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1

THE SOVIET ATOMIC BLAST

On September 3, 1949, a United States Air ForceWB-29 weather reconnaissance aircraft on a routinemission from Japan to Alaska landed with its sen-sors clouded by traces of radioactivity. Hours later,the same aircraft recorded significantly higher lev-els of radiation in the same area, prompting the AirForce Long Range Detection Center to declare anofficial alert. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)in Washington was notified immediately. Withinfour days laboratory analysis in the United Statesdetermined that the radioactive samples collectedby the Air Force were the product of nuclear fissionprobably conducted somewhere in the Soviet Union,possibly the result of an accident at some previouslyunknown Soviet nuclear reactor, or, equally possi-ble, the by-product of an atomic explosion. On Sep-tember 14, the AEC appointed a panel of prominentscientists under the direction of Dr. Vannevar Bush,former chief of the Office of Scientific Research andDevelopment during World War II, to determine thesource of the radiation. Five days later, on Septem-ber 19, the Bush Panel concluded that the collecteddata were “[c]onsistent with the view that the origin

of the fission products was the explosion of anatomic bomb.”1

Later on September 14, Secretary of DefenseLouis Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff informedPresident Truman of the Bush Panel’s findings andurged him to make an immediate public announce-ment of the panel’s conclusions. The AEC urged thesame course of action the following day. Truman ini-tially demurred, saying he wished to avoid creatingan atmosphere of panic at a time when crises allover the world—the recent devaluation of thepound, the continuing dollar shortage in Europe, thefailure of the Dodge plan in Japan, and the impend-ing Communist victory in China—had heightenedinternational tensions.2 On September 21, however,he agreed to make an announcement before theSoviets did. The following day, Truman informedSen. Brien McMahon, Chairman of the Joint Com-mittee on Atomic Energy, of the Soviet explosion.On September 23 the president informed his cabi-net and the press:

I believe the American people, to the fullestextent consistent with national security, are enti-tled to be informed of all developments in thefield of atomic energy. That is my reason for mak-ing public the following information.

We have evidence that within recent weeks anatomic explosion occurred in the U.S.S.R.

Ever since atomic energy was first released byman, the eventual development of this new force

Case 342, Part A

THE END OF THE U.S. ATOMIC MONOPOLY

William Taylor Fain & David S. PainterGeorgetown University

Copyright 1989 by Institute for the Study of Diplomacy.ISBN: 1-56927-342-1Publications, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.20057–1025 http://data.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/isd/

2222 William Taylor Fain & David S. Painter Case 342, Part A

by other nations was to be expected. This proba-bility has always been taken into account by us.

Nearly 4 years ago I pointed out that “scientificopinion appears to be practically unanimous thatthe essential theoretical knowledge upon whichthe discovery is based is already widely known.There is also substantial agreement that foreignresearch can come abreast of our present theoret-ical knowledge in time.” And, in the Three-NationDeclaration of the President of the United Statesand the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdomand of Canada, dated November 5, 1945, it wasemphasized that no single nation could in facthave a monopoly of atomic weapons.

This recent development emphasizes once again,if indeed such emphasis were needed, the neces-sity for that truly effective enforceable interna-tional control of atomic energy which thisGovernment and the large majority of the mem-bers of the United Nations support.3

Public reaction to the news of the Soviet explo-sion was surprisingly mild in both the United Statesand Europe. “Most newspapers reported the factswithout sensationalism and, many chose to quoteGen. [Omar] Bradley [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs]and Gen. [Leslie] Groves [former military supervisorof the wartime Manhattan Project] to the effect thatthe news was not alarming.”4

The news of the Soviet atomic test was anunpleasant though not entirely unexpected jolt tostrategic planners who had come to rely on the U.S.atomic monopoly as a constant in their calcula-tions. U.S. nuclear scientists had predicted in 1945that the Soviets would require three to five years toproduce an atomic weapon of their own. In fact,four years and six weeks had passed between thefirst U.S. atomic test at Alamogordo and the Sovietexplosion estimated to have taken place on August29. Still, policymakers had been taken by surprise.The perception of the Soviet Union as a “technologi-cally backward nation in which whatever creativespark that existed was stifled by an oppressivestate” had made policy makers subconsciously pushthe five year estimate back several years.5

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND THE SOVIET BOMB

On June 14, 1949, two and a half months before theSoviet explosion, the JCS had presented the AEC

with a report detailing its projected nuclear weaponsrequirements through 1956. The report concludedthat significantly more fissionable material was nec-essary to fulfill its requirements than was being pro-duced by the United States at the time. Expandedproduction of such material would be quite expen-sive, and therefore problematic, given President Tru-man’s strict budgetary ceiling. Therefore, beforerendering a decision on the JCS report, the presidentappointed a Special Committee of the NationalSecurity Council consisting of Secretary of DefenseJohnson, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, andChairman of the AEC David Lilienthal to study thematter. Their report, delivered on October 10, con-cluded that:

7. . . . the proposed acceleration of the atomicenergy program is necessary in the interests ofnational security based upon the following con-siderations:

a.The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that thisaccelerated program will constitute a netimprovement in our military posture both as adeterrent to war and as preparation for warshould it prove unavoidable.

b. The views of the Atomic Energy Commissionthat it is feasible to meet the requirements of theproposed program.

c. The views of the Department of State that theproposed expansion is not untimely from theviewpoint of possible international repercus-sions, particularly in view of the recent atomicexplosion in the USSR.

d. . . . The Special Committee further concludesthat the recent atomic explosion in the USSRincreases the urgency with which the proposedprogram should be undertaken and executed, butthis acceleration should be clearly understood tobe a projection of previous plans based upon ourown capabilities, rather than as a counter-devel-opment to the Soviet explosion.6

Nine days later President Truman approved thefindings of the Special Committee’s report. Para-phrasing the wording of the report, he enumeratedthe advantages of the accelerated program as: 1)lower unit cost of weapons; 2) increased militaryeffectiveness; 3) decreased logistical and manpowerrequirements; and 4) greater flexibility in militaryoperations.7 On October 20, Truman issued a pre-pared statement about the expansion:

Case 342, Part A End of U.S. Atomic Monopoly 3333

[Reading] “In view of certain recent statementsabout the construction program of the AtomicEnergy Commission, I want to clarify the presentstatus of a recent development within the pro-gram.

A decision has been made to expand the facilitiesof the Atomic Energy Commission. This decisionis the result of careful studies directed towardsfinding means of increasing our productioncapacity in an orderly fashion. It is a matterwhich has been under consideration for manymonths by the Atomic Energy Commission andthe Department of Defense, as well as theNational Security Council. I have authorized theAtomic Energy Commission to initiate the con-struction program now with funds available—now available, and I expect to recommend to theCongress early next year a financial plan whichwill enable the Commission to carry its programthrough.”8

In the question and answer period which followed,Truman was asked whether the decision to expandthe atomic program had been in any way influencedby the Russian bomb. He responded, “No, it wasnot.”9

THE “SUPER”

Meanwhile, on October 5, AEC Commissioner Adm.Lewis L. Strauss, who was known as a hardlinerwhere the Soviet Union was concerned, had issued amemorandum to his fellow AEC Commissionerswhich argued:

1) When the Soviets exploded the atomic bombthe U.S. forever lost its monopoly in theatomic weapons field.

2) At the moment that the Soviet had as manyatomic bombs as it needed, the Kremlin wouldstrike. It mattered not whether the U.S. had1,000 or 100,000 more bombs than theenemy.

3) The U.S. must find a way to hold back a thirdworld war until the Soviet hunger for conquestwas weakened by internal strife.

4) Our only hope was to create a new and greaterdeterrent to Soviet aggression, a weapon manytimes more powerful than the A-bomb. Hence,

the AEC must turn its energies immediately tothe manufacture of a hydrogen bomb.10

Strauss urged a “quantum jump” in atomic plan-ning and requested that the matter of the hydrogenor “Super” bomb be placed on the agenda of a spe-cial meeting of the GAC in October.

Meanwhile, Dr. Ernest Lawrence, director of theUniversity of California Radiation Laboratory, andhis colleague Dr. Luis Alvarez, both highly respectedand influential physicists, concluded independentlythat accelerated research on the hydrogen bombwas vital to U.S. security. Both decided to lobby theAEC on behalf of the hydrogen bomb during a previ-ously scheduled trip to Washington in the secondweek of October. Stopping first in Los Alamos toconsult with their colleague Edward Teller on thematter, Lawrence and Alvarez continued on to Wash-ington arriving on the afternoon of October 8.Within the hour they were at the AEC headquartersmeeting with Strauss who showed them his memo-randum of three days earlier and pledged his coop-eration. On October 10 the scientists were invited tolunch with Sen. Brien McMahon, Chairman of theJoint Committee on Atomic Energy and his Chief ofStaff William Borden, both of whom had been con-vinced by Strauss that research on the so-called“Super” was critical to the preservation of U.S. stra-tegic posture. By the end of the luncheon both“legislators and scientists were more than ever con-vinced that the superweapon might well save thenation from the Soviet threat.”11 Before leavingWashington later that afternoon, Lawrence and Alva-rez met with AEC Chairman Lilienthal to discusstheir ideas for expanded research on the Super, butthey found him unreceptive. Disturbed by the moralramifications of the weapon, Lilienthal refused toconsider the option at the time. In his diary that day,he noted uncomfortably that Lawrence and Alvarezhad been “drooling over the H-bomb. . . . Is this allwe have to offer?”12

The possibility of building a super bomb basedon nuclear fusion rather than fission had been dis-cussed as early as 1942 by Edward Teller, a Hungar-ian-born physicist, and his colleagues at the LosAlamos Scientific Laboratory in New Mexico. Tellerestimated that weapons based on the fusion princi-ple might produce explosive energy yields as greatas one thousand times those of fission weapons.Work on thermonuclear weapons was suspendedduring the war in favor of the more feasible and thusstrategically more important atomic fission bomb.13

In the summer of 1945, after the first successfulatomic blast, Teller and his colleague Dr. Robert

4444 William Taylor Fain & David S. Painter Case 342, Part A

Oppenheimer had again begun studying the feasibil-ity of the Super. In a report to Secretary of WarHenry Stimson, the scientists wrote that the weaponwas probably feasible and that the U.S. should pro-ceed with its development. The following spring, aconference of scientists was held at Los Alamos todiscuss the status of research on the nuclear fusionprocess. The scientists’ report, published on June12, concluded that weapons based on thermonu-clear reactions were “on the whole workable,” butthat a “Super Bomb Project would necessarilyinvolve a considerable fraction of the resourceswhich are likely to be devoted to work on atomicdevelopments in the next years.”14 Mindful of theeconomic cost of developing the Super, the U.S. gov-ernment opted instead to pursue less expensive fis-sion weapons programs.

THE SCIENTISTS AND THE SUPER

Between October 28 and 30, the General AdvisoryCommittee to the AEC convened, as requested byCommissioner Strauss earlier in the month, to con-sider the feasibility and desirability of acceleratedresearch on the Super. Created by the AtomicEnergy Act of 1946 simultaneously with the AEC,the GAC consisted of nine scientists and leaders intechnological fields charged with consulting the AECon matters of scientific and policy-making impor-tance. In October 1949 its members were:

1) J. Robert Oppenheimer, Chairman

2) James B. Conant, President of Harvard Univer-sity

3) Lee A. DuBridge, President of the CaliforniaInstitute of Technology

4) Enrico Fermi, University of Chicago Institutefor Nuclear Studies

5) Isidore I. Rabi, Columbia University

6) Hartley Rowe, Vice President and Chief Engi-neer, United Fruit Company

7) Oliver E. Buckley, President of Bell TelephoneLaboratories

8) Cyril S. Smith, Director, Institute for the Studyof Metals, University of Chicago

9) Glen Seaborg, University of California (inEurope at the time of the meeting)

Robert Oppenheimer, Chairman of the GAC, hadenjoyed a brilliant scientific career and outstandingrecord of government service. As wartime directorof the Los Alamos laboratory, he had presided overthe first successful atomic explosion. In a muchquoted 1948 article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Sci-entists, Oppenheimer had written “[i]n some sort ofcrude sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no over-statement can quite extinguish, the physicists haveknown sin; and this is a knowledge which they can-not lose.”15 By the autumn of 1949, Oppenheimerhad come to oppose a crash research program onthe Super for both moral and practical reasons. In aletter to James Conant, he wrote:

I am not sure the miserable thing will work, northat it can be gotten to a target except by oxcart.It seems likely to me even further to worsen theunbalance of our war plans. What does worry meis that this thing appears to have caught the imag-ination, both of the Congressional and militarypeople, as the answer to the problem posed bythe Russian advance.16

For three days the GAC engaged in intensive dis-cussion of the Super issue and heard presentationsfrom Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Omar Brad-ley, who expressed the military’s interest in acquir-ing the weapon, and State Department PolicyPlanning Staff Chief George F. Kennan, whoexplained his interest in reemphasizing the quest forinternational control of atomic energy.

On October 30, the Committee presented its find-ings to the AEC in a lengthy three part report.17 PartI described “certain recommendations for action bythe Commission directed toward the commondefense and security.” The GAC endorsed plans toexpand facilities for the processing of uranium andplutonium and to increase supplies of ore. It alsorecommended an accelerated research and develop-ment program for fission weapons and delivery sys-tems and for so-called “booster” systems whichused some elements of fusion technology.

Part II of the report dealt with the Super, describ-ing what was known about its technology and thestrategic economics of its production. The GACnoted that the weapon’s explosive power was poten-tially unlimited and that it could cause thermal andradiation damage to an area of several hundredsquare miles. The super “would bring about thedestruction of innumerable human lives; it is not a

Case 342, Part A End of U.S. Atomic Monopoly 5555

weapon which can be used exclusively for thedestruction of material installations of military orsemi-military purposes.” The GAC believed that “noexperimental approach short of actual test” wouldbe able to prove the feasibility of the weapon andthat many tests would likely be necessary. All prob-lems considered, the Committee concluded that “animaginative and concerted attack on the problemhas a better than even chance of producing theweapon within five years.”

In Part III, the Committee stated unanimouslythat “we all hope that by one means or another, thedevelopment of these weapons can be avoided,”and recommended that the United States not accel-erate its research on Super technology. In twoaddenda to the report, the GAC members outlinedtwo different lines of reasoning behind their recom-mendation. In the first, James Conant wrote for asix-man majority of the GAC that “we base our rec-ommendation on our belief that the extreme dan-gers to mankind inherent in the proposal whollyoutweigh any military advantage that could comefrom this development.” Further, the majority wasconcerned that “a superbomb might become aweapon of genocide.”18

Enrico Fermi and I.I. Rabi, in the second adden-dum, expressed the same reservations in equallyimpassioned terms:

. . . we believe it important for the President ofthe United States to tell the American public, andthe world, that we think it wrong on fundamen-tal ethical principles to initiate a program ofdevelopment of such a weapon. At the same timeit would be appropriate to invite the nations ofthe world to join us in a solemn pledge not to pro-ceed in the development or construction of weap-ons of this category. If such a pledge wereaccepted even without control machinery, itappears highly probable that an advanced stageof development leading to a test by anotherpower could be detected by available physicalmeans. Furthermore, we have in our possession,in our stockpile of atomic bombs, the means foradequate “military” retaliation for the productionor use of “super.”

THE AEC REPORT

In the first week of November; the five-man AEC,consisting of Lilienthal, Strauss, Sumner Pike, HenrySmyth, and Gordon Dean, met to consider the rec-ommendation of the GAC and to formulate its own

recommendation to the president on the Superquestion. The Commission was unable to reach aconsensus on the issue. Lilienthal, Pike, and Smythcounseled against pursuit of the Super, while Straussand Dean favored accelerated research. On Novem-ber 9, Lilienthal presented the president with theAEC’s report. The report concluded that the hydro-gen bomb was probably feasible and would haveunlimited power, but it would require at least threeyears to develop. Furthermore, to beat the Soviets ina race to acquire it would take a maximum effort bythe U.S., which would be impossible to keep secret;likewise, it was believed that any Russian thermonu-clear test could be detected. The report also con-cluded that for the United States and the USSR bothto develop the H-bomb would greatly intensify andchange the character of the arms race.19

The report reflected the split within the Commis-sion. Lilienthal, Pike, and Smyth urged the presi-dent to announce publicly as soon as possible that itdid not appear at this time that “the development ofthis weapon is consistent with this country’s pro-grams for world peace or our own long term secu-rity.” Strauss and Dean, on the other hand, urgedTruman to take the opportunity to press the SovietUnion for a renewed effort at international control ofatomic weapons. If that failed, they recommendedaccelerated development of the Super.

In an appendix to the report, Lilienthal, Dean,and Smyth included their personal observations onthe issue. Lilienthal wrote that he could “find nobasis for a belief that the Superbomb would add toour strength. Moreover, there is reason to believethat it will actually diminish that over-all strength.”He also suggested that proceeding with the develop-ment of thermonuclear weapons might in effectclose the door on policies for promoting peace, giv-ing the impression to the rest of the world that “weare going far beyond any possible military needs,that we have abandoned our program for peace andare resigned to war.” Finally, he reasoned that thebenefits of building H-bombs was far outweighed bytheir cost:

As is pointed out in the General Advisory Com-mittee letters, without Superbombs we do con-tinue to maintain a deterrent against the Russiansin our power to retaliate with our stockpile ofatomic weapons. The difference in the amount ofdamage that could be inflicted on Russia bySuperbombs as compared with A-bombs is notsignificant; it does not, in my opinion, by anymeans constitute enough difference to outweighthe serious damage to your policy (which is the

6666 William Taylor Fain & David S. Painter Case 342, Part A

policy of this country) that is involved in startingdown the road of the Superbomb program.20

Dean, expressing his own views and those ofStrauss, countered:

To announce that we will not undertake such adevelopment is to grant the USSR a potentialmonopoly in this field. This would in my opinionhave a bad effect upon the American people. Itmight well shake the confidence of our friends inwestern Europe. It would have no good effect onthe Kremlin.

In my opinion it would be a mistake to renouncethe development at a time when considerableprecise knowledge of the weapon is lacking andto make this renunciation without first having aconsidered judgment as to its military and psy-chological value in deterring an aggressor or wag-ing a war.21

Smyth argued that developing the Super would con-tribute little to national security and would probablyworsen the general standing of the U.S. in the world.He called for a fresh attempt at negotiating with theSoviets for international control, arguing that anannouncement not to develop the hydrogen bombwould have a tonic effect on the discussions:

I feel that discussion will be more vigorous andfruitful if it starts from a negative decision thanfrom one to go ahead. A negative decision is agesture of good faith and optimism. Also, inci-dentally, such a decision is more easily reversedthan a one to go ahead full speed at the presenttime.

Though a bare announcement of a decision with-out a correlated statement of policy does notappear likely to be fruitful, it does not seem wiseto me to state at this time what circumstancesmight cause us to reverse our course of actionand to go ahead with development of the“Super,” I would not want to make our positiondependent on some specific act or statement bythe Russians, nor to have the threat of a “Super”bomb development hanging over negotiations.22

THE DEBATE CONTINUES

The debate over the Super, heretofore kept highly

secret, was made known to the public on Novem-ber 18, 1949. In a speech calling for strict secrecy innuclear matters, Sen. Edward C. Johnson of the JointCommittee on Atomic Energy also noted that con-siderable progress had been made by American sci-entists toward creating a bomb 1,000 times aspowerful as that dropped on Nagasaki.23 The follow-ing day, President Truman ordered that secrecymeasures be strengthened with respect to discus-sion of the Super.

On November 19, Truman instructed Adm. Sid-ney Souers, Executive Secretary of the NationalSecurity Council to reform the Special Committee ofthe NSC which had advised him on the expansion ofthe atomic energy program earlier in the year.Souers was to lead a working group which would aidDefense Secretary Louis Johnson, Secretary of StateDean Acheson, and AEC Chairman Lilienthal inmaking “recommendations as to whether and inwhat manner the United States should undertakethe development and possible production of ‘super’atomic weapons.” A month went by, however, beforethe Special Committee formally met.24

Truman’s action and the Washington Post articleprompted reactions from George F. Kennan, Directorof the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff OnNovember 18, Kennan prepared a list of nine ques-tions which he felt would have to be answered forthe United States to arrive at a rational decision con-cerning the development of the super-bomb:

1. Would the use of the super-bomb constitute amenace to civilization itself through the possi-bility that it would pollute the earth’s atmo-sphere to a dangerous extent?

2. Would our development of this weapon initself prove a deterrent to war?

3. Assuming the Soviet Union possesses theweapon, would possession of it by the UnitedStates deter or impede in their seeking tospread their influence by methods of intimida-tion?

4. Would our development of this weapon makea foregone conclusion that it would be used incase of war?

5. Would our development of the super-bombincrease our military capacity as comparedwith increased production of atomic bombs?

Case 342, Part A End of U.S. Atomic Monopoly 7777

6. Would the development of the super-bombdetract significantly from the economicstrength of the country?

7. Would the possession of the weapon as ameans of creating terror serve the interests ofthe United States either as a preventive of waror as a means of winning it?

8. What would be the moral effect in the UnitedStates and throughout the world of our devel-oping this weapon of mass destruction, theingredients of which have no peaceful applica-tions whatever?

9. Should our decision on the question be deter-mined by what Russia may or may not do withrespect to developing the super-bomb?25

In a letter to the president dated November 21,Sen. Brien McMahon, chairman of the Joint Commit-tee on Atomic Energy, extolled at length the advan-tages to be gained by possession of the Super,stressing the cost efficiency and ease of delivery. Heasserted that the “various military possibilitiesinherent in the Super seem clear even to a layman”,and that “if we let Russia get the Super first, catas-trophe becomes all but certain—whereas, if we get itfirst, there exists a chance of saving ourselves.”McMahon suggested that President Truman gobefore the United Nations and explain that both theUnited States and the Soviet Union were able tobuild this terrible weapon:

You could point out that the possibility of ravag-ing 1,000 square miles at a single blow does notdecrease the danger from ordinary fission bombsbut that it dramatizes and renders still moreurgent the need for effective international con-trol. Thus the horror and revulsion which thesuper inspires in moral beings might be har-nessed and made to penetrate a world-wide pres-sure of pubic opinion upon the Kremlin to accepta sane and worthwhile control plan.26

Following the split of the AEC on the Super issue,Lewis Strauss left Washington for a California vaca-tion. After almost three weeks of reflection, he wasconvinced more than ever of the necessity to accel-erate development of the hydrogen bomb. In amemorandum dated November 25, Strauss madeclear his feeling that the United States must obtainthe technology for the Super before the Soviets,who, he wrote, as atheists were not likely to be dis-

suaded from producing the weapon on moralgrounds. Further, he attempted to counter the asser-tion by the GAC and his fellow AEC Commissionersthat the H-bomb was somehow morally more objec-tionable than the fission bombs which preceded it.“In sum, I believe that the president should directthe Atomic Energy Commission to proceed with allpossible expedition to develop the thermonuclearweapon.”27

During its regularly scheduled meeting of Decem-ber 1–3, the General Advisory Committee again tookup the matter of the Super. After careful reexamina-tion of their views, the members of the Committeedecided that they were satisfied with the conclu-sions expressed in the October 30 report. In order toclarify the range of factors affecting their decision,the members appended to their December report tothe Commissioners four personal letters from Drs.Buckley, Rowe, Fermi, and DuBridge and a memo-randum from the Secretary, Dr. Manley.28

Buckley believed that research on the thermonu-clear process should be continued but based hisopposition to development of a hydrogen bomb onfour arguments: 1) its feasibility was uncertain; 2) itwould cost at least one billion dollars to develop andwould divert resources from established fissionbomb research; 3) it would not add appreciably toAmerican military strength, 4) if the U.S. could buildone so could the Russians.

Rowe echoed Buckley’s view that the Superoffered no military advantage over standard fissionweapons which might be neglected during a crashresearch program on fusion weapons. Further, hefeared the psychological and moral ramifications ofthe Super for American democracy.

Fermi admitted that the Super might have someadvantages over atomic weapons in attacking troopconcentrations and heavy buildings but assertedthat there were few Soviet targets large enough towarrant use of thermonuclear weapons. Moreover,the resources expended on producing one hydrogenbomb could be used to produce four uraniumbombs and four plutonium bombs.

DuBridge felt that U.S. development of a thermo-nuclear weapon would stimulate the Soviets to pur-sue one of their own. A more practical use ofresources, he claimed, would be to develop a work-able defense against the Super. He also opposed thepursuit of the Super on psychological, diplomaticand moral grounds.

Manley argued that development of the Superwas incompatible with previously articulated U.S.policy aimed at establishing international control ofatomic energy. He contended further that enough

8888 William Taylor Fain & David S. Painter Case 342, Part A

fission bombs could achieve the same total destruc-tion as fusion weapons and that possession of theSuper would add only marginally to the total powerof America’s anticipated atomic stockpile.

THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE NSC

The reconstituted Special Committee of the NSC,consisting of secretaries Acheson and Johnson andAEC Chairman Lilienthal, met for the first time onDecember 22. Lilienthal’s previously stated objec-tions to the Super were well known to his colleaguesand were based upon both practical and moral con-siderations. Lilienthal was shocked at the degree towhich U.S. military strategy relied on atomic bombsand was determined that the United States shouldbe made less dependent on the use of high yieldweapons against urban targets. Lilienthal con-tended that a thorough reassessment of U.S. mili-tary strategy was in order before a technological fixwas sought to the problem posed by the Soviet test.He believed that adopting a technological solution,and thus increasing America’s reliance on itsnuclear arsenal, would decrease any potential Con-gressional and public support for conventional rear-mament and would hurt efforts to secureinternational control of atomic energy.29 Morally, Lil-ienthal was in fundamental agreement with themembers of the GAC who feared that the hydrogenbomb was incapable of destroying military targetswithout causing extensive collateral damage to sur-rounding civilian areas and thus might become aweapon of genocide. In short, the AEC Chairmanopposed accelerated research on the Super. As hehad written earlier in the fall, “We keep saying ‘wehave no other course.’ What we should say is ‘We arenot bright enough to see any other course.’”30

Secretary of Defense Johnson came to the meet-ing enthusiastic over the prospect of an Americanthermonuclear weapon. For the last four years thePentagon had pursued a military strategy whichrelied more and more on the use of atomic weaponsas a means to promote and protect U.S. security. Tomany U.S. strategic planners, the Super appeared tooffer even greater advantages.31

The first detailed military study on the Super hadbeen conducted by the Pentagon’s Military LiaisonCommittee (MLC) to the AEC shortly after theadverse recommendation of the Commission hadbeen brought to the attention of the Joint Chiefs. OnNovember 17, the MLC reported that the construc-tion of a 1,000 KT to 10,000 KT weapon was feasi-ble within three years. Such a weapon would be as

powerful as nine atomic bombs and could destroyan area of sixty-five square miles. The cost of devel-oping the Super was indeterminate but would surelydivert substantial resources from existing fissionweapons research. While there were only four Sovietcities with an area greater than sixty-two squaremiles, a judicious mixture of thermonuclear andatomic weapons could avoid a waste of fissionablematerial. Use of hydrogen weapons, the MLCclaimed, would reduce the delivery effort. Further,the Super would have a significant psychologicaleffect on the nation which possessed it. Failure toacquire it before the Soviets would be demoralizingto the American people and “would have ‘gravepolitical repercussions’ that might raise seriousquestions concerning the continued unity of spirit,confidence, and determination of the westernnations.”32

The Joint Chiefs accepted the MLC’s conclusionsand on November 23 presented Secretary Johnsonwith a detailed report which maintained that “pos-session of a thermonuclear weapon by the USSRwithout such possession by the United States wouldbe intolerable.” The JCS also argued that “a unilateraldecision on the part of the United States not todevelop a thermonuclear weapon will not preventthe development of such a weapon elsewhere.”Since the United States possessed the capability topursue development of the Super it was imperativethat it do so. The report concluded that “the forego-ing considerations decisively outweigh the possiblesocial, psychological, and moral objections whichmay be considered to argue against research anddevelopment.”33

On December 16, the defense members of theSpecial Committee’s working group circulated amemorandum of their own concerning “The MilitaryImplications of Thermonuclear Weapons.” Afterrepeating the Joint Chiefs’ November 23 memo ver-batim, the members discussed at length the reper-cussions of sole possession by the United States, bythe Soviets, possession by both nations as well asconsiderations of timing, effort, and internationalcontrol policy. They concluded that expeditedresearch was critical. Secretary Johnson adopted theconclusions of these papers before the December 22meeting of the Special Committee.34

Secretary of State Dean Acheson, under attack for“losing” China, felt that the United States needed todeal with the Soviet Union from a position ofunquestioned strength and was inclined to believethat the Super would help cement that position.Moreover, Acheson was unconvinced by the moralarguments of the scientists against hydrogen bomb

Case 342, Part A End of U.S. Atomic Monopoly 9999

research. As he noted in his memoirs, “Those whoshared this view were, I believe, not so much movedby the power of its logic (which I was never able toperceive—neither the maintenance of ignorance northe reliance on perpetual good will seemed to me atenable policy) as by an immense distaste for whatone of them described as ‘the whole wretched busi-ness’.”35 Earlier in the fall, the Secretary of State hadspoken with Oppenheimer who tried to sway him tothe side of the scientists. Acheson later told a col-league, “You know, I listened as carefully as I knowhow, but I don’t understand what ‘Oppie’ was try-ing to say. How can you persuade a paranoid adver-sary to disarm ‘by example’?”36

Acheson relied heavily on Paul Nitze, DeputyDirector of the State Department Policy PlanningStaff for advice during this period. In a memoran-dum dated December 19, Nitze recommended:

1. That the President authorize the A.E.C. to pro-ceed with an accelerated program to test thepossibility of a thermonuclear reaction;

2. That no decision be made at this time as towhether weapons employing such a reactionwill actually be built beyond the numberrequired for a test of feasibility;

3. That the N.S.C. reexamine our aims and objec-tives in the light of the USSR’s probable fis-sion bomb capacity and its possiblethermonuclear bomb capability;

4. That, pending such a review, no public discus-sion of these issues on the part of those havingaccess to classified materials in this field beauthorized.37

Acheson sought to clarify his thoughts on thequestion of atomic weapons and American securityin a memorandum dictated on December 20.38

I. It is of immediate importance that the UnitedStates Government review and decide its posi-tion regarding the essentiality and probableuse of weapons of mass destruction—particu-larly atomic weapons—so far as our security isconcerned. Why?

1) Because we are, in effect, deciding now to relyupon and use such weapons. Why is this so?

a) Because while we had atomic weapons and noother nation had, it came to be regarded as a

powerful deterrent to war and a guarantee ofour security; the Atomic Energy Act authorizesproduction of weapons upon this theory; theycame to play a large part in military planning;and Russian behavior over the past few yearsovercame popular aversion to the use of theweapon. Thus acceptance of and reliance uponit has grown more subtly than through anyarticulate major premise.

b) Because, having assumed commitments relat-ing to the defense of Western Europe, as nec-essary for our own defense, we do not haveany other military program which seems tooffer over the short-run promise of militaryeffectiveness. Therefore, we are proceedingwith the development of atomic weapons andcarriers.

(Note: This reasoning does not prove thatatomic weapons provide the promise of mili-tary success. That will be examined later.)

c) And because also our proposals for interna-tional control will not be accepted by the Rus-sians, a situation which produces deadlock andmeans the inevitable continuation of produc-tion and mutual plans for use.

2) It is also necessary to review and decide ourposition regarding the essentiality of atomicweapons because without it our position oninternational control (as well as other policymatters noted below) becomes confused anddangerous.

a) We cannot over a period of time carry convic-tion (and this is of vital importance in the coldwar) in advocating and directing the effort forinternational control and abolition of atomicweapons, if at the same time our military reli-ance on them is growing.

b) We cannot consider profitably any proposalswhich might be acceptable to the Russians andmight prohibit for practical purposes in peace-time all production of fissionable materials insufficient quantity to make bombs, unless weknow whether we want to do so, or not.

c) If we proceed with further development ofatomic weapons, without a clear idea of ourattitude toward their use, control or abolition,we will affect the attitude of the Russians—and

10101010 William Taylor Fain & David S. Painter Case 342, Part A

the chances of avoiding war, the attitude of ourallies—and the course of the cold war, and theattitude of our own public. In other words, wewill affect in various ways the direction of drift.

3) The absence of a clear decision will confusemilitary planning and this in turn will confuseforeign policy and commitments.

a) Planning for the defense of Western Europewill before long raise in acute form questionsof the use of atomic weapons.

i. If plans are based on non-use, or use in retalia-tion only, serious consequences may follow,unless the full implications of such plans aretaken fully into account in other areas of policyand action.

ii. If plans are based upon initial use, and othersrely thereon, the United States may have lostthe moral right of freedom of action eventhough, at a later date, our national interestmay demand different action.

iii. If alternate plans are made, an impression ofindecision is given.

b) Aside from these immediate problems, thetask of the planners will be gravely affected bya decision one way or the other on this centralquestion and by the developments whichwould grow out of either decision.

4) It is important to review and decide our posi-tion on the use of these weapons because todo so will enable us to identify and possiblydecide some major questions affecting foreignpolicy. Some of these are:

a) Which are the most immediate dangers to oursecurity? Those involved in the cold war orthose involved in military aggression?

b) Will military aggression, if it comes, bedirected against us or against our allies?

c) If against us, what are the problems involvedand how does use or non-use of atomic weap-ons affect their solution?

d) If against our allies, the same questions.

e) How does the availability of atomic weaponsto both sides now affect the possibility of theiruse? The possibility of precipitating war? Theoutcome of the cold war? What will be thetrend in this respect in the future?

II. Which danger is most imminent and pressingupon us? That which pertains to the cold waror the danger of military aggression?

1) Soviet theory informs us that their primaryattention is directed toward the former.

a) They believe that the capitalist world isdoomed by internal decay.

b) They do believe and advocate active and sub-versive activities within capitalist societies bythe communist parties.

c) They do not believe that the overthrow has tocome through communist arms in the firstinstance, but they believe that the capitalistworld will not finally surrender power withouta resort to arms and that, therefore, at sometime they may be attacked.

d) They would prefer a war between capitalistcountries in which they intervene at the deci-sive moment, but in view of the unlikelihoodof that coming about might intervene in con-fused situations created by satellites or subver-sive groups.

2) Russian history is divided, but Soviet historyseems to be against military adventures whichentail any risk.

a) The Crimean war, the Russo-Japanese war andWorld War I show tendencies toward aggres-sive adventure. But these latter may be said tohave involved no great risk and to have lessonsthat risk is hard to estimate. The great care toescape involvement in the ‘capitalist’ war of1939 supports the thesis that the lesson waslearned.

3) A cold appraisal of the world situation wouldseem to give the Politburo reason to think thattheir chances in the cold war are not bad, thattheir dogmas are being proved true, and thatmilitary risks to speed the inevitable are notnecessary or desirable. They might well con-clude that more effort was needed to grease

Case 342, Part A End of U.S. Atomic Monopoly 11111111

the wheels of economic and social confusionabroad.

4) This would be a sensible conclusion. Our alliesare not strong and have a long way to go to getstrong. They are divided on some of the essen-tial steps—Germany, colonialism in Asia andAfrica, policy in the Middle East. The Americanpeople may tire or become confused. Ourproblems take perseverance of purpose anduse of resources. They take a large degree ofunity and persistence of purpose. Democraciesare not noted for these qualities.

5) This is important. They need and want thepeople, industry and resources of WesternEurope. They do not want to destroy them.Success in the cold war achieves these. The hotwar may lose all this and more too.

6) This is also important. The loss of WesternEurope or of important parts of Asia or theMiddle East would be a transfer of potentialfrom West to East, which, depending on thearea, might have the gravest consequences inthe long run.

Conclusion on Point II. The weight of the evi-dence leads to the belief that the Russians willput their chief reliance on the cold war. It ishere that we must meet the most pressingdangers and not from military aggression.

Against this is the danger that -

a) They may think they are going to be attackedand foolishly attack first.

b) That failure in the cold war, the growth of Tito-ism, and the possible instability of the regimemay lead to unpredictable action. This seemsunlikely but not impossible.

The point is made not to disregard the dangersof military aggression but to devise policy togive priority to what comes first.

III. In the case of military aggression by theU.S.S.R. is it likely to be directed first againstus or against our allies?

The answer would seem to be, either a simul-taneous attack against both, or an attackagainst some other nation or nations. An

attack against the U.S. alone seems too diffi-cult, pointless, and hazardous.

The point which the question and answer, ifcorrect, brings out is this: The function of theatomic weapon in regard to the defense ofcontinental United States is to prevent theattack or to stop it by reason of the generalpunishment inflicted on the enemy—retalia-tion. It can hardly have, in this field, a morespecific military purpose. In the case of a pro-tracted war, other factors would immediatelyhave important bearing.

These other factors would have to do with thecourse of the war in other areas. Before com-ing to this, let us appraise the influence ofatomic weapons on preventing or stopping thewar.

IV. What can be said about the effect of atomicweapons in preventing or stopping theassumed war against the United States?

Without treading on military ground, considerthe problem in two parts: (a) a war startedagainst the United States and others simulta-neously; and (b) a war started against our alliesonly.

1) If there were no atomic weapons, it seemsunlikely that an attack would be made againstthe United States. This leaves out of consider-ation other weapons of mass destruction. Ifthere were none of these, the conclusion thatthere would be no attack against us seemshighly probable, through sheer difficulty.

2) Would the same be true if it were firmlybelieved on both sides that such weaponswould not be used except in retaliation; butthat they would be promptly and vigorouslyused in retaliation? This involves a calculationas to whether the enemy believed the riskswere worth it. In this case it is fair to believethat the risks would not be worth it and therewould be no direct attack on the United States,or that the probability of attack would be less-ened. This is no inconsiderable considerationto be ignored, if true.

3) Inject a new factor. Suppose a third nation, sayBritain, had atomic weapons. Two questions:Would that make use against us more likely?

12121212 William Taylor Fain & David S. Painter Case 342, Part A

Would Britain use them if others did not,except for retaliation?

A fair answer in both cases is, NO. So, as to anattack on the United States, it would seemmuch less likely if it were known that wewould not precipitate atomic warfare, butwould retaliate if such warfare were introducedby others.

4) Insofar as an attack on our allies is concerned,the considerations are different. Suppose boththe United States and Russia had stockpilesbut that ours was greater, would the knowndetermination on our part to use them in thefirst instance deter attack? No one can say. Itwould be a factor. Possibly a great factor. Butlet us suspend judgement and consider otheraspects of the problem.

5) Would it stop an attack once begun by otherweapons? Here we are not speaking of techni-cal military use, but of its effect on changingthe will of the rulers to press on with the war.We can say with more assurance that it isdoubtful whether its use would have such aneffect. By hypothesis its use would have beenexpected and discounted. Aside from its mili-tary effect upon troops in motion, the effectwould have to be worse than the expectationto break the will of the aggressors.

6) Would it stop the attack by destruction of warindustries and supplies? This postulates a fairlylong war and a possibility of sustained strate-gic air penetration of the enemy’s territory. Iftroops were equipped and in motion fairlyclose to objectives, and not faced by strongresistance, these factors would not be of greatimportance.

7) Would it stop the attack by purely militarymeans? This is for the military to answer, but itis hard to see how this would be done.

V. What is the real relation of the atomic weaponto the vulnerability of our western allies to Rus-sian attack?

1) To what degree does our accumulation ofatomic weapons act as a defensive shield forour allies? What can be done to substitute forthis shield?

2) Does a continued reliance upon the atomicdefensive shield prevent progress toward thesubstitutes therefor?

3) How important would be a further substantialstrengthening of the economies of WesternEurope?

4) What contribution would be incorporatingwestern Germany into Western Europe?

5) What contribution would the withdrawal ofRussian troops from Eastern Europe make?

6) What could be done in the field of conven-tional armaments either to build up adequateEuropean defensive strength or through inter-national control of conventional armaments torestore a balance in Europe?

VI. The effect of passage of time upon these con-siderations.

1) Would a continued accumulation of atomicweapons and means of delivery actually stimu-late the outbreak of war? It does not appearthat this would be likely until such time as theU.S.S.R. considered that its atomic capabilitieswere sufficient to offset ours and had a clearsuperiority in other fields.

2) Is it true that within 5–10 years the U.S.S.R.may be expected to have a stockpile of atomicweapons of sufficient size effectively to neu-tralize the present advantage which we pos-sess and might this time be shortened if theU.S.S.R. developed a thermonuclear reaction?

3) If this is so, would we be better off addressingourselves now to finding substitutes for thedefensive shield our atomic weapons are nowgiving our allies?

The Special Committee meeting of December 22degenerated into an inconclusive head-to-head con-frontation between Lilienthal and Johnson. As theofficial history of the Joint Chiefs put it:

Mr. Johnson insisted that the issues were narrowand technical, having to do mainly with the valueof the “super” bomb as a weapon. On this score,he said, all in the Department of Defense wereagreed that the potential military uses justifiedgoing ahead with a development program. Only if

Case 342, Part A End of U.S. Atomic Monopoly 13131313

the Soviet Union agreed to the U.S. plan for inter-national control of atomic energy would theDefense Department agree to forego the “super”bomb. Mr. Lilienthal insisted on the importanceof the moral issue. The “purpose and course ofmankind” were tied to the decision. It was incon-ceivable not to consider what Secretary Johnsondisparagingly referred to as “philosophy.”39

Because of what Acheson called “the acerbity ofLouis Johnson’s nature”, the meeting broke up.40

Consultation between the members continued onlyon an individual basis before the Committee metone final time on January 31.

FINAL ARGUMENTS

On January 10, the Joint Committee on AtomicEnergy assembled to discuss the hydrogen bomb.Sen. McMahon reviewed the events of the previousmonths, read to the members the report of the Gen-eral Advisory Committee of October 30, and thenread the text of his November 21 letter to the presi-dent which reportedly drew “warm approval fromSenator Knowland and most of the other mem-bers.”41

On January 13, the Joint Chiefs presented anassessment of the hydrogen bomb question to Sec-retary Johnson. Regarding the weapon’s militaryutility and affordability, they asserted:

The nature of modern war is such that defensealone cannot bring about a favorable decision.They [the Joint Chiefs] believe that the truism,“the best defense is a good offense,” is still valid.Hence, they are convinced that it is necessary tohave within the arsenal of the United States aweapon of the greatest capability, in this case thesuper bomb. Such a weapon would improve ourdefense in the broadest sense, as a potential retal-iatory weapon, as well as a defensive weaponagainst enemy forces.

The assignment of some facilities and materialsfor a super weapon would to some extent inter-fere with the research and development programfor military and peacetime application of atomicenergy. However, the cost in money, materials,and in industrial and research effort in developinga super bomb appears to be within the capabilityof the United States without materially interferingwith improvement of existing weapons and othermeans of defense.42

The Joint Chiefs also argued that foregoing researchand development on thermonuclear weapons wouldhave dire consequences in terms of the UnitedStates’ global security interests:

In the present world, where peace and securityrests so completely on the military capability ofthe United States vis-à-vis Communist aggression,it would be foolhardy of the United States volun-tarily to weaken its capability by such a renuncia-tion. Public renunciation by the United States ofsuper bomb development might be interpreted asthe first step in unilateral renunciation of allatomic weapons, a course which would inevita-bly be followed by major international realign-ments to the disadvantage of the United States.Thus, the peace of the world generally and, spe-cifically, the security of the entire Western Hemi-sphere would be jeopardized.43

As to the moral questions surrounding the H-bomb,the Joint Chiefs declared that:

There are undoubtedly a number of moral objec-tions which may be considered to argue againstresearch and development by the United Statesleading to the development and test of a thermo-nuclear weapon. The above military consider-ations outweigh such possible objections. Inaddition, it is difficult to escape the convictionthat in war it is folly to argue whether oneweapon is more immoral than another. For, in thelarger sense, it is war itself which is immoral, andthe stigma of such immorality must rest upon thenation which initiates hostilities.44

Secretary Johnson forwarded the report to thePresident on January 19. The following day, Gen.Bradley met with the JCAE to present the JCSreport’s conclusions. By the end of the meeting theCommittee seemed to be firmly behind the develop-ment of the Super.45

Meanwhile, George Kennan had assembled hisviews on the question of international control ofatomic energy and weapons of mass destruction ina 79-page memorandum to Secretary Acheson. Ken-nan argued:

The real problem at issue, in determining whatwe should do at this juncture with respect tointernational control, is the problem of our atti-tude toward weapons of mass destruction in gen-eral, and the role which we allot to theseweapons in our own military planning. Here, the

14141414 William Taylor Fain & David S. Painter Case 342, Part A

crucial question is: Are we to rely upon weaponsof mass destruction as an integral and vitallyimportant component of our military strength,which we would expect to employ deliberately,immediately, and unhesitatingly in the event thatwe become involved in a military conflict withthe Soviet Union? Or are we to retain such weap-ons in our national arsenal only as a deterrent tothe use of similar weapons against ourselves orour allies and as a possible means of retaliation incase they are used? According to the way thisquestion is answered, a whole series of decisionsare influenced, of which the decision as to whatto do about the international control of atomicenergy and the prohibition of the weapon is onlyone.

We must note, by way of clarification of this ques-tion, that barring some system of internationalcontrol and prohibition of atomic weapons, it isnot questioned that some weapons of massdestruction must be retained in the national arse-nal for purposes of deterrence and retaliation.The problem is: for what purpose, and against thebackground of what subjective attitude, are we todevelop such weapons and to train our forces intheir use?

We may regard them as something vital to ourconduct of a future war—as something withoutwhich our war plans would be emasculated andineffective—as something which we haveresolved, in the face of all the moral and otherfactors concerned, to employ forthwith andunhesitatingly at the outset of any great militaryconflict. In this case, we should take the conse-quences of that decision now, and we shouldobviously keep away from any program of inter-national dealings which would bring us closer tothe possibility of agreement on international con-trol and prohibition of the atomic weapon.

Or we may regard them as something superflu-ous to our basic military posture as somethingwhich we are compelled to hold against the possi-bility that they might be used by our opponents.In this case, of course, we take care not to buildup a reliance upon them in our military plan-ning. Since they then represent only a burden-some expenditure of funds and effort, we holdonly the minimum required for the deterrent-retaliatory purpose. And we are at liberty, if we sodesire, to make it our objective to divest ourselves

of this minimum at the earliest moment byachieving a scheme of international control.

We should remember that more depends on thisbasic decision than simply our stance toward theproblem of international control. It must alsohave an important effect on our domestic atomicenergy program, and particularly on what we doabout the superbomb. If we decide to hold weap-ons of mass destruction only for deterrent-retalia-tory purposes, then the limit on the number andpower of the weapons we should hold is gov-erned by our estimate as to what it would take tomake attack on this country or its allies by weap-ons of mass destruction a risky, probably unprof-itable, and therefore irrational undertaking forany adversary. In these circumstances, the prob-lem of whether to develop the superbomb andother weapons of mass destruction becomes onlya question of the extent to which they would beneeded to achieve this purpose. It might be, forexample, that the present and prospective stock-pile of conventional bombs, combined withpresent and prospective possibilities for delivery,would be found adequate to this purpose and thatanything further in the way of mass destructionweapons would be redundant, or would fall intoan area of diminishing returns.

If, on the other hand, we are resolved to useweapons of mass destruction deliberately andprior to their use against our allies, in a futurewar, then our purpose is presumably to inflictmaximum destruction on the forces, populationand territory of the enemy, with the least expen-diture of effort, in full acceptance of the attendantrisk of retaliation against us, and in the face of allmoral and political considerations. In this case,the only limitations on the number and power ofmass destruction weapons which we would wishto develop would presumably be those of ordi-nary military economy, such as cost, efficiency,and ease of delivery.

Depending, therefore, on which of these coursesis selected, our decision on the superbomb mightbe one of two diametrically opposite ones.

Kennan left little doubt as to where he stood on thisissue:

It is entirely possible that war may be wagedagainst us again, as it has been waged against usand other nations within our time, under these

Case 342, Part A End of U.S. Atomic Monopoly 15151515

concepts and by these weapons. If so, we shalldoubtless have to reply in kind, for that may bethe price of survival. I still think it vital to our ownunderstanding of what it is we are about that wenot fall into the error of initiating, or planning toinitiate, the employment of these weapons andconcepts, thus hypnotizing ourselves into thebelief that they may ultimately serve some posi-tive national purpose. I doubt our ability to holdthe respective weapons in our national arsenal, tofit them into our military and political plans, toagree with our allies on the circumstances of theiruse, and to entertain the prospect of their contin-ued cultivation by our adversaries, without back-sliding repeatedly into this dangerous, andpossibly mortal, error. In other words, even if wewere to conclude today that “first use” would notbe advantageous, I would not trust the steadfast-

ness of this outlook in a situation where theshadow of uncontrolled mass destruction weap-ons continues to lie across the peoples of theworld. Measured against this alternative, animperfect system of international control seemsto me less dangerous, and more considerate ofthose things in international life which are stillhopeful.46

Acheson remained skeptical, however, as heexplained to Lilienthal on January 26, “The continu-ing Soviet threat and the collapse of the Nationalistgovernment in China made it hard to counter thedemand for bigger weapons.”47

On the morning of January 31, 1950, the SpecialCommittee came together to finalize its recommen-dations to the President on the question of theSuper.

NOTES

1. Kenneth W. Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff andNational Policy, vol. 2 of The History of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1979), 523.

2. Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, AtomicShield, 1947/1952, vol. 2 of A History of the United StatesAtomic Energy Commission (University Park, PA: Pennsyl-vania State University Press, 1969), 366.

3. Public Papers of the President of the United States:Harry S. Truman 1949 (Washington, DC: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1964), 485.

4. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 3695. Herbert York, The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller and

the Superbomb (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Co.,1976), 42.

6. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of theUnited States, 1949, vol. 1, 564 (hereafter FR).

7. Condit, JCS and National Policy, 535.8. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:

Harry S. Truman, 1949 (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern-ment Printing Office, 1964), 522

9. Ibid., 523.10. James R. Shepley and Clay Blair, Jr., The Hydrogen

Bomb: The Men, The Menace, The Mechanism (New York:David McKay, 1954), 21.

11. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 377.12. Barton J. Bernstein, “Truman and the H-Bomb,”

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March 1984), 13.13. Teller’s initial ideas on how to build such weapons

proved to be incorrect; see Ronald E. Powaski, March toArmageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race,1939 to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press,1987), 54.

14. York, The Advisors, 24.15. York, The Advisors, 47.

16. Shepley and Blair, Hydrogen Bomb, 70.17. Robert C. Williams and Philip L. Cantelon, eds. The

American Atom: A Documentary History of Nuclear Policiesfrom the Discovery of Fission to the Present, 1939–1984(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984),117–120.

18. Conant’s personal view was that “[t]he real answer[to the Soviet bomb] was to do a job and revamp ourwhole defense establishment, put in something like Uni-versal Military Service [and] get Europe[e] strong on theground.” Bernstein, “Truman and the H-Bomb,” 13.

19. FR 1949, 1:576–585.20. Ibid., 582–583.21. Ibid., 583.22. Ibid 584–585.23. Washington Post, 18 November, 1949. Johnson

delivered the speech on November 2, but the story wasnot picked up right away.

24. Bernstein, “Truman and the H-Bomb,” 15.25. FR 1949, 1: 585–587.26. Ibid., 588–595.27. Ibid., 596–599.28. Condit, JCS and National Policy, 550–553.29. Warner R. Schilling, “The H-Bomb Decision: How

to Decide Without Actually Choosing,” in Stanley I. Kutler,New Perspectives on the American Past, vol.2, 1877 to thePresent (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1969), 476–477.

30. Bernstein, Truman and the Bomb, 13.31. David Alan Rosenberg, “American Atomic Strategy

and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision,” Journal of AmericanHistory 66 (june 1979); 62–87.

32. Condit, JCS and National Policy, 547.33. FR 1949, 1: 595–596.34. Ibid., 604–610.

16161616 William Taylor Fain & David S. Painter Case 342, Part A

35. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years atthe State Department (New York: W.W. Norton and Co.,1969), 346.

36. Bernstein, “Truman and the H-Bomb,” 15.37. FR 1949, 1:610–611.38. FR 1949, 1:612–617.39. Condit, JCS and National Policy, 550.40. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 348.

41. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 399–400.42. FR 1950, 1: 505–506.43. Ibid., 50644. Ibid., 511.45. Condit, JCS and National Security Policy, 556.46. FR 1950 1: 29–30, 39–40.47. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, 404.

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17

At about 10:30 on the morning of January 31, Secre-taries Johnson and Acheson and Chairman Lilienthalalong with their staffs filed into a second floor roomof the Old State Building (now the Old Executiveoffice Building) to hammer out a final draft of theirrecommendation to the President.

There was still significant disagreement amongthe members on the desirability of acceleratedresearch on the Super. Acheson and Johnson clearlyfavored development at this point, but Lilienthalkept repeating that he had a “visceral feeling this iswrong.” Nevertheless, he agreed to consider with hiscolleagues a draft recommendation written by StateDepartment atomic energy advisor Gordon Arnesonwhich suggested:1

(a) That the President direct the Atomic EnergyCommission to proceed to determine the techni-cal feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon, thescale and rate of effort to be determined jointlyby the Atomic Energy Commission and theDepartment of Defense; and the necessary ordi-nance developments and carrier program to beundertaken concurrently; (b) That the Presidentdefer decision pending the reexaminationreferred to in (c) as to whether thermonuclear

weapons should be produced beyond the numberrequired for a test of feasibility; (c) That the Presi-dent direct the Secretary of State and the Secre-tary of Defense to undertake a reexamination ofour objectives in peace and war and of the effectof these objectives on our strategic plans in thelight of the probable fission bomb capability andPossible thermonuclear bomb capability of theSoviet Union; (d) That the President indicate pub-licly the intention of the government to continuework to determine the feasibility of a thermonu-clear weapon, and that no further official infor-mation on it be made public without approval ofthe President.

The first recommendation reflected the viewsexpressed by the Joint Chiefs on January 13. Thesecond was made in deference to the views of Lil-ienthal and other members of the AEC and its GACwho hoped to delay in some fashion the productionof thermonuclear weapons. The third recommenda-tion was in conformance with the views of Lilienthaland others who had pressed for months for a funda-mental review of U.S. strategic posture. It was sup-ported by Acheson.

Johnson disagreed strenuously with (b) believingthat it conveyed a sense of uncertainty by theUnited States. He quickly acceded to the request fora reassessment of the U.S. strategic position, how-ever. Acheson agreed to strike (b) “recognizing thatthere was no need for an explicit statement to pro-tect the President’s option to defer that decision.”

Case 342, Part B

THE END OF THE U.S. ATOMIC MONOPOLY

William Taylor Fain & David S. PainterGeorgetown University

Copyright 1989 by Institute for the Study of Diplomacy.ISBN: 1-56927-342-1Publications, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.20057–1025 http://data.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/isd/

18181818 William Taylor Fain & David S. Painter Case 342, Part B

Lilienthal “apparently concluded that events hadnow moved so far that a formal dissent on his partwas useless” and capitulated to the views of his twocolleagues. Any further protest might weaken theCommission’s or his bureaucratic position. Lilienthalnow agreed to support a recommendation in favorof accelerated research on the Super. He main-tained however, the right to express his reservationsto the President face to face. It was approximately12:30 when the members of the Committee decidedupon their recommendation and decided to walknext door to the White House to inform PresidentTruman of their decision. Lilienthal later recalledJohnson saying that “the heat was on in Congress,and every hour counted in getting this matter dis-posed of.”2

The President, waiting in the Oval Office for theSpecial Committee to arrive, was actually in nodoubt as to what his decision would be. When Tru-man read the Joint Chiefs’ recommendation in favorof development on January 19, he had said that it“made a lot of sense, and he was inclined to thinkthat was what we should do,” Acheson recalled, andon the twenty-first, he indicated to his staff that hehad made up his mind.3

After the Committee had been ushered into theOval Office and presented the president with itsreport, Lilienthal recorded that Truman “said that hehad always believed that we should never use theseweapons and that our whole purpose was peace;that he didn’t believe we would ever use them butwe had to go on and make them because of the waythe Russians were behaving; we had no othercourse.”4 Lilienthal attempted to outline his moralobjections to the Super but was cut off by the presi-dent. “Truman asked the Special Committee ‘Canthe Russians do it?’”, All members nodded. “‘Wedon’t have much time,’” Admiral Souers (also inattendance] said. “‘In that case,’” asserted Truman,“‘we have no choice. We’ll go ahead.’”5

Less than ten minutes after it had begun, themeeting was adjourned.

Later that afternoon the White House issued apublic statement announcing that the President hadinstructed the Atomic Energy Commission to “con-tinue its work on all forms of atomic weaponsincluding the so-called hydrogen or super-bomb.”6

Truman told his staff on February 2, “there wasactually no decision to be made on the H-bomb.”7

In his opinion, the critical decision had been madethe previous October when he ordered the expan-sion of atomic weapons production. His January 31decision had followed naturally given the interna-tional and bureaucratic exigencies he faced. Thedevelopment of atomic power by the Soviets, follow-ing the consolidation of Communism in EasternEurope, the revolution in China, and the economicand labor unrest in Europe coalesced with the opin-ions of the State and Defense Departments that theUnited States operate from positions of strength inits military and economic policy to ensure that thepresident would decide in favor of acceleratedresearch on the Super.

On February 16, Brig. Gen. Herbert Loper, amember of the Military Liaison Committee to theAEC, wrote a memo speculating that if the Sovietshad begun a concerted atomic research program in1943, it was conceivable that they now had the abil-ity to outstrip the United States in atomic weaponsproduction. While admitting that this speculationmight be fantastic, he urged that it be considerednevertheless. His superior, General Robert LeBaron,endorsed the memo and forwarded it to the JointChiefs on February 20. Four days later, after consid-ering Loper’s speculation, the JCS recommended toSecretary Johnson “most urgently . . . immediateimplementation of all out development of hydrogenbombs.”8 The report was brought to the attention ofthe President who appointed Johnson, Acheson, andAEC Commissioner Henry Smyth to study the issue.On March 9, they recommended that Trumanapprove the concept that “the thermonuclearweapon program is regarded as a matter of highesturgency” for the nation and that he take steps toexpedite the eventual production of fusion weapons.Truman approved the recommendation the nextday. The United States was now formally commit-ted to the development and production of nuclearweapons.9

As part of his January 31 decision, the Presidenthad authorized a review of America’s strategic goalsand posture. On April 7, the product of that review, alengthy memo drafted primarily by Paul Nitze, whohad replaced Kennan as chief of the State Depart-ment’s Policy Planning Staff, was circulated in Wash-ington. Designated NSC-68, it would prove to be oneof the most important and influential documents ofthe Cold War.10

Case 342, Part B End of U.S. Atomic Monopoly 19191919

NOTES

1. Shepley and Blair, Hydrogen Bomb, 87–88.2. Bernstein, “Truman and the H-Bomb,”16; FR 1950

1:513–517.3. Bernstein, “Truman and the H-Bomb,” 16. 4. Ibid., 16.5. Robert J. Donovan, Tumultuos Years: The Presi-

dency of Harry S. Truman, 1949–1953 (New York: W.W.Norton and Co., 1982), 155.

6. Public Papers of the President of the United States:Harry S. Truman, 1950 (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern-ment Printing Office, 1956), 138.

7. Rosenberg, “American Atomic Strategy,” 86.8. Rosenberg, “American Atomic Strategy,” 85; FR

1950 1.9. Ibid., 51; FR 1950 1:538–542.

10. Ibid., 234–292.