WILD RIDE - DTIC · Wild Ride: Launching Troops Through Space for Rapid Precision Global...
Transcript of WILD RIDE - DTIC · Wild Ride: Launching Troops Through Space for Rapid Precision Global...
WILD RIDE:
LAUNCHING TROOPS THROUGH SPACE FOR RAPID PRECISION GLOBAL INTERVENTION
Shon P. Williams, Major, USAF April 2007
Blue Horizons Paper Center for Strategy and Technology Air War College
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DISCLAIMER
The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not
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ABSTRACT
In 2002 the forward-leaning Marines officially documented a need to transport “small
numbers of combat Marines…at sufficient speed to ensure the relevance of global terrestrial
force projection at the earliest stages of conflict.” They have stated the desire to use space as the
transport medium. With certain technological advances, the space domain may provide the
solution, perhaps the only solution, for this USMC transportation requirement. Although
achieving a viable, responsive troop space transportation option comes with significant
challenges, the US Air Force as the lead service for space should invest in capabilities that will
both satisfy the stated Marine Corps need and make possible other missions that would benefit
from fast, low-cost, reliable space transportation.
The purpose of this paper is to examine technologies supporting worldwide point-to-point
space transportation “and the implications of this for the USAF between now and 2025.” While
this futuristic method of achieving rapid global mobility requires maturation of a wide range of
technologies, this paper will focus on launch vehicle technologies where an appropriate Air
Force contribution would reap substantial rewards for the United States and the Air Force. After
exploring the background related to this problem, the paper delves into launch vehicle
technologies and immerses the concept in eight possible future scenarios. In seven of the eight
alternative futures, we can see utility in having access to a rapid, point-to-point space transport
technology.
The author concluded that the need for rapid, precision global mobility through space is
valid. Technologies are maturing rapidly with the potential to deliver manned and unmanned
responsive spacelift capabilities sooner than 2025, but they have not been adequately
demonstrated in a single system. With the proper investments, disciplined planning, and the
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right partnerships, the nation will see the opening of the space superhighway.
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CONTENTS
Disclaimer ....................................................................................................................................... ii
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iii
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
Chapter 2: Problem (“Why Needed? Who’s Responsible?”) ......................................................... 3 Why Needed? .............................................................................................................................. 3 Who’s Responsible? ................................................................................................................... 7
Chapter 3: Technology Exploration (“Can We?”) .......................................................................... 9 Assumptions .............................................................................................................................. 10 Technologies Required ............................................................................................................. 10 Sources of Technology and Related Concepts ......................................................................... 11
Chapter 4: Analysis of the Future (“Should We?”) ...................................................................... 16 Challenges and Counterarguments ........................................................................................... 16 Future Forecasts and Technology Implications ........................................................................ 18
State Actor Threat Scenarios for 2025 .................................................................................. 19 Nonstate Actor Threat Scenarios for 2025 ............................................................................ 20 Utility of Rapid Troop Space Transport in Eight Alternative Futures.................................. 22
Chapter 5: Recommendations ....................................................................................................... 25
Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusions .......................................................................................... 29
Notes ............................................................................................................................................. 30
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 35
Appendix A: Universal Needs Statement (UNS) and DRAFT Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) – Small Unit Space Transport And INsertion (SUSTAIN) Capability .............................. 38
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
For most people, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) invokes images of a few
proud, skilled warriors engaged in fierce amphibious assaults and ground combat, perhaps even
slaying dragons.1 If the Corps has its way, in future images these same Marines will gear up for
spaceflight and ride in launch vehicles on their way to the dragon’s lair on the other side of the
earth. In 2002 the forward-leaning Marines officially documented a need to transport “small
numbers of combat Marines…at sufficient speed to ensure the relevance of global terrestrial
force projection at the earliest stages of conflict.”2 They have stated the desire to use space as
the transport medium. With advances in materials and nanotechnology to reduce weight,
information technology for command and control, biotechnology to keep the warfighters mission
ready, and technologies to enable more aircraft-like operability, the space domain may provide
the solution, perhaps the only solution, for this USMC transportation requirement. Although
achieving a viable, responsive troop space transportation option comes with significant
challenges, the US Air Force as the lead service for space should invest in capabilities that will
both satisfy the stated Marine Corps need and make possible other missions that would benefit
from fast, low-cost, reliable space transportation.
The purpose of this paper is to examine technologies supporting worldwide point-to-point
space transportation “and the implications of this for the USAF between now and 2025.”3 While
this futuristic method of achieving rapid global mobility requires maturation of a wide range of
technologies, this paper will focus on launch vehicle technologies where an appropriate Air
Force contribution would reap substantial rewards for the United States and the Air Force. After
exploring the background related to this problem, the paper will delve into launch vehicle
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technologies, immerse the concept in eight possible future scenarios, and make recommendations
for USAF investment.
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CHAPTER 2: PROBLEM (“WHY NEEDED? WHO’S RESPONSIBLE?”) The scope of the intervention necessary to contain or neutralize a contingency grows exponentially as the time between the decision to take action and the physical intervention increases. Earliest intervention results in minimal force application, with consequent minimal visibility at the lowest national cost.4
Why Needed?
One could easily argue that the stated USMC space mobility requirement begs the
question, “Why do the Marines and the nation need the ability to send troops through space?”
The world is changing. Enemies in The Long War on Terror and of the nation’s future are not
limited by borders. In his provocative work, The Clash of Civilizations?, Samuel Huntington
hypothesized that in the coming years “the dominating source of conflict will be cultural…the
principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different
civilizations.”5 He goes on to say that while conflicts between states will still exist “the fault
lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.”6 With the increase in
globalization, one cannot necessarily draw these “fault lines” on a map—they defy borders and
span the globe.
This trend is sure to continue, and, as such, we must be prepared to appear anywhere in
the world within seconds, minutes, or a few hours versus many hours, days, or more.
Conceivably the U.S. military will need to respond quickly to multiple locations around the
world simultaneously. Forward presence of military units around the world may be sufficient in
some cases; however, we likely will not have the force size or political will to maintain the level
of forward presence required to respond to the emerging set of conflicts. Space has the potential
to afford us this global flexibility and responsiveness.
United States Special Operations Command expanded upon these thoughts in its 2004
Special Operations Forces Space Enabling Concept (SOFSEC). They foresee that a dangerous,
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uncertain strategic environment with a dramatically increasing range of threats will continue to
pose challenges in the future. The following elements characterize this future strategic
environment: “military power will continue to be required to protect…U.S. global interests”; the
“battlespace will continue to be global, if not universal”; “the speed and scale of the proliferation
of…technology and CBRNE weapons will continue to increase”;7 “adversaries will have greater
access…to sophisticated capabilities”; and “adversaries will continue to adapt as U.S.
capabilities evolve.” 8 Tapping into the global reach capabilities that space power offers will
allow the US and its Allies to handle the complex contingencies that will continue to litter the
international landscape.
In light of the changing world situation, the USMC has predicted that in 25 to 30 years
they will need to send a “squad-sized unit of Marines any place on the Earth in less than two
hours time.”9 As stated in their 2002 Universal Needs Statement (UNS) for the Small Unit
Space Transport and INsertion (SUSTAIN) capability, “the Marine Corps needs a capability to
transport small, mission-tailored units through space from any point on the globe to a
contingency at any other point on the globe within minutes.”10 The Marines like to refer to the
concept as getting 13 thinking “brains” on the ground at the earliest stage of a crisis rather than
13 sets of “boots.” Based on the UNS, the SUSTAIN capability should have the following
characteristics: negligible sensor cross-section, kinetic air defense survivability, flexibility to
enter and sustain low earth orbit, transport of up to 13 combat-equipped personnel (not including
the transport crew), flexible launch on demand, combined arms weapons suite for self-defense
and fire support, multiple personnel insertion options (high altitude, low altitude, ground),
unrefueled transport operation for entire mission cycle, vertical and/or short takeoff and landing
(V/STOL), avoidance of foreign airspace overflight restrictions, and post-mission extraction
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ability. Appendix A contains the full text of the UNS as well as the unpublished draft Initial
Capabilities Document (ICD).
Marine Colonel J. R. Wassink, head of the Information Operations and Space Integration
Branch at the USMC Pentagon headquarters offered anecdotal evidence as to the need for faster
response times. Regarding the 04 November 1979 capture of 66 American civilians at the US
diplomatic mission in Tehran, Col Wassink pondered, “What could have been done if we could
have rapidly reinforced the embassy in Iran? Could we have avoided the [14-month] hostage
crisis?” He went on to say that time, distance, and access issues have caused the Marines to
reconsider their options for future expeditionary warfare: “We looked at space because you don’t
have to worry about overflight. [Also], a prepositioned MEU with a V-22 or C-17 still takes
many times longer than two hours to get there.”11
Similar to the USMC need, Special Operations Forces (SOF) require “responsive
unmanned lift for systems and high loiter vehicles that support persistent and pervasive
operational awareness…launched on short notice into space.”12 Although the stated SOF
requirement only asks for responsive, flexible, unmanned access to space, many of the requisite
technologies are the same. Certainly with SOF’s rare ability to exploit new technology,
USSOCOM would also jump at the opportunity to transport a SOF team anywhere in less than
two hours.
From an Air Force perspective, the preponderance of effort related to flexible, rapid
space access comes from the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) program. According to the
Mission Needs Statement (MNS), one of the four ORS required key capabilities is “recoverable,
rapid-response transport to, through, and from space,” and any ORS systems must be responsive,
maneuverable, operable, economical, survivable, interoperable, and flexible.13 The SUSTAIN
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concept falls well within this mission space. Additionally, Maj Bob Lancaster, an Air Force
Security Forces officer who worked the Security Forces Transformation project, immediately
recognized Air Force applications that stem from the USMC concept. He postulated that “if [the
USMC and SOF] mission is base seizure, and they get there in under two hours, the follow-on
forces (Security Forces, etc.) will need to get there quickly as well.”14 Career logistician Maj
Andy Hunt of HQ USAF/A9 also acknowledged utility in the concept for Air Force rapid
resupply missions stating that “from a logistics standpoint it would be fantastic.”15
The obvious implication of responsive space launch is the fast, flexible, precise global
delivery of “stuff” (i.e., people, equipment, weapons, or other assets). An important side benefit
of this precise global delivery is the global range that it affords, thus avoiding much of the costs,
force protection, sustainment, and foreign access requirements of forward bases.16 Furthermore,
one can easily envision other benefits of this type of capability: point-to-point high-value cargo
delivery, long range strike and precision global strike (PGS), or, if extended to orbital
applications, responsive satellite replenishment, satellite repair, or astronaut recovery. Col
Wassink would like to see in the DoD an “increased recognition of emerging types of missions
(i.e., take PGS a step further to be not just Global Strike but ‘Global Intervention’—expand the
mission set to more than just kinetic but to global influence.”17 The author dubbed this concept
“rapid precision global intervention,” or the ability to take the full range of capabilities quickly
and accurately anywhere in the world to achieve the desired effects. The reader will see this
concept throughout this paper.
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Who’s Responsible? The US Air Force provides the Nation a unique capability to project national influence anywhere in the world on very short notice. Air and space forces, through their inherent speed, range, and flexibility, can respond to national requirements by delivering precise military power to create effects where and when needed.18
—Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1
Strategic thinkers in the Department of Defense and elsewhere recognize the advantages
of revolutionizing the space launch business; however, the current launch paradigm needs a
major shift to achieve the desired responsiveness. “Rapid” and “responsive” are often the
adjectives of choice for spacelift discussions when uttered from the mouths of space visionaries,
warriors dreaming of a better way to get to the fight, or future planners trying to create a new
reality. In today’s world, however, “rapid, responsive space launch” only exists if one
dramatically redefines “rapid” and “responsive.” Fortunately, the future holds the promise of
transforming today’s slow, unresponsive spacelift into a realistic capability for moving people
and cargo anywhere in the world in a very short time. The distinctive capabilities of the Air
Force make it uniquely suited to help make good on this promise and suggest that the AF should
take the DoD lead on advancing our rapid force projection options using space as a medium.
While rapid response is not the sole purview of the Air Force, the Air Force does bear the
major burden to lead these global types of activities. Per Air Force Basic Doctrine (AFDD 1) the
USAF’s distinctive capabilities “stem from two sources: functions that are best accomplished
only by air and space forces and functions that achieve the most benefit to the Nation when
performed by air and space forces.”19 Three of the USAF distinctive capabilities—rapid global
mobility, precision engagement, and global attack—highlight what air, space, and cyberspace
power bring to this fight. Capitalizing on these distinctive capabilities in “command of the
commons,”20 the Air Force could realize the concept of near instantaneous intervention
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anywhere. The following excerpts from AFDD 1 define the three aforementioned distinctive
capabilities, providing context for discussing the Air Force’s role in delivering rapid space
launch options for combatant commanders.
Rapid Global Mobility refers to the timely movement, positioning, and sustainment of military forces and capabilities through air and space, across the range of military operations…It is the particular competence of air and space forces to most rapidly provide what is needed, where it is needed…in minimum time to directly achieve strategic objectives.21 Global Attack: The ability of the Air Force to attack rapidly and persistently with a wide range of munitions anywhere on the globe at any time is unique…the responsiveness of air and space forces can be instantaneous…Our Service is able to rapidly project power over global distances and maintain a virtually indefinite “presence” over an adversary…The ability to continuously observe an adversary’s actions from space and then, when provoked, to swiftly respond with a wide variety of capabilities provides the true essence of deterrence.”22 Precision Engagement: Increasingly, air and space power is providing the “scalpel” of joint Service operations…The Air Force is…the Service with the greatest capacity to apply the technology and techniques of precision engagement anywhere on the face of the Earth in a matter of hours. In addition to the traditional application of force, precision engagement includes nonlethal as well as lethal force...Precision engagement represents a global capability not only to win wars, but also the ability to drive crises to peace.23 In addition to the distinctive capabilities of the Air Force, in June 2003 the Secretary of
Defense appointed the Secretary of the Air Force as the DoD Executive Agent for Space with the
mission to “develop, coordinate, and integrate plans and programs for space systems and the
acquisition of DoD…operational space force capabilities to ensure the United States has the
space power to achieve its national security objectives.” In this context, space power is defined
as “the total strength of a nation's capabilities to conduct and influence activities to, in, through,
and from the space medium to achieve its objectives.”24 One should note that the mission covers
the “nation’s” space capabilities and not solely those of the DoD or the Air Force. Specific duties
of the DoD Executive Agent for Space include integrating the DOD Component needs into the
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National Security Space Plan (NSSP), developing courses of action that improve space
programs, and encouraging commercial competition and prototypes that increase capabilities at
lower costs and with shorter acquisition cycles.25
With the SECAF’s dual roles in space, first as head of the Air Force component with its
distinctive capabilities that are global and expeditionary in nature and second as DoD Executive
Agent for Space, the Air Force should have a dog in the fight when it comes to exploring and
satisfying service and joint space needs. While the Air Force has stepped up in its new role as
DoD space champion, the service is conspicuously absent in the discussion of manned space
operations, and it only scratches the surface of the responsive spacelift requirements. To the
USAF’s credit, resources are tight, the nation is at war, and the NSSP does indeed list as a
desired future state to achieve flexible, responsive space launch;26 the Air Force just does not yet
have a good plan for the DoD to get there.
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CHAPTER 3: TECHNOLOGY EXPLORATION (“CAN WE?”)
Without risk and without failure, we cannot initiate and realize the very breakthroughs we so desperately need to open the space frontier.27 —Peter H. Diamandis, MD Chairman/CEO, X PRIZE Foundation Chairman/CEO, Zero Gravity Corporation Founder, International Space University
Assumptions
The statement of two assumptions will help narrow the scope of the evaluation of
responsive space launch technologies. Although these assumptions seem to be in the territory of
science fiction, they are not beyond the realm of possibility, but not by 2025.
1. We will not see other technological breakthroughs (i.e., advanced robotic warriors,
super soldiers, or “proxy bots”28) by 2025 that will eliminate the need to send thinking
humans in harm’s way as first responders to achieve the desired effect.
2. Teleportation, or movement from one place to another without traveling through space
(the three-dimensional type not the outer type), will not be a reality anytime in the
next 20 years.
Technologies Required
Like most advanced capabilities, space transportation requires a host of technologies,
people, and processes to work together as a system of systems. Good people and processes are
extremely important; without them, any new capability is sure to fail. While this section
addresses people and process issues, it does not attempt to explore people and processes in depth.
This section will instead focus primarily on technologies, principally those involved in the
launch vehicle itself. Furthermore, with respect to the specific technologies presented here, it is
the synergistic relationship between the various technologies, not necessarily the individual
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technologies themselves, that will provide the breakthroughs necessary to open space up to a
greater expanse of operations.
Many different materiel design concepts could provide the capabilities necessary to
deliver the desired SUSTAIN capabilities. Trade studies must occur to optimize the system
designs. The most likely answer to the problem will be a family of operationally responsive
spacelift vehicles, some suborbital, some orbit-capable, with a range of lift capacities. The most
efficient family will not only meet the needs of SUSTAIN but will also satisfy the range of ORS
requirements and ideally the requirements of civil and commercial space at the same time. While
these decisions require much more analysis by a larger team of experts, the following
technologies are common to virtually any of the design options: propulsion, thermal protection,
structures, materials, avionics, power systems, and operability.
Sources of Technology and Related Concepts
Several concepts within military, commercial, and civil space have addressed or are
addressing certain aspects of the problem of making responsive space transportation a reality.
The following paragraphs describe some of the key projects and their respective potential
contributions to this mission and to the technology areas mentioned in the previous section,
especially in the areas of propulsion and operability. These explanations will be intentionally
brief. Readers should check the provided references for additional information on each project.
High Ops Tempo – Energetic Access to Globe & Launch Experiment (HOT EAGLE) HOT EAGLE was Air Force Research Laboratory’s (AFRL) paper study completed in
2006 for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to examine the feasibility
of SUSTAIN. Although DARPA did not decide to fund HOT EAGLE after this seedling effort,
much of the work continued in AFRL’s FAST project (see below). FAST has a broader scope; it
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is not focused on SUSTAIN but on the bigger picture of responsive space access. Nonetheless,
the approach and technologies are similar.29
Fully-Reusable Access to Space Technology (FAST)
FAST is a joint project of AFRL and Air Force Space Command with the intent of
demonstrating technologies to enable existing and new Air Force operational space missions
such as spacelift; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); space control; and global
mobility. Key goals of this program include reducing space launch costs and increasing
reliability by an order of magnitude, “aircraft-like operability” (15-minute call-up time, four-
hour turnaround, four or more times higher flight rates than existing launch systems, operations
and maintenance crew size of six or less), and scalability to support a full range of payload
requirements. Although FAST is primarily concerned with launch to orbit, its technologies are
intrinsic to point-to-point global transportation as well. Planned experiments include the
following: airframe and structural health management experiment, propulsion experiment,
subsystem experiment, leading edge demo, and flight operations experiment. The FAST program
approach is to demonstrate these fully-reusable access-to-space technologies in a series of small
and affordable ground and flight experiments leading up to an integrated experimental X-Vehicle
in 2010 to 2015 and prototype Y-Vehicle in 2015 to 2020. As of Fall 2006, the AFRL program
office had the resources and personnel in place to execute the ground demos.30
Affordable, REsponsive Spacelift (ARES)
ARES is an Air Force Space Command and AFRL program intended to “create a
transformational spacelift capability, embodying affordability, responsiveness, simplicity of
operations, and reliability for a wide range of payload classes.”31 ARES is actually a family of
vehicles to provide affordable, responsive spacelift for all of the DoD’s satellites. The concept is
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a hybrid launch vehicle with expendable upper stages and a fly-back booster, 24- to 48-hour
turnaround time, and costs expected to be lower than current expendable or conceptual fully-
reusables. Flight demonstrations are scheduled to begin in 2010. The ARES budget is
approximately $4M per year.
Falcon Family of Launch Vehicles
The Falcon family is “designed to provide breakthrough advances in reliability, cost,
flight environment and time to launch” for transporting satellites to low earth orbit.32 Reliability
is the principal driver. Falcon 1 is a two stage, rocket-powered launch vehicle. It is designed for
cost efficient and reliable transport of small (1500 lb) satellites to low Earth orbit. Two test
launches have occurred in 2006 and 2007; both had failures prior to reaching orbit but gathered
valuable test data. Falcon 9 is a heavy lift vehicle. The developer, SpaceX, won a contract from
NASA to demonstrate three flights of Falcon 9 beginning in 2009.33
X-41 Common Aero Vehicle (CAV)
The Air Force CAV is a maneuvering reentry vehicle capable of carrying a variety of
payloads (primarily munitions) down from orbit or suborbital reentry and either impacting a
target or dispensing munitions at a desired location. CAVs are expected to have 2000-3000
nautical miles of cross-range for maneuvering. “CAV needs to be deployed at very high
velocities to be effective, and Mach numbers less than 20 for suborbital deliveries produce
relatively short ranges and cross-ranges.” This limitation would have implications for a
suborbital manned vehicle if CAV-like technologies were used. DARPA’s FALCON (Force
Application and Launch from CONUS) program (not to be confused with the Falcon family of
launch vehicles) is scheduled to provide a reasonable penetrator capability from a traditional
launch vehicle in the 2008 timeframe. FALCON has no funding for any on-orbit CAV effort.34
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X-43 Hyper-X
In 2004 NASA made aviation history with two flights of a scramjet-powered, hypersonic
airplane (or greater than five times the speed of sound). This was the first hypersonic flight of a
vehicle with air-breathing engines. Compared to rocket-powered vehicles, scramjets (supersonic
combustion ramjets) promise more aircraft-like operability for increased affordability, flexibility,
and safety for flights within the atmosphere and into orbit. Unlike rockets, because scramjets do
not have to carry their own oxidizer, the vehicles can be smaller and lighter - or carry more
payload than an equivalent sized rocket. Ultimate applications include hypersonic missiles,
hypersonic airplanes, the first stage of multistage reusable launch vehicles, and single-stage-to-
orbit reusable launch vehicles. The eight-year, $30M per year program was a high-risk, high-
payoff research effort.35
SpaceShipOne
SpaceShipOne by private company Scaled Composites won the Ansari X-Prize for the
first non-government manned space flight above 100 km. The goal was to demonstrate that non-
government space flights can be feasible and low cost in an effort to spawn the space tourism
industry. New technologies included the launch aircraft, the three-person spaceship, hybrid
rocket propulsion technologies, and a variety of new systems. SpaceShipOne is air-launched
from the mother aircraft, separates and climbs to suborbital altitude, then reenters in a high drag
configuration for stable flight. It finally lands horizontally on a runway. Other commercial
ventures were competing with Scaled Composites prior to their winning the X-Prize. Some of
these other companies still have their own vehicle systems attempting to achieve the same
goals.36
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As mentioned before, several other projects are also making steady progress in
technologies related to responsive spacelift. NASA, DARPA, the Navy, the Air Force, and their
contractors are the chief contributors along with some private companies. The main problem
with all of these projects is not with the technology but with the fact that they are more or less
separate projects that are only loosely linked. To really drive a revolution in space access in a
resource-constrained environment, the nation needs to coordinate its efforts, capitalize on areas
of expertise, and share costs.
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS OF THE FUTURE (“SHOULD WE?”) “The status quo is not an option for the things you care about.”37
Challenges and Counterarguments
Many challenges exist that the US will need to overcome before a SUSTAIN type of
capability could come to fruition. Some of these same challenges provide valid
counterarguments against the need for launching troops through space. Since these challenges
and counterarguments merit individual, extensive attention outside the scope of this paper, this
section merely poses some important questions, in recognition that responsive space access is not
an easy, risk-free proposition.
What specific situations exist or could exist where transport by air, sea, or ground is not
good enough and space transport would be required? Are there other non-materiel solutions that
would obviate the need for transporting troops through space? What is the cost/benefit tradeoff?
Will the military and commercial wartime and peacetime “market” adequately support this
capability? These questions all deal with validating the need for space transportation of troops.
Evolutionary improvements in air, land, and sea mobility coupled with improvements in forward
basing structure could satisfy some of the USMC needs without traveling though space and
developing revolutionary systems. Unfortunately, there are still limitations with each of these
such as political overflight restrictions, that prevent them from meeting all of the USMC future
expeditionary requirements. The draft ICD in Appendix A does a good preliminary assessment
of the alternatives and how they might contribute to an interim solution.
Is there enough room for people, weapons, gear, and extra people/cargo for the return
flight? Will the passengers be mission-ready upon landing? Can they rapidly egress in a
tactically sound manner? How much training will be required? How often will flights be
practiced? These questions address the concept of operations. Although each question has its
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own unique problems, all of them can be resolved within the design trade space. Of these
CONOPS issues, the mission readiness challenge may require the most research. Insufficient
data exist to allow proper analysis of the impact on the human organism during these types of
suborbital or possibly orbital profiles. Never has a human had to endure the physical rigors of
combat immediately following spaceflight, so more work still needs to occur.
What would such a capability force the enemy to do? Can they see you coming? How
vulnerable would the system be to shoot-down, worst case with simply small arms fire? Does
your landing let them know you are there? How do we ensure other states do not mistake troop
launch as a hostile missile launch? Finally, these questions relate to enemy responses and system
survivability. These are perhaps the most challenging of the questions posed since the enemy
intentions are never certain and the enemy always gets a vote. Designing the vehicles with self-
defense and fire support in mind can overcome the survivability issues; however, these
capabilities will add weight, which is never the friend of space access. As for the mistaken
identity problem, there is historical precedence for geographically separating nuclear and non-
nuclear launch sites and flying different launch profiles to prevent just such a catastrophic
misunderstanding.
Countless other questions arise—How do you get the people home? Would this capability
replace or just augment airborne platforms? What type of ground infrastructure will you need? Is
the current ground system viable? Is this system antonymous? If so, what's the fail safe? What
are the risks? All of these questions require careful consideration before expending too much of
the DoD’s resources.
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Future Forecasts and Technology Implications
To make informed recommendations influencing strategic decisions about future
technology needs, one must understand the world context in which those technologies will
function. Though it is virtually impossible to predict the future accurately, it is possible and
useful to forecast a range of plausible futures that are relevant to the technologies in question. As
part of the Air Force Blue Horizons effort,38 Majors Joel “Spicoli” Luker and James “Buster”
Myers used the “scenario thinking” forecasting methodology to develop eight possible future
stories of the enemy threat space in the year 2025, including “what the enemies may look like,
how they may act/react, and what capabilities they may possess.”39 Though not meant to be an
all-inclusive list of potential futures, these eight scenarios provide a good framework for
discussing what friendly capabilities we need based on possible enemy capabilities.
Scenarios are powerful stories about how the future might play out in relation to a certain
issue or group. Scenario thinking is both the “process through which scenarios are developed and
then used to inform strategy” and the “posture toward the world—a way of thinking about and
managing change.”40 A key step in the process involves exploring the driving forces that could
mold the future. Majors Luker and Myers chose four drivers relevant to the nature of the 2025
threat: What type of actor (state or nonstate)?, What type of warfare (regular or irregular)?,
Where will the actor fight (foreign soil or our soil)?, and With what will he fight (materiel or
information)? By separating state from nonstate actors and by using the assumptions that in 2025
state actors will operate entirely on foreign soil and that no nonstate actors will fight using
regular warfare, two scenario matrices resulted (figures 1 and 2).41
Following a description of the eight chosen scenarios, this section will analyze the utility
of responsive space launch technologies in each of those eight futures. Famous war strategist Sun
19
Tzu made the oft-quoted statement in The Art of War: “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a
hundred battles you will never be in peril.”42 These scenarios provide some insight into
identifying and knowing the future enemy and will hopefully help us to “never be in peril.”
State Actor Threat Scenarios for 2025
This section contains a brief summary of the four state actor threat scenarios and enemy
capabilities posed by Maj Joel Luker. For a more in-depth look at each scenario, refer to Maj
Luker’s paper.43
The Wishful Thinking scenario looks much like
traditional, conventional warfare, describing a materials-
based enemy military fighting the US military in a large-
scale, force-on-force conflict. In this future, state actors
continue to take a long time acquiring major weapon
systems; thus, anything we would expect to see in
operation in 2025 would be in development now or in the
near future, with the exception of rapid transfers of
disruptive technologies into revolutionary weapon
systems.
The Information Immobilization adversary will also attempt to fight the US military with
regular warfare but instead using primarily information-based systems to counter US capabilities.
Enemies in this alternative future will be able to immobilize our cyber-centric, warfighting
machine using superior information operations. Their regular capabilities still exist but come
primarily from purchases from other states.
David&
Goliath
InformationImmobilization
WishfulThinking
ThePhantomMenace
Information DominantMateriel Dominant
Irreg
ular
Reg
ular
David&
Goliath
InformationImmobilization
WishfulThinking
ThePhantomMenace
Information DominantMateriel Dominant
Irreg
ular
Reg
ular
Fig. 1. State Actor Scenarios (Reprinted from Maj Joel J. Luker, “State Actor Threats in 2025” [master’s research paper, Air Command and Staff College, 2007], A-11.)
20
In the case of The Phantom Menace, information-based, state actors will attack the US in
an irregular manner. They must remain covert to avoid retaliation from the US with
overwhelming force. Cyber attacks on our nation’s critical infrastructures will be prevalent due
to their potentially catastrophic effects and the difficulty in attributing them to a specific actor.
These state actors will also conduct influence operations through public and private media
sources to discredit the US and reduce our power in the world.
Finally, in David and Goliath a materials-based state fights the US using irregular tactics.
This adversary is likely a small, regional power with
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and access to
modern technology and weapons. They will use irregular,
guerilla-style warfare generally in urban environments to
level the playing field against a major military power like
the US. Also, this type of enemy state is unable to project
its military forces into US territory unless it uses special
operations or terrorist-style tactics.
Nonstate Actor Threat Scenarios for 2025
This section contains a brief summary of the four nonstate actor threat scenarios and
enemy capabilities posed by Maj James Myers. For a more in-depth look at each scenario, refer
to Maj Myers’ paper.44
In the American Insurgency future, nonstate adversaries fight on U.S. soil with material
weapons including WMD, targeting infrastructures, institutions, and populations. The enemy’s
goal is to assault the American way of life and to effect the overthrow of the US government. We
face a well-equipped, agile group comprised largely of American citizens that are interspersed
Guerillas in the Mist
Cyber 9/11American Insurgency
BlindBattlefield
Information DominantMateriel Dominant
Fore
ign
Soi
lO
ur S
oil
Guerillas in the Mist
Cyber 9/11American Insurgency
BlindBattlefield
Information DominantMateriel Dominant
Fore
ign
Soi
lO
ur S
oil
Fig. 2. Non-State Actor Scenarios (Reprinted from Maj James W. Myers, “Nonstate Actor Threats in 2025” [master’s research paper, Air Command and Staff College, 2007], A-11.)
21
throughout the US population, so their activity is difficult to detect or distinguish from that of
criminals.
Similarly, in the Cyber 9/11 scenario, the enemy targets infrastructures, institutions, and
populations on our soil. These information-based attacks have large-scale crippling effects for
relatively short periods to long periods of time, depending on the nation’s readiness level. Cyber
9/11 is an “information warfare allegory to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, with a set
of high-effect, coordinated attacks.”45 In addition to network warfare capabilities, these
cyberterrorists will likely have access to electronic attack methods such as high power
microwave (HPM)46 and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons.47 Although the attacks will be
on American soil, the enemy may reside anywhere in the world due to the global
interconnectedness of the infosphere; thus, detection and attribution will be difficult.
In the Blind Battlefield scenario, the adversary fights US/Coalition forces on its own
home—our foreign—soil, dispersed throughout the population, wearing the natural camouflage
of a native. The enemy seeks a return to the pre-invasion status quo, and his modus operandi is
all-out information combat to destroy coalition effectiveness by “replac[ing] the fog of war that
US informational tools eliminated.”48
Finally, in the Guerillas in the Mist future, a materials-based, nonstate actor on foreign
soil works to turn the indigenous population against the US/coalition and drive them away for
good. With his familiarity with his environment and ability to blend among the people, he can
easily coordinate effects and capabilities, simultaneously making it nearly impossible to obtain
useful intelligence against him. A dichotomy of sorts, the adversary minimizes collateral damage
against his own civilization from his own attacks, while provoking the coalition to assault this
same group that the enemy does not want to harm.
22
Utility of Rapid Troop Space Transport in Eight Alternative Futures
Rapid precision global intervention using space transport brings many benefits and
capabilities to the warfront that do not currently exist: precision at a speed of response we have
never seen before, extremely rapid replacement of capabilities (people/“brains”/boots, C4ISR,
munitions, nonkinetic instruments) or resupply of goods, circumvention of overflight restrictions,
and avoidance of forward basing, to name a few. How does this technology with its inherent
benefits play out in the alternative futures posed in the previous sections?
First, it has virtually no utility in an American Insurgency. In this case, the enemy lives
and fights on American soil. Much easier and cheaper means of getting to the enemy exist that
are just as fast due to the relatively short distances to reach them within our borders and the
abundance of resources readily available in close proximity.
In Wishful Thinking we might see some limited utility depending on what the enemy
chooses to do. We can always stand to get people and things places quicker, but in this scenario,
it may not be worth the cost and effort to develop the systems. We already excel at fighting this
kind of conventional war and will probably continue to excel at it with incremental upgrades to
existing systems. Similarly, in The Phantom Menace, we might see limited utility but for
different reasons. In the The Phantom Menace it is extremely difficult to detect an attack or
identify the attacker without other advances in information operations. Once an attack from this
type of enemy occurs, it may be too late to respond because unlike the similar Cyber 9/11
scenario, “when The Phantom Menace attacks, [in order to protect against a swift, massive
retaliation] it will do so in a massive, coordinated fashion to create synergy between the various
assaults and minimize the US’s ability to recover from one strike before the next one occurs.”49
In the next three scenarios, we start seeing rapid space mobility really making a big
23
difference. In Cyber 9/11, the US would benefit from the ability to provide rapid, persistent ISR,
perhaps in the form of unmanned aircraft (UA) and a team of joint terminal attack controllers
(JTAC) and Marines or SOF deployed from a space vehicle.50 Quick response would be crucial
since the intelligence in this case is limited, so we would want to follow any short-notice
intelligence leads that we had. The availability of EMP weapons raises the stakes on this scenario
as well. Next, if the Information Immobilization enemy successfully immobilizes our
information, we need to rapidly mobilize it again to prevent the enemy from beating us with their
less advanced material forces. Rapid replacement of UAVs, C4ISR equipment, and even
satellites rendered inoperative from cyberattack are all possibilities. Thirdly, Guerrillas in the
Mist are like the adversary in the David and Goliath scenario, but they are less dangerous, and
probably will not use WMD due to the desire to minimize collateral damage on their own people;
however, rapid space transport will pay dividends again by providing rapid ISR capabilities to
follow short-notice intelligence leads.
In the final two alternative futures, the author argues that rapid precision global
intervention is vital to the success of US operations. In a Blind Battlefield, rapid replacement of
C4ISR is imperative to once again lift the fog of war and give the gift of sight (and other senses)
to the military forces in the region that have been disabled. Finally, in David and Goliath, the US
does not want the end result to be the same as the Biblical account, with the proverbial stone in
our skulls and our heads cut off.51 This enemy is dangerous with the power of a state and
advanced technology and the will to use it, including WMD, but it fights with irregular warfare
tactics in the city. Rapid global mobility through space will allow force projection of Marines,
SOF, and munitions with supporting C4ISR to close with and destroy the enemy with lightning
speed and precision.
24
The following specific scenario fits well with the David and Goliath case. In March
2006, Majors Sean Monogue and Pete Garretson from the Air Force Future Concepts
Development Division, HQ USAF/A8XC, brainstormed a plausible scenario for delivering 13
people anywhere in the world in less than two hours. They titled the concept “Two Hours to
Regime Change / Regime Change on Demand,” and a brief paraphrase follows.
Imagine that you have an indigenous group willing to execute a regime change beneficial to US interests, but they lack military power and need the benefits of airpower. JTACs are in short supply, you cannot expect to train your indigenous forces properly, and the JTACS are not needed until direct action commences. On command, in pops a team of JTACs to seed with the indigenous forces, and you simultaneously populate the environment with CAV-delivered,52 dominator-type,53 loitering, multi-target munitions, providing 1,000 individual munitions. Now your ground team has significant airpower—the equivalent of multiple manned strike sorties—but has more persistence; does not require theater basing, overflight permission, or a JSTARs-like capability;54 and can be inserted both faster and with better survivability than via aircraft.55 One can certainly recognize the sizeable advantages to be gained by adding technologies
and systems to our arsenal that greatly increase the speed, flexibility, and precision of our force
projection. In seven of the eight scenarios, we can see utility in having rapid precision global
intervention capabilities through space; in five of the eight we see great utility in it; and in two of
the eight the capability is vital to US success, based on the author’s assessment. This analysis
demonstrates a need to at least fully explore the technological possibilities and make appropriate
investments proportional to the operational and strategic advantages to be gained.
25
CHAPTER 5: RECOMMENDATIONS These airframe, propulsion, and guidance and control subsystems, together with extensions of advanced research presently underway…will make it possible to achieve other goals with the subsystem…a whole gambit of follow-on projects immediately becomes feasible.56
- Major General Bernard Schriever, 1957 Commander, Western Development Division Air Research and Development Command
The United States is a nation at war. In a resource-constrained environment, how does a
nation at war fight the current fight yet still prepare for the next war and future wars?
Understandably, when the budget and manpower are tight, research and development efforts take
a back seat to current operations; however, if we expect to maintain our advantage in the world,
the United States must determine a way to continue to invest in the future without sacrificing the
present. The following recommendations address this problem as it relates to using space for
rapid precision global intervention.
1. Air Force should put rapid troop space transport on the table
a. At a minimum, the AF should engage in active dialogue with the USMC,
USSOCOM, USTRANSCOM, and NASA to understand the rapid mobility
needs and help find a way to satisfy them even if not with space power in the
interim. USAF distinctive capabilities and DoD Executive Agent for Space
responsibilities indicate it should lead the DoD in determining where the
department needs to go with this.
b. Air Force support USMC in officially entering SUSTAIN into the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) for joint
acquisition consideration.
c. Prepare for Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of rapid troop space transport
capability by 2025. Costs expected to be on the order of $40M/year. Focus on
26
point-to-point, suborbital global transportation for manned system. Synergize
with responsive orbital efforts.
d. Conduct trade studies to address the following questions: (1) Single system or
family of systems?, (2) Launch from air or surface?, (3) What type of
propulsion—rocket, hypersonic, hybrid, other?, (4) Does orbital insertion
make sense or is point-to-point suborbital the way to go?
e. Investigate answers to the challenges and counterarguments posed in Chap. 4.
f. Conduct a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) involving air, sea, and space
transportation options. Variables for comparison include cost (lifecycle and
per mission), distance, time, payload weight, and effects achieved.
2. Increase investment in AFRL’s Fully-reusable Access-to-Space Technology (FAST)
program. This program has the right management approach for how to proceed.
Involve other stakeholders in evaluating and modifying the technical approach. Add
troop mobility requirements.
3. Create a technology roadmap for responsive spacelift as a long-term plan for where
the nation should be in 2025 to 2030 with clear milestones to get there. Assign
responsibilities for execution of the plan.
4. Plan a series of incremental demonstrations and tests to prove specific advanced
technologies and the overall concepts and CONOPS. Include a robust plan for
experimental vehicles (X-vehicles) in the technology roadmap. With respect to the
real need for X-vehicle demonstrations, Mr. Jess Sponable, AFRL’s FAST Program
Manager, aptly stated, “I fear we’ve forgotten that operations is itself a technology
and a prerequisite to proving the potential for low-cost flight.”57
27
5. Air Force continue investments in ARES, Falcon family, and CAV. Support Navy
and NASA on hypersonic propulsion technology. Integrate them as part of one plan
for the nation with a common end state. Reassess these programs after performing
trade studies and developing the long-term plan.
6. Establish structured partnerships within military, civil, and commercial space
specifically targeting rapid, responsive suborbital and orbital spacelift.
a. Clearly outline responsibilities. No loose handshake agreements. Achieve
buy-in from all stakeholders, including the President and Congress.
b. Establish technology focus areas for each partner based on proven areas of
expertise.
c. Develop and execute a plan to share costs among all military, civil, and
commercial space partners
7. Follow-on Research
a. HQ USAF/A9 (Studies, Analyses, Assessments, Lessons Learned) conduct
mobility study taking rapid space mobility options into consideration. By
inserting these space transport capabilities into a simulated future war with
future force structures, one could get a better understanding of the effects of
projecting small teams forward in two hours or less.
b. Explore “Rapid Precision Global Intervention” as an air, space, and
cyberspace doctrinal construct. This concept encompasses aspects of Rapid
Global Mobility, Global Attack, and Precision Engagement across the full
spectrum of kinetic and nonkinetic response options to achieve global
influence quickly and precisely.
28
Regardless of whether or not the USMC SUSTAIN need can or even should be
completely satisfied, the Air Force should invest in technologies that enable more responsive,
flexible transportation to and through space. We find ourselves now in a similar situation as
General Schriever did exactly 50 years ago where successes in one project will open the
floodgates for other projects that can benefit from similar technologies. If we are strategic in how
we plan and organize our government and commercial space access technology development
programs, we can maximize the potential for cross-flow of technologies and ideas and speed up
the implementation cycle for all of the related capabilities.
29
CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this new century, those who effectively utilize space will enjoy added prosperity and security and will hold a substantial advantage over those who do not. Freedom of action in space is as important to the United States as air power and sea power. In order to increase knowledge, discovery, economic prosperity, and to enhance the national security, the United States must have robust, effective, and efficient space capabilities.58
- President George W. Bush US National Space Policy, 31 Aug 2006
The Marines and other services have demonstrated a need for flexible and rapid global
mobility, manned and unmanned. The Air Force is the right service to lead the exploration and
development of these capabilities. Technologies are maturing rapidly with the potential to deliver
a SUSTAIN or other ORS capability sooner than 2025, but they have not been adequately
demonstrated in a single system. With the proper investments, disciplined planning, and the
right partnerships, the nation will see the opening of the space superhighway.
In the future, space will afford the Marines and other services an opportunity to respond
quickly and effectively to crisis situations anywhere in the world. Although it will not likely
completely replace more traditional mobility methods, space can offer a speed and
responsiveness not currently available by land, sea, or air. As Brigadier General Richard C.
Zilmer, commander of the Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command, proclaimed, “Is it
futuristic? Yes. Is it visionary? Yes. Is it a concept? Yes. But it’s going to get here eventually,
and we want to be in on the ground floor”59
30
NOTES 1 The Marine Corps launched a recruiting campaign in the early 2000’s that showed a single Marine taking on all kinds of grueling tasks, including fighting dragons. Since this is not a timeless reference, I include this note for posterity.
2 Lt Gen E. R. Bedard. Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations. To Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, (Memorandum, 22 July 2002), 1.
3 Lt Col John Ackerman et al., "BLUE HORIZONS: Emerging Technologies for the USAF Syllabus," (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 06 October 2006), 1. Both quotes in this paragraph are from the same source.
4 United States Marine Corps (USMC), Universal Need Statement (UNS) -- Small Unit Space Transport and Insertion (SUSTAIN) Capability (Washington D.C.: HQ USMC Plans, Policies, and Operations Department, July 2002), 1.
5 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22.
6 Ibid.
7 CBRNE stands for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high-yield Explosive weapons. The acronym CBRNE indicates the five recognized types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
8 HQ USSOCOM Space IPT, "Special Operations Forces Space Enabling Concept," (18 March 2004), 4, 6.
9 Brig. Gen. Richard C. Zilmer, "The Trainer: Zilmer Quickly Adopts Lessons and Tactics from Iraq and Afghanistan to Prepare Marines for Combat." By Sue A. Lackey. Sea Power 48, no. 7 (July 2005), http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/jul_05_32.php.
10 United States Marine Corps (USMC), UNS SUSTAIN, 1.
11 Colonel John. R. Wassink (HQ USMC Plans, Polices, & Operations; Information Operations and Space Integration Branch Head, Pentagon), interview by the author, 13 March 2007. Also, the acronym MEU stands for Marine Expeditionary Unit.
12 HQ USSOCOM Space IPT, "Special Operations Forces Space Enabling Concept," 9.
13 HQ AFSPC/DRS, "Mission Need Statement AFSPC 001-01 for Operationally Responsive Spacelift, ACAT Level I," (20 December 2001), 2.
14 Maj Bob Lancaster (USAF Force Protection Battlelab), interview by the author, 05 April 2007. Maj Lancaster’s statements are his own personal opinions and not official Battlelab or Security Forces positions.
31
15 Maj Andy Hunt (HQ USAF/A9FC, Logistics Analysis), interview by the author, 07 March 2007.
16 This paper does not attempt to explore the range of issues associated with the arguments of global range versus forward basing. This issue could easily be one or more papers in itself. Suffice it to say that global range and forward basing each have their benefits and drawbacks. More in-depth study needs to occur to find the right balance between the two.
17 Colonel John. R. Wassink (HQ USMC Plans, Polices, & Operations; Information Operations and Space Integration Branch Head, Pentagon), interview by the author, 13 March 2007.
18 Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine (17 November 2003).
19 Ibid., 76.
20 Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony," International Security 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 7.
21 Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, AFDD 1, 80-81.
22 Ibid., 79-80.
23 Ibid., 80.
24 Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5101.2, DoD Executive Agent for Space (03 June 2003), 2. In the selected quote, I italicized "nature's" for emphasis.
25 Ibid., 4-5.
26 Department of Defense Executive Agent for Space, "National Security Space Plan: Fiscal Year 2008 and Beyond," (U). May 2006. (Secret/NOFORN) Information extracted is unclassified).
27 Patrick J. G. Stiennon and David M. Hoerr, The Rocket Company (Reston, Va.: AIAA/American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2005), ix.
28 Richard Silberglitt et al., "The Global Technology Revolution 2020, in-Depth Analyses: Bio/Nano/Materials/Information Trends, Drivers, Barriers, and Social Implications," in Technical Report Series (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), xix.
29 Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, "SUSTAIN (Military)," http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SUSTAIN_(military).
30 Kevin Davis, "USAF to Test Concept RLV Airframe," Free Republic 11 April 2007.
31 GlobalSecurity.org, "ARES - Affordable Responsive Spacelift," http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/ares.htm.
32 SpaceX, "Falcon 1 Overview," http://www.spacex.com/falcon1.php.
32
33 Encyclopedia Astronautica, "Falcon," http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/falcon9.htm.
34 Terry Phillips and Bob O’Leary, "Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) on Orbit," Schafer Corporation, http://www.dtic.mil/dticasd/sbir/sbir041/srch/af031d.doc.
35 NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, "NASA "Hyper-X" Program Demonstrates Scramjet Techologies: X-43A Flight Makes Aviation History," http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/news/FactSheets/FS-040-DFRC.html.
36 Scaled Composites website, "Tier One: Private Manned Space Program," http://www.scaled.com/projects/tierone/message.htm.
37 Diana Scearce, Katherine Fulton, and the Global Business Network community, What If? The Art of Scenario Thinking for Nonprofits (Global Business Network, July 2004), 1.
38 It has been more than ten years since the USAF has engaged in a long-range assessment to help guide its strategic planning, investment and capability decisions. This year’s ACSC Blue Horizons research seminars are an integral part of a CSAF-mandated effort, not only to accomplish a new long-range technological and strategic assessment, but also to make “taking the long view” a standard part of USAF strategic planning. Air University and AF/A8 have formalized an ongoing examination of the impact of accelerating technological change on the Air Force and provide to the Air Staff in-depth research on technologies vital for the future of the Air Force. The results of this research will feed directly into staff reports, futures games and importantly – help guide Air Force positions in the QDR process. This course will examine the impact of accelerating technological change on the world and the implications of this for the USAF between now and 2025. It will focus on areas of accelerating technological change and the potential for symbiotic interaction among technology areas. Ackerman et al., "Blue Horizons Course Syllabus."
39 Maj Joel J. Luker, "State Actor Threats in 2025" (Research Paper, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, April 2007), 2, A-11. Maj James W. Myers, "Nonstate Actor Threats in 2025: Blue Horizons Scenarios" (Research Paper, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, April 2007), A-11. These two references describe in detail the process Majors Luker and Myers used to develop their eight future scenarios.
40 Scearce, Fulton, and community, What If? The Art of Scenario Thinking for Nonprofits, 8. This source does a great job of explaining the purpose of scenario thinking and the basic process.
41 Maj Joel J. Luker and Maj James W. Myers, 2025 Threat Scenarios (Briefing Slides: 10 January 2007).
42 Sun Tzu and Samuel B. Griffith, The Art of War; Translated with an Introduction by Samuel B. Griffith and with a Foreword by B. H. Liddell Hart (Norwalk, CT: The Easton Press, 1991), 84.
43 Luker, "State Actor Threats".
33
44 Myers, "Nonstate Actor Threats".
45 Ibid., 11.
46 “The general public is familiar with the [HPM] technology as it applies to household microwave ovens that use this form of energy to penetrate and cook food. Whereas a typical microwave oven generates less than 1,500 watts of power, [HPM devices] can generate millions of watts of power. When microwaves encounter modern microelectronics-based systems, the results can be disastrous to the electronics – causing systems to “burn out” and fail or function improperly. This heavy reliance on electronic components in today’s weaponry makes highpower microwave weapons attractive. A short burst of highpower microwave energy can be lethal to electronics while having no affect on humans operating the equipment.” For more information see the following: United States Air Force Research Laboratory, "Fact Sheet: High-Power Microwaves," http://www.kirtland.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-070404-036.pdf.
47 “The high-altitude nuclear weapon-generated electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is one of a small number of threats that has the potential to hold our society seriously at risk and might result in defeat of our military forces. The damage level could be sufficient to be catastrophic to the Nation, and our current vulnerability invites attack. Briefly, a single nuclear weapon exploded at high altitude above the United States will interact with the Earth’s atmosphere, ionosphere, and magnetic field to produce an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) radiating down to the Earth and additionally create electrical currents in the Earth. EMP effects are both direct and indirect. The former are due to electromagnetic “shocking” of electronics and stressing of electrical systems, and the latter arise from the damage that “shocked”—upset, damaged, and destroyed—electronics controls then inflict on the systems in which they are embedded. The indirect effects can be even more severe than the direct effects. The electromagnetic fields produced by weapons designed and deployed with the intent to produce EMP have a high likelihood of damaging electrical power systems, electronics, and information systems upon which American society depends. Their effects on dependent systems and infrastructures could be sufficient to qualify as catastrophic to the Nation. Depending on the specific characteristics of the attacks, unprecedented cascading failures of our major infrastructures could result. In that event, a regional or national recovery would be long and difficult and would seriously degrade the safety and overall viability of our Nation. The primary avenues for catastrophic damage to the Nation are through our electric power infrastructure and thence into our telecommunications, energy, and other infrastructures. These, in turn, can seriously impact other important aspects of our Nation’s life, including the financial system; means of getting food, water, and medical care to the citizenry; trade; and production of goods and services. The recovery of any one of the key national infrastructures is dependent on the recovery of others. The longer the outage, the more problematic and uncertain the recovery will be. It is possible for the functional outages to become mutually reinforcing until at some point the degradation of infrastructure could have irreversible effects on the country’s ability to support its population.” For more information see the following: Jr. Dr. John S. Foster et al., "Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, Volume 1: Executive Report," (Washington D.C.: US Congress, 2004).
48 Myers, "Nonstate Actor Threats", vi.
34
49 Luker, "State Actor Threats", 26-27.
50 A joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) is a qualified (certified) Service member who, from a forward position, directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air support and other offensive air operations. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.7, Airspace Control in the Combat Zone (13 July 2005), 36, 80.
51 1 Samuel 17:49-51 (New American Standard Bible).
52 Phillips and O’Leary, "Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) on Orbit."
53 Mr. Benjamin T. Plenge, "Area Dominance with Air-Delivered Loitering Munitions Aids the Warfighter.," Air Force Research Laboratory Munitions Directorate, http://www.afrlhorizons.com/Briefs/Apr04/MN0308.html.
54 Air Combat Command, "Fact Sheet: E-8C Joint STARS " Public Affairs Office, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=100. JSTARS stands for Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System.
55 Maj Peter Garretson, e-mail message to author, 13 December 2006.
56 Major General Bernard A. Schriever, "ICBM: A Step toward Space Conquest" (paper presented at the Astronautics Symposium, San Diego, CA, 19 February 1957), 3.
57 Jess Sponable, "The Next Century of Flight," Aviation Week & Space Technology (24 May 1999): 94.
58 George W. Bush, "U.S. National Space Policy," (Washington D.C.: 31 August 2006), 1.
59 Brig. Gen. Richard C. Zilmer, "The Trainer: Zilmer Quickly Adopts Lessons and Tactics from Iraq and Afghanistan to Prepare Marines for Combat." By Sue A. Lackey.," Sea Power 48, no. 7 (July 2005), http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/jul_05_32.php.
35
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APPENDIX A: UNIVERSAL NEEDS STATEMENT (UNS) AND DRAFT INITIAL CAPABILITIES DOCUMENT (ICD) – SMALL UNIT SPACE TRANSPORT AND
INSERTION (SUSTAIN) CAPABILITY
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40
41
42
43
44
45
DRAFT
46
DRAFT
47
DRAFT
48
DRAFT
49
DRAFT
50
DRAFT
51
DRAFT
52
DRAFT
53
DRAFT
54
DRAFT
55
DRAFT
56
DRAFT