal

Offices

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TABLE 7. STATUS OF COVENANTS

Reference Description of Covenant Status as at 12/31/1992

MetropolitanCorporation of Lahore

Project Agreement

2.06 (a) Prepare quarterly Regular reports not

progress report. provided.

4.02 (i) Audit MCL accounts and Ongoing.

financial statements

annually.

4.02 (ii) Within six months of FY92 outstanding.

financial year-endprovide certified


and audit report.

Lahore Development

Authority

Project AgreementObligations not

2.06 (a) Perform all obligations discharged include

under agreement with completing scheme by

HBFC re Gujjapura. 12/31/1986 and repayingHBFC investment, with

Islamic profit, and 3

years' maturity.

2.07 (a) Prepare quarterly Report to 12/31/1992progress reports. provided.

2.10 (a) Provide exempt plots on Plot allotment toGujjapura site to exemptees in progress.

provide landowners onpayment of development

charges sufficient to

recover on-site costsincluding IDC.

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2.10 (b) Sell plots on Gujjapura 3,304 plots allotted.site to low incomebeneficiaries selectedaccording to proceduresand on termssatisfactory to IDA.

2.10 (c) Sell other plots on Allocation of remainingGujjarpura site at plots in process.market price, or atleast to recover costsas in 2.10 (a).

2.11 (a) Before 12/31/83, Property TaxGoPunjab/LDA to provide reassessmentsand thereafter completed.implement a costrecovery plan forWalled City component.

2.11 (b) On completion of the Outstanding.component, to review

cost recovery and ifnecessary adjustfees/tariffs/taxes torecover costs.

2.12 Prepare standard sale Satisfactory.agreements forGujjarpura plots onterms and conditionssatisfactory to IDA.

3.02 By 12/31/83, LDA to Double-entry accountingundertake an improvementsorganization review, implementedand during the project satisfactory.to implement agreed

recommendations.

4.02 Audit LDA accounts and FY91 and FY92 Financialfinancial statements Statements and Auditsannually. outstanding.

4.02 (ii) Within six months of Satisfactory.financial year-endprovide certified


and audit report

including a separateauditor's opinion inrespect of certificatesof expenditure.

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4.02 (ii) Furnish quarterly Satisfactory.financial statement.

Housing BuildingFinance Corporation

Project Agreement

2.02 Make investments in InfrastructureWalled City housing investment made.improvement, and Housing loan componentGujjapura low income discontinued.housing purchase andconstruction, inaccordance withcriteria satisfactoryto IDA.

2.03 By 12/31/83 establish Profits, if any, onand maintain a Gujjarpura scheme stillrevolving fund, awaited.financed by profits oncredit investments, forfurther investment inurban projects.

2.06 Perform obligations In part ongoing,under HBFC investment although no Islamicagreement to on-land profit has been repaidcredit investments on to GOP (and none hasterms specified been received fromtherein, and to repay LDA).GOP a share of Islamicprofit.

4.02 (i) Audit HBFC accounts and Loan componentfinancial statements discontinued.annually.

4.02 (ii) Within six months of Major problems continuefinancial year-end with HBFC accounting.provide certified Actions taken includefinancial statements HBFC Portfolio Auditand audit report (under FSAL) andincluding a separate Financialauditor's opinion in Reconciliation Trainingrespect of certificates (under Credit 1348-of expenditure. PAK).

4.02 (iii) Furnish quarterly Not Provided.financial statements.

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TABLE 8A. USE OF IDA RESOURCES - STAFF INPUTS+_--_-------------------------------_+_-______+______-+_______+_____-_---____________+

ISR.|STAGE OF PROJECT CYCLE IFINANCIALIPLANNEDIFINAL ICOMMENTSINO.1 I YEAR I I

I1 |Identification to Appraisal I FY82 I I 8.0 |Estimate not availablel

I IDeparture I I I I II I I I I I I|2 |Appraisal Departure to Invitationi FY82 I | 21.9 |Estimate not availablel

I Ito Negotiate I I I II I I I III

F 3 INegotiations to Effectiveness I FY83 I 1 11.2 |Estimate not availablel

I I I I I I I| 4 ISupervision I FY83 |18.00 | 1.1 I

| FY84 |18.00 | 23.2 |

| FY85 | 18.00 | 19.6 || FY86 | 18.00 | 19.7| FY87 18.00 28.0 |

| FY88 | | 12.1| FY89 F | 12.6 F| FY90 F I 5.9 || FY91 F | 37.8 |

| FY92 F 19.7I FY93 F 6.6 F

----------------------------------- - -- +-------+-- ----

F 5 |TOTAL: I I 90.0 | 227.4 | I_-----------------------+_______-_ +______-+_____-_+-_______--____________+

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TABLE BE. USE OF IDA RESOURCES - MISSIONS

ISTAGE OF PROJECT CYCLE IMONTH/ INUMBER OF IDAYS IN ISPECIALIZATION |PERFORMANCE ITYPES OF

I |YEAR |PERSONS IFIELD IREPRESENTED a/ IRATING |PROBLEMS c/ |

I I I I I ISTATUS b/ I

IThrough Appraisal | 2/74 | 2 | 2 | I I -

I 5/74 1 4 1 4 1 a,c,d I - -

I 11/74 1 41 9 1 a,f I -l

I 8/75 1 31 10 1 a,f

|11/75| 21 7 1 a,f -l I

110/761 1' 2 1 a | -l

110/771 11 2 1 a | -I

12/791 11 S a | -I

| 5/79 I 2 8 1 a,f - I -

| 11/79 4 | 16 | a,b,c,f

|2/80| 3 1 12 a,b,f

5/80| 4 1 101 a,b,f

I 7/80 I 2 1 7 a,c

| 11/80 I 6 | 17 a,b,c,f,g I - I

2/81 j 7 18 a,b,c,f,g I - I

jAppraisal through Board Approvall 6/81 | 1 j 2 | c I - -

I 1 10/81 1 4 I 5 | a,b,c,f - I -

111/82 1 2 1 5 | c,d I -I

15/83 1 1 4 1 e | -I

~~~~~~~~~~I III I I I|Supervision I 7/83 1 31 3 c,d,e

110/83| 1 7 l e | - _

I 2/84 | 6 3 a,b,c,d,e,f | 2 1

| 7/84| 31 41 a,b,c 2| 31

I 3/85 | 4 j 6 a,b,c,e | 2 3

| 9/85 | 4 8 a,b,c,f j 2 3

| 2/861 3| 31 a,c,d -l -

I 4/86 I 6 4 a,b,c,e,f 3 | 3 I

| 8/86 | 6 9 a,b,c,e,f | 2 3

| 2/87 | 7 I 9 I a,b,c,e,g,f,g | 2 3 |

I 10/87 | 3 I 7 b,e,f | 2 3

|4/88| 2| 12 b,e 21 31

12/88 4 | 8 b,c,f | 2 3

|3/89 | 1 1 2 1 b 2 1 3 1

15/89 1 1 | 2 1 b 2 1 3 1

7 7/89 | 4 | 17 | b,c,f,g | 3 | 3 |

6 6/90 | 5 j 10 I b,c,g,f | 3 I 3 I

| 10/90 4 | 6 b,c,g,f I - I - I

| 12/90 | 3 I 11 I b,c,f 2 1 3 |

|5/911 4 1 3 1 b,c,g -I -I

I 7/91 4 15 1 c,e,f 2 3

| 11/91 | 6 10 I b,c,e,f 2 3

| 6/92 4 12 b,c,d,f j 2 3

| 1/93 | 3 16 b,c,d | 2 j 3

a) Key to Specialization. b) Key to Status.

a = Urban Planner 1 = Improving, 2 - Static,

b = Municipal Engineer 3 = Deteriorating

c - Finance Analyst c) Key to Problems.

d - Sanitary Engineer 1 - Technical, 2 - Financial,

e - Procurement Specialist 3 = Institutional/Management.

f = Technical Specialist

g = Solid Waste Specialist

World Bank Document · 2016. 8. 29. · CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Rupee (Rs.) Rs.1 =...

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Transcript of World Bank Document · 2016. 8. 29. · CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Rupee (Rs.) Rs.1 =...