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WHITE PAPER PROPOSAL The Interrogation-Torture (I-T) Matrix A Guide to Determining Appropriate Usage of Interrogation and

Torture Techniques

Team Members:

Adeel Iqbal Trevor Nguyen Alexander Randolph aiqbal@berkeley.edu ttnguyen@berkeley.edu alexradolph@gmail.com

UC Berkeley UC Berkeley UC Berkeley

CSEP 590/Public Policy 190P 008 Introduction to Homeland Security

Professor Stephen Maurer Goldman School of Public Policy University of California, Berkeley

December 7, 2005

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WHITE PAPER PROPOSAL The “Interrogation-Torture (I-T) Matrix”

A Guide to Determining Appropriate Usage of Interrogation and Torture Techniques

I. Introduction

Efficient and effective interrogation practices are crucial for the maintenance of a secure

state, especially when the state faces a terrorist threat. The United States government carries the

burden of ensuring the security of its citizenry, which translates into the burden of flawless

intelligence. Authorities must use all resources at their fingertips to compile intelligence

information, and they must be very careful with potential sources once detained. The government

can ensure that highly effective interrogation practices are employed by creating a system for

comprehending the severity of a threat and the level of cooperation of a detainee. In this analysis,

we propose such a system: a comprehensive matrix which predicts all of the possible scenarios

and subjects that any governmental agency may encounter as a participant in the United State’s

coordinated effort to protect national security.

Understanding this matrix is best done through example; we, thus, illustrate two different

scenarios which serve as models for the matrix. The first describes a very local threat, which has

a very limited impact from a global, or even statewide, perspective. The second describes an

international threat, spanning borders and peoples, which carries a major potential for damage.

This first threat is the simple household burglary. An individual can easily enter a

residential home or small business and vandalize the property, steal various items including cash

and assets, as well as instill fear in the hearts and minds of the residing individuals or property

owners, and the surrounding community. A common burglar’s damage, from a financial

standpoint, can be in the low millions, depending on the setting and the extent of damage. If we

limit the burglar scenario to an average middle-class family home in the San Francisco Bay Area,

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we can estimate the value of theft in the thousands to the ten thousands. Most American families

do not keep significant chunks of cash handy; thus, many thefts are of goods and assets such as

television sets, computers, cameras and jewelry. Damage to the home can be in the tens and

hundreds of thousands: This can include the cleaning and repair of sink clogging and water

overflows, carpet spills, broken walls and glass, and tampered doors and knobs. Arson can

significantly raise the costs. Middle-class property in the area limit we defined is in the $600,000

range (Zito C-1) – a large sum to lose. Three and four-alarm fires can result in a significant loss

for an individual family.

Impact is not only tangible, however. Even if nothing is taken, the mere fact that an

individual entered the family home will put a touch of fear in the hearts and minds of the

residents and their neighbors. It will make them question their surroundings non-stop and put

them in a mode of alarm. It would not be abnormal for each of the residents to begin to check

three or four times if their doors are locked at night. Residents may feel compelled to install a

security system as well, for which costs range in at least the hundreds.

Local news coverage will introduce a whole other aspect of terror. Spotlight will make

the residents even more cautious. Neighbors, after noticing the impact on their fellow’s home,

may opt to install security systems as well. Depending on the extent of damage, again, people

residing in the district, city or region of the incident may become extra cautious. Police and

authorities in the region may have to increase surveillance in order to appease their constituency,

or simply announce that an investigation is being conducted. Overall, the security policies of the

executive branch will not change, however. In a matter of weeks, life for the neighborhood will

be back to normal, for the most part. The family may experience trauma for a longer period.

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This scenario, which includes possible damages above $1 million, fits into the category

of low threat. The second scenario, which has global impacts, fits into the high-intensity category.

This is an attack similar in nature to those of September 11, 2001. Estimated damages for such

an attack would be in the billions. The psychological and social impacts, although quantitatively

incalculable, would be extremely significant, high-strung, and long-term.

Immediate impacts of four airliners crashing into prime property in two of the financial

city centers of the country and world range in the billions. Long-term impacts are in the hundreds

of billions. According to a University of Colorado study of the impact of September 11, in New

York City alone, 30 million square feet of office space was damaged, 12 million of which was

Class A (Rubin). A subway station, five phone-switching stations, two electrical substations,

300,000 phone lines and 33 miles of cable were destroyed. These basic infrastructure repairs cost

close to $8 billion dollars. Telecommunication and computer equipment losses were between $2

billion and $5 billion, and property loses were estimated at $34 billion. Clean-up of debris and

policing of the surrounding areas was upwards of $14 billion (Rubin).

The World Trade Center housed more than 430 companies from over 28 countries. An

estimated 50,000 people worked at the complex and another 140,000 visited daily. More than

4,000 of these individuals are unaccounted for. This loss of human capital had a major financial

and personal impact. Close to 200,000 jobs relocated from New York City after the attacks

(Looney).

The implied projected cumulative loss in national income through the end of 2003

amounted to 5 percentage points of annual GDP, or half a trillion dollars, according to Looney.

The insurance industry lost between $30 billion and $58 billion. The airline industry – aside from

the immediate loss of four jets and the associated insurance claims from families of the deceased

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– lost around 20 percent of its relative value measured one year after the attacks. Tourism,

shipping, etc. all were impacted, especially due to heightened security measures which slowed

productivity (Looney).

The government also proposed some $50 billion in national defense spending in 2003, as

well as close to $40 billion for homeland security – a 100 percent increase from 2001. The

increase may impact other government services. In the long term, operating and production costs

will continue to shoot up due to security increases, longer wait times and higher insurance

premiums. Inventories may go up due to less reliable transportation systems (Looney).

Somewhat related to security spending will be the psychological and social impacts

around the nation and world. Aside from a general feeling of insecurity, citizens of the United

States after the September 11 attacks, for example, had increased cases of post-traumatic stress

disorder, an upsurge in asthma attacks among asthmatics and a rise in usage of cigarettes, alcohol

and marijuana in the two months following the attacks. Others had a fear of violence and hate

crimes being committed against them. Many worried about the potential for war (American

Psychological Association).

Media reports only exacerbated the situation. Graphic images, reports and commentary

kept the public glued and extremely concerned. The impact of a follow-up war pushed the global

fear factor higher as multiple nations joined the preliminary effort. Individual troops and their

families would have to deal with the crisis and loss potential. The United States had an image to

maintain in the international community, and would have to do some damage control in the years

after the attacks. This would also add costs. Overall, the loss of time – spent on security systems,

policy paperwork, counseling, etc. – would be detrimental, albeit necessary, to all organizations.

There is no doubt an impact from a high-threat level attack would be significant.

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The question this analysis attempts to address is how authorities should interrogate the

perpetrators of either act of terror once they are detained. What sorts of questions should be

asked? Should the treatment and methods used be different depending on the scenario? This is

where the matrix enters.

The first part of this white paper compares, contrasts and reviews current practices of

interrogation and torture and analyzes interrogators’ and their subjects’ psychological functions.

In the latter part we construct and present the “Interrogation-Torture (I-T) Matrix.” Finally we

will present justification for the I-T Matrix, and predict implications of its employment.

II. Background

A. The Dilemma of Terrorism:

Definition:

Use of the matrix comes in response to the threat of terrorism. But in order to understand

this threat, we must understand what terrorism is. Although the debate over the definition of

terrorism has spanned more than seven decades, there have been active efforts in recent years to

classify terrorism with a set terminology. This effort has not been as decisive as in the case of

murder or rape. The UN, for example, was unable to reach consensus on an internationally

accepted definition of the term at its last convention this fall. The challenge has been in

correlating the terrorist act with a criminal act, which aims to defy a system rather than change or

improve it (Heymann 7).

Definitions of past councils and international leaders have mentioned violence directed at

specified bodies. The 1937 League of Nations Convention defined terrorism as “all criminal acts

directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of

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particular persons or a group of persons or the general public” (“Definitions”). AP Schmid

proposed to the UN Crime Branch in 1992 that an act of terror should be briefly defined as the

peace-time equivalent of a war crime (“Definitions”). And the British “Prevention of Terrorism

Act” of 1974 described terrorism as “the use of violence for political ends, [which] includes any

use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear”

(Heymann 3).

The U.S. federal definitions are somewhat more focused, as they clearly separate

traditional warfare and state-to-state warfare from acts of terrorism, even though terrorism may

have political inspirations or implications. The U.S. State Department classifies “any violence

perpetrated for political reasons by subnational groups or secret state agents, often directed at

noncombatant targets, and usually intended to influence an audience” as terrorism (Heymann 3).

U.S. federal statutes use the following description: “Any activity that involves criminal violence

that ‘appears to be intended i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; ii) to influence the

policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or iii) to affect the conduct of a government

by assassination or kidnapping’” (Heymann 3).

The Changing Nature of Terrorism:

Terrorism is not a new concept; it is an act of violence that has been practiced for

centuries. The difference now is in the method of its employment: Today’s terrorists aim to

inflict mass casualties and are less dependent on their home states. There is not one home base

for terrorists as they have developed intricate and gigantic multi-national networks based off

religious and ideological doctrines (National Commission on Terrorism). Furthermore, today’s

terrorists, as compared to those of earlier decades, are waging a war against an ideology instead

of having a clear political objective. These factors make terrorist attacks more difficult to detect

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and prevent, according to the National Commission. Moreover, the technology terrorists use

today is extremely advanced, and their planning systems involve great detail (Nacht). Much of

their acts sprout from one key point: a dislike of western ideals, especially those of the United

States (National Commission on Terrorism). Today, their acts can impact Americans on U.S. soil,

whereas decades ago, U.S. citizens were only vulnerable off their homeland.

This changing nature of terrorism makes evident the need for the United States to develop

a new and much more effective means of prevention. Because it is a great challenge to fight

terrorism today, we have more of a duty to safeguard ourselves. Specialized interrogation

practices are crucial for the search and exposure of terrorist plots and actors. Simple criminal

interrogation practices are not sufficient.

Interrogation

Interrogation, however, must not be confused with torture. Interrogation aims to find

answers to unanswered questions. It is a heightened form of interviewing technique, which may

include non-conventional questioning methods. It can include torture, although the two are not

synonymous. Torture, according to the UN Convention Against Torture, “means any act by

which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person

for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing

him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or

intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any

kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or

acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include

pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.” But torture can

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be so narrowly defined that certain methods of interrogation, although painful, are not actually

considered torture by law (Harbury 21).

According to Christina Filarowski-Sheaks, special assistant in the Office of the Under

Secretary of Defense for Policy, torture is limited to actions which, if committed in the extreme,

would result in death. Thus, various practices that non-governmental bodies consider torture, in

essence, are not classified as torture, and are legal means of interrogation, she said. These can

include water boarding, mild physical contact and the removal of clothing.

Torture is not something we can sanction officially, as it is prohibited by international

law. In his article “The International Law of Torture: From Universal Proscription to Effective

Application and Enforcement”, published in the Harvard Human Rights Journal, Winston Nagan

states “there is a universal consensus in the international community that torture and other forms

of cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment cannot be reconciled with a global

order fundamentally committed to basic respect and human dignity”. He continues that the very

idea of “torture attacks the essential physical and psychological integrity of a human being”.

Nagan then concludes that “it is, therefore, not surprising that torture is prohibited by

international, regional, and national law”1 (p. 3).

Although torture is off limits, we can sanction certain mentally and physically taxing

practices not classified as torture. The best way to avoid this terminology dilemma is to use an

identification spectrum created by the Department of Defense. The spectrum, which ranges from

direct questioning to death, shows what is and what is not sanctioned by law. We are legally

allowed to use direct questioning and derogatory terminology, we can attack one’s personal

dignity and we can degrade the subject with our statements and actions, according to Filarowski- 1 Nagan, Winston P., and Lucie Atkins. The International Law of Torture: From Universal Proscription to Effective Application and Enforcement. Spec. issue of Harvard Human Rights Journal 14 (Spring 2001). 14 Nov. 2005 <http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/iss14/nagan/shtml>.

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Sheaks. What we cannot do is use the methods in Filarowski-Sheak’s definition of torture, and

no doubt, kill a subject.

B. The Balance of National Security and Human Rights

The terrorist attacks of September 11 introduced a new era in international relations. The

need to combat terrorism became a priority for a number of countries’ national security goals.

Being the only remaining super power, American’s received a wake-up call and had to realize

that a new type of war had finally reached the front yard, which seemed so unreachable just days

before. Americans enjoyed the protection of bordering friendly nations to the north and south

and being protected by two big oceans to the west and east. Unlike conventional warfare,

terrorism does not care about proximity. Organizations like al Qaeda have no need to mobilize

massive armies; the attacks showed that it only takes eleven men to strike a devastating blow to

our nation’s morale and economy.

Only nine days after September 11, Bush addressed a joint session of congress and

declared to the American people that the “war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end

there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and

defeated”2. This new war on terror signified a new era in American foreign policy and with this

new threat came new challenges. It was without a doubt that the Bush Administration believed

that in order to fight terrorism any means were necessary and acceptable to reach that goal. With

a lack of on site intelligence resources and no current informants from inside the terrorist

network, gaining knowledge from captured suspected terrorists during interrogation seemed to be

the only alternative to prevent future attacks from happening. Torture is one technique used

during interrogation to gain that information. In this section of the paper we will analyze the

2 Bush, George W. "President Declares 'Freedom at War with Fear'." United States Capitol, Washington DC. 20 Sept. 2001. Office of the Press Secretary 20 Sept. 2001. 17 Nov. 2005 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/ 09/20010920-8.html>.

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different perspectives on torture and discuss the challenge of obtaining vital information about

future attacks during interrogation without violating human rights.

Different Perspectives on Torture

Israel and the Lautenberg Commission – No other nation on the globe understands the

daily threat of modern day terrorism more than Israel. Since its founding day enemies surround

Israel and nations that do not think it should exist in the first place. With the increasing and

persistent threat of suicide bombings and terrorist attacks the Israeli government wanted to find

out whether or not the violent interrogation techniques of the General Security Service (GSSS)

were at all constitutional. In 1984, the government commissioned a task force, headed by former

President of the Supreme Court, Moshe Landau, to look into this matter. “The Landau

Commission concluded that Israeli’s codified version of the necessity defense authorizes in

advance the use of force in interrogation if the interrogator reasonably believes that the use of

force is necessary to get information that would prevent the greater loss of innocent lives.”3 For

over ten years this interpretation of local law guided the justification and foundation for torture

in Israel.4

The Israeli Supreme Court challenged this interpretation of the law in 1999. The court

rejected the idea that torture may be used even when a suspect is perceived to know the location

of a bomb, information about a possible attack, or the names of the leaders in the terrorist

organization. In the final ruling the court argued that:

Terrorist act and the general disruption of the order are the GSS means of choice…They

carry out terrorist attacks in which scores are murdered in public arenas, public

3 Silker, Elizabeth S. Terrorists, Interrogation, and Torture: Where Do We Draw the Line. Diss. Notre Dame Law School, 2005. 4 Israel is a party and signee to the UN Treaty on Torture.

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transportation, city squares and centers, theaters and coffee shops….They act out of

cruelty and without mercy.

The court continued:

One the one hand, it is in our duty to ensure that human dignity be protected; that it is

not harmed at the hands of those who abuse it, and to do all that we can to restrain police

investigators from fulfilling the object of their interrogation through prohibited and

criminal means; on the other hand, it is also our duty to fight the increasingly growing

crime rate which destroys the positive aspects of our country, and to prevent the

disruption of public peace to the caprices of violent criminals that were beaten by police

investigators.

It is know throughout the world that Israel has not completely stopped torture during

interrogation, even after this major court decision. We can see that suicide bombings and terrorist

attacks have not stopped. On the contrary, they have increased in the last couple of years.

State Interest vs. Human Rights: Getting Information without Violating Human Rights

The CIA Handbook on “Human Resource Exploitations” addresses the limits on

interrogation right from the get go. The handbook begins with a “prohibition against use of

force” and instructs the interrogator to abstain from using force as an interrogation technique.

The handbook states that “the use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to

unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind as an aid to interrogation is prohibited by law,

both international and domestic: it is neither authorized nor condoned” (p. 5). Furthermore, the

prohibition highlights that the use of force during an interrogation “yields unreliable results, may

damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say what he thinks the

interrogator wants to hear” (p.5). On the other hand, the handbook also states that psychological

tricks, verbal trickery, or other nonviolent and non-coercive ruses employed by the interrogator

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in the successful interrogation of uncooperative subjects should not be confused with the

prohibited use of force.

Most of the experts on interrogation techniques agree that information obtained from a

subject under torture is not reliable. It is in the state’s interest to gather reliable information and

intelligence through questioning a subject5. The challenge for both the state and the interrogator

is to obtain that information without violating human rights and/or international law. The Bush

Administration is dealing with this very dilemma in the current global war on terror.

Moreover, the United States is a party to the U.N. Treaty on Torture and has always been

an international champion of human rights advocacy around the globe. Furthermore, the Bush

Administration accepts and supports the international ban of torture. September 11 introduced a

new challenge to American National Security. Having the biggest and most powerful military on

the globe that is second to none was no longer enough to keep our country safe. A new approach

was needed. With the intelligence budget at an all time low, which was cut after the end of the

Cold War, and no informers inside these terrorist networks the administration looked to new

methods to gain information that could prevent another devastating terrorist attack.

Understanding how the international law looked upon torture, the administration wanted

to know the limitations of torture techniques. In their book the Torture Papers: The Road to Abu

Ghraib, Karen Greenberg and Joshua Dratel state that “the Bush Administration, concerned

about the legality of harsh interrogation techniques, understood the desirability of establishing a

legally viable argument to justify such procedures”6 (p.1). This discussion and concern lead to

the now infamous exchange of memos between the White House and the Justice Department,

also know as “the Torture Papers”. 5 A subject may be prisoners of war, defectors, refugees, illegal immigrants, terrorists, traditional criminals, or spies 6 The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib. Ed. Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

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It was clear that the administration saw torture as a viable interrogation method. The

question was over how far they could go without violating international law. “The premises of

the Bush Administration after September 11, 2001, was that in the end, fighting terrorism,

justified whatever means were chosen. It sought repeatedly to eliminate legal constraints on the

means it adopted”.7 The memos dealt with two questions: first, what are the limitations on

interrogation techniques and where does international law come in. Second, what is the exact

status of the prisoners under U.S. captivity and what protections if any do they enjoy as a result.

More importantly, the administration needed to know if members of al Qaeda or any terrorist

were protected under the Geneva Conventions and/or international law. One of the biggest

contributors to the Torture Papers is John Yoo, a professor at UC Berkeley’s Boalt Hall School

of Law. In his research paper “The Status of Terrorists”, he tries to defend the administration’s

course of actions and argues that the members of al Qaeda are not legally entitled to the status of

prisoners of war under international law and are instead illegal combatants. He writes: “al Qaeda is

not a nation-state, and as such cannot be a state party to the Geneva Conventions. Even if al Qaeda

were capable of becoming a party to the treaties, it has not done so, nor has it ever declared an

intention to accept their terms”. Yoo then concludes, “al Qaeda members cannot claim the benefits

of a treaty to which their organization is not a party” 8 (p. 9).

Furthermore, Yoo discusses the fact that terrorists and al Qaeda do not follow the simple rules

of law the international community has established. International law and specifically the third

Geneva Convention extend prisoner of war protections to:

Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of

organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or

outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias

7 Id. p. 12. 8 Yoo, John C, and James C. Ho. "The Status of Terrorists." Research Paper, 2003. UC Berkeley Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series. UC Berkeley School of Law. 12 Nov. 2005 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=438123>.

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or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following

conditions:

(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;

(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;

(c) That of carrying arms openly;

(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.9

The foundation the Bush administration builds its case on for legitimizing the use of torture

relies on the very fact that al Qaeda was not part of the treaty, is not a nation state that follows the

very simple rules of war, and can consequently not expect to enjoy the benefits and protection the

treaty gives.

Interestingly, the CIA Handbook educates their employees that, “the legality of detaining

and questioning a subject, and of the methods employed, is determined by the laws of the

country in which it is done” (p. 14). Moreover, it is the responsibility of the interrogator to know

and understand the local laws to avoid any later embarrassment to the agency, administration,

and country and to avoid and legal actions against any of them.

C. Psychological Impacts

Much of the recent American and international communities’ perceptions of interrogation

and torture are based on media and journalistic reports of abuse, torture and human rights

violations like those occurring at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. However, the shocking images

and gripping tales of vile acts are the mere end results of interrogation and torture. They do little

in capturing the deeper psychological and social aspects of such experiences from both the

interrogators and subjects’ perspectives. In this section, we will examine the psychology of

interrogation and torture and experience of such acts as an interrogator and subject. Only from

examining and experiencing the very act of interrogation and torture do we hope to define the

9 Id, at p. 11.

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limits of interrogation and torture and to determine better policy development and

implementation.

Understanding the Interrogator

Interrogator profile – Regardless of the interrogators’ (a.k.a. “questioners”) creed and

background experiences, the main objective of interrogation is to obtain relevant facts and

information that the agency feels the subjects possess, thus the use of highly trained and qualified

interrogators is crucial for the efficient exploitation of subjects who are potential sources of

important intelligence information. The United States’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual (1983) and the Army’s Field Training Manual

FM 32-45 both profile an interrogator’s personality as possessing a suitable personality

characteristic that will enable him to gain cooperation of the source. An interrogator should have

high motivation to achieve, alertness in constantly monitoring the subjects’ attitudes and gestures,

and patience and tactfulness that will create a favorable atmosphere between him and the subject.

Other characteristics include credibility, objectivity, self-control, adaptability, perseverance and

professional appearance and demeanor. These personal qualities should be ideally inherent, but

they can also be cultivated with training and practice.

Mechanisms and motivations – Most interestingly, both manuals emphasize the

importance of the interrogators’ motivation, as being critically related to his success because

being an interrogator may often be difficult and gruesome work requiring solid motivation and

mental stability to persevere and endure through challenging cases. In certain cases where the

interrogation requires intensified techniques inflicting physical and mental discomfort onto the

subjects, the interrogator may seek different extrinsic and intrinsic factors to motivate and justify

their actions.

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On one hand, an interrogator may find extrinsic, external factors such as obedience to

authority and social roles compliance to justify their injurious actions. Psychologist Stanley

Milgram (1963) has shown that obedience to authority is often cited as a motivation to inflict

pain on fellow human beings. His famous experiment is a great example of how participants

willingly administered electric shocks to fellow participants (who were confederates of the

study) using a switch machine when an authority figure (an experimenter) was present dictating

specific orders to continue administering shocks. Participants obeyed hesitantly at first but later

justified their injurious actions by blaming authority, and they will less likely engage in self-

condemnation reactions because they do not perceive themselves as the main cause of their

injurious actions. Milgram’s results have been used to explain the Nazi’s horrific treatment of

prisoners in World War II, how uniform officers and interrogators commit atrocious acts by

blaming the orders dictated by their superiors.

In addition, psychologists have shown that complying with social roles is often cited as

motivation to inflict pain on fellow human beings. Psychologists Haney and Zimbardo’s (1973,

1998) famous Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE) is yet another great example of participants

closely assumed their roles and used such roles to abuse power and inflict pain on others of

lesser roles. Specifically, a group of psychologically healthy college students were assigned

prisoner and guard roles in a six-day experiment in a prison-like experiment. The “guard”

students internalized their roles, mistreated their peers by devising sadistic ways to harass and

degrade prisoners, and became indifferent to the obvious sufferings their actions caused.

Meanwhile, the “prisoner” students also internalized their roles, suffered psychological trauma

and breakdowns, and begged to be released from the experiment. Haney and Zimbardo explain

the negative, anti-social behaviors as the result of an intrinsically pathological situation and roles

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that distort and re-channel the behavior of normal people into deviant injurious actions. They

have also cited their prison experiment to explain the behaviors of interrogators and aberrant

soldiers who internalize their roles and demean captives, like the recent events at Abu Ghraib.

On the other hand, interrogators find intrinsic, internal reasons such as disengagement

techniques and conformity to justify their injurious actions. Psychologists Osofky, Bandura and

Zimbardo (2005) explain three sets of disengagement mechanisms interrogators may use. In the

first set, interrogators convert their injurious actions into righteous actions by using: 1) moral

justification – their actions fulfill a moral purpose; 2) euphemistic language – euphemisms

minimize severity of dreaded action; and 3) exonerative comparison – compare actions to worst

inhumanities. In the second set, interrogators minimize their role by diffusing their

responsibility for the injurious actions. They will divide labor, make group decisions and engage

in collective action in order to avoid stigmatization and full responsibility for their actions. In

the last set, interrogators demean their subjects by attributing demonic and bestial qualities to

them. They will blame their subjects’ attributed inferior qualities as warranting injurious actions.

Furthermore, psychologist Solomon Asch (1951) has demonstrated our tendency to

perceive or report what the great majority wants to see or hear. His Line Judgment Task

experiment places the participant on the spot in choosing which of the three choices of simple

black lines is exactly the same length as the standard fourth line. Five other participants (who

were confederates of the study) chose the wrong choice of line even though another choice is

obviously correct (i.e. standard fourth line is five inches and the correct answer is five inches,

however all five confederates chose the eight-inch line as the correct answer). Being placed on

the spot and experiencing great pressures to conform to the other confederates, the participant

anguishes over choosing the obviously correct answer but gives into the majority of the group

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and chooses the wrong answer. Asch’s results have been used to explain how individuals forgo

their personal principle and often times the correct moral standards in order to conform to the

majority of the group because the significant social pressure and discomfort. Likewise,

interrogators like any other individual may ignore their moral standards and commit injurious

acts due to the majority’s pressure.

In summary, an interrogator often uses numerous psychological mechanisms to balance

his or her mind, to find a deeper motivation to interrogate and inflict torture if necessary, and to

keep from agonizing and struggling internally over subjecting fellow human beings to physical

abuse. It is important to be aware of such psychological mechanisms and motivations because it

is the first step in controlling the interrogator. When the government’s agencies and policy

makers become aware and understand how their interrogators function mentally, it is then

possible to design interrogation and torture policies and procedures that will limit or altogether

avoid the interrogator committing inappropriately atrocious conducts. In particular, when the

CIA becomes aware that one of its interrogators is completely subservient to authorities without

a strain of moral reasoning and objection, constantly interrogates in group structures with

diffused responsibilities, and internalizes his interrogation role to use it for abuse, then it is only

appropriate to take preventive measures eliminating that interrogator from interrogating and

violating the subjects. Overall, understanding the interrogators’ psychological mechanisms is

only half the story. We must also understand the subjects’ psychological mechanisms.

Understanding the Subjects

Identity – The main experience of interrogation and torture subjects is the breaking down

of identity because one of the key aims of interrogation and torture is to undermine a person’s

sense of self, agency and control (Silove, 1999). In particular, interrogation and torture attempt to

20

psychologically break down the subjects’ cohesive identity when an interrogator uses non-

coercive and coercive techniques to deprive the victim of his positive self concepts, image and

esteem (Lavik, 1994). The lack of identity is intensified when the interrogator deprives the

subjects of his attachment to others who can confirm him as a person while enforcing anonymity

through isolation. Regardless of the severity of the interrogation and torture techniques, each

strips the subject of his socializations and humanity in order to reveal the deeply guarded secrets.

The Ordeal – Throughout their ordeals, subjects experience the dual impacts of

interrogation and torture as physical actions are dually used to break down the subjects’

mentality. Subjects experience numerous psychological consequences of organized violence, all

of which are connected and resultant of each other (Sveaass, ed Lavik, 1994). Foremost, they

experience powerlessness and they privatize their pains by taking the blame for their sufferings

in which they are the solely private individual to experience and understand their sufferings.

Their capture and confinement immediately takes control out of their hands and gives it to the

interrogators. They assume the blame and guilt as a way to regain control, and taking blame

becomes the only solution in an impossible and uncontrollable situation. The privatization of

suffering leads to depression and learned helplessness. Helplessness is the psychological state

that occurs when events seem uncontrollable and unpredictable. The motivation to respond is

significantly reduced. While feeling helpless, subjects will also feel distrust and lack of

confidence. The hatred towards the interrogators pervades all interactions and prevents building

trust. Also, the anonymity destroys social groups and support networks while new ones are

difficult to develop under such conditions of fear. They also deny and conceal emotions in fear.

And in their helplessness and compounded lack of social interactions, subjects feel immense

doubts and identity crisis. People begin to doubt their senses and they question their own

21

judgment, which gives way to feelings of becoming mad and incapable of making sense in the

world and of oneself. The lines between reality and fantasy become blurred. Overall,

interrogation and torture is a powerful tool in the hands of those holding power. Doubt,

confusion, anxiety and helplessness reduce initiatives and pave the way to immense

psychological distress.

The Breaking Point – Although each interrogation and torture technique is specifically

designed to induce certain dramatic results and can push the subjects’ endurance to the brink of

death, each subjects’ endurance and ability to withhold their secrets and immunity to developing

long term psychological effects varies significantly. The “breaking-point” is indeterminate

because realistically some people will talk and some will not (Amnesty, 2005). Of those who

talk, many will say anything from lies and half-truths to stop the infliction of suffering. But of

those who have refused to talk, some have died still refusing. What psychologists have been able

to determine is the coping methods subjects use to endure their discomfort and prolong their

ability to withhold secrets. As reported by Lavik (1994), the survivors have managed to

maintain the experience of attachment to confirming persons in their internal world. One

survivor described how he experienced almost telepathic contact with his family by intentionally

hallucinating while he was in his prison cell in which he spent several years. Another survivor

described how he delivered a birthday poem in Morse code through the prison wall to the

prisoner in the adjacent cell.

Additionally, psychologists have determined the vulnerability and protective factors

influencing the individuals’ response to trauma. According to Basoglu et al (2001), being female

or having a past psychiatric history appear to be risk factors for post-traumatic stress disorder

(PTSD), for example. Protective factors include: having religious faith, having a conviction to a

22

political cause and mental preparation for torture. Lastly, having social networks and family

connections appear to alleviate psychiatric symptoms, particularly depression and PTSD.

The Effects: Individual – The time will come for subjects to rediscover the world,

socialize themselves to humanity, rebuild trust and attachments and cope with their recent

sufferings, yet they will be forever scarred physically and mentally. The range of minor to major

psychological effects during the interrogation and torture may disappear after a period of time

out of captivity, but some effects are long lasting and even fatal (Hauf, ed. Lavik, 1994, Amnesty,

2005). Psychologists are still trying to measure the effects of interrogation and torture; however,

some results are certain. First, torture has long-term psychological effects leading to PTSD and

high indices of psychological disturbances (Silove, 1999; Basoglu et al, 1994). PTSD is

characterized by re-experiencing of the traumatic event in which unwanted recollections of the

incident create distressing images, nightmares or flashbacks, avoidance of reminders of the event,

and hyper arousal for at least one month in which subjects experience insomnia, irritability,

impaired cognition, hyper vigilance and increased startle reactions (Yehuda, 2002). In a

controlled study, Basoglu et al (1994) found that 33 percent of released prisoners who had been

tortured suffered from lifetime PTSD as compared to 11 percent of their non-abused counterparts.

Levels of anxiety and depression were higher in torture survivors but only in the moderate range.

Furthermore, the effects of interrogation and torture are often cumulative. Isolation,

sensory deprivation and long-term sleep deprivation has been shown to cause serious and long

lasting psychological damage (Amnesty, 2005). Prolonged isolation can be especially

devastating, especially causing an inability to think or concentrate, creating disorientation,

hallucinations, and depression. Sensory deprivation and long-term sleep deprivation lead to

23

cognitive impairment, including attention deficits, impaired memory, reasoning and verbal

communication, while depriving a person of 15 minutes would be nothing more than annoying.

The Effects: Social and Economic – Besides individual psychological effects, subjects

also suffer social and economic effects (Basoglu et al., 2001). Social, marital and family

problems occur because of the inability to feel intimacy and to reestablish trust. Psychological

problems may also arise in children, as they become indirect victims witnessing the torture of

their parents, experiencing the absence of either one or both parents, or enduring parents’

posttraumatic psychological disorders. Children may experience anxiety, depression, aggression

and many other physical and mental symptoms. Economically, prolonged imprisonment and its

stigma lead to the loss of social or occupational status and educational opportunities, which leads

to greater social difficulties. PTSD and other psychological problems are significantly socially

inhibiting and undermine chances of finding employment. Memory and concentration

challenges may impair and prevent learning new skills for new jobs and performance.

Policy Implementation – Having examined and considered both the subjective

experiences and psychological mechanisms of the interrogators and subjects, we are better

enabled in developing informed interrogation and torture policies and practices. Such considerate

policies and practices minimize the interrogators’ likelihood of torturing and unnecessarily

harming subjects by prescribing the appropriate techniques to subjects who fit the right

classification. They also minimize subjects from inappropriate physical techniques inflicting

undue harm and psychological effects. For example, an interrogator may only apply non-

coercive techniques in extorting information from cooperative subjects even though he has

serious intentions to inflict detrimental harm to national security. That interrogator may not

apply coercive techniques because it will inflict undue harm on the subjects because the subject

24

is already cooperating. Overall, understanding the interrogators and subjects’ psychology will

enable effective policy implementation that will meet the objectives of ensuring national security

while being aware of subjects and not committing further human rights violations.

III. Interrogation-Torture (I-T) Matrix

A. The Matrix

The Interrogation-Torture (I-T) Matrix is a two-dimensional structure which determines

the interaction between level of threat and level of cooperation posed by the captured subjects.

First, the level of threat is composed of two extremes: mild threat – the threat posed by the

subject does not immediately threaten national security, but it is may still pose as a criminal act

or carry legal punishments (e.g. the burglary scenario); and serious threat – the threat posed by

the subject does immediately threaten national security (e.g. September 11 example). In between

these two extremes is a continuum of different scenarios of varying threat levels. Second, the

level of cooperation is either “Yes” or “No” obviating whether the captured subjects will

cooperate with the interrogators or not. Similarly, in between these two extremes is a continuum

of different scenarios of varying cooperation levels. (See APPENDIX I.)

In using the I-T Matrix, it is assumed that the subjects have been arrested, detained and

are currently in custody of the interrogators. The interrogators will determine the appropriate

interrogation techniques by first categorizing the subject based on the level of threat and level of

cooperation (i.e. the subject poses as a mild threat and is fully cooperating). Then, the

interrogator will use the appropriate non-coercive and coercive techniques prescribed by each of

the Quadrants (i.e. mild threat + yes cooperation = interrogation techniques in Quadrant I). The

prescribed techniques utilize psychological functioning and mechanisms of both the interrogators

25

and subjects in maintaining an appropriate interrogation session without having the interrogators

use excessive coercive techniques, violate the subjects’ right and cause undue physical harm.

Coercive techniques

According to the CIA (1983), the purpose of using coercion is to bear an external force

onto the subject and induce psychological regression in which the subject loses autonomy and

reverts to an earlier behavioral level. The subject will lose the capacity to engage in complex

activities and situations, and deal with stressful interpersonal interactions or individual

frustrations. In order to successfully apply coercive techniques, an interrogator must meet three

major principles. First, the interrogator must induce physical weakness, including prolonged

constraint or exertion, exposure to extreme temperatures, and deprivation of food or sleep.

Secondly, the subject must be helplessly dependent on the interrogator for the satisfaction of all

basic needs. Lastly, the interrogator must instill into the subject a strong fear of things that are

vague and unknown.

Regression – The purpose of coercive techniques is to induce regression, and it is the key

to breaking the subject. Interrogators may thwart attempts to relate to this new environment by

driving the subject deeper into his psyche until the subject is no longer able to conduct himself in

a mature manner. Regression techniques include persistent manipulation of time, retarding and

advancing clocks, serving meals at odd intervals, disrupting sleep patterns, disorienting day and

night, conducting unstructured interrogation sessions, asking nonsensical questions, ignoring

half-hearted attempts to cooperate and rewarding non-cooperation.

Deprivation of sensory stimuli – Enforcing solitary confinement and cutting a subject off

from external stimuli is a powerful stressor making the subject turn his awareness inward and

project his unconscious outward. Common symptoms found in subjects include perceiving

26

inanimate objects as alive, hallucinating, intensely loving any other living thing, and

experiencing delusions. Extreme deprivation induces unbearable stress and anxiety, and the

subject loses touch with reality. In addition, extreme deprivation is equivalent to torture. In

relations to the I-T Matrix, deprivation of sensory stimuli may be used in: Quadrant III because

the subject must be induced to cooperate and reveal his intents; and in Quadrant IV because

subjects with serious intents may have well guarded secrets that are detrimental to national

security. It is important to apply varying duration and lengths until the subjects of both intents

are willing to cooperate.

Threats and fear – The threat of coercion is more effective than coercion itself in

weakening and destroying resistance, while actual physical harm creates further defiance,

resentment and hostility. In using threat, the interrogator must offer time for the subject to

comply, rationalization for compliance and an alternative escape route (i.e. telling the truth). If

the subject refuses to absolutely comply, then the threat must be carried out or else further threats

will be considered a bluff and the subject will gain confidence. Furthermore, the threat of death

is useless because the subject will feel hopelessness as if all actions will lead to it.

Pain – People have approximately the same threshold at which they begin to feel pain;

however people react to pain differently depending on early conditioning to pain. Intense pain is

likely to produce false confessions because the subject will lie to avoid further punishment, yet

some subjects may enjoy pain and may be willing to withhold information. Pain is externally

applied, and it may increase the subjects’ will to resist. Pain is more effective when the pain a

subject feels is the pain he is inflicting upon himself. For example, the pain and discomfort of

being forced to maintain a rigid position for a long time originates from the subjects’

27

unwillingness to divulge information. He or she is then engaged in an internal struggle over

whether to give up or continue enduring his suffering.

Hypnosis and heightened suggestibility – The reliability of answers obtained from a

subject under the influence of hypnotism is highly doubtful because it may be distorted,

fabricated and based on the suggestions of the interrogator. However, the subject will strongly

desire to escape the stress of the situation, which then places him in a state of heightened

suggestibility. The interrogator can take advantage of this opportunity by using the “magic

room” technique where the interrogator manipulates the subject to think social and physical

conditions are similar to hypnosis. For example, the subject may be given the suggestion that the

cigarette is bitter, but in reality the cigarette is prepared to have a bitter taste. A psychologically

immature subject could be suggested that he has been hypnotized and reveal secret information.

Narcosis – Similar to the deception of the “magic room,” the subject is led believe he has

been drugged with a truth serum. This “placebo effect” may induce him to reveal relevant detail.

Non-coercive techniques

The end goal of coercive techniques and non-coercive techniques is the same. Non-

coercive techniques, however, play on the idea that the subject may believe that cooperation is in

his best interest, according to the CIA manual. The stick of power is always in the hand of the

interrogator, and this is something that cannot be forgotten. The following are possible non-

coercive techniques, which fall within the scope of the matrix.

The direct approach –Making no effort to conceal the purpose of the questioning.

Straight talk with low level sources can be effective.

Going next door – If the goal is to gather information instead of to get a confession, using

a less resistant source may be a better idea.

28

Nobody loves you –Telling the detainee that all information about his case came from

those that knew him; i.e. they betrayed him, and the interrogator is giving him the opportunity to

respond.

We know everything – Make it appear that all information about the individual is already

known and that questioning now is solely to identify whether or not the detainee is being sincere.

A fake file can be used.

Double informers – Planting two informants in one cell can allow one informant to pry

information from the detainee after explaining to the detainee that he suspects the other

“prisoner” of being an informant.

News from home – Providing carefully crafted letters to the detainee can create the

impression that his loved ones are in danger. His aid in the interrogation process may keep his

loved ones safe – or so he is made to believe.

The witness – Authorities can walk a witness by the detainee’s cell into the interrogation

room to give the impression that a statement is being taken. A stenographer can enter the

interrogation room and reemerge to type the false statement in the detainee’s vicinity, implying

that the work has been done. This may make the detainee want to give his side of the story.

Joint subjects – If two or more individuals are suspected of involvement, they should be

separated immediately. One should be used as a pawn against the other, and vice versa.

Joint questioners – Use the good cop, bad cop scenario. One questioner should aim to

alienate the detainee, while the other consoles and earns his trust.

Ivan is a dope – Tell the detainee that his organization is the one at fault and the one who

screwed him. Explain we understand where he is coming from and are here to help him.

29

Unanswerable questioning – Bombard the detainee with questions he is unable to answer

so that he feels overwhelmed. Then give him an answerable question so that he feels relieved to

have answered a question.

B. Method to evaluate the subject for intent and cooperation

In this section we will discuss the methods interrogators should use to evaluate the

subject for intent and cooperation. In the two cases the interrogator was faced with the question

of how far he can go during the interrogation: what interrogation techniques are appropriate and

which are not proportional to the threat level.

We will demonstrate how the matrix can be applied and used in our two hypothetical

scenarios. In order to evaluate the threat level a subject poses to national security we decided to

break the level of intent into two categories, “mild threat” and “extreme threat”. The first

category, a “Mild Threat” scenario, includes everything posing a no-threat to low –threat to law

enforcement. The second category, a “Serious Threat” scenario, includes everything that poses a

high to extreme threat to law enforcement and national security. We have compiled some

examples of types of crimes an interrogator may face:10

“Mild Threat” “Extreme Intent” • Theft • Speeding • Drug Possession • Domestic Violence/Physical Assault • Murder • Fraud • Other blue collar, white collar, and

traditional crimes

• Acts of domestic and international terrorism

o Anthrax attack o Plans to blow up buildings and

landmarks o Kidnapping of American

citizens • Subjects in the CIA intelligence

categories (APPENDIX II)

10 Our list is not comprehensive, but should act as a guide to what types of crimes would either pose a low or high threat level to national security

30

The level of cooperation (yes or no) is determined by the simple fact whether or not the subject is

forthcoming with their information and whether or not the interrogator feels like the subject is

answering the questions truthfully. The interrogator should always start a subject out with non-

coercive interrogation techniques in order to determine the level of cooperation (Quadrant I and

II). If the subject is unwilling to cooperate and/or stops cooperation, the interrogator always has

the option to place the subject in the third or fourth quadrant at any point during the interrogation.

Analyzing the Subjects

In the 1980’s the CIA developed psychological characteristics (APPENDIX III) that

assign the subjects into eight pre-determined profiles. These profiles try to predict a subject’s

character and how they may respond to certain interrogation techniques. These classifications

are extremely useful to prevent counter-productive interrogation methods that may lead to

unreliable information and/or making the subject uncooperative. The objective of the interrogator

should be to obtain information without having to use any coercive interrogation techniques.

Our first case can be classified as a “mild-threat” scenario. A burglar does not pose a high

threat level to national security. The interrogator should therefore place the subject in Quadrant I

of the Matrix. In order to assess the subject’s level of cooperation the interrogator should start

with the suggested non-coercive interrogation techniques. If the interrogator encounters any type

of resistance they should increase the intensity of the techniques. Once all non-coercive

techniques have been exhausted the interrogator shall move the subject into Quadrant III and

proceed with the suggested coercive interrogation techniques. This should be repeated until the

objective of obtaining the desired information has been achieved.

Our second case can be classified as an “extreme-threat” scenario. A terrorist does pose a

high risk to national security. The interrogator should therefore place the subject in Quadrant II

31

of the Matrix. Similar to the first case, the interrogator should start with the suggested non-

coercive interrogation techniques to assess the subject’s level of cooperation.11 If the interrogator

encounters any type of resistance he should increase the intensity of the techniques used on the

subject. Once all non-coercive techniques have been exhausted the interrogator shall move the

subject into Quadrant IV and proceed with the suggested coercive interrogation techniques. This

should be repeated until the objective of obtaining the desired information has been achieved.

IV. Conclusion

A. The Universality of the I-T Matrix

The matrix aims to present a system applicable to all types of threats. Everything from a

mild threat scenario, as illustrated by a simple burglary, to a high-intensity threat like the

September 11 attacks fits into the model. The system is universal. The methods employed today

can be employed tomorrow and still bring back the same end result of quality intelligence.

B. Justifying the I-T Matrix

In this paper we have discussed both the ethical and legal limitations of using coercive

interrogation techniques. The I-T Matrix should serve as a comprehensive predictor of all the

possible scenarios and subjects that any governmental agency may encounter as a participant in

the United States’ coordinated effort to protect national security. The United States is currently

engaged in a global war on terror and has any right to defend itself from future terrorist attacks.

We are not arguing to condone the use of torture nor are we condemning it, but rather

offer a policy method to minimize the practice. Government officials sometimes have to get their

hands dirty to get the job done. The interrogator’s primary goal and objective is to obtain

11 One can notice the techniques used in the “extreme-threat” category are more extensive and intense than the ones found in the “mild-threat” category

32

information from the subject. Ideally, the matrix will serve as a guideline to government

agency’s helping them determine when it is reasonable to use certain interrogation techniques.

At the beginning of the paper we posed two hypothetical scenarios that an interrogator

may face on any given day. The matrix will help the interrogator assess the potential threat to

national security of the detained subject. We would argue that the techniques employed to obtain

vital information should be proportional to the threat the subject poses: a burglar should never be

treated the same as a terrorist. The matrix will make it easier for the interrogator to reach his

objective without overstepping the boundaries of international law.

C. Applicability of the I-T Matrix

The I-T Matrix can be used by the domestic and international legal system for

determining future cases concerning interrogation and torture practices. Its logical reasoning

structure is straightforward and rigid in prescribing appropriate actions. It is similar to the other

numerous reasoning structures that the legal system already uses to determine cases and rulings.

An exemplary structure is the United States’ Supreme Courts’ chart containing the “Level

of Fit” Tests12 in determining equal protection. The chart contains three tests (rational basis,

intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny) that the Supreme Court uses to consider the level of

state interests (legitimate, important and compelling) and find a fit between policy or law and

state interests (rationally related, substantially related, and narrowly tailored). The more the

Court is concerned with ensuring equal protection, the Court will likely depart from using the

rational basis test and use a higher level of scrutiny. Finding the right fit will prescribe

appropriate actions on whether to uphold or strike down statues violating equal protection. The

tests aim to ensure equal protection and prevent the government from transgressing civil rights. 12 These concepts were mentioned and discussed by the Goldman School of Public Policy Professor Sean Farhang in lecture on September 15, 2005.

33

Similarly, we offer this I-T Matrix to ensure human rights and prevent interrogators as

representatives of the government from violating rights. The lines are often ambiguous between

using appropriate interrogation and torture techniques that will induce information without

further inflicting the subject undue harm and violations. This I-T Matrix is a direct approach to

clarifying such ambiguity.

D. Where do we go from here?

In the global war on terror government intelligence officers will face difficult and ethical

questions. Sometimes they will have to violate ordinary societal norms to get the job done. In

her book Terror in the Name of God, Jessica Stern argues, “we expect our leaders to make

decisions to defend the nation’s interest and to take actions that would be considered immoral in

ordinary life. We expect them to defend us by stealing other countries’ secrets, to discover not

only their capabilities, but their plans and intentions” (p. 204). When you join the government

you may find yourself with dirty hands taking actions that would normally be violating the

norms and values of society. The concept of “dirty hands” is especially true in times of war.

34

APPENDIX I The Interrogation-Torture (I-T) Matrix

(based on techniques presented in: the US Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual (1983), the Army’s Field

Manual FM 34-52 (1992), and class lecture on “New Techniques Compared to FM 34-52” (Nov. 30, 2005).)

Threat

Mild Serious

Yes

Non-coercive Techniques

The Direct approach We know everything Unanswerable questioning

Non-coercive Techniques

The Direct approach Going next door Nobody loves you We know everything Double informers News from home The witness Joint subjects (a.k.a. divide and conquer) Joint “questioners” (a.k.a. friend and foe) Ivan is a dope Unanswerable questioning

Coo

pera

tion

No

In addition to Non-coercive techniques Coercive Techniques

Regression Use of 20hr interrogation Removal of comfort items Removal of clothing Forced grooming Use of phobias to induce stress

Threats and fear: Yelling

Hypnosis and heightened suggestibility: Deception

Narcosis (“placebo”)

In addition to Non-coercive techniques Coercive Techniques

Regression Use of 20hr interrogation Removal of comfort items Removal of clothing Forced grooming Use of phobias to induce stress

Deprivation of sensory stimuli Isolation up to 30 days Light and auditory stimuli deprivation Hooding

Threats and fear Yelling

Pain Use of stress positions

Hypnosis and heightened suggestibility Narcosis (“placebo”)

*Disclaimer*

1) The I-T Matrix only shows the extremities in which a subject may be categorized. In between the intent and cooperation factors, there is a continuous spectrum of continuous possible categories that a subject

may also be categorized. For example, a subject with mild intent may at first be non-cooperative, but eventually gravitates towards cooperation.

2) This paper takes the perspective of agents and agencies defending national security, and determining whether they are a threat to national security. We also offer mild-intent to show the applicability of situations involving subjects. 3) This I-T Matrix assumes that all subjects were arrested and currently detained in custody of the interrogator(s).

I

II

III IV

35

The following resources are taken directly out of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual

APPENDIX II

CIA Intelligence Categories

Travelers – Technique used for interrogation is elicitation. Are only questioned if they fall under one or more of the following categories

Defectors, escapees, and refugees – Are interrogated and questioned to establish the authenticity an legitimacy of their intention to defect due to the fact that they could be planted and intentionally provide false information

Agents – Are debriefed rather than interrogated. Are only interrogated if they belong to the next three categories.

Provocateurs – subjects that pretend to be defectors, escapees, or refugees to penetrate an opponent organization. These subjects are usually trained in deception and fabrication of a “cover story”.

Double Agents – Are not interrogated unless they are benefiting the opposition more than us

Fabricators – Are interrogated to prevent any damage to our intelligence service. Subjects are usually playing both sides, have little to no intelligence importance and waste your time.

APPENDIX III

Personality Categories

• The Orderly-Obstinate Subject – The subject is usually very intellectual and tends to think logically. He is punctual, orderly, and tidy. He acts frugal but not impulsive, is vengeful and stubborn. Subjects are secretive and consider themselves superior to others. The interrogator should avoid hostile and threatening interrogation techniques that could awaken old anxieties and habitual defense mechanisms

• The Optimistic Subject - This subject is always happy. They enjoy a continuous state of well-being. They are impulsive, inconsistent, and undependable. He is not able to withstand a lot of pressure and tries to avoid pressure. Interrogators should avoid interrogation techniques that pressure the subject. Reassurance and friendliness will bring him out. The best technique is the “friend and foe” approach.

• The Greedy, Demanding Subject – Subjects in this category are extremely dependent and passive, constantly demand being taken care of. They try to get other to defend them and are likely to shift loyalties if they feel his previous sponsor has let them down.

• The Anxious, Self-Centered Subject – Subjects are extremely fearful and engage in a constant struggle to conceal their fear. They like to pretend that there is not such thing as danger and are intensely vain and sensitive. Subjects like to brag about accomplishments to gain rewards and approval.

• The Guild-Ridden Subject – Subjects in this category have a strong and cruel unrealistic conscience and often attempt to prove that they have been treated unjustly. They might provoke unjust punishment to satisfy their conscience. They may commit crimes in order to confess and be punished.

• The Subject Wrecked by Success – Subjects cannot tolerate success and have a history of failing at critical points. They frequently blame their failures on others and have a strong need to suffer and may seek danger or injury.

• The Schizoid Subject – Subjects live in a fantasy world most of the time. They cannot distinguish that world from reality and are extremely intolerant of any frustration that occurs in the real world. To them allegiance to a group or country is temporary.

• The Exception – Subjects in this category feel that the world owes them a great deal. They feel that they suffered a great misfortune and must be rectified. If that claim is denied they may become rebellious. Demands for money, aid, and other favors will likely be out of proportion to the value of their information.

36

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