KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL

The Reform of EC Competition Law

New Challenges

Edited by

Ioannis Lianos

Ioannis Kokkoris

Wolters KluwerLaw & Business

AUSTIN BOSTON CHICAGO NEW YORK THE NETHERLANDS

Summary of Contents

ForewordThe Reform of EC Competition Law: The Challenge of anOptimal Enforcement System xxiiiValentine Korah

Preface xxix

List of Abbreviations xxxix

PartiInstitutional Aspects 1

Section AThe Design of an Optimal Competition Law Enforcement Regime 3

Chapter 1Welfare-Based Optimal Legal Standards: A Brief Review ofTheory and Applications 5Yannis S. Katsoulacos & David Ulph

Chapter 2Private Enforcement: Current Situation and Methods ofImprovement 17Denis Waelbroeck

Chapter 3An EU Competition Court: The Continuing Debate 33Christopher Bellamy

vi Summary of Contents

Section BConcurrent Proceedings in National and EC Competition Law . 53

Chapter 4Case Allocation in Antitrust and Collaborationbetween the National Competition Authorities andthe European Commission 55Alexandra Mikroulea

Chapter 5The Role of Arbitration in Competition Disputes 75Laurence Idot

Chapter 6Modernization and the Role of National Courts:Institutional Choices, Power Relations, and Substantive Implications 95Kosmas Boskovits

Section COptimal Sanctions and Their Limitations 119

Chapter 7Optimal Antitrust Enforcement: From Theory to Policy Options 121Frederic Jenny

Chapter 8Tools for an Optimal Enforcement of European Antitrust Law:Examples of Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines and onCommitment Proceedings. Is the European Commission Right? 139Eric David

Chapter 9Protecting Human Rights in the Context of EuropeanAntitrust Criminalization 161Peter Whelan

Part IIThe Challenges of Economic Evidence 183

Chapter 10'Judging' Economists: Economic Expertise in CompetitionLaw Litigation 185A European View

Ioannis Lianos

Summary of Contents vii

Part IIIVertical Aspects 323

Section ACompetition Law Policy in Markets with Non-conventionalPrice-Formation Mechanisms 325

Chapter 11Antitrust Issues in Dynamic Markets •, 327Federico Etro v _.

Chapter 12Antitrust Issues in Network Industries 343Nicholas Economides

Chapter 13EC Competition Law and Parallel Trade in Pharmaceutical Products 377Assimakis Komninos & Anthony Dawes

Section BAbuse of a Dominant Position 409

Chapter 14Exclusionary Abuses and the Justice of 'Competition on the Merits' 411Philip Marsden

Chapter 15The Implementation of an Effects-Based Approach underArticle 82: Principles and Application 419Penelope Papandropoulos

Section CMergers 435

Chapter 16Critical Analysis of the ECMR Reform 437Ioannis Kokkoris & Krisztian Katona

Chapter 17On the Economics of Non-horizontal Mergers 477Nikolaos Vettas & Frago Kourandi

Section DCartels 495

viii Summary of Contents

Chapter 18An Optimal Enforcement System against Cartels 497Maria Luisa Tierno Centella

Chapter 19The ECN and the Model Leniency Programme 505Kris Dekeyser & Fabio Polverino

Section EState Action and EC Competition Law . 519

Chapter 20The Community State Aid Action Plan and the Challenge ofDeveloping an Optimal Enforcement System 521Alena Zemplinerova

Chapter 21EU Competition Policy for Rescuing and Restructuring Companies 537Nikolaos E. Farantouris

Chapter 22State Aid Law Claims in Merger Control 559Alexandros Stratakis & Luca Crocco

List of Contributors 577

Table of Contents

ForewordThe Reform of EC Competition Law: The Challenge of anOptimal Enforcement System xxiiiValentine Korah

Preface xxix

List of Abbreviations xxxix

PartiInstitutional Aspects 1

Section AThe Design of an Optimal Competition Law Enforcement Regime 3

Chapter 1Welfare-Based Optimal Legal Standards: A Brief Review ofTheory and Applications 5Yannis S. Katsoulacos & David Ulph

I Introduction 5A Decision Errors of Legal Rules 7B Indirect (Deterrence) Effects of Legal Rules 7C Procedural Effects of Decision Rules 8

II Choosing Legal Standards: Some Limitations of ExistingAnalyses 8

III Choosing Legal Standards: A Welfare-Based Approach 9IV An Application to Refusals to License IPs and Microsoft 11V Concluding Remarks 14

Table of Contents

Chapter 2Private Enforcement: Current Situation and Methods ofImprovementDenis Waelbroeck

IIIIIIIVV

VIVII

VIIIIXX

IntroductionThe Basis for Damages Actions in EC LawThe Situation in the Member StatesDetermining the forumEstablishing the Claim v.A DiscoveryB Making Prior Decisions BindingFaultDamagesA Punitive DamagesB The Passing-on DefenceCollective ActionsCostsConclusion

17

1718202022232424252626283031

Chapter 3An EU Competition Court: The Continuing Debate 33Christopher Bellamy

I The Last Twenty Years: How We Got Here 34A Setting up of the CFI 34B The Increasing Workload 36C Changes to the Rules of Procedure 37D Structural Reform: Judicial Panels and the

European CST 39E The-House of Lords Report 2007 40

II Where Are We Now? 41III Where Should We Go from Here? 47

A The House of Lords Report 47B Specialized Chambers? 48

IV The Wider Picture 49A Increasing Workload, Delay, Dilution? 49B Judicial Review and Fundamental Rights 49C Modernization: No Coherent Appellate Structure 50

V Looking Ahead: A Tentative Conclusion 51

Section BConcurrent Proceedings in National and ECCompetition Law 53

Table of Contents xi

Chapter 4Case Allocation in Antitrust and Collaborationbetween the National Competition Authorities andthe European Commission 55Alexandra Mikroulea

I Introduction 55II Case Allocation within the Network 57

A Lack of Binding Allocation Rules 581 Centre of Gravity v 582 Best-Placed v. Well-Placed Authority 59

B Initial Allocation Period 60C Exchange of Information 61

HI Conflicts of Jurisdiction under the AllocationSystem 62A Positive and Negative Conflicts 62B Unpredictability of Penalties 64

IV Procedural Rights of the Parties 64A The Right to a Fair Hearing 65B The Right to a Fair Administrative Procedure 66C The Right to a Fair Trial 67

1 Review of Article 11, Paragraph 6 Decisions 672 Review of Article 13 Decisions 683 Review of Other Decisions 68

D Access to the File 69E Legal Representation and the Protection of the Confidentiality

of Lawyer-Client Communications 69F The Protection Against Self-Incrimination 71G The Principle of 'ne bis in idem' 72

V Conclusion 72

Chapter 5The Role of Arbitration in Competition Disputes 75Laurence Idot

I Introduction 75II Competition between the Arbitrator and the

National Judge 78A Evolution in Law 78

1 Stability of the Conditions Required by NationalArbitration Law 78

2 Amendment of the Limits Imposed byCompetition Law 79

xii Table of Contents

B Evolution in Practice 811 Limitation of Specialized Authorities' Intervention 812 The Contracting Parties' Wariness Towards Ordinary

National Courts 83III The Organization of Relationships between the Arbitrator

and Other 'Competition Authorities' 84A Cooperation Relationships 85

1 Autonomous Proceedings 852 Successive and Parallel Proceedings 87

B Scrutiny Relationships v _.. 881 Ignorance of Competition Law 892 Erroneous Application of Competition Law 91

IV Conclusions 94

Chapter 6Modernization and the Role of National Courts:Institutional Choices, Power Relations, and SubstantiveImplications 95Kosmas Boskovits

I Introduction 95II Decentralization Versus Uniform Application: A Delicate

Trade-off 96A The Shift to a Decentralized System and Its Counterbalances 97B The Impact on Institutional and Procedural Autonomy 102

III The Relationship between Competition Authorities and NationalCourts: The Mixing of Roles 106

IV The Substantive Impact: The Standards of Application ofArticle 81 EC 112

V Conclusion 116

Section COptimal Sanctions and Their Limitations 119

Chapter 7Optimal Antitrust Enforcement: From Theoryto Policy Options 121Frederic Jenny

I Introduction 121II The Economic Model of Law Enforcement 123III Limitations of the Model 127IV Insights from the Model 128V Conclusion 136

Table of Contents xiii

Chapter 8Tools for an Optimal Enforcement of European Antitrust Law:Examples of Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines and onCommitment Proceedings. Is the European Commission Right? 139Eric David

I Introduction 139II Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant to

Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No. 1/2003 142A The Need for Transparency Countered by the Retention of

Wide Discretion 1421 The Need for Transparency 1422 The Commission's Intention to Strengthen Its Discretion 1433 The CFI and The ECJ's Position: Discretion v.

Consistent Policy 144B Uncertainties Resulting from the 2006 Guidelines 148

1 Methodology to Set the Fines 1482 The Uncertainties Surrounding the Methodology of

the 2006 Guidelines and Its Application 149a Uncertainty Regarding Whether Application of

the Methodology of the 2006 Guidelines isAppropriate 149

b Uncertainties Surrounding the MethodologySet Down by the 2006 Guidelines 150

III The Commission's Commitment Proceedings Policy 154A The Commitment Proceedings Before the Commission:

Theoretical Aspects 1541 The Commitment Proceedings within the System of

Community Proceedings 1542 The Inherent Risks in the Commitment Proceedings 155

B The Commission's Jurisprudence 157IV Conclusion - 159

Chapter 9Protecting Human Rights in the Context of EuropeanAntitrust Criminalization 161Peter Whelan

I Introduction 161A Background 161B Aims and Layout 162

II The Normative Position of Human Rights in the Context ofEuropean Antitrust Criminalization 163A Accommodating Human Rights within a Theoretical

Model of Antitrust Criminalization 163

xiv Table of Contents

B Deterrence as an Objective of Criminalization 164C Acknowledging a 'Plurality' of Values 164D A Compromise Model 165

III The Principle of Legality and its Effect on the Substance ofCriminal Antitrust Laws 166A The Concept of Legality 166B 'Sleeping giants' and Legality 167C Legal Certainty in Definition 168

IV Due Process and European Antitrust Criminalization 170A Due Process as a European Right v . 170B Strengthening of Procedural Rights 171

1 Standard of Proof 1712 Right against Self-incrimination 1723 Consequences of Strengthening Rights 173

C Division of Functions 175D Exchange of Information 177E Ne Bis in Idem 179

V Conclusion 180

Part IIThe Challenges of Economic Evidence 183

Chapter 10'Judging' Economists: Economic Expertise in CompetitionLaw Litigation 185A European View

Ioannis Lianos

I Introduction 185II Expert Evidence in the Courtroom: Origins and Problems 190

A The Origins of Expertise: Informational Asymmetry andEpistemic Competence 191

B Science, Objectivity, and the Specific Nature of EconomicExpertise 2001 The Evolution of Acceptable Methods of Observation as

a Limit to the Demarcation Criterion of Empiricism 2032 The Possibility of Deductive Science as a Criticism to the

Demarcation Criterion of Induction 2063 The Elusive Demarcation Criterion of Facts-Based

Reasoning Versus Theory/Abstract Reasoning 2124 Scientific Practice as a Limit to the Demarcation

Criterion of Scientific Consensus 2175 Pragmatism as a Limit to the Demarcation Criterion of

Objectivity 224

Table of Contents xv

C The Development of an Economic Science for Litigation:Implications for the Evolution of Research in AntitrustEconomics 227

III Economic Expertise in Competition Law: Scope and Implications 234A The Legal Relevance of Economic Expertise in EC

Competition Law - 234B The Many Faces of Economic Evidence in Competition Law 237

1 Economic 'Facts' 2382 Economic Transplants 2393 Economic Authority v 2434 Economic 'Laws' 246

IV Points of Entry of Economic Expertise in the Courtroom:A Comparative Institutional Analysis 247A Expert Witnesses 248B Court-Appointed Experts 254C Hybrid Options 261

1 Assessors and Special Juries 2612 Amicus curiae or Advice from the Competition

Authorities 2623 Internal Economic Expertise (Clerks, Research, and

Documentation Units in Courts Formed by Economists) 2624 Specialized or Trans-Disciplinary Courts 263

V Substantive Assessment of Economic Expertise 263A Admissibility of Economic Expertise: The Exclusionary

Ethos 2651 The Emergence of the Gatekeeping Role of the Judge 2652 The Application of the Daubert Rules in Competition

Law Litigation 2713 A Critical Assessment of the Daubert Test 274

B Assessment and Sufficiency of Economic Expertise: TheDiscursive Ethos 2871 Attaching Weight to Economic Evidence as a Filter

for a More Extensive Competition Law Assessment 288a The Development of Procedures Requiring the

Weighing of Economic Evidence: Summary Judgmentsand the Expansion of the Plausible Economics Inquiry 288

b How to Determine the Evidential Weight of EconomicEvidence? 293

2 The Determination of the Standard of Proof 304a A Probabilistic Account of Standards of Proof

(Persuasion) for Economic Evidence 305b Relative Plausibility Theory and Standards of Proof

(Persuasion) 315VI Conclusion 319

xvi Table of Contents

Part IIIVertical Aspects 323

Section ACompetition Law Policy in Markets with Non-conventionalPrice-Formation Mechanisms 325

Chapter 11Antitrust Issues in Dynamic Markets 327Federico Etro \

I Introduction 327II Endogenous Market Structures and Competition Policy 328III Toward a Reform of Antitrust Policy for Dynamic Markets 331IV Predatory Pricing 332V Intellectual Property Rights Policy 334VI An Application: The Dynamic Market for Online Advertising 337VII Conclusions 341

Chapter 12Antitrust Issues in Network Industries 343Nicholas Economides

I Introduction 343II The Logic of Competition Law in the United States and the

European Union 344III Markets with Network Effects 345

A Sources of Network Effects and the Reversal of the Lawof Demand 345

B Critical Mass , 351IV Features of Markets with Network Effects 351

A Ability to Charge Prices on Both Sides of a Network 351B Network Effects may or may not be Internalized 352C Fast Network Expansion 353D Perfect Competition is Inefficient 353E Incompatibility as a Strategic Weapon 354F Inequality of Market Shares and Profits 357G Monopoly may Maximize Total Surplus 361H In Networks, Market Inequality can Exist without

Anti-competitive Acts 361I In Network Industries, Free Entry Does Not Lead to Perfect

Competition 362J Imposing an Egalitarian Market Structure Is Likely to be

Counterproductive 362K Nature of Competition is Different in Network Industries 363L Path-Dependence 363

Table of Contents xvii

V Competition Policy Issues in Network Industries 364A Interconnection Issues in One-Sided Bottlenecks 364B Interconnection Issues in Two-Sided Bottlenecks 367C Market Power Creation Specific to Networks:

The Importance of Technical Standards 369D Vertical Integration and Vertical Control Issues in Network

Industries 371E Dynamic Efficiency Issues 372F Innovation Issues 372G Criteria to Be Used for Antitrust Intervention in Network

Industries 372H Criteria to Be Used for Remedies 373

VI Concluding Remarks 375

Chapter 13EC Competition Law and Parallel Trade in Pharmaceutical Products 377Assimakis Komninos & Anthony Dawes

I Introduction 377II The Factual Background: The Greek Example 381III The Specific Legal and Economic Context of the

Pharmaceutical Sector Sets it Apart from Other Industries 383A State Regulation and Public Service Obligations 383B The Benefits of Parallel Trade cannot be Presumed to

Accrue to Customers and End Consumers 386IV The GSK Cases 389

A Article 81 EC 389B Article 82 EC 393

V Comment " 398A Article 81 EC , 398B Article 82 EC 403

1 The Definition of the Relevant Market and Dominance 4032 Abuse 404

VI Conclusion 408

Section BAbuse of a Dominant Position 409

Chapter 14Exclusionary Abuses and the Justice of 'Competition on the Merits' 411Philip Marsden

I Introduction 411II The Exquisite Problem 412III The Different Enforcement Approaches 414IV Some Suggestions Based on Merit and Justice 416

xviii Table of Contents

Chapter 15The Implementation of an Effects-Based Approach underArticle 82: Principles and Application 419Penelope Papandropoulos

III

in

IVVVIVII

IntroductionDifferent Approaches to Designing Rules for the Analysis ofExclusionary ConductAn Effects-Based Approach to Analyse Unilateral Conduct byDominant Firms vPredation: The American Airlines CaseInput ForeclosureRebatesConclusion

Section CMergers

419

420

424426429430433

435

Chapter 16Critical Analysis of the ECMR Reform 437Ioannis Kokkoris & Krisztian Katona

III

III

IVV

IntroductionJurisdictional ReformA Member State Referrals to the CommissionB Referrals to Member StatesC Article 9 ECMR, Post-Notification Referrals upon

Request by Member StatesD Pre-Notification Referrals upon Request by the

Merging PartiesE Company Requests for Pre-Notification Referral to the

CommissionProcedural ReformA Pre-Notification ConsultationsB State of Play and Triangular MeetingsC Discussion of RemediesD Other Procedural InnovationsSubstantive ReformCase Law AnalysisA Oracle/PeopleSoft

1 Analysis of the Case2 A Gap Case?

B Sony/BMG1 Analysis of the Case2 A Gap Case?

437438439440

441

442

443445445446447448448452452452457463463467

Table of Contents xix

VI Market Structure Conducive to 'Gap' Cases 472VII Conclusion 474Annex 1 475

Chapter 17On the Economics of Non-horizontal Mergers 477Nikolaos Vettas & Frago Kourandi

I Introduction 477II Vertically-Related Firms and Markets v . 480

A Vertical Chains 480B Pre- and Post-Chicago Views 481

III Main Economic Effects in Vertical Structures 482A Double Marginalization: The Basic Vertical Externality and

Solutions 482B Equilibrium Pricing Incentives with Strategic Pricing 484C Quality and Specific Investments 487D Dynamics 489E General Lessons from the Theoretical and Empirical Analyses 490

IV Non-horizontal and Non-vertical Cases 491V Economic Analysis Behind Non-horizontal Merger Guidelines 491VI The Possible Roles of the Non-horizontal Merger Guidelines 493VII Conclusion 494

Section DCartels 495

Chapter 18An Optimal Enforcement System against Cartels 497Maria Luisa Tierno Centella

I What is Special About Cartels? 497II What is Special About the Enforcement of Cartel Rules? 498III Detecting and Proving Secret Cartels 499IV Timely Punishment: Sanctions 502V Is There Such a Thing as an Optimal System to Enforce

the Cartel Prohibition? 503

Chapter 19The ECN and the Model Leniency Programme 505Kris Dekeyser & Fabio Polverino

I Introduction: Antitrust Enforcement in the Pre-modernization Era 505II The European Competition Network and Its Functioning 506

A An Integrated and Flexible Enforcement System 507B Exchange of Information 508

xx Table of Contents

C Work Sharing 509D Coherent Application of Antitrust Rules 510E Achievements of the ECN Network 511

III The Model Leniency Programme 512A The Implications of ECN Cooperation for National

Leniency Programs 512B Remedies Adopted in the Network Notice 513C The Adoption of the Model Leniency Programme 514D The Principles of Leniency Harmonization 515E The Summary Application System k 515F The Results of the MLP " "" 516

IV Conclusion 517

Section EState Action and EC Competition Law 519

Chapter 20The Community State Aid Action Plan and the Challenge ofDeveloping an Optimal Enforcement System 521Alena Zemplinerova

I Introduction 521II Enforcement of EU State Aid Control 523

A Less and Better Targeted State Aid 523B Effective Procedures, Better Enforcement, Higher

Predictability and Transparency 525C Shared Responsibility between the Commission and the

Member States 526D Greater Emphasis on Economic Analysis 527

III State Aid Under the EU Treaty 528A Transfer of State Resources 528B Economic Advantage 529C Selectivity 530D Effects on Trade Between Member States 530

IV Assessment of State Aid Compatibility with the EU Market 531A Negative Effects of State Aid 532B Positive Effects of State Aid 533

V Concluding Remarks 535

Chapter 21EU Competition Policy for Rescuing and Restructuring Companies 537Nikolaos E. Farantouris

I Introduction 537II Meaning of 'a Firm in Difficulty' 540III Rescue or Restructuring? 542

Table of Contents xxi

IV Compatibility with the Common Market 544A Application of Article 87(3) EC 544B Rescue Aid 546C Restructuring Aid 549

1 Restoration of Long-term Viability 5502 Avoidance of Undue Distortions of Competition 5513 Real Contribution of the Aid Beneficiary 5524 Full Implementation of Restructuring Plan 553

D The 'One Time, Last Time' Principle 554V Final Remarks I . 555

Chapter 22State Aid Law Claims in Merger Control 559Alexandros Stratakis & Luca Crocco

I Introduction 559II EC Case-Law 560

A The Matra Doctrine: Origins and Recent Developments 560B The RJB Mining Case: The Matra Doctrine in a Merger

Control Context 563C The BaByliss Judgment: A Step Back from RJB Mining! 566

III Commission Practice Post-/?Jfi Mining 568A RAG II 568B The Hellenic Shipyard Cases 569C Metronet/lnfraco 570D Deutsche Post/DHL(II) and Deutsche Post/Exel 571E Iberdrola/Scottish Power 573F ENEL/EMS 573

IV Concluding Remarks 574

List of Contributors 577