Work Incentives and the Single Mother: Dilemmas of Reform

Canadian Public Policy

Work Incentives and the Single Mother: Dilemmas of ReformAuthor(s): Patricia EvansSource: Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Jun., 1988), pp. 125-136Published by: University of Toronto Press on behalf of Canadian Public PolicyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3550572 .

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Work Incentives and the Single Mother: Dilemmas of Reform PATRICIA EVANS* Department of Social Work Atkinson College York University

Un des plus importants developpements, au cours des dix dernieres ann6es, dans les programmes d'assistance sociale a te l'identification des meres celibataires comme 6tant un des groupes sur lequel doit porter l'incitation au travail. Trois strategies principales sont identifi6es: 1/ une strat6gie financiere qui agit sur les caract6ristiques du systeme de l'assistance sociale en vue d'ameliorer les r6compenses mon6taires du travail; 2/ une strat6gie de service qui tente d'ameliorer les opportunit6s d'emploi des ben6ficiaires; et 3/ une strat6gie restrictive qui repose sur les exigences de l'emploi et les penalit6s, afin de promouvoir le travail. Selon l'experience de l'Ontario, en prenant comme exemple les strat6gies financieres et de service, il est discut6 des facteurs qui ont entrain6 leur d6veloppement et sont etudies les dilemmes qu'elles soulevent. II est sugg6r6 que les supplements de salaire ne peuvent satisfaire l'objectif d'encourager les beneficiaires de l'assistance sociale au travail a plein temps, mais que les politiques futures doivent s'assurer que les besoins de l'emploi sont plus soigneusement determines. Cependant, si on ne porte pas attention a la position generale des femmes sur le marche du travail canadien, l'amelioration des incitations au travail sont susceptibles de ne produire que des gains modestes en regard de l'embauche des meres celibataires touchant l'assistance sociale.

One of the most significant developments to occur in social assistance programs in the last decade has been the identification of single mothers as an important focus for work incentives. Three major strategies are identified: 1) a financial strategy which manipulates the features of the social assistance system to improve the monetary rewards of employment; 2) a service strategy which attempts to improve the employment opportunities of recipients; and 3) a restrictive strategy which relies upon work requirements and sanctions to enforce work. Using Ontario's experience with the financial and service strategies as an example, the factors which led to their development are discussed, and the dilemmas they raise are examined. It is suggested that wage supplements cannot meet the objective of encouraging social assistance recipients to enter full-time work, but future policies must ensure that employment services are more carefully targeted. However, without attention to the general position of women in the Canadian labour market, improved work incentives are likely to produce only modest gains to the employment of single mothers on social assistance.

I Introduction

The report of the Macdonald Commission contains the most recent statement of the

need for the income security system to achieve a, 'desirable balance of work incentives, adequacy of benefits and program economy' (Canada, Royal Commission on the Economic Union and

Development Prospects for Canada, 1985:779). This is not an easy balance to strike: govern-

ments must set levels and conditions of social assistance benefits that are compatible with notions of social justice in a liberal democratic society, without discouraging participation in the low wage labour market, or imposing what is viewed as an unacceptable burden on the public purse. The dilemma for governments which can afford to expand social benefits neither too much nor too little is in part mediated by the work incentive policies in income support programs.

Canadian Public Policy - Analyse de Politiques, XIV:2:125-136 1988 Printed in Canada/Imprimd au Canada



Work incentives attempt to ensure that all who are able to work are in fact employed. They are also a potentially important vehicle for containing social assistance expenditure and for convey- ing society's expectations of individual and social responsibility.

Work incentive policies include positive and negative forms of inducement; the polar ends of the work incentive spectrum are recognized in such expressions as the 'carrot and the stick' and 'pushes and pulls.' Three major strategies may be identified: 1) a financial strategy to increase the monetary rewards from low-paid work; 2) a service strategy to provide a variety of supports to reduce obstacles to employment; and 3) a restrictive strategy to enforce labour force participation which can include the imposition of work requirements and implicit measures such as eroding the value of benefits, and increasing the scrutiny of claimants and recipients. The tension between the competing objectives of alleviating poverty, increasing work and containing costs confront policy-makers with intrac- table dilemmas and unpalatable trade-offs (Keel- ey and Robins, 1979:55; Aaron, 1975:187). Rein (1973:167) argues that an important outcome of this dilemma is that the restrictive approach is increasingly used as the more positive work incentives fail to meet the desired objectives.

The incentive to work for the employable male applicant and the woman without depen- dants has been supported by requirements to register for employment, demonstration of job search activity, and threat of benefit curtailment for refusing suitable work. At different times, the work test, work relief and public service employment have provided additional buttresses to the work incentive.1 Expectations regarding work for single mothers on social assistance have been considerably more ambiguous. Moth- ers' Allowance legislation, implemented in a number of provinces between 1916 and 1935, developed in part to protect the welfare of children whose mothers, upon the death of their spouse, would otherwise be relegated to the full-time work force.2 Until recently, sole- support mothers generally have not been subject to explicit expectations of employment as a

condition of entitlement to social assistance nor a focus for work incentive programs.

Since the mid-seventies, the majority of provinces have redefined the expectations of work for single mothers on income maintenance programs, and embarked on initiatives to move them into the labour market (for a review, see Evans and McIntyre, 1987). The emergence of the work incentive for this group, and their redefinition as employable, is one of the most significant developments to take place in social assistance policies in recent years.

The dilemmas confronted in work incentive policies, and the contention that they inexorably become more restrictive, are examined with reference to Ontario's well-defined programs. The first section of this paper examines the economic, political and social factors which helped to identify single mothers as an important focus for work incentives. The second part describes the two stages in the development of Ontario's programs, incorporating the financial and service strategies, and assesses their effectiveness in increasing work, and in reducing social assistance expenditure. The paper con- cludes with a discussion of the implications of this analysis for the future direction of work incentive programs for single mothers on social assistance are analysed.

II The Emergence of the Work Incentive: Focus on Single Mothers

During the 1970s several factors converged which helped to define mothers on social assistance as employable and to direct attention to the development of programs to move them from welfare into work. Three major and interrelated factors are identified and discussed in this section: 1) a climate of fiscal restraint; 2) the political imperative to respond to the on-going problem of work and welfare; and 3) social and demographic changes.

Influence of Fiscal Restraint Economic factors are particularly important to the redefinition of single mothers on social assistance as employable. The 1970s were marked by stagflation, and as Manzer notes

126 Patricia Evans



(1985:70), increasing costs and an expanding welfare clientele help to identify social welfare expenditure as an attractive target to reduce government deficits. In 1970, Ontario produced its first and last balanced budget of the decade, while 1975 heralded both a dramatic increase in the deficit and the explicit ascendancy of policies of fiscal restraint over those to promote full employment (Bryden, 1980: 435). The 1980 Ontario Budget articulated clearly the objective of the government's program of fiscal restraint: 'The central purpose of this program is to reduce the burden of government on the economy, thereby freeing resources for more productive use in the private sector' (Ontario, Ministry of Treasury and Economics, 1980:6).

Social spending, conventionally regarded as 'unproductive' and consuming more than two- thirds of total provincial expenditure, is targeted for particular attention in a time of fiscal restraint. The decline in the purchasing power of social assistance benefits in Ontario between 1975 and 1983 attests to the efforts to contain social assistance costs.3 These costs are difficult to contain, however, as the unemployment which is likely to accompany efforts to control inflation increases reliance on precisely these programs.4 As Mildred Rein (1974:xi) observes, this is precisely the context in which the somewhat elastic definition of employability is likely to expand:

In one form or another, society has always been willing to maintain those who cannot maintain themselves. But when a group that is being assisted becomes too large or its support too costly, attempts are made to distinguish those in the group who can maintain themselves from those who cannot - to separate out the non-deserving from the deserving. To single out employables is thus the essential strategy for containing the size of the assistance group under such circumstances.

The Political Calculus The publication of several reports in the relatively affluent late sixties had alerted Canadians to the existence of the working poor (Adams et al., 1971; Economic Council of Canada, 1968; Senate Special Committee on Poverty, 1971),

and in 1973, the federal government outlined its proposals for a guaranteed income and launched the Federal-Provincial Social Security Review (Canada. Department of National Health and Welfare, 1973). By 1976, the initial consensus on income security reform had disintegrated as the difficulty of producing a plan with the potential to redress poverty, maintain work incentives, and contain costs became apparent. Ontario was concerned about the ultimate financial burden that the federal proposals would impose on the provinces, and was the only province to reject outright the final federal proposals (Hum, 1985:36; Ontario, Ministry of Treasury, Economics and Intergovernmental Affairs, 1976).

By the end of the 1970s, Ontario not only had witnessed the demise of the federally proposed guaranteed income, but also had experienced the failure of its own efforts to provide income supplementation for the working poor. In 1975, the province joined with the municipalities of Toronto, Ottawa, and Peterborough to adminis- ter an experimental wage supplement scheme to encourage the working poor to continue in employment, and to induce social assistance recipients to 'seek and accept jobs which might otherwise be less economically attractive' (So- cial Service Commissioner, Regional Munici- pality of Ottawa-Carleton, 1975).

Toronto's pilot project ended in failure in December, 1978, with only a fraction of its budget spent. Factors which explain why so few applied and were eligible include: 1) the low levels of permitted earnings and meagre wage supplements; 2) the lack of available information about the program; and 3) the deterrent effect of a program administered through the auspices of the welfare department; and 4) the exclusion of those in receipt of housing and/or day care subsidies.5 The removal of these barriers to

program participation, however, also increases the costs. The appropriate balance among the objectives of reducing poverty, preserving the incentive to work, and containing costs appeared once again elusive.

The pilot program ended, and Ontario chose not to join the provinces of Saskatchewan, Quebec, and Manitoba in the delivery of a

Incentives and the Single Mother 127



province-wide income supplementation for the working poor (for information, see Ross, 1981). The difficulty in striking the appropriate balance between the 'progressive' and the 'conservative' aspects of social welfare policy, particularly important in Ontario politics, is exacerbated in times of economic restraint (Penner, 1978:214). Always in search of efforts to create solutions to the ever present problem of poverty and welfare, the provincial government appeared to shift its attention from addressing the low wages of workers to the related issue of work incentives within the social assistance system.

Socio-Demographic Factors In addition to the economic and political factors, there were obvious social and demographic trends which helped to redefine the expectations of work for single mothers on welfare. By 1980, 46 per cent of all mothers with children under the age of six were employed outside the home, and 60 per cent of those with children between six and fifteen years old (Statistics Canada, 1986). As maternal employment outside the home became increasingly common, the expectations of employment for single mothers on social assistance also altered.

The interest in developing programs to encourage single mothers into the labour market was also influenced by a significant increase in their numbers on the social assistance caseload between 1971 and 1978 (Social Planning Coun- cil, 1986b), a reflection of the rise in sole- support mothers in the population as a whole. As a recent report produced under the auspices of the Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services noted, single mothers represent 'the largest potentially employable client group on the social assistance caseload' (Community Concern Associates, 1984). In addition, employable men and women without dependents have always been subject to work requirements; in spite of sporadic demands for compulsory work programs, these are still for the most part politically unacceptable.6 Single mothers, less likely to be labelled as 'feckless' are therefore more easily regarded as suitable subjects for positive work incentive strategies.

In summary, the climate in Ontario by the late 1970s included a concern to restrain social

spending, a shift in the focus of the political debate from the working poor to social assistance recipients, and a growing proportion of single mothers on the social assistance caseload. By the end of 1979, these factors converged to direct policy explicitly toward the development of work incentives for single mothers on social assistance.

III The WIN Program: The First Stage

In October 1979, the Work Incentive Program was introduced. This enabled Ontario Family Benefit recipients who entered full-time employment to receive a wage supplement and to retain entitlement to some social assistance related benefits. The objective of the WIN program was, in the words of the Minister of Community and Social Services, to help recipients to, 'over- come the triple barriers ... of low wages, the lack of fringe benefits and jobs which were less secure than the welfare they had been receiving' (Legislature of Ontario, Debates, 1980:3064).

Wage supplements, based on the negative income tax mechanism, topped up low wages to a maximum of $150 per month, depending on family size and earnings. WIN participants continued to be eligible for premium-free medi- cal care, prescription drugs and dental care benefits which had been available to them as social assistance recipients. Participants were also assured an immediate reinstatement to benefits if, for any reason, they were unable to continue employment. In addition, a one-time 'back to work' grant of $225 was provided to defray the initial expenses incurred in returning to work.

In some respects, WIN was an innovative provincial social assistance initiative. It was entirely funded by the province, as the federal government argued that it did not meet the Canada Asssistance Plan cost-sharing criteria. At the same time, fiscal considerations imposed a number of limitations, including a failure to create additional day care spaces (Legislature of Ontario, Debates, 1979:S-959). Similarly, there were no provisions for employment placement nor monitoring of provincial minimum wage and labour standards legislation.

The participation rate in the WIN program

128 Patricia Evans



suggests that it has failed to increase full-time work amongst Family Benefit recipients, and thereby to reduce social assistance expenditures. At no time since its inception, has the participation in the WIN program exceeded 3 per cent of the sole-support mothers on social assistance in Ontario. WIN's critics have identifed a number of reasons for its low take-up rate including the narrow range of earnings in which the incentive operates effectively, poor implementation, and its failure to address what may be the most important obstacles to a single mother's effective participation in the labour force: inadequate employment opportunities and the lack of acces- sible and affordable child care (Globe and Mail, February 26, 1980, p. 15; Ontario Welfare Coun- cil, 1979; Social Planning Council, 1983:78- 85).

The WIN program did nothing to improve the affordability and accessibility of day care. Most of the WIN mothers who used licensed day care received subsidies (77 per cent). However, two-thirds of all WIN mothers relied on the informal and unsubsidized sector, and of those with child care costs, 28 per cent paid at least $120 per month (Social Policy Research Associ- ates (SPRA), 1982:42, 54). The overwhelming majority of subsidized spaces in Ontario are located in licensed centres, which a number of mothers cannot use because of lengthy waiting lists, transportation problems and limited open- ing hours. Half of the WIN mothers, for example, regularly worked evenings and/or week- ends (SPRA, 1982:52). Child care costs and shift work were both factors associated with the almost one-third (32 per cent) of the WIN participants who returned to social assistance within the first two years (SPRA, 1982:71).

The problem with the WIN program, however, was not primarily its lack of attention to day care, but one of fundamental strategy. There are inherent constraints on the effectiveness of the financial incentive delivered through the social assistance system. The combination of earnings and wage supplement must be large enough to compensate for: 1) the loss of social assistance benefits, which unlike wages, take family size and shelter costs into account; 2) the direct costs of employment - e.g., child care, transportation, meals; and 3) the 'hidden' costs

of employment which result from less discre- tionary time to shop and cook, as well as income tax liability and any reduction in the value of income-related benefits such as subsidized housing.7

The comparative value of the WIN incentive is shown in Table 1, which contrasts the annual income of WIN single mothers, working 35 hours a week, with: 1) the income of a single mother who has the same earnings, but has not been on social assistance and is therefore not eligible for the WIN program (shown under 'Earnings + Transfers'); 2) the income of a single mother who receives Family Benefits, the social assistance program administered by the province; and 3) a Family Benefit recipient who is also employed ten hours a week. In addition, the Statistics Canada low-income cut-offs, Cana- da's unofficial but widely recognized 'poverty line,' is used as a measure of adequacy. WIN and FB income does not include the value of OHIP premiums, drugs or dental care, and is therefore somewhat underestimated.

An examination of Table 1 illustrates the limited nature of the WIN incentive. In 1980, the WIN mother of one child worked for $67 a week more than she received as a non-employed recipient of social assistance; the mother of three children raised her income by $55 a week. This amounts to a financial gain of $1.91 and $1.57 per working hour, respectively, before any costs incurred through employment are considered. When the comparison is made to the mother on Family Benefits who works part-time, the economic incentive to work full-time is even more limited. In contrast to her FB counterpart who works ten hours a week at the same wages, the WIN mother with one child experiences a net gain of $33 a week; for mothers with three children, the differential narrows to $21 a week, despite the high tax-back rate imposed on earnings of social assistance recipients over $140 a month.8 For many FB recipients, the decision to enter full-time employment must be based on motives other than economic. Indeed, 86 per cent of WIN's participants said that they would have begun to work full-time without the program (SPRA, 1982:64).

The WIN supplement did improve the adequacy of income from low-wage employment. In




Table 1 Annual WIN income, compared to FB income, and the Statistics Canada low-income cut-offs, by family size, 1980

Total FB FB Family Earnings + WIN WIN Income,2 Income, Low-income size transfersl supplement income no earnings P/T earnings3 cut-offs4

2 $7579 $1140 $8719 $5251 $7014 $8438 3 $8279 $1494 $9773 $6398 $8161 $10767 4 $8778 $1734 $10512 $7677 $9440 $12807

Notes: 1 Earnings are based on the average monthly earnings of $590 (or $4.21 an hour for 35 hour week) for WIN par-

ticipants as reported in Debates, Legislature of Ontario, June 19, 1980, p.3064. Transfers include the Refundable Child Tax Credit of $238 and Family Allowance payments of $261 per child per annum.

2 Includes Family Benefits for children aged 4, 8 and 12 years old and transfers. 3 Assumes part-time employment of $4.21 an hour for 10 hours a week, subject to 50% deduction rate for earn-

ings between $125-$225 monthly. 4 Statistics Canada, Income Distribution by Size 1980, Cat. 13-206. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services,

June 1982, p.25. Figures cited for metropolitan areas.

1980, it brought the average income of a single mother with one child just over the poverty line. However, as Table 1 also indicates, WIN becomes less helpful as family size increases: only the combination of earnings, transfer payments and the WIN supplement in the case of a single mother with one child produces an income which exceeds the 1980 low-income cut-offs. In addition, the table reveals the serious inequities to the

working poor which arise when program eligibility is predicated upon the receipt of social assistance. At wages of $4.21 per hour, the income of the non-WIN working poor household was 15-20 per cent less than their WIN

counterparts. Although the WIN program consistently was

lauded by the Ministry as a cost-saving and effective program, it has been abandoned as a work incentive strategy. The last WIN increase occurred in 1981; since then, the value of the

wage supplement has been allowed to erode over time. The impact of this is illustrated in Table 2, which shows WIN income, including earnings, the WIN supplement, and transfer payments, for a single mother with one child.9 This is contrast- ed with FB income, with and without part-time wages, as well as the Statistics Canada low- income cut-offs.

The extent to which WIN's effectiveness as a work incentive and anti-poverty device has further declined is apparent in Table 2. The gap

between the income of a WIN participant and a

non-employed FB recipient narrowed from $67 a week in 1980 to $50 a week in 1985, a decrease which does not reflect the impact of inflation. The decrease in the WIN work incentive is even more marked in comparison to the FB mother who works part-time: the WIN mother who gained an advantage of $33 a week from full- time employment in 1980, stood to benefit by only $11 a week in 1985. The adequacy of the WIN program similarly declined: the average income of a WIN single mother with one child declined from 103 per cent of the poverty line in 1980 to 82 per cent in 1985.

The abandoning of the WIN program by the Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services reflects the difficulty in balancing the objectives of program effectiveness, cost con- tainment, and equity. Wage supplements directed to those who have been on social assistance are constrained by two important parameters. To operate as a financial incentive, low wages must be supplemented at a level sufficiently above the income of social assistance recipients, but not so high that the supplement creates unacceptable inequities to the working poor or encourages them to leave work for welfare. To extend the wage supplement to all of the working poor in a form of guaranteed annual income, a move which may be desirable from the standpoint of adequacy and equity, is unlikely to gain support

130 Patricia Evans



Table 2 WIN income for single mother with one child, comared to FB income and Statistics Canada revised low-income cut-offs, selected years

Total FB FB Family Earnings + WIN WIN Income, Income,2 Low-income size transfers1 supplement income no earnings P/T earnings cut-offs3

1980 $7579 $1140 $8719 $5251 $7014 $8438 1981 $8415 $1800 $10215 $6765 $8642 $10614 1983 $9043 $1680 $10723 $7535 $9476 $12440 1985 $9881 $1230 $11111 $8523 $10565 $13500

Notes: 1 For definition of earnings, see end note 9. Transfers include annual amounts of Refundable Child Tax Credit

and Family Allowance benefits. 2 Based on a child of 4 years old and eligibility for maximum shelter supplement. 3 1980, 1981, 1985 information from Statistics Canada, Income Distribution by Size, Cat. 13-206, 13-207, for

respective years; figures cited for metropolitan areas.

in a climate concerned to restrain social spending.

III Employment Supports Initiative: The Second Stage

In 1982, in the wake of the ineffectiveness of the WIN program, and the dilemmas inherent in its reform, Ontario abandoned the financial incentive and turned firmly in the direction of an employment services strategy to increase the labour force participation of single mothers on social assistance. The Employment Supports Initiatives Projects included three major compo- nents: 1) the preparation of an employment plan based on an assessment of the specific barriers to labour force participation faced by each individual participant; 2) pre-employment services such as life skills and job-search counselling; and 3) information and referral to education and training programs. In addition, participants could be at least partially reimbursed for such employment related expenses as transportation, sup- plies, and child care. This shift in emphasis from a financial to a service strategy redefined the major employment obstacles facing single mothers on social assistance from that of low wages to inadequate preparation for employment.

Of the 17,197 individuals who have partici- pated in ESI since its inception, 21 per cent have found full-time employment, while another 12 per cent have begun to work on a part-time

basis.10 It is difficult to place these figures in perspective: they are based on cumulative employment activity from the summer of 1982 to December 1986. There is no information available regarding annual or cohort flows, and no control group to compare outcomes in the absence of ESI. However, an evaluation at the end of its first year of operation revealed that 10 per cent of the participants had achieved full- time employment. This is considerably less than the 25 per cent rate which originally had been anticipated and not much higher than the 8

per cent who are estimated to leave the general caseload for employment each year (Community Concern Associates [CCA], 1984:18-19, figures extrapolated). For those who found employment, ESI appeared to have little impact on the type of jobs they obtained: the percentage working in the service, sales and clerical sectors

pre and post ESI enrolment were virtually identical (CCA, 1984:36,198, 202).

Unlike the WIN program, ESI extended help with child care costs to the informal sector. However, maximum amounts were low (in 1983, the Toronto rate was $49 a week per child), and a lack of subsidized spaces was also viewed as a constraint to the program's effectiveness (CCA, 1984:252). Although child care was identified as an employment obstacle for over one-third of the ESI mothers, only 57 per cent of those received help with arrangements or cost (CCA, 1984:127).




The ESI program has failed to make a significant difference to the employment opportunities of single mothers, in spite of the fact that it appears to be targeted to the more employable. At the end of the first year it was found that ESI participants were younger and had spent less time on social assistance than the caseload as a whole; as well, one-third had worked full-time in the two years prior to ESI participation. In addition to the influence of self-selection, explicit 'creaming' was acknowledged by one project site, while others noted a tendency to pay greater attention to the more 'motivated' (CCA, 1984:256).

One explanation for the failure of the ESI program to reach its employment target, and its apparent ineffectiveness in altering the types of employment the participants obtain, may rest in the program's emphasis on pre-employment services rather than skill development. During the first year, the majority of participants were involved in services such as goal clarification, self-esteem building, and educational upgrad- ing. Programs which focus on job-readiness and general employability may well be the needed initial step for single mothers without recent labour market experience. Without the second step, however, which ensures relevant skills for the job market, employment opportunities are unlikely to be significantly altered. Although lack of job skills was identified as an employment obstacle for 2179 of the 4954 ESI participants, only 344 (16 per cent) of those sole- support mothers actually received job training (CCA, 1984:140).

The US experience in providing employment services for single mothers on social assistance suggests some lessons for Ontario and the other provinces as they attempt to move single mothers from welfare to work through an employment services strategy. ' Evaluations found that those who were relatively well equipped for the labour market when they entered the program, failed to find employment substantially different from what they would have found on their own (Gordon, 1978:7; Schiller, 1978:521). In contrast, those with the least education and employment experience, the group for whom it is most expensive to provide services, received the greatest benefits. Gordon (1978:78) describes

the central paradox of service strategies: higher rates of completion and placement for the least disadvantaged help to ensure that programs continue to be directed to them, even if they receive the fewest benefits: they are also, in the short-term, least expensive to assist. However, if programs which serve the more employable improve neither the kind of employment participants obtain, nor the speed with which they get work, they are, in the long run, very expensive indeed.

Despite its lack of success in moving single mothers from social assistance to full-time employment, the ESI program was judged to be cost-effective. The calculated savings, however, assume that participants would not have entered employment in the absence of the ESI program, an assumption which is not borne out by caseload turnover, nor the evidence which indicates the considerable extent to which single mothers 'mix' work and welfare over time (Evans, 1984:86; Rank, 1985:374). Final assessment of the effectiveness of ESI must necessarily await an evaluation based on a controlled comparison. There are indications, however, that its greatest impact may be that the Ontario government appears to be 'doing something' about welfare dependency and the costs of social assistance.

IV Restrictive Strategies: The Way Ahead for Ontario?

Rein (1973:167) contends that policy will increasingly rely on a more restrictive strategy, as other work incentive measures fail to achieve the desired objective of reducing the costs of social assistance. This trend is evident in the United States (Dunn, 1984), and has been apparent in some Canadian provinces. In 1978, for example, Alberta imposed a work requirement which includes single mothers with one child over the age of four months (Evans and McIntryre, 1987). In 1981, British Columbia announced a policy which permitted reduction in benefits to single mothers who were expected to, but were not actually working (Globe and Mail, Septem- ber 5, 1981, p.8). Work requirements may be 'often ineffective, wasteful, and basically un- manageable' (Leman, 1980:215) - they cannot impose work where jobs and day care are not

132 Patricia Evans



available.12 However, they do help to erode the legitimacy of the single mother's entitlement to social assistance and may increase receptivity to further restraints in social assistance spending.

Ontario has not imposed a work requirement for single mothers, although in June 1981, coinciding with the development of the ESI project, the Minister of Community and Social Services announced his intention to shift the delivery of income support programs to single mothers from the provincial Family Benefits program to the municipalities, which traditionally have had responsibility for those recipients categorized as employable. The rationale for this move was to ensure that sole-support mothers had improved access to services designed to promote their economic self-sufficiency (Ontar- io, Ministry of Community and Social Services, 1984). Critics, however, expressed concern that a transfer to municpal welfare, characterized by lower benefit levels and a less uniform administration, would not operate in the long-term interests of single mothers (Legislature of Ontar- io, Debates, 1981, S501).

As part of its reform efforts, the Liberal government in Ontario has announced the first major review in 20 years of the adequacy and equity of social assistance programs. In the near future, the government seems unlikely to pursue the more restrictive measures of either imposing work requirements, or allowing the value of social assistance benefits to erode. The outcome of the Social Assistance Review is more likely to be a renewed commitment to positive work incentives, with attention paid to modifications of the current financial and service incentives.

V Future Directions

The increasing proportion of single mothers on the social assistance caseload, the changing role of women in the economy, and a concern to contain social spending, have caused provincial governments across Canada to re-evaluate their labour market expectations for single mothers on welfare. British Columbia and Alberta have introduced stringent work requirements, which are perhaps more likely to serve as a political symbol of their intent to protect the public purse than meet the economic objective of decreasing

the social assistance rolls. Ontario, traditionally a leader in the administration of social welfare (Chandler and Chandler, 1979:192), has adopt- ed financial and service strategies in an attempt to move single mothers from welfare into the workforce. Both initiatives have met with disap- pointing results. This examination of Ontario's experience cannot produce ready answers nor immediate solutions to the dilemmas which work incentives pose in the administration of social assistance. However, it does clarify the issues which need to be addressed and suggests several directions for future policies.

First, the provision of wage supplements to social assistance recipients who enter full-time employment is not a viable work incentive strategy, although it may serve other objectives. The evidence from this examination of the WIN program suggests that it is simply not possible to provide supplements which are large enough to serve as an important factor in the decision of most single mothers to enter employment without creating serious inequities to the working poor. Not only would these anomalies be moral- ly and politically difficult to defend, but the economically rational behaviour of the working poor would imply giving up employment to become eligible for the supplement. A costly but more equitable alternative, a form of guaranteed income to encompass both social assistance recipients and the working poor, does not appear to be on the political horizon either. While the current levels of WIN supplements might be increased somewhat to improve the adequacy of earnings for a vulnerable group of single mothers, it cannot be pursued as an effective work incentive strategy.

In contrast, while the ESI program needs significant improvements, it should not necessarily be abandoned as a work incentive strategy. The development of employment services to move single mothers from welfare to work, however, must be based on a clear statement of what these programs expect to accomplish, and for whom. There is no evidence to suggest that the current ESI program in Ontario is particularly effective either in helping more single mothers to obtain employment, or in improving the employment they do obtain. The essential foundation of employment support programs must




contain: 1) a careful identification of the women they intend to serve (least employable/most employable, e.g.); 2) the development of objectives relevant to the specific group/s; and 3) an evaluation process capable of monitoring the extent to which these objectives are met. These are all neglected aspects of current programs.

The present emphasis in ESI on pre- employment services and education may be important for women without recent labour market experience, but programs which ensure skills for availabile jobs, must follow. As the Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toron- to (1986:114) has pointed out, many single mothers must earn a minimum of $8.00 per hour to compensate for the loss in benefits and costs incurred in employment. If employment services cannot open up to individuals whatever opportunities exist for relatively well-paid and secure jobs, work will not become a viable alternative to welfare.

Third, if governments wish to move single mothers from welfare to work, they must provide adequate funding to ensure that day care of an acceptable quality is available and affordable to the single mother. Neither WIN nor ESI confronted this problem squarely - that is, with a guarantee of earnings-related subsidies set at realistic levels for all those requiring child care. The current underfunding of child care ensures that only those single mothers with young children who can access the limited subsidized sector, or use unpaid or unusually inexpensive child care arrangements can consider the option of full-time employment.

It should also be recognized that these improvements, if implemented, will not produce wholesale reductions in the estimated 40-45 per cent of the province's single mothers who receive social assistance. Policies which improve the position of women in the Canadian labour market - pay equity, parental leave, improved labour standards legislation, and the expansion of unionization - will have a particular relevance for the low-income single mother. In addition, the general position of women in manpower programs must be improved (for a critique, see Abella, 1984).

The dilemmas confronting provincial governments in the administration of work incentive

programs are not easily resolved. The level of the wage supplement directed to social assistance recipients is constrained by the inequity imposed on the working poor. The impact of a service strategy designed to increase human capital will depend in part upon a labour market in which it can be invested. The most effective solution to the employment problems of single mothers on social assistance may lie outside the boundaries of provincial welfare administrators. However, the major cost of the failure of welfare solutions to employment problems is likely to be borne by the single mother and her children. As the legitimacy of their entitlement to income support is increasingly called into question, the terms and conditions of their benefits may well become more restrictive.

Notes

* The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments of Lorna Hurl and Ernie Lightman on an earlier draft of this article and to thank the anonymous reviewers whose constructive criticisms strengthened the final product; the weaknesses unfortunately remain the sole responsibility of the author.

1 Single men traditionally have faced the most stringent conditions attached to their eligibility for benefit. In 1980, all welfare recipients, except those single and considered employable, received a 10% increase in benefit rates. See 'Singles on welfare called victims of bias,' Globe and Mail, April 8, 1980, p. 5.

2 While the intention was to remove the need for full-time

employment, the incentive to work part-time was explicit in some provinces, and implicit in the low level of benefits provided in all provinces (Strong-Boag, 1979).

3 Depending upon the category of benefit, the purchasing power of social assistance recipients in Ontario declined from between 2-20% during the period 1975-1983 (Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto and the Ontario Social Development Council, 1983:13). However, from 1982-1985, the level of monthly benefits for a single parent with one child rose by 38.3%, an increase of 20.4% when adjusted for inflation (Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, 1986:7).

4 For a graphic comparison of the relationship between the

unemployment rate and the employable welfare caseload in Metropolitan Toronto between 1979-1982, see Social

Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto and the Ontario Social Development Council, 1983:69. See also, 'Metro welfare rolls swell by 5,000,' Globe and Mail, February 15, 1982, at p. 1 and 'Welfare crisis looms in wake of high unemployment,' Toronto Star, August 3, 1982, pp. Al, A13.

5 Between October, 1975 and September 1976 1,453 enquiries for the program were received, 905 applica-

134 Patricia Evans



tions were issued, and 439 were completed and returned. In September, 1976 there were 47 individuals receiving wage supplements (Municipality of Metropolitan Toron- to, 1976). Some modifications were made to the pro- gramme, but the take-up rate did not alter significantly ('Metro urged to raise low-income supplement,' Globe and Mail, May 20, 1976).

6 For recent examples of 'workfare,' see Leslie Bella (1983); 'Pick worms or lose your benefits official tells welfare recipients,' Toronto Star, April 6, 1983, p. 1.

7 In 1985, a WIN single mother with one child earning $6.00 an hour, 35 hours per week, paid taxes of $1410 and $412 in UIC and CPP deductions (Social Planning Council, 1986:112). In addition, 69% of WIN mothers who were Ontario Housing Corporation tenants faced rent increases which in some cases could exceed 100% - these increases were thought to be a partial explanation of the significant correlation found between failure on the WIN program and OHC residence (Social Policy Re- search Associates, 1982: 58,165).

8 Under Family Benefit regulations, the first $140 earned by a single mother is exempt from any reduction in benefit. Earnings between $141-$240 reduce the benefit by 50% for every dollar earned; earnings over $240 are deducted dollar for dollar.

9 Earnings for Table 2 were calculated on the basis of the 1980 average earnings of the WIN participants, reported in Legislature of Ontario, Debates, June 19, 1980, 3064. This amount was 42% of the average industrial earnings for Ontario (Statistics Canada, 1980). The baseline of 42% of the average Ontario industrial wage was then used to calculate earnings in other years, using Statistics Canada (1980), for the appropriate years.

10 Information obtained from Ontario Ministry of Commu- nity and Social Services, Adult Services Division, February, 1987.

11 A recent survey of Deputy Ministers revealed that only New Brunswick and the Northwest Territories did not report employment programs specifically directed to single mothers on social assistance (Evans and McIntyre, 1987).

12 As Lurie (1978) notes, work requirements often do not require work but demand that 'recipients engage in activities that will increase their likelihood of becoming employed.' They vary according to: 1) whom they apply; 2) the specific efforts required; 3) the nature of jobs that individuals might be required to accept; and 4) the penalties for non-compliance.

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Work Incentives and the Single Mother: Dilemmas of Reform

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