l I I

,

,

,

,

Introduction

In order to SC t the stage for this study of Thomas Aquinas's metaphysical thought, 1 would like 10 recall briefly the esSt'mial moments of his life and career. He was born:H his family's castle in Roccasecca, h aly in 122411225. I-I c. received his c!cmclHary education at the Benedictine abbey of Monte Cass ino, located only a

few miles from his fiunily horne. In 12J9 he lx:gan the $Iudy o f the liberal am :u

the newly founded Studium gnlf'rtllr J.t Naples and remained there until about 1244.

II was undoubtcdly there that he received his first formal instruction in philosophy, and it was also there that in 1144 he joined the recently esrablishcd Dominican O rder. This step did not fit in wiTh his filtllily's plans for him. A careeT wilh the more prestigious Benedictine Order would have been much more ro their liking.

$0 Strong was his fami ly's resistance to Thomas's entering the Dominican Ordet that, upon learning that the Dominicans were sending him to Paris for further

his mother arranged 10 have him intercepted by his brother (o r brothers)

and some other soldiers in the Emperor's service and detained at the family castle for a year or more. hnally. however. since his resolve remain ed unb roken. he was permiHcd to rejoin his Domin ica n confreres and made his way to Paris in t:Z.45. '

At Paris he first came into contact with Albert the Creat during the period t:Z.45-

1248, and in 11.48 he accompanied Alben [Q Cologne in order to co ntinue h is theo-logical formation there. In Il.jl. he was scnt hack to l'aris to begin working for the

highest degree offered by the University there, that of Magister in Theology, and pu rsued the rigorous academic progra m required for this until 1256. Not least

I, On J.A, Friar ThonulJ d"Aq"in". His Lift. TIJo"giJl ami Wi r*. 1J rev. ni. (Wa.>h iu!;lOn, D,C.. I,}S,). 11,,= more by Torrell./nitiatiDII a winl Tht!l"tJs d'AIl";" Sa /'fI"fOlU" rI SO" ",""If" (Frioourg. 199'). English StUnt ThomnJ AquimlS. VoluIll" I. TlK Prrnln ami His U''t>rk D.C., ' 996). the daring of

v>r;ous wrirings I will follow rhose in srudy Qlhnwisc: ;ndicm"(l, On rhis urly p

xiv Introduction

among his duties during this period was his responsibili ty 10 comment on the &,,-tnlcel of Peler ,he Lombard , and this resuhed in the eventual publication of his first major cheologic21 writing, his Commentary Oil the &mmw. By 1256 he had completed Ihe rcquiremellls for becoming a MaS[t~r of T heology and in Ihe spring

of Ih31 year delivered his inaugural lectUre as a Regenl MaSler. However, owing 10 Ihe hostili ty of a num ber of secular Masters in the theology faculty aga in.~1 the twO

recently founded mendicant orders, the Franciscans and Ihe Dominicans, neither

Thomas fl or his Franciscan counterpart , Bo naventure, was fo rmally admil1ed imo

the assembly of Masters until August Ill 7. They had, howc\'er, been lecturi ng as

Masters in (heir respecti\'e religious houses. During this period of preparation at

Paris (12-52-12j6) Thomas also produeed (wo important philosophical (realises, De principiis naturae and De n lte n tHtntia. !

l:rom 12j6 until 1259 Thomas carried OUI the li.lllcrions of a Master (Professo r) of Theology at the Un iversity of Paris. These duties included cond ucting fo rmal

disputed questions (result ing in his Quamio"N diIpllfatat Dt writau) and quodlib-etal d isputations (where any appropriate question could be raised by any member in the audience, and would ultimately have 10 be answered by the presiding Mas-ter). His Quodlibets 7-11 and his Com mentary on the De Tnnirate of Boethius resulted fro m this period.'

Thomas returned 10 Italy in 1259 and ser.ed there at various Dominican ho uses of study as ucturcr or as Regen! Masrcr, continuing to lcach and 10 wrile at a rapid pace. Du ri ng Ihis period he co mpleted his Commentary on the De anima, thereby commencing a series of illlensive studies of AriSlOtie which would evemu ally rt'Suh in panial or IOtal commentaries 0 11 twelve works by the Siagiri te. He completed his Summll COl/ fra Gt1Itila (12.59-1265) and the Prima Parr of the Summa dltologillt (1266-1268). Also dating from Ihis period are his Exposition on tbt DilJine Namer(of P:reudo-D ionysius), DiJPured Qut$liom on tIlt POUHr olGod (De pountia), Disputed Qumiom on Spiritttlll CrMtll"S, Displlted QUNtiom 011 till! Soul, and many olher works of a theological or religious nature."

in laIC 12.68 o r early 12.69 he returned to Paris to resume his fun ction there as Regent Master of T heology a1 the Uni versity. Various controversies dcmanded his

attention during this period. Certain more conservati\'e theologians, heavily in-

l. On Thomas's rime al Puis (1l"U- 1l -4S) IoC":C" Wc-ishd pL pp. S6--4I ; Torrell, pp. 1?-4. On rhe p"rioo at Cologn" s Torrd\. pp. 4 - 35.0" Thomas'! hu t ruching ye-

Introducti on xv

sp ired by the md idon of 51. August ine (ahhough also fumiliar wit h ArislOtle's thought). were challenging the mOle Aristotelian versiOIl of C hristian wisdom

Thomas had becn developing. To cite but one hotly contested issue, against the

prevai ling view defended by this group Thoma.~ maintained, as he had th roughout

his caretr, that unaided human reason had not proved that the world began 10 be

and , indeed , could nOt proVt th is poinl. Finally, writing in 11.70 in his Drnrumilt1tf

mundi, he went so fa r as to hold that an etcrnally created world is possible. Like all of his C hristian contemporaries. of course, he believed on the grounds of r{'velation

that the world began 10 be, but for him this was and could be only a mailer of religious belief.'

During the 12605 and earl y 11.705 a radical form of Aristotelian ism was bei ng

developed by certain Masters in the Faculty of ArtS ar Paris (by now really a facu lty of philosophy) , such as Siger of Brabant. Iloe.thius of Dacia, and ot hers. Ofren if not accu rately referred 10 as Lat in Averroi.~m , this movement was marh-d by the

tot"J.1 dedication of irs leaders 10 the pursui t of the purely philosophical life. At least

in some instances, ini tially they were not particularly concerned if some of their philosophical conclusions happened 10 be at odds with orthodox Christian belief. So nue was this that in DeI" Studirs 7 (977). PI'. 16,)- 201, '51'. pp. 179-85.

xvi lmrod uclion

sible. i.e., aile receiving and spiritual intellect for all human beings. a separaIe and

immaterial substance, which is ultimately responsible for the thin king that each

one of us apparently does. Un like the defense of one separate agent or abmact ing intellect for the human race, a view espoused no t only by Siger but by various

perfectly orthodox thinkers of the time. this Averroisric position undercut the pos-sib ility of individual immortal ity of the human sou l and hence of personal reward

or punishment in the life to come. In 1270 Thomas directed a well-crafted treatise against this position. his D r: unitalt' imrlltCtllJ COntr4 Avrrroi$laJ. In this work

Thomas cha llenged Siget's interpretation bOlh on histOrical grounds (it was not

the correct reading of Aristode's Dr 4I1ima), and on philosophical grounds (i t was not good philosophy). This tightly reasoned work is a lasting tcstimony to Thom-

as's phi losophical skill and power.1 On sti ll another front, the mendicants, including both Franci5Cans and Domini-

cans. were again under atlack by certain secular Masters in Theology at Paris. In-

deed, the very viabili ty of the mendicant way of life was being challenged. Against these dissenting vo ices Thomas d irect

In[rod ucrion XV II

obligations were concerned, he was a teacher, a professor of theology. And if his writ ings may be divided into various categories, the majority of them may be de-scribed as theological or religious rather than as purely philosoph ical in character. In shorf, T homas Aquinas was a profess ional theologian. !!

This poi nt has been especially em phasil.ed by various twentieth-century iOleT-preters of his thought. owing in no small measu re to the gradually evolving views developed by Etienne Gilson concerning what he called ~Christ ian Phi losophy" and his application of the same to Thomas's ph ilosophical thought. Indeed, Gil-son's position concerning th is eventually went beyond his ead ier claim lhat we should nOt study Aquinas's ph ilosophy as a purt ph ilosophy but as a Christia n Philosophy. and thereby take into accou nt certain positive influences titat it re-ceived from Thomas's religious faith. I n later writings Gilso n emphasized tht point that Thomas's original philosoph ical thought is contained in his theological wri t-ings, not in his philosophical opuscula and cornmtntar ies. Because it is found in theological writings. it has been transformed into theology and fa lls under the for-mal object of theology. Hence we should srudy it from that perspectivt, i.e., as tran$formed into lheology, and should not aHempt to eXlract il from its theological home so as to prest'11I it as a pure philosophy By doing this we will thereby gai n knowledge of all the ph ilosophy his theo logy contains.1:

On other occasions I have examined and critically eVwphy imo Thornis!ic lheulogy sec 1mrmIS. p. lh. 11 . 6; also; " ... lh~ n3lUle of the doctrine in

Introduction XVlll

writings, a point to which I shall return below. Second , Thomas has taken the trouble of explaining in considerable detail his views concerning the distinction

bcno.'ccn philosophy and theology. the different kinds of theoretical philosophy, the

distinctive subject of meraphysics, the methodology to be used in metaphysical thinking. and the difference between following lhe philosophical order and follow-ing the theological order. Si nce all of these dements arc present in his wrilings. they constitute a standing invitation for today's historian of philosophy to take Thomas at his word and to draw upon them in reconstructing his meraphysical though!. h is this that I shall anempt to do ill th is book. I )

To return to the point mentioned above. let me now add a word about the

di fferent kinds of writings Thomas has left fo r us. While they m.ay be grouped or divided in various ways, I would propose the following in the interests of simplicity: (,) ph ilosophical commentaries (twelve commentaries on Aristotle and one on the Liba d~ cnusu); (1) commentaries on sacred scriprure; CJ) theological commentaries (on the D~ Trinilnuand lhe D~ H~bdomadibmof BoethiU5, on the D~dilJinis "omi~ nibu$ of Psclldo-Oionysius. and on the Smlmm of Pe('er Lombard- of these only two are commentaries in the strict sense, i.e., on the D~ H~bdomadibUJ and on the D~ divilliJ nomil/ibus; the other tWO offer brief expositions of the texts of Boethius and ofreter and use them as occasions for much fuller and highly personal disquisi-tions by Thomas himsclf); (4) works of theological synthesis (Summa contra Gm~ liln, Summa tI)(ologia~, Compmdillm the%gia!', and if one prefers to include it here, the Commentary on the Sm u ncrJ listed above); (5) Dispured Questions and Quodlibetal Questions (resulting from Thomas's functions as a professor of theol-ogy); (6) theologic.tl opuscula; (7) philosophical opuscula (Dr mu rr rsst:nria, Dr principiis narurar, D~ unirau i"u/l~ctm, Dr luumitau ml/1IIIi, D~ IUbsranriis upa-raris [the first sixteen chapters, although the second and unfini shed part (ce. 17-19) considers sepa rat e: substances in the light of C.atholic teaching and is therefore theo-logical !). H

IJ. FOI my critique of Gilson's position sec MrtaphYlknl TlNmn. pp. ll- j}. Sa pp. 2}- 14 for a qualifitd " 'ay in which I would accept dQUibing ~ philmophy such as Thomu's as Christian ,~ Le., in Ihe moment of discovery bur no! in die momcll1 of proof. Also s my ~The l'ouibi l;ly of 3 ChriS1i~n Ph ito!>Ophy: A Thomis!ie Perspective, ' Faith mltl Phi/DWPhy I (1984). PI" 172-9r 3 good rdume of his long-running disagreement with Gi lwn on thi.\ i!Ue see Van Sto:..:nbcrghen, "Etienne Gilwn, historien de 13 pens mwic\'alc ,- Rm~r pbiw.wphiqur dr u,ulJtlin n (t979). tsp. PI" 49'- S05 For a more m :enl criliquc .stt J. Acmen. Medin .. ! Phik>wplry and the Tramundrnl/lu. TIN u~ DjT/H)>nm Aquinm (Ltidcn. 1996), PI" , - 10. fur another vt'uion of the tendency to theol-ogi~m in iUlerplcl ing Aquinas's philosophicallhoughl set: M. Jordan. "Theology and Pb il()SOphy," in TIN umbridsr Companion ro Aquinas, N. Kret"lmann and E. Stump, td5. (Cambridge. 1991), PI' Zjl- SI.

14. This i~ fundamema lly thc same class ifiCliion proposed by Van Ste.:nbcrghen in his u. pbir-, phir au XIII, siirk. PI'. 180- 8), alt hough 1 am including under !heologiClI opusc:ula wri lings he lim under .pologelical opuscula, 0puKub for the defense: of Ihc ,\iendica nu. opuscula on $pi ritu~ 1iry, and !ihlrgiCliI wririn~, !eilers, and 5(;rmon~ . The Gualog in Torrell. preparC

",

In t roduc t ion .

m

(n considering possible sources which we may use in Tcrovering Thomas's meta-

physical thought, IV .. O of these categor ie..~ of writings, the philosophical comlllemar-

ies and the phi losophical opuscuJa, stand out si nce both are clearly philosophicaL This notwit hstand ing, Gi lson lended 10 min imize their importance for any effon

to discoVt'r Thomas's personal metaphysical thought. According to Gilson, [he

philosophical opuscula are not all that significam as sources for Aqu inas's personal metaphysical thinking, and the commentaries on Aristotle :lre really only exercises

by ThorTlru; in the hislOry of philosophy; in them he writes as the commentator or

the expositor, nor as an original phil05opher. l ~

In my view the philosoph ical opuscula are extremely important sources for our knowledge of Thomas's personal and original phi losophical positions. This will become dear below from my citalions from them-especially fro m the De nltl' l't l'1semia. the Dr principiis "atl/rar, and the Dr mbslIIlltiis uparatis-in scHing forth

some of his mosl fundamental metaphysical positions. I have already referred 10 the philosophical sign ificance of Thomas's Dr unildll' imr fLrctllS contTlf AVrrro;staJ

bmh as a cont ribution to the study of ArislOtle's thoughts on the matter, and as a personal philosophical critique of Siger's views. And for final clarificat ion of his views o n the possibiliry of:1I1 eternally created world, I have found his Dr al'urni-((fU mu"di 10 be of till': urnlOSt importance. \~

As regards the sign ificance of Thomas's commcmaries o n AristOtle and Ihe Libn dr r(1UJis, it wou l{j be a very strange procedure for us 10 ignore or minimize their importance for our understanding of his perso nal phi losophical views on a priori grounds. After aI! , he did devote a considerable amount of time and energy to prepari ng them. This is especially nOleworthy since it was nOI one of his rcrognizcd dUlies as a professional theologian to wri te extended lileral commentaries on Aris-

totle's works. ' 7

(~ ) Commcmario on Ariswdc; (s) Olhel Com,"c1\l~';ClO; (6) Polemical Wriliflg~; (7) T,ca(isc5; (8) Lew:rs and Req~QI5 (or F..xpt"11 Opinion; (9) Li rurgi(al Workl. &rn1On5, f'r.l)crs. Sec pp. BO- W.

15 5 Gilson. Thr O,,ist;"n f'J,il()wphy fllSt. Thflmas Aqu;nfls (New yo,k, 1956), p. 8. Stt p. H: "There i~ ~ s.crio of w(lrks in which SI. Thoma.< "sed the philosophicrl method-Ih .. Commcnruio on Arislotlc and a small nurnber of OpUS{uia. But c~c h opusrulum gi,'cs but a rr.lgmelll or his (hough(, ~nd (he cornrn",nr~ rio on ArinOilc ... only 1(1 u~ SUS!":C( impcrflly wh~1 might h~vr Ott" [he namre of ~ Summa of !1lOmi' lic phi!oSQphy organ;1-td by 51. Thollla.< him~lf ... : Cf. E/rmrms q/Ch.;,,;an l'J,ifo,ophy. p. IS!, n. 6; T}" /'biwwpl". and Tbrq/qgy. PI" 110- 11: '"S;a.inl Thom~s ;~ only a com menUior in his "".ili nS$ On AriswLle. f

xx Introd uction

Even 50, as I have nared on another ocC'.v;ion, I do th ink that considerable care must be exercised when we consult them as sources for Thomas's personal philo-sophical thinking. Some twentieth-century interpreters seem to assume th.u almost any statement made by Thomas in these works should be taken as an exp~ssion of his personal thought . G ilson, at the other extreme, would reduce them to mere

exercises in and contributions 10 the history of philosophy. The truth seems to

fall somewhere in between. One cannot immedia tely assume that every position exprc:ssed in such a commentary is merely Thomas's understanding of the text on

which he is commenti ng. On many occasions such expositions also seem to repre-

sent posi tions Thomas himself holds. On other occasions T homas's discussion goes beyond the thought of ,he rext on which he is commenting, and he indie-oues as much to us. However, when he docs not clearly spcUlhis out fo r us in the commen-

tary itself, we need some kind of control to determine whether Thomas is accepting as his own a panicular position he is selling forth in his commentary, or whether

he is merely expressing his understanding of the text on which he is commenring. Frequently enough such a control is at hand, either in the Proocmium to a panicu-

lar commentary irsetf. where he is more likely to speak in his own name, or in other writings where he deals with the same topic and is clearly expressi ng his own views. Whcn lhe views he presents in more independent writings agree with (hose he

exposes in a panicular commentary on Ari5{Olle, we may assume [hat he accepts {he Iauer as his own position as well. When there is disagreement bcrv.eeil lhe rwo

discussions, we should be very hesil"ant in assigning such a posi tion from one of his commentaries to Thomas himself, unless Ihere is also some evidence poimi ng to change or development in h is thinking on that poi nt. lt

As fo r our right to draw upon writings which fall under the other categories we have distinguished 3bove, all of which appear 10 be theological in some sellse, CC f -

differrm ~iew$ concern ing wh~ tMr and !() W~~t ex tent we m~y use t~m in r('CQMtrucring ThomU'$ pel"lOn~1 thoughl > "orr~ll , I)P. lJ7- )!;I. H~ himself e.mpha~iWi the point that in writing them Thomas whhfli to dCl('rmine the mind of AriSl()tlc in the teX(~ on which he commentS, but Ihalthis des ire 10 disco\'("r whal Arinod~ "wi$hed 10 Sly al limes leads Thomas 10 go beyond the textS them seh-es in his ~arch for truth. A1 SQ cf. J. Doig. AfJui"tn 0" MntlrhFio: A hisumil1-dom'i"tll study 0/ l~ Commtnla'J on rhr MnapbJIio (The Hague. 1971). pp. ix- xiv.

18. S my M~(tlpryi(aI7Mmn, p. 17. r will apply th is mcthod in Ch. II below when de~ling with T hom:l.!'S views on f4'pa rtll io and Ihe discovery of Ihe subj

inlroducrion xx,

tai n distinctions are in ord('r. Van Stel:nberghen has suggested that al times we find in such writings self-colHained philosophical discussions inserted as such into a theological work.'Y For instance, in Chapters I and II below we shaH IUrn to a number of questions and articles frOIll T homas's Commentary on Boethius's Dr Tri"itau where he presents his views on the d i\,isio ns, subj~ts, distinct ive knowing procedures. and mcrhodologies of the three theoretical sciences, physics. mathe,

matics, and metaphysics. Discussions such as these may and should be used as important sources for reco\'cring his metaphysical though t. Or again, we mar find a running series of philosophical discussions joi ned together as succeed ing ques-tions or chapters in works such as the Summa rhrologi(u (see [he so-cal led Treatises on God, or on Man , or on Law) or the Summll contra Gmtiln (St.'(' Ihe reliance on argu ments based on natu ral reason throughout Bks I-TIl ). o r in the earlier part of the Compt!fldium tlJroll)giar. We may easily remove such d iscussions from the gen-eral theological contex t of lhe writings in which they appear and from the refer-ences to Scripture and the Fat hers con tained in some of their lIidrtltTS or rrd (omra!; and use them as imporr:lIlt sources in reconstructi ng Thomas's metaphysical thought ,lo

O n still other occasions we will find similar self-contai ned ph ilosophi cal discus-sions proposed as individual questions within Disputcd Q uestions (sec, for in-stance, the discussion of trut h and the associated derivation of the transcendentals in D~ l!rrilaU, II {, a. t} o r in certa in particular questions within his various Quodli-bets. These 100 may easily be removed fro m their general theological settings and uS(:d as im portant expressions of Thomas's personal thought. Finally. on stil! ot her occasions we will find Thomas using philosophical reasoning as an instrUlll cnt in working out a strictly theological argumen t. In such cases I wou ld agree with Gil-son that the particular ph ilosophical reaso ning has here become theo.logical. None-theless. we may still exam ine this underlying philosoph ical or metaphysical reason-ing in order to determine what particular philosoph ical choice o r choices Thomas has made in dc\'cloping this particular theological argumentation . Because he him-self [faces diversity in theologies 10 diversity in their underlying philosophies, we may, if we make approp riate distinclions, use even such texts as add itional sources

for our effort 10 rC1:o\'er his meraphysicalthought. 11

19. Ul philoJ()phi" au Xlllr rik/r. p. 318. l O. WI' C'~n do t h i~ beaus

xxii Intro duc tio n

In sum , as regards the different categories of Thomas's writings distinguished

above, to the extent lhat imponam elements of his thought are contained in any of them, (Q that extent 1 will fed frt:e 10 draw upon those works in presenting his metaphysics. And I will preSCnl this as his metaphysics or his metaphysical thought ,

not as his theology or as his "Christian philosophy." 12 In rhis eRon I will be guided by Thomas's explicitly stated views co ncerning the

nature and subject of metaphysics, the distinctive processes involved in arriving at

metaphysical thinking, the disrinction between ph ilosophy and theology, and the

difference between following the philosophical o rder and following the theological

order. Before concluding this Introduction , therefore, I wish 10 consider brieRy his vie .... 'S o n the distinction between philosophy and theology as well as his under-

standing of the difference between fo llowing the ph ilosophical order and following

the theo logical order. Thomas deals with the distinction between philosophy and theology 0 11 differ-

ent occasions. He offers perhaps his clearest discussion of this in (I. 2., a. 3 of his Commenlary on the Dr Trinitatt of Boethius. In Ihis particular article he is con-cerned with determin ing whether or not it is permissible to use philosophical argu-ments and authorities in the science of the faith, i.e., in theology. The genera.! sett ing fo r Ihis discussion is, therefore. theological, and this is appropriate; con fli ct between faith and reason should not arise fo r someone who has no religious bith.n

After presen t ing a series of arguments against the legitimacy of using philosophi-cal arguments and autho ri ties in one's theologizi ng and then another set of argu-ments in support of doing this. Tho mas offers his solution. The gifts of grace: are

added 10 namre in such a way that they do not destroy nature but perfect it. This is an important presupposition on Thomas's part. since it indicates thai the gifts of grace. includ ing religious faith, should not be regarded as inimical 10 or as de-structive of nature. As his texi continues, Ihe light of faith , which is given 10 us as

a grace, docs not destroy Ihe light of natural reason, which is also given to us by God.1 ' In saying this Thomas combines something which he accepts only on fai th (that the light offa ith is divinely given) with something else which he undoubtedly

philosophorurn 5e(:1:ItOlt$ (ucrulU. ~ quibu! in philosophicis ~ rudili lUlU: Abo se~ Aer(S(On. M"fi-n",1 f'hiu,f()phy and rlN Tmns,mdmla/s. p. 7 , n. I. who C;lelo fk '''-'110, q. I. ~. 1 as ~n illusu.uion of ,his. Thefe Thorn~s indic~l es Ihal \P~udo-) Dionysiu$ scrms 10 be following Ih~ Plalonins when hr plOiCO the good btfor~ being (Sana' Thumar.u Aquino Dpaa tlmnia [Rome. ,881- J. Vol. l}, p. II. lines IS9- 161= l.con. 1j.II;l 59- 16I),

H. This is no! 10 d~ny ,hal Thomas will draw upon his faith as a neg~tive norm in developing hi~ phil~phy even in purely philosophio. l works such a$ hi~ Comm"nLl lic:s on Ari~lod~ or Ih~ philosophical 0pu$Cula if and when h~ finds it necessary 10 do $0. Nor it it 10 d~ny Ihal one mighl refer 10 his philoj;(lphy a~ Chrisrian in {h~ "momem of di$Co\'ery a~ opposed to Ihe "moment of proof~ (see uOle IJ above).

l}. See lown. 10.96-'00. 14. Uon. 10.98:114- 118. NOle: " ... unde "t lumen fidei. quod nobis gralis infundilUr, non d ....

SHU;I lumen natural;.' I"llionis divinilUs nobis indilUrn:

",

Imroduc[ion XX II!

also firsl accepted on faith but for wh ich he will also argue philosophically (that , like everything else Ihat is distinct from God, the light of natural reason is created by him). l)

Thomas gocson to explain that while the natura l light of human reason is inca-pable of arriving at knowledge of those things which are made known 10 us only Ihrough fai th . i.e., revealed mysteries, it is nonetheless impossible for truths which have been revealed to us by God to be contrary to (hose instilled in us by nature. This is so, he reasons, b

xxiv Imroducrion

subject to the weaknesses and possible mistakes to wh ich unaided human reason is profle. l~

Here we have Thomas's justification for the right of the C hristian believer to use his or her religious fai th as a check, as it were, as a negative norm , with rcs~ct to a philosophical conclusion if th;n conclusion clearly conuadicts revealed truth. At the same time, it is intercsting to observe that T homas does not apply ,his same thinking to a conclusion based on thcological reasoning, i.e., to a position a theologian might reach by reasoni ng about or even from a revealed premise. Pre-sumably this is because Thomas is keenly awa re that if human reason when used by phi losophers is fallib le, it is equally fallible when employed by theologians.l')

T homas goes on 10 draw OUI an intercsting consequence from the point he has JUSt made. In the case of conllict between all (alleged) philosophical conclusion and a rl'vealcd truth, it is possible by using the principlcs of philosophy 10 refu te an error of this kind ei ther by showing that it is altogether impossible or else by showing lhat it has nOl in fact been demonStrated. He must allow for these twO possibilities because, as he explains, JUSt as those things which ~rtain to faith (alone) cannot be demonstra tively proved, SO too, certain things which are opposed to them cannot be demonstratively shown 10 be false. The)' can, however, be shown not to be necessary, i.e. , not to have oc-en demonstrated:!O While continuing to defend a real harmony between faith and reaso n, Thomas i ~ allowi ng for what we may call revealed mysteries, such as the Trini ty or the Incarnation. Because such an icles of fa ith ca nnot be demonstrated by natural reason, if someone denies such a tru th the beSt the believer can do in respond ing is 10 show that [he denial ilSeif has nor been demonstrated. If Thomas wer .... 10 al10w for the possibilit), thaT one could demonst rate that the denial of such a [(mh is itsel f false, he would in effect be admitting that the revealed mystery cou ld itself be demonstrated,

Fi nally Thomas su ms up three ways in which one may lise philosophy in theo-logical inqu iry: (I) to dernollS1Tale what he calls preambles for faith, i.e., truths that should be known by onc who believes, such as those that are proved by natural argumentation about God-fo r instance, the fact that God exists, that God is olle- and similar truths which are proved in philosophy about God or about crea-tu res and are presupposed by fai th ; (2) 10 manifest through certain likenesses truths

1&. LO$ilivt inlluences which Gilson claims w find running from 3 beli~tr'$ f~jlh. ;IS in the a sc of Aquinn. to his philosoph;~;ng.

}O. Uon. 50.99:' 41 - 147: " ... ct ideo p

Inrroduction xxv

which we know through faith, as Augustine docs in his Dr Tnnita/(; h) to oppose claims made against faith eilher by showing them to be false, Of else by showing that they are not ncressa!)" i.c., that they have nOt been demonstrated. '!

Thomas also identifies two ways in which a believer may fall into error while using philosophy in theology. First, one might employ philosophical concl usions which a rc opposed ro faith and which, he remarks, are not really philosophy but an abuse or corruption of it. Second, one might ref lise to accepl on faith anything which philosophy can not demonsnate and, ro IISC a more f:tmiliar terminology, fall into rationalism.'"

In order 10 fill in one point Thomas has nOt explicitly developed here, we may turn to his Summa cOflfm G~flfi/~ I, cco 3 and 4. In c. 3 he distinguishes tWO kinds of truths concerning God which arc accessible to us: (I) those which completely surpass reason's ability to disco\'er and which, therefore, can be held only on tile grounds of religious belief. such as the Trinity; (1) mos

xxvi Introduction

reverse order, begin ning with a study of God, and only subsequently considering creatures insofar as they are o rdered and related to God.' )

Accordingly, after a p reliminary discussion in Chapt"cr I of Thomas's views on the subjcCl and the narure of metaphysics as a philosoph ical science and the rela-tionship of its subject to divine being, in Ch. II we shall consider his account of the way we arrive at knowledge of the subject of this discipline, ~ing as being. Subsequently in our effort to follow thc philosoph ical order as T homas has de-scribed it, we shall devote Pans One and Two to his metaphysical analysis of finite being. Only in Part Three will we move on [0 consider his philosophical discussion of divine being (God).

Within Part One itself, because of Thomas's dcfrnse of being as being as the subject of metaphysics, we will concemr.lte on (errain issues which arc as broad in

extension as this subject itself, with spc:.'Cial emphasis on the role the act of being (mr) plays in his understanding of finitc being. Hert' wc will consider his debt to Parmcnides in fo rmulating the problem of the O ne and the Many in the order of being. along wilh his views on analogy as appl ied to finite being (Ch. III). his metaphysics of panici pation in being (Ch. IV). the central role played in his resolu-Tion of these issues by his theory of composition of essence and tlU in finite beings (Ch. V), and his appeal to a kind of relative nonbeing as part of his response to the issue of the One and the Many in the order of being (eh. VI).

In Pan Two we will shift our emphasis to his explanation of the essence or essential StruClure of finite being as this is expressed in his general theory of su bsrance-accident composi tion (eh. VIl ) along with certain rel:Hed issues (Ch. VlIr) , and then to his understanding of matter-form composition which, against theories of universal hylemorphism, he restricts to materi al beings (eh. IX).

In Part Three we will consider in detail his argu mentation for God's existence (ehs. x. Xl , Xli ). In C h. XlII we will examine his highly nuanced views concern-ing the possibiliry of quiddit"ativc knowledge of God, and will then return to his theory of analogy of being, but chis time as applied to divine being. 1 n Ch. XIV we will fi rst complere some addit ional poinu which he establishes philosophically aboUT God. and will then revisit cerrain issues concerning finiTe being which we had previously considered without assum ing God's existence. At this point we will bring this study to a close.

j ). FA. c il. , pp. 95-96. Note: - Exinde eli~m 0 1 quod non rodem ordine u1raque d()Clrin3 pro-c.edi l. N~m in d()c!rin~ phi!oS(lph i~t, quae cre~turu $t(:undum ~ oonsider:u et 0: ds in lXi cognitio-nem perducil. prim~ t $1 consider:nio de cre~!U ris er u!tim~ de Dto. In docl,ina ~ro fidei . quae crearun~ non nisi in o rdine ad Dcum c(>nsident. primo CSt considenlio Dei c( po~t rnodum crt~1Ur~ " rum.~ !n his various prescruarions of Aquinas's -Chr inian~ Philorophy, G ilson WQUld ~Iwa)'$ intiS! on following the t heo logial order !""athtr than ! he philosophia!. Stt TIN Chrillian Phi/OJoph) 0/ St. T/;.omas Aqu;nas. pp. II - H, 44l- 4j, n. H; t"irm(>lli o/Om'srian Phi/lIJ(Jphy. p. 41 aoo p. 190, n. 41. For crit icisms of Gilson 0 11 Ihis p-oi nt $ec: my MrtapbJliraf TINmts, PI'. 1.9- 13; Aerl!lCo, Mtdi,,,,,1 /'hi/oJvphy ,md "It 1"u .. a n,u,w,h, pp. S-

Introduct ion ..

XXV] ]

In sum , therefore, in This sTUdy I propose !O SC I forth T homas Aquinas's meta-physical thought, based on his own texIS, in accord with the philosophical order,

in the way he h imsel f might have done it had he chosen 10 writc a Summa mnaphy-sicar. My hope is that it will prove to be of interest to any reader who is interested

in exploring thaI metaphysics.

'.

The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas

I Aquinas on the Nature of Metaphysics

O ne of (he more notable developments in recent decades in OUf understanding

of Aqui nas's Inctaphysical thought has been a growing appreciation of the d isti nc-tive way in which he accounts fo r our discO\'cry ofbcing as real or as existi ng and,

consequent upon th is, for our knowledge o rl)Cing as being. ' T hat th is is of imp or-

lance 10 anyo ne interested in his metaphysics goes without saying. Accord ing 10 Thomas, as we shall shonly see in greater detail, metaphysics has as its subjcCI being in general or bei ng as heing. J-Ience in considering his treat ment of ou r d iscO\'cry of

being as being we arc really taking up his account of the way in which o ne gels 10 the subject of this science o r, to put it in o ther terms, h is \i

4 Narure of Metaphysics

poses or divides" and is ocrrer known 10 us loday as judgment.} Thomas's appeal

10 judgment 10 accoum for our d iscove ry of the existence of things has been

stressed by various writers, but especially so by Etienne G ilson and OIhers who have dcvelopcd his work in this dirCn. IO , I"7: 101-1O~ . For discu5sion and for 3ddil ion~1 r~f~r~ nc~ ~ the following c:hap t~r. ,.. Xc nOl~ 1 abo,c. In addit;on.\tt , for instance, Gilson, 'I'M Chrisrian Philuwphy o[St. TiHJmJU

AqllinllS, pp. 40-41; j. Owens. An Ekmmlary ChriJfian Mrlllphy,jo (Milwaukec, 1963) , pp. t7- 41; ~Judgmcnt ~nd Truth in Aquinas: J, 'f~di,mItl1 5Iud;u}l (1970), pp. IJ8- \8. rcpr. in his 51. Tho mllJ AqllinllJ on liN &i>fOlrr of God. TiN Col/rad Pdpm ofJD>rph Owt-m, ] . Catan, td. (Alblny, N.Y .. (980), pp. }4-jI ; "Aquin~ on Knowing Exislence, Rrvi~w of Mrlaphytio 19 (1976), pp. 67~, repr. in 5:. Tiwmm AquinllJ on ,hi &iJlo.cr olGod. pp. 1.0- J}. Also ~ hi~ An /"urprruuion of xu. rrnu(Milwauke('. (968), esp. c. 2.

I Von. \0.148- ,.9 6. For refcrences 10 somc of these SC~ R. W. Schmidt. "Lcmploi de la sepHation en m':'laphy-

siquc," RrVUI phi/lOphiqul dr ~ur.'Iljn 58 (1960), pp. J7 J~J . t'$pially }7 J- 7S. Among e~ r! ic r trc~t menu Schmidl corrtly mC5.SCS Ihe imporr:llncc of thu by L.-/l..\. R~git . Un livre: La phiwwphi~ tU /.z m:ru.." Quelques 'Aporics''- Erudn'l rrtlNrrhN I (1936), pp. 1l7- 16. cspa;i~lIy pp. [)i- 18. AJso $tt J. Owcn~, "Mctaphylic:r.1 Sep;!t:llion in Aquin:u.~ M,d;,It"'ll Srutiin }4 (197l). PI). 187- J06; L Sweeney. A M~J(Jphysics of AUJIN .. ,ir & isJm,ialiJm (Englewood Cliffs. N.J., 196j ). pp. )07- 29 and pp. )07-8, nn. [3. 1\. 16, for rctell'nC~ to other litet:l ture (:Oncernin!,; this. Also ~ thc di.s

Nacure of Metaphys ics 5

divine science) a fitting division: As Thomas himself recognizes. the remote ances-try for this threefold d ivision in Boethius is to be found in Aristotle's Ml'Iophysin, Uk VI. c. L~

Thom;l$ hegins hi s fuJi exposilion and defense or (his division in the

6 NalUre of Metaphysics

science, and hence of defend ing the un iry of that science by reason of a unified

subject-maner, would be undermined. Instead, notes T ho mas, when habi ts or

powers 3rc disti ngu ished by reason of their o bjects they arc d ivided nOt by reason of any kind of difference whal'sQCver, but only by reason of d iffe rences which are essemial fO such objccts considered precisely as such. I! '10 ill u$(r:t te this T ho mas

notes (hat it is incidenta l to an object of a sense power whether th;n object is a

pbm o r an an imal. Sense powers arc distingu ished not by reason of such d iversity

bUl by reason of the kind chac oht:l ins between color (the specifying object of sigh t)

and sound (the specifyi ng objcct of hearing). As fAr as the theoretical sciences arc

concerned, therefo re, they tOO arc to be d ivided by reaso n of diversi ty in objects of theoretical consideration (spnuutbilia) considered precisely as such, !J

T homas com ments that one aspect belongs to an object of theoretical science

insofar as it is considered from the side of the intel lective [)Ower; and something

else belo ngs to it insofar as it is considered from the side of the habit of science whereby the imelleet is pcrfcct ed. l ~ As reg:mh rhe firs t poim , insofar as something is an objeci of the intellect. it must be rendered immaterial in some way. Th is is so because the intcl le

Nature o f Meraphysics 7

ne

8 NalUfC of Metaphysics

which docs nOt depend on ma([er in the order of being ((!S~). This kind of object

(an exist apart from maner, ei ther in the sense that it is never present in matter, or

else in the sense that in certain cases it is present in matter and in certain GISCS not . To illustrate the first of these, Thomas singles out God and angels. As examples of rhe sC'COnd he ci tes substance, quality. being (nil), potency, act. the o ne and the

many, and things o f this kind. l l

In other words, o bjects of the first type are nOt and c::mnot be realized in maner because they POSiTively exclude materiality. Hence one may, as I have suggested in

another comext, describe Ihem as positively imnlalcrial.12 Objects of Ihc second

type do not have to be reali 'led in matter in order 10 ('XiSI, even though they may

be. As Thomas puts it, in cerrain cases they are present ill maner, and in certain

cases nOi. Being, for instance, may be realized in malter, as it is in every material being; but it may also be realized wi thout being presen t in matter, as in immaterial

beings. Hence we may describe th ings of this type as neg:nively immaterial, mean-ing thereby that they do nOt have to be presem in maner in order to ex isl. We may

31ro describe them as neutrally im materia l, meaning by this that they mayor may

nOI be p resent in matterY Thomas concludes this discussio n by no ti ng that divi ne science deals wi th all

of these, that is, wit h both types o f objects which do not depend on maner in order

to exis!. He also writ es [hat this sc i~nce is named theology or d ivine 5cience because fore most among the things considered in it is God. II is known as metaphysics

because it comes after physics in the order of learning. This is so because we must mo\'e from a knowledge of sensible th ings !O an understand ing of things which are

nOI .sensible. This same science is also known as firs t philosophy insofar as the other

sciences take their principles fro m it and therefore come afler it.H As I havl.': ex-plained in so me dcta il elscwhere, T ho mas does not always o ffer this same reason for describ ing metaphysics as first philosophy. In his Cornrnent3ry 011 the Meta pbysicshe will say that it is so named because it deals with the fiTS! causcso( things. ~)

1.1. "QuO- 1 67) .

15. Stt MtMphJ$itlll T/umf'S. c. III (" ' First Philo~phy' According !O Thomas Aquinas"). pp. 15- 67. s...~ {II duodnim lilmll Mrftlphys;rlJrum /lrjJltlu/is r.>:/X'siri(J. M . R. Cal hala and R. SpiJ'!,z i. ros. (Turin-Rolllt'. 19S0). Pr~mium . p. 1.. In br ief. in the srudy jU51 ciced I have a!temptro w show how I h('.'''' 1"'0 ~n'om do no. e~dudr O"~ anmhrr by ~ppc;o!ing [() Th()ln"~. dis! incI;on bc!v.~n synthr-

,

Narurc or M eraph ysics 9

In ,h(: pr(:selH context Thomas also remarks that it is not possible fo r there to be things which depend on maner in order to be understood but wh ich do nO! depend on maucr in order to exist. This follows from the immaterial natu re of lhe intellect. An imnmerial intellect can hardly impose dependency upon matter in order fo r objects !O be understood if those same objects do not depend on ma11er in the order ofbei ng.M Th is is an important point, since it indicates that in Thorn as's eres the threefold division of theoretical science is exhaustive. There is no fourth distinctive ki nd of object of theoretical science which might lead one to postu late a founh theoretical science.

As far as metaphysics is concerned, therefore. '1. 5 J. [ of Thomas's Comment2ry tells us that it deals with a special kind of object of theoretical knowledge, that is, the kind thai does not depend on maner in order 10 exist. T his kind is subdivided into the type of objoct thai cannot exist in matter (t he positively immaterial) and the type that mayo r may n O! be present in matter (the negatively or neutrally imm aterial). Metaphysics deals with bOl h rypes of objects, [hough Thomas has not yel indicated how this is possibk' and how Ihese IWO TYpes fit together. If he has offered God and angel.~ as illustra tions of dte posit ively immaterial. he has listed being (I'm) and substance along with a number of others as illustrations of the ncg:Hivdy or neU! ra lly immaterial. Th is reference to being (I'm) is import .. nt since, as we shall shortly $('e, for Aquinas txing as being or ocing in general is the subject of memphysics.

Thomas's reply to the sixth objenioll in this same article merits considerat ion before we conclude Ih is section. He notes that one may indeed say thallhe subjens of the other theoretical SCiences-physics and mathematics-also enjoy a certain ki nd of being and can therefore be described as being~. But eve n though being (nu) is the subject of metaphysics, it does nOI fo llow frottl this that these other sciences are themselves pa ns of metaphysics, as the objection would ha\'e it. :?

Each of these mher thOOrelical sciences examines one part of bei ng (such as mobile being or quantified being), and docs so accordi ng to its special mode of co nsideration. T he special mode of co nsideratio n of any such science is different , cont inues Thomas, from that whereby the metaphysician studi es being. Ir is he~ cause of this that Ihe su bjec t of such a particu lar science is nOl a pan of lhe subjen of metaphysics. It is nOt a part of being under th;u formality whereby being iself is the subjeCl of metaphysics. l8

~i> (via compoJllJumJ) and ~naly.i~ (Ili" uwbJlh",iJ) ~nd 10 ~no tl,c' Ji~linCiion h

JO Nature of Metaphysics

In sho rt , T homas is here acknowledgi ng that in a particular theo retical science

such as physics o ne stud ies a special or restr icted kind of bci ng, i.e., mobile being,

but nOt in the way one slUclics bei ng in met:l phys ics. In physics one doo nOt study

mobile being insofar :ls it is being, but under some other perspective, that is, insofar

as it is mobi1e. l'I In metaphysics, on the other hand, one studies being taken as such

(rather than as rcsu iCl('d to a gi\'en kind of being). And ont' slUdies it as being. T homas's discussion in this rep ly is important , for i t suggcslS that in identi fying

the subject of a science such as met:lphysics it is not enough simply to take in to account the kind or range of object stud ied therein- in the prese nt case, being as

such rather than any r('SHin ed kind of being. O ne mUSt also bear in mind the perspective from wllich such objects are considered , i.e., as being ra ther than as

mobile or as quant ifi ed . Moreover, T homas's ans"\vcr at least implies that one may

exam ine the same thing, taken materially, from two d ifferent fo rmal perspectives

and therefore in twO di ffe rent sciences. T hus one and the s:une material thing may

be examined in physics insofar as it is viewed as mobile, and in metaphysics insofar as il is co nsidered as bei ng. 'w Wi th these points in mi nd we are now in position to

turn 10 the second section of ,his chapter, where we shall consider T homas's views

co ncern ing the subjeCT of Illetaphysics.

lum iHius f10 n esl pus subiecti meuphy~icae, non t nim esl p~ rs t nlis 5CCundum ilbm "uionem qu~ en> cSt 5ubk'C turn mctaph~s iQ.e. ioed hac r~1ione cOI1 ~idc r~ ta ipsa CSt spial is 5C~ru'a aliis C PhiloS nnn quia sempet sin t ~i n c mataia: ~ qui~ non de nc

Natu re of Metaphysics II

2 . The Subject of Metaphysics

Something of the Aristotelian (and Boethian) background for T homas's three-fold division of the thf,;oretical sciences has already ben;g. 'Ar;~{()lclo:s' trsrt Philosophic als u ni vcrs~k Wisscnsch~ rl von dc" AI'XA I . ~ Ard"l! for Grsr/"dm dn "'"WWpiJU)l (1 970). pp. llj- 46 ; J. O wtns. l1Jr /)(Klr1l1f IIflkillg in Ih< Ar;lIouli"" Mmlphpir1. 3d ~d . O o romo. 1

12 Nature of Metaphysics

In Bk VI, c. I , after referring to his in\estig:nion of the principles and causes of bei ngs as beings and presumably, therefore, to his science of being as being, Aris-totle again contrasts this with more restriCied sciences which limit themselves to a given class of being and concern themselves with tha.t rather than with be:ing taken as such and as be:ing:H Until this point Aristotle's text presents no insurmountable difficulties for the reader. Bur after discussing physics or natural philosophy (which studies the kind of substance which has within itself its principle of rest and mo-tion) and mathematics (some pans of which study theiT objectS as immutable and separate from maner), Aristolle becomes concerned about the ontological status of the things STUd ied by another science. j ) If there is something eternal and immu-table and separate, it belongs to some theoretical science [Q invcstigate this. Neither physics nor mathernarics will quali fy. Therefore there must be a first science which studies things which arc both immUtable and separate (and which does not merely study them as immutable and separate). This Aristotle refers to as theology (or divine science) . .l6

This immediaICly raises a question for the reader. Has not Aristotle's third theo-retical science itself now become a science of a particular kind of being, that is, th~ immutable and separate and divine? If so, what is the relationship berwecn this third science~lheology-and the science of being as bei ng? Umil this poim Aris-totle's emphasis in presenting the science of being as being has been on its nonpar-ticulariry and therefore on its universal iry in seopcY Unlike the panictllar sciences of mathemat ics and physics, it does not remict itsclf to any giv~n kind of being; it studies being taken si mply as such, and it studies it as being. Now, however, divine science has been presented as the science of sepa.rate (,miry.

To his credit Aristotle himself n w this diffi culty. O ne might be perplexed, he writes, concerning whether first philosophy is universal, or whether it deals with one given genus or nature. In reply he comments that if there is no other subsrance apart from those which arc composed by nature, physics will be (he firs! science. But if (here is some immutable substance, the science which studies this will be prior; it will be: first philosophy; il will be universal insofar as it is first; and it will belong to this science to study being as being.')! In other words, Aristotle wants 10 identify his d ivine science or theology with his science of being as being. This much is dear from his text. How h( does so and whether he is really successful in this effort is a very differen t maner, and one which continues to be disputed by com-mcntators.3~ Rather than enter intO that question here, it will be enough for us 10

H. Stt 10 !Sb 3-10. JS. For his discU5Sion of physics ~ 102Sb 18- 1026 :17. On mathem3tics Sa' 10 16a 7- 10. 36. See 1016a IO- H . }7 . Stt hi5 pres

Na HJre of Metaphysics 13

note that di\'ergent readings of Aristotle concerning this point had surfaced long before the time ofAquina5 and that tWO such inrcrpret':l.t ions wer(' known to him, that is, those otlert d by Avicenna and by Averroes.

In his Metaphysics (Liver de phi/mopbi" prim(l) Avicenna examines ill some detail the claims of different candidates for the title subjeCt of metaphysics. He considers and then rejects the possibility that God might be regarded as the subjett of this science. Since no science can demonstrate the existence of its own subjeCt, and since according to Avicenna God's existence can be established in metaphys ics and on ly in metaphysics, he concludes that Cod cannot be regarded as its subject. Nor wi ll it do to suggest that the causes themselves might be regarded as its subject. Only being as being can serve as the subject of this science.~o

Agai nst th is line of reasoning AverrOC$ argues that it is in physics rather than in metaphysics that one establishes Cod's existence. T herefore, Avicenna's rl.":!.sons fo r rejecting God as the subjeCt of metaphysics must themselves be rejected. t While Averroes grams tb:!. t Aristotle does refer to this as the science which stud ies ~ bei ng as bei ng," he notes that in this usage the term "being" really means substance.

40 . Sec his J.ib(~ ir l'hiuJJoph!a pr;'~II!. e. t (Van Rie l W .. pp. 4- 6), where he :ngues Ihal God is not Ih, s'lbj1 of lhis sc ience. Sec pp. 6--'

14 Naturc of Mctaphysics

Accordi ng 10 AvcrrQCs, therefo re, one must study substance first and foremost in

its primary instance. thai is, as realized in that separate substanCe which serves as lhe first form and the ultimate end or final cause of everything clse.4! One knows

that such a being exists because of one's demonstration of th is at the end of Physics VIII. Therefore, separate substance or the d ivine is really the subject of this sci-

ence.'!) Averroes seems to think that he can safeguard the general or no n particular

charaCicr of metaphysics by reason ing that when one studies the first form and

ultimate end of all else. one studies all else as well. Whether this solutio n can do justice to the immediate nonparriculariry of the science of being as being as this is

set forth by Aristotle in Mnaphysics IV. c. 1 is highly doubtful. in my opinion .H

Be that as it may, here we arc interested in Aquinas's position . He agrees wilh Aviccn na that the subject of metaphysics is being as being ((TIS hlqlllUirum n t em), or as he also describes it, being in general (rm communr). T his is already at least

implied by the text we have examined in q . S, a. I. ad 6, of his Com memary on the De Trinitarr. It is confirmed by remarks Thomas makes in q . 5, a. 4 of th is same treatise. as well as in his Commentary on III Smrrnus. d . 27. q . 2. a. 4 . sol. 2, and in his Com mcmary o n rhe Metaphysics (Prooemium) . 4~ At rhe sam!." time, he offers

.p . On this at ~he sciener which inveslig~t es ~ing at being see I" I phyt.,

Nature of Metaphysics IS

a new and high ly original solut ion to the issue concerning the relat ionship betv.eell

being as being (or being in general) and divine being.

Thus in q.~, a. 4 of his COllunelliary on the Dr Tril1 itdtr, Thomas continuC$ to defend the view that divine science. deals with things which arc without maner and

motion. In devdoping th is poin t he explains more fu ll y what he understands by divine science (as Bocthius has named it ill the [ext on which Thomas is comment-

ing). If every science slUd ics a given subject-genus, it must also co nsider the p ri n-

ciples of that genus. But principles arc of twO kinds. Certain principles arc com-

plete natures in themselves and at the same time serve as princi ples for other thinb>S.

Thus heavenly bod ies may be regarded bodl as complete beings in themselves and as p ri nciples oflower bodies: and the same holds for simple bodies in that they are

also principles for mixed bodies . If [his is so . such principles may be c)(:lm ined in

t\vo different sciences. that is. in the science which studies that of which they are

principles, and in another science which studies tht'm as complete natures in them-selves . ~

Other principles, however, are not complete natures in themselves but are only

principles for other things. 11 is in this way th3t 3 un it fun clions as the principle of

number. ~ point as Ihe principle of a line. and matter and form as principles of

natural body. Such principles arc studied in the science which is directed to that of

which they arc principles: but un like the first kind of principles, these are IIOt also

considered in another sciencc which wou ld treat them as complete natures in them-

selves. 47

With these genera! gtlideli n e.~ est":.tblished , Thomas goes on 10 nOle that any

given genus ha.~ cerra in common principles which eXtend 10 :tlJ the other principles

of rhat genus itself. So i[ is [hat all beings, insofar as [hey share in being, have

cemin principles which arc the principles for every being. Such principles arc said

to be common in one of two ways, as Aviccnn~ has indicated. They may be com-mon in [he order of predication in the sense in which a fo rm is said to be common to all ot her fo rms because i( call be predicaTed o f each of them . Or [hey may be

common in the order of causa! iry as, for instance, one ;md the same sun is said to be the principle for all thi ngs which are subjt'1:t 10 generat ion . AIl beings have certain

common pri nciples in the first sense, (ha[ is , in [he order of pred ication. By this Thomas means that certain names

16 Narure of Metaphysics

dum analogiam. But as he points OUt , beings also h;we certai n principles which arc com mon in the second or causal sense.~~

To illustr:lIc this point Thomas preS('nts what might be regarded as an outline of an argument for the ex istence of God. The principles of accidents may be re-duced 10 the principles of subsrances. And the principles for corruptible 5ubsranCl's may be Haced back 10 incorruptible substances, so that all beings are:: reduced to u n ain principles accord ing 10 an ordere::d grndation. Ikcausc that which is the principle of being for all thi ngs must itself he bei ng to the maximum degree, prin-ciples of this kind (the highest principlc::s for all other beings) must themseh'cs be most pcrfer:t and therefore in act 10 the m;uimum degn.-c so as to have either a minimum of potemialiry or else none at all. This follows from the fact that act is prior to potency, as ArislOtle has pointed out in MrttlphYiia IX. Hence these Sll-preme principles will be free from matter (for mauer always implies potentiality) and free from motion (the act of that which existS in potency). Divine things arc principles of this kind . As AriSlOtie n:IIC$ in MnaphJfiu VI, " if the divine existS anywhere, il exists in such a nature," i.e. , in one that is immaterial and immobile.49

After offering this brief argument for the existence:: of "divine" things or prin-ciples, Thomas applies the distinction between the kinds of principles which are also complete natures in themselves and the kinds which are not. Divine things themselves arc both complete narures in themselves and the princi ples for other beings. Therefore they can be studied by fwO sciences. On the one hand, they can be studied insofar as they arc the common principles for all beings. But if such first principles are most irnelligible in themselves, they arc not most knowable to us. We:: Gln arrive at knowledge of them through the light of nalllral reason only by reasoning from effect to causc, as the phi losophers have done. (Here Thomas finds support in the well-known text from Romtllls t:20: ~Th(: invisible things of God are:: seen, being understood frolll the things which arc made."po Therefore divine things arc not studied by the philosophers except insofar as they arc the principles of all other things. Thai is to say, they arc considered in thai discipline which treats those things which arc common to all beings, and which has as its subject being as being (,m inquantum m ms). This S(:ience, remarks Aquinas, is referrc::d to by the philosophers as divine science.}'

48. In.ln. jO.ISPoS- 1l4. For Thomas's rcr~ r~nce 10 Avicenna Sn" the IaIier'S Su/fil"lmria, J, c. l (Venke, 1508). f. ,~ .. ~. Thomas also refers here 10 Ar;!wrie'5 MtI:lphysics Xl (i.e., XII ) in oflkr ro show that c( rtain principles arc colllmon in thc lint way ~nmdu>n anaipgia1l'l. For this sec Mrr. XII, c. -{ (to7Q:,\ ;1 - jJ): c. 5 (1071a 19- J5).

49. I.ron. 50. tI3'l14- 154:tO. Thomas inuoducc$ Ih i ~ argument wilh this remark: " .. . 111 sint quacdam res eacdem numno cxiSlcnlO omnium rcrum prill(;ipia ... : Sec Arililotlc. MrlopJrysin IX, cc. & and 9; Mrrop!rysiNVl, c. t (1016a /9- 11).

10. leon . ~O. I54:t4 1- l j7. ror another and fulle, imerpr('r.l.rion ofRoman$ 1:10 in this s;!mc "cin cf. T hon]",ts'.1 Commenlary on Paul's leiter 10 Ihe Roman~ . Scc S. Tholllor Aquilllllir "",",orn ongr/iri in or>lnnS. Il,,,/' Apoiloli piIlolas CO"' r'lmrari4. Vol. , (Turin, 19t9), c. I, Iccl. 6, pp. tl -11.

II . ~ .. . unde CI huiusmooi

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20 Nature of Metaph ysics

amined , si nce without them complete knowledge of the things which arc proper (0 any given genus or s]x:cies cannOt be had. At th~ same time, knowledge of such things cannot be entrusted to anyone of t he particular sciences; fOf these un iversal

principles are needed for knowledge of every class of beings and could with equal justification be examined by each particular science. Therefore they should be in-vest ig:l1ed in o ne general or univer~al science which, because it is supremely intel-

lectual, is ruler of the others . ~' Thirdly, something may be regarded as most intelligible from the standpoint of

the intellect's knowledge. Si nce a thi ng enjoys intellective power only to the extent that it is free from m:iltcr, those things will be most intell igib le which arc supremely

free fro m matter. This follows because the intellect and its obj:t should be propor-tioned to one anot her. BUI those things are supremely free from matter which ab-

stract nOI on ly from designated maner (as do natural fo rms when they ar~ grasped un iversally, and wi th which physics deals), but also from sensible matter entirely.

They abstract from sensible maller nOt only in the order of understanding (as do mathematicals), but also in the o rder of exiSH:nce. Such is true of God and intelli-

gences. Therefore the science which studies such things-God and intellig~nces

seems to be supremely intdlecmal.w At this poim Thomas seems to have identi fi ed three different classes of objects

which are supr~mely imcll igible: (I) [he fi rsl causes; (2) tlta! which is most un iver-sal , such as bei ng, etc.; (3) Cod and intelligences. Can he b ring these lhrce classes together in some f.lshion so tha t all will fa ll with in the scope of a single science?

This he immediately proceeds to do. First of all, he commenrs, the aforemen-tioned separate substances (God and the intelligences) are the universal and first causes of being. T hus he col lapses classes [ and j into one. MOf('Over, he contin ues,

it belo ngs to one and [he same science to consider the proper cau~ of a given

genus and that genus itself. So it is that the natural philosopher considers the prin-ciples of natural body. In like fashion. T ho mas continues, it belongs 1'0 one and lhe same science to consider the separate substa nces and being in general (ms com-

mw u). Being in general is the Ugenus" of which these separati' substances afe the universal causes. (T homas does not intend for liS to t3ke the term "genus" litera lly

as he uses it here, of course, si nce he would never admit thai being is a genus in the proper sense.) Now he has un ited the science which has class 2 (being in general) as its subj:t with the science which studies the p rinciples and causes of that sa me

subject, that is, Cod and intelligences.G'

59. Ibid. Nor .. in panicubr: "Unde et ilb scientia maxim .. CSt in lelieclu;llis, quae cira principi;l maxime univeruli. VNsatUI. QU:I(C quidcm 5Un l ens, el ea quae wnS

Natu re of Metaphysics 11

As Thom;ls explains. it follows from this that while the science in question stud ies the three classes of intelligible objects which he has dist inguished, it docs not consider each of these as its subject, but only one, that is, being in general (fill (OmmIUlt)."l Tht;: subjt:ct of a science. cont inuC$ Tho mas. is that whose principles and Causes one investigatt:s. T he causes of that subject-genus arc not Iht:mselves the subject of the science. Knowledge of the causes of such a genus is .. Hiler the end or goal al which the .scienccs investigation aims. Therefore, while only being in general is the subject of this science. the emire science may be said to deal with Ihings which are separate from matter in the order ofllCing {mt} as well as in the order of understand ing. Not only are those things s;tid to be separate from mail er in this fashion which can never be present in matter; the sante is true of rhoS which mayor may not be realized there. such as mf ( OIlWJUfIl'.(,j

At this poi nt, of cou rse. T homas has once again aplX'aled to his distinction between tht twO ways in which things may be said to be free from matter and Illotion in the order of being itself. BOth what we have described as the positively immaterial (God and intdligence$) and the negatively immaterial (being as such) will be studied by the mClaphysician. But it is only the l:mer, being as such or being in general, whidt is the subject of this science. God and separate substances are not its subject. Nor is knowledge of mclt ent ities presupposed for one 10 begin metaphysics, at least so lar as one ca n dete rmine from the texu we have examined unli l now. On the contrary. such knowledge is held out by Thomas as the end o r goal of the metaphysicia n's invcstigation. 6oI

22 Nature of Meraphysics

Th is suggests thac in the order of discovery one n1ll5t first arrive at 1u1Owiedge of being as being or ofbcing in genera l in order for metaphysics ro have its proper subject established. And this in turn brings us to the issue to be discussed in the following chapter: Precisely how, according to Aquinas, docs one go about dis-covering being as being, thc subject of mctaphysics?

below of the rondjtjon ~ requi rcd for fhe judgmem of SC'r~r.f1 ion 1nd hc-nee for one's di.~covery of the ~ubre.::1 of meraphY$iC$.

11 Our Discovery of rhe Subjecr of Metaphysics

Since Aquinas holds lhar being as being is the subjccl of metaphysics, it remains fo r us to determine how he ac(;ounrs fo r Ollf discovery of (his subject . In order to do this we must first consider his explanation of the way in which we arrive at

knowledge ofbt-ing as real or as exiSting. fu already noted a1 the beginning orCh. I, Thomas's m OSt importJIH single discussion of these issues is in q . S, J . 3 of his Commentary on the De 'irillirmcof Boelhius. At the very beginning of the corpus of this article he makes a point which is crucia l fo r our understanding of his view

of the way in wh ich one d iscovers being as existing or as real. Farther on in th is

sallle article he offers his fullest account of all operat ion which he rlJ.mcs scpai.1tion (upnrari()) and which he explicitly CQnnttrs with metaphysics. In taking up these points, therefore, this texl will serve as our focal poin!.

I. Our Knowledge of Being as Real

Q. 5, a. J is explic itly directed 10 the question whedler mathematics considers without maucr and moti on things which are present in maner. This queslion itsclf is raised for Thomas by lhe Boethian text on which he is commenting. I

In setting up his rcpl)' Thomas begins by observing thaI one mu.~t understa nd how lhe in tellect can abm:lcl in its operation. As will become dea r from prcdsions wh ich he introdlu.:es into his text ar a later poim , Thonus is here using [he term wabsrract" veT)' broad ly so as to signifY any way in which the incellcci distinguishes

I. - ... ICllio uUum mluhcmal ica consider:llio sit sine:- motu CI maleri;!. de his qu~e sum in ma-leri,- (i-lll, ~o" J6 :{>-7) ' &~ lx..,lhius, d~~r;pl;Oll or malhcmalics in c. ~ of his lfl Trinirau: " ... fflar/'allarira. sillc rnol u inabSlfacla (hue eni rn forrnas rorporum Speculalu r sine rn'feria aC po:r hocs;nc molU . qu~c formae cum in ma l cr;~ 5; 111 , ab his scpuari non p;.:tUIII) ... ~ (ed_ cil .. p. 8: 10-14). For Thomas's literal exposition of this passage. before he introduces his morc original (re~t ment haK'd on questions ~IlJ articlcs. ,ICe l..con_ ~O_I 14:86-,00. As he o:pl~ins Ihere. whi le m~, h('mal ' ;e:.ts can Ix: (on ~idcred aparl from (sensible) mailer. Ihey ( annOI exist apan fwm il.

'J

24 Discovery of the Subject of Metaphysics

o r divides. In developing a rather brief remark made by Aristotle in Dr. Im i mp, Bk II I, Thomas writes that the irHellegnosei t de unDqlloquc quid en , al ia vero qua componi t t r diyidil, scilicet enllnriat ionem affi rmalivam yel ntgalivam formando~ (Leon. 10.r -.6:87- 91). For Aristotle SC'~ t:Hanima III. c. 6 (-.3Q;1 lQ-18J.

j. "I::I h~e quidclll duae opcflitionC5 duobus quae .Iu m in rebus r~pondcm. Prima quidem oJX'" r;uio r~pic il ips;tm n~lur~m ~i . secundum quam rcs imel lecta aJ iq~tem gr.ldum in cnribus ool inct, s;ye 5i l res COml'!cla, U! IOrum aliquoJ , 5;\"C res incornpkl"a , til patj >fd acciden5~ (Leon. 50. 1-.7:96-101).

4 . "Scc:unda ycro opeTlH io lapki! ipsurn esse lei; quod quidem ~ulul 0" consrcg:l( ion~ princi-piorum rei in COm p

Discovery of the Subject of Meraphysics 25

but its first act, i.e., its actual existence. laken in a third way, mr signifies the rruth

of composition, that is, of judgment , as this is expressed in propositio ns. In Ihis sense, continues Thomas, the verb "is" is referred to as the copula. \'V'hcn used in this third way fiSt is reali7-cd in the full scnsc in the intellect which composes or divides. Nonet heless, when so used this NSf itself is grounded in the mr of lhe thing, that is, in the act of its essence (i ts existence) juSt as truth is.('

O f these three usages the fim may m ike the reader as somewhat surprising. In many other contexts Thomas is content simply to dist inguish between mf insofar as it signifies the composition of a proposition which the intellect effects through judgment, and rssl! taken as :lclllal existence o r, as Thom:lS of len expresses it , as the aCiUJ i'S!rndi (act of !xing) . In ot her words, he o f len limits himself to the second and third meanings he has si ngled OUI in the present ['exi. For instance, he appeals to this rwofold distinction in Summa t/H'O/og;lU I, q. j, a. 4 in order to meet an objection against his d:lim that ill God essence and Nft' (acl of being) are iden tical.7

In our text fro m Thomas's Commentary o n Ihe Df: 7,iniUJu he has distin-gu ished between the nature of a thing to which the intellect looks in its fi rst opera-

lion, and the very rotof:! thing 10 wh ich the intellect looks in its second operat ion . In this text it is d ear that tsst'cannot mea n natu re or quiddity ; fo r it is wi th this

that (fsr is here cont ras ted. It would seem 10 follow that it must mean either a th ing's act ual existence, or else that au which is formed b)' and exists only in the intellect when it judges. l3ut since Thomas has referred ht' re 10 the very (/u of th t" th illg (ipJllm tnl' rei). rhis suggeslS that he docs no t here have in mind (Sir si mply as it exists in the intellect as expressed in judgment, that is. as the copula. By process of elimi nation we seem 10 be left with the remaini ng alternative: esu as used here signifies the aClual existence o f a thi ng. It is thi ~ wh ich is captured through judg ment. Nonetheless, this interpretat ion is rejected by various Thomistic scholars.s

8

26 Discovery of the Subjecr of Meraphysics

highligh ted to good effect in various publications, especially in c. VI of his Bri"g ami Somr Pbilosopbl'rJ.' As Thomas develops this in his Commentary on Aristotle's Dr inurpwatiof/r, the \'erb "is" as it appears in propositions is sometimes predi-cated in its own right, as when we say; "Sorces is." By this we wish to indicate that Sortes is in reality, i.c., that he aC[ually exists.lo As Gilson develops th is poim, the verb "is" often appears in what we may d e.scribe as existential judgments, or judg-ments of existence. I I But, Thomas continucs, on other occasions the verb " is" is

nO[ p red icated in its own right as if it were th~ principal predicate, but only as

joined to the principal p rediCltc in o rder to connect it with the subjeCt of a prop-osition. So it is when we say: "Soncs is whi te." In this case the speaker does not intend 10 assert that Son es acmally exists, but ralher to attribute whi teness 10

h im . As G ilso n explains, such judgments may be described as judgments of attri-bUlion. lz

As we return to our text from Thomas's Commentary on the Dr Trif/ ifllLr, we should recall another point which Tho mas makes in the same immediate COntext. Because truth ariscs in the intellect from the fact thaI the intellect is conformed to

reali ty, it follows that in irs second operat ion (judgment) the ill1dlect cannOt truth-

fully abstract what is united in reality. For the intellect 10 abstract (that is, 10 distin-

guish or d ivide) in this operation is for it to assert that there is a corresponding separatio n with respect 10 the thing's very ~fU. For instance, if I am speaking of

someone who is actually white and separate human being from whiteness by saying ~this human being is nOt whitc,n my judgment is fal se. 1.)

In other words, Tho mas is reminding us that uuth in the suict sense arises at the level of judgment. Any composi tion or division effected by ,he intellect through judgmcll1 must correspo nd to a composition or divisio n which obtains in reality if

that judgmell1 is 10 be true. While this point appears to be evident enough in itself,

9. Ed. d f. , pp. ' 90-104. Abo sec his T," Chr-isritm I'hilowplry IIiSl. Thomas Afluinas, pp. 4O-.. g . ' 0. " ... cOllsidenlldum dl quod hoc v!' f quod nihil ~Iiud imcndimu5 signili c~ rc quam quod S .. m es 5il in rcrum rwura .. ." Expmirio Libri Ihyrrmmiasll , 1 {(..con. '.1.88:36--40). This .... ork hils l.crwcen Dembt"r r170 and October ' 17 t (!.ron. ,. 1.8S -8S).

II. ~ /Hint and mlt Philosoplun. pp. lOO-lOt as well is the citat ion and di$C u>sion of rh is rell by R~is as rcproducI by GiJ.~n ill Ihc $:Imc soun::e. pp. lI8- l0.

r 1 . ... q ll:l.ndoquc vcro noll praedia rur per 5

Discovery of the Subject of Me taphysics 27

it is important to keep it in mind in the present discussion . If, as we arc suggcst ing. Thomas holds chal the intelleCl's second oper'Jt ion (judgment) is ordered 10 the Wt of thing$ and if this means their actual existence, one might concl ude that such is the case on ly in judgments of existence, Thomas's text indicates that the same holds for judgmerHs of anribmion such as "Sones is white. " Even in such judg-ments there must !x- some reference 10 real ity or, as Thomas has put it , 10 Ihl' very me of the thi ng in quCS!ion. In f.1CI, as Gilso n ha.~ phrased ii, in judgmenrs of attribu tion "is" has correctly been chosen to serve as a copula ~because all judg-menls of attri bution are meant to say how a certain thing actually is. "l~

Our text from Thomas's Commentary on the Dr Trinifflu is more or less paral-leled by rwo others ftom his Commentary on I Smfmm. In the first of these, taken from d. t9, q. h a, I, ad 7, Thomas draws the same distillCiion be(l.\'cen the imcl-lcrl's rwofold operation. Olle of these is named by some "imagination" (that is, conCept formation) or "formation" on Iht' part of the intellect, and is referred to by Aristotle as an understanding of indivisibles. The other, which some refer 10 as belief (jidn), consists in (he composition or division expressed in a propositi on, T his, of course, is what we mean by judgment. While (he first operation grasps Ihe quiddity of a thing, the second has to do with its NIt. Because tTllth as such is grounded in (,Sst rather than in qu iddity, Truth and falsity properly speaking arc found in this second intci leclUal operation and in the sign of this same operation, that is, in the proposition. l~

Thomas has offered a fuller explanation in t he corpus of Ihis same an ide of his poim concerning truth . In addition to things which enjoy their complete !x-ing (mr) outside Ihe mind, and ot hers which exist only in Ihe mind, thert~ are still Ol hers which have a foundalion in reality OUlsi de Ihl' mind, bUI which {""xiSt as such (as formally perfected) only ill the intellect. Such, for instance, is the nature of a universal or of time. Truth is still anot her example. While truth has a foundat ion in extramental reality, it is perft'ctcd as such onl)' by an act on the p:1TI of the intellcct. Moreover, since both quiddity and me are realized in a gi \'en thing, lTuth is based 011 a thillg'~ (IS( more so than on its quiddity. , 6

I~. /hi,,! and Somr Philowp},rn. p. 100. l ~. M.ndonnct w .. VoL!. p. ,,89. NOI~: - ... diccndum. quod cum ~it duplo operatio inle l

ksi , ionc ,.ej div;~i()ne proposition;s: prima opt" r~l i\) respicil quiddita!ctn rei: ~cunda n:sp;ci l = ips;"s.' For some helpfu l cummClHS on lhe usage of Ihe lelm forme/in 10 dcs ig"a ,~ k"owlcd~ by forming' conccpl SCl ionem in!d l

28 Discovery of the Subject of Metaphysics

Thomas also writes thaI it is through that same operatio n by which the intellect grasps the fflt'of a thi ng that it complCl(~s o r perfects the relation of adequation in which truth itsdf consists. '1 In Other words, it is through judgment lhat one grasps t'lU JUSt as if is through judgment that Huth, properly speaking, is realized . T hroughout Ihis discussion, therefore, Thomas has co nt rasted NJt' wit h nature o r q uidd ity. And throughoul this d iscuss ion, i'SSt' is said 10 be grasped by the intellec mal operation we know as judgment . Since ~ is conrrasted wilh quiddiry in this d iscussion, it $CCms cleat that when il is so used i1 must signif)' actual existence. It is th is which is grasped th rough judgmelll rather than through the intellect's fi rst

operation. T his being so. it also seems thaI. as ffltappeau in our leXl from Thom-as's comment oP

Discovery of [he Subject of Meraphysics 29

ccrncd Thomas imends to sign if)' aClu:!1 existcnce by his usage of thl' term t$U. He must rather mean thereby a thing's mode of existing. 11

One remark ill the same immediate co ntext from Thomas's Commentary on the De Tr initllfl!, q. ), a. j, migh t be taken as suppOrt for Regis's read ing. After writing that th e imellen's second operation looks 10 the very t"SU of a thing, Thomas ~dds that Ihis t'SSr resul tS from the unit ing of the principles of a thing in the case of composites. or accompanies the thing's nature as in the case of sim ple substances.l: How can Thomas say tha t tIll' results from the joining tOgether of the principles of a thing in the case of composites if m e means the thing's act ual exis t ence~ Is it not rat her the thing's emire being {tm} including its cssence and its ex i .~tence which resultS from the uniting of its pri nciples . th:u is, of its maner and its form ~B

Reinforcement for Regis's reading might also be sought from another parallel text from T homas's Commentary on I Smfl'1lrn (d. 38, q. t, a.. 3) . There, while seeki ng to determi ne whether God has knowledgt, of our individual judgments (t!1JUmitlbilia), Thomas again disti nguishes between a thing's quiddity and its l'ssl!

JO Discovery of [he Subject of Metaphysics

exemplar for all ot her em. And jllSt as by knowing his essence he knows every other thing, so by knowing his NU he knows tht' Nuof everything else. But , as Thomas points Ollt, chis implies no d iversity or composit ion in God since his m .. does not differ from his essence, nor does it follow from anything which is composed . Since Thomas has already argued at length elsewhere in this same Commentary on I SmrmcN that essence and rot' (existence) are not identical in creatures, we can

assume that in speaking of the nature and rsSt'of a crea ture in COntraSt wilh that of

God, he has in mind the creature's naUirc and its actual existcnee.M Hener it fo llows that this text also should be taken as implying that the intellcct grasps actual exis-tence through judgment.

St ill, against this interpretation Olle may insisl: How can Tho mas say in the last-memioned cOlllext that the rMr of a maner-form composite consists of a certllin

composition of mauer and form or of an acci

Discovery of [he Subject of Metaphys ics 31

rsu (ta ken :l$ its act of being) results fro m its essence or even that it consiSts of or is ~o/lS t' i t u{ed by Ihe union or composition of its maHel and ilS fo rm, that is, ofils essence principle. l8

At this point another disrinCl ion should be ment ioned, and one which Thomas does not al ways bring out expl icitly. [n light of what we, have now seen, it is th rough judgment Ihat we b(.'Come intellectua lly aware that th ings actually exist. Btl{ as already noted, ill Thomas's melaphysic.~, if a given subsl:lnce act ually exists, this is owing to t he presence within that thing of an intrinsic act pri nciple (flClIlHSUlldi) which actualizes its essence, is distinct from it, and enters into co mposition wi th i(. Accord ing to Thomas the distinction of this in tri nsic act of being from its co rre-spondi ng essence principle is nOt immediately evident to us, but needs co be justi -fi ed by philosoph ical argu mentat io n. T his bei ng so, one may ask: I n which of these twO closely related $Cnses is T homas using t'J5f when he writes that it is grasped th rough the intellect's second operat io n (judgment) rather than through its first oper:l!ion (simple apprehension)? Ooc.~ he si mpl> intend to Signify by eSJt thc fil et that somethi ng actually exists (i ts f.1eticity)? Or dues he also have in rn ind ,he thing's dist inct intrin ~ i c act of bcing (IICftIJ I'sJl'lIdi )?29

In our texts from T homass Commentary on the Dr Trinilflu, q. 5, 3.3 and his Commcllt"ary Oil I Smlmm (d. 19 and d. 38), he has 1I0t explicitly distinguished between these twO usages of f SU. And umil ,his point, by using the expression ":lcma! existence" in IlHerprcti ng these pa&~ages , I ha\'c ancmptcd 10 preserve in English somet hing of the ambiguity of the Lati n mi. III examining lh is issue, tWO points should be kept in mind. FiTS! of all , if a given Llling's intrinsic act of being (lIn us f'lJmdi) may be said to be constitutcd by I he principlcs of its essence i nsof:1T as it is measured and limitcd by thaI essence. mlltfltis mlHlmdis lilc same may be

t Ho For ~ br it:fbu! h~lprul discu5SiQn o f !h ;~ ~e O"'~n5 . "Aq uinas o n Knowing ExiS lenc~. " p. 18. AIS() S"" I" ffl ~m .. d . 6 . II. 2.~ , 2 . rtlpO>lJio. ,,hert. in the COUf.o;e of p,,paring to add ress tht issue conccrning whttlicr {he.e is only one mr ill Cl ltiM. Thotn~~ ~g~ in nmc. thJ r tJU'cm hc u.1ed in tWO differenr W1t ys, ei the r ~5 sign ifying d\( !.mh of ~ proposi t ion. i. c .. ~s a cupub, or d sc II that which com sponds {pmintl} to the n~llI re of ~ thi ng. Thi.1 second t1Jf is fo und in the th ing and is ~n "K IlU cm'$ re~uha !" n principIis rd. , icUl lucne ~I ~C1US lucem i~. " Thomas aga in add5 t h~t s.omelim~ rot is al~ I~hll in 3 Ihi rd way. a. =~nCC . So:

32 Discovery of {he Subject of Metaphysics

said of ils existence (elu) when this is taken in the sense of fa clicity. If this presup-poses (he presence of an intrinsic aCI of being (aclUJ nsmdi) in that thing. it also p resupposes a corresponding essence principle. The difficulty remains in determin-

ing in which of these senses Thomas is using m~ when he writes that it is grasped though judgment. Secondly, no matter how this particular que .. aioll m:l.y be an -

swerl-d. a philosophic.llly more significam poim remains. According 10 Aquin:ts,

rSJ~, when taken as a thing's intrinsic actus mmdi. cannot Ix: red uced 10 the status of another qu iddity or essence. Any such reduction would destroy its dynamic character as act and would indeed, as Gilson and others have warned, reduce

Thomas's metaphysics 10 another version of essemialism.

In 3He1l1pting to d iscern Thomas's answer to our question, we should re

Discovery of the Subject or Metaphys ics J3

Be th:H as it may, in the order of discovery an intrinsic com position and disdnc-tion of eSSC'nce and me within finite beings is not immediatclyevident 10 us in our prephi losophical experience. And since here we wish 10 develop Thomas's meta-physical thought by following the philosophical order, we need only conclude from the above that according to T homas it is through judgment that we come 10 know things as actually existing. We need nOi and shou ld not yet assume lhat a distinc-lion and composition of essen ce and act of being with in finite beings has been established. Th is can only come later, after one has already discovered b{'ing as being, (he subject of metaphysics. l3ul presupposed fo r (hat discovery, I am sug-gesting. is an initial recognition of being as real or as actually existing. And presup-posed for thaI is an initial judgment of exis[ence.}J

Allo!ll

34 Discovery of the Subject of MClaphys ics

he offers his argumentation fo r real distinction and composition of essence lnd t'su in such participating bdngs.J7 As he explains in ST l, q. 5, :1.. I, ad I, Ihe term being (m s) indicates that something is in act. But act is ordered to potency, he adds. T herefore, something is said [0 be a being (ms) in the unqualified sens

Discovery of (he Subjecr of Metaphysics 35

in other comeXls T homas stJ tes o r implies dla[ it is dHough the intelleCl's second o perJtion (judgmerl[ ) that we discover that th ings actually exisc41 The impl ication is th is. Evt"n at this pri mi ti\'!.: or preph ilosophicdl level in our understand ing of

being or o f realit),. we mUSt undcrstand something as aemal if we are 10 grasp it as

existing or as real. Before conclud ing this part icular sectio n, therefore. I would li ke 10 offer a brief

accou nt of the Steps through which o ne must pass in d iscoveri ng bei ng as real or as existing it) acco rd wi th Thom as's general theory of knowledge. Because T ho mas

has nOt spelled OUt this procedu re for us in det~ i l. m)' accoull1 must be regarded as a reconstruct ion. Others have ~I rt'ady 3nemptt'd to o ffa such reco nstructions in

accord with Thomas's thought, and Those presented by J. M:Hitai n, by R. Schmidt, and by A. M. Krapiec h~\'e p roven to be helpful. Nevertheless. my accoulll will d iffer in vario us respcClS from each of dleirs, and I must accept full respo nsibility for any $horlcomings that may rema in in i1.41

As is well known, Tho mas holds that all of ou r knowled ge begins with sense experience and must in so me wa}' be derived (rom it . ~J Supposc th:lt we have come::

into contact with one o r more objccts 3t the level of external sense perception. In

o rder for perception to occu r. in some wa}' Olle o r more external scnse power nlUS! be acted upon by the ob jecl wh ich is 10 be pcrceivcd. That there is a passive element

in percep tion is a po int repeated ly made by Aquinas. [n reacting to this impressio n from WiT hout. Ihe sense in question will directly perceive the th ing insofa r as it falls under that sense's pro)>er St'nsc object, that is, insof.-u as it is someth ing colo red, or sou ndi ng, o r smeil ing, etc. , and hence imp licitly w meth ing wh ich acts . ~4

~ I . Cf nn. 10 ~nd J I abo,c. Fo. Sti!i3ru;nhcl (anriwuistcmidl") imctpm~tion or mra, it is used in the leXIS from 'll'OIll:l5's Commentary on the Sm tmCfl Stt B. G~ I C

36 Discovery of (he Subject of Me(aphys ics

Goin g hand in hand with this, accord ing [0 Thomas, wi ll be rewgnit ion by an internal sense power known as the common sense (U1IJIIS communis) that the exter-nal senses are indeed perceiving. At the same time, this internal sense power is requ ired to account fo r the fact that, even at the level of perception, we can dist in-

guish the proper object of one external sense from that of another, for instance, that which is white from that which is sweet.' If these [wo aClivities lead Aquinas

to defend the need for the commo n sense as a distinct internal sense, the first of these also suggesrs that the common sense. may play an imponant role in our d is-

covery of the existence of extramemal things. Li ke the external senses themselves, the commo n sense presupposes that the external senses are in direct contact wi th

thei r app ropriate obj&:1S and , as noted , it also enables o ne [0 be aware that one is indeed sensing.46

Even at this levellherc seems 10 be an implicit aw:lreness o f the act ual ex istence of tilt: thing which is perceived by one or more external sense; for in being awa re

that one is sensing, one is also aware that one's power of sense perception is being acted upon by some object. Strictly speaki ng, what is perceived is an existent rather than existence as such. Hence such knowledge of existence itself is still o nly im-

pliei!. Exislence will not be singled OU I or isolatt'

Discovery of the Subject or Metaphys ics 37

According to Aqui nas's general theory of knowledge, however, other steps are

req uired for this to happen . Still :11 the level of the internal senses, another internal

sense power will produce an image or likeness in which the fo rm of the external objttt. as appropri:lle\y distinguished and o rga nizcd by the common sense. is pre-

served. This likeness is known as a phantasm and is p roduced by the internal sense known as the imag i na { ion . ~~ This phantasm in turn is submillcd to the liglll of

the intellect 's active or abmactive power, the agent intellect, which abstracts the

potentially intelligible COll[etH contained therei n from its individuating conditions

and renders it :Ictually intelligible. Th is abstracted illlcll igible cOlllcm ill turn is im pressed o n the other intellective power, the pos.~ i b l e int ellect (inullertld pom'~

bilis), and is grasped or apprehended by ir. At