The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 7 | Issue 30 | Number 1 | Article ID 3192 | Jul 27, 2009

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Who is Korean? Migration, Immigration, and the Challenge ofMulticulturalism in Homogeneous Societies

Timothy Lim

Who is Korean? Migration, Immigration,and the Challenge of Multiculturalism inHomogeneous Societies

Timothy Lim

What is a Korean?

“I don’t know,” opines a 31-year old Koreanwoman. “I have always believed that Korea is asingle-race country. And I’m proud of that.Somehow, Korea becoming a multiracialsociety doesn’t sound right.”[1] This is not anunusual view. Indeed, the large majority ofKoreans would likely agree that Korean societyis inextricably tied to and defined by a uniqueK o r e a n i d e n t i t y , o n e b a s e d o n a nuncompromising conflation of race andethnicity.[2] The strong tendency amongKoreans to conflate race and ethnicity hasimportant implications, the most salient ofwhich is this: it has served to create ane x c e p t i o n a l l y r i g i d a n d n a r r o wconceptualization of national identity andbelongingness. To be “truly” Korean, one mustnot only have Korean blood, but must alsoembody the values, the mores, and the mind-setof Korean society. This helps explain whyoverseas Koreans (from China, Russia, Japan,the United States and other countriesthroughout the world[3]) have not fit intoKorean society as Koreans. They are different,“real” Koreans recognize, despite sharing thesame blood. At the same time, those who lack a“pure blood” relationship, no matter howacculturated they may be, have also beenrejected as outsiders. This rejection, moreimportantly, has generally led to severe forms

of discrimination.

This is arguably most apparent with“Amerasians,” who, in South Korea, areprimarily children born to a Korean woman andan American man, usually a U.S. soldier.[4] It isimportant to note here that it was only in 1998that non-Korean husbands gained legal rightsto naturalize, while non-Korean wives have longhad this right. At the same time, up until 1994,most “international marriages” in Korea werebetween a foreign man and Korean woman. According to the ethno-racial and patrilineallogic of belongingness in South Korea, then,Amerasians have been viewed as decidedlynon-Korean interlopers who belong, ifanywhere, in the land of their fathers. The illtreatment of Amerasians was, as Mary Lee andothers have argued, exacerbated by apatriarchal and hyper-masculine sense ofnational identity: Amerasian children wereassociated with the “shame” and “humiliation”of a dominant Western power conquering andabusing Korean women for sexual pleasure.[5]Not surprisingly, then, Amerasians have beenostracized from mainstream Korean society;they were not only subject to intense andpervasive interpersonal and social abuse,[6]b u t a l s o t o i n s t i t u t i o n a ldiscrimination—Amerasian males, for example,were barred from serving in the South Koreanmilitary, which is mandatory for every otherKorean male and is “an institutional rite ofpassage which enables access to citizen rights”(emphasis added)[7] (This law was revised in2006 so that “mixed-blood” Koreans couldvoluntarily enlist for military service.) Inconcrete terms, the discriminatory treatment ofAmerasians has resulted in unusually high

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school drop out rates (and much lower levels ofeducational achievement overall) ,[8]significantly higher rates of unemployment andunderemployment, and much lower pay.[9]

Given the mistreatment of Amerasians inKorean society, it is not at all surprising thatother “out-groups” would have experiencedsimilar treatment. But, until fairly recently,there were few other significant out-groups inSouth Korea. This is no longer true: for, overthe last two decades, hundreds of thousands ofnewcomers or foreign migrants have flowedinto South Korea from other parts of Asia andaround the world. The first large groups offoreign migrants—almost exclusively non-skilled workers—were subject to intenseexploitation and abuse: they were treated asl i t t le more than cheap, expendablecommodities by the Korean factory owners andsmall-scale business people for which theyworked. (Not surprisingly, Amerasians havebeen largely relegated to the same type ofwork.) The South Korean government,moreover, played a key role in making thispossible, first, by helping to criminalize foreignworkers—despite the obvious need and demandfor their labor—such that most became “illegalimmigrants” (this was the case for most of the1990s);[10] and, second, by working tolegitimize, through an “Industrial TechnicalTraining Program” (which ran from the early1990s to 2004), a highly discriminatory laborsystem that sought to institutionalize lowwages and limited worker protections: the“trick” was to define full-fledged (foreign)workers as mere trainees (the Korean system,it is useful to note, was modeled after a similarsystem in Japan).[11] Significantly, even thoseforeign workers who shared Korean blood—i.e.,ethnic Koreans from China or Josenojok—weresubject to the same abuses and mistreatment.Over the years, conditions for foreign workershave improved markedly (a process I discuss indetail elsewhere[12]), but the social basis fordiscrimination has remained largely intact,namely, an extremely narrow conceptualization

of Koreanness that determines who is, and whois not, classified as Korean.

A protest organized by the Migrants TradeUnion (MTU), an organization of foreign

workers in South Korea, February 18, 2009(Source: Photograph taken by author)

By itself, I should emphasize, a deeplyembedded sense of Koreanness is not a badthing. All (modern) societies are based on acommon or shared identity. The source of thisidentity may be a notion of shared blood (i.e.,race), ethnicity or both, as it is in contemporaryKorea (and Japan). But a shared commitment toa political or social idea can also bind membersof a national community together. Mostnational communities are, by their very nature,too large and dispersed for most members toever meet or directly interact with all but thetiniest fraction of the community. In this sense,all national communities are, in the now well-worn phrase by Benedict Anderson,[13]“imagined” in that they are bound together byabstractions rather than physical connections.To put it in slightly different terms, nationalcommunities are formed from reified, collectivemyths that def ine the boundar ies ofbelongingness. Such collective myths help tocreate and sustain national unity and purpose.For Korea, the collective mythology played aparticularly important role in the resistanceagainst Japan’s “assimilation policy” during the

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early part of the 20th century and (for SouthKorea) in the turbulent “transition tomodernity” in the post-liberation years.[14]

By contrast, it is easy to see what can happeni n s o c i e t i e s i n w h i c h a n a t i o n a lcommunity—bound together by a sharedidentity—is weak or nonexistent. The ethnicand separatist violence that racked the formerYugoslavia in the 1990s is testament to this. Aneven more salient example is Iraq today:although the country suffers from manyproblems, one of the most serious is the lack ofa shared identity. There is, to put it simply, nooverarching “Iraqi” identity as such, onlycompeting identities—Shiite, Sunni, Kurdish,Arab, Islamist, and so on—distinguishedlargely, albeit not solely, on the basis ofethnicity.[15] Of course, the fragmentation ofidentity in Iraq today is itself the product of acomplex and highly contingent politicalprocess, one that is well beyond the scope ofthis paper to address. Suffice it to say,however, that just as there was a strongnational consciousness in the past, a unifiedIraqi identity may emerge in the future.

Still, identities based on a notion of ethnicand/or racial homogeneity can be dysfunctionaland even dangerous, especially in societiesundergoing significant and rapid social change.The reason is clear: they create an extremelynarrow and rigid category of belongingnessthat may marginalize and subordinate certaingroups of people, or even entire communitiesthat do not meet the criteria for “membership.”Such subordination, at the very least,undermines human rights and legitimates andinstitutionalizes discriminatory treatment ofout-groups—as has certainly been the case inS o u t h K o r e a . M o r e s e r i o u s l y , t h emarginalization and subordination of certaingroups based, even if only in part, on anascribed identity of “otherness” is frequentlyexpressed as xenophobia, and may lead towidespread social and political conflict. Suchwas the case in France when “ethnic riots”

engulfed the working-class suburbs aroundParis in 2005 and after. More recently in 2008,murderous violence was inflicted on foreignimmigrants in South Africa. In the UnitedStates, violence against out-groups has beenless dramatic in recent times, but immigrantshave long been subject to scapegoating and“racial hatred.”

At present, the exclusionary nature of nationalidentity in South Korea has not been a sourceof widespread social tension or conflict, stillless ethnically based communal violence. Koreahas been fortunate in this regard if onlybecause out-groups in Korean society have,until recently, been very small. But this ischanging, as I will discuss in the followingsection. One basic objective of this article, infact, is to describe and analyze the inexorabledemographic changes that are taking place inSouth Korea. At the same time, this paper isdesigned to show that these changes arecreating significant challenges for South Korea,specifically with regard to the country’shitherto exclusionary national identity.Establishing that South Korea will facesignificant demographic and social challengesin the future, however, is not the sole or evenprincipal goal of this paper. I am alsoconcerned with assessing the prospects forchange in South Korea. In particular, I amconcerned with the question: “Can South Koreamake the shift from a self-defined “mono-racial” and “mono-ethnic” society to amulticultural or multiethnic one?” While I donot offer a definitive answer, I argue that afundamental shift is not only imaginable, butalso distinctly possible.

To support my argument I draw from anunlikely comparative case: Australia. Amongthe reasons for making this comparison is thatAustralia’s national identity was once every bitas narrowly defined and restrictive as SouthKorea’s. Indeed, there is a strikingly similarparallel between the social construction of amono-racial and mono-ethnic national identity

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in the two countries. In considering the utilityand validity of a comparison between Australiaand South Korea, moreover, it is important toavoid the fallacious assumption that twootherwise very different units of analysiscannot be meaningfully compared. As studentsof comparative politics understand, “mostdifferent systems” are comparable, particularlywhen the key variables of interest are the sameor s imi lar between the two un i t s o fanalysis.[16] In this regard, too, I believe that acomparative analysis of Australia and SouthKorea holds some lessons for Japan. In thiscase, though, it is the hard-to-miss parallelsbetween South Korea and Japan that will likelydraw the most attention: recognizing this, I tryto highl ight some of the most sal ientsimilarities. This paper, however, is not meantto provide a systematic comparison, so mycomparisons here will be far more suggestivethan substantive.

The remainder of this paper is organized asfollows: in the next section, I describe (insummary fashion) some of the majordemographic changes that have been takingplace in Korea over the last two decades; I alsoshow that the “demographic shift” in Korea is along-term trend and one that is more likely toaccelerate than to reverse course. Second, Iexamine the social implications of increasingdiversity within South Korean society. Isuggest, in the following section, that the mostviable route toward a “multi-ethnic” society inKorea should be based on developing a moreinclusive definition of who belongs to Koreansociety. This leads to my final substantivesection, a discussion of Australia’s turn towardmulticulturalism and the implications for SouthKorea. To repeat, the primary objective of thissection is to demonstrate the real-worldpossibility of large-scale change from a raciallyand ethnically based conception of nationalbelongingness toward a more inclusive “multi-cultural” one.

The End of the Homogenous Nation: The

Demographic Shift in Korea

South Korea is experiencing a significantdemographic transition: in the space of lessthan two decades, from 1990 to 2007, thenumber of “foreign residents”[17] in SouthKorea grew from just under 50,000 to over onemillion (equivalent to 2 percent of SouthKorea’s population). This represents a 2,000percent increase over 18 years. The onemillion-person milestone, according to theMinistry of Justice, was first reached in August2007;[18] by the end of 2008, this number hadalready grown to 1,158,866 (2.35 percent ofthe total population).

The largest numbers of foreign residents, about377,000 (or 32.5 percent), are ethnic Koreansfrom China (Joseonjok), but as indicated above,migrants come from around the world. Thelargest groups are from China (other thanJoseonjok), Vietnam, Japan, the Philippines,Thailand, Mongolia, Indonesia, Taiwan,Uzbekistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan,Cambodia, Nepal and India.

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Most foreign residents (more than 70percent[19]) are non-skilled workers, and manyof these workers are in South Korea illegally.Moreover, while non-skilled foreign migrantworkers are, by law, temporary residents, manyhave lived and worked in Korea for more thanfive years and some for longer than twodecades: according to the Korean ImmigrationService, of the 200,489 “unlawful foreignnationals” in Korea in 2008, more than 46,000had been living in the county for five years orlonger and, of these, almost 21,000 had been inSouth Korea for at least 10 years.

There are, I should also note, a growingnumber of skilled or professional workers:between 1990 and 2006, the number hasincreased from 2,833 to 27,221 (even thelarger figure, however, represents only 6.4percent of all registered migrant workers inSouth Korea for that year).[20]

Another increasingly important source ofdiversity comes from the dramatic increase ininternational marriages. As recently as 1990,there were only 619 international marriages intotal. Between1990 and 1999, however, thenumbers began to ramp up, reaching acumulative total 93,063 or an average of about9 ,300 per year . By the ear ly 2000s ,international or “multicultural marriages” (asthey are now often called) had started to takeoff. In 2001, the number was 15,234 and by2005 (the peak year), there were 43,121international marriages in the country, whichaccounted for 13.6 percent—about one inseven—of all marriages in Korea that year.[21]

As of December 2007, the total number ofimmigrants to South Korea through marriagestood at 146,508 (of this number, 30 percent or44,291 have obtained Korean nationality[22]).Most international marriages involve foreignbrides, and most foreign brides are from China,many of them being Joseonjok. At the sametime, there are also a large number of womenwho come from Vietnam and the Philippines tomarry Korean men.

The substantial increase in internationalmarriages, it is important to note, does notreflect a newfound openness to foreign

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cultures. Instead, particularly the increase inthe number of “migrant brides” is a product ofa number of intersecting factors, the mostsalient being demographic. There is a shortageof “marriageable women” for certain groups ofKorean men—specifically, for never-marriedmen in rural areas and previously married(divorced or widowed) or disabled men of “lowsocio-economic status” in urban areas. InKorea’s rural areas, the lack of marriageablewomen is particularly acute, as many ruralwomen marry into urban families or simplyleave rural areas. The statistics are telling: inrural villages (myun), for ages 20-24, the sexratios (number of males to females) were 1.26,1.51, 1.88, and 1.62 in 1970, 1980, 1990, and2000 respectively.[23] As a result of thisimbalance, in 2007, international marriagesaccounted for 40 percent of all marriagesamong men engaged in agriculture.[24] Theeconomic gap between South Korea and themajor sources of “migrant brides” is anothersalient factor. This gap reflects a moregeneralized phenomenon—also referred to asglobal hypergamy[25]—in which women frompoorer countries (such as Vietnam, thePhilippines, China, and other countries in Southand Southeast Asia) move to economicallyw e a l t h i e r c o u n t r i e s a s “ m a r r i a g emigrants”[26]; Korea has joined Japan andTaiwan as such a site for internationalmarriage. There are a number of othercritically important factors as well, includingthe role of the Korean state, the UnificationChurch (which has played a key role inarranging marriages between Korean men andwomen from the Philippines[27]), andcommercial agencies (e.g., marriage brokersa n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l “ m a t c h m a k i n g ”agencies).[28]

From left, Bui Thi Thuy and Kim Tae-gooand To Thi Vien and Kim Wan-su preparedfor weddings in Vietnam and life in SouthKorea, February 2007 (Source: Người Việt Ly

Hương(http://www.lyhuong.net/tailieu/KoreanBachelors

.html))

There is, finally, an “endogenous” source ofdiversity: the children of internationalmarriages. As the number of internationalmarriages has increased, so too has thenumber of “mult icultural chi ldren.”Amerasians, as I noted above, has been part ofSouth Korea since the 1950s, but their numbershave always been relatively small due, in part,to overseas adoptions (and, of course, someemigrate to the United States with theirAmerican fathers).[29]

A membership meeting of KoreanAmerasians, held in Fullerton, CA, May 24,2009 (Source: Korean Amerasians Association

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(http://amerasians.org/index.html))

Over the past 20 years, moreover, theirnumbers have been greatly overshadowed bythe growing number of “Koasians” (partKorean, part “Asian”). According to the KoreanImmigration Service, in mid-2008, there wereat least 51,918 “multicultural children” inSouth Korea including Amerasians andKoasians). Of these, 33,140 were age six oryounger, and 18,778 were school age, thenumber of is the latter rising rapidly from7,988 in 2006 to 18,445 in 2008. These figuresdo not include the children of undocumentedworkers, many of whom are married tocompatriots and not to Korean spouses, but arereluctant to register their children with localschools for fear of being deported orimprisoned. There are an estimated 5,845 suchchildren.[30] (Korean law allows any childbetween the age of seven and 12, regardless ofresidency or legal status, to register with alocal elementary school.)

These trends—both international marriages andinternational worker migration flows—remainstrong and are likely to grow. The Koreangovernment projects the proportion of foreignresidents in Korea to increase to 5 percent by2020.[31] Furthermore, given Korea’s lowfertility rate of 1.08,[32] one of the lowest inthe world, the 5 percent figure will almostcertainly be little more than a waypoint in amuch longer journey toward significant socialheterogeneity. The reason is clear: Korea,along with Japan and other societies with lowbirthrates, simply will not have enough able-bodied people to replace their working agepopulations and support welfare systems forthe growing numbers of retirees. A well-knownUN study in 2001 indicated that Korea wouldneed a total of 6.4 million immigrants between2020 and 2050, or an average of 213,000 peryear, to keep the size of its working agepopulation (15-64 years old) constant at itsthen figure of 36.6 million.[33] Japan faces acomparable situation: the “medium variant

projection” in the UN study indicated that, tokeep “the size of its population at the levelattained in the year 2005, the country wouldneed 17 million net immigrants up to the year2050, or an average of 381,000 immigrants peryear between 2005 and 2050. By 2050, theimmigrants and their descendants would total22.5 million and comprise 17.7 per cent of thetotal population of the country.[34] “Getting Ready For a Multi-EthnicSociety”?

Koreans are not blind to these changes and thisis especially apparent in the media. From themost conservative to the most progressive newssources, editorial writers and columnists haveacknowledged the country ’s loss o fhomogeneity and its move toward a “multi-ethnic society.” Consider, for example, thiseditorial, written in 2005, from the Hankyoreh(one of Korea’s most progressive papers), “GetReady for a Multi-Ethnic Society”:

Experts say that Korea is already no longer ahomogeneous society, and that is has alreadyessentially become an immigrant nation. As oflast year foreign workers topped 420,000 andforeign wives numbered more than 50,000.Naturally there is a continuous rise in thenumber of children who have mothers orfathers from China, the Philippines, Vietnam,Thailand, Mongolia, Russia, the US, and Japan.Given the fact Korea has a low birth rate and isaging and that international interaction is onthe rise, the trend is going to accelerate. Theproblem is that our understanding of thesituation and our society's preparedness lagsfar behind that trend. Just as has been the casewith foreign labor, marriage to foreigners hasrun into various problems …. It is time ourcountry formulate real plans as a multi-ethnicsociety. To begin with, there needs to be betteroversight of the international marriageagencies. Foreign spouses need to be givenhelp in adjusting socially, through Koreanlanguage and cultural education. There needs

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to be counseling for the problems faced byinternational families. Most importantly weneed to have open hearts that accept them asmembers of Korean society (emphasisadded).[35]

According to the Hankyoreh editorial, “gettingready” for a multiethnic society primarilymeant providing “better oversight of theinternational marriage agencies”, and givingforeign spouses more help in “adjustingsocially, through Korean language and culturaleducation.” Tellingly, the latter suggestionignores the notion that Korean husbands mightbe served by learning about their spouses’culture and language. Also missing from theeditorial is any discussion of how, for example,tens of thousands of “multicultural children”could be successfully integrated into SouthKorea’s educational system—an issue that, in2005, was certainly salient. But, equally tellingis the editorial’s exclusive focus on foreignspouses (even after pointing out that the largemajority of foreign residents are workers): thisreflected the then common assumption thatforeign workers—especially non-skilled foreignworkers—would and should have no permanentplace in Korean society. There is, in short, littlein the editorial—except for the very lastsentence—that suggests “getting ready” wouldhave necessitated any significant changeswithin Korean society and/or South Korea’srigid ethno-racial conception of identity.

The failure of Hankyoreh to address the deepersignificance of Korea’s transformation into amulti-ethnic society was typical of editorialsand columns written before 2006. But that wasbefore American football star, Hines Ward, wonthe 2006 Super Bowl Most Valuable Player(MVP) award. Mr. Ward happened to have aKorean mother and an African-American father.He had only lived in South Korea for one yearafter his birth. Still, after winning the MVPaward, Mr. Ward became an overnightsensation in his “motherland.” The Koreannational media embraced Ward as a Korean

success story. Hundreds of stories were printedand aired about Ward and his Korean heritageand he began to appear frequently inadvertisements in Korea. Ward received a“hero’s welcome” on his first visit to his“motherland” in April 2006. The tacit, ifunintentional, message underlying these storieswas that neither pure blood nor culture is anecessary attribute of Koreanness. After all,Ward’s blood is “mixed” and he grew up in theUnited States where, as a young man, helearned almost nothing about his Koreanheritage or Korean culture, including how tospeak Korean. Ward’s embrace, it is importantto emphasize, was different from that of otherAmerasians or “mixed blood” entertainers orsports figures in South Korea (as well as inJapan and other Asian countries): he sparked asignificant national debate on Korean identityand the country’s “shameful” history ofdiscrimination. Even more, Ward’s successprovoked a number of immediate policychanges. Shortly after his visit to South Korea,for example, the Ministry of Educationannounced that middle school textbooks wouldno longer describe Korea as a “nation unifiedby one bloodline,” but instead speak of “amultiethnic and multicultural society.”

Hines Ward (bottom, center), on his visitto South Korea in April 2006, participates

in an event held by the Pearl S. Buck

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International Foundation in Seoul (Source:Korea Times

(http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/special/2008/07/178_11298.html))

Admittedly, the ability of the “Hines Wardphenomenon,” by itself, to sustain a substantived e b a t e o n K o r e a n n e s s , m u c h l e s sfundamentally change attitudes on a society-wide basis, is limited. After a short period ofintense interest, the Korean public quicklyforgot about Ward and the uncomfortablequestions his embrace by Korean societyraised. Nonetheless, many Koreans (especiallywithin the government, news media, andacademia) did not forget. The nationalgovernment, in particular, finally began toaddress decades of unchecked discrimination,both social and institutional, against “mixed-race” Koreans and foreign residents generally.In April 2006, for example, the governmentgranted legal status to people having mixed-race backgrounds and their families, “as part ofmeasures to eradicate prejudices anddiscrimination against them.” Universities wererequired to admit a certain number of “mixed-heritage” students; and special programs wereproposed to provide educational assistance,legal and financial aid, and employmentcounseling to poor families.[36] As notedabove, the law barring “mixed race” Koreansfrom serving in the military was also revised in2006.

These were well-intended measures, but suchmeasures, for the most part, failed to addressthe underlying source of discrimination,marginalization, and subordination, namely, anational identity that defines difference anddiversity as undesirable and, therefore,inferior. This point was underscored by aninsightful editorial in the Korea Herald, whichargued that the anti-discrimination law wasflawed because it equated inter-racialparentage with a physical disability. As theeditors put it, “These policy makers seem tobelieve that l ike people with physical

disabilities, the mixed-race people who havesuffered from open and hidden discriminationin this society need social props to help themshed handicaps in finding opportunities inlife.”[37] It is worth noting that this bias in thegovernment’s efforts was no accident, for theKorean government had long classified “mixblood” heritage as a type of disability, alongwith “Harelip, Deformity (Hand or Foot),Prematurity, Mental Illness, Heart Diseases,and Others.”[38]

The question remains: Is Korea ready for amulti-ethnic society? On the one hand, thereare positive signs. More and more Koreans,especially those in positions of influence, arecognizant of the issue and many believe thatsomething must be done. In addition, as thediscussion above clearly shows, Korean societyis more heterogeneous than it has ever beenand there is every indication that it will becomemuch more so in the future. Sheer weight ofnumbers, then, may force Korea to become“ready.” On the other hand, the concept ofKorean identity as it has developed historicallyhas left little room for acceptance of socialheterogeneity, still less the wholesaletransformation of Korean identity.

Who Belongs to Korean Society?

A redefining of national identity does not meanthat the concept of Koreanness based on bloodand culture must be discarded. In the case ofSouth Korea, this is unlikely, certainly in theshort-term. Rather, a redefining of Koreanidentity can be based on widening the scope ofbelongingness. Thus, instead of asking, “Who isKorean?” the more appropriate question maybe: Who belongs to Korean society? This latterquestion suggests that the key issue facingKorean society is the ability to not only tolerateor recognize the reality of increasing socialheterogeneity, but also to accept and respectethnic or cultural pluralism as a social good, asa new national ideal. This is the premise behind“multiculturalism,” which might most simply be

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defined as the acceptance and embrace ofcultural difference.

The alternative is widening and deepeningsocial conflict between full-fledged “members”of Korean society and growing numbers of“non-members, including those who may havede jure membership (i.e., citizenship ordenizenship), but whose cultural or otherascribed differences are not accepted ortolerated. On this point, it bears repeating thatAmerasians—despite their cultural integrationinto Korean society—have nonetheless sufferedsevere from discrimination and mistreatmentbecause of their “mixed blood.” In a similarvein, Korea’s “brethren” from China, theJoseonjok, who generally speak Korean andhave a strong cultural affinity, have alsosuffered discriminatory treatment and haveeffectively been identified as outsiders. Thissuggests that the primary issue is notnecessarily the unwillingness or inability ofmarginalized groups to “assimilate” (or at leasttry to assimilate) into Korean society, butrather it is the hitherto impenetrable barrier ofa rigidly and narrowly defined conception ofbelongingness and identity.[39]

As it stands, the pressures for a social orpolitical explosion continue to build. And, whilesome policy changes are taking place, thus farthey have done little to address the underlyingsource of social exclusion in Korean society. Inshort, it remains necessary to move toward amore expansive definition of belongingness,toward the creation of a “multicultural nation.” The Road to a Multicultural Nation: AComparative Look at the “AustralianModel”

To get a better sense of the prospects andconcrete possibilities for change in SouthKorea, it is useful to consider, albeit briefly, acomparative case: Australia. To be sure, insharp contrast to South Korea, Australia is acountry of immigration: historically, a very

large proportion of the country’s populationhas been born outside its borders. In 1901, forexample, 23 percent of Australia’s non-Aboriginal population was born overseas. By1947, the proportion had shrunk to 9.8 percent(due largely to more restrictive immigrationpolicies, which excluded non-Europeanimmigrants during the interwar period); butafter the end of the Second World War, thenumbers again increased: by 1954, 14.3 ofAustralia’s population was foreign-born. [40] In2008, the overseas-born population had risen to22%.[41] Second, despite racially andethnically laced violence in 2005 (the Cronullariot[42]), Australia appears to provide acompelling example of cultural or ethnicinclusivity, tolerance, and openness.[43] To besure, considerable “ethnic tensions” remain inAustralian society, most important concerningthe two percent of the population of aboriginalorigins. There has nevertheless beenmeaningful, progressive change towardmulticultural acceptance of Australia’ssubstantial immigrant population, much of it inrecent years from Asia. Third, and perhapsmost saliently, Australia does not have thecenturies-old (even millennial-old) tradition ofpolitical, linguistic and geographic continuitythat Korea purportedly has—a tradition towhich most Koreans ascribe the power andembeddedness of Korean identity. On this lastpoint, though, it is important to recognize, atthe outset, that the firm belief in the ancientor ig ins of Korea’s ethnic and rac ia lhomogeneity is a popular myth. The strongsense of Korean identity and ethnic nationalismis in fact largely a 20th century phenomenon,ar is ing f i rs t in react ion to imper ia lencroachment and Japanese attempts tosubjugate and assimilate Koreans into theempire as imperial subjects.[44] Herein lies akey reason for a comparison of Australia andSouth Korea: both countries share a profoundsimilarity in the colonial origins of thehistorical construction of a homogeneousnational identity. In this regard, too, it isimportant to understand that, in South Korea,

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much of this “construction” occurred only inthe second half of the 20th century, and thatthe state played a key role. As we will see inAustralia, the construction of an earlier mono-cultural and mono-ethnic national identity wasalso a product of state action.

In fact, in Australia, the effort to construct ahomogeneous racial and ethnic identitypredates the Korean experience by manydecades. For nearly a century, beginning in the19th century, the Australian governmentattempted to create a mono-cultural,homogenous “white” society—preciselybecause Austra l ia was a country o fimmigration. This effort was well reflected inwhat came to be known as the “WhiteAustralia” policy (or, more formally, theImmigration Restrictions Act of 1901[45]). Theobjectives of the White Australia policy,according to James Jupp, were unabashedlybased on a conflation of race and ethnicity:“The Aboriginal population was expected to dieout, with those of ‘mixed race’ … assimilatinginto the majority population to the point ofeventual invisibility.”[46] Non-Europeans,moreover, were effectively forbidden to settlein the country. Interestingly, too, the WhiteAustralia policy was premised on the same anti-immigration logic we hear in South Korea,Japan and other “homogenous” societies today:Australian officials justified the policy byasserting that anyone who looked differentwould provoke social unrest in a “totallyhomogenous” white British society[47] (on itsface, a perplexing claim given Australia’s non-white aboriginal population—more on thisbelow.) It is also worth noting, too, that theAustralian government also discriminatedagainst non-Anglo and non-Celtic Europeans; asJupp puts it, “Australia was not settled by‘Europeans’ but by the ‘British,’ partly to keep‘Europeans’ out! Its subsequent history wasdetermined by that fact.”[48]

This badge from 1906 shows pride in“White Australia” (Source: Wikipedia

(http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/8/89/Ac.whiteaustralia.jpg))

The logical extreme of the White Australianpolicy was manifested in the discussions amongthe governing elite (from the 1930s to 1950s)to “biologically absorb” and/or culturallyassimilate the decidedly non-white Aboriginepopulation, although for a long time thequestion of “where Aborigines fitted into thewhite nation was generally fudged or ignoredfor as long as they seemed headed forinevitable extinction.”[49] Ultimately, a policyof assimilation was adopted, but it was one thatclearly reflected the then-prevalent andunequivocally racist discourse on the need tomaintain national homogeneity (a “pure race”)as the source of national cohesion and nationalprogress. Under Australia’s assimilationistpolicy (which was officially adopted in 1937,but not formally implemented throughoutAustralia until 1951), a conscious effort was

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made to exterminate Aboriginal culture; as partof this policy, children were forcibly taken fromtheir parents and placed in institutions (bothgovernment-run and missionary) so that anentire generation could learn “white culture” (apractice highlighted in the feature film, Rabbit-proof Fence). In addition, Aborigines were notallowed to use their native names or practicetheir traditional culture. It was, in short, anattempt at cultural genocide, elements of whichstayed in place until the 1970s.[50]

Australia’s policy of assimilation was notlimited to Aborigines. After 1945, and partly inresponse to increased labor demands and a lowfertility rate among white Australians—thesame issues, not coincidentally, that Korea (andJapan) face today—the country was forced toaccept greater numbers of non-BritishEuropean migrants.[51] Most of the newEuropean immigrants came from Germany,Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands,Poland, and the former Yugoslavia. Between1947 and 1953, 170,000 “European” refugeesarrived in Australia, followed by subsequentwaves of immigrants (including those fromSoviet-bloc countries such as Czechoslovakia,Hungary, Latvia, the Soviet Union, andUkraine). The new immigrants were expectedto learn English, adopt existing cultural normsand become indistinguishable from theAustralian-born population as rapidly aspossible.[52] Given Australia’s history ofintolerance and outright racism toward non-Anglo immigrants, however, it is little wonderthat the assimilation of “European” immigrantsdid not work as planned.

The pressure for change, therefore, wasbuilding: as more and more of the populationwas non-Anglo-Celtic, the contradictionbetween Australia’s mono-cultural and mono-racial national identity and the reality of thecountry’s ethnic diversity became increasinglydifficult to ignore. In addition, in a post-warenvironment that witnessed the creation ofmany newly independent states in Asia and the

economic rise of Japan, South Korea andTaiwan, Australia’s Anglo-centric orientationthreatened to alienate all of its closest—andincreasingly important—geographicalneighbors. This presaged, more broadly, ahistoric reorientation in Australia. Until the endof the White Australia policy in 1973, thecountry had formally defined itself as a Britishsociety, unequivocally part of the Anglo world.This orientation has certainly not been lost,[53]but in the 1970s Australia explicitly movedtoward becoming “part of Asia.” The basicrationale and implications of this shift werespelled out quite clearly in 1984 by then-PrimeMinister Bob Hawke, who stated:

A most important step in drawing closer to Asiais that we have accepted and welcomed the factthat people from Asia form part, and most likelyan increasing part, of our population, and thatAsian culture will, likewise, form an increasingpart of our national heritage. No less importanthas been the transformation of our economicrelationship with Asia … we will continue tomake this a major priority.[54]

It is worth highlighting the economic rationalein Hawke’s statement, for it reinforces a basicpoint: the shift from a mono-cultural tomulticultural society in Australia was not aproduct of a new “enlightened” consciousnessper se, but of economic forces that were largelyresponsible for creating a new multiethnicreality. Or as Perry Nolan (a former seniorforeign affairs officer) bluntly put it, “Thereality is that Australia is located in theAsian/Pacific region. Like it or not, thisgeographical fact is not going to change Acceptit and use it as an advantage …. Refuse toaccept our location and opportunities and wewill very soon, become the ‘poor white trash ofAsia.”[55]

The pressures South Korea faces are notexactly the same, but they are very similar,even profoundly similar. The same can be saidof the political and policy choices South Korea

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faces. On this point, it is worth pointing outthat Australia did not move from its racially-and ethnically biased assimilation policy to amulticultural policy in one fell swoop. Instead,the process unfolded gradually. For example,the White Australia policy began to be modifiedin 1966 (in response to the waves of non-AngloEuropean immigrants) and was finallyabolished in 1973. Two years later, the RacialDiscrimination Act of 1975[56] outlaweddiscrimination based on race and ethnic origin.Other significant changes included theabolition of a discriminatory immigrationsystem that accorded privileges to Britishsettlers over settlers from other countries andfinal acceptance of Aboriginal people as citizen(1967), although it was not until 1996 thatAboriginal people were legally consideredrightful inhabitants of the country withrecognized land rights.[57] And, it took anothertwelve years, for the Australian government toissue a formal apology, which was delivered byAustralia’s Prime Minister Kevin Rudd onFebruary 12, 2008.[58] (Importantly, however,many critics, especially in the Aboriginalcommunity, felt that the apology was far fromadequate, in part because it does not explainwhy the government was “sorry,” nor did itprovide any concrete plans to redress pastwrongs.[59])

More broadly, Australia made two basic shiftsin its immigration policy.[60] The first was from“assimilation” to integration, and the secondwas from integration to multiculturalism.Integration policy, according to Australia’sDepartment of Immigration and Multiculturaland Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA), “recognizedthat the adjustments required for a successfulimmigration program should includeadjustments by the host society.”[61] In otherwords, there was increasing recognition that “itwas unrealistic to expect migrants to dissociatethemselves from their cultural and linguisticbackgrounds, and that successful resettlementof new arrivals required greater responsivenessto their needs.”[62] At a concrete level,

however, the shift to integration meantproviding social services to new immigrants,better educational opportunities, language andtranslation/interpretation support andassistance for self-help programs (primarilyt h r o u g h c o m m u n i t y - b a s e d e t h n i corganizations).[63]

The positive effects of integration policies canbe very limited, however, if the “adjustments bythe host society” fail to address adequatelylarger issues of national identity andbelongingness. After all, “integration” meansvery little if racial and ethnic discrimination notonly remains firmly embedded in society atlarge, but is also entrenched in the institutionsof governance. Further, integration means verylittle if certain groups are still viewed—andtreated—as subordinate and inferior to thedominant culture. These shortcomings wererecognized in the Galbally Report,[64] which,as Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser noted, “…identified multiculturalism as a key concept informulating government policies andrecognized that Australia was at a critical stagein its development as a multiculturalnation.”[65] The Galbally Report reinforced andextended existing integration policy, but alsowas the first substantive step in dealing withissues of national identity. For example, theReport led to the promotion of multiculturaleducation in government and non-governmentschools; the establishment of the AustralianInstitute of Multicultural Affairs (designed toprovide policy advice to the Commonwealth onmulticultural issues); and the creation ofChannel 0/28, which Fraser called “a serviceunique in the world.”[66] (This new channelwas originally designed to broadcast only“ m u l t i c u l t u r a l ” — a s o p p o s e d t o“ethnic”—programming that would be ofinterest to all Australians. The first programshown was a documentary on multiculturalismentitled “Who Are We?”)

This was just the beginning of a long,complicated process, which continues today. It

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is, more simply, a work in progress. And whilethere are many critics of this process, it is fairto say that Australia has witnessed a seachange in that the quest ion, “Who isAustralian?” is no longer subject to a clear-cutanswer based on race and Anglo-Celtic values.At the same time, it is important to recognizethat multiculturalism has not entailed arejection of “core values” for Australian societyand national identity. Instead, the model ofAustralian multiculturalism explicitly eschewscultural relativism by consciously constructingan “over-arching framework of values”, most ofwhich are derived from the Anglo-Celticcultural tradition and then molded into theirpresent Anglo-Australian form.[67] Thisframework has not been entirely successful.But this should not be a surprise given thatsuccessful completion of the process requires,as Smolicz puts it, “the acceptance of aculturally pluralist solution by the Anglo-Celticdominant majority—with some values shared,and others preserved and adapted byconstituent ethno-cultural groups, within thenew nation.” More to the point, Smolicz tells usthat the “degree of acceptance of minorityethnic [sic] as ‘real Australians’ (i.e., asmembers of the nation in its most basicideological/emotional sense) has not yet beenfully accomplished.” [68]

Ironically, the lack of complete success inAustralia is a good sign for South Korea. It isgood in the sense that Australia represents a“realistic” model of the challenges Korea willlikely face in the transformation from a mono-cultural society to multicultural one. One ofthese challenges, for example, is likely (if notalmost assuredly) the rise of xenophobiagenerally, but also most specifically in the formof political parties, such as the One Nationparty in Australia, which has railed at the“Asianisation” of Australia and against thepolicy of multiculturalism in general. Moregenerally, Australia’s still imperfect path tomulticulturalism demonstrates an essentiallycommon sense—but easily forgotten—lesson:

the type of fundamental political and socialtransformation that multiculturalism representsin a formerly “homogenous” society willrequires decades of ongoing struggle, withmany steps backward for every few stepsforward.

Conclusion: Who are the Agents ofMulticulturalism?

The government and people of South Koreahave a tremendous opportunity to not onlyaccept the reality of increasing socialheterogeneity, but also to embrace a newmulticultural vision. This will not be easy, forKorea’s sense of national identity has deeproots; the belief in the oneness of blood andculture is embedded in the psyche of manyKoreans. As in Australia, however, it is possibleto uproot even the most ingrained orthodoxies.The first step is to recognize that ethnic andcultural diversity is not a threat to Koreanidentity and national strength, but a potentialand potentially potent source of new creativeenergy. This is particularly important in thecurrent era, one in which increasing“globalization” has not only put more and morepressure on all societies to innovate and growin new directions, but has also put pressure onstates to become more inclusive. Even more, amono-cultural, race-based based nationalidentity that subordinates and marginalizesother ethnic and cultural groups has become adangerous anachronism. It not only breedsdivisiveness and social tension, but also, andmore importantly, can barely be justified in aworld where human rights has become anaccepted norm of global society. Despite allthis, for many people it is difficult to imagine afundamental shift in the notion that Korea is a“single-race country.”

The apparent lack of space for significantchange, though, should not be taken forgranted. Indeed, since the end of Japanesecolonial rule, South Korea has witnessedtremendous social, political, and economic

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change. Just two generations ago, fewobservers would have given South Korea anychance to become one of the largest economiesin the world and a major competitor in some ofthe most advanced markets. And, just 20 yearsago, few Koreans could have imagined that thecountry would host hundreds of thousands offoreign workers, or that Korean men—in themost conservative and traditional parts of thecountry—would be marrying women fromChina and Vietnam in increasing numbers.Granted, these latter two changes are not aproduct of a new enlightened view amongSouth Koreans. But, this only helps underscorea key point: sometimes societies are compelledto change.

This said, there is nothing automatic orinev i tab le about the t rans i t ion to amulticultural society. If it happens in SouthKorea, it will be the result of a political processinvolving many actors. Some of these actorswill be the new immigrants themselves as theypress for greater recognition of their rightswithin Korean society. Significantly, this hasalready happened to with regard to labor andhuman rights for foreign migrant workers—anissue I examine at length elsewhere.[69] Thestep toward political and residency rights,however, is much larger one to take. Manyforeign migrants—primarily non-skilledworkers—are uninterested in taking this step.They simply want a secure short-term job thatallows them to earn a decent wage and workunder satisfactory conditions. For others,though, political and residency rights areimportant. They understand, too, that it is atwo-way street: they must adapt to Koreansociety just as Korean society must adapt tothem. While almost no data are available,anecdotally it appears that many long-term“residents” have learned the Korean languageand Korean customs (in my interviews with arange of foreign workers, for example, allspoke Korean). For foreign women who havemarried Korean men, it is virtually de rigueurto learn Korean and to adapt, almost

immediately, to traditional Korean culturalpractices (in a manner, to become “moreKorean” than most Korean women).

Korean “liberals” must also play a key role, asthey have already done in the struggle formigrant worker rights.[70] More specifically,the network of Korean non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs) must continue to providefinancial, organizational and logistical supportto foreign migrants/immigrants, whosenumbers and resources are still relatively smalland unstable. For a long time, Korean NGOsglossed over or ignored the issues of politicaland residency rights, particularly as they applyto foreign workers (as opposed to foreignspouses). But, the persistence of activists inthe foreign worker community, combined withthe fortuitous success of Hines Ward, hashelped to shift or redirect the discourse fromone focused almost exclusively on labor andhuman rights to one increasingly aimed at therights of belongingness, denizenship andcitizenship.

Finally, as in Australia, the state will have toplay a central role. Minimally, the state mustconstruct, whether reactively or proactively,the over-arching legal and institutionalframework within which the broader shifttoward a multicultural society unfolds. But thestate must also balance between the centrifugalforces of ethnic diversity and the centripetalneed for national cohesion. To achieve socialand political stability, all major “groups” insociety—from majority to minority—need abasic level of security. Obviously, this is noteasy to achieve; arguably, however, the state isthe only institution capable of fulfilling thistask. Whether the Korean (or Japanese) state isup to this task remains an open question. But itis clear that it can be done.

Postscript

I addressed these issues in the years 2006 and2008. In June 2009, the Korean Immigration

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Service released a report entitled, The FirstBasic Plan for Immigration Policy, 2008-2012.This 120-page report, in some respects, is ablueprint for a transition to a multiculturalsociety in South Korea, along the lines I havesuggested here. It is a very general blueprint,to be sure , but i t acknowledges theinexorability of global immigration to SouthKorea (for non-skilled workers, high skilledworkers, foreign spouses, the Korean“Diaspora,” and others), and addresses keyissues: social integration, citizenship andnaturalization laws/procedures, civic educationon multiculturalism, educational policies(K-12), etc. Of course, broadly written policydocuments or white papers, may ultimatelyhave little concrete impact. If nothing else,though, the Plan signifies a dramatic, evenfundamental, shift in South Korea’s officialperspective on immigration: multiculturalism,inclusivity, and integration are key themesrunning throughout the document.

Timothy Lim is a professor of Political Scienceat California State University, Los Angeles. Heis the author of Doing Comparative Politics: AnIntroduction to Approaches and Issues(http://www.amazon.com/dp/1588263452/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20) and of numerous articles ontransnational worker migration to South Korea.

You can find more information about the authorat his instructional website: click here(http://instructional1.calstatela.edu/tclim/).

I would like to thank Mark Selden, who not onlyprovided many useful suggestions for thepreparation and revision of this paper, but alsoencouraged me to expand and deepen myoriginal short essay for publication in JapanFocus. I would also like to thank the reviewersfor their comments and suggestions.

Recommended citation: Timothy Lim, “Who isKorean? Migration, Immigration, and the

Challenge of Multiculturalism in HomogeneousSocieties” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol.30-1-09, July 27, 2009.

Notes

[1] Quoted in “Korea Greets a New Era ofMulticulturalism,” Korea Herald, July 25, 2006.

[2] The concepts of race and ethnicity aresocial constructions, collective identitiesformed through historical and socio-politicalprocesses. This is a generally accepted viewwith regard to ethnicity, which is widelyunderstood as a cultural phenomenon: acollective identity based on shared customs andvalues (at times rooted in religious beliefs), acommon language or dialect, and other socialcharacteristics and practices embraced by agroup, community or society. Race is a farmore controversial concept, especially whenused to describe supposedly distinct—andinherently separate—groups on the basis ofgenetic or biological characteristics. The“biological” usage of race has long beendiscredited among social scientists, most ofwhom understand race as a symbolic marker ofdifference

[3] In 2003, the number of ethnic Koreansliving in regions other than the Koreanpeninsula was over 6.3 million (according to areport issued by the Ministry of Diplomacy andCommerce). This figure represents 14% of theentire Korean population. Cited in Lee Jun-shik,“The Changing Nature of the Korean People’sPerspective on National Issues, and FellowKoreans Living Abroad,” The Review of KoreanStudies, v. 8, no 2 (2005): 111-140.

[4] The term “Amerasian” was originally coinedby Pearl S. Buck, who used it to refer to anychild born to an “Asian” parent and anAmerican parent in the aftermath of U.S.military interventions in Asia. Thus, there areAmerasian children in Korea, the Philippines,Japan, and most prominently, Vietnam. The

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fathers of most Amerasian children are U.S.soldiers.

[5] See, for example, Mary Lee, “Mixed RacePeoples in the Korean National Imaginary andFamily,” Korean Studies, vol. 32 (2008), pp.65-71; and Katherine Moon, Sex Among Allies:Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

[6] Park Kyung-Tae, “Left Behind: AmerasiansLiving in Korea,” paper presented at theKorean Nation and Its ‘Others’ in the Age ofGlobalization conference, University of Hawaii,April 20-21, 2007.

[7] Lee, “Mixed Race Peoples,” p. 59.

[8] According to Pearl S. Buck International, in2002, almost 10 percent of Amerasians inSouth Korea failed to enter or completeprimary school (compared to a nationalcompletion rate of virtually 100 percent) and17.5 percent did not graduate from middleschool (cited in Lee, “Mixed Race Peoples, p.60). Overall, the drop out rate for Amerasianswas 47 percent (cited in Park, “Left Behind”).Dropout rate? Through high school? Explain ordrop sentence.

[9] Based on a survey of 101 Amerasiansconducted by Park Kyung-Tae in 2006. Parkdescribes the situation this way: Amerasians“… are employed mostly in construction,manufacturing factories, restaurants, etc. Only24 percent have regular jobs.” Further,according to Park’s survey, the averagemonthly income for Amerasians was 1,460,000won, which was less than half the nationalaverage of 3,068,900 won. Park, “Left Behind.”

[10] Lim, “Fight for Equal Rights,” pp.338-339.

[11] Lim, “Fight for Equal Rights,” pp.340-341.

[12] See Timothy C. Lim, “Racing from theBottom in South Korea? The Nexus betweenCivil Society and Transnational Migrants,”Asian Survey, vol. 43, no. 3 (2003), pp.423-442.

[13 ] Bened ic t Anderson , Imag inedCommunities: Reflections on the Origins andSpread of Nationalism (London and New York:Verso, 2006, revised ed.).

[14] Gi-wook Shin, “Ethnic Pride Source ofPrejudice, Discrimination,” Korea Herald,August 3, 2006.

[15] An interesting discussion of this issue isavailable as an audio program on United StatesInstitute of Peace website. See “What Does itMean to be Iraqi? The Politics of Identity inI r a q i(http://www.usip.org/events/2006/1017_iraqi_identity.html),” a public meeting of the IraqWorking Group, October 17, 2006, onlinerecording

[16] See my discussion of comparativemethodology in Doing Comparative Politics: AnIntroduction to Approaches and Issues(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006), chs. 1 and2.

[17] By the official government definition, aforeign resident is any non-citizen residing inKorea for 91 days or longer. There are anumber of minor exceptions to this rule,including any member of diplomatic delegationor consular corps, members of internationalorganizations, and Canadian citizens residingin Korea up to six months. The number of short-term (91 days to one year) foreign residentshas remained fairly constant, so the recent anddramatic increase in the overall foreignresident population is overwhelmingly based onindividuals staying in South Korea for longerperiods of time.

[18] Based on data from South Korea’s Ministry

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of Justice; cited in “Korea Heads Toward aMulticultural Society,” Korea Herald, June 6,2008.

[19] “Korea Heads Toward a MulticulturalSociety.”

[20] Figures cited in Seol Dong-Hoon,Migrants’ Citizenship in Korea: With a Focus onMigrant Workers and Marriage-basedMigrants,” unpublished paper (n.d.). Datacollected by Seol from the Statistical Yearbookof Departures and Arrivals released by theMinistry of Justice.

[21] Cited in Korean Immigration Service (KIS),The First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy,2008-2012 (Seoul, June 2009). p. 45.

[22] KIS, The First Basic Plan, p. 45.

[23] Lee Yean-Ju, Seol Dong-Hoon, and ChoSung-Nam, “International Marriages in SouthKorea: The Significance of Nationality andEthnicity,” Journal of Population Research, vol.23, no. 2 (2006), p. 166-167.

[24] KIS, The First Basic Plan, p. 45. This figurealso includes Korean men engaged in fishing.

[25] Global hypergamy refers to a pattern ofmovement in which brides from more remoteand less developed locations to increasinglydeveloped and less isolated ones, and globallyfrom the poor and less developed global southto the wealthier and industrialized north. Forfurther discussion, see Nicole Constable,“Introduction: Cross-Border Marriages ,Gendered Mobility, and Globaly Hypergamy,”in Nicole Constable, ed., Cross-BorderMarr iages : Gender and Mobi l i t y inTransnational Asia (Philadelphia: University ofPennsylvania Press, 2005), pp. 1-16.

[26] It is useful to note that global hypergamyis not as clear cut as it may appear on thesurface. Freeman, for example, points out that

in the case ethnic Korean brides from Chinawho marry Korean men, “…the complex andconflicting ways in which constructions ofnationality, gender, and geography intersect inthese marriages make it difficult to distinguishthose ‘in charge’ from those who are deprived.”Caren Freeman, “Marrying Up and MarryingDown: The Paradoxes of Marital Mobility forChosonjok Brides in South Korea,” inConstable, ed., Cross-Border Marriages, pp.80-100.

[27] For an extended discussion of the role ofthe Unification Church, see Kim Minjeong,“‘Salvation’ Through Marriage: GenderedDesire, Heteronormativity, and ReligiousIdentities in the Transnational Context” (paperpresented at the Gender, Religion & Identity inSocial Theory Symposium, Blacksburg, VA,April 2009).

[28] The factors behind the upsurge ofinternational marriages in South Korea are toocomplex to adequately cover here. But severalstudies available provide in-depth discussion ofthese factors. See Nancy Abelman andHyunhee K im, “A Fa i led At tempt a tTransnational Marriage: Maternal Citizenshipin a Globalizing South Korea,” in Constable,ed., Cross-Border Marriages , pp. 101-123; LeeHye-Kyung, “International Marriage and theS ta te i n Sou th Korea : Focus ing onGovernmental Policy,” Citizenship Studies, vol.12, no. 1 (February 2008), pp. 108-123; andFreeman, “Marrying Up and Marrying Down.”

[29] See Park, “Left Behind.” Park estimatesthat, as of 2000, there were fewer than 1,000Amerasians residing in South Korea, maybe asfew as 433.

[30] “Educating Chi ldren of ForeignResidents,” Korea Herald, June 24, 2008.

[31] “Diversity Causes Korea to Face NewChallenges,” Korea Times, February 24, 2008.

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[32] The Korean National Statistical Officereported the figure of 1.08 in 2006. Over a five-year period from 2000 to 2005, however, theUnited Nations, World Population Prospects1950-2050: The 2006 Revision gave a figure of1.20, which was still lower than or equal to allcountries except for Hong Kong (SAR). Figuresare cited from the UNDP (United NationsDeve lopment P rogramme) , HumanDevelopment Report . Avai lable here(http://hdrstats.undp.org/indicators/48.html).

[33] A number of other scenarios were alsodiscussed, but most did not anticipate a furthersignificant decline in Korea’s fertility rate. SeeUnited Nations Population Division (UNPD),“Country Results: Korea,” in ReplacementMigration: Is it a Solution to Declining andAgeing Population? (United Nations, 2001),a v a i l a b l e h e r e(http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/ReplMigED/migration.htm).

[34] UNPD, “Country Results: Japan,” inReplacement Migration.

[35] “Get Ready for a Multi-Ethnic Society[Editorial],” Hankyoreh, June 29, 2005.

[ 3 6 ] “ K o r e a t o S c r a p M i x e d - R a c eDiscrimination,” Korea Times, April 8, 2006.

[37] “Law for the Mixed-Blood?” Korea Herald,April 11, 2006.

[38] Cited in Lee, “Left Behind.” Theseclassifications come from a governmentprepared handbook on adoptions entitled,Adoptees by Types of Disability: Domesticallyand Abroad.

[39] Despite familiarity with Korean languageand culture, ethnic Koreans from China oftenfind it hard to thoroughly assimilate intoKorean society. Freeman, for example, pointsout that Joseonjok women are “[r]eadilyidentified by their style of dress, their patterns

of speech and pronunciation, and theirunfamiliarity with Korean linguistic andbehavioral codes of politeness. [Joseonjok] arefor the most part unable to ‘pass’ as SouthKoreans.” Freeman, “Marrying Up andMarrying Down,” p. 95.

[40] All figures cited in Department ofImmigration and Multicultural and IndigenousAffairs (DIMIA), Report of the Review ofSettlement Services for Migrants andHumani tar ian Entrants (Canberra :Commonwealth Publishing Service, 2003), pp.23-25.

[41] Larry Rivera, “Australian Population: TheF a c e o f a N a t i o n , ” a v a i l a b l e h e r e(http://goaustralia.about.com/cs/people/a/austpopulation.htm).

[42] The Cronulla riot involved a violent clashbetween white Australian “surfies” and “Arab”youth from the Western suburbs of Sydney. Tomany in Australia, the riot was understood as abacklash against Australia’s turn towardmulticulturalism, as an effort to protectAustralia’s national identity by drawing limitsaround multiculturalism. For a fullerdiscussion, see Andrew Lattas, “’They AlwaysSeem to be Angry’” The Cronulla Riot and theCivlilising Pleasures of the Sun,” AustralianJournal of Anthropology, v. 18, no. 2 (December2007), pp. 300-319.

[43] For the most part, these traits have beenconfirmed through empirical research. In anational survey in Australia, for example, fouracademic researchers drew this conclusion:“The overall picture is one of a fluid, plural andcomplex society, with a majority of thepopulation positively accepting of the culturaldiversity that is an increasingly routine part ofAustralian life. … In practice, most Australians,from whatever background, live and breathecultural diversity …. Cultural mixing andmatching is almost universal. There is noevidence of ‘ethnic ghettos.’” Ien Ang, Jeffrey

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E. Brand, Greg Noble and Derek Wilding,“Living Diversity: Australia’s MulticulturalFuture,” Humanities and Social Science Papers(Bond University, 2002), p. 4. Available here(http://epublications.bond.edu.au/hss_pubs/19/).

[44] Shin, “Ethnic Pride Source of Prejudice,Discrimination.” Shin provides a much fullerand scholarly treatment of this subject in hisbook, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy,Politics and Legacy (Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press, 2006).

[45] Although passed in 1901, the ImmigrationRestrictions Act more or less codified existingpractices that had been going on for severaldecades.

[46] James Jupp, “From ‘White Australia’ to‘Part of Asia’: Recent Shifts in AustralianImmigration Policy Toward the Region,”International Migration Review, v. 29, n. 1(Spring 1995), p. 208.

[47] James Jupp, From White Australia toWoomera: The Story of Australian Immigration(Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 9.

[48] Jupp, From White Australia, p. 3.

[49] Anthony Moran, “White Australia, SettlerNationalism and Aboriginal Assimilation,”Australian Journal of Politics and History, v. 51,no. 2 (2005), p. 172.

[50] One scholar argues that it was not justcultural genocide, but simply genocide. SeePaul R. Bartrop, “The Holocaust, theAbor ig ines , and the Bureaucracy ofDestruction: An Australian Dimension ofGenocide,” Journal of Genocide Research, v. 3,no. 1 (2001), pp. 75-87. Similarities anddifferences to Japanese colonial policies inKorea are striking. Like the Australians, Japansought to assimilate Koreans in numerous waysincluding banning the Korean language in the

schools and enforcing Japanese names. Foranalogies to the practice of breaking upfamilies of aboriginal Australians, however, it isbetter to turn to US practices with respect toIndian families in the first half of the twentiethcentury.

[51] Increasing prosperity and lowerunemployment in post-war Britain alsostemmed the flow of Anglo immigration toAustralia.

[52 ] S tephen Cas t l e s , “Aus t ra l i anMulticulturalism: Social Policy and Identity in aChanging Society,” in Gary Freeman and JamesJupp, eds., Nations of Immigrants: Australia,the United States and International Migration(Oxford and New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1993), p. 185.

[53] As Jupp notes, “ … despite the growth ofAsian studies and the current popularity ofJapanese as a school subject, the severancefrom Britain has not involved a massive shift incultural orientation.” Jupp, “From ‘WhiteAustralia’ to ‘Part of Asia,’” P. 211.

[54] Robert J. Hawke, "Australia's Security InAsia"; cited in Denis McCormack, “Immigrationand Multiculturalism,” in Your Rights '94,Australian Civil Liberties Union (Carlton,Australia: ACLU, 1994), p. 10.

[55] Perry Nolan, “Ability the Only Criterionthat Matters in Migration,” The AustralianFinancial Review, September 5, 1988.

[56] The text of the Act is available here(http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/rda1975202/).

[57] Smolicz, “Globalization and CulturalDynamics in a Multiethnic State,” p. 32.

[58] The full-text of the speech is available here(http://www.pm.gov.au/media/Speech/2008/speech_0073.cfm).

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[59] A year after the speech, for example,Michael Mansell (director of the TasmanianAboriginal Center) argued that Rudd washiding behind his largely symbolic apology toavoid the hard work of improving Aboriginalliving standards, which are among the lowest inthe world. As Mansell put it, “Aboriginalpeople, and especially members of the stolengenerations, are probably worse off now thanwhen Kevin Rudd made the apology a yearago.” Even more, Mansell asserted: "There isno land rights for the dispossessed, nocompensation for the stolen generations, thehealth standards are not improving and theAboriginal imprisonment rate continues toclimb. The apology has provided the Ruddgovernment with a political shield againstcriticism of its failures in Aboriginal affairs."Cited in “Rudd Under Fire a Year AfterApology to Aborigines,” available here(http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5je6sE0UgKIcqkNSJf_0EAvpBXuIQ).

[60] The focus in this section is on non-Aboriginal communities in Australia. This islargely because government policies toward theAboriginal communities and other ethniccommunities have proceeded along differenttracks. Until recently, the basic policies towardAboriginal communities were premised ondeliberately encouraging separate traditionalAboriginal communities. These policies havenot prevented integration (for example, 70percent of Aborigines are married to non-indigenous spouses, live in urban areas, andprofess Christianity), but they have helped tocreate remote Aboriginal communities thatsuffer from poverty and other social problems.Peter Howson, “Aboriginal Policy,” MelbourneAge, April 20, 2004.

[61] DIMIA, Report of the Review of SettlementServices, p. 27.

[62] DIMIA, Report of the Review of Settlement

Services, p. 27.[63] DIMIA, Report of the Review of SettlementServices, p. 28.

[64] The official title of the Galbally Report isthe Report of the Review Post-Arrival Programsand Services to Migrants, which was preparedb a 4-person committee and chaired by FrankGalbally. For a brief discussion of the report,see Leslie F. Claydon, “Australia’s Settlers” TheGalbally Report,” International MigrationReview, v. 15, no. 1/2 (Spring-Summer 1981),pp. 109-112.

[65] Malcolm Fraser, “Inaugural Address onMult icul tura l ism to the Inst i tute ofMulticultural Affairs,” The Malcolm FraserCollection at the University of Melbourne,November 30 , 1981. Ava i lab le here(http://www.unimelb.edu.au/malcolmfraser/speeches/nonparliamentary/multiculturalism.html).

[66] Fraser , “ Inaugura l Address onMulticulturalism.”

[67] Smolicz, “Globalization and CulturalDynamics in a Multiethnic State,” p. 32.

[68] Smolicz, “Globalization and CulturalDynamics in a Multiethnic State,” p. 32.

[69] See, for example, “Racing from theBottom in South Korea? The Nexus betweenCivil Society and Transnational Migrants inSouth Korea,” Asian Survey vol. 43, no. 3(2003), pp. 423-442; and “Democracy, PoliticalActivism and the Expansion of Rights forInternational Migrant Workers in South Koreaand Japan: A Comparative Perspective,” IRIReview, vol. 11 (Spring 2006), pp. 156-204.

[70] For a discussion of this issue, see my 2002article, “The Changing Face of South Korea,” inThe Korea Society Quarterly (Fall/Summer).A v a i l a b l e h e r e(http://english.seoul.go.kr/today/infocus/column/1235150_5097.php).

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