WiFi Networks KIT Seminar Nayan
Transcript of WiFi Networks KIT Seminar Nayan
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Wi-Fi NetworksChallenges & Solutions
by
Nayan Prajapati
10MEEC13
KIT&RC, Kalol.
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Characteristics :
Types
Infrastructure based
Ad-hoc
Advantages Flexible deployment
Minimal wiring difficulties
More robust against disasters (earthquake etc)
Disadvantages
Low bandwidth compared to wired networks
Need to follow wireless spectrum regulations
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Infrastructure
network :
Ad-hoc network :
APAP
AP
wired network
AP: Access Point
Types :
Fig 1 : Types of WiFi Networks
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Components/Architecture
Station (STA) - Mobile node
Access Point (AP) - Stations are connected to
access points.
Basic Service Set (BSS) - Stations and the AP with
in the same radio coverage form a BSS.
Extended Service Set (ESS) - Several BSSs
connected through APs form an ESS.
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AP
30 client systems located within a radius of 103 m.
Depends on such variables as indoor oroutdoor placement, height above ground,nearby obstructions, other electronic devicesthat might actively interfere with the signal
by broadcasting on the same frequency, typeof antenna, the current weather, the poweroutput of devices.
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Protocol Architecture
MAC sublayer
MAC layer
management
PLCP sublayer
PMD sublayer
Physical layermanagement
Table 1 : Protocol Architecture
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802.11 Physical Layer
There are two sub layers in physical layer:
• Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS)• Frequency Hoping Spread Spectrum (FHSS)
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DSSS
• Direct sequence signaling technique divides the 2.4 GHz band into 11 22-MHz channels. Adjacent channels overlap one another partially, withthree of the 11 being completely non-overlapping. Data is sent acrossone of these 22 MHz channels without hopping to other channels.
Fi 2 : DSSS
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Medium Access Control layer
Asynchronous data service (DCF)
- CSMA/CA - RTS/CTS
Time bounded service (PCF)- Polling
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DCF
- CSMA/CA is a DCF
- Medium sharing through CSMA/CA
- Allows one STA to use the medium
- Random Back off interval before retransmission
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IEEE 802.11 MAC Protocol
• Also known as CSMA/CA
• 802.11 CSMA (no collision detection)
Sender
If the channel is idle for DIFS seconds
- Transmit DATA packet
If the channel is busy
- Backoff
Receiver
If DATA packet received
- Return ACK after SIFS seconds
Source Destination
DIFSDATA
SIFS
ACK
Fig 3 : CSMA/CA
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Wireless Media Disperse Energy
A BC D
Distance
Signalpower
SINR threshold
Signal not same at different locatio
Fig 4: Wireless Media Disperse Energy
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Collision Detection Difficulty
Signal reception based on SINR
Transmitter can only hear itself
Cannot determine signal quality at receiver
A CD
B
Fig 5 : Collision Detection Difficulty
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IEEE 802.11 MAC Protocol
Source Destination
DIFS
SIFS
RTS
CTS
DATA
SIFS
ACK
CSMA/CA (Collision Avoidance) - RTS/CTS Implementation
• Sender transmits an RTS packet
• Receiver responds with a CTS packet
• Purpose of CTS packet
- Reserves channel for sender
- Notify other stations
Goal – Avoid “Hidden Node” collisions
SIFS
Fig 6 : RTS/CTS -1
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CTS = Clear
To Send
RTS = Request
To Send
RTS-CTS
D
Y
S
M
K
RTS
CTS
X
Fig 7 : RTS/CTS -2
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MATLAB Simulation
• Includes RTS/CTS exchange
•
Simulates CSMA/CA
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Analysis
Fig 8 : Simulation result of CSMA and CSMA/CA
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Exposed Node Problem :
Fig 9 : Exposed Node
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Virtual Sieve : Distributed
channel assignment[3]
In [1], the authors proposed a modified transmission power threshold based on a multi-
channel medium access control protocol toimprove the hidden node avoidance.
In [2], a multi-channel MAC protocol wasproposed and nodes can dynamically switch toother channels to avoid collisions.
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Virtual Sieve : Distributed
channel assignment[3]
Fig 10 : Distributed Channel Assignment
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MAC management
Synchronization- finding and staying with a WLAN - synchronization functions
Power Management- sleeping without missing any messages- power management functions
Roaming
- functions for joining a network - changing access points - scanning for access points
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Synchronization
Timing synchronization function (TSF)
Used for power management- beacons sent at well known intervals - all station timers in BSS are synchronized
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Power Management
Mobile devices are battery powered- power management is important formobility
802.11 power management protocol- allows transceiver to be off as much as
possible
- is transparent to existing protocols
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Power management approach
Allow idle stations to go to sleep.
Periodically listen to Traffic Indication Map(TIM).
APs buffer packets for sleeping stations. OFPM protocol : variably adjust LI(listen
interval) [4]
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Roaming
Mobile stations may move beyond the coverage area of their AP but within range of another AP
Re association allows station to continue operation.
performing authentication at the new access point. In [5], authors proposed an innovative lightweight
authentication scheme called SFRIC (secure fast roamingusing ID-based cryptography).
SFRIC employs ID-based cryptography to simplify theauthentication process. It performs mutual authenticationfor the mobile client and AP with a 3-way handshake.
It does not require contacting an authentication server orexchanging certificates.
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Roaming approach
Station decides that link to its current AP is poor.
Station uses scanning function to find another AP
Station sends Re-association Request to new AP
If Re-association Response is successful- then station has roamed to the new AP- else station scans for another AP
If AP accepts Re-association Request- AP indicates Re-association to thedistributed system
- Distributed system information isupdated
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Scanning
Scanning is required for many functions
- finding and joining a network
- finding a new access point during
roaming
Passive scanning
- find networks simply by listening for
beacons Active scanning
- on each channel send a probe and waitfor probe response
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Problems in Wireless
Signal strength decreases proportional to thesquare of the distance
Sender would apply CS and CD, but the collisionshappen at the receiver
Sender may not “hear” the collision, i.e., CD doesnot work
CS might not work, e.g. if a terminal is “hidden”
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Net Stress
Fig 11 : Net Stress Software
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Wi-Fi Security Threats
• Wireless technology doesn’t remove any oldsecurity issues, but introduces new ones
• Eavesdropping
• Man-in-the-middle attacks
• Denial of Service
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Eavesdropping
• Easy to perform, almost impossible to detect
• By default, everything is transmitted in clear text
• Usernames, passwords, content ...
• No security offered by the transmission medium
• Different tools available on the internet
• Network sniffers, protocol analysers . . .
• Password collectors
• With the right equipment, it’s possible toeavesdrop traffic.
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MITM Attack
1. Attacker spoofes adisassociate messagefrom the victim
2. The victim starts to lookfor a new access point,and the attackeradvertises his own APon a different channel,using the real AP’s MACaddress
3. The attacker connectsto the real AP usingvictim’s MAC address
Fig 13 : MITM Attack
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Denial of Service
• Attack on transmission frequecy used
• Frequency jamming
• Not very technical, but works
• Attack on MAC layer• Spoofed deauthentication / disassociation messages
• can target one specific user
• Attacks on higher layer protocol (TCP/IP protocol)
• SYN Flooding
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References
[1] T. B. Manjukumar, “Performance degradation of IEEE 802.15.4slotted CSMA/CA due to hidden nodes,” 32nd IEEE Conferenceon Local Computer Networks, 2007.
[2] S. Wiwatthanasaranrom and A.honphoem, “Multichannel macprotocol for ad-hoc wireless networks,” 7th National ComputerScience and Engineering Conference (NCSEC 2003), 2003.
[3] Zhe Yu,”Virtual Sieve: A Distributed Channel AssignmentAlgorithm Resolving the Hidden Node Problem “.
[4] Zi-Tsan Chou,”OFMP for power management in wirelessneetworks”,ICWCS,2008.
[5] Yoohwan Kim,”SFRIC authentication method”,IEEE
international conference,2007. [5],Brian P Crow,IEEE 802.11 Wireless Local Area Networks. IEEE
Communications Magazine
[6]www.breezecom.com