Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFCIAL USE ONLY

f>.je'viNv.!Ls .H, u N -, tULiJ j. [; -jpQ *1 ' i , Report No. 10023

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

INDIA

CHAMBAL (MADHYA PRADESH) IRRIGATION II PROJECT(CREDIT 1288-IN)

OCTOBER 25, 1991

Agriculture Operations DivisionIndia DepartmentAsia Regional Office

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir officia: duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY EOUIVALENTS

Currency Unit = Rupee, Rupees (Rs.)US$1 - Rs. 9.00 at appraisal (December 1980)US$1 = Rs. 12.77 (average during project years 1983

through 1989)US$1 = Rs. 15.5 on March, 1989

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

CADA Command Area Development Authoritycusec Cubic meters per secondDRP Dam Safety Review PanelERR Economic Rate of ReturnGOI Government of IndiaGOMP Government of Madhya Pradeshha Hectarekm KilometersNEYRPIC A French Proprietary NamePMU Project Monitoring UnitPTC Project Training CenterSAR Staff Appraisal ReportUSAID United States Agency for International

DevelopmentWALMI Water And Land Management Institute

FISCAL YEAR OF BQRROWER

Government of India and Government of Madhya Pradesh: April 1 to March 31.

FOR OMCIAL USE ONLYTHE WORLD BANK

Washington. D.C. 20433U.5.A.

Offic ol Olrectol-. itIalOpoatkhns Evaluatm

October 25, 1991

MEMORAUDUM TO. THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS A2D T PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on IndiaCghbal (Madhva Pradesh) Irrieation II Project (Credi_ 128-IN)

Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "ProjectCompletion Report on India - Chambal (Madhya Pradesh) Irrigation II Project(Credit 1288-IN)" prepared by the Asia Regional Office with Part II of thereport contributed by the Borrower. No audit of this project has been madeby the Operations Evaluation Department at this time.

Attachment

This document hu a restrcted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the perfomanceof their official dutl. Is contents may not othoewlse be disclosed without World Bank authodrAtlon.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PROJECT COMPLETION REPQRT

INDIA

CHAMBAL (MADHYA PRADESH) IRGATION PROJECT(CREDIT 1288-4N)

TABLE OF ONTENT

Preface . ..........................................Evaluation Summary ......... .........................

PART 1: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE

Project Identity ...................................... 1Background ....................................... 1Project Objectives and Description .......................... 1Project Design and Organization ........................... 3Project Implementation ................................. SProject Results ...................................... 6Project Sustainability .................................. 8Bank's Performance .................................. 8Borrower's Performance ................................ 9Project Relationship ........... 9 9Consulting and Support Services ............................ 9Project Documentation and Data ............................ 10

PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE

Comments on Bank's Review (Part I) ........................ 12Evaluation of Bank's Performance .......................... 29Evaluation of Borrower's Own Perfornance .................... 30Effectiveness of Relationship Between Bank and Borrower . .......... 30Adequacy and Accuracy of Statistical Information ................ 30

PART Im: STATISTICAL INFORMATION

Related Bank Loans and Credits (Table 1) ..................... 36Project Timetable (Table 2) ................. ,.,,.. 39Schedule of Disbursements (Table 3) ........................ 40Project Implementation (Table 4) ......... .................. 41Project Cost (Table SA) ................................ 44Project Financing (Table SB) ............................. 47Direct: Benefits (Table 6A) . ................. 48Economic Impact (Table 6B) ............................. 49Studies (Table 6C) . 57Status of Covenants (Table 7)............................. 61Staff Inputs (Table 8A) ................................. 66NMssions (Table 8B) .................................. 67Area Irrigated - Whole Command (Table 9A) ................... 70AreaIrrigated-AIBD Area(Table9B) ....................... 71Yields of Major Crops (Table 10) .......................... 72Releases to Project Area (Table 1 1) ......................... 73Map IBRD 16044

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof theit official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

iPROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

INDIA

CHAMBAL (MADHYA PRADESH) IRRIGATION II PROJECT(CREDIT 1288-IN)

PREFACE

This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Chambal (Madhya Pradesh) IrrigationU Project in India for which Credit i288-IN in the amount of SDRs 27.6 million was approved onAugust 10, 1982. The c'.edit was closed on March 31, 1989, two years behind schedule. Finaldisbursement was made on October 23, 1989 and SDR 1.1 million was cancelled.

The PCR was jointly prepared by the New Delhi Office of the Agriculture OperationsDivision, India Department, Asia Region (Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and HI), and theBorrower (Part HI).

Preparation of the PCR was started during the Bank's final supervision of the project inFebruary 1989, and is based, inter alla, on the Staff Appraisal Report, the Credit and ProjectAgreements, supervision reports, correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower, andinternal Ba-k memoranda.

iii

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

INDIA

CHAMBAL (MADHYA PRADESH) IRRIGATION II PROJECT(CREDT 1288-IN)

EVALUATION SUMMARY

Qbjetives

1. The project's objectives were to improve the canal conveyance and drainage systems, toconstruct additional roads, to prevent further encroachment of ravines into the project area, and toprovide a more reliable source of water supply to the tail end of the command area (para. 3).

Implementation E=prince

2. From the start, the project was beset with management problems which slowed projectprogress. However, the situation improved significantly in mid-1988 as a result of stable andpositive management, only to further decline during the project's final year. Major managementproblems identified were: inherent weakness of the Ayacut Department's ability to controlactivities of strong line agencies; and frequent changes in management staff in both the AyacutDepartment and the Command Area Development Authority (paras. 16-18).

Reults

3. Project results were mixed. Canal security and capacity works, and aquatic weed controlworks approached revised targets, while canal control works fell seriously short of target as did theAmbah Intensive Block Development. Drainage, buildings, telecommunications and aerial seeding(ravine arrestation) approached or exceeded their target, whereas roads and training facilities fellshort significantly (paras. 19 and 20). A major achievement of the project was the successfulintegration of public sector tubewells into a canal irrigation project (para. 25). In addition, the siteinvestigations and studies of the Pagara, Kotinak and Pillowa dams recommended by the DamSafety Review Panel (DRP) which were carried out by the Ihrigation Department led to a firmprogiam for upgrading these dams (para. 22). The recalculated ERR for the project was 10.3%compared to 35% estimated at appraisal for a total project area of 221,000 ha. For the AmbahIntensive Block Development the recalculated ERR was 24.7% for a revised area of 35,000 hacompared with 34% estimated at appraisal for 40,000 ha. For the remaining command area due tocanal and other improvements, the recalculated ERR was 7.9% for a revised area of 186,000 hacompared with 35% estimated at appraisal for 181,000 ha. (para. 28).

Sustginability

4. Benefits from the project may only be assured through adequate maintenance of projectworks, and if outstanding prescribed works under state funding are completed. Urgent attentionshould be paid to the drainage problem of the area to prevent environmental problems (para. 29).

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Findings and Lessons Lean

5. The main lessons of the project are:

(i) More time should have been devoted to the projec. preparation which could haveminimized management and technical problems encountered during prject implementation(paras. 11-12, and 16-17).

(ii) Project preparation and appraisal should have emphasized the condition of existingdams that served the project area and the Bank's requirement for independent review of thesafety aspects of such structures (paras. 14 and 22).

(iii) Field inspections during preparadon should have recognized waterlogging problemsin the project area, as well as the deterioration of drains constructed in Phase I, that couldcause environmental problems (paras. 12 and 29).

(iii) Cost estimates should have been more realistic and adequate provisions for physicalcontingencies and cost escalation should have been provided (para. 23).

PIOJECT COMPLETlONRjEPRQT

INDIA

CHAMBAL (MADHYA PRADESH) IRRIGATION 11 PROJECT(CREDIT 1288-I

1PJABYJProiet Revw fOite Bnkll's P-ersDiective

Project Identity

Name : Chambal (Madhya Pradesh) Irrigation II ProjectCredit Number: 1288 - INRVP Unit : Asia RegionCountry : IndiaSector : AgricultureSub-sector : ITigation

Backoun-d

1. Madhya Pradesh is the largest State in India geographically, and in 1981 had a populationof about 52 million, giving it a much lower population density than most other Indian states. TheState is rich in minerals and forests, and agriculture contributed some 55% of the State's domesticproduction. Madhya Pradesh has a high hydroelectric generation capacity, and is one of the fewStates in India without power constraints. Its population is about 84% rural, with about 20%comprising tribal and backward classes. In 1979, about 66% of the population was below thepoverty line. In order to increase agricultural production and to make it less dependent on thevariable rainfall, the State has, since independence, given the highest priority to irrigationdevelopment. In 1980, only 2.2 million ha had been provided with irrigation facilities out of anestimated potential of about 12.9 million ha.

2. In the 1970s, the Government of India (GOI) developed the concept of command areadevelopment in response to the slow gestation rate of newly-developed irrigation projects and lowproduction generally. Authorities were created which were intended to focus on the lowerechelons of irrigation systems to carry out on-farm development, to organize and train farmers, andto facilitate supplies of inputs. In Madhya Pradesh, a separate Command Area DevelopmentDepartment (also known as the Ayacut Department) exists, whereas certain other States haveevolved a structure where the command area development element is the operating wing of theIrrigation Department. The Ayacut Departnent was the lead agency in this project, and a seniorexecutive in the Indian Administrative Service of Commissioner status controlled all construction,operation and maintenance activities within the Chambal Command Area Development Authority(CADA). Under his administrative, but not technical, direction are units seconded from other linedepartments, including the Irrigation Department, Agriculture Department, Public WorksDepartnent, and Forest Department.

Pret. Qbjectives and Desgition

3. The objectives of the Chambal (Madhya Pradesh) Irrigation Project were: improvement ofboth the canal conveyance and drainage systems; construction of additional roads; prevention offurther encroachment of ravines into the project area; and provision of a more reliable water supplyto the tail end of the command area.

2

4. Phase II of the Chambal (Madhya Pradesh) Irrigation Project consisted of the followingcomponents:

a) creation of the Ambah Intensive Block Development over about 40,000ha in the Ambah Branch Canal command, incorporating augmentationtubewells, the improvement of canals and water courses, and theintroduction of level top canal operation;

b) upgrading of main canals and distribution network;

c) improving main and link drainage;

d) upgrading and extension of rural road network:

e) ravine arrestation by plantations and conservation;

f) canalside plantations;

g) improvements to monitoring and evaluation activities;

h) studies to examine supplemental water sources and to develop improved criteria foroperation and maintenance; and

i) development of a training institute.

All the above components are defined in Table 4, (Project Implementation) andTable 6C (Studies).

5J. Te Ambah Intensive Block Development was the core of the project and consisted of thefollowing subcomponents:

a) development of 24,000 ha in the Ambah Branch Canal distributary 33Rcommand in Morena district, and 16,000 ha at the tail of said Canal in BhindDistrict;

b) installation of 175 augmentation tubewells for supplemental supplies pumpinginto the distributaries under public control;

c) provision of level top canal operation on canals down to 6 cusecs to permitponding of water from augmentation tubewells as insurance against powerfailures;

d) installation of additional cross-regulators in canals down to 6 cusecs to permitconstant volume (constant level downstream control) mode of operation;

e) trial installation of NEYRPIC hydraulically-operated gate cross regulators indistributary 33R of the Ambah Branch Canal;

f) full lining down to water course level and the installation of water control andmeasuiing devices; and

3

g) construction of 7 storage tanks at augmentation tubewell locatdons to examinetheir efficacy in time of power failure.

6. General canal improvement works outside the Ambai, Intensive Block Development areascomprised the following:

a) canal security works: to inhibit seepage and erosion by selectively lining the mainand branch canals;

b) canal capacity works: to upgrade about 114 km of existing water courses to minorcanal status and about 176 km of disuibutary and minor canals with increasedcapacides, together with improved head gates;

c) canal control works: to install about 98 cross regulators, 7 escape structures, 21bridges and 1375 chakl outlets; and

d) aquatic weed control: to isolate breeding grounds from the main canals.

7. The drainage component was intended to continue works initiated under the Phase Iproject, and to relieve a further 4550 ha. Ravine arrestation was also a continuation of Phase Iover a further 11,000 ha. Canalside plantation was a newly-introduced component, intended toprevent animals entering the canal, to reduce wind erosion, reduce evaporation from canals, and toprovide fuelwood over a length of 420 km of major canal banks.

8 . The roads component was intended to improve project area communications byconstruction of 25 km of new macadam roads, the widening and strengthening of 68 km ofmacadam roads and of 183 km of black top roads, and ancillary structures. In addition tomiscellaneous buildings for the Irrigation and Public Works Departnents, some 47 buildingcomplexes would be constructed throughout the project area for management, operation andmaintenance staff.

9. The project c.st for the Phase II tize slice was estimated at Rs. 556 million (US$ 61.8million). Detailed component costs are shown in Table 5A.

-roject Design and Organization

10. The overall project concept was appropriate to the development requirements and the needto improve equity of supply to project beneficiaries. It was a logical continuation of Phase I.While the canal control works, canal capacity works, canal security works, weed control anddrainage, were all routine upgrading/improvement operations, the Ambah Intensive BlockDevelopment was extremely innovative with respect to augmentation tubewells, level top canals,and automatic gates. The canal and chak improvement works were to be to standards alreadydeveloped in northwest India. Other ancillary components, including road improvements,buildings, studies and training were all infrastructural/support elements to raise project efficiencyand to provide institutional improvements.

I a "chak" is the lowest echelon in the system, commonly a 40 ha block, served by anetwork of water courses and field channels and operated by the beneficiaries.

4

11. 'Ihe project management structure, with the Ay-^ut Department as the leadl agency for theGovernment of Madhya Pradesh (GOMP), was prescr;bed by current and still existing GOMPorganization, and the project was framed around this structure.This same project inmanagementstructure worked reasonably well during the execution of the first phase of the project. However,many of the difficulties experienced ;n the Phase II project may be directly ascribed to theweakness of the systeia where the Ayacut Department had under its direction units fiom four majordepartments (Irrigation, Agriculture, Forestry and Public Works Departments). This situationresulted in a complex management structure, with staff nominally responsible to the command areadevelopment authoiity (CADA) but with their careei strulcture in another. It would kave been moreappropriate for the Irrigation Depurtment to have been charg.d with irrigation and drainage works,for the Public Works Department to have been responsible for roads and buildings, and the AyacutDepartment to have been in charge of conservation activities, infiastructural development andstudies. Other states have successfully assigned each specialty within a command area to theappropriate line agency, with specified procedures for coordinadon. In general, this latter structurewas less dependent upon the individuials concerned.

12. Except for the integration of groundviater component, the project could have benefitted ifmore time was allowed for preparation. The feasibility of groundwater development was based oninadequate information on groundwater quality presented to the appraisal mission which was notcritically examined by the mission and which resulted ini implementation delays. Reasons forconcern about preparation are:

a) The project envisaged introduction of sophisticated "level-top" canal operationprocedures which required highly responsive gates and operations procedures,which proved inappropriate to local conditions, and required either liniited trials in apilot area, or a far more detailed analytical basis for wider introduction. Inconsequence, this central innovative element of the project was unsucc?ssful andalso resulted in delays in implementation.2

b) In continuation of (a) above, NEYRPIC gates were specified to be installed indistributarv 33R of the Ambah Branch Canal for demonstration purposes, but atappraisal (Annex 7 para. 8 of the SAR) these were found to be too radical to beintroduced on a project scale. It was also determined during implementation thatimportation of said gates were not feasible, and that they were unlikely to bemanufactured in India due to objections from the manufacturers and forlicence/patent reasons.

c) 40,000 ha specified for augmentation tubewells were not carefully reviewed forgroundwater quality. 16,000 ha area in the Ambah Branch Canal in the Bhind areahad to be abandoned due to high salir :ty. And only after further investigation wasthe second augmentation tubewell area transfeiTed to the Bhind Main Canal.

d) Based on a 1985 Landsat interpretation, waterlogging was a problem in areascovering about 30,000 ha (about 9% of the command area). However, only 4550

2GOMP noted that it was at the Bank's recommendation that they agreed to electrically-operated gates to provide uninterrupted supplies during shut-down periods. They considered thisto be too sophisticated for this type of operation. However, GOMP failed to come up with asuitable alternative. At project closing, the test model installed by the Indian Institute ofTechnology in New Delhi ha zI not been successfully demonstrated.

5

ha of drainage was included in Phase 11. It is likely that the area was marginallysmaller in 1980 at appraisal. However, the probletmi must have been well known tothe Agriculture Department at that time. In addition, field inspection would haveindicated how much dtterioration due to lack of maintenance had occurred on drainsconstructed in Phase 1.

e) The canal service road improvement component was not included at projectappraisal, though earlier identified. This was surprising in a project moreconcerned with impro' ig operation and mainitenianice than with construction,withiout which maintt,. . Bwould have been inhibited during the monsoon season.The component was suu... .uently added with Bank agreemenlt.

f) Funding of the training facilities was not included at initial project idendfication andpreparation, although it had been considered at appraisal. Following GOMPrecommendation, the Bank subsequently agreed to inclusion of this component inSeptember i983, a delay which was partly responsible for its slow development.

13. The two most positive aspects of the project were the installation of augmentadon tubewellsand the formation of the Project Monitoring Unit (PMU). Due to power availability in MadhyaPradesh, the augmentatior. tubewvei. had, under the project, improved production at canal tailareas. The PMU had carnied out excellent monitoring and evaluation to assist project managementand state agricultural planners to improve project operation, and to draw conclusions generally onthe operation of projects of this type.

14. The project is served by one major dam and three minor dams in Madhya Pradesh, and twomajor dams and a barrage in Rajasthan. The Bank's operational guidelines required independentreview of the safety aspects of all dams serving the project. Given the age of some of thesestructures (several were built in the early part of the century), preparation and appraisal did notplace adequate emphasis on their condition. It took Bank supervision missions until March 1987to persuade the Irrigation Department of GOMP to take positive action in ensuring the safety of thestructures.

15. The appraisal of the project was less than satisfactory: a central aspect of the project (theadvanced canal operation proposals) was poorly analyzed; the groundwater resource foraugmentation wells was not critically assessed and subsequently proved to be problematic; and theproposal to introduce rotational water supply system was not understood or not supported by theBorrower. This background affected implementation, which in any case was not smooth, byadding uncertainties, revisions, and the basis for disputes. GOMi had commented that the advicereceived from Bank's supervision missions was not always consistent, causing further delays andconfusion. However, the extent of reformulation requlired during execution presented supervisionstaff with problems and issues to resolve. While the appraisal process was not as detailed as itshould have been, it was inevitably limited by the inadequacy of the preparation work available tothe appraisal staff.

Project Implementation

16. Table 8B indicates that at no time did the project rise above 2/1 rating (under the old ratingsystem), and, between January 1985 and February 1987, it was close to being a "problemproject." Thereafter, in response to stable and positive management, it improved significantly untilmid-1988 when it commenced a further decline, only to be rated by the final supervision missionas a "problem project" in February 1989. Two major reasons for the decline are:

6

a) inhetent weakness of the Ayacut Department's ability to control the activities ofstrong line agencies; and

b) frequent changes in management of both the Ayacut Department and ChambalCommand Area Development Authority and associated project staff.

17. Partly as a result of the somewhat complex management and funding structure of theproject, the paradoxical situation arose in several financial years where unit managers complainedof shertages of funds, yet at the end of the fiscal year unutilized funds were returned to GOMP. Inaddition, staff responsible for the dam safety and quality control aspects of the project, felt that dueto the management structure. they were unable to impose their authoaity in the project which wascontrolled by another department. Without Bank intervention, this would have had seriousconsequences instead of just being a cause for delays.

18. Table 7 shows that project covenants were generaily complied with satisfactorily, with theexception of those pertaining to funding, studies, rotational water supply3 , and submission of auditreports.

Project Results

19. Project physical achievements are shown in Table 4. Canal security works, canal capacityworks and aquatic weed control works almost reached revised targets. Canal control works on theother hand fell seriously short of their targets. This last component is esseniial to better canaloperation on which the project rationale is based and therefore has serious implications. Ancillarycomponents had mixed results in that drainage, buildings, telecommunications, and aerial seeding(ravine arrestation) almost reached or exceeded their targets, whereas roads and training facilitiesfell short significantly.

20. In the Ambah Intensive Block Development, most components fell significantly belowrevised targets. In the case of augmentation tubewells, this was due to the need to relocate 71 unitsfrom Bhind area of the Ambah Branch Canal to the Bhind Main Canal command due to salinity.Water course lining has achieved dismal results due to indecision by the Irrigation Department ondesigns and materials4, and to procurement delays. Indeed during the February 1989 supervisionmission, it was learned that the project had unilaterally decided to halt further works due to highcosts. However, it was fully demonstrated during the drought year of 1988 that the 103augmentation tubewells now operational in 33R command of the Ambah Branch Canal providedconsiderable irrigation potential and helped to maintain irrigation supplies.

21. The Water and Land Management Institute (WALMI) had initially been intended forlocadon either at Gwalior or Raip?ir. Following GOMP request, the Bank agreed to relocation ofWALMI to a central location at Bhopal to serve the State more easily, provided a project training

3This project objective was consistently resisted by GOMP, and as a result there wereproblems with the definition of the appropriate infrastructure. While GONlIP has noted that thiscaused delays in execution, it was in fact resistance to an agreed project concept.

4GOMP notes that changes by the Bank in the specifications of materials allowed for liningled to delays in this component: this is true, but the changes were an attempt to improve on thequality of works, which were unacceptably poor based on the original standards.

7

center (PTC) was established in the project area to satisfy project needs. WALMI wassubsequently funded under the nationwide USAID program, and funding was deleted from theCredit. To date only temporary premiises exist for demonstration farms. There are still no PTCfacilities at Morena to cater for project training requirements, although they are soon to beconstructed in the Commissioner's Complex. While WALMI, Bhopal has followed a highlyambitious and successful training program, the programs at the proposed PTC facilities could notbe organized due to delays in completion of infrastructure. However, training programs weretemporarily conducted at the Agricultural Farm in Morena for departmental field staff and farmers.

22. Dam safety requirements were neglected by the Irrigation Department until they were madestringent conditions for the first Credit extension in March 1987. As a result, GOMP caused itsDam Safety Review Panel (DIRP) to inspect all project related dams in Madhya Pradesh andRajasthan. Emerging from these reviews were recommendation for remedial works on the majordams and barrage well upstream of the project. With respect to Pagara, Kotwal and Pillowa damswithin the project area, the Irrigation Department carried out all site investigations and studiesrecommended by the DRP in a competent and diligent manner, such that an approved detailedprogram of remedial measures on each dam had been developed. GOMP has committed to carryout these works. The positive, albeit dclayed, studies leading to a firm program for upgradingthese dams is a major success for the project.

23. Project costs are shown in Table 5A. From a time slice target of Rs. 556.3 million (US$61.8 million), actual expenditure at the final closing date of March 31, 1989 amounted to Rs.707.2 million (US$ 45.6 million), with an estimated additional Rs. 375.6 million (US$ 24.2million) required to complete outstanding works prescribed under the time slice. This gives arevised project cost estimate of Rs. 1082.8 million (US$ 69.8 million). Some of the reasons foran almost doubling of project costs when actual prescribed q~.antities were in general reduced were:inadequacy of cost estimates due to out of date unit rates and inaccurate quantities, increase in laborand materials cost, and rise in establishment costs as a result of the two-year credit extension.

24. In common with many other projects in India, studies were in general very delayed. Table6C describes these fully. Studies under the direction of the PMU concerning project monitoring,and those under the direction of the Irrigation Department on dam safety, were well-executed. TheManagement and Maintenance Study which was awarded in June 1987, was suspended soon afterinitiation due to funding problems. The Water Resources and Management Study was awarded inJune 1988. The study of the operation of NEYRPIC automatic gates was not possible as theproject imported only one gate instead of several as intended. The study of an electrically-controlled gate was commenced after its installation in December 1988. In short, a mostdisappointing record in a project designed to consider improved water management above all otheraspects.

25. The major impact of the project has been the successful integration of public sectortubewells into a canal irrigation project. Although it is still too early to quantify the impact of thiscomponent, continued irrigation in areas served during the drought of 1988 is clear evidence oftheir contribution as indicated in Table 9B. Since project inception, the improvement in reliabilityof power for the augmentation tubewells has meant that the level top principle is no longerimportant, in that pumping can reliably be made to coincide with canal releases. Indeed, in therelocated augmentation tubewells in the Bhind Main Canal area, level top earthworks will not berequired. Another variation in this area is that the augmentation tubewells are situated such thatshould farners on each minor canal form responsible and accountable cooperatives, theauginentation tubewells would be handed over to them for operadon and maintenance, andpossibly for running costs payment. This is a most important experiment, which could have far-

8

reaching results in India.

26. The Chambal Irigation System and the Chambal Inrigation Project have contributedsignificantly to poverty-reduction and social improvement in the project area through increasedavailabili.y of water for irrigation. This is especially true for the tail end areas previously sotenuously supplied with water. The major adverse effect has been the large built-up of waterlogging, which, if not corrected, will worsen.

27. The results of the project must also be considered in the broader perspective of the ChambalIrrigation System operation, which should not be considered totally in conjunction withimprovements under Chambal Irrigation Project. The objective of the project was to progress fromabout 188,000 ha irigated (aggregate of two seasons) in the late 1970s to 221,000 ha at the end ofthe current project. However, reference to Table 9A shows that there has instead been a decline to124,000 ha in 1982/83, followed by a gradual rise again to over 169,000 ha during 1986/87,1987/88 and 1988/89. The reasons for this disappointing achievement are excessive diversion topowerful groups at the head end of the system, erratic supplies released at the Rajasthan/MadhyaPradesh border at Parvatti aqueduct, (as shown in Table 11), and inappropriate canal operation.Thus, by this criterion, the project has not been a success. However, yields over the same periodhave dramatically increased as shown in Table 10. This increase was due to increased use offertilizer, improved agricultural extension, and in places, improved water reliability. Indeed,Chambal is considered to have one of the highest yields of crops in the entire State.

28. Reference to Tables 6A and 6B shows benefits derived from the project. Direct benefits inTable 6A show a marked rise at the projected full development of 250,000 ha compared withappraisal estimates. Table 6B shows the project's economic impact. The recalculated ERR for theproject as a whole was 10.3% compared to 35% estimated at appraisal for a total project area of221,000 ha. For the Ambah Intensive Block Development the recalculated ERR was 24.7 for arevised area of 35,000 ha compared with 34% estimated at appraisal for 40,000 ha. For theremaining command area due to canal and other improvements, the recalculated ERR was 7.9 for arevised area of 186,000 ha compared with 35% estimated at appraisal for 181,000 ha. The declinein ERRs was mainly due to cost overruns, delayed benefits, and decline in economic prices ofsome commodities.

Project Sustainability

29. The project works, if adequately maintained, are likely to yield continued benefits. This iscontingent on all outstanding prescribed works being completed under State funding. A majorconcern is the ominous development of waterlogging and consequent salinity, which woulddevelop into the serious "usar land" (wasteland) problem similar to that in neighboring UttarPradesh. It is urgent that GOMP attends to the neglected drainage of the area to preventenvironmental problems.

Bank's P ance

30. The Bank should have allowed more time for GOMP to prepare the project, as evidencedby the groundwater quality in Bhind area the Ambah Branch Canal and the increase in projectcosts. Although the Ambah Intensive Block Development was the most important component, itwas undoubtedly over-imaginative and non-replicable with respect to automatic controls. Drainageestimates were seriously below requirements.

31. As Table 8B shows there was an almost total absence of agriculture input in project

supervision up until early 1985, when the multi-discipline task force concept was introduced by theBank's Agriculture Unit in New Delhi. Thereafter, all the required disciplines were involved inproject supervision. Partly as a result of this, perfoimance ratings improved. Its later decline wasdue entirely to project management deterioration, which the Bank clearly pointed out but withnegligible effect. It was only at the first Credit extension that the Bank was able to persuadeGOMP to tackle the drainage problem pragmatically, to initiate the two major water resource andmanagement studies, and to initiate serious dam safety studies. On the subject of watermanagement training, the Bank provided technical assistance.

Borrower's Performance

32. The project's performance was satisfactory under the following components: monitoringand evaluation (due to a well-managed and staffed PMU), augmentation tubewell installation, canalsecurity and capacity works, and ravine arrestation. However, except between 1986 and 1987when progress was reasonably satisfactory, the performance of project management and thecomponent units (with certain exceptions) was below optimum resulting in delays in filling staffvacancies, equipment procurement, and construction, and delays in carrying out studies and damsafety activities, and confused financial allocation to component units. This is not a criticism ofindividual performance, but rather of the weakness of the project institution.

Project Relationship

33. Personal and professional relationships between Bank and Borrower's staff were alwayscordial. GOMP without exception provided promptly project data requested by the Bank.

Consulting and Support Services

34. The following government organizations, acting as consultants, undertook the followingproject-financed studies:

a) Water Resources and - Central Water and Power Research StationManagement Study (CWPRS), Pune in Association with Water

and Power Consultant Services (WAPCOS).

b) Management and - WALMI, BhopalMaintenance Study

c) Dam Safety Study - Central Soils and Materials Research Station(CSMRS), Delhi and Central WaterCommission (CWC).

d) Canal Bank Road Study - Central Road Research Institute (CRRI),Delhi

35. All project construction was undertaken by contractors. Watercourse lining and roadconstruction works, also carried out by contractors, were of substandard quality, and action isbeing taken by GOMP to improve quality of works.

10

Project Documention and Data

36. The SAR with its supplemental data volume were detailed with respect to institutional,management and technical aspects, and provided Bank staff with adequate guidance on theproject's development and its components as intended at appraisal.

37. As noted above, the PMU carnied out exemplary work in reporting, monitoring andevaluation which were of high standard. GOMP's project staff prepared data required for theproject completion report.

11

PART II

PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE

t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

12

PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE

Comments on Bank's Review Contained in Part I-…__ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _

Summary of observations Commentsrecorded In the PCR

(a) Paras 1 to 9 deal with lnttoduc No comments.-tion & broad outlines of the'lihse-11 of Chambal Irrigatlon

Project.

(b) Para 10 and 11 of the CADAs have been set up basicallyProject Completion Report - to Induce and effect coordinationMany of the difficulties experi- amonst different departments lik e-enced In Phase II Project Irrigation,Agriculture,Forest ,Publicmay, be directly ascribed to Works etc, to bring activities of(1) tha weakness of the system all the major departments underwhereby the Ayacut Depart ment the umsbrella ol Coiiiitnainft Are ahas to coordinate activities of Development Autliority.Tiie Nni'sionfour major department (ID,AD, has pointed out that credit shouldFI) and PWVD),and (1i) having have flown to the different dlepart-non-technical IAS officers In -ments for thelr sectoral works andadministrative charges. It Is Ayacut Department for conservation,considered more appropriate ,infrastructur a 1 development andthat the Credit should have studles only.This arrangementbeen made with the Irrigation ;for credit flow could haveDepartment as lead agency for been made but the Coordinationall Irrigation and drainage works ,by the Commissioner at thethe PVD rand the lead agency CADA level Is Imperative becausefor roads and buildings and in the lack of coordinationAyacut Department only with at CADA level, the performancerespect to conservation, would be still worse. It isinfrastructual development,and i Incorrect to say that havingstudies. Each agency would have a non-technical IAS officerhad separate tasks with In administrative charge wasappropriate fund allocations not propitl6us to the ef ilcient

Implementation of various works.Hlaving various sectoral worksIn command area to be Implementedby different ciepartments.theircoordination by an IAS officerat CADA level Is unavoidablylmperative.Therefore,the observa--tion of the World Bank MissionA. not based on a factual assess--ment and practical difficultiespertaining to the Implementationof the CADA activities.T hethings would have been muchworse if the arrangement assuggested by the World BankMilssion were to be made.I nfact, the Ayacut Departmentshould have had more powersto coordinate the activitieswhich would have made the role of

jCommissioner much more effective.

13

Summary of observatlons Commentsrecorded In the PCR

(c) Para 12 of the PCR - Reasons The Bank have Indicated thatfor concern abo.ut preparation level. top canal and down-streamof the Project. control principles of canal

regulation were not suited to(I) Para 12(a) of PCR: this project where automatic

gates or electrically operatedThe level top canal and gates manned constantly bydown stream control princl- vigilant staff would be required.-ples require,automatic This principle of canal regulationgates or electrically operated was adopted only on the recommen-gates manned constantly by -dation made by the World Bankvigilant staff.Automatic gates and the entire plan In thils respectare not manufactured in India was prepared under the guldanceand their Import Is not of the Bank. This system of canalpermitted.As the cross regulation Is suited only toregulators on the distribution 'the most sophisticated projectssystem(not the main canal elsewhere In the World. Thereforesystem) ,are large In number there was an inherent draw-it Is out of question to back In the planning of Phase-I1expect gate operators to with regard -to canal regulationprovide vigilant,round the and the Bank cannot absolve Itselfclock operation.Thus it Is, from this responsibility. We agreenot seenhow the systm could with the observation of thehave operated In practice by World Bank Mission but theInstalling manually operated res ponsibility for pitfallsstandard cross regulators. Is to be shared by the WVorld

Bank also.(i) Para 12(b) of PCR

Neyrpic ga.tes were specified Neyrpic gates were Installedto be Installed In distri bu only for demonstration purposes.-tory 33R of ABC for demons- Later on It was reallsed by-tratlon purposes.In suppleF. the Bank that It could not-mental data volume It was be replicated because suchadmitted by the Wlorld Bank gates could not be manufacturedthat the gates were unlikely In India and their Import wasto be manufactured In India also not feasible. The Bankdue to many reasons like has Itself Indlcated In theobjections from the manufactu- Proje6t-Completion-Report In-rers and grant of licence etc. this Para that It Is Inexplicable

as to why such non-replicable(111) Para 12(c) of PCR system was set up for demonstra-

-tion.This error was also committedTwo areas specified for ATW only on the recommendationcovering 40,000 hectares of the Bank and the Bank haswere hot carefully reviewed to share the responsibilityfor ground water quality.Oniy for this also.one mention has been madeIn very correspondence during 16000 ha. area In ABC Bhindpreparation and thereafter area had to be abandoned dueIt was assumed to be to high salinity.In any groundsatisfactory. -water Project ,water quality

Is Invariably the dominantparameter. In the field reportof December 29, 1983 the Milssion

14

Summary of observatlons Commentsrecorded In the PCR

had observed that 'WVater qualityis not expected to pose problems,

particularly as the augmentationwell water Is blended withsurface water." It shows thatthe Bank had approved thesite Initially which was changedwhen chemical analysis of thewater quallty was done.

(lv) Para 12(d) of PCR it has been mentioned In thisOara of the PCR Itself that -

WVith the present extent the problem of water-loggingof water-logging covering *as not well apprehended atabout 30,000 ha.(about the time of formation of Phase-II9% of the command area), of Chambal Irrigtion Project.ThisIt is Inconceivable how was also an Inherent defectonly 4550 ha. of drainage In the planning which envisagedwas specified for Phase-II. Qnly 4550 ha.for drainage.

Entire planning for Phase-IIhad been done under the guidanceof the Bank. Apart from theofficers of Agriculture & IrrigationDepartment at the time of formationof Phase-II,the officers ofthe Bank also did not foreseethis problem.

Now direclives have beenlisued to the officers of IrrigationDepartment to prepare a MasterPlan for drainage In ChambalCanal System.

(v) Para 12(e) of the PCR Undoubtedly canal service roadImprovement Is an Integral

Canal Service Road Improve- confiponent of Command Area-ment was not Included In development.This shortcoming

the SAR but was subsequent- had been made at the time-ly added with Bank agree of preparation of SAR but later-ment. This Is surprising in reallsed by the Bank.Againsta project more concerning the target of 125S Xms of WBM andwith Improving operation 183 Kns of Brroads,113.424 Kmsand maintenance than with of WBM Roads have been construc-construction. Without all -ted and 169.236 Kms. of BTweather service & Inspec road strengthening has been-tion roads,maintenance done till September.1989.would necessaaily belhhibited In the Monssonseason.

15

Summary of observatlons Commentsrecorded in the PCR

(vi) Para 12(f) of the PCR - The funding of the trainingThe funding of the training facilities should have t)eenfacillties was not Included Included at initial Credit compositionat Initial Credit composition so that activlties could haveal though It had been consi- been started right at the time-d,ored at appralsal.Pollow- of Inception of Phase-Il.lt-Ing the representations was neither thought out atmade by Govt. of M.P. the time of preparation ofthe Bank subsequently agreed Phase-ll nor was It recommendedto this In September,1983, by the Bank.It may he mentioneda delay which was partly here that the entire plan forresponsible for Its slow Phase-I1 had been prepareddevelopment. under the active supervision of

the Bank.lIad there been anysuch suggestion from the 13ankIt would have found a placeIn the Intitial Credit composition.Therefore,it had been an erroron the part of the Bank also.

(d) Para 13 of the Project Completion These two areas which lhaveReport - The two most positive been rated by the Bank asaspects of the Project were thel areas of success are actuallyInstallation olf ATWs,and the the two sectors where a lotformation of the Project Moni- of reformative and remedi al-toring Unit(PMU).The former works have to be done to makehas,under the adequate power them useful and success Inavallability for the staff,been a true sense. Performance ofdemonstrated to have fully ATWs durlng the last flabijustified the rellance placed season and the current seasonIn It to assist the production cannot be evaluated to be ent-irelyat canal tall areas.The latter satisfactory, If a cost - benefithas carried out excellent analysis Is done. It has alsomonitoring and evaluation to been noticed recently that theassist project management. ground water level in wells

In the . vicinity of * some ofthe ATWs has start ed recedingwhich may pose drinking waterproblem in future.So Is thecase of the Project MonitoringUnit.Though many studies havebeen conducted,these have notcontributed to monitoring ofthe different programmes ofPhase-lI.lf this Is the stanclardof tating done by the Bank.thenpeirformance of other scintrsshould be classified as excellent,If a factual analysis Is done.ThisIs only a subjective analysisof the Bank officerh whichIs not based on facts and fig4res.

16

StPImary of observatlons Commentsrecorded In the PCR

(e) Para 14 of the PCR - The The Bank have polnted outpreparation and appraisal of Its own deficiency and etrorPhase-II did not place adequate for not giving adequate emphasisemphasis on the safety aspect to dam safoty aspect at Iheof all dams serving the time of preparation and appraisal.Project .

(f) Para 15 of the PCR - The l'here are undoubtedly Intia-appraisal, given the weaknesses contradictions,omisslons andIn preparation was thosough Inclusion of Impractical schemesand the SAR and SDV are In the SAR, some of whichwell documented and clear. !have been reflected in theThere are certain minor contra- aforesaid paras.-dlctiong between the SAR andSDV however on technicalissues and component sizes.

(g) Para 16 of the PCR - Between The Bank have indlcated t)iatJanuary,1985 and February,1987 between January,1985 and FebruaryIt was verging on being a 1$87. the project was nearing"Problem project.' Thereafter a status of "problem project. "In response to stable and positive lIhereafter It gained considerablemanagement,it Improved signi- impiovement till 1988, after-ficantly until mid 1988 when It which It commenced the furthercommenced a further decline, decline and acquired statusonly to be rated by the final of a 'problem project" In Februarysupervision mission as a .1989. This observation of lhe"problem project' In February, Bank Is not based on any factual1989.Two major reasons may be analysis. The Bank In Its fieldIdentified. report of date May 30,1988

has termed year 1987-88 a(a) Due to the Inherent weakness bad year and year 1986-87

of the Ayacut Department's having a satisfactory paceability to control the acilvi- of Implementation. Para 2 of-ties of stronger line ,!he Field Report of the Wolidagencies; and Bank Mission April 19 to 28,

1Q88 reads as following(b) Over frequent changes "The Project which has

In management of both recently developed a satisfactnrythe Ayacut Department and pace of Implementatlion In FYChambal CADA and,associ.ated 1986-87 suffered a setbackproject staff. In the following FY 1987-88.

The World Bank' Missionhad Indicated In Para 3 ofIts Field Report of visit duringOctober 25 to 28,1988 mentionedas follows t

" The overall physicalprogress In the Project hasshown some marginal Improvementsince the last revleiw from68% to 72% of the target amount."

17

Suinmar y of observations Commentsrecorded In the PCR.

In paia 3 of the FieldReport of World Bank Mission(April 19 to 28,1988) ihe Missionhas lndlcated as follow;g

'The overall physicalprogress In the Project Isstatic since tho last reviewat about 68% of the target amount.

The excerpts aforesaidexemplify that thie analysIsof thfe Wor ld Blank Nil ssioniIn the PCR Is not basedt onactual performance and fac:tialinformatlon and is contiovettedby the previous findings ofthe Bank itself.ln the PiojectCompletion Report the Bankha s pointed out the peuiodbetween January,1985 and February,1987 as worse and April 1987to mid 1988 as very good.whileIn the Field Repott (April,19to 28,1988) It has mentlonedthat financial year 1986-87had a satisfactot y pace ofimplementation and got a set-back In the' following financialyear 1987-88. Further It hasbeen mentlioned In the sameField Repoit that overall physicalprogress was static at 68%.In the Field Report of visitof October 25 to 28, 1988 Ithas mentioned that there wassome marginal Improvementsince the last review whichhad been done In the imonIhof April,1988.The overall physicalprogress which had been staticat 68% till April, 1988 shiowedan improvement after April,1988to come to 72%. Though it maybe a marginal improvementbut It certainly gained somemomentum after April,1988 andbroke an Inertia prevailingIn the preceding year.TheseInferences can be drawn fromthe observations of tIhe lVorldBank Mission which have beennarrated In the previous FieldReports.

After mid 1988 a selectivereview of the activities undergoingIn phase-II had been takenup. Works like earth wotk

18

Summary observations Comments_ _acorded Ln the PCR -

ror wage storage, which Involvedonly a wantnful ox pondltitrehad bcen guspendlod. Sincethe 'Level Top Cana3' and'Down Stream Control Principles'of canal regulatlon were foundno longer suitable In the Chambalcommand,therefore.such wot kswere stopped. Mote emphasiswas given to canal conlrolwot ks which was the pivotalactivity to Introduce an effie lentcanal-regulation In ChamibanlCanal System. Aftor mid 1)88,11 more cross regulators wereconstructed Increasing the nunibetto 58, which further got increiasedto 66 till Decemb 'r.1989. Agenicieswere fixed for installing gntesfor the ctoss tegulators. OtherImpor tant works which wereof the patamount Importancefor the canal system like canalprotection works.improvementof the canal service toads,drilling and energisation ofATWs ,construction of Commissioner'sComplex at Morena constructlonof WBM roads and BT roadstrengthening were accelerated.Liningof water cources in AIBD areawas found to be too expensive,therefore,lt was suspended.

Rating this project bythe final supervision Missionas a 'problem project" canlotbe said to have been basedon any logical method and Itis not known what parametershave been considered by theBank for declaring the projectag a Problem Project. As admittedby the Bank Itself In Its ProjectCompletion Report .there were.some Inherent drawbacks I nthe planning of Phase-I1 whilch-compounded the problems duringthe course of Its lmplementallon.

However.lt Is worthmentil;ninghere that In response to bettermanagement practices Intto4ucod during the year 1988-89*the crop ylelds have showrtb

* a quantum jump In the year1988-89 which Is evident fromAnnexute-1. It has been appreciatedby the Bank also In ProjectCompletion Report In Para 27.Tola i area I ir r-Igated by tce

canls"lia alo %own an increse

19

-------- -- - -- --- -------

Summary observations Commentsrecorded In the PCR

durlng tho year 1988-89 - lAnnoxure- 21

(h) Para 17 of the PCR - The The Chlief Engineer.IrrisallonGwallor Zonal Chier Engineer Department,Gwallot was alsoof ID.who is responsible for the actively involved In the lmplemen-dam safety and quality control -tation of Phse-1I as well asaspects of the projent. felt the water management practicesunable to Impose his authority In Chambal command. Ills nurgotilonsIn a project controlled by were always welcomed andanother depaitment and It Is Incorrect to say thatmanaged by a senior IAS officer.. he felt unablo to Impose his

authorlty. In fact, on ac.ouintof the dual control, the Chairmanof the CADA sometimes feltIt difficult io Impose authotityover the officers of 1 riganlonDepartment . it necessitatesthat the power of the ChalrmanCADA should be well definedIn a system where dual controlexists.

(1) Para 18 of the PCR - The Delays in submission of auditstatus of. covenants during reports were always avoldedProject executlon Is given In excepting when It was unavoidableTable 7. From this,it Is noted During the year 1988-89 anthat they were generally area of 2665 Hectares was bioughtcomplied satisfactorily,wlth under RW (Warabandi).In thethe exception of those preceding 3 years area uinderpettaining to funding,studles R%V was nil. In the year 1989-90RWS, and submission of audit having been directed by thereports. Department of Command Area

Development.Government of MiadhyaPradesh,3hopal vide Its letterNo. 6-2/82/Aya/40 dated28-7-1989, this work was

entrusted to the It-rigationDepartment I.e. Chief Engineer,lrrigation.Gwallor. ItALMI andCWPRS Pune were ala0 requestedto expedite completion of thestudles entrusted to them underPhase-II which showed a favourableresponse durlng the year 1989-90.

(J) Para 19 of the PCR - It is Durlng the year 1988-89 andnoted that canal security works , 1989-90, 19 more cross-regulatorscanal capacity works and aquatic were constructed. Agency rorweed control works were able tQ Installation of gates was fixodapproach thelr revised targets. | reallsing the fact that thisCanal control works on the other activity which was most essontialhand fell seriously short of to better canal operplion hadtheir targets.This last component been lagging behind In past.Activi-

-ties pertalning to conRttirctt.ln

20

Suimmary of obser vatlons Coitmentstecorded In the Pt...

Is essential to better canal of Project Training Cenire,Morenaoperation on which the project was also accelerated duringrationale Is based,and therefore the last year.Likewise, undorthis has serious Implicatlons. roads component, against a targetAncillary components had mixed of 125.5 Kms of WBM roadresults,in that drainage,buildings 115.14 Kms. have been constructedtelecommunications and aerial till December ,1989. Under nTseeding (ravine arrestation) were road strengthening. against aapproachIng or exceeded their target of 183 Kms. strengtheningtargets.whereas roads and training has been completed In 169.236facilities fell short signl- Kms. till December,1989. It-ficantly. shows that these are only margi-

-nally behind the targets.

(k) Para 20 of the PCR - In the Sites Of 71 units of ATWs hadAIBD element,most components fell been shifted from Shind areasignilficantly below their revised of ABC to the command of Bhindtargets. In the case of ATWs, Main Canal on account of salinity.this was due to the need to Water Courses lining got delayedthe shifting of sites of 71 units not merely due to Indecisionof Bhind area of ABC to the Bhindby IrrlIgatlon Department OnMain Canal command following 'designs and materials as mentloneiabandonment of the former due ln the PCR but It also sufreredto salinity. Water course lining due to confusing directiveshas achieved dismal results,due Issued by -the Misslon fromto Indecisions by ID on designs time to time. In the SAR brickliningand materialso and to procure- was permitted which later-ment delays.Indeed during the on got changed to first classFebruary,1989 supervision Mi3slon ,brIcks after being directedit was learnt that the Project had by the Milsslon during the courseunilaterally decided to halt furtherof their visits.works due to 'high costs.'However, Lateron the Bank insistedIt was fully demonstrated durin8 upon half round-pipe-lining

drought year of 1988 that the which was found to be too103 ATWs now operational In expensive and,therefore, the33R command of ABC provided work was suspended after October,1988considerable Irrigation potentlal' under intimation to the Missionand helped to maintaln Irrigation during theli visit In the monthsuppiLes. of. October.1988.

(1) Para 21 of the PCR - There are Building work for Project Trainingstill no PTC facilities at Centre at Morena coule not bedMotena to cater for ptoject started early due to delaystraining requirements,although in site selection. This Issuethey are soon to be consttucted has been resolved during theIn the CommissLoner's Complex preceding year and concepttheze.While WALMI Bhopal has plan for Project Training Centrerollowed a highly ambitious and has been submitted to WALMIsuccessful tralning program, Bhopal, which has been forwatdedvirtually nothing has been to EFCOS for further scrutinyIntroduced at Morena.In this and modificatlon.ilowevet, ttainingthe Project has seriously programmes had been regularlydefaulted. lorganised In the Agricultute

Farm Miorena and In the 'dirfetentvillages making special effnitsdutrInt the ptecedinR Iwo ye.'r .whlrhIs evidiencedi hy the ohqervnHinn

21

Summary of obser vations Cornmlcirt.recorded *ln the PCR.

of the World Bank Misslonnarrated in Para 62 of theField Repoi t sent after theirvisit duirlng October 25 to28th October,1988.

"Project Training Centre at Morenaha continued to function effectivelyb.y Importing organized trainingto field staff of related depaitmentsIn project specific activityas well as to large body offarmers on various essentialInputs for planningcrop strategies."Hence this obser va t Ion of theBank Is not based on factsand Is in contravention of theprevious finding of the WorldBank M1ission recorded In theField ReporI(Visit 25 to 28 Oct.88)

(in) Pata No 22 of the PCR- WVith Nb commentsXespect to Pagara,KotwalPillowa tams within the Projectarea tt ei ID cariled out allsite 1 'estigations and sludiesrecommended by the DRP In acompetent and diligent manner,such that an approved detailedprogram of remedial measureson each dam has been derived.Government of Madhya Pradeshhas committed to carry outthese works.The positive(albeitdelayed) studies leading to afirm program for upgradingthese dams Is a major successof the Project.

(n) Para No 23 of the PCR-The It seems that Initially thlereasons for an almost doubling project cost was not realisticallyof project cost estimate when assessed.There are many factorsactual prescribed quantities attributing to the doublinghave In general reduced since of the project cost like extensionproject lnceptlon are not clear. of the period of Phase-II whichIt can only be assumed that contributed to more expenditurecost estimates at prepatation on establishment.Rise In labourwere grossly inadequate, due to rates and material cost areout of date unit rates and some other factors.inaccurate quantities.

(o) Para No 24 of the PCR-In common The Wlorld Bank have expressedwith many other projects in satisfaction over the studiesIndia studies In general got executed by PNIU and that regarding

22

Suniaz y of obser vations Commentstecorded In the PCRtics ci I bed - - - - - - -very delayrd. Table 6 C Dam Safety aspect . hecdecscribes these fully. Those under was an initial delay inthe direction of the PMU on awarding studles regarding

project monitoring and those water resources and manage-on dam safety by ID were well ment to CWPRS Pune.Nowexecuted.In spite of vets1stent draft reporls have bcenBank representatlon, It was not prepared and final reportuntil the first credit extension is lo be submitted bywas due In March,1987 that CWPRS,Pune.the Water Resources and Neyrpic automaticMlanagement Study,and the M.anage gates and electrically-ment and Management Study controlled IIT gates weTt-were finally ready for award. Installed In the ChambalThe former was not actually Command Canal Syslemawarded until June,1988,but Is on experimental basis. NC! ypicnow under actiVe and competent gate was Installed onexetution by a competent the advice of the WVorld Bank.Indlan consulting consortium. It was a wasteful exerciseThe latter awarded to WALMI which has been criticisedB3hopal In June,1987 was In Para 12(b) of Ihesuspended soon after Initiation PCR Itself.It seems thatdue to non-release of funds by the Bank also wanted toAyacut Department,and has since conduct some experiments,nade no further progress.Both about the feasibility ofthe latter studies were the Nerypic and IIT gates.subject of covenants.The study Such schemes which ateof the operation of NEYRPIC automatic only taken up on experimentalgates was not possible,as the basis cannot be widelyproject Imported only one gate Implemented so long asInstead of a group as Intended. a firm conclusion Is notThe study pf an electrically arrived at regarding suchcontrolled gate has only recently experiments.The Bankbegun due to its late Installa4ion have also now reallsedIn December,1988. In short,a most that Installation of onedisappointing record In a project neyrpic automatic gate wasdesigned to consider Improved not a just scheme towaler management above all Introduce In the Chambalother aspects. Canal System which Is not

po sophisticated.

(p) Para No 25 of PCR-The major During the course ofImpact of the project has been implementation of Phase-IIthe successful integration of It was reallsed titat the levelpublic sector tubewells Into a top canal system of walercanal ltrigation project. Although Regulation was not aIt Is yet too early to quantify success due to many factors.the effect with confidence,the Therefore this concept wascontinued Irrigation In areas abandoned In relocated ATWsserved during the drought of of Bhind Main Canal area.Now1988 Is a clear evidence of their proposals have been sentcontribution as Indicated In table to the Government for9 B. Since Project Inception,the providing direct irrigatlon

23

Summary of observations X Commentsrecorded In the PCR …- --

Improvement in iellability of fiom the ATWs In Bhindpower for the ATWs has meant Main Canal area.It wouldthat the level top principle be premature to arilveIs no longer importait, in that at any conclusion regardingpumping can be reliably made to the performance of AT%Vscoincide with canal releases, In Chambal Canal System.11Itdeed, In the relocated ATW's can be meaninpfully evaluatedto Bhind Canal area,level top after a course of time takingearth works will not be required into account Its cbst-benefitAnother variation In this area analysis.Is that the ATW's are sited suchthat should the farmers on eachminor canal form responsible andaccountable cooperatives,the ATW'swould be handed over to them foroperation and maintenance.andpossible for running costspayment.This Is a most importantexperlment,which could have farreaching results in India.

q) Para No 26 of PCR-Due to the It Is agreed that thleimprovements brc'ght about by Chambal irrigation SyslemCIS genetally the Incidence of and Chambal Ittigation Ptojectbn4idlttry In this notoriously lawless have brcught prosperity Inarea Is markedly diminised.This the area contrlbutingis specially true for the tall significantly to socialend areas previously so tenuously Improvement.On account ofsupplied with water.Thus the constant monitoring andCIS and CIP have contributed vigil ,Irrigation In tallsignificantly to social lmprove- Increased duilng thement.Poverty In the tall end area last ygar.A master planhas also been reduced.The n:ajor Is being prepared byadverse effeot has been the the Project-Engineers tolarge built up of water logging, take curative measures Inwhich if not corrected will the water-logged ateas.Theextend. Project - Engineers have

also been directed toprepare a Pilot Project

** *tfor the same.

(r) Para 27 of PCR - It Is recalled In Phase-I1, a targetthat the Intention of the Project of 2,21,000 ha. for irttigationwas to progress from about was envisaged.This could188.000 ha. irrigated(aggregate) not be achieved due toof two seasons) In the late many factors,the major1970's to 221.000 ha.at the i being that area undetend of the current project. Kharif could not be incteased.Ilowever,reference to Table 9A People have also suit tedshows that there has Instead growing HY ctops whichbeeh a decline to 124.000 ha. have high delta. llowevetrIn 1982/83 followed by a area Itrigated dut inggradual rise again to over the yeat 1988-89 is the169.000 ha.during 1986/87, highest after 1980-81.which

24

Summary or observatlons ConifncnIsfeco:ded In the PCR -_ _-__

disappolnting achievement are The yeat 1988-89 also witnessedthrought to be excessive a quantum jump In the productivitydiversions to powerful groups and total production In theat the head end of the system, Chambal Canal System,whichertatic supplies released at is evident from Annexure-3.Targe tthe Rajasthan/MP border at of 2,21,000 ha.cannot be achievedParvati Aquaduct,(as shown because of the ptevaillng croppingIn Table 11),and Inappropriate pattein in the area.Theze Iscanal operation.Thus by this also under-reporting by thecriteria ,the Project has lowet functionaries of Itigatlonnot been a success.However, Departrment peltaining to theyields over the same period lIrigation-statistics.have dramatically Increased as Cultivators In lhe commandshown In Table 10. have switched over to oilseeds

and cash crops malnly mustard.whichhas increased faim Income Inthe Chambal Coimmand System.Whilegrowing mustaid ctop the cultiva--tors keep the land fallowand take only this crop Ina year. Therefore a latge arearemains mono -cropped.Effortsare afoot to' change the cioppingpattern In the command.

Target of 221 Lakh ha.wasenvisaged In the SAR at thetime of evolution of Phase-IIkeeping in view of 'the factthat after completion of Phase-lIthe benefits accrued out ,wouldlnctease the toal area litigatedto 2.21 Lakh hectares.As allthe wor ks/activities of Phase-IIhave not reached their stateof completion,this target couldnot be achieved at this transitionals,tage when the full benefitsout 6f the activities of Phase-IIremain still to be expected..

(s) Pata 28 of PCR - In spite of (1) Economic Rate of ReturnIncreased yield there is a vwill show an lncteasedepression In the Economic Rate only after completlon ofof Return due to serious cost all the activities of Phase-1loverrun and delayed benefit. when they reach their

full development stage.(2) In the Bhind Main Canal

Main Canal area whete.direct Irrigation flomthe ATW Is also proposed,moreintensive. cultivation willbe done fortming societiesof the farmers.

25

Suminaty of observations Commentsrecor ded In the PCR

11t) lala 29 of PCR-The Ptoject Ptoposals have been sent towot ks if adequalely maintaitied cieate two tDralnagc Dlvisions.ate likely to yield continued The concerningbenefits.This Is contingent on all departments have been entiustedoutstanding prescribed works with the tesponsibility ofbelng completed undex State completing the Incomplete wo kls.funding.A major concern Is the Howeve I,t may be mentionedominous development of water- here that the maintenance fundslogging and consequent salinity of the system are too scarcewhich would develop Into the for its fuither up-keep andsetious"Usar land'problem maintenance.similar to that In neighbouringUttat Pradesh.It Is of the

utmost urgency that GOMPattends to the neglecteddrainage of the area to preventsuch an envlionmental disastet.

(u) Pare 30 of the PCR- The Bank Performance of the Bank has(did not ensure a sound prepara- been evaluated In this Paration by GOMP,as evidenced by by the Bank Itself. Apait fiotnthe groundwater quality in this there have also been someBhind area ABC,and the sharp intra contradictions in thesubsequent increase in costs. directives Issued by the Bank.Although the AIBD was the most Misslonswhich created a stateImportant component ,it was of confusion and delay In tiheundoubtedly ovetimaginative, execution.Some of them canand non-repilcable with respect be enumerated as follows:-to automatic conttol.Drainage (1) Relocation of the TVsestimate were seriously below from ABC to Bnf C ah ea.Therequitements. Bank had initially advised

that water quality wouldno. be expected to poseproblem on the presumptionthat the augmentation wellwater Is blended withsur face water.

(2) The' Bank had also agreedinitlially that APM outletswould not be requitedthroughout in the ChambalCanal System(as mentionedIn Pata 6 of the Field Reportof the visit between Jan.31and Fe.1,1984).Installationof pipe.outlets had beensuggested at such placeswhere mlnors were llned.Lateton the Bank Insisted onIntroducing only APM outletsthroughout In the command.This caused delay In theconstruction of outlets,

26

Summsi ty of observations Cominmentstecoidecd In the PCR

(3) As menttoned In Para 18 ofthe SAR linilng by locallymanufactured bilcks hadbeen suggested,which waslater on changed to class-Ibricks and furthet to Halfround pipes.

(4) Above all It may be mentionedhere as admitted by the t3ankitself that level top canalprinciple of water regulationwas too imaginative toq beImplemented practically Inthe Chainbal Canal System.Canal Control-wotks wasthe most Important activitywhich,having got delayed,dueto a faulty planning,advetselyattected executlon of theother allied activities.

(v) I'ara 31 of the PCR- The The conslusion of the Bank Ispet for mance ratings Improved not based on factual infor matIonto their peaks In late 1987. . bLater dlecline was due entirely and Is controve ted by previousto pioject management deterl- findings of thie Bank itself

oiaton,hichtheBankclerly made from time to time afteroiateon,which the Bank clearly visits of the World Bank Mission.pointed out but wlth negligible This has already been detailedeffect.It was only at the first l aa--o h omnscredit extension that the Bank In Pata -g- of the comments.finally Induced GOOMP to tacklethe drainage problempragmatically,to Initiate thetwo major water resource andmanagement studies,and toInitiate serious dam safetystudies. In the subject ofwater management training,theBank made a large contributionwith Its consultants under Bankfinanced technical assistance.

(w) Para 32 of the PCR- Apart As Indicated In the foregoing Patafrom a period ov er about (g)the version of the Bank is1986 and 1987,the petformance not Lased on facts.Undoubtedlyof the project management and there have been some diaw-the component uilts(with certain backs in the execution of Phase-Ilexceptions)was below optimum. works.Reasons for this have beenLong delays In filling staff narzated In brief In the foregoing

27

Summary of observallons Commentsrecorded In the PCR

vacancles,procurement of equip- paas. \hen the project startedmcnts,delays to most component on a wtong footing,the executionconsttuction,delays In carrying alone cannot be expected toout studies and dam safety rectify the Inhetent defectsactivities,confused financial and deliver best results.allocation to component units Regarding the reotganisationetc. ,ate evidence of this.Only of the Command Azea Developmentin the field of inonitoring and jAuthorlty,a thinking Is goingevaluation(due to a well *at the Government level tomanaged and staffed PMU) ATWs reorganise and rejuvenate theInstallation,canal security and stTucture.Pio' osals have alsocapacity wor ks,and ravine aires- been sent to the Goveinment thattastion has the ptoject the funding In the commandpeiformed satisfactoilly.This areas should be as enforcedIs r'at a cliticism of Individual in the Sub-Plan areas.performance,but rather of theweaknesses of the present mode Proposals have also beenof placing project development sent zto onment form the

managmentwith he Aacutmoder nization of the ChambalCanal System and other components

Depa *tment. which are considered necessary

after termination of Phase-II.

(x) Para 33 of the PCR-Inspite of Relationship between the Bankperlods when the project was and BorTower 's staff werenot per forming well and the always cordial .There haveneed for Bank Missions to make been some Instances of lack ofpertinent crlticism of It, efficiency at some levels forpersonal and professional rela- which the Government wastionships between Bank and tequested to take suitable action.Borrower's staff were always Performance of the Project wascordlal.GOMP without exception also affected on account ofprovided promptly any data the fact that there was vatiencetequested by the Bank. In the directives Issued by the

World Bank from time to timeas mentioned In the commentsof Para 30 of PCR.

(y) Parr 34 of the PCR- The No commentsfoll owing Govt.organizationswere concerned with studyexecutlon.acting as consultantst

(a) Water resources h Nanage- CWPRS PUNEment Study. In associatioi wIth(WAPCOS)

(b) Management and Maintenance WALMI BHOPALStudy.

(c) Dam Safety Study CSMRS & CWR

(d) Canal Bank Road Study CRRI NEW DELHI

28

Stimmar y of obser vatlons Commentsrecoided in the PCR

(z) Pain 35 of the PCII-AlI Action Is being taken regardingconisltuction in the project sub standard works.was by contractois.Thosecar1 ying out water courselining and road constructlionwere not of adequate standardgenerally.

(aa) Para 36 of the PCR-The SAR Observations of the t3ankwitih Its SDV were detailed a re agreed excepting thatwith iespect to Institutional, thete were Inclusion of toomanagenment and technical Imaginative activities andaspects,and provided both omissions of some lmportantproject staff and Bank activities.supervisois with adequateguldance on the project deve-lopment and Its components asintended at appialsal.Legaldocumenits were very limitedIn paillcular convenants,and that covering dam safetywas particularly lacking.

(ab) Para 37 of the PCR-As noted It cannot be denied that manyabove,the PMU car r led out studies had been conductedexemplary work In the Ptoject, by the PMU,but the monitoringand repoiting,monitoring aspect In the PMU was notand evaluation were all to effective as desired initlally.high standard.At PCRpiepatation,the Projectstaff pr-epared data require-ments In the required format.

29

Evaluation of the Bank's erformance durin theevolutioni an3 neienaoLothe Project -w ths;ecia1 emhaqis on le-ssons i~earnt-

This point has been covered -under the precedirgsection andcontains a detailed analysis regarding short-fall underdifferent activities and the areas of success, Some of theareas where performance of the Bank was not propitious to theefficient execution of the Phase-II works are mentionedrbelows(1) The level-top canal and down-stream principle of water

regulation was too imaginative to be implementedefficiently in the Chambal Canal System,which is not sosophisticated. On account of this faulty planning otherimportant activities were also adversely affected.

(2) 75 Augmentation Tubewells. had to be relocated to BhindMain Canal area on account of salinity, The previous sitefor the 74 Tubewells had been approved by the Bank on thepresumption that the Augmentation Tube-wells water isblended with surface water. The Bank has to share theresponsibility for the same, Which delayed implementationof this scheme.

(3) Initially the Bank had approved installation of pipeoutlets where minors were lined. Later on the Bankinsisted on introducing only APM outlets throughout in thecomnmand. This variance in the directives caused delay inthe construction of outlets and adver.sely affected the.execution of water-regulation-system ultimately.

(4) In the SAR (Para 18) lining of water courses with locallymanufactured bricks was permitted. This was ohanged to

Class A bricks and further to half-round pipe lining. Thisvariance in the view taken by the Bank in respect ofwater-course lining affected execution of this work.

(5) Water-logging problem was not well apprehended at thetime of formation of Phase-Il Project and a provision was

made only for 4550 Ha. of thte lind for 'Irat1iaqv. Nowgravity of the problem have been realised and the ProjectEngineers have been directed to prepare a Master Planand a Pilot Project for drainage in consultation with theofficers of Department of Agriculture.

(6) Proposals have also been made for modernisation of theChambal Canal System keeping in view the deficienciesprevailing after the termination of Phase-Il.

30

Evaluation of the Borrower's-own performancesUndoubtedly

there have been some deficiencies on the part of Projectofficers for which action has already been initiated.

However, it would not be out of context to mention here

that some of the problems were compounded on account of

the ermpneous planning. This point has been discussed at

ler in the preceding sectiQns. . TNe Bnk has been hypexr cal to dome ox tne areas p3rtaini g tosmpIementation of Phaso-Il. Fin Ings of the Bank have beencontroverted by the previous observations made by theWorld Bank recorded aftoe the visits of the Utorld Bank

Missions from time to time.

Effectiveness of the relationship between: the Bankan3 the Bo-rrowers

The relationship between the two has always been

cordial during the evolution and implementation of the

Project.

AdeQuacY and accuracy of the factual informationcontained n Part-III of,1the PCR.

- Table I Table No.1 relates to the Project.,located in Madhya Pradesh for which

-World Bank Credit has been extended.

Table No.2 - No comments.Project Time Table

- Table No.3 - No comments.Schledule ofdisbursement.

- Table t1oo4 - Reasons for shortfall under differentProject Implementation activities have been analysed and

detailed under Part II preparedby the CADA which specify thecomments on the analysis containedin Part-I of the PCR.

- Table 5-A Reasons for increase of the ProjectProject costs, cost have been mentioned under

Para (n) of Part II of the reportprepared by CADA.

- Table 5-B No Comments.Project financing

- Table 5-A No comments.Direct benefit.

31

Table 6-B Benefits of Phase II have notEconomic impact. accrued fully on account of the fact

that all the activities of Phase IIhave not reached their full develop.ment stage, ERR will show an increaseonly after completion of allPhase IIschomes.

- Table 6-C The matter is under considieretionStudies Public Road at the State Government level.Study.

Drainage studies. The Project officers have beendirected to prepare a Master Planand' a Pilot Project for takingcurative measures in the water-loggedareas. Proposals have also been sentto the State Government for creatingtwo separate Divisions for drainage-Work exclusively.

- Rest of observaLions No comments.made by the World Bankunder Sub-Head 6-C.

Table 7-Project Full facts have not been given underAgreement - Funds this Section. Now adequate funds areprovided by the State being provided under Fiepd Channelbevernment were Construction programme to improveinadequate, quality of micro-network system.

- Rest of the points havebeen covered under Part-IIreport,prepared by CADA.

_ Table 8-A-Staff inputs. No bomments.

- Table B-a No comments.

_ Table 9-A

- Table 9-B- TableC1lO No comments.

- Table 11

- Table 11(b) See Part II: Coments on Bank'sReview Contained in Part I

32 PART II

of te ruAn~gthe-Chambal C AsDo Programmne,

(i) seasonw.tse Area IrrIgtated b ChAmbal Canaig.

(Area in liectares)-…-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - -a - - -a…

Year Area irrigated during Total Irrigated"'-IJil - t-Rartui Area

Ar-ea -Pe-rene~t Ar e-a P e r ce-n tto tototal total

-…-- - - - - -- - - - - - - --- - - --a a a a a - - …- - - - -

Ci) ~(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

1974-75 14444 8.90 147938 91.10 162382 100.000

1975-76 19670 11.36 153426 88.64 173 096 100.000

1976-77 20945 11*59 159756 688.41 1607 01 100.000

1977-78 23986 12.74 164321 87.26 188307 100.000

1978.79 24076 13.53 153807 86.47 177883 100.000

i979-80 26025 14.38 154902 85.62 181007 100.000

1980-81 15110 9.99 .136099 90.01 151209 100.00

1981-82 7752 5.25 139872 94.75 147624 100.00

1982-83 6785 5e'47 117231 94.53 124016 100.00

1983-84 8939 7.15 116019 92.85 124958 100.00

1904-85 10045 6.90 135530 93.10 145575 100.00

j985-86 13182 8.48 142276 91.52 155458 100.00

1986-87 23944 14 a,14 145362 85.,86 169306 100.*00

1987-88 29491 17*43 139743 82.57 169234 100.00

1988-89 17846 9.94 153286 90.006 171132 100.00

- n --a a - aa a a a- ana ---- - - --

33

Part IIANNEXUUtE - 2

(2) P_OLution of Princijpal s,C Chinbal Command Area.

(in tonnes,

So Crop 1974-75 1987-08 1988-89 Percentage in-Noe crease or

decrease in 1988-89 over 1974-75*

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

1 Rice 19553 28773 52214 + 76*68

2* Jowar 24270 11187 23769 - 2.06

3. BaJra 38628 64029 100746 + 160.81

4. Maize 240 530 59 - 75.42

o. Wheat 163950 380895 403982 + 53.04

6* Barley 33384 15440 19569 _413G

7. Gram 73984 39537 175548 24*92

8. Mustard 51556 159050 250948 + 386.75

O i_ _ _ _ -

Part 11ANNIEXURE - 3

(3) Productivity of Principal Crops in Chambal Command Area-

(In Quintals per he~ctare)-…-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- …- - - - - - - - - - - - -

So Crop 1974-75 2983-84 1984-85 1985-'86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 Percentage in-No. crease or de-

crease in 1988over 2974-75.

(i) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8). (9) (lo)- - - - -- -- - - - - -- - -- - - - -- -- - - -- - -- -- - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - -…

lo R*1.7 362 146 15. 10 7.21 18472 3 1.67 + 173.*73

2.* Jowar 8.74 10.70 los -7.95 6.69 5.69 11.35 + 29.86

3.0 Bajra 6. 42 11.68 12.58 9.28 7.v17 8.24 13.-42 + 109.*03

4.0 Wheat 13.79 22.00 23.38 26.02' 31.42 27.28 30.*05 + 117.9 1

so Barley 13.86 13. 18 13.84 8.92 14.24 13.-58 18.58 + 34.05

6. Gramn 6.93 11.36 14.73 145S5 12.53 7.94 13.*42 + 93.*65

7.o Tur 8.69 13.78 14.52 18.20 23.978 12.50 17.42 + 100.46

So Mustard 5.79 9.68 11.92 7.46 9.38 9.16 13*49 + 132.99- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - - -…- -… - - - -

35

PART III

STATISTICAL INFORMATION

Table 1Page 1 of 3

TABLE 1

Related Bank Loans and Credits

Loan/Credit Purpose Date Status CommentsTitle of

Approval

1. Credit 391-IN: To expand and improve the June Information notHadhya Pradesh credit facilities available 1973 readilyAgricultural Credit for farmers throughout the available.Project state.(US$ 33.0 H)

2. Credit 562-IN: To increase agricultural June Project closed Most prescribed project works a'Madhya Pradesh production and farm incomes 1975 on 06/30181 exceeded targets, but On-FarmChambal Command Area through the upgrading of after two years Development works was 522Developmeat Project irrigation facilities, and extension. below targets. Project(US$ 24.0 H) provision of drainage, On-Farm failed to improve water

Development works and rural management.roads in the Chambal project.

3. Credit 712-IN: To strengthen agricultural June Project closed Some 4Z of Credit was notHadhya Pradesh supporting services in the 1977 on 9/30/83 on disbursed. Project largelyAgricultural state, particularly extension schedule. achieved its objectives.Extension and and research.Research Project(US$ 10.0 H)

4. Credit 715-IN: To assist provision of May The Credit The Credit was fullyNational agricultural credit 1977 closed on disbursed, and substantiallyAgricultural nationwide. 12131/79 on achieved its obiectives.Refinance and schedule.DevelopmentCorporation ProjectII (US$ 200.0 M)

Table 1Page 2 of 3

Loan/Credit 'Lrpose Date Status CommentsTitle of

Approval

5. Credit 947-IN: To assist provision of July The project The Credit was fullyNational agricultural credit 1979 closed-on disbursed, and the projectAgricultural nationwide. schedule on substantially achieved itsRefinance and 06/30182. objectives. Certain problemnsDevelopment were experienced withCorporation Project agricultural creditIII administration and high(US$ 250.0 H) percentages of repayment

defaulters.

6. Credit 1108-IN: To finance a time slice of the March The project The project failed to achieveHadhya Pradesh construction of 16 Medium 1981 closed on more than a token irrigationMedium Irrigation Irrigation Projects, and to 3131188 after a potential. Although 15 dams,Project develop about 107,000 ha of one-year were complete or nearing(SDR 112.6 H) irrigation potential. extension. completion, the canal system

and On-Farm Development workswere very delayed. Inparticular, Resettlement ERehabilitation problems besetthe project throughout, andthe very unsatisfactoryResettlement& Rehabilitationactivities were the majorreason for the Bank decliningto give the project a secondextension to 3131189 asrequested by GOMP. As aresult, some SDR 5.98 H werecancelled from the Credit onclosure.

Table IPage 3 of 3

Loan/Credit Purpose Date Status CommentsTitle of

Approval

7. Credit 1138-IN: To reorganize the extension April The project's The project, althoughHadhya Pradesh services in 30 districts, and 1981 original delayed, has substantiallyAgricultural to complete activities closing date achieved its objectives. ItExtension II Project commenced under Credit 391-IN