8/4/13 Winckel, Anne --- "The Contextual Role of a Preamble in Statutory Interpretation" [1999] MelbULawRw 7; (1999) 23(1) Melbourne University Law Review 184

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Winckel, Anne --- "The Contextual Role of a Preamble in StatutoryInterpretation" [1999] MelbULawRw 7; (1999) 23(1) MelbourneUniversity Law Review 184

THECONTEXTUALROLEOFAPREAMBLEINSTATUTORYINTERPRETATIONIINTRODUCTIONIICONSTRUCTIVEROLEOFTHEPREAMBLEIIICONTEXTUALROLEOFTHEPREAMBLE

ACurrentStateoftheLaw1A-GvPrinceErnestAugustusofHanover2WacandovCommonwealth3ActsInterpretationActs

BEarlierStateoftheLaw1AssistingwithMeaningoftheAct2RaisinganAmbiguityintheAct

CReflectionsonthe‘NoRecourseRule’1ClarificationoftheRule2AdvocatesoftheRule3ExplanationsfortheRule

IVCONCLUSION

THE CONTEXTUAL ROLE OF A PREAMBLE IN STATUTORYINTERPRETATION

ANNEWINCKEL[*]

[Apreamblecanplaybothconstructiveandcontextualrolesinstatutoryinterpretation.Somecommentatorsandjudgeshavedisagreedoverthecontextualrole.AsmallnumberhaveadvocatedthatapreamblecouldnotevenbereferredtoaspartofthecontextofanActwithoutanambiguitybeingindependentlyidentifiedinthesubstantiveenactments.Evidencesuggeststhatthis‘rule’hasneverbeenthefavouredviewofthecourts,anditiscertainlynotanaccuratestatementofthecurrentlaw.Misconceptionsaboutthecontextualroleofapreamblecanbetracedtobothmistakenassumptionsaboutthelegalstatusofpreambles,andtheimperfectmethodsofstatutoryinterpretationcommentators.]

INTRODUCTION

Vigorousdebateatthe1998ConstitutionalConventionregardinganewpreamblefortheCommonwealthConstitutiondemonstratedtheneedforclarificationofthelegalsignificanceofthe

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preamble.[1]Inordertoevaluatetheconstitutionalsignificanceofthepreamble,itisnecessarytobeginbyexaminingthesignificanceofpreamblesinordinaryActsofParliament.Therearealsootherincentiveswhichjustifyareconsiderationofthecurrentandpaststatusofpreamblesinstatutoryinterpretation.Firstly,whileveryfewmodernstatuteshavepreambles,[2]thereissomesuggestionthatthepracticeisagainincreasing.[3]Secondly,thereismeritinreconsideringthecurrentlegalsituationinthelightof1980s’changestoAustralianActsInterpretationActs.Finally,thestatusofpreamblesinstatutoryinterpretationpriortothe1980shasbeenthesubjectofsomedispute,[4]andthisdebatemaybeclarifiedthroughfurtheranalysisofthepastroleofpreambles.

Apreambleisanamendable,descriptivecomponentofastatute,[5]anditisgenerallyplacedafterthelongtitleandbeforetheenactingwordsandthesubstantivesections.ItisausefulguidetotheintentionoftheParliamentinthatitmaydetailthemischieftowhichtheActisdirected;[6]explainthereason,purpose,objectorscopeoftheAct;[7]anddetailfactsorvalueswhicharerelevanttotheAct.[8]

Preamblescanbeseentohavebothacontextualandaconstructiveroleinstatutoryinterpretation.[9]Thecontextualroleiswherethepreambleassistswithconfirmingtheordinarymeaningoftheenactments,andassistswithdeterminingifthereisanyambiguityintheAct.Theconstructiveroleiswherethepreambleiseffectualinclarifyingormodifyingthemeaningofambiguousenactments.Whilethereissubstantialconsensusonthefunctionofapreambleinrelationtothelatterrole,thecontextualroleofapreamblehashadthemorecontestedhistory.Itisthecontextualroleofapreamblewhichistheprimaryconcernofthisarticle.RecentjudicialcommentinAustraliahasclarifiedthesignificanceofapreambleaspartofthecontextofawholeAct.[10]However,differingopinionsastowhethersuchacontextualroleexistedearlierinthiscentury—particularlyinrelationtoastatutewhichwasnotambiguous—needcloserattention.ThereisevidencetosuggestthattheproponentsofwhatIcallthe‘norecourserule’(thesuggestionthatapreamblecannotbereferredtoatallunlessanambiguityisindependentlyidentifiedinthestatute)werenotaccuratelyreflectingtheacceptedstateofthelaw.

Afterabriefsummaryoftheconstructiveroleofapreamble,IwillthenconsiderindetailtheroleofapreambleaspartofthecontextofawholeAct,bothcurrentlyandhistorically.

II CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE OF THE PREAMBLE

Theconstructiveroleofapreambleinstatutoryinterpretationrelatestotheeffectthatapreamblemayhaveinmodifyingtheordinarymeaningofsubstantiveenactmentsinastatute.Whilethereisnodoubtthatthepreamblemayplayaconstructiverolewhereambiguityexistsinthetext,theextentofthatrolewillalwaysbedependentontheindividualfactsofeachcase.[11]ChittyLJcommentedthat:‘Theeffectofthepreamblemustvaryaccordingtothegreaterorlessambiguityoftheenactingwords,andthedistinctivelanguageofthepreambleitself.’[12]

Ifthereisanambiguityinthetext,thetextmaybeclarifiedthroughreferencetothepreamble.[13]Ifthepreambleisquiteclear(itisoflittleassistanceifitisitselfambiguous),[14]thenitmay‘throwlightupon’thepreferredmeaning.[15]AsaguidetolegislativeintentandtheobjectoftheAct,thepreamblemayindicatehowvariousambiguousenactmentsmayberestrained[16]orenlarged[17]tobetterreflecttheintentionsofParliament.Thisintentionmaybediscoveredthroughvarioustypesofinformationprovidedinpreambles,suchasinformationaboutthemischieftoberemedied,themotivesbehindthelegislation,andthepurposes,objectsandscopeoftheAct.

However,justbecausethepreambleisnarrowerinscopethanasubstantivesectiondoesnotmeanthattheenactmenthastoberestrained.Wearefrequentlyremindedthatanenactmentshouldnotbeautomaticallylimitedbyvirtueofthefactthatthepreambleisnarrower.[18]Moreoftenthannotitisobviousthattheparliamentintendedtolegislatebeyondthepreamble.Likewise,awidepreambleoughtnottoautomaticallysuggestanenlargedenactment,forthelegislaturemayhavedesiredtobemorespecificinthatarea.

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Wherethereisnoambiguity,wherethetextisplainandclear,thepreamblecannotaffecttheinterpretationofthewords—eithertonarroworenlargethemeaning[19]—butthewordsmustbeconstruedaccordingtotheirordinarymeaning.[20]Thereisawell-knownrulethat‘wherethewordsofaStatuteareplainandclear,theirmeaningcannotbecutdownbyreferencetothepreamble.’[21]Similarly,theplainandclearenactmentcannotbe‘controlled’,[22]‘restrained’,[23]‘restricted’,[24]‘qualif[ied]’,[25]‘confine[d]’[26]or‘limited’[27]byanarrowerpreamble.Likewise,thepreamblemaynotbroadenaclearsubstantivesection.[28]

WhereasubstantivesectionofanActincludes‘general’words,eventhoughtheyareplain,clearandcouldbeappliedintheirordinarymeaning,neverthelesstheymaybegivenarestrictedinterpretationbythecourt.[29]Itmust,however,beclearthatthewordswereintendedtobelimited.[30]Insuchasituationwheregeneralwordsareused,referencetothepreambleisrelevanttothequestionofwhetherthewordswereintendedtobelimited,andwhatconstructionisthereforeappropriate.Duetotheapparentclarityofmanygeneralwords,itiseasytomistakenlyapplytherulethatthepreamblemaynotcutdownplainwords.However,ithasbeensuggestedthattheverynatureofthegeneralitycancreateanambiguitywhichneedsclarification.[31]Also,thegeneralityofthewordsmaybeseenasbringingintodoubtthescopeoftheAct.

Mostlaw-makersarefamiliarwiththe‘settled’ruleofstatutoryinterpretationthatapreamblecannotbeusedtocutdownorrestrainthewordsofasubstantivesectioniftheyareclearandunambiguous.However,itisimportantnottoconfusethisrulewithwhatIamcallingthe‘norecourserule’:thesuggestionthatunlessthereisanambiguity,apreamblemaynotevenbereferredtobythecourt.Theformersettledruleisclarifyingtheconstructiveroleofapreambleinstatutoryinterpretation,whereasthe‘norecourserule’issuggestingthatwithoutanambiguity,apreamblemaynothaveacontextualrole.The‘norecourserule’isthesubjectofconsiderablediscussioninPartIIIofthisarticle.

III CONTEXTUAL ROLE OF THE PREAMBLE

A Current State of the Law

Thecontextualroleofapreambleinstatutoryinterpretationrelatestothemannerinwhich,aspartofthecontextofawholeAct,apreamblemayassistinconfirmingtheordinarymeaningofenactments,orindeed,besuggestiveofalternativemeaningswhichareconsistentwiththeintentionsofthelegislature.ThecurrentstateofthelawisdefinitivelyexpressedbytheHouseofLordsinA-GvPrinceErnestAugustusofHanover,[32]andismentionedbyMasonJintheHighCourtcaseofWacandovCommonwealth.[33]ItisfurtherclarifiedbytheamendmentstomostActsInterpretationActsinthe1980s[34]andsubsequentHighCourtprecedents[35]providingforpurposiveapproachestostatutoryinterpretation.Theseauthoritiesallsupporttheideathatthepreamblemaybesurveyedaspartofthewidercontextofastatutewhendeterminingthemeaningofanysection.Theyalsosuggestthatthepreamble,aspartofthecontext,maybeusedforcheckingtoseeifanambiguityispresent.[36]Likewise,Bennionsuggeststhatitis‘unsafetoconstruetheenactmentwithoutreferencetothepreamble’.[37]Incontrast,variouscommentatorsinthepasthavesuggestedthatintheabsenceofanambiguity,apreambledoesnothaveacontextualrole.[38]Itiscontendedinthispaperthatsuchapositionisnolongerthecase,andthereisstrongevidencetosuggestthatitneverwasthelegalposition.

1 A-G v Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover

MaxwellontheInterpretationofStatutes(‘Maxwell’)[39]commentedthattherewasnowlittletobesaidaboutpreamblesininterpretation,asithadbeen‘authoritativelystated’bytheHouseofLordsinA-GvPrinceErnestAugustusofHanover(‘PrinceErnest’sCase’).[40]Whilethiscaseisanexampleofasituationwherethepreamblewasofnoassistanceinconstruingthestatutebecausethepreamblewasitselfunclear,neverthelessthejudgesgavesomedefinitiveexplanationsoftheroleofapreamblein

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statutoryinterpretation.Includedintheseexplanationswereanumberofreferencestothepreamble’sroleaspartofthecontext.Inparticular,thecaseisauthorityforthepropositionthatanActcannotbesaidtobeunambiguousuntilitisreadasawhole,includingthepreambleifthereisone.[41]

PrinceErnest’sCaseemphasisedthecontextualroleofthepreamblewithrespecttotheinitialreadingofastatute.[42]TheCourtexplainedthatstatutesshouldbereadasawholefirst,todetermineifinfacttheenactmentswereclearorambiguous.ViscountSimondsarguedthatwordscouldnotbereadinisolation,but‘theircolourandcontent[were]derivedfromtheircontext.’[43]Hewentontosaythatitwashisrightanddutytoconsiderthepreamble,ashehadtoexamineeverywordofthestatuteinitscontext.[44]ViscountSimondsfurtheraddedthat:

[N]ooneshouldprofesstounderstandanypartofastatute...beforehehadreadthewholeofit.Untilhehasdonesoheisnotentitledtosaythatitoranypartofitisclearandunambiguous.[45]

LordNormandputitasfollows:

InordertodiscovertheintentionofParliamentitisproperthatthecourtshouldreadthewholeAct,informitselfofthelegalcontextoftheAct...andofthefactualcontext,suchasthemischieftoberemedied...Itisthemerestcommonplacetosaythatwordsabstractedfromcontextmaybemeaninglessormisleading....[N]opartofastatutecanberegardedasindependentoftherest.[46]

TheprinciplesofstatutoryinterpretationexpressedinthisHouseofLordsjudgmenthavebeenapprovedbytheHighCourt,[47]andtheuseofthepreambleaspartofthecontextwasexplicitlyaffirmedbyMasonJinWacandovCommonwealth(‘Wacando’sCase’).[48]

2 Wacando v Commonwealth

Wacando’sCaseconcernedthequestionofwhetherornotcertainislandsoftheTorresStraitfellwithintheboundariesoftheStateofQueensland.TheCommonwealtharguedthattheCrownhadhadthepowertoannextoanycolonytheislandsinquestion,andthatinparticular,s2oftheAustralianColoniesAct1861(UK)[49]providedanargumentwhichallowedforsuchanannexation.[50]CarmelloWacando,aninhabitantofDarnleyIsland,arguedthatthepreambleoftheAustralianColoniesAct1861(UK)suggestedanarrowerinterpretationofthestatute,andalimittotherelevantCrownpower.MasonJagreedwiththisargument,reiteratingtheprinciplefoundinPrinceErnest’sCase:‘Theparticularsectionmustbeseeninitscontext;thestatutemustbereadasawholeandrecoursetothepreamblemaythrowlightonthestatutorypurposeandobject.’[51]

MasonJacknowledgedthatthepreambleoftheAustralianColoniesAct1861(UK)suggestedanarrowerinterpretation,ands2oftheActwas‘readilysusceptibleofthe[alternate]interpretation’.[52]Thus,anambiguitywasidentifiedandMasonJconcludedthattheActwasbestgivenalimitedinterpretation,consistentwith‘readingthe1861Actasawholeandgivingeffecttoitsexpressedobjectandpurpose’.[53]

WilsonJagreedwithMasonJthattheAustralianColoniesAct1861(UK)couldnothaveauthorisedannexationofDarnleyIslandtoQueensland,buthecametohisconclusionwithoutreferencetothepreamble.AfterreadingtheActinthecontextofthepreamble,GibbsCJcametotheoppositeconclusion—thattheActdidauthoriseannexation.UnlikeMasonJ,GibbsCJconstruedtherelevantsectionas‘plainandunambiguous’,andthereforenotabletobelimitedbythepreamble.[54]

NotwithstandingthedifferencesintheCourtinrelationtotheeffectofthe1861Act,CarmelloWacandowasnotsuccessful.Whilethe1861Actwasnotfoundtoauthorisetheannexation,theCourtwas

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unanimousthattheannexationwasvalidatedunderthelaterColonialBoundariesAct1895(UK).[55]Thedecisionwithrespecttothe1861Actwasnotessentialtothejudgment;infactBrennanandMurphyJJfailedtocommentontheissueatall.AitkinJdidnotdiscussit,butmerelyagreedwiththejudgmentoftheGibbsCJwho,inanycase,hadreliedonthe1895Acttojustifyhisdecisionintheend.Conversely,MasonandWilsonJJbothdisagreedwithGibbsCJinrelationtotheAustralianColoniesAct1861(UK),andtheytookanarrowerinterpretationoftheActconsistentwiththelegislativeintentevidentinthepreamble.[56]PearceandGeddessubmitthatMasonJ’scommentsonthecontextualroleofthepreamble,arethe‘betterview’ofthecase.[57]CertainlyMasonJ’sdescriptionoftheprincipleseemstobeconsistentwithsubsequentHighCourtprecedents,andtheapproachtointerpretationnowrequiredunderAustralianInterpretationActs.

3 Acts Interpretation Acts

Thecontextualroleofthepreambleinassistingwiththeordinarymeaningoftheenactments,andinclarifyingiftheActisclearorambiguous,isconsistentwithcurrentinterpretationlegislationpassedbymostAustralianParliaments.The1981amendmenttotheActsInterpretationAct1901(Cth)requiresthatapurposiveapproachtostatutoryinterpretationbepreferredbycourts.Section15AA(1)wasinsertedasfollows:

IntheinterpretationofaprovisionofanAct,aconstructionthatwouldpromotethepurposeorobjectunderlyingtheAct(whetherthatpurposeorobjectisexpresslystatedintheActornot)shallbepreferredtoaconstructionthatwouldnotpromotethatpurposeorobject.

AllStatesandtheAustralianCapitalTerritoryhaveenactedsimilar,ifnotidentical,provisions.[58]Section15AAcanitselfbeinterpretedintwoways:eithertorepresenttheequivalentofthe‘mischiefrule’ofinterpretation—allowingthepurposetobeconsideredwhereanambiguityexists—orestablishingthattheAct’spurposeistobeconsideredeveniftheenactmentsareclear.[59]ItisthissecondbroaderunderstandingthatseemstobeconsistentwiththecurrentapproachoftheHighCourt.DawsonJ’sanalysisoftheequivalentVictorianprovisioninMillsvMeeking[60]isanexampleoftheviewthatthepurposeofanActoughtbeconsideredevenintheabsenceofanambiguity.DawsonJexplainedthattheinterpretiveapproachimposedbys35oftheInterpretationofLegislationAct1984(Vic),‘needsnoambiguityorinconsistency;itallowsacourttoconsiderthepurposesofanActindeterminingwhetherthereismorethanonepossibleconstruction.’[61]TheHighCourt’sapproachtointerpretationinCICInsuranceLtdvBankstownFootballClubLtdisalsoconsistentwiththeprinciplethatanambiguityisnotneededforconsiderationtobegiventothepurposeofanAct,orthemischiefwhichtheActaimstoremedy:

[T]hemodernapproachtostatutoryinterpretation(a)insiststhatthecontextbeconsideredinthefirstinstance,notmerelyatsomelaterstagewhenambiguitymightbethoughttoarise,and(b)uses‘context’initswidestsensetoincludesuchthingsastheexistingstateofthelawandthemischiefwhich...onemaydiscernthestatutewasintendedtoremedy.[62]

SouthAustraliaisoneStatewhichpossiblycouldbefoundtohaveamorelimitedapproachtointerpretation,astheSouthAustralianequivalenttos15AAoftheActsInterpretationAct1901(Cth)beginswiththewords‘whereaprovisionofanActisreasonablyopentomorethanoneconstruction,aconstructionthatwouldpromotethepurpose...’[63]ThisphrasecouldsuggestthatanambiguitymustalreadybepresentbeforethecontextorpurposeoftheActbecomesrelevant.[64]Nevertheless,thereisstillacommonlawargumentthatapreamblemaybeconsideredaspartofthecontextintheinitialreadingofanActasawhole,whetherornotanambiguityexists.[65]

Theadditionofs15ABtotheActsInterpretationAct1901(Cth)in1984,expandedtheavailabilityof

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extrinsicmaterialintheinterpretationofaCommonwealthAct.Sections15AB(1)(a)and(b)bothconfirmthattheordinarymeaningofthetextistobedetermined,‘takingintoaccountitscontextintheActandthepurposeorobjectunderlyingtheAct’.ClearlythepreambleaspartoftheActisabletoassistindeterminingtheordinarymeaning.Secondly,thecontextandpurposeorobjectoftheActarerelevanttodeterminingifthetextwillleadtoaresultthatismanifestlyabsurdorunreasonable.[66]Again,allstatesandtheACT(exceptSouthAustralia)haveenactedanalogousprovisionstotheCommonwealth’ss15AB.[67]

TheHighCourthasaffirmedthatthecontextofthewholeActissignificanttodeterminingtheordinarymeaningofthewordsconstrued.Sections33and34oftheInterpretationAct1987(NSW)areequivalenttotheCommonwealth’sss15AAand15AB.InSaraswativTheQueen,[68]theHighCourthadtoconsidertheinterpretationoftheCrimesAct1900(NSW),andinsodoingMcHughJcommented(TooheyJconcurring)thatss33and34oftheInterpretationAct1987(NSW)confirmedthat,

itisalwaysnecessaryindetermining‘theordinarymeaning’ofaprovision...tohaveregardtothepurposeofthelegislationandthecontextoftheprovisionaswellastheliteralmeaningoftheprovision.[69]

McHughJfurtherexplainedthatthepurposeoflegislationcouldsometimesonlybediscoveredbyan‘examinationofthelegislationasawhole’.[70]

Inthelatterpartofthetwentiethcenturythereislittledoubtthatapreambleisusedliketherestofthecontext:tohelpestablishtheordinarymeaningofthesubstantivewordsandtobeaguidetotheintentionofthelegislature.[71]ItseemstofollowfromthisthatapreamblemayalsoassistinidentifyingambiguitiesintheActwhereanalternativeconstructioncouldbetterenacttheintentoftheParliament.Thecontextualroleofapreambleissupportedbybothlegislation,andbyconsistentcommonlawprecedents.

B Earlier State of the Law

Beforetheriseofthepurposiveapproachtostatutoryinterpretation,thecourtswerestilladoptingawholisticapproachtothereadingofstatutes,andusingthepreambleinacontextualrole.Itisevidentfromearlycases,thatlongbeforetheturnofthecentury,thepreamblewasusedtoassistwiththeordinarymeaningofthesubstantivesections.Thereisalsosomesuggestionthateventhenthepreamblewasabletopromptalternativemeaningswhichmadeevidentanyambiguitiesinthetext.

Theearlycasesthemselvesareanexcellentguidetotheviewandhabitofthecourtswithrespecttotherolethatpreambleswereabletotake.TheInterpretationAct1889(UK)[72]didnotgiveassistancewithrespecttothestatusorroleofpreambles.PrimarilytheImperialActwasconcernedwithdefiningspecificwordsandexpressions,andmadenomentionofpreamblesoranypreferredapproachtointerpretation.Veryearlycasesrevealthatfarfromrestrictingtheroleofapreamble,greatsignificancewasgiventoit.DyerCJinStowellvLordZouchisrecordedassayingthatthepreambleisa‘keytoopenthemindsofthemakersoftheAct,andthemischiefswhichtheyintendedtoredress’,andhepointedoutthat‘forthebetterapprehensionofthepurview,thepreambleoftheActistobeconsidered’.[73]LordCokeechoedthesamesentimentsinhisInstitutes,whereheagreedthatthepreambleis‘agoodmeantofindoutthemeaningofthestatute,andasitwereakeytoopentheunderstandingthereof’.[74]

1 Assisting with Meaning of the Act

ItseemsclearthatearlycourtscommonlyusedthepreambleaspartofthecontextofthewholeActtoconfirmorassistwiththeordinarymeaningofthetext.In1749,LordLeeCJstatedthat:‘Everywordofthestatutemustbeconsideredbothofthepreambleandenactingclause.’[75]TheCourtwasconsideringaclearbutbroadsectionofanAct,andinfacttheydidreadthepreambleaspartofthe

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context,toassistindeterminingtheordinarymeaningofthewords.In1828,LordTenterdenCJstatedthat:‘InconstruingActsofParliamentwearetolooknotonlyatthelanguageofthepreamble,orofanyparticularclause,butatthelanguageofthewholeAct.’[76]SirJohnNichollinBrettvBrett[77]hadsomeveryexpansivewordstosayonthesubject:

Thekeytotheopeningofeverylawisthereasonandspiritofthelaw—itisthe‘animusimponentis’,theintentionofthelaw-maker,expressedinthelawitself,takenasawhole.Hence,toarriveatthetruemeaningofanyparticularphraseinastatute,thatparticularphraseisnottobevieweddetachedfromitscontextinthestatute:itistobeviewedinconnexionwithitswholecontext—meaningbythisaswellthetitleandpreambleasthepurvieworenactingpartofthestatute.Itistothepreamblemoreespeciallythatwearetolookforthereasonorspiritofeverystatute;rehearsingthis,asitordinarilydoes,theevilssoughttoberemedied,orthedoubtspurportedtoberemovedbythestatute,andsoevidencing,inthebestandmostsatisfactorymanner,theobjectorintentionofthelegislatureinmakingandpassingthestatuteitself.[78]

Nicholl’sreverenceforcontextualinterpretationwasquotedandapprovedinPrinceErnest’sCase,whereLordSomervellexpressedhisregretthat‘thesubjectwasnotleftwhereSirJohnNichollleftitin1826.’[79]LordSomervellalsoemphasised‘onecompellingrule’:thatthe‘wholeoranypartoftheActmaybereferredtoandreliedon.’[80]

In1853,PollockCBadvocatedthenecessityofawholisticreadingofastatute:

[H]oweverplaintheapparentgrammaticalconstructionofasentencemaybe,ifitbeperfectlyclearfromthecontentsofthesamedocument...thattheapparentgrammaticalconstructioncannotbethetrueone,thenthatwhichuponthewholeisthetruemeaning,shallprevailinspiteofthegrammaticalconstructionofaparticularpartofit.[81]

WilliamCraiesconfirmsandelaboratesPollock’sprincipleinhis1892commentary,citinganumberofotherauthoritieswhichconcur.[82]Furthersupportforthecontextualroleofthepreambleisfoundin1902,whenLordThringdeclaredthat:‘TheproperfunctionofapreambleistoexplaincertainfactswhicharenecessarytobeexplainedbeforetheenactmentscontainedintheActcanbeunderstood’.[83]Thepreambleaspartofthecontextplaysanevenlargerrolewherethestatuteconcernedisapenalstatute,forsuchActsareinterpretednarrowly.[84]

2 Raising an Ambiguity in the Act

Aroundtheturnofthecentury,lessconsensusexistedwithrespecttotheroleofthepreambleinhelpingtoidentifyanyambiguitiesinasubstantivesectionoftheAct,throughraisingalternativemeaningswhichwereconsistentwiththeintentionofParliament.Itshouldberememberedthatbyraisinganambiguity,thepreambledoesnotthenautomaticallyhelptoresolveit.Theordinarymeaningofthewordsmayprevail,notwithstandingthefactthatanalternativeconstructionisidentifiedthroughreferencetothepreamble.

Thecontextualroleofthepreambleisevidentintheseriesofcasesdealingwiththe‘WillsAct’1752(Imp).[85]Thestatutorysectioninquestionincludedthewords‘anywillorcodicil’.[86]Theissuewaswhetherthesectionrelatedtorealpropertyonly(assuggestedbythepreambleandthelongtitle)or‘any’willsincludingpersonalproperty.LeesvSummersgill[87]decidedthatthewords‘anywillorcodicil’wereperfectlyplain,andcouldnotbelimitedbyreferencetothepreamble.LeesvSummersgillwasnotfollowedinBrettvBrett,[88]andwasoverruledbyEmanuelvConstable.[89]Itisclearfromthelattertwocasesthatthewords‘anywillorcodicil’werefoundtobegeneral,indefinitewords,andcapableofamorelimitedmeaning.InEmanuelvConstable,SirJohnLeachMRsaid:

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Iagreethatthepreambleofastatutecannotcontroulaclearandexpressenactment:buttheplainintentofthelegislatureisexpressedinthepreamble,andthenatureofthemischief,whichissoughttoberemedied,mayservetogiveadefiniteandqualifiedmeaningtoindefiniteandgeneralterms.[90]

Indecidingthatthewordscouldnotbeappliedintheirordinarymeaning,thecourtsreliedheavilyonthesuggestioninthepreamblethattheActwasrelatedtowillsforrealproperty,andinparticular,tofraudsinvolvinglegalwitnessestothewill.TheCourtarrivedatthealternativemeaningwhichbetterrepresentedtheintentionoftheParliament,asaresultofreadingtheActincontext,includingthepreamble.

L’ApostrevLePlaistrier[91]isanothercasewheretheword‘any’createdageneralandsoindefinitemeaning.Thecaseinvolvedanactionoftroverfordiamondsinthepossessionofabankrupt.Thediamondswereleftinthekeepingofapersonwhosubsequentlywentbankrupt,andthelawprovidedforthedisposalof‘anygoodsorchattels’whichthebankrupthadintheirpossession.[92]TheCourthadtodetermineifthestatuteappliedonlytothegoodsofthebankrupt,oralsotogoodswhichwerebeingheldinsafekeepingforanother.ThedecisionwasthatthenarrowerwordsofthepreambleshouldrestricttheActasthepreamblespokeonlyofthebankrupt’sgoods,andsointhiscasethejewelswerenotliabletothebankruptcy.[93]InRyallvRowles,[94]theCourthadtoconstruethesamestatute,andtheycametotheidenticalconclusionaboutthemeaningofthewords‘anygoodsorchattels’.LordParkerCBsaid:

Iadmitinmanycasesthepreamblewillnotrestrainthegeneralpurview...Butitisarule,andsoagreedthere,thatwherethenotrestrainingthegeneralityoftheenactingclausewillbeattendedwithinconvenience,itshallrestrain.[95]

Asthesecasesinvolvedgeneralwords,onemightarguethatinfacttheyconcernedambiguousstatutes,[96]andwerethusuncontroversialintheirreferencetothepreambles.However,onemightequallyarguethattheplaingeneralwordsofthestatuteswouldhavebeenappliedliterally,butforthealternativeinterpretationspromptedbythepreambles.

AnexampleofwherethegeneralanduniversalwordsofthestatutewerenotrestrictedbythepreambleisTheSussexPeerageCase.[97]ThatcaseinvolvedtheinterpretationoftheRoyalMarriageAct1772(Imp),[98]andparticularlywhetheroverseasmarriageshadtocomplywiththerulerequiringmarriagesoftheKing’sdescendantstobegivenroyalconsent.Thewords‘contractingmatrimony’werefoundtobegeneralanduniversal,buttheywereneverthelessgiventheirplainmeaning.Itisnoteworthythatthisconstructionwasfoundtobeconsistentwiththepreamble,theobjectoftheAct,andthemischiefintendedtobeprevented.[99]Inthiscasethepreamblewasusedinitscontextualroletoconfirmtheordinarymeaningofthewords.

C Reflections on the ‘No Recourse Rule’

ThereiscurrentlylittledoubtthatapreamblemustbereadaspartofthecontextofthewholeAct,andmayinfactraisedoubtsaboutthemeaningofsubstantivesections.Thereisalsoevidencethatearlycourtscommonlyusedthepreambleinthiscontextualrole.However,asmallnumberofjudgesandcommentatorsrejectthishistoricalclaim,andsuggestthatnoreferencecouldbemadetothepreambleofanActunlesstherewasalreadyanambiguityevidentinasubstantivesection.ThisisastrictviewofinterpretationwhichIamcallingthe‘norecourserule’.Inessence,theruleisthatunlessthereisanindependentlyestablishedambiguityinasubstantivesectionoftheAct,thepreamblemaynotbereferredto.Thisrulecompletelyprohibitsacontextualroleforthepreambleifanambiguityhasnotindependentlybeenidentified.TheautomaticresultofthisruleisthatthepreamblecanneveritselfraiseorsuggestanambiguityinthesubstantivetextofanAct,andnorcanthepreambleplayaconstructiveroleintheinterpretationofenactmentswhichseemclearwhenreadinisolation.Whilethereisnodoubtthatsuchaviewwasheldbysome,theweightofthejudicialauthoritysupportsthe

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historicalvalidityofthecontextualroleofthepreambledescribedabove.Tounderstandthedebate,itisusefultoclarifythemeaningofthe‘norecourserule’,andidentifyandanalyseitsvariousadvocates.

1 Clarification of the Rule

Firstly,itisimportantnottoconfusetheadvocatesofthe‘norecourserule’withthosewhoaremerelyrepeatingthe‘settledrule’that‘thepreamblecannotbemadeuseoftocontroltheenactmentsthemselveswheretheyareexpressedinclearandunambiguousterms.’[100]Thislatterruleisnotprohibitingreferencetothepreamble,butratherprohibitinguseofthepreambleinitsconstructiveroleinaffectingthemeaningofclearsubstantivesections.Thelegalmeaningofcontrolisto‘restrain’or‘overrule’[101]—itcannotbetakentomeanthatthepreambleisirrelevant,orthatitcannotassistwiththeenactmentsbyeitherconfirmingtheirmeaningorraisingdoubtsabouttheirmeaning.TheEarlofHalsburyLCalsoreflectsontheconstructiveroleofthepreambleinPowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd(‘Powell’sCaseII’):

Twopropositionsarequiteclear—onethatapreamblemayaffordusefullightastowhatastatuteintendstoreach,andanotherthat,ifanenactmentisitselfclearandunambiguous,nopreamblecanqualifyorcutdowntheenactment.[102]

Whilethisstatementincludesanothergoodexampleofthesettledruleofconstructionthatapreamblemaynotrestrainaclearenactment,ithasbeenmistakenlycitedasevidenceofthe‘norecourserule’.[103]Infact,anumberofjudgesfrombothPowell’sCases(CourtofAppeal1897;HouseofLords1899)actuallyreliedonthepreambleoftheBettingAct1853(UK)[104]toindicatethattheword‘place’intheActneededlimiting.[105]Furthermore,LordShandoftheHouseofLordswentsofarastosaythatnotwithstandinganyambiguityinthestatute,‘thetermsofthepreamblearesoclearastotheobjectandintendedscopeofthestatutethatthejudgment,eveninthatview,mustbegiveninfavouroftherespondents.’[106]

MasonJinWacando’sCaserecognisedthepotentialconfusionbetweenthetwoideas:

Ithasbeensaidthatwheretheenactingpartofastatuteisclearandunambiguousitcannotbecutdownbythepreamble.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatacourtcannotobtainassistancefromthepreambleinascertainingthemeaningofanoperativeprovision.Theparticularsectionmustbeseeninitscontext;thestatutemustbereadasawholeandrecoursetothepreamblemaythrowlightonthestatutorypurposeandobject.[107]

In1792,GroseJgaveasimilarexplanationinCrespignyvWittenoom:‘Thoughthepreamblecannotcontroultheenactingclause,wemaycompareitwiththerestoftheAct,inordertocollecttheintentionoftheLegislature’.[108]Itisessentialtodifferentiatebetweentheconstructiveroleandthecontextualroleofapreamble.[109]

Secondly,the‘norecourserule’mustbedistinguishedfromtheoftenrepeatedstatementthatrecoursemaybehadtothepreambletohelpresolveanambiguityinthetext.Forinstance,LordJamesstatedthat,

ifthewordingofthestatutegivesrisetodoubtsastoitsproperconstruction,thepreamblecanbeandoughttobereferredtoinordertoarriveattheproperconstructiontobeputupontheenactingportionofthestatute.[110]

Suchastatementisinthemannerofapermissiontouseapreambleinitsconstructiverole.ItisinnowayintendedtobeaprohibitiononusingthepreambleaspartofthecontextoftheAct.Itisnaturalthatifthereisanambiguity,thenwewillbedirectedtothepreamble(orperhapsextrinsicaids)tohelpresolvetheinterpretation.Nevertheless,suchanexhortationisnotsuggestingthatunlessthereisan

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ambiguity,thepreamblemaynotbereferredto—asisthecasewiththeadvocatesofthe‘norecourserule’below.Similarly,thewordsofLordTindalCJinTheSussexPeerageCasecanbeunderstoodasapermissionandnotaprohibition:

[I]fanydoubtarisesfromthetermsemployedbytheLegislature,ithasalwaysbeenheldasafemeanofcollectingtheintention,tocallinaidthegroundandcauseofmakingthestatute,andtohaverecoursetothepreamble.[111]

Indeed,farfromignoringthepreamblebecausethetextwasclear,LordTindalCJ’sjudgmentitselfmadeconsiderableuseofthepreambleinitscontextualrole.ApreamblewasoftenreadbyjudgesaspartofthecontextofanAct,butthendisregardedasaninterpretivetool,whenthetextitselfwasfoundtobesufficientlyclear.[112]Suchjudgmentsrecognisedthatenactmentssometimeshaddeliberateapplicationtothingsotherthanthosementionedbythepreamble,andthatthemeaningofthestatuteshouldnotinthosecasesberestrainedorenlargedjustbecausethepreamblewasdifferentinscope.Nevertheless,thecourtscommonlyemployedthepreambleinitscontextualrole,evenintheabsenceofanambiguity.

2 Advocates of the Rule

The‘norecourserule’isadirectprohibitiononanyreferencetothepreambleintheabsenceofambiguityonthefaceofthestatute,andithasanumberofapparentproponents.TwojudgesfromthePowell’sCases,[113]CraiesonStatuteLaw,[114]Craven,[115]CrossonStatutoryInterpretation[116]andHalsbury’sLawsofAustralia[117]allseemtoadvocatesomeformoftherule.

Forinstance,inPowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd(‘Powell’sCaseI’),RigbyLJoftheCourtofAppealstatedthattheenactingclausesweretobedealtwithfirst,‘unlesstherebesomeambiguitywhich[made]itpermissibletorefertothepreamble.’[118]LordDaveycommentedinthesubsequent1899HouseofLordsdecisionthat:

[T]hepreambleisakeytothestatute,andaffordsacluetothescopeofthestatutewhenthewordsconstruedbythemselveswithouttheaidofthepreamblearefairlycapableofmorethanonemeaning.Thereis,however,anotherruleorwarningwhichcannotbetoooftenrepeated,thatyoumustnotcreateorimagineanambiguityinordertobringintheaidofthepreambleorrecital.[119]

ItisessentialtonotethatbothRigbyLJandLordDaveyweredeliveringdissentingjudgments.NoothermemberoftheHouseofLordsortheCourtofAppealconcurredwithRigbyLJ’sviewthattheenactedwordsoughttobereadfirst.Indeed,ALSmithLJexpresslyadvisedthatthepreamble‘must’bereadfirst.[120]NordidtheyconcurwithLordDavey’swarningaboutnotimagininganambiguitytobringintheaidofthepreamble.Infact,inPrinceErnest’sCase,ViscountSimondsspecificallyrejectedLordDavey’smannerofdescribingtheprocess:

Tosay,then,thatyoumaynotcallinaidthepreambleinordertocreateanambiguityineffectmeansverylittle,and,withgreatrespecttothosewhohavefromtimetotimeinvokedthisrule,Iwouldsuggestthatitisbetterstatedbysayingthatthecontextofthepreambleisnottoinfluencethemeaningotherwiseascribabletotheenactingpartunlessthereisacompellingreasonforit.[121]

Theemphasisisonthefactthatatextoughtnotautomaticallybeaffectedbyaninconsistentpreamble.Acompellingreasonisnecessaryforthepreambletoberelevant.A‘compellingreason’maybeunderstoodasanunambiguouspreamblewhichclearlyrevealstheintentionofParliamentwithrespecttotheenactmentinquestion,andanenactmentwhosewordscanlegitimatelybearthealteredinterpretation.

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CraiesonStatuteLawalsoappearstosupportthe‘norecourserule’.Since1892,everyeditionofthecommentary(‘Craies’)hasrepeatedthephrase:

[T]hegeneralrulewithregardto[thepreamble’s]effectupontheenactingpartofthestatutehasalwaysbeenthatifthemeaningoftheenactmentisclearandunequivocalwithoutthepreamble,thepreamblecanhavenoeffectwhatever.[122]

Whilein1892thisstatementcouldinitiallybetakentoapplytothesettledruleabouttheconstructiveroleofthepreamble—thatapreamblecouldnotrestrainclearenactments—astimepassedthevariouseditionsofCraiesrefinedthetextsurroundingthis‘generalrule’statement,sothatitincreasinglyseemedtoadvocatethe‘norecourserule’.Forinstance,Craies(2nded,1892)followsthis‘generalrule’statementwithadescriptionofOverseersofWestHamvIles.[123]Thatcaseisnotstrongsupportforthe‘norecourserule’.[124]Craies(3rded,1901)[125]followsthis‘generalrule’statementwiththequotefromtheEarlofHalsburyLC’sjudgmentinPowell’sCaseII.[126]Asdetailedabove,theEarlofHalsburyLC’scommentisindicativeofthesettledrulethatapreamblecannotrestrainaclearenactment.[127]Craies(3rded,1901)thengoesontoquotefromtheonlyclearprecedentsupportingthe‘norecourserule’—thejudgmentofLordDaveyinPowell’sCaseII.[128]ThispreferenceforthedissentingjudgmentofLordDaveycarriesrightthroughtoCraies(7thed,1971),whereLordDaveyisquotedtwice,[129]eventhoughheisnotsupportedbythemajorityjudgments.

Increasingsupportforthe‘norecourserule’intheCraies’commentariesissimilarlyindicatedbytheselectivereferencemadetoPrinceErnest’sCase.Craies(7thed,1971)quotesthejudgmentofViscountSimondsregardingtheneedfora‘compellingreason’[130]beforeallowingthepreambletoinfluencethemeaningofthestatute.[131]However,CraiesomitstomakeanyreferencetoSimonds’extensiveremarksonthecontextualroleofthepreamble.[132]

Craies(7thed,1971)alsosupportsthe‘generalrule’statement(aboutthepreamblehaving‘noeffectwhatever’)withfootnotereferencestoWardvHolman[133]andEtonCollegevMinisterofAgriculture.[134]ThefootnotereferenceinCraies(7thed,1971)[135]toWardvHolmanquotesthemisleadingheadnoteratherthanthejudgment.[136]ThereferencetoEtonCollegevMinisterofAgriculturesuggeststhatWilberforceJheldthat‘astheenactingsectionwasunambiguous,thepreamblemustbeignored’.[137]Thissummaryofthejudgmentisincorrect.WilberforceJcertainlyconsideredthepreamblestotheEcclesiasticalLeasesAct1571(Eng),[138]buthefoundthatthepreambletos3oftheActwasinitself‘farfromclear’,andthatbeingambiguous,thepreamblecouldnotrestricttheclearenactments.[139]

OtherthanLordDavey’sdissentingjudgmentfromPowell’sCaseII,Craies(7thed,1971)haslittleotherjudicialsupportforthe‘norecourserule’.

InthecourseofdiscussingthesignificanceofthepreambleoftheConstitutionActtothesecessionofanAustralianState,Craven,in1984,stronglyendorsedthe‘rule’that,‘recoursemayonlybehadtothepreambleintheeventthatthewordsofthesectionunderconsiderationhavefirstbeenfoundtobeunclearorambiguous’;[140]andlater:

Thepreamblewouldthereforenotevenbeconsultedifthewordsofthesectionunderconsiderationdidnotrevealanambiguity.Thus,inthecaseofclearwords,thepreamblewasignored.[141]

Cravenmadeitclearthatthis‘rule’appliedtotheroleofpreamblesasaffectinginterpretation,asclarifyingthemischieftoberemediedandpurposefortheAct,andasassistingwithcontext.Inotherwords,inCraven’sanalysis,neitherthecontentofthepreamble,thecontextofthepreamble,northepreambleasanaidtointerpretationcouldberelevantorreferredto,unlessthesubstantivesectionwasfoundtobeindependentlyambiguous.

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ItisimportanttonotethatCravenwaswritingbeforethe1984amendmenttotheActsInterpretationAct1901(Cth),[142]andhewasnotwritingwiththebenefitofrecentjudicialcommentsonthepurposiveapproachtostatutoryinterpretation.Althoughhisviewofthepreamble’sroleappearstohaveremainedunchangedin1986,[143]hehasmorerecentlyacknowledgedthatthe‘norecourserule’isnotrepresentativeofthecurrentstateofthelaw.[144]Craven’sinitialrejectionofthecontextualroleofthepreamblecanbeattributedtoanover-relianceonCraies(7thed,1971).[145]Cravenalsocitedcasesinsupportofthe‘norecourserule’whichactuallyproposeeitherthesettledruleofconstructionthatapreamblecannotrestrainaclearenactment,[146]orthestatementofpermissiontousethepreamblewhenneededtoresolveanambiguity.[147]Forinstance,CravencitesBowtellvGoldsbrough,Mort&CoLtd(‘Bowtell’sCase’)[148]insupportofthe‘norecourserule’.Afteracceptingthesettledprinciplethatthepreamblecannotcutdowntheclearwordsofanenactment,GriffithCJwentontousethepermissivelanguage‘[b]utif’ratherthantheprohibitivelanguage‘[o]nlywhere’suggestedbyCraven.GriffithCJ’scommentwas:

Butifthewordsareuncertainasappliedtothesubjectmatter,andmaybearmorethanonemeaning,thenyoumay,inapropercase,refertothepreambletoascertainwhatwastheoccasionforthealterationofthelaw.[149]

Craven’sinterpretationofBowtell’sCaseisthatGriffithCJproposedthat,‘theplainwordsofanenactmentcould“neverbeaffected”bythepreamble.Onlywherethewordsthemselveswereuncertain...wouldthepreamblebeconsulted.’[150]GriffithCJ’sjudgmentisnotastrongauthorityforCraven’s‘rule’.

CrossonStatutoryInterpretation(3rded,1995)(‘Cross’)likewiseadvocatesthe‘norecourserule’:

Ifthesolecauseofdoubt[abouttheclearmeaningofanenactment]isadisparitybetweentheotherwiseclearandunambiguouswordsandatitle,preamble,headingorside-note,thejudgemustdisregardhisdoubtsandapplytheotherwiseclearandunambiguouswords...althoughthepartsofthestatutewhichdonotenactanythingmaybeconsultedasaguidetoParliamentaryintentandhencetothemeaningoftheenactedwords,effectmustnotbegiventoanydoubtswhichtheymayraiseaboutthemeaningofthosewords.[151]

ThisstatementisnotspecificallyrelevanttotheAustraliancontext,asCrossisarelativelymodernEnglishtext.ItwasalsowritteninthecontextofthefactthatUKActsInterpretationlegislationhadnotbeenamendedtorequireapurposiveapproachtostatutoryinterpretation.[152]Nevertheless,itisinstructivetolookatthestatementinCrossasitisindicativeofatypicalviewofthecommonlaw.Thebasicpropositionisthattheplainmeaningofanenactmentwillprevailoveradoubtcreatedonlybythepreamble,title,headingorside-note.Thestatementseemstoassumethatthereisasimilaritybetweenrulesaboutpreambles,andstatutoryinterpretationprinciplesregardingheadingsandside-notes.Thelattertwoelementsofastatuteareunamendabledescriptivecomponents,andtherehasneverbeenanysuggestionthatheadingsandside-notescouldraiseanambiguityinanAct.Ontheotherhand,whenCrosslaterdealsspecificallywithpreambles,thereisaclearcontradiction.ThecommentaryaffirmstheruleinPrinceErnest’sCase,whichprovidedthatacourtcouldnotbecertainthattheenactmentswereunambiguousuntilthewholeActhadbeenreadinthecontextofthepreamble.[153]ItseemsthattheattitudeinCrosstowardthe‘norecourserule’isitselfambiguous.

Finally,theconfusionwhichcanresultfromnotclearlyarticulatingthevariousprinciplesisevidentinthebriefcommentfoundinHalsbury’sLawsofAustralia:

Thepreamblehasbeenheldtobepartofthestatuteandthusallowsthecourt,whereambiguityinthetextexists,toexamineitforthecolourandcontextofthewholestatute.[154]

Atfirstglancethissummarysuggeststhatanambiguityisnecessarybeforethecontextualroleofthe

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preamblemaybeemployed.However,ofthesixreferencesthatarecited,onlyoneofthemactuallysupportsthe‘prohibition’.ThatoneauthorityisLordDaveyfromPowell’sCaseII,andhisargument,asalreadydiscussed,isputaspartofanisolateddissentingjudgment.[155]Also,thewordsquotedabovefromHalsbury’sLawsofAustraliaregardingthe‘colourandcontextofthewholestatute’seemtohavetheirorigininastatementbyViscountSimondsinPrinceErnest’sCase:‘Forwords,andparticularlygeneralwords,cannotbereadinisolation:theircolourandcontentarederivedfromtheircontext.’[156]ThestatementofthelawinHalsbury’sLawsofAustraliamaybebetterunderstoodasanattempttosummariseboththecontextualandconstructiveroleofapreambleinonesuccinctstatement.Unfortunately,inthisinstance,thebrevitycanleadtoambiguity.

Eachoftheseadvocatesofthe‘norecourserule’canbeunderstoodmoreaccuratelywhenconsideredinthebroadercontextofstatutoryinterpretationanditsdiversesetofprinciples.

3 Explanations for the Rule

Thereareanumberofexplanationsfortheexistenceofthe‘norecourserule’,includingmistakenassumptionsabouttheroleofpreambles,mistakenassumptionsaboutthelegalstatusofpreambles,theriseoflegalformalism,andtheimperfectmethodsofcommentators.

Oneofthereasonswhytherehasbeenconfusionbothaboutwhenitispermissibletorefertothepreambleandwhenitispermissibletousethepreambletoconstruetheenactments,isbecauseofthetendencytoassumethatthepreambleisirrelevantintheabsenceofadisputedinterpretation.Weoughtnotforgetthatthepreamblehasavarietyofroles.Asadeclarationofinformation,[157]thepreambleconstantlyinformsthereaderoflegislationthroughoutthelifeoftheAct,perhapsneverbecomingsubjecttolitigationatall.However,whenadisputearisesaboutthemeaningofasubstantivesection,thentheremaybeargumentaboutwhatrolethepreambleshouldplay.Intheeventofanambiguity,itisnaturalthatthemischieftoberemediedorthelegislativeintentwillbesought,thusimmediatelyfocussingattentiononthepreamble.Butonecouldarguethatreferencetothepreambletothrowlightonanambiguityisnotthepreamble’sprimaryrole.Preamblesarenotputintoplaceonlytoassistwhenthingsbecomeunclear.Fundamentally,theyaretheretoinformthecommunitythroughouttheoperationofthelaw.Itisanarrowviewtoalwaysconsidertheroleofpreamblesintermsofdisputedmeanings.

AnotherincorrectassumptionwhichhasencouragedlimitationsonreferencetothepreambleistheassumptionthatthepreambleisnotpartoftheAct.Whilethispropositionisclearlyincorrect,[158]certainrestrictiveattitudestoreadingpreamblescanbetracedtoit.AnUnitedStatescommentary,StatutesandStatutoryConstructionbyJGSutherland(‘Sutherland’),reflectsonthisconnection.[159]Sutherlandsuggeststhatruleswhichrestrictreferencetothepreambleare‘foundedonthemisconceptionthatthepreamble,becauseitprecedestheenactingclause,isnotenactedbythelegislature.’[160]SutherlandremindsthereaderthatthereisnodoubtthatapreambleispartoftheAct,andthetextgoesontosuggestthat:‘Moreaccurateinterpretationswillbeachievedifthepreambleisconsideredthesameastheenactedpartofthelawandthe“wholeact”mannerofinterpretationisfollowed.’[161]

ApreambleisclearlyidentifiedinthecommonlawaspartoftheActofParliament,[162]butnotpartofthelaw-makingportionoftheAct.[163]AnActofParliamentcanbedividedintothreemainparts:theoperativecomponents(includingthesectionsandschedules);theamendabledescriptivecomponents(includingthelongtitle,thepreamble,andtheshorttitle);andtheunamendabledescriptivecomponents(includingthemarginalnotes,thepunctuationandthesectionalheadings).[164]Traditionally,unamendablecomponentshavehadlesssignificanceinrelationtostatutoryinterpretation,asthesesectionsoftheActarenotformallydiscussedbytheParliament(theyaregenerallyfinalisedbythelegislativedraftersaftertheBillhasbeenpassed).Incomparison,thepreamblehasbeenseenasareliablesourceoftheintentionofParliament,asitissubjectto

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parliamentarydebate.[165]

Halsbury’sLawsofEnglandsuggeststhatpreambleshavebeenacceptedasapartofthestatutesincethemiddleofthenineteenthcentury.[166]SalkeldvJohnsonprovidesthat‘thepreambleisundoubtedlyapartoftheact,andmaybeusedtoexplainit’.[167]Thereissomeevidenceinpreviouscenturiesthatthepreamblewasoncenotconsideredpartofthestatute,[168]butsuchcaseshavelongbeenconsideredbadprecedents.[169]BenniongoessofarastosuggestthatjudgeshaveneverdoubtedthatthepreamblewaspartoftheAct.[170]However,itiscertainlytruethattitlesofstatuteswereoncenotconsideredpartoftheAct,becausetheywereinitiallyaddedbythejudgesforclarity,asParliamentdidnotoriginallysupplyatitle.[171]

ThediscreditedideathatthepreambleisnotpartoftheActmaywellexplaintheconvictionofsomeoftheadvocatesofthe‘norecourserule’.[172]Theirviewthatreferencetothepreambleoughttoberestrictedcanbelikenedtothesimilarrulewhichappliedtousingextrinsicsources.Accesstosourcesoutsidethe‘fourcornersoftheAct’waseitherprohibitedaltogether(suchasreferencetoHansard),orrestrictedtooccasionswherethemischieftoberemedied,ortheintentionofParliamentwasrequiredtoresolveanambiguity(suchasreferencetothehistoryofthelegislationasprovidedforbythe‘mischiefrule’).[173]Infact,thewordsofRigbyLJ—thattheenactingclausesweretobedealtwithfirst,unlesstherewasanambiguitywhichmadeit‘permissibletorefertothepreamble’[174]—arereminiscentofthetraditionalmischiefruleasproposedbyHeydon’sCase.[175]However,thereisacleardifferencebetweenidentifyingthepurposeofanActthroughreferencetothepreamble,andgoingbeyondthefourcornersoftheActtoextrinsicsources.[176]

Likewise,Craven’suseofthephrase‘manifestambiguity’suggestsamisleadingcorrelationbetweentheprinciplesgoverningpreambles,andtheoldrulesaboutextrinsicsources.Craven,inhis1984article,suggestedthatbothDixonvTodd[177]andPresidentetcoftheShireofArapilesvBoardofLand&Works[178]wereexamplesoftheHighCourtapprovingTheSussexPeerageCase[179]for‘thepropositionthatthepreambletoastatutecouldonlybeemployedinthecaseofmanifestambiguity.’[180]Neithercaseinvolvedtheissueofapreamble,andneithermentionedtheideaof‘manifestambiguity’.However,bothcasesdiddiscusstheconceptof‘manifestabsurdity’,[181]andthisismostlikelythesourceofCraven’sphrase.However,generallycourtshavemadeitclearthateven‘doubt’aboutthemeaningofanenactmentisenoughtobecalled‘ambiguous’,[182]andthereisnojudicialauthoritytosupporttheideathata‘manifestambiguity’isnecessarytoallowthepreambletoplayitsconstructiverole.Authorityvaries,butambiguityhasbeensaidtoexistwherethereare:equivocalwords;[183]doubtsastotheproperconstruction;[184]twopossibleconstructions;[185]tworivalconstructions;[186]or,suchgeneralwordsthattheycouldapplyuniversallyorbelimited.[187]

Likeextrinsicsources,marginalnoteshaveneverbeenconsideredpartofanAct,andforalongtimeneitherwereheadings.[188]Nevertheless,commentariessuchasCross(3rded,1995)sometimestreatpreamblesinthesamemannerasheadingsorside-notes.[189]ThisisagainsuggestiveofthemisconceptionthatthepreambleisnotpartoftheAct.

Cross(3rded,1995)furthersuggeststhattherulesregardingtheuseofpreamblesininterpretationareidenticaltotherulesregardingstatutorylongtitles.[190]EarliercommentariessuchasMaxwell(1sted,1875)andCraies(2nded,1892)treatlongtitlesandpreamblesquiteseparately.Bothearlycommentariesagreethatthetitlewasnotpartofthestatute,andoughtnotbeconsideredwhenconstruingthestatute.[191]Conversely,Maxwell(1sted,1875)andCraies(2nded,1892)bothemphasisethatpreambleshavehadalonghistoryofbeingfavouredbythecourtasaninterpretivetool,andthatpreamblesare‘undoubtedlypartoftheAct.’[192]InPowell’sCaseI,thetitleandpreambleareclearlydistinguishedfromeachotherbythefactthatthetitleisnotconsideredpartoftheAct.[193]Thereisevidencethatin1854,thepracticeoftheHouseofCommonswaschangedtoallowtheHousetoamendthetitle.[194]ThetitlesofallstatutespassedbeforethatdatecouldinnowayhavebeenconsideredpartoftheAct.AswithextrinsicsourceswhichdidnotformpartoftheAct,referencetothe

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titlewasoriginallylimitedtooccasionswhereanambiguityalreadyexisted.[195]Thetendencytotreattitlesandpreamblesalikeisamorerecentpractice.[196]Totreatpreamblesinthesamemannerastitlesisbasedonanothermisleadingassumption.

The‘norecourserule’isalsothenaturalconsequenceofanallegiancetoastrictlyformalapproachtostatutoryinterpretation.Withtheriseofpositivism,courtswereincreasinglyemphasisingthespecificoperativewordsofanAct,ratherthanotherevidenceofthe‘intentionofthelegislature’whichwaslessquantifiable.MasonJdirectlycriticisedthisnarrowliteralapproach:

Problemsoflegalinterpretationarenotsolvedsatisfactorilybyritualincantationswhichemphasizetheclarityofmeaningwhichwordshavewhenviewedinisolation,divorcedfromtheircontext.Themodernapproachtointerpretationinsiststhatthecontextbeconsideredinthefirstinstance...[197]

Itisnotsurprisingthatcourtswhichabidedbyastrictlypositivistapproachtolawwouldchoosetoonlyconsiderwordsinisolation.LordTindalCJinTheSussexPeerageCaseappearedtosupportsuchapractice.Heexplainedthat,

theonlyrulefortheconstructionofActsofParliamentis,thattheyshouldbeconstruedaccordingtotheintentoftheParliamentwhichpassedtheAct.Ifthewordsofthestatuteareinthemselvespreciseandunambiguous,thennomorecanbenecessarythantoexpoundthosewordsintheirnaturalandordinarysense.[198]

Certainly,LordTindalCJseemstobeexpressinganarrowliteralviewofinterpretation.Indeed,itisagenerallyacceptedprinciplethatclearwordsarethebestindicationofParliament’sintention,butwemustalsorememberthatthereisconsiderableauthorityforthepracticeoflookingfortherealintentionofthelegislatureinthe‘wholeAct’[199]orthe‘statuteitself’,[200]includingboththepreambleandtheenactments.[201]Furthermore,whileLordTindalCJ’swordsseemtosuggestastrictlyliteralapproach,hisactualjudgmentisfarmoreflexible,makingreferencetothepreambleaspartofthecontext.[202]Inanycase,eventhemostformalapproachtostatutoryinterpretationcannotdenythatthemeaningofanEnglishwordisoftenonlydiscerniblethroughitscontext.

Finally,theexistenceofthe‘norecourserule’cantosomeextentbeexplainedbytheordinarymethodsofcommentators.Bynatureoftheiractivity,commentatorsonstatutoryinterpretationprefertopresentasuccinctsetofrules,ratherthanadiversesetofcontradictoryprinciples.Thus,mostcommentatorsliketospeakintermsof‘rules’,andtheydividetheiranalysisintotwoparts:whenthewordsareplain,andwhenthewordsarenotplain.[203]Thisdivisioncanbeanartificialconstructionwhichincreasesthelikelihoodofinflexible‘rules’beingassociatedwithonlyoneofthesecategories.Forinstance,inCraies(2nded,1892)theauthorusedamarginalnotewhichsaid:‘Butiflanguageisnotclear’;whereasthetextofthecommentaryactuallysaid:‘Iftheobjectormeaningofanenactmentisnotclear’.[204]Aspreamblesaregenerallynotassociatedwiththecommentaryon‘whenthewordsareplain’,theresultinginferencesencouragethosewhoadvocatethe‘norecourserule’.

Also,caremustbetakentonotusethelanguageofcommentators(ratherthanthelanguageofthecourts)whendescribingtherulesofstatutoryinterpretation.Commentatorsarefrequentlytryingtosummarisevastamountsofinformationintoonetext,andoccasionallymayprovidesummarieswhichmisleadduetotheirbrevity.ThestatementfromHalsbury’sLawsofAustraliamentionedaboveregardingtheexaminationofthepreamble‘whereambiguityinthetextexists’isanexampleofsuchasummary.[205]ItisinstructivetonotethatHalsbury’sLawsofAustraliagivesonlyfivesentencesofinformationonpreambles.Itisanexceedinglycondensedanalysiswhichmayinevitablyleadtoincorrectinferences.

Anothercommonhabitincommentarieswhichcanleadtoerroneousinferencesisassociatedwiththepracticeofreprintingcommentariesovermanydecades,withavarietyofauthors.Authorsovertime,

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tendtoaddnewinformationtothecommentarywithoutsubstantiallychangingthesurroundingcontext.AnexampleofthisisseeninacommentarybyPearceandGeddes,whereafterWacando’sCase[206]wasdecided,theyinsertedintotheircommentaryasignificantquotefromMasonJonthecontextualroleofthepreamble.[207]However,becausethereferencetoWacando’sCasewasinserteddirectlyafterapre-existingquotefromGriffithCJinBowtell’sCase,[208]theinformationcommunicatedonthecontextualroleofthepreamblehasapotentiallymisleadingcontext.ThePearceandGeddestextcouldconceivablyresultintheperceptionthatthecontextualroleofthepreambleisincompatiblewithsettledrulesabouttheconstructiveroleofthepreamble.[209]

Notwithstandingthevariousmisconceptionsaboutpreambles,thetendencyofsomejudgestowardsahighlyliteralapproachtointerpretation,andthemisleadinglanguageofsomecommentaries—thecommonpracticeofjudgeshasbeentohaverecoursetothepreambleevenwhenthemeaningisplain.Thisisthecontextualroleofthepreamble.IfthemeaningoftheenactmentsremainedunambiguousinthecontextofthepreambleandthewholeAct,thentherewasnoneedtoemploythepreambleinitsconstructiveroletorefinethemeaningoftheAct.ThiscommonpracticeinstatutoryinterpretationcasesisfarfromthesuggestionthatnorecoursemaybehadtothepreambleunlessanambiguityisindependentlyidentifiedintheAct.

IV CONCLUSION

Preambleshaveacontextualaswellasaconstructiveroleinstatutoryinterpretation.Preamblesarepartofthewidercontextofastatute,andshouldbereferredtoduringtheinitialreadingofanActasawhole.Thepreamblemay,inthatrole,confirmtheplainandordinarymeaningofthewords,oritmayinfactraiseorconfirmalternativeconstructionswhichsuggestanambiguityinthesubstantivesections.AnActcannotbesaidtohaveaclearmeaninguntilithasbeenreadthroughasawholedocument,includingthepreambleifoneexists.However,theinterpretationofanActwillnotautomaticallybeaffectedjustbecauseanalternativemeaning(thusanambiguity)israisedthroughreferencetothepreamble.Torestrainorenlargetheenactments,theenactmentmustbeabletobearthealternativemeaning,andtheremustbeacompellingindicationthatthepreambleisthemostaccurateguidetotheintentionofthelegislatureregardingthemeaningofthesubstantivewords.

WhilethecontextualroleofapreambleisconsistentwithEnglishcommonlaw,currentActsInterpretationlegislation,andrecentHighCourtprecedents,thepastexistenceofacontextualroleforapreamblehasbeencontestedbythosewhoadvocatetherulethatapreamblecannotbereferredtoifthereisnoambiguityalreadyevidentinthetext.Theseadvocatesofthe‘norecourserule’canbeunderstoodtosomeextentinthecontextofmisleadingassumptionsandmisleadingcommentariesonstatutoryinterpretation.

Historically,preambleshavebeenusedbythecourts,notonlytoaidtheinterpretationofambiguoussectionsandtoassistindeterminingthemischieftoberemediedbytheAct,butalsotodeterminetheintentionsofParliament,ascontextforclarifyingthepossiblemeaningofsubstantivesections,andasaguideforwhentolimit‘general’substantiveprovisions.SuggestionsthatthepreamblecouldnotbereferredtowithoutanambiguityintheActseemtolackstrongauthority.Takingintoaccountthedifferencesbetweenordinarystatutesandconstitutions,[210]itmustalsobeclarifiedifthepreambletotheCommonwealthConstitutionmayormustbeconsideredaspartofthecontextwheninterpretingasubstantiveprovisionwhichonitsfaceisunambiguous.

[*]BA,LLB,DipEd(Adel),GCLP(SA);BarristerandSolicitoroftheSupremeCourtofSouthAustralia;Lecturer,FacultyofLaw,TheUniversityofMelbourne.

[1]SeeDepartmentofPrimeMinisterandCabinet,‘ConstitutionalConvention:TranscriptofProceedings’(1998)<http://www.dpmc.gov.au/convention/hansard.html>.

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[2]DCPearceandRSGeddes,StatutoryInterpretationinAustralia(4thed,1996)16;AlastairMacAdamandTomSmith,Statutes(3rded,1993)71.

[3]GwenMorrisetal,LayingDowntheLaw(4thed,1996)128.Examplesofmodernstatutesincorporatingpreamblesinclude:SexDiscriminationAct1984(Cth),LawReform(DecriminalizationofSodomy)Act1989(WA),Anti-DiscriminationAct1991(Qld),AboriginalandTorresStraitIslanderCommissionAct1989(Cth)(asamendedin1993).Also,preamblesarenowcommoninregulations,legislationoftheEuropeanParliament,constitutionsandmoderninternationalcovenants.

[4]SeebelowPartsIII(B)–(C).

[5]FARBennion,StatutoryInterpretation:ACode(2nded,1992)483.ThepreambleispartoftheAct:A-GvPrinceErnestAugustusofHanover[1957]AC436,467(LordNormand);butdoesnotitselfhavesubstantivelaw-makingpower:475(LordSomervell).Seebelownn162–163.

[6]EgBettingAct1853(UK)16&17Vict,c119,asdiscussedinPowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1899]AC143,184,thepreambleofwhichindicatedthattheActaimedtosuppress‘akindofgaming[thathad]oflatesprunguptendingtotheinjuryanddemoralisationofimprovidentpersonsbytheopeningofplacescalledbettinghousesoroffices’.SeealsoBennion,aboven5,499.

[7]EgAnti-DiscriminationAct1991(Qld),wherethepreamblebeginswiththewords‘Parliament’sreasonsforenactingthisActare-’;andthe‘WillsAct’1752(Imp)25Geo2,c6,asdiscussedinBrettvBrett(1826)3Add210;162ER456—thepreambleofwhichsuggestedthatthescopeoftheActextendedtowillsandcodicilsofrealpropertyonly,andnotallproperty.SeealsoMacAdamandSmith,aboven2,70.

[8]EgCommunistPartyDissolutionAct1950(Cth)whichcontainedadetailedpreambledescribingthethreatoftheCommunistParty,theneedforoppositiontoCommunism,andthelegitimacyoftheActundervariousconstitutionalheadsofpower.SeealsoJohnBellandSirGeorgeEngle,CrossonStatutoryInterpretation(3rded,1995)126–7.Itshouldbenotedthatstatementsoffactinapreambleshouldnotberegardedasconclusive,butmerelyasprimafacieevidenceofthetruthofthosefacts;andwherethepowertomakethelawdependsontherecitaloffactsinthepreamble,evenprimafacieprobativeforceshouldnotbeallowed:AustralianCommunistPartyvCommonwealth[1951]HCA5;(1951)83CLR1,263–4(FullagarJ).

[9]Ihavechosenthetermsconstructiveandcontextualforeaseofdenotation,andtheyoughtnotbetakentooliterally.Forinstance,whenconsideringapreambleinitscontextualrole,oneisstillinvolvedinconstruingastatute.

[10]SeebelowPartsIII(A)(2)–(3).

[11]RvPierce[1814]EngR477;(1814)3M&S62;105ER534,536(LordEllenboroughCJ);A-GvPrinceErnestAugustusofHanover[1957]AC436,474(LordSomervell).

[12]PowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1897]2QB242,299.

[13]MacAdamandSmith,aboven2,71;JohnQuickandRobertGarran,TheAnnotatedConstitutionoftheAustralianCommonwealth(1901)284;PeterMaxwell,OntheInterpretationofStatutes(1sted,1875)46;TheSussexPeerageCase(1844)11Cl&Fin85;[1844]EngR822;8ER1034,1057(LordTindalCJ).

[14]EgEtonCollegevMinisterofAgriculture,FisheriesandFood[1964]1Ch274.

[15]MasonvArmitage[1806]EngR271;(1806)13VesJun25;33ER204,208(LordErskineLC).

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[16]EgPowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1899]AC143;wheretheword‘place’intheBettingAct1853(UK)16&17Vict,c119,wasinterpretednarrowly,inlinewiththeobjectoftheActexpressedinthepreamble,soasnottoprohibittheconductofbookmakersinanopeninclosureatracemeetings.

[17]SeeEarlofHalsbury,LawsofEngland,vol27(1913)Statutes,‘2ClassificationandFramework’[201].SeealsoMaxwell,(1sted,1875),aboven13,46.

[18]EgDean&ChapterofYorkvMiddleborough[1827]EngR874;(1827)2Y&J196;148ER888,897(LordAlexanderCB);A-GvPrinceErnestAugustusofHanover[1957]AC436,462–3(ViscountSimonds);WacandovCommonwealth[1981]HCA60;(1981)148CLR1,23(MasonJ);PearceandGeddes,aboven2,118;Maxwell,(1sted,1875),aboven13,39.

[19]MacAdamandSmith,aboven2,71;QuickandGarran,aboven13,284.

[20]PowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1897]2QB242,272(ALSmithLJ).

[21]BowtellvGoldsbrough,Mort&CoLtd[1905]HCA60;(1906)3CLR444,451(GriffithCJ).ThisstatementwasaffirmedbyGibbsCJinWacandovCommonwealth[1981]HCA60;(1981)148CLR1,16.SeealsoPowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1899]AC143,157(EarlofHalsburyLC).

[22]EgEmanuelvConstable[1827]EngR557;(1827)3Russ436;38ER639,640(SirJohnLeachMR);PowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1897]2QB242,290(RigbyLJ),299(ChittyLJ);PowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1899]AC143,192(LordJames);WardvHolman[1964]2QB580,587(LordParkerCJ).

[23]EgRyallvRowles[1749]EngR11;(1749)1VesSen348;27ER1074,1084(LordParkerCB).

[24]EgPowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1897]2QB242,261(LindleyLJ).

[25]EgPowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1899]AC143,157(EarlofHalsburyLC).

[26]EgMasonvArmitage[1806]EngR271;(1806)13VesJun25;33ER204,208(LordErskineLC).

[27]EgHaltonvCove[1830]EngR865;(1830)1B&Ad538;109ER887,895(LordTenterdenCJ).

[28]EgWilsonvKnubley[1806]EngR45;(1806)7East128;103ER49,51–2(LordEllenboroughCJ).

[29]WilliamCraies,ATreatiseontheConstructionandEffectofStatuteLaw(2nded,1892)223;EmanuelvConstable[1827]EngR557;(1827)3Russ436;38ER639,640(SirJohnLeachMR).

[30]Craies,(2nded,1892),aboven29,223;PowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1897]2QB242,266(LopesLJ).

[31]BowtellvGoldsbrough,Mort&CoLtd[1905]HCA60;(1906)3CLR444,457(O’ConnorJ).

[32][1957]AC436,463(ViscountSimonds);465–8(LordNormand).Seebelownn45–46andaccompanyingtext.

[33][1981]HCA60;(1981)148CLR1,23.Seebelown51andaccompanyingtext.

[34]Egtheinsertionofss15AAand15ABintheActsInterpretationAct1901(Cth).Seebelownn58and67.

[35]EgSaraswativTheQueen[1991]HCA21;(1991)172CLR1;CICInsuranceLtdvBankstownFootballClubLtd(1997)187CLR384.Seebelownn62and69andaccompanyingtext.

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[36]MacAdamandSmith,aboven2,71;Butterworths,Halsbury’sLawsofAustralia,vol24(at29March1999)Statutes,‘2InterpretationandConstruction’[385-160].

[37]Bennion,aboven5,501.

[38]Seebelownn113–117.

[39]PStJLangan,MaxwellontheInterpretationofStatutes(12thed,1969)7.

[40][1957]AC436.

[41]Ibid463(ViscountSimonds).SeealsoBellandEngle,Cross(3rded,1995),aboven8,129;MacAdamandSmith,aboven2,71.

[42][1957]AC436,461–3(ViscountSimonds),472(LordTucker),465–7(LordNormand),473–4(LordSomervell).ThisprincipleofthecontextualroleofthepreamblewasapprovedandappliedbyBrandonJinTheNorwhale[1975]2AllER501,506–7.

[43]A-GvPrinceErnestAugustusofHanover[1957]AC436,461.

[44]Ibid.

[45]Ibid463.

[46]Ibid465,467.

[47]CICInsuranceLtdvBankstownFootballClubLtd(1997)187CLR384,408(BrennanCJ,Dawson,TooheyandGummowJJ).SeealsoJohnsvAustralianSecuritiesCommission[1993]HCA56;(1993)178CLR408,452(TooheyJ).

[48][1981]HCA60;(1981)148CLR1,23.

[49]24&25Vict,c44.

[50]TheargumentwasthattheAustralianColoniesAct1861(UK)authorisedtheannexationbycertainLettersPatent1878.

[51]WacandovCommonwealth[1981]HCA60;(1981)148CLR1,23.

[52]Ibid.

[53]Ibid24.

[54]Ibid16.

[55]58&59Vict,c35.

[56]WacandovCommonwealth[1981]HCA60;(1981)148CLR1,24(MasonJ),29(WilsonJ).WilsonJallegedthathewasabletoreachhisdecisionbasedontheconstructionoftheenactment,andnotrelyingonthepreamble.

[57]PearceandGeddes,aboven2,118.Seealsobelown209.

[58]InterpretationAct1987(NSW)s33;InterpretationofLegislationAct1984(Vic)s35(a);ActsInterpretationAct1954(Qld)s14A;ActsInterpretationAct1915(SA)s22;InterpretationAct1984(WA)s18;ActsInterpretationAct1931(Tas)s8A;InterpretationAct1967(ACT)s11A.

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[59]PearceandGeddes,aboven2,27.PearceandGeddesexpresslysupportthelatterapplicationthatthepurposemustbeconsideredinallcases.Barnesreferstosucharequirementthatthepurposebeconsideredat‘firstlevelinterpretation’asthe‘obligatoryview’:JeffreyBarnes,‘StatutoryInterpretation,LawReformandSampford’sTheoryoftheDisorderofLaw’(Pt2)(1995)22FederalLawReview77,105.

[60][1990]HCA6;(1990)169CLR214,235.DawsonJisindissent,butBarnessuggeststhatitwouldseemthatMasonCJandTooheyJagreedwithhiminprinciple:Barnes,aboven59,105.

[61]MillsvMeeking[1990]HCA6;(1990)169CLR214,235.

[62]CICInsuranceLtdvBankstownFootballClubLtd(1997)187CLR384,408(BrennanCJ,Dawson,TooheyandGummowJJ).Whilethiscasedoesnotinvolveapreamble,thecommentsareparticularlyrelevanttoourdebate,asthemischiefwhichastatuteisintendedtoremedyiscommonlydescribedinthepreamble.SeealsoSaraswativTheQueen[1991]HCA21;(1991)172CLR1,20–1(McHughJ).

[63]ActsInterpretationAct1915(SA)s22(1).

[64]PearceandGeddes,aboven2,31.

[65]A-GvPrinceErnestAugustusofHanover[1957]AC436,463(ViscountSimonds);CICInsuranceLtdvBankstownFootballClubLtd(1997)187CLR384,408(BrennanCJ,Dawson,TooheyandGummowJJ).Seecommentsinaboven62.

[66]ActsInterpretationAct1901(Cth)s15AB(1)(b)(ii).

[67]InterpretationAct1987(NSW)s34;InterpretationofLegislationAct1984(Vic)s35(b);ActsInterpretationAct1954(Qld)s14B;InterpretationAct1984(WA)s19;ActsInterpretationAct1931(Tas)s8B;InterpretationAct1967(ACT)s11B.

[68][1991]HCA21;(1991)172CLR1.

[69]Ibid21.

[70]Ibid.

[71]Itisinterestingtonotethatinternationaltreatiesarealsotobeinterpreted‘inaccordancewiththeordinarymeaningtobegiventothetermsofthetreatyintheircontextandinthelightofitsobjectandpurpose’:ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,openedforsignature23May1969,1155UNTS331,art31(1)(enteredintoforce27January1980)inPearceandGeddes,aboven2,46.Thecontextisspecificallydeemedtoincludethepreamble,accordingtotheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,art31(2).

[72]52&53Vict,c63.

[73](1562)1Plowd353;75ER536,560.

[74]LordEdwardCoke,InstitutesoftheLawsofEngland(1628,CoLitt)79.InSalkeldvJohnson[1848]EngR498;(1848)2Exch256;154ER487,499,PollockCB,citing4Inst330,quotedLordCokeasdescribingthepreambleas‘akeytoopenthemeaningofthemakersoftheact,andthemischiefsitwasintendedtoremedy’—whichseemstobeanunusualreiterationofthetwoconcepts—thatthepreambleisthekeytothestatuteandthekeytothemakers.

[75]RyallvRowles[1749]EngR11;(1749)1VesSen348;27ER1074,1086.

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[76]DoevBrandling[1828]EngR51;(1828)7B&C643;108ER863,870.

[77](1826)3Add210;162ER456.ThiscasewasdecidedintheArchesCourtofCanterbury—anecclesiasticalcourt—butitwasconfirmedbytheCourtofDelegatesonappeal:seeEmanuelvConstable[1827]EngR557;(1827)3Russ436;38ER639,640.

[78]BrettvBrett(1826)3Add210;162ER456,458–9.

[79][1957]AC436,473.

[80]Ibid.

[81]WaughvMiddleton[1853]EngR181;(1853)8Exch352;155ER1383,1385.

[82]Craies,(2nded,1892),aboven29,99.

[83]LordThring,PracticalLegislation:TheCompositionandLanguageofActsofParliamentandBusinessDocuments(2nded,1902)92.

[84]EgA-GvSillem[1863]EngR989;(1863)2H&C431;159ER178,214(PollockCB).SeealsoBellandEngle,Cross(3rded,1995),aboven8,172.

[85]25Geo2,c6.

[86]‘WillsAct’1752(Imp)25Geo2,c6.

[87][1811]EngR236;(1811)17VesJun508;34ER197.

[88](1826)3Add210;162ER456,458.

[89][1827]EngR557;(1827)3Russ436;38ER639.

[90]Ibid640.ThelatterpartofSirJohnLeachMR’squotewascitedbyQuickandGarran,aboven13,285.

[91]CitedinCopemanvGallant[1716]EngR13;(1716)1PWms314;24ER404,406.

[92]‘BankruptcyAct’1623(Eng)21Jac1,c19.

[93]Craies,(2nded,1892),aboven29,223–4.

[94][1749]EngR11;(1749)1VesSen348;27ER1074.RyallvRowlesoverruledtheconclusionreachedinanearliercase(CopemanvGallant[1716]EngR13;(1716)1PWms314;24ER404)thatthepreamblecouldnotrestrainthegeneralwordsinthe‘BankruptcyAct’1623(Eng)21Jac1,c19.

[95]RyallvRowles[1749]EngR11;(1749)1VesSen348;27ER1074,1084.LordHardwickeLCconcurredat1088.

[96]Seeaboven31andaccompanyingtext.

[97][1844]EngR822;(1844)11Cl&Fin85;8ER1034.

[98]12Geo3,c11.

[99]TheSussexPeerageCase[1844]EngR822;(1844)11Cl&Fin85;8ER1034,1058(LordTindalCJ).

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[100]PowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1897]2QB242,299(ChittyLJ).

[101]JohnWhite,ACompleteLatin-EnglishandEnglish-LatinDictionary(nopublicationdate)85;JSimpsonandEWeiner(eds),TheOxfordEnglishDictionary(2nded,1989)853respectively.

[102][1899]AC143,157.

[103]EgWilliamCraies,ATreatiseontheConstructionandEffectofStatuteLaw(3rded,1901)209.SeealsoGregoryCraven,‘TheConstitutionalityoftheUnilateralSecessionofanAustralianState’(1984)15FederalLawReview123,128.

[104]16&17Vict,c119.

[105]EgPowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1897]2QB242,256(LordEsherMR),266(LopesLJ),271–3(ALSmithLJ).PowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1899]AC143,183(LordShand),193(LordJames).

[106]PowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1899]AC143,183.

[107]WacandovCommonwealth[1981]HCA60;(1981)148CLR1,23.

[108][1792]EngR3107;(1792)4TemRep790;100ER1304,1306.

[109]Itisinterestingtonotethattheprincipleprohibitingthepreamblefromrestrainingclearenactmentshasnotalwaysbeenthemostwell-knownrule.Someearlycasespresentthe‘rules’asthoughthepreamblewerefavouredabovetheenactment.Forinstance,inRvPierce[1814]EngR477;(1814)3M&S62;105ER534,536,LordEllenboroughCJcompletelyreversestheonusbystatingthat:‘Itcannotbyanymeansberegarded,asanuniversalrule,thatlargeandcomprehensivewordsintheenactingclauseofastatutearetoberestrainedbythepreamble.’

[110]PowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1899]AC143,192–3.

[111][1844]EngR822;(1844)11Cl&Fin85;8ER1034,1057.

[112]EgTheSussexPeerageCase[1844]EngR822;(1844)11Cl&Fin85;8ER1034.SeealsoWilsonvKnubley[1806]EngR45;(1806)7East128;103ER49.

[113]PowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1897]2QB242;PowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1899]AC143.

[114]SGGEdgar,CraiesonStatuteLaw(7thed,1971).

[115]Craven,aboven103.

[116]BellandEngle,Cross(3rded,1995),aboven8.

[117]Halsbury’sLawsofAustralia,aboven36.

[118][1897]2QB242,285.

[119]PowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1899]AC143,185.

[120]PowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1897]2QB242,271.

[121]A-GvPrinceErnestAugustusofHanover[1957]AC436,463.

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[122]EgCraies,(2nded,1892),aboven29,221;Edgar,Craies(7thed,1971),aboven114,201–2.Notethatthefirsteditionof1879isbyHenryHardcastle.

[123](1883)8AppCas386.SeealsoCraven,aboven103,128.

[124]Thepreambleofthe‘SturgesBourne’sAct’1819(UK)59Geo3,c12wasfoundtobemisinformedandunhelpful,andsoitdidnotassistintheconstructionoftheenactmentwhichseemedtobeambiguous:OverseersofWestHamvIles(1883)8AppCas386,389(LordBlackburn).

[125]Craies,(3rded,1901),aboven103,209.

[126]PowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1899]AC143,157.SeealsoCraven,aboven103,128.NotethatCravenmistakenlyattributestheEarlofHalsburyLC’squotationtotheCourtofAppealjudgmentinPowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1897]2QB242,269[sic].

[127]Seeaboven102andaccompanyingtext.

[128]PowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1899]AC143,184–5.

[129]Edgar,Craies(7thed,1971),aboven114,202–3.

[130]A-GvPrinceErnestAugustusofHanover[1957]AC436,463.

[131]Edgar,Craies(7thed,1971),aboven114,203.

[132]A-GvPrinceErnestAugustusofHanover[1957]AC436,461–3.

[133][1964]2QB580.SeealsoCraven,aboven103,130.

[134][1964]1Ch274.

[135]Edgar,Craies(7thed,1971),aboven114,202fn90.

[136]TheheadnoteforWardvHolman[1964]2QB580,580heldthat:‘assection5ofthePublicOrderAct,1936,wasplainandunambiguous,thatsectioncouldnotbeconstruedbyreferencetothepreambleoftheAct’.Atfacevalue,thisstatementcouldpossiblybetakentosupportthe‘norecourserule’,butinactualfactLordParkerCJdidrefertothepreamble,andheactuallyconcludedthatthepreamblewasnotinconsistentwiththesubstantivesections:at587.TheheadnotetoWardvHolmanisinaccurateandmisleading.ThereisalsoevidencetosuggestthatinWardvHolmanthepreamblewasconfusedwiththelongtitle:Bennion,aboven5,497.

[137]Edgar,Craies(7thed,1971),aboven114,202fn90.

[138]13Eliz1,c10.TheActfellintotwoparts,withapreambleintroducingeach.

[139]EtonCollegevMinisterofAgriculture[1964]1Ch274,280.

[140]Craven,aboven103,127–8.

[141]Ibid128fn38.Craven,ibid127–30,reiteratedthisruleinatleasteightdifferentways.

[142]In1984,s15ABwasaddedtotheActsInterpretationAct1901(Cth).

[143]SeeGregoryCraven,Secession:TheUltimateStatesRight(1986)85–8.

[144]SeeCommonwealth,ConstitutionalConvention[2ndto13thFebruary1998],Transcriptof

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Proceedings,9February1998,472–3(ProfessorGregoryCraven,Non-ParliamentaryAppointedDelegate).

[145]EgCraven,aboven103,130.

[146]EgMasonvArmitage[1806]EngR271;(1806)13VesJun25;33ER204,208(LordErskineLC);BowtellvGoldsbrough,Mort&CoLtd[1905]HCA60;(1906)3CLR444,451(GriffithCJ);WacandovCommonwealth[1981]HCA60;(1981)148CLR1,15–16(GibbsCJ);LeesvSummersgill[1811]EngR236;(1811)17VesJun508;34ER197.ThislattercasewasoverruledbyEmanuelvConstable[1827]EngR557;(1827)3Russ436;38ER639,640–1.ItisnoteworthythatCravenremovesreferencetoMasonvArmitage,LeesvSummersgillandOverseersofWestHamvIles(1883)8AppCas386,inhislaterwork:Craven,Secession,aboven143,215.

[147]EgTheSussexPeerageCase[1844]EngR822;(1844)11Cl&Fin85;8ER1034,1057(LordTindalCJ);BowtellvGoldsbrough,Mort&CoLtd[1905]HCA60;(1906)3CLR444,451(GriffithCJ).

[148][1905]HCA60;(1906)3CLR444.

[149]Ibid451.

[150]Craven,aboven103,128.GriffithCJdoesnotusethewords‘neverbeaffected’inBowtellvGoldsbrough,Mort&CoLtd[1905]HCA60;(1906)3CLR444.

[151]BellandEngle,Cross(3rded,1995),aboven8,124–5.

[152]In1969,LawCommissionsforEngland,WalesandScotlandproducedareportrecommendingapreferenceforthepurposiveapproachtostatutoryinterpretation:LawCommissionforEnglandandWalesandScottishLawCommission,TheInterpretationofStatutes,LawComNo21,ScotLawComNo11(1969).TheUKdidnotrespondtothisrecommendationbyenactingitinUKinterpretationlegislation:PearceandGeddes,aboven2,26.

[153]A-GvPrinceErnestAugustusofHanover[1957]AC436,463(ViscountSimonds);BellandEngle,Cross(3rded,1995),aboven8,129.

[154]Halsbury’sLawsofAustralia,aboven36,[385-200].

[155]Seeaboven119andaccompanyingtext.

[156]A-GvPrinceErnestAugustusofHanover[1957]AC436,461.

[157]Seeabovenn6–8andaccompanyingtext.

[158]Seebelownn162,167and170andaccompanyingtext.

[159]FrankHorack,StatutesandStatutoryConstructionbyJGSutherland(3rded,1943)vol2.

[160]Ibid349.

[161]Ibid.

[162]Eg,A-GvPrinceErnestAugustusofHanover[1957]AC436,467;whereLordNormandstatedthat‘thepreambleispartofthestatute’.SeealsoHalsbury’sLawsofAustralia,aboven36,[385-200].

[163]Eg,A-GvPrinceErnestAugustusofHanover[1957]AC436,475,whereLordSomervellstatedthat‘apreambleisnotanenactingprovision’.

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[164]Bennion,aboven5,483.

[165]Forinstance,alengthypreambletotheAboriginalandTorresStraitIslanderCommissionBill1989(Cth)wasdeletedafterconsiderableparliamentarydebate.(ApreamblewaslateraddedtotheAboriginalandTorresStraitIslanderCommissionAct1989(Cth)in1993.)

[166]LordHailsham(ed),Halsbury’sLawsofEngland,vol44(1)(4thed,1995)Statutes,‘1NatureofPrimaryLegislation’[1265].

[167][1848]EngR498;(1848)2Exch256;154ER487,499(PollockCB).

[168]Themaincasecitedforthepropositionthatapreambleis‘nopartoftheAct’isMillsvWilkins(1704)6ModRep62;87ER822.ThiscaseisactuallydealingwithtitlestoActs,andthereferencetopreamblesisobiterdicta.Also,aclosereadingrevealsthatwhileCounselproposedtheideathatatitlewasnotpartoftheAct,HoltCJrephrasedthepropositiontoemphasisethatthetitle(andpreamble)werenotpartofthe‘law’or‘enactingpart’:at822–3.

[169]Halsbury’sLawsofEngland,aboven166,[1263];Craies,(2nded,1892),aboven29,220.

[170]Bennion,aboven5,500.

[171]A-GvLordWeymouth[1743]EngR4;(1743)Amb20;27ER11,12(LordHardwickeLC).

[172]Forinstance,Craven,aboven103,127,seemeduncommittedregardingthestatusofthepreambleaspartoftheAct.HecitedthediscreditedcaseMillsvWilkins(1704)6ModRep62;87ER822(seeabovenn168–169),hecommentedthatthepreamble‘wouldappear’tobepartofthestatute,andhefurtherusedindefinitephrasessuchas‘whatevertheposition’and‘maybepartofthestatute’.

[173]Edgar,Craies(7thed,1971),aboven114,125,127.

[174]PowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1897]2QB242,285.

[175][1584]EngR9;(1584)3CoRep7a;76ER637,638.

[176]ApreambleisclearlywithinthefourcornersoftheAct:DeputyFederalCommissionerofTaxation(NSW)vWRMoranPtyLtd[1939]HCA27;(1939)61CLR735,754(LathamCJ).

[177][1904]HCA52;(1904)1CLR320.

[178][1904]HCA33;(1904)1CLR679.

[179][1844]EngR822;(1844)11Cl&Fin85;8ER1034.

[180]Craven,aboven103,128.

[181]DixonvTodd[1904]HCA52;(1904)1CLR320,327(GriffithCJ);PresidentetcoftheShireofArapilesvBoardofLandandWorks[1904]HCA33;(1904)1CLR679,686(GriffithCJ).

[182]EgTheSussexPeerageCase[1844]EngR822;(1844)11Cl&Fin85;8ER1034,1057(LordTindalCJ).

[183]PowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1897]2QB242,266(LopesLJ).

[184]EgPowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1899]AC143,192(LordJames);TheSussexPeerageCase[1844]EngR822;(1844)11Cl&Fin85;8ER1034,1057(LordTindalCJ);MasonvArmitage[1806]EngR271;(1806)13VesJun25;33ER204,208(LordErskineLC).SeealsoSaraswati

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vTheQueen[1991]HCA21;(1991)172CLR1,22(McHughJ).

[185]EgPowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1899]AC143,183(LordShand).

[186]Ibid179(LordHobhousedissenting).

[187]BowtellvGoldsbrough,Mort&CoLtd[1905]HCA60;(1906)3CLR444,457(O’ConnorJ).

[188]Edgar,Craies(7thed,1971),aboven114,195,209–10.

[189]BellandEngle,Cross(3rded,1995),aboven8,124–5.Seeaboven151andaccompanyingtext.

[190]Ibid126.

[191]Maxwell,(1sted,1875),aboven13,34;Craies,(2nded,1892),aboven29,212.SeealsoA-GvLordWeymouth[1743]EngR4;(1743)Amb20;27ER11.

[192]Craies,(2nded,1892),aboven29,220.

[193]PowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1897]2QB242,265(LopesLJ),289(RigbyLJ).

[194]ByStandingOrder34:PowellvKemptonParkRacecourseCoLtd[1897]2QB242,289(RigbyLJ).

[195]Edgar,Craies(7thed,1971),aboven114,193–4.

[196]EgBellandEngle,Cross(3rded,1995),aboven8,126;PearceandGeddes,aboven2,117.

[197]K&SLakeCityFreightersPtyLtdvGordon&GotchLtd[1985]HCA48;(1985)157CLR309,315.

[198][1844]EngR822;(1844)11Cl&Fin85;8ER1034,1057.

[199]DoevBrandling[1828]EngR51;(1828)7B&C643;108ER863,870(LordTenterdenCJ).SeealsoCrespignyvWittenoom[1792]EngR3107;(1792)4TemRep790;100ER1304,1306(GroseJ).

[200]BeckevSmith[1836]EngR22;(1836)2M&W191;150ER724,726(ParkeB).SeealsoCaledonianRailwayCovNorthBritishRailwayCo(1881)6AppCas114,122(LordSelbourneLC).

[201]A-GvSillem[1863]EngR989;(1863)2H&C431;159ER178,216(PollockCB).SeealsoHaltonvCove[1830]EngR865;(1830)1B&Ad538;109ER887,895(LordTenterdenCJ).SeealsoThompsonvAustralianCapitalTelevisionPtyLtd[1996]HCA38;(1996)186CLR574,613(GummowJ).

[202][1844]EngR822;(1844)11Cl&Fin85;8ER1034,1058.

[203]EgCraies,(2nded,1892),aboven29,76and110.

[204]Ibid223.

[205]Halsbury’sLawsofAustralia,aboven36,[385-200].Seeaboven154andaccompanyingtext.

[206][1981]HCA60;(1981)148CLR1.

[207]PearceandGeddes,aboven2,118.Seeaboven107andaccompanyingtext.

[208]BowtellvGoldsbrough,Mort&CoLtd[1905]HCA60;(1906)3CLR444,451.

[209]AsGibbsCJinWacandovCommonwealth[1981]HCA60;(1981)148CLR1,15–16,hadendorsed

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GriffithCJ’sstatementthatapreamblecouldnotcutdownthemeaningofplainandclearenactments(GriffithCJ’sstatementbeingthepre-existingquotefromBowtellvGoldsbrough,Mort&CoLtd[1905]HCA60;(1906)3CLR444,451inPearceandGeddes),theauthorsmakereferencetoGibbsCJ’sendorsementfirst,followedbythewords:‘ButwhatissubmittedtobethebetterviewappearsinthatsamecasefromMasonJ’:PearceandGeddes,aboven2,118.

[210]Aconstitutionalpreamblearguablydiffersinauthorship,content,amendabilityandinterpretation.Forexample,ifapprovedatreferendum,thepreamblecannotbesaidtobeauthoredpurelybyalegislature;thecontentwillgenerallyincludeadeclarationofthesourceofauthorityfortheconstitution;itwillnotbeamendablebythelegislaturealone;anditwillbeunderstoodinthecontextofprinciplesofconstitutionalinterpretation.

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