When you are born matters: the impact of date of birth on child cognitive outcomes in England
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Transcript of When you are born matters: the impact of date of birth on child cognitive outcomes in England
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2008
When you are born matters: the impact of date of birth on child
cognitive outcomes in England
Claire Crawford, Lorraine Dearden & Costas Meghir
Institute for Fiscal Studies
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2008
Background
• Children must have started school by the beginning of the term after they turn five
• Local Education Authorities (LEAs) are free to set admissions policies within this framework– Single entry point, 2 entry points or 3 entry points
• Academic year: 1st September to 31st August– Expect children born at the end of the academic
year to perform more poorly than children born at the start of the academic year
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2008
Raw differences (example).3
.4.5
.6.7
.8.9
1
KS
2 -
Pro
port
ion a
t ex
pec
ted l
evel
Aug88 May88 Feb88 Nov87 Aug87 May87 Feb87 Nov86 Aug86 May86 Feb86 Nov85
Day of Birth
Mean of Outcome
.3.4
.5.6
.7.8
.91
KS
3 -
Pro
port
ion a
t ex
pec
ted l
evel
Aug88 May88 Feb88 Nov87 Aug87 May87 Feb87 Nov86 Aug86 May86 Feb86 Nov85
Day of Birth
Mean of Outcome
.3.4
.5.6
.7.8
.91
KS
4 -
Pro
port
ion a
t ex
pec
ted l
evel
Aug88 May88 Feb88 Nov87 Aug87 May87 Feb87 Nov86 Aug86 May86 Feb86 Nov85
Day of Birth
Mean of Outcome
.3.4
.5.6
.7.8
.91
KS
5 -
Pro
port
ion a
t ex
pec
ted l
evel
Aug88 May88 Feb88 Nov87 Aug87 May87 Feb87 Nov86 Aug86 May86 Feb86 Nov85
Day of Birth
Mean of Outcome
Males Females
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2008
Background
• Why might this be?– Age of sitting the test (absolute age) effect
• They are younger when they sit the tests
– Age of starting school effect• They start school at a younger age
– Length of schooling effect• They receive less schooling prior to the test
– Age position effect• They are the youngest relative to others in their class
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2008
Previous research
• Children born at the end of the academic year do perform worse:– Puhani & Weber (2005), Bedard & Dhuey (2006)
• Some studies attempt to disentangle the effects of these four factors:– But only for post-compulsory schooling outcomes
• Fredriksson & Ockert (2005)• Black, Devereux & Salvanes (2008)
– More difficult for compulsory schooling outcomes• Age at test = age at starting school + length of schooling
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2008
Our contribution
• Regional variation in admissions policies allows us to break this linear relationship for compulsory schooling outcomes– Children born on the same day (who sit tests at
the same age) start school at different ages
• We can separately identify:– Absolute age effect– Age of starting school/length of schooling effect– Age position effect
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2008
Modelling strategy (1)
• How large is the August birth penalty?– Regression discontinuity design
– Compare boys and girls born in August with boys and girls born in September • In the same school (and school year)• No need to worry about observable characteristics
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2008
Modelling strategy (2)
• What drives the August birth penalty?– Compare children born on the same day across
admissions policy areas
– Controlling for observable characteristics now very important
– OLS regression framework:'
1 2 3. ( ) . ( ) . ( )is s i i i i iy f age f agess f agepos x
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2008
Data
• Administrative data on all children attending state school in England– National Pupil Database
• Key Stage test results from age 5 (Foundation Stage) to age 18 (A-levels and equivalent)
• Limited background characteristics from PLASC (e.g. ethnicity, FSM, SEN)
• Home postcode used to link in local area data from 2001 Census and 2004 Index of Multiple Deprivation
– HESA data– Admissions policy data
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2008
Our samples
• Not possible to follow the same individuals all the way through, so consider 2 groups here:– Group 1:
• 2 cohorts (born 1990-91 or 1991-92)• Test results at ages 7, 11 and 14
– Group 2:• 2 cohorts (born 1985-86 or 1986-87)• Test results at ages 11, 14, 16 and 18• HE participation at age 18
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2008
How large is the August birth penalty?
KS1 KS2 KS3 KS4 KS5 HE
Group 1 Boys -0.263**
[0.003]
-0.128**
[0.003]
-0.085**
[0.003]
Base 0.612 0.719 0.688
Girls -0.257**
[0.003]
-0.133**
[0.003]
-0.077**
[0.003]
Base 0.703 0.760 0.729
Group 2 Boys -0.152**
[0.003]
-0.100**
[0.003]
-0.066**
[0.003]
-0.014**
[0.003]
-0.015**
[0.003]
Base 0.578 0.609 0.422 0.341 0.207
Girls -0.150**
[0.004]
-0.086**
[0.003]
-0.052**
[0.003]
-0.012**
[0.003]
-0.015**
[0.003]
Base 0.623 0.651 0.470 0.431 0.281
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2008
Does the August birth penalty vary by subgroup?
• Made comparisons across several groups: – FSM vs. non-FSM– Black Caribbean vs. White British
• Most noteworthy finding is lack of significant differences across subgroups– August birth penalty is the same for all individuals
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2008
What drives the August birth penalty?
Raw gap Estimated difference (i)+(ii)+(iii)
Absolute age effect
(i)
Length of schooling effect (ii)
Age position
effect (iii)
Boys KS1 -0.594** [0.010]
-0.577** [0.007]
-0.683** [0.058]
0.101** [0.013]
0.005 [0.057]
KS2 -0.339** [0.010]
-0.321** [0.007]
-0.296** [0.055]
0.021 [0.011]
-0.046 [0.054]
KS3 -0.229** [0.010]
-0.199** [0.006]
-0.127 [0.081]
-0.004 [0.010]
-0.067 [0.080]
Girls KS1 -0.561** [0.010]
-0.545** [0.007]
-0.576** [0.055]
0.125** [0.012]
-0.094 [0.054]
KS2 -0.325** [0.010]
-0.320** [0.007]
-0.254** [0.053]
0.045** [0.011]
-0.111* [0.052]
KS3 -0.200** [0.010]
-0.187** [0.007]
-0.238** [0.088]
0.014 [0.010]
0.036 [0.088]
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2008
Which admissions policy is best?
Raw gap Estimated difference (i)+(ii)+(iii)
Absolute age effect
(i)
Length of schooling effect (ii)
Difference in (ii) from
1 entry point
Age position
effect (iii)
KS1 2 -0.611** [0.022]
-0.598** [0.008]
-0.576** [0.055]
0.072** [0.009]
-0.053** [0.009]
-0.094 [0.054]
3 -0.645** [0.016]
-0.629** [0.009]
-0.576** [0.055]
0.040** [0.006]
-0.085** [0.010]
-0.094 [0.054]
KS2 2 -0.377** [0.022]
-0.349** [0.008]
-0.254** [0.053]
0.017* [0.008]
-0.028** [0.009]
-0.111* [0.052]
3 -0.389** [0.016]
-0.357** [0.008]
-0.254** [0.053]
0.008 [0.005]
-0.037** [0.009]
-0.111* [0.052]
KS3 2 -0.236** [0.022]
-0.204** [0.008]
-0.238** [0.088]
-0.002 [0.007]
-0.016** [0.008]
0.036 [0.088]
3 -0.239** [0.016]
-0.201** [0.008]
-0.238** [0.088]
0.000 [0.005]
-0.014 [0.009]
0.036 [0.088]
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2008
Summary
• August-born children experience significantly poorer educational outcomes than September-born children
• Almost entirely due to differences in the age at which they sit the tests
• Starting school earlier is marginally better for August born children– They benefit from having more time in school
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2008
The policy dilemma
• Results presented emphasise August birth penalty, but findings also apply more generally– On average, the younger you are the worse you do
• Ideally need to create a level playing field for all children regardless of date of birth– But also need to have school years, so someone will
always be the youngest
© Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2008
Possible policy options?
• Flexibility in school starting age not enough!• Age adjustment of tests/testing when ready
– Could use principle that proportion reaching expected level should not vary by month of birth
• We show a simple linear adjustment could be appropriate
– Alternatively could set expected level by age (rather than school year)
• e.g. reach Level 4 by age 11½ rather than end of Year 6
• But requires more testing opportunities (“testing when ready”)