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Why different interpretations of vulnerabilitymatter in climate change discoursesKAREN O'BRIEN a , SIRI ERIKSEN a , LYNN P. NYGAARD b & ANE SCHJOLDEN ca Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo, POBox 1096 Blindern, 0317, Oslo, Norwayb CICERO, PO Box 1129 Blindern, 0318, Oslo, Norwayc Forum for utvikling Oslo, NorwayPublished online: 15 Jun 2011.

To cite this article: KAREN O'BRIEN , SIRI ERIKSEN , LYNN P. NYGAARD & ANE SCHJOLDEN (2007) Why differentinterpretations of vulnerability matter in climate change discourses, Climate Policy, 7:1, 73-88

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Why different interpretations of vulnerability matter in climate change discourses 73

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Why different interpretations of vulnerability matterin climate change discoursesKAREN O’BRIEN1*, SIRI ERIKSEN1, LYNN P. NYGAARD2, ANE SCHJOLDEN3

1 Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo, PO Box 1096 Blindern, 0317 Oslo, Norway2 CICERO, PO Box 1129 Blindern, 0318 Oslo, Norway3 Forum for utvikling Oslo, Norway

■ synthesis article

In this article, we discuss how two interpretations of vulnerability in the climate change literature are manifestations ofdifferent discourses and framings of the climate change problem. The two differing interpretations, conceptualizedhere as ‘outcome vulnerability’ and ‘contextual vulnerability’, are linked respectively to a scientific framing and ahuman-security framing. Each framing prioritizes the production of different types of knowledge, and emphasizesdifferent types of policy responses to climate change. Nevertheless, studies are seldom explicit about theinterpretation that they use. We present a diagnostic tool for distinguishing the two interpretations of vulnerability anduse this tool to illustrate the practical consequences that interpretations of vulnerability have for climate change policyand responses in Mozambique. We argue that because the two interpretations are rooted in different discourses anddiffer fundamentally in their conceptualization of the character and causes of vulnerability, they cannot be integratedinto one common framework. Instead, it should be recognized that the two interpretations represent complementaryapproaches to the climate change issue. We point out that the human-security framing of climate change has beenfar less visible in formal, international scientific and policy debates, and addressing this imbalance would broaden thescope of adaptation policies.

Keywords: adaptation; climate change; Mozambique; vulnerability

Dans cet article, nous discutons de la façon dont deux interprétations de la « vulnérabilité », telle qu’elle est couvertedans la littérature sur les changements climatiques, représentent deux manières différentes d’aborder le sujet duproblème climatique. Les deux interprétations, définies ici en tant que « vulnérabilité liée aux conséquences » et« vulnérabilité liée au contexte » relèvent, respectivement, du point de vue scientifique et celui de la sécurité humaine.Chaque point de vue donne priorité à la formation de différents types de savoir, et mettent en valeur différents modèlesde politiques de réponses aux changements climatiques. Cependant, les différentes études précisent rarement quelledéfinition est appliquée. Une méthode d’évaluation permettant de distinguer les deux interprétations est avancée ici etappliquée pour illustrer leurs conséquences réelles sur les politiques et réponses, au Mozambique. Les deuxinterprétations étant ancrées dans deux discours différents et étant fondamentalement différentes quant à laconceptualisation du caractère et des causes de la vulnérabilité, elles ne peuvent être intégrées dans un cadred’analyse commun. Il s’agit plutôt de reconnaitre que les deux interprétations représentent des approchescomplémentaires au problème des changements climatiques. Le point de vue de la sécurité humaine a été jusqu’alorsmoins couvert dans le débat international officiel en matière de science et de politiques : un rééquilibrage agrandiraitle champ des politiques d’adaptation.

Mots clés: adaptation; changements climatique; Mozambique; vulnérabilité

■ *Corresponding author. E-mail: karen.obrien@sgeo.uio.no

CLIMATE POLICY 7 (2007) 73–88

© 2007 Earthscan ISSN: 1469-3062 (print), 1752-7457 (online) www.climatepolicy.com

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1. Introduction

Vulnerability has found its place into the climate change lexicon, with both natural and socialscientists eager to measure and assess vulnerability, whether from the perspective of regions, sectors,ecosystems or social groups. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) ThirdAssessment Report (TAR) considers climate change vulnerability to be a function of exposure,sensitivity and adaptability (McCarthy et al., 2001). Through this broad framework, the meaningof vulnerability has expanded to engulf notions of risk, impacts and adaptability. Approaches tovulnerability from the natural hazards, rural livelihoods and poverty literatures have penetratedclimate change research, while at the same time climate researchers have developed their owninterpretations and approaches (e.g. Kelly and Adger, 2000; Smit et al., 2000; Burton et al., 2002;Brooks, 2003; Wisner et al., 2004; Füssel and Klein, 2006). It is also widely seen as an integrativeconcept that can link the social and biophysical dimensions of environmental change (Turner et al.,2003; Ionescu et al., 2005).

Nevertheless, the fact remains that the word ‘vulnerability’ means different things to differentresearchers. And while it has been fairly well documented how these differing definitions andinterpretations of vulnerability are an outcome of the wide breadth and scope of climate changeresearch and the diverse scientific communities involved, there is little understanding about whatthis actually means for climate change research and policy. There has been a failure to appreciatethat these differing definitions are manifestations of different discourses on climate change –discourses that not only represent different approaches to science, but also different politicalresponses to climate change (Demerritt, 2001; Forsyth, 2003). The question we address here is notwhether one approach is better than the other, but to what extent differing interpretations ofvulnerability can, in fact, be integrated into a common framework.

We first trace the development of the two main interpretations of vulnerability to climate changeand show how they are based on two distinct framings of the climate change issue that emergefrom different discourses on global environmental change. We refer to these interpretations asoutcome vulnerability and contextual vulnerability, and link them to a scientific framing and ahuman-security framing of climate change. Each framing prioritizes the production of differenttypes of knowledge, and emphasizes different types of responses to climate change. We then presenta diagnostic tool for distinguishing the two interpretations of vulnerability, and illustrate thepractical consequences that interpretations of vulnerability have for climate change policy andresponses by drawing on examples from research on Mozambique. We demonstrate that discoursesand framings of climate change do matter. They influence the questions asked, the knowledgeproduced, and the policies and responses that are prioritized. We conclude that the different framingsof outcome vulnerability and contextual vulnerability make it very difficult to integrate them intoa single integrative vulnerability framework. Instead, the two interpretations represent complementarymeans of understanding the significance of climate change and its relevance to society.

2. Different framings, different discourses

There have been many efforts to define, classify and understand the meaning and utility of vulnerability(Chambers, 1989; Dow, 1992; Bohle et al., 1994; Liverman, 1994; Ribot, 1995; Bankoff et al., 2004;Cardona, 2004; O’Brien et al., 2004a; Brooks et al., 2005; Adger, 2006; Eakin and Luers, 2006).Definitional differences can be attributed to the utility of the concept across different fields of study,including natural hazards, poverty and development. Kelly and Adger (2000) identify two mainapproaches to vulnerability in the climate change literature: ‘end-point’ and ‘starting-point’

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approaches. The end-point approach considers vulnerability as ‘the end point of a sequence ofanalyses beginning with projections of future emission trends, moving on to the development ofclimate scenarios, and thence to biophysical impact studies and the identification of adaptive options’(p. 326). Any residual consequences that remain after adaptation has taken place define the levels ofvulnerability. Vulnerability here summarizes the net impact of the climate problem, and can berepresented quantitatively as a monetary cost or as a change in yield or flow, human mortality,ecosystem damage, or qualitatively as a description of relative or comparative change. An example ofan end-point definition can be found in the IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR), which definesvulnerability1 to mean ‘the degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverseeffects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes’ and sees vulnerability to climatechange as a function of exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity (McCarthy et al., 2001, p. 6).

The starting point approach, in contrast, considers vulnerability as a present inability to copewith external pressures or changes, which in this case is changing climate conditions. Here,vulnerability is considered a characteristic of social and ecological systems that is generated bymultiple factors and processes. A focus on prior damage, referred to by Kelly and Adger (2000) asthe ‘wounded soldier’ approach, assumes that addressing present-day vulnerability will reducevulnerability under future climate conditions (Burton et al., 2002).

The distinction between end-point and starting-point vulnerability studies exemplifies thedifferences between the two main interpretations of vulnerability. These interpretations are moresuccinctly summarized as ‘outcome vulnerability’ and ‘contextual vulnerability’. Outcomevulnerability is considered a linear result of the projected impacts of climate change on a particularexposure unit (which can be either biophysical or social), offset by adaptation measures. This isrepresented schematically in Figure 1a, where the result of the analysis is an outcome that can beattributed to climate change. While positive outcomes are possible, it is the negative outcomesthat are associated with vulnerability. Outcome vulnerability is often used to determine the extentto which different scenarios of greenhouse gas emissions lead to ‘dangerous interference with the

FIGURE 1 Frameworks depicting two interpretations of vulnerability to climate change:

(a) outcome vulnerability; (b) contextual vulnerability.

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76 O’Brien et al.

climate system’, as discussed in Article 2 of the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 1992). Reducing outcomevulnerability involves reducing exposure through climate change mitigation, or developingadaptations to limit negative outcomes.

Contextual vulnerability, in contrast, is based on a processual and multidimensional view of climate–society interactions. Both climate variability and change are considered to occur in the context ofpolitical, institutional, economic and social structures and changes, which interact dynamically withcontextual conditions associated with a particular ‘exposure unit’. As depicted in Figure 1b, contextualconditions influence the exposure to climate variability and change, as well as potential responses.Responses can in turn affect both the processes and contextual conditions. Climate change is importantbecause it modifies biophysical conditions, which alter the context for responding to other processesof change (e.g. economic liberalization, political decentralization, the spread of epidemics). Theseother processes, in turn, alter the context in which climate change occurs. From this perspective,reducing vulnerability involves altering the context in which climate change occurs, so that individualsand groups can better respond to changing conditions. It also stresses the need to mitigate climatechange on the basis of equity and justice (Athanasiou and Baer, 2002, Adger et al., 2006).

The two depictions of vulnerability represented in Figure 1 are not simply about differentinterpretations of the word vulnerability. They are about fundamentally different framings ofthe climate change problem. We distinguish these as a scientific framing and a human-securityframing of climate change. The framing of an issue creates boundaries around social groups,biophysical entities, or their interactions, to establish an ordered vision of events (Forsyth, 2003).Framings influence the questions that are asked and structure the kind of knowledge that isproduced. They determine what is included on the agenda, and what is silenced. Framings emergefrom discourses that are embedded in institutions, actors and academic disciplines.

Scientific framings view climate change as a problem of human impacts on the global climatesystem. Research is focused on the changes that can be attributed to greenhouse gas emissions,with special emphasis on quantifiable impacts based on future general circulation model scenarios(Demeritt, 2001). Firm boundaries are drawn between ‘nature’ and ‘society’, and the focus isdisproportionately on nature as part of the Earth system (Castree, 2001). In the scientific framingof climate change, society is typically represented as one box that both drives the process andexperiences the consequences. Vulnerability is interpreted as the negative outcome of climatechange on any particular exposure unit – an outcome that can be quantified and measured, andreduced through technical and sectoral adaptation measures, as well as by reducing greenhousegas emissions. As Füssel and Klein (2006) point out, this framing tends to favour a physical-flowsview that emphasizes the flow of matter and energy between systems components.

Human-security framings, in contrast, view climate change as a transformative process that affectshumans in different ways, and focuses on the consequences of climate variability and change forindividuals and societies. Human security is defined as occurring when and where individuals andcommunities have the options necessary to end, mitigate or adapt to risks to their human, environmentaland social rights, and have the capacity and freedom to exercise these options (GECHS, 1999). In thisframing, nature and society are often considered as inseparable aspects of the same context (seeCastree, 2001; Forsyth, 2003); nature–society relationships are conceptualized as a mutuality, ratherthan as a duality (Oliver-Smith, 2004). This sets much wider boundaries around the issue of climatechange, emphasizing its interactions with multiple processes of change. It can also be associated withan actor–system view that ‘emphasizes the flow of information and the relationship between differentfactors that determines social decision-making’ (Füssel and Klein, 2006, p. 311).Vulnerability isconsidered to be influenced not only by changing biophysical conditions, but by dynamic social,economic, political, institutional and technological structures and processes; i.e. contextual conditions.

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Human-security framings can reveal the complex nuances of climate change. Human securitymay involve more than food security or economic performance, and could include such aspectsas a sense of belonging, respect, social and cultural heritage, equality and distribution of wealth,dispersed settlement, access to nature-based outdoor activities, and control over one’s own destiny.Importantly, what constitutes ‘damage’ or ‘negative effects’ varies across contexts and cultures.The values deemed important to a society or community may include not only life and property,but also family, neighbourhood and profession, as well as the more general ‘desirable ends forsociety’ (Næss, 2001; Farley and Costanza, 2002). Furthermore, it may be that the more subtleimpacts have greater relevance to individuals and communities (such as skiing in Norway orgardening in England), and these are often disregarded as trivial based on quantitative economicmeasures of vulnerability to climate change.

TABLE 1 Discourses on global environmental change (adapted from Leichenko and O’Brien, 2007) and relationship to

framings of climate change

Environmental Description Framing of climate change

change discourse

Biophysical • Takes the dynamic Earth system as a starting A scientific issue that requires a

point and focuses on what humans are doing to better understanding of key

biological and physical conditions and processes biophysical processes and

• Reflects the ‘enlightenment’ paradigm of impacts.

positivist science, which is based on an

understanding that more information and knowledge

will enable society to better manage environmental

problems.

Critical • Emphasizes how social and political relations A human-security issue that

shape processes, responses, and outcomes from requires understanding

environmental change. differential capacities to respond

• Reflects social theory and post-structuralist and to changing conditions.

postmodernist approaches to knowledge. Many proponents

question the rational, scientific paradigm that underlies the

biophysical and human–environment discourses.

• Draws on the work of philosophers and postmodern theorists.

Proponents argue that scientific enquiry, theories and

hypotheses represent constructions of reality that are

influenced by history and by the current cultural, political

and economic context.

Human–environment • Situates global environmental change within the context Refers to both framings, but

of interrelated human and environmental systems, where the emphasizes the role of science in

natural environment is inseparable from human activities. promoting sustainability.

• Draws upon references to the ‘coupled human–environment

system’, resilience, and adaptive management.

• Nature–society interactions are considered to operate at

multiple scales, and interact with multiple stressors.

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These two framings are not arbitrary, but instead can be seen as products of different discourseson climate change – discourses that represent distinct world views and approaches to science.Discourses can be considered a system of representation, or an area of language use expressing aparticular standpoint and related to a certain set of institutions (Peet and Watts, 1996). Theyinfluence interpretations of what certain phrases mean and control how they are used, prioritizethe questions that are asked and answered, and influence the solutions that are prescribed (Leichenkoand O’Brien, 2008, forthcoming). In particular, discourses influence how problems are framed.This is achieved through problem closure, language, and social participation (Forsyth, 2003). Thereare numerous ways of classifying discourses on environmental change. Adger et al. (2001), forexample, identify a global managerial discourse and a populist discourse. Although discourses andthe framings associated with them are often implicit rather than explicit, they nevertheless reflecthow individuals and societies perceive and evaluate the issue of climate change (Forsyth, 2003).

Three global environmental change discourses are described in Table 1 and related to framingsof climate change. These are, of course, generalized discourses that could be categorized in anumber of ways (Adger et al., 2001; Leichenko and O’Brien, 2008, forthcoming). A biophysicaldiscourse on global environmental change emphasizes the importance of understanding keyprocesses of the integrated Earth system, and how human activities affect these processes (Leichenkoand O’Brien, 2008, forthcoming). This supports the scientific framing of the climate changeissue. This is in sharp contrast to a critical discourse that emphasizes the role of social, politicaland economic relations in shaping the processes, responses and outcomes of environmental change(Leichenko and O’Brien, 2008, forthcoming). This discourse is closely associated with human-security framings of climate change. A human–environment discourse that emphasizes the coupledsocial–ecological system can be linked to both framings. Within the human–environment discourse,some research emphasizes the role of science and technology for improving environmentalmanagement, while other research emphasizes the importance of location and context ingenerating vulnerability (Leichenko and O’Brien, 2008, forthcoming). Not surprisingly, it is fromthis discourse that most efforts to develop an integrative framework for vulnerability assessmentsemerge (Turner et al., 2003; Newell et al., 2005).

3. Identifying conceptualizations of vulnerability

Most studies do not explicitly refer to a discourse or framing; instead, this must be interpretedthrough the language, methods and questions that appear in texts and debates. The word‘vulnerability’ is used in all three discourses; thus it is often difficult to ‘place’ a study within adiscourse and framing based on the presence or absence of this word. Figure 2 presents a diagnostictool that can be used to clarify the interpretation of vulnerability that is being used in anyparticular climate-change study. The figure shows typical prioritized questions, focal points,methods, results and proposed responses, and can thus be used to distinguish whether a givenstudy is addressing ‘outcome vulnerability’ or ‘contextual vulnerability’. The questions that areaddressed in a study, either implicitly or explicitly, can provide a strong clue as to the interpretationof vulnerability. The question ‘To what extent are human activities contributing to dangerousclimate change?’ is closely associated with studies focusing on outcome vulnerability. In contrast,the question of whether climate change is a relevant problem for a particular region, community,sector or social group is typically associated with contextual vulnerability studies. The question ofwho is negatively affected by climate change may be addressed by both types of studies; outcomestudies often focus on vocations or professions, while contextual studies focus on class, race, ageor gender. The question ‘Which sectors are likely to be negatively affected by climate change?’ is

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most often associated with outcome vulnerability, but may form an important part of contextualvulnerability studies, particularly if a society’s economy is dominated by climate-sensitive activities.The question of why some regions and social groups are more vulnerable than others is closelytied to contextual vulnerability studies. Here, the underlying causes are not considered to be climatechange alone, but interactions between contextual conditions and multiple processes of change.

The focal point of the study can also provide a good indication as to the interpretation ofvulnerability. Studies that focus on vulnerability to future climate change and sectoral sensitivities(such as vulnerability of agricultural yields to climate change in 2050) are generally outcome-oriented (Lal et al., 1998). Studies that focus on current climate variability, livelihood and copingstrategies, and political economy, including entitlements and social capital, are closely linked tocontextual vulnerability and the questions of whether climate change is a relevant problem andwhy some groups and regions are more vulnerable than others. The role of institutions as a focusof vulnerability research often lies between the two interpretations: in some cases institutionaladaptations are considered in relation to outcome vulnerability (e.g. policy reforms to offset thenegative impacts of decreased future agricultural yields), and in other cases institutional changesare related to contextual vulnerability (e.g. water privatization that affects the ability to respondto drought). A focus on multiple stressors is also in the intermediate area; some vulnerabilitystudies may assess outcomes on an exposure unit in relation to two or more stressors, while othersrecognize multiple stressors as a key factor influencing the context in which regions or groups areexposed to and respond to climate change.

The methods used in vulnerability studies also tend to be closely associated with the interpretationof vulnerability and the related questions and focal points. Dose–response models, integrated

FIGURE 2 Diagnostic tool for identifying interpretations of vulnerability.

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assessment models and scenario-based approaches are, to differing degrees, associated with outcomevulnerability studies of future climate change and sectoral sensitivities, as reflected in their positiontowards the left in Figure 2. Scenario-based methods are imposed on biophysical and socio-economicsystems, usually through the use of models, to determine outcomes on various natural, economicand social sectors (exemplified by Lal et al., 1998; Yohe and Schlesinger, 2002; Sutherland andGouldby, 2003). This approach relies on future scenarios and directs attention towards futureimpacts of climate change, rather than towards present vulnerability. Nevertheless, scenario resultsare sometimes included in contextual vulnerability studies as well, but mainly as a tool for describingfuture biophysical and socio-economic conditions. Household surveys and case studies are, incontrast, more closely linked to contextual vulnerability studies. They often examine in depth, inone location, how multiple stressors interact with the driving causes of vulnerability (Eakin, 2003;Lind and Eriksen, 2006). Indicator approaches to vulnerability and agent-based modelling may beassociated with either type of study. Indicator studies can be used both to enhance understandingof the causes of vulnerability and to quantify the extent of the problem (Luers et al., 2003; O’Brienet al., 2004b; Eriksen and Kelly, 2007). Agent-based modelling studies represent behaviours andresponses that are influenced by the context, but the focus is often on vulnerability as an outcome(Acosta-Michlik and Rounsevell, 2005).

Identified results from vulnerability studies are not surprisingly related to the questions posed,focal points and methods. For example, dose–response models and integrated assessment modelstypically lead to findings regarding measurable gains or losses and sectoral impacts typical of anoutcome interpretation of vulnerability, addressing questions of which sectors are likely to benegatively affected by climate change. Household surveys and case studies investigating livelihoodand coping strategies and political economy reveal key interacting processes and relative winnersand losers – results that address questions of why some regions and social groups are more vulnerablethan others. Contextual studies frequently lead to findings regarding institutional and socio-economicconstraints to local responses; that is, an identification of the factors that prevent coping andadaptation. Constraints may also be identified in outcome-oriented vulnerability studies, particularlyin relation to specific sectoral adaptations (e.g. soil type, barriers to ecosystem migration, etc.).

The findings from outcome-type vulnerability studies lead to particular conclusions about responsesto climate change. With increased knowledge of sectoral impacts and outcome vulnerability, it ispossible to identify sectoral sensitivities that could be reduced through adaptations. Quantificationof the measurable gains or losses also leads to an understanding of the urgency with whichinternational agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions should be put in place. Whenvulnerability is viewed as contextual, however, vulnerability assessments can be used to identifyopportunities and constraints to implementing specific adaptation policies (Burton et al., 2002).The type of response measures that emerge are social rather than technical in nature, and includepoverty reduction, diversification of livelihoods, protection of common property resources, andstrengthening of collective action (Kelly and Adger, 2000). Such measures strengthen the ability torespond to stressors and secure livelihoods under present conditions, which should then increasethe capacity to respond to changing conditions in the future. Adaptive management is anotherpolicy recommendation that results from outcome- as well as contextual-type vulnerability studies.Adaptive management refers to ‘combining, in a dynamic ongoing process, local and scientificecological knowledge in the co-management of resources and ecosystems’ (Olsson and Folke, 2001,p. 86). This can be both a way of addressing identified maladapted practices as well as institutionalconstraints to local responses to climate change. While some of the policy conclusions may besimilar, the two types of vulnerability studies can lead to very different conclusions regardingresponses. As we show in the next section, these differences do matter.

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4. Different interpretations in practice: examples from Mozambique

We illustrate the effect of how vulnerability is conceptualized on recommended responses byexamining the case of Mozambique using two studies; one that refers to outcome vulnerability andone that focuses on contextual vulnerability. We use the diagnostic tool presented in Section 3 to‘locate’ the two studies. In Figure 3, the National Vulnerability Assessment for Mozambique, carriedout by the Ministry of Coordination of Environmental Affairs (MICOA, 2000), is labelled usingstars (*), while a study of vulnerability to climate stress in the context of market integration (Eriksenand Silva, 2003) is labelled using circles (O). These two studies have been selected because theyillustrate contrasting interpretations of vulnerability.

Mozambique is a southern African country with a population of about 17 million. Mozambique’seconomy and society is emerging from a civil war that ended in 1992. At the same time, since the early1990s, the country has been undergoing a liberalization of the economy. Currently, the people ofMozambique are constantly responding to climate variability, both within and between seasons, whichis characteristic of the southern African region (Hulme et al., 2001). Some recent droughts, floods andcyclones have been particularly severe: during the floods in 2000, about 700 people died and 550,000had to be relocated from their homes, and Mozambique’s annual economic growth rate was reducedfrom 8% to 2% (Christie and Hanlon, 2001). The region-wide drought that culminated in 2003 put659,000 people in Mozambique in need of food aid (FEWS-NET, 2004). Future climate change is likelynot only to increase temperatures, but also to affect climate variability and the frequency and intensityof extreme events (Joubert and Hewitson, 1997; McCarthy et al., 2001; PRECIS, 2001; Tyson et al., 2002).

The prioritized question in the MICOA (2000) study relates to the extent to which climatechange is a serious problem for Mozambique, reflected in a star far to the left in Figure 3. Asectoral approach is taken, with efforts to identify measurable gains or losses. The focal point ofthe study is climate change between 1975 and 2075. The method involves the use of generalcirculation model results in a vulnerability assessment model, which is a collection of dose–responsetype models used to predict changes in the water, coastal resources, agriculture, forestry, rangelandsand livestock sectors.

Climate scenarios interpreted specifically for Mozambique suggest that a doubling of CO2 inthe atmosphere could lead to an increase in the mean annual temperature by 1.8–3.1°C, a 2–9%decrease in rainfall, and a 2–3% increase in solar radiation by 2075 (MICOA, 2000). Four mainoutcomes were associated with these changes, and consequently interpreted as climate-relatedthreats: (1) inundation of low-lying lands, mainly in the coastal zone; (2) freshwater shortage,limiting domestic, industrial and hydropower use; (3) reduction in crop production, such asmaize yields; and (4) a decline in nitrogen content in plants, reducing their nutritional value,affecting livestock in particular.

The responses identified in the report focus both on mitigating greenhouse gas emissions and onadaptation. Largely technical, sectoral adaptation measures are suggested on the basis of the projectedimpacts on resources. Decreased freshwater availability can be addressed by increased efficiency ofwater use, construction and improvement of dams, irrigation channels, and the establishment ofschemes for recycling water. The impacts of climate change on the agricultural sector can be addressedby means of adjustments such as changes in crop types, season and location of farming, or thedevelopment of intensified and mechanized farming, with intensive use of fertilizers and irrigation.Furthermore, coastal erosion and salt water intrusion can be addressed through a combination ofintegrated and participatory management, and the construction of dykes and seawalls. Correctingcurrent inappropriate practices is thus the main adaptation focus, although the study also suggeststhe use of natural means of coastal dune-building in response to coastal erosion.

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The main question addressed in the study by Eriksen and Silva (2003) is why some regionsand social groups are more vulnerable than others. Specifically, they examine how marketintegration affects the local pattern of coping and vulnerability. The focus was on multiplestressors, in particular how climate stress (variability and extremes) and market integrationinfluence local livelihood strategies. The study employed a comparative case-study approach,examining two villages of differing market integration, both affected by the 2000 floods andthe 2003 drought: Massavasse, located in the Chokwe district; and Matidze, located in theneighbouring Mabalane district. The main methods of data collection were householdquestionnaires, semi-structured household interviews, key informant interviews, and groupinterviews, as well as local market surveys. Although the interview data were also analysedquantitatively, the study emphasized qualitative analysis, placing its methods to the right inFigure 3.

Findings focused on the large variations in vulnerability, both within and between the villages,and the multiple factors that influenced these variations. Dryland, rainfed farming, predominantin Matidze, appeared to be undergoing a process of marginalization. For example, irrigation-based villages in Chókwè district were the target of government, international aid agency andNGO assistance, both in reconstruction and recovery after the floods and in infrastructural andagricultural development. In contrast, most villages in Mabalane district received no such attention,and thus agricultural tools and equipment lost during the 2000 floods were not replaced, affectingsubsequent harvests. In particular, the small-scale irrigation that would have provided food andincome during the 2003 drought had all but disappeared.

FIGURE 3 Identifying interpretations of vulnerability in two Mozambique studies.

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Furthermore, the opening up of market opportunities with increased trade and liberalizationof the economy had very unequal benefits. Income opportunities in trade of agricultural goods aswell as forest products, particularly charcoal, and casual employment on commercial farms providednew sources of livelihood for many. Market-based mechanisms were more robust in the face ofdrought in Massavasse, where access to regional and national markets was fairly good. Somecommercial farmers with access to water through pump irrigation, market information andtransport, were able to produce vegetables for the market and benefit from elevated prices. InMatidze, most of the market-based coping strategies proved unviable or yielded very marginalprofits as the drought intensified, such as small-scale production of sweet potato and pumpkinleaves in the river bed for local sale.

The study concluded that people are able to evolve their coping strategies and access newopportunities that arise with market integration, but this takes place mainly through informalmechanisms, and often at marginal benefit (Eriksen and Silva, 2003). Although the study did notidentify specific responses, the main conclusions have clear implications for the type of adaptationmeasures that could be formulated: reducing local vulnerability depends on addressing processesand inequities that exclude most people from the formal economy and formal types of copingstrategies in the face of climate stress, and on making informal activities that are accessible tomost people more viable. The findings also imply that in the absence of such responses, the mostvulnerable people in Mozambique are unlikely to be reached by formal technical interventions.In effect, the technological expertise provided through government programmes has been ofmost use to the more wealthy farmers who can afford to invest in the new technology, whilefewer technical options are available for rainfed farming, or the plethora of other livelihoodactivities in which people engage (Eriksen and Silva, 2003). Technological measures may actuallybe counterproductive and exacerbate inequality and the processes of marginalization of ruralhouseholds that are currently contributing to vulnerability, instead of effectively reducingvulnerability (Adger, 2003).

Comparing the two studies in Figure 3, the MICOA vulnerability assessment can be consideredto be an example of outcome vulnerability, while the Eriksen and Silva (2003) study addressescontextual vulnerability. To a policy-maker, the word vulnerability may suggest that the studiesare addressing the same aspect of the climate-change problem. However, the studies differsignificantly in their prioritized questions, focal points, methods and findings, and identify verydifferent policy responses.

5. Conclusions: an integrated framework for reducing vulnerability?

The implication for policy-making of different interpretations of vulnerability, as illustrated bythe two Mozambique studies above, is clear: ‘vulnerability reduction’ as a policy objective may berhetorically non-controversial, but what this means in practice depends on the particularinterpretation of vulnerability. Forsyth (2003, p. 191) points out that ‘[u]nder orthodox approachesto environmental science, vulnerability may be best addressed by mitigating biophysical changesconsidered the main causes of risk’. These differ from alternative approaches that emphasizereducing vulnerability by also increasing the ability of societies to adapt to such changes (Forsyth,2003).

Adaptation to climate change has received particular attention in recent years, as it has becomeclearer that some degree of climate change is inevitable regardless of mitigation efforts. Adaptationrefers to ‘adjustment in ecological, social, or economic systems in response to actual or expectedclimatic stimuli and their effects or impacts’ (Smit and Pilifosova, 2001, p. 881). The interpretation

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of vulnerability affects the type of adaptation that is promoted, influencing decisions on what,how, and who to fund (Huq and Burton, 2003).

In the scientific framing, adaptations are made in response to projected climate change.This places urgency on identifying exactly how the climate will change in response to differentscenarios of future greenhouse gas emissions. Scientific knowledge about climate change iscritical to assessments of outcome vulnerability, for it answers the question ‘vulnerable towhat?’ In the human-security framing, adaptations are not necessarily directly linked to anyparticular manifestation of climate change (e.g. a 2.4°C warming, or a 17% decrease in rainfall).Instead, they may involve some combination of decreasing exposure and increasing copingor adaptive capacities, to respond to multiple shocks and transformations. This framingemphasizes a more generalized ‘vulnerability to change’, where climate hazards and long-term changes represent only part of the profound transformations affecting societies.Consequently, there are multiple points for intervention. This approach allows for adaptationto uncertainty, which has been increasingly identified as a distinguishing characteristic ofenvironmental change and policy (Mitchell and Hulme, 1999; Lempert et al., 2000; Berkhoutet al., 2003).

The scientific framing of climate change and an understanding of vulnerability as anoutcome have generated adaptation research that is impacts-driven, employing the standardseven-step approach outlined in the IPCC Guidelines (Carter et al., 1994) and oriented towardsmitigation policies. ‘What matters in this connection is the extent to which the gross impactof climate change can be reduced by adaptation’ (Burton et al., 2002, p. 147). Viewingvulnerability as an outcome leads to the danger that adaptation is reduced to building localcapacity to make sectoral and technological changes, rather than addressing the fundamentalcauses of vulnerability, including the geopolitical and economic contexts (Brooks, 2003).There is little doubt that technological adaptations such as irrigation schemes, drought-tolerant seed varieties, raised bridges, structural improvements in housing and so forth candecrease vulnerability to climate change in many countries. However, technologicaladaptations to climate change represent only one of many options – and in some cases aproblematic one (for instance, if adaptations increase inequality within or among regionsor social groups).

Thus the natural question to ask is whether it is possible to integrate these two interpretationsinto a comprehensive and formal framework for understanding vulnerability to climate change.By definition, integrated frameworks presuppose that it is possible to develop a sharedconceptualization of the problem – in this case climate change. Integration occurs whendifferent disciplines can make use of the common framework and interact to better understandthe system in question. The question then becomes whether it is possible to reconcile the outcomeand contextual conceptualizations of vulnerability at a fundamental level, or whether thedifferences between scientific and human-security framings of climate change mean that thesetwo conceptualizations must remain mutually exclusive. As Newell et al. (2005, p. 301) aptlypoint out:

If the knowledge that we seek to integrate consists of disparate models of causality, then the integrationprocess cannot be simply a matter of building a ‘shared language’. Single words take multiple meaningswhen different speakers have different models and examples in mind. We must be particularly wary ofsuperficial approaches to developing ‘better communication’ that only appear to remove conceptualconfusion – ‘[a] common language may still hide divergent assumptions’ (Pickett et al., 1999, p. 304).

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Evidence suggests that, indeed, the differences may be simply too great to overcome. Becausemerging two different framings involves different discourses and different actors, integrating thetwo interpretations of vulnerability into one unifying framework is not simply a matter of science,but of the politics of climate change. Although there have been many attempts to develop integrativevulnerability frameworks (see Turner et al., 2003; Ionescu et al., 2005; Füssel and Klein, 2006),these frameworks arguably do not integrate the different interpretations, but instead formalize asingle interpretation. The development of an integrative framework requires a process of conceptualblending, which comes about through the construction of new world views from two or moreexisting world views (Newell et al., 2005). This conceptual blending has not been achieved acrossthe various discourses on global environmental change; such a blending cannot be negotiated,but involves a change in beliefs and understandings.

Although it may be possible to integrate across disciplines, it is much more difficult to integrateacross discourses that are based on different models of causality. Outcome vulnerability and contextualvulnerability address two different but interrelated questions that reflect two distinct framings of theclimate change issue: (1) ‘Are humans changing the climate system?’ and (2) ‘What are the differentialimplications of climate change for society?’ The first question is addressed through the scientificframing, which is embedded in institutions with strong influence over climate-change debates andresearch, including the UNFCCC, the IPCC, and most international global change research programmes.The second question has yet to be clearly articulated. In fact, the human-security framing is far lessvisible in formal, international scientific and policy debates, and has been considered the domain ofNGOs, development practitioners and social movements (see, for example, www.ecoequity.org/).

Outcome vulnerability and contextual vulnerability are thus two different but complementaryaspects of climate change. Rather than being merely a question of definitions or semantics, theinterpretation of vulnerability has consequences for how climate research is carried out withininterdisciplinary research institutes, where scientists with differing backgrounds often useterminologies that are vaguely defined and lack shared meanings. As Downing (2003, p. 96)notes, ‘the climate change community does not appear to be very close to adopting standards,or even a common paradigm and analytic language’. Misunderstandings caused by differentconceptualizations of vulnerability can be largely avoided by using qualifying terms (Füssel andKlein, 2006). But it also requires explicitly recognizing the different framings of climate change,and acknowledging that they are both important to understanding both the relevance of andresponses to climate change.

The dominance of the scientific framing of climate change has meant that the scope ofadaptation policies has been interpreted quite narrowly (Klein et al., 2007). Increased attentionto the human-security framing of climate change may raise the relevance of climate change tobroader communities, and create a greater urgency for understanding the complexities of theEarth system (O’Brien, 2006). Thus we can conclude that, although integration is importantfor meaningful comparisons of vulnerability assessments (Ionescu et al., 2005), it is perhapsmore important to recognize the usefulness of approaching vulnerability from differentperspectives.

Acknowledgements

This research was carried out with support from the Norwegian Research Council (Climate changeimpacts and vulnerability in Norway: A regional assessment) and the World Bank (Economicchange and climate vulnerability in southern Africa). The authors would like to thank Nick

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Brooks, Robin Leichenko and Knut Alfsen for comments on earlier drafts, and Richard Klein,Cezar Ionescu and the FAVAIA research group at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impacts Research(PIK) for sharing their insights. They are also grateful to three anonymous reviewers for substantialcomments that contributed to major revisions to an earlier draft.

Note

1. Because vulnerability is referred to in several chapters of the TAR, there are multiple and often conflicting definitions(see Brooks et al., 2005).

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