Where's the Cure?Author(s): Kenneth CainSource: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 3 (May - Jun., 1998), pp. 127-128Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20048886 .

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Illiberal Illusions

concept that can be appropriated by liber

alism alone. Constitutions enshrine not

only individual rights but democratic

mechanisms, and the abrogation of the

latter is as unconstitutional as the violation

of the former.

Zakaria argues that the introduction

of democracy in divided societies can

foment "nationalism, ethnic conflict, and even war." But the fact that populist nationalism and ethnocentrism can be

inflamed and put to violent uses by lead

ers of limited accountability does not

mean that democracy itself invokes these

malign forces. In most instances, national

ism exerts its influence through public expression, not democratic voice. To say otherwise is to confuse the passions of

the masses with the power of majorities.

Indeed, nationalism has often been manip ulated from above as a strategy for averting, not responding to, democratization.

Moreover, since the propagation of

nationalist sentiments requires a degree of freedom of speech and assembly, it

may in fact be liberalization rather than

democratization that makes states more

dangerous. Such a conclusion is sup

ported by the argument that an imperfect

"marketplace of ideas" fosters the spread of nationalist myths. The expansion of

liberal freedoms, not democratic account

ability, makes possible the articulation of

identity and difference for invidious ends.

Even where democratization does

provoke nationalist conflict, research

suggests that this is a consequence of a

specific path rather than the general

process of democratic transition.The

scholars Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan have shown that the sequence of elections

crucially influences the mobilization of

nationalist forces. Where regional elections

precede federal ones, political identities

and agendas crystallize around ethnic, nationalist themes and can threaten state

integrity, whereas "if all-union elections

are held first, there are strong incentives

for political activists to create all-union

parties, and an all-union agenda." Liberal autocracies have a long record

of conflict with each other; liberal democ racies do not. In the last century, European states of the former kind intermittently took up arms against one another and

ultimately?and disastrously?threw themselves into a

general conflagration. Since the middle of this century Europe s states have been of the latter kind. They overcame the security dilemma and ren

dered war among themselves unthinkable.

To be sure, other factors have been at

work: the growth of interdependence, the

bonding effect of the Cold War. But the

distinctive, pacific effect of democracy on

even hitherto liberal states appears striking. Nigel gould-davies is a Lecturer in

Politics at Hertford College, Oxford Uni

versity.

Where s the Cure? KENNETH CAIN

Zakaria's diagnosis of the illiberal

democracy virus is acute, but he offers

precious little byway of cure. Anyone who has participated in chimerical U.S.

or U.N.-sponsored good governance initiatives would understand why: most

of these programs simply don't work. As

Zakaria points out, exporting democracy is much easier than exporting the rule of

law. Constitutional liberalism requires the good faith of such a wide range of actors that addressing only one component

FOREIGN AFFAIRS-May/Junei998 [127]

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Responses to Zakaria

is fruitless. For example, in the realm of

criminal justice alone, reform requires an

independent and highly educated judiciary, competent prosecutors, an active defense

bar (who is going to pay for the defense

lawyers?), well-trained and ethnically rep resentative police, humane corrections staff

and an appropriate prison infrastructure?

all of which require substantial investment

in universities and professional academies.

The cost of creating and maintaining this

system would overwhelm many poor

democracies, not to mention take several

decades to develop fully.

Moreover, the last thing many illiberal

though democratically elected regimes want is an independent judicial system? an anathema to unfettered power. Reform

programs in Cambodia and Haiti have

failed badly due to these hard realities.

Meanwhile, Congress has savagely cut

funding for aid programs. Unfortunately, the investment in dollars and the level of

good faith required to overcome obstacles

to constitutional liberalism in many of

the poorest democracies imply that the

illiberal virus will continue to attack and

infect weak cells of democracy. kenneth Cain is an International

Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

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