When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk belief?Griffiths %26 Wilkins

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    When do evolutionary explanations of belief debunk belief?

    Paul E. GriffithsDepartment of PhilosophyUniversity of Sydney

    NSW 2006Australia

    ohn S. Wil!insS"hool of #umanities and So"ial S"ien"es$ond University%&D '22(Australia

    AbstractEver sin"e Dar)in people have )orried a*out the s"epti"al impli"ations of evolution. +f our mindsare produ"ts of evolution li!e those of other animals, )hy suppose that the *eliefs they produ"e aretrue, rather than merely useful- +n this "hapter )e apply this arument to *eliefs in three differentdomains/ morality, reliion, and s"ien"e. We identify replies to evolutionary s"epti"ism that )or! insome domains *ut not in others. he simplest reply to evolutionary s"epti"ism is that the truth of

    *eliefs in a "ertain domain is, in fa"t, "onne"ted to evolutionary su""ess, so that evolution "an *ee1pe"ted to desin systems that produ"e true *eliefs in that domain. We "all a "onne"tion *et)eentruth and evolutionary su""ess a 3ilvian *ride4, after the tradition )hi"h as"ri*es the triumph of

    5hristianity at the *attle of the 3ilvian *ride to the truth of 5hristianity. We arue that a 3ilvian*ride "an *e "onstru"ted for "ommonsense *eliefs, and e1tended to s"ientifi" *eliefs, *ut not tomoral and reliious *eliefs. An alternative reply to evolutionary s"epti"ism, )hi"h has *een useddefend moral *eliefs, is to arue that their truth does not depend on their tra"!in some e1ternalstate of affairs. We as! if this reply "ould *e used to defend reliious *eliefs.

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    $ut then )ith me the horrid dou*t al)ays arises )hether the "onvi"tions of mans mind,)hi"h has *een developed from the mind of the lo)er animals, are of any value or at alltrust)orthy. Would any one trust in the "onvi"tions of a mon!eys mind, if there are any"onvi"tions in su"h a mind-

    5harles Dar)in, &etter to William Graham, 7887

    1. Evolutionary debunking arguments in three domains

    )o traditional tarets for evolutionary s"epti"ism are reliion and morality. Evolutionary s"epti"alaruments aainst reliious *elief are "ontinuous )ith earlier eneti" aruments aainst reliion,su"h as that impli"it in David #ume4sNatural History of Religion.7Evolutionary aruments havefre9uently *een used to support moral s"epti"ism. :i"hard oy"e, for e1ample, arues ;that

    des"riptive !no)lede of the enealoy of morals

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    *eliefs derived from the s"ien"es. +n later se"tions )e "onsider a se"ond )ay to deny the epistemi"premises in Bahane4s s"hema, namely *y ivin a deflationary a""ount of truth"laims in therelevant domain. Bahane and others have e1plored this response to evolutionary s"epti"ism a*outmoralityM )e "onsider it as a response to evolutionary s"epti"ism a*out reliion.

    2.In Hoc Signo Vinces:Truth and ragmatic !uccess

    ;5onstantineis reported to have seen )ith his o)n eyes the luminous trophy of the "ross,pla"ed a*ove the meridian sun, and ins"ri*ed )ith the follo)in )ords/ $L #+S5ON%UE:. 5hrist dire"ted 5onstantine to frame a similar standard, and to mar"h,)ith the assuran"e of vi"tory, aainst 3a1entius and all his enemies.@

    Ed)ard Gi**onDecline and #all of the Roman Empire

    When 5onstantine fouht the *attle at the 3ilvian *ride in 72, he adopted a ne) *attle standard.his )as the "hi rho , the first t)o Gree! letters of the name ;5hrist@/ QRT. 5onstantine)on, and )ent on to found the $y=antine :oman Empire. Did he )in *e"ause of the po)er of thesin and the truth it denoted, or *e"ause his larely 5hristian soldiers )ere inspired to fiht moreeffe"tively- raditionally, many 5hristians have assumed the former. 5onstantine )as su""essful

    *e"ause his *eliefs )ere true/ God )as on his side.

    We "all an arument )hi"h lin!s true *elief to pramati" su""ess a 3ilvian *ride4 arument. hespe"ifi" !ind of pramati" su""ess )ith )hi"h )e )ill *e "on"erned is evolutionary su""ess. odefeat evolutionary s"epti"ism, true *elief must *e lin!ed to evolutionary su""ess in su"h a )ay thatevolution "an *e e1pe"ted to produ"e oranisms )hi"h have true *eliefs. #o)ever, it )ould *e too

    mu"h to re9uire that evolution produ"e oranisms all of )hose *eliefs are true. Evolutionary theorymust e1plain the )orld as it a"tually is, and )e !no) that people and animals often form false*eliefs. +t )ould also *e too mu"h to re9uire that evolution produ"e oranisms )hose *eliefs areformulated in an ideal "on"eptual s"heme V it ouht to *e possi*le for someone other than God oran ideal epistemi" aent spea!in at the end of in9uiry4 to have true *eliefs. FWe suest that areasona*le formulation of the 3ilvian $ride prin"iple )ould *e somethin li!e this/

    3ilvian $ride/ he C fa"ts are related to the evolutionary su""ess of C *eliefs in su"h a)ay that it is reasona*le to a""ept and a"t on C *eliefs produ"ed *y our evolved "onitivefa"ulties

    We do not *elieve that a 3ilvian *ride "an *e "onstru"ted lin!in true reliious *eliefs toevolutionary su""ess. Even a "ursory e1amination of the leadin "ontemporary a""ounts of theevolution of reliious *elief ma!es it "lear that none of them ma!e any referen"e to the truth orfalsity of those *eliefs )hen e1plainin their effe"ts on reprodu"tive fitness.65onversely, althouhthe 3ilvian *ride arument has *een endorsed *y some reliious thin!ers in the past, and may

    persist in the vular theoloy of some reliious traditions, fe) if any "ontemporary theoloiansa""ept that the relative truth of t)o reliions "an *e de"ided in *attle, or *y "ountin their

    FF+t has *een arued that Plantina4s evolutionary s"epti"ism rests on ?ust su"h an over*lo)n "on"eption of true*elief4/ 3i"hael :use, Jhe Ne) 5reationism/ +ts Philosophi"al Dimension,,J inThe Cultures of Creationism: "nti$Evolutionism in English$%pea&ing Countries, ed. Simon 5oleman and &eslie 5arlin

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    adherents. $elievers may *e uaranteed su""ess in the afterlife, *ut they are not uaranteed the !indof su""ess that is relevant to reprodu"tive fitness.

    #o)ever, )hile the 3ilvian $ride has no serious standin in theoloy, it "ontinues to *e ta!enseriously as arument for the truth of s"ientifi" *eliefs. :i"hard Da)!ins ma!es use of this

    arument to "ontrast s"ien"e and reliion/ ;+f all the a"hievements of s"ientists )ere )iped outtomorro), there )ould *e no do"tors *ut )it"h do"tors, no transport faster than horses, no"omputers, no printed *oo!s, no ari"ulture *eyond su*sisten"e peasant farmin. +f all thea"hievements of theoloians )ere )iped out tomorro), )ould anyone noti"e the smallestdifferen"e-@H+n the philosophy of s"ien"e the so"alled ultimate arument4 or mira"le4 arumentfor s"ientifi" realism is "losely related to the 3ilvian *ride. A""ordin to this arument, unlesssomethin very li!e the entities referred to *y s"ientifi" theories a"tually e1ists, and unless thosetheories are at least appro1imately true, then the pramati" su""ess of the te"hnoloies derivedfrom those theories )ould *e mira"ulous.8#o)ever, )hile this arument is still ta!en seriously, itis notoriously hard to formulate a version of the arument that does not prove either too mu"h ortoo little.(oo mu"h if it suests that te"hnoloi"al su""ess esta*lishes the truth of the s"ien"e

    from )hi"h it is derived. he industrial revolution, after all, )as founded on Ne)tonian theoriesthat )e no) !no) to *e fundamentally mista!en. So )e have ood reason to suspe"t that even themost su""essful s"ientifi" theories are only steppin stones to ne) and different theories. oo little

    *e"ause on"e )e )ater do)n the notion of truth to avoid the pro*lem ?ust raised, )e ris! definintruth in terms of pramati" effe"tiveness and renderin the arument "ir"ular.

    Kortunately, it is not ne"essary for us to settle the realism de*ate in the philosophy of s"ien"e. +n thene1t se"tion )e )ill "onstru"t a 3ilvian *ride lin!in "ommonsense *eliefs a*out the )orldaround us to evolutionary su""ess. #avin done so, )e )ill s!et"h ho) the *ride miht *ee1tended to s"ientifi" *eliefs. We )ill *e "ontent to sho) that it is reasona*le to a""ept and a"t ons"ientifi" *eliefs, and )ill not attempt to esta*lish any parti"ular form of s"ientifi" realism.

    ". #uilding the $ilvian #ridge% &o' evolution tracks truth

    3any authors have arued that evolution )ill not produ"e "onitive systems )hi"h tra"! truth.hey arue as follo)s/ Evolution )ill favour "onitive adaptations )hi"h produ"e *eliefs thatma1imise an oranism4s fitness irrespe"tive of )hether those *eliefs are true. #en"e, )e shoulde1pe"t "onitive adaptations to *e fitnesstra"!in rather than truthtra"!in. We !no) thatsele"tion )ill often favour unrelia*le "onitive systems, )hi"h produ"e many false *eliefs, overmore relia*le "onitive systems )hi"h )ould eliminate those false *eliefs. his suests that ourevolved "onitive adaptations do not tra"! truth.70

    he e1tensive psy"holoi"al literature on heuristi"s and *iases in human "onition is a ri"h sour"eof e1amples to underpin this arument. #uman *eins perform very *adly on apparently simplereasonin tas!s, "ommittin a rane of )ell!no)n falla"ies. hese effe"ts are so )idespread and

    H:i"hard Da)!ins, Jhe Emptiness of heoloy,J#ree 'nuiry 78, no. 2 / 6.8. . 5 Smart,hilosophy and %cientific Realism , #ilary Putnam, JWhat +s3athemati"al ruth-,J inMathematics, Matter and Method .(Alan 3usrave, Jhe Ultimate Arument for S"ientifi" :ealism,J in Relativism and Realism in %cience, ed. :o*ert

    Nola

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    so systemati" that they are over)helminly li!ely to *e intrinsi" to the desin of the human mind.People also e1hi*it a *road rane of selfservin "onitive *iases, ivin them unrealisti"ally

    positive vie)s of themselves and their prospe"ts. hese traits "orrelate )ith mental )ell*ein,ivin rise to the phenomenon of depressive realism4 in )hi"h mildly depressed people have morea""urate selfper"eptions. #en"e these traits are also li!ely to *e part of the desin of the mind.

    $ut despite these fa"ts, the fundamental sele"tion pressure drivin the evolution of "onition istruthtra"!in. he very idea that fitnesstra"!in is an alternative to truthtra"!in is "onfused.When the relation *et)een the t)o is properly formulated it *e"omes "lear that the various"ir"umstan"es in )hi"h sele"tion favours unrelia*le "onitive me"hanisms all involve o*tainin asmu"h truth as possi*le iven the "onstraints. All sele"tion pro"esses are "onstrained, or elseoranisms ;)ould live for ever, )ould *e imprena*le to predators, )ould lay es at an infiniterate, and so on.@77An un"onstrainedly optimal "onitive system )ould have every true *eliefrelevant to its a"tivities and no false *eliefs, *ut this is not possi*le. Evolution sele"ts for truthtra"!in in the same sense that it optimises any other trait under sele"tion V it does the *est it "aniven the "onstraints.

    0.1 )hy truth$trac&ing and fitness$trac&ing are not alternatives

    +t is an error to "ontrast truthtra"!in and fitnesstra"!in *e"ause, as one of us has dis"ussed atlenth else)here,72this is to treat "omplementary e1planations at different levels of analysis as ifthey )ere potential rivals at the same level of analysis. +t is perfe"tly sensi*le to as! )hi"h ofvarious properties of a trait under sele"tion is the taret of sele"tion/4 does *lood "ontainhaemolo*in *e"ause it *inds o1yen, or *e"ause it is ri"h in iron, or *oth- Su"h 9uestions haveans)ers, at least in prin"iple. hey as! )hether either or *oth of these properties enter into somela)li!e eneralisation a*out sele"tion, so that they "an fiure in a sele"tive e1planation of the trait.$ut su"h 9uestions presuppose that the t)o properties and the "orrespondin sele"tion e1planations

    are potential alternatives to one another. +t ma!es no sense to as! if haemolo*ins )ere sele"ted for*indin o1yen or for enhan"in fitness. o reard these as alternative hypotheses a*out theevolution of haemolo*ins is to "onfuse t)o, separate levels of e1planation.

    he "lassi" )ay to determine )hi"h of t)o properties is the taret of sele"tion is topose the "ounterfa"tual 9uestion if either property had o""urred )ithout the other, )ould the traithave follo)ed the same tra?e"tory in the population-47+f haemolo*ins *ound o1yen e9uallyeffi"iently *ut did not "ontain iron, this )ould have no effe"t on sele"tion. After all, manyoranisms V o"topuses, for e1ample V use "opper*ased respiratory proteins

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    a)ay from details )hi"h, in "onventional evolutionary theory at least, ma!e no differen"e to theevolutionary tra?e"tories of populations.7'Given some num*er of alternative traits, theirherita*ilities, initial fre9uen"ies, fitness fun"tions, the effe"tive population si=e, and so forth )e "an"ompute their li!ely fre9uen"ies at some future time. $ut this e1planation is in no sense a rival toan e1planation )hi"h in"ludes the underlyin reasons )hy the alternative traits have those relative

    fitnesses in some parti"ular "ase. he se"ond e1planation is an instan"e of the first, more enerale1planation.7F

    +n summary, it is senseless to set up fitnesstra"!in4 as an alternative to truthtra"!in4 *e"ausetruthtra"!in is a property at a lo)er level of e1planation. +t is a eneral measure of a "ertain !indof e"oloi"al intera"tion )ith the environment, a!in to forain effi"ien"y4 or respiratoryeffi"ien"y4, as )e )ill see *elo). he "laim that an oranism su""eeded *e"ause it )as *etter thanits rivals at tra"!in truth is "ompara*le to the "laim that it su""eeded *e"ause it )as a moreeffi"ient foraer or had a *etter respiratory system. A*stra"t as they may *e, these "laimsnevertheless stand to the "laim that the oranism su""eeded *e"ause it )asfitteras potentialinstan"es of that still more a*stra"t e1planation.

    0.3. )hy evolution selects for truth$trac&ing

    So the proposal that our evolved "onitive adaptations do not tra"! truth "annot mean that theytra"! fitness instead. +t must mean that they tra"! some other property )hi"h is a enuinealternative to truth at the same level of e1planation. $ut, )e )ill arue, the "onitive adaptationsthat ive rise to the "ommonsense *eliefs )ith the help of )hi"h )e and other animals a"t on aneveryday *asis are not tra"!in any su"h alternative to truth. +f they fail to tra"! truth as effe"tivelyas they miht, it is *e"ause they are tra"!in truth su*?e"t to "onstraints. he "urren"y ofevolutionary su""ess in the domain of "onition is still truth.

    he most fundamental "onstraint is "ost. 5onition is very "ostly. he human *rain ma!es up a*out2X of *ody mass, *ut a""ounts for a*out 20X of o1yen "onsumption. #avin *eliefs, )hether trueor false, "omes at a hih pri"e. $e"ause "onition is so "ostly )e "an immediately rule out someevolutionary s"enarios that have *een proposed *y evolutionary s"epti"s.76he hypotheses that

    *elief has no effe"t on *ehaviour, or that havin *eliefs redu"es fitness, are nonstarters. +f this )asthe "ase then there )ould *e stron sele"tion for not havin *eliefs. he proposal that *eliefsevolved *y eneti" lin!ae also has no plausi*ility/ the relevant neural traits are "omple1 andor9uantitative and their eneti" *asis is )idely distri*uted a"ross the enome. A surprisin amount ofattention has *een iven to Plantina4s suestion that most *eliefs "ould *e false, *ut thatoranisms miht have )a"!y desires )hi"h, )hen added to the false *eliefs, ive rise to adaptive

    *ehavior/ ;Perhaps Paul very mu"h li&esthe idea of *ein eaten, *ut )hen he sees a tier, al)ays

    runs off loo!in for a *etter prospe"t, *e"ause he thin!s it unli!ely the tier he sees )ill eat him.his )ill et his *ody parts in the riht pla"e so far as survival is "on"erned, )ithout involvinmu"h *y )ay of true *elief.@7H$ut the issue is not )hether there is some "om*ination of false

    *eliefs and mat"hin desires that "ould enerate some adaptive *ehavior. he issue is )hetherevolution "ould desin "onitive adaptations that "onsistently produ"e adaptive *ehavior *y

    7'We are inorin all the issues raised *y evolutionary developmental *ioloy and other attempts to enri"h traditionalneoDar)inian evolutionary theory. +ntrodu"in these )ould massively "ompli"ate the e1position and )e are "onfidentthat the differen"es are simply not ermane to the topi" of this essay.7Fhese are ro*ust pro"ess4 and a"tual se9uen"e4 e1planations respe"tively. See Bim Sterelny and Paul E Griffiths,%e+ and Death: "n 'ntroduction to the hilosophy of /iology , 8'.76he various suestions *elo) are from Alvin Plantina, Jhe Evolutionary Arument aainst Naturalism,J in

    Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on lantinga!s Evolutionary "rgument "gainst, ed. ames B $eil*y

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    produ"in *eliefs )hi"h are false and ad?ustin desires to fit. We su*mit that this is not possi*le.he only )ay to do it )ould *e to have some other"onitive me"hanisms )hi"h tra"!ed truth, and)hi"h ad?usted the desires in the liht of the a"tual oals of the oranism so as to ensure that thefalse *eliefs nevertheless produ"ed adaptive *ehavior. +n that "ase, it )ould *e the states of this,se"ond me"hanism that )ould *e the effe"tive *eliefs and desires, and the false *eliefs and )a"!y

    desires envisaed *y Plantina )ould *e a *i=arre and e1pensive detour *et)een the effe"tive*eliefs and desires and the oranism4s motor systems.

    We "an safely "on"lude that *eliefs are the output of a set of "onitive adaptations. hoseadaptations are not desined to produ"e only true *eliefs, or to produ"e all the relevant true *eliefson every o""asion. $ut this is not *e"ause they are tra"!in some property other than truth. +t is

    *e"ause they are tra"!in truth in a "onstrained manner.

    ruthtra"!in is stronly "onstrained *y "ost *e"ause oranisms have limited resour"es and truthtra"!in is not the only thin they need to do to survive. :esour"es allo"ated to formin true *eliefsare resour"es unavaila*le for ma!in sperm or es, or fihtin off the effe"ts of aein *y

    repairin damaed tissues. 3odern humans in first)orld "ountries lead a sheltered life and it ishard for us to appre"iate ?ust ho) dire"t these tradeoffs "an *e. A dramati" e1ample "omes from asmall Australian mammal, the $ro)n Ante"hinus 4"ntechinus %tuartii5. +n this and several relatedspe"ies a short, fren=ied matin season is follo)ed *y a period durin )hi"h the male4s se1ualorans reress and their immune system "ollapses. hen all the males in the population die. heAnte"hinus has little "han"e of survivin to the ne1t *reedin season and so it allo"ates all of itsresour"es to the reprodu"tive effort and none to tissue maintenan"e. here "an *e little dou*t that if,li!e us, the Ante"hinus had a massively hypertrophied "orte1 and enaed in a lot of "ostlythin!in, it )ould allo) that neural tissue to de"ay in the matin season so as to allo"ate moreresour"es to sperm produ"tion and se1ual "ompetition.

    As Gerd Gieren=er and "olla*orators have lon arued, many of the *est!no)n human failures ofrationality "an *e understood as heuristi"s that sa"rifi"e *ein riht all the time for *ein riht mostof the time at a reatly redu"ed "ost.78A heuristi" is a method for o*tainin truth )hi"h does notuarantee a "orre"t ans)er every time, *ut )hi"h et it riht often enouh that there is no point inadoptin a more relia*le *ut more "ostly method. A heuristi" is not a method for o*taininsomethin other than truth. So, )hile our use of simple heuristi"s does, indeed, sho) that truth is

    *ein traded off aainst fitness, )hat this means is that truthtra"!in, a "omponent of fitness, is*ein traded off aainst other "omponents of fitness, su"h as sperm produ"tion. he same is true ofour adaptations for lo"omotion V )e "ould have stroner les, *ut the "ost )ould not *e ?ustified.his does nothin to 9uestion the vie) that the adaptive purpose of les is lo"omotion. ust so, the

    e1isten"e of *ounded rationality4 does nothin to 9uestion the vie) that the adaptive purpose of the"onitive traits that ive rise to *eliefs is truthtra"!in.

    Another "onstraint arises from the intrinsi" loi"al stru"ture of many "onitive tas!s. he stru"tureof many tas!s is su"h that it is loi"ally impossi*le to form true *eliefs )ithout also formin somefalse *eliefs. Kor e1ample, )henever an oranism needs to ma!e a de"ision under un"ertainty, thenit is loi"ally impossi*le to redu"e the ris! of type one errors )ithout increasingthe ris! of typet)o errors

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    evolutionary tas! they fa"e is that of a"hievin an optimal *alan"e *et)een type one and type t)oerrors.

    he appli"ation of this o*servation to evolutionary psy"holoy has *een termed error manaementtheory4 and is the su*?e"t of a small s"ientifi" literature. 7(#ere, ho)ever, )e )ant to emphasise the

    very eneral appli"ation of this !ind of intrinsi" tas! "onstraint. his point has *een "learly made*y Peter GodfreySmith20usin a "lass of evolutionary models "alled sinal dete"tion theory4. +nthese models, oranisms respond to sinals )hi"h are less than perfe"tly relia*le indi"ators ofrelevant states of affairs in the environment. Krom an information theoreti" point of vie) the

    pro*lem fa"in an oranism )hi"h re"eives a sinal is )hether it is a veridi"al sinal or )hether itis noise .

    'nsert figure 1 a7out here

    Evolution )ill sele"t oranisms )hi"h de"ide to a"t, or )hi"h form an a"tionuidin *elief, at)hatever point alon the hori=ontal a1is is evolutionarily optimal

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    $e"ause the animal a"ts as if the )orld is a "ertain )ay )hen the )orld is that )ay, and thusa"hieves its oals. Why does a"tin )hen the sinal is noise yield a redu"tion in fitness- $e"ausesu"h an a"tion )ould *e frustrated *y the )ay the )orld is, and thus "onstitute a )aste of pre"iousresour"es, et" . GodfreySmith puts the point li!e this/ ;"orresponden"e truth has adefinite pla"e in the sinal dete"tion approa"h. Kor, if 5 9the mental state formed on the 7asis of ;

    is rearded as representin S, hits and "orre"t re?e"tions are truths, )hile misses and false alarmsare errors. So truth remains a definite oal of "onition, thouh the truthlin!ed virtue ofrelia*ility4 is ta!en apart and overhauled.@27

    +n the liht of the t)o "lasses of unavoida*le "onstraints that )e have identified V "ost "onstraintsand intrinsi" tas! "onstraints )e "an "on"lude that the evolutionary optimum of truth tra"!in4should *e defined as o*tainin as mu"h truth and as little error as possi*le, iven the intrinsi" tradeoffs *et)een these t)o, )ith the *alan"e *et)een them determined *y the value of the truths andthe "ost of the errors, and )ith possi*le solutions "onstrained *y the "ost of "onitive resour"es. 22

    his "an *e put in the form of a sloan/

    Oranisms tra"! truth optimally if they o*tain as mu"h relevant truth as they "an afford, andtolerate no more error that is needed to o*tain it.

    We propose that )ith this definition of truthtra"!in it is over)helminly li!ely that "ommonsense*eliefs are produ"ed *y "onitive adaptations that tra"! truth. $y "ommonsense4 )e mean thoseeveryday *eliefs )hi"h uide mundane a"tion, and )hose su*?e"tive "ertainty )as famouslyappealed to *y G.E 3oore.23oore4s e1amples in"luded the e1isten"e of his *ody, and of otherhuman *odies and inanimate *odies, all arraned in spa"e and time, as )ell as the fa"t that thoseother human *odies !ne) similar thins. Any plausi*le a""ount of the evolution of these sorts of

    *eliefs in humans and other animals )ill *e of the !ind des"ri*ed in this se"tion. At the heart of thate1planation )ill *e the fa"t that animals "an in"rease their fitness *y dete"tin states of affairs inthe )orld and mat"hin their a"tions to those states of affairs.

    (. A #ridge Too far? )ommonsense and !cience

    . his )ould seem *roadly in line )ith our frame)or!.2Geore Ed)ard 3oore, JA Defen"e of 5ommon Sense,J inContemporary /ritish hilosophy 43nd %eries>, ed. .#.3uirhead .

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    illustrations fan"iful *e"ause they omit the mar!ins that are visi*le to inse"t pollinators or in"lude"olours that those inse"ts "annot see. A more interestin e1ample "omes from the )or! of the

    pioneerin etholoist Bonrad &oren= on the )orld of the *ird4. &oren= arued that his *irds. Note that this translation )as pu*lished in a "onventional s"ientifi" volume alonsidethe early papers of the No*el Pri=e )inners &oren= and Ni!o in*eren. he oriinally s"ientifi" nature of the 6m-elt"on"ept is often forotten *e"ause of its later use in philosophy and literary theory.26:e1 Dalton, Jrue 5olours,JNature '28, no. 6(8

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    "on"eptual s"heme, only that there are more truths to *e had than are "aptured *y the evolved"on"eptual s"heme of either spe"ies. here are many )ays of "lassifyin the )orld )hi"h are not

    purely ar*itrary and the fa"t that these "lassifi"ations are "onstrained *y reality e1plains )hy theyhave some deree of pramati" utility2(. One o*vious philosophi"al frame)or! in )hi"h to ma!esense of the fa"t that oranisms "an have true *eliefs in many different evolved "on"eptual s"hemes

    )ould *e stru"tural realism4. hat is to say, )e should have the same attitude to *eliefs formulatedin an evolved "on"eptual s"heme that )e have to the "ontent of a su""essful *ut no) supersededs"ientifi" theory li!e Ne)tonian physi"s. he fa"t that it is possi*le to have true *eliefs usin this"on"eptual apparatus is to *e understood in terms of some deree of stru"tural resem*lan"e

    *et)een that apparatus and the stru"ture of the )orld

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    notion at allsatisfies me. + feel most deeply that the )hole su*?e"t is too profound for thehuman intelle"t. A do miht as )ell spe"ulate on the mind of Ne)ton.Y &et ea"h manhope *elieve )hat he "an.2

    Dar)in is suestin an epistemi" *oundedness thesis. We !no) there are limitations on the

    "on"eptual a*ilities of other animals. Dos )ill never a*le to master "al"ulus. his leads to thesuspi"ion that there may *e truths that )e ourselves are "onstitutionally una*le to entertain. $utDar)in )as 9uite "onfident that our fa"ulties )ere ade9uate to unravel the )or!ins of nature. hehistorian on #ode has des"ri*ed ho) the youn Dar)in arued on theoloi"al rounds for *oththe ina*ility of the human mind to fathom the mind of the "reator and the a*ility of the human mindto understand "reation itself, a position #ode des"ri*es as "onitive optimism a*out nature4.

    +n this se"tion )e )ill arue that )hether or not there are some ultimate limits to our a*ility toimprove our "on"eptual s"heme, )e are not simply "onfined to our evolved "on"eptual s"heme and)e have not yet rea"hed the limits of our a*ility to *ootstrap ourselves into more ade9uate"on"eptual s"hemes. We )ill then arue that, iven that our "onitive adaptations tra"! truth in the

    realm of "ommonsense, )e have reasons to *elieve that )e "an derive relia*le !no)lede in themore ade9uate "on"eptual s"hemes of s"ien"e.

    Our arument that humans are not "onfined to their evolved "on"eptual s"heme is an appeal to thehistory of s"ien"e. No human *ein had the "on"epts of differentiation and interation *efore&ei*ni= and Ne)ton4s introdu"tion of the "al"ulus. After t)o thousand years of spe"ulation a*out

    physi"al theory the spa"e of possi*le dynami"al theories )as "ompletely altered. As a result, for thepast four hundred years edu"ated people have reularly had thouhts that no hominin had in theprevious four hundred thousand. Other dramati" e1amples in"lude the pro*a*ility revolution4'ofthe nineteenth "entury, and the spatialisation of time.F+n this respe"t, human *eins are verydifferent from *luetits, and even from other primates. here is no pre"edent in other animals for

    radi"al "hanes in the stru"ture of the Um)elt "aused *y individual "onitive innovations )hi"hspread *y "ultural diffusion.

    he arument that this pro"ess has not "ome to an end is a simple appeal to the "urrent state ofs"ien"e and to informed opinion a*out its li!ely future. +t is o*vious that more "on"eptualinnovations li!e those ?ust des"ri*ed are li!ely to o""ur, and )e )ill not la*our the point.

    +f human *eins are a*le to supplement their evolved "on"eptual s"heme )ith ne) "on"epts of theiro)n invention, should )e have "onfiden"e that our "onitive fa"ulties "an tra"! truth in this ne),enri"hed "on"eptual frame)or!- We have arued a*ove that our "onitive fa"ulties )ere sele"ted

    *e"ause they tra"!ed truth in the human Um)elt. $ut they )ere not sele"ted for their a*ility to do"al"ulus, or to reason usin the pro*a*ility "al"ulus , or for their a*ility to use very indire"t eviden"e to re"onstru"t thedistant past. So there is no direct3ilvian *ride lin!in these parti"ular "onitive pro"esses to

    pramati" su""ess.

    +nstead, there is an indirect3ilvian *ride. here is a 3ilvian *ride "onne"tin our "ommonsense*eliefs to pramati" su""ess, and )e "an use "ommonsense to ?ustify the methods *y )hi"h )e

    2Dar)in to A. Gray, 3ay 22nd7860. Dar)in "orresponden"e pro?e"t _287'on #ode, Jhe Note*oo! Prorammes and Pro?e"ts of Dar)ins &ondon Lears,J inThe Cam7ridge Companion to

    Dar-in, ed. on #ode and Greory :adi"! , FHF(.'

    +an #a"!in,The Taming of Chance .Fohn $ielo), Jime ravel Ki"tion,J inReality and Humean %upervenience: Essays on the hilosophy of David*e-is., ed. Gerhard Preyer and Kran! Sie*elt .

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    arrive at our s"ientifi" *eliefs. he reasons )e have to thin! that our s"ientifi" "on"lusions are"orre"t and that the methods )e use to rea"h them are relia*le are simply the data and aruments)hi"h s"ientists ive for their "on"lusions, and for their methodoloi"al innovations. Ultimately,these have to *e a*le to stand up to the same !ind of "ommonsense s"rutiny as any other addition toour *eliefs. he "onvi"tion that the *ase rate falla"y is a falla"y, and that )e should uard aainst

    our tenden"y to "ommit it )hen reasonin informally, does not rest on a de"ision to follo)pro*a*ilisti" reasonin )herever it leads, *ut on evaluatin the arument. When a pie"e of verysimilar reasonin leads to a "on"lusion that does not stand up to "ommonsense evaluation V su"h asthe arument for payin an unlimited amount for a ti"!et in the St Peters*ur ame 6V )e "on"ludethat there is an error some)here in that reasonin.

    hus, if evolution does not undermine our trust in our "onitive fa"ulties, neither should itundermine our trust in our a*ility to use those fa"ulties to de*u themselves V to identify their o)nlimitations, as in per"eptual illusions or "ommon errors in intuitive reasonin. Nor should itundermine our "onfiden"e in adoptin ne) "on"epts and methods )hi"h have not themselves *eenshaped *y the evolution of the mind, *ut )hose introdu"tion "an *e ?ustified usin our evolved

    "onitive fa"ulties. he 3ilvian *ride "an *e e1tended to s"ien"e.

    *. Evolutionary skepticism and ethics+n the previous t)o se"tions )e have arued that evolutionary s!epti"ism a*out "ommonsense ands"ien"e fails. Evolutionary s!epti"ism a*out "ommonsense is defeated *y the e1isten"e of a 3ilvian

    *ride "onne"tin the relia*ility of our "onitive fa"ulties in the )orld of "ommonsense V thehuman Um)elt V to evolutionary su""ess. Evolutionary s!epti"ism a*out s"ien"e is defeated *y thefa"t that our trust in s"ien"e "an *e ?ustified usin "ommonsense aruments. +n this se"tion )e turnto evolutionary s!epti"ism a*out ethi"s.

    Evolutionary a""ounts of ethi"s pre"ede Dar)in, *ein the *asis of #er*ert Spen"er4s ethi"alsystem.HAfter Dar)in, Spen"er "hampioned a slihtly revised version of his evolutionary ethi"sin"orporatin natural sele"tion.8$ut *oth evolutionists(and moral philosophers'0soon rea"hed the"on"lusion that moral value )as somethin that evolution, and indeed nature in eneral, "ould notdeliver. G.E. 3oore4s )ell!no)n Naturalisti" Kalla"y, )hi"h purports to sho) that oodness is nota natural property, )as tareted dire"tly at Spen"er4s evolutionary proressivism.'7Evolutionaryethi"s has had some lu!e)arm revivals sin"e that time, most re"ently in the mid7(80s follo)in itsdefense *y 3i"hael :use and :o*ert :i"hards.'2

    6+n this ame a "oin is tossed until it "omes up heads. Lou re"eive a `7 if the first toss is heads, `2 if the se"ond toss is

    heads, `' if the third toss is heads, and so forth. An simple appli"ation of de"ision theory implies that thee1pe"ted out"ome of this ame is an infinite amount of money, and so it )ould *e rational to pay anyamount to moneyto *e allo)ed to play.H#er*ert Spen"er,%ocial %tatics, or, the Conditions Essential to Human Happiness %pecified, and the #irst of Them

    Developed .8YYY,The Data of Ethics .(homas #. #u1ley,Evolution and Ethics, he :omanes &e"ture M 78(.

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    +n his re"ent paper, Bahane arues that evolution is not only una*le to provide a foundation formorality, *ut in fa"t de*un!s moral truth.'he *asi" pattern of arument is one that )ill *y no) *efamiliar/ evolution *y natural sele"tion tra"!s fitness rather than truth. he evolution of the moralsense is an offtra"!4 pro"ess *e"ause it has no intrinsi" tenden"y to produ"e a moral sense that

    tra"!s moral truths. Bahane ives the arument as follo)s/

    7. Causal premise. Our evolutionary history e1plains )hy )e have the evaluative *eliefs )ehave.

    2.Epistemic premise. Evolution is not a truthtra"!in pro"ess )ith respe"t to evaluativetruth.

    .Evaluative scepticism. None of our evaluative *eliefs is ?ustified.

    he idea that evolution is an offtra"! pro"ess )ith respe"t to evaluative truth "an *e seen at )or!in Dar)in4s "lassi" dis"ussion of the evolution of morality/

    ;+n the same manner as various animals have some sense of *eauty, thouh they admire)idely different o*?e"ts, so they miht have a sense of riht and )ron, thouh led *y it tofollo) )idely different lines of "ondu"t. +f, for instan"e, to ta!e an e1treme "ase, men )erereared under pre"isely the same "onditions as hive*ees, there "an hardly *e a dou*t that ourunmarried females )ould, li!e the )or!er*ees, thin! it a sa"red duty to !ill their *rothers,and mothers )ould strive to !ill their fertile dauhtersM and no one )ould thin! ofinterferin.@''

    Dar)in arues that if our e"oloy had *een different, then )e )ould ?ude different thins to *eriht and )ron, ?ust as different spe"ies of animals ?ude different thins to *e *eautiful. Animalsare aestheti"ally attra"ted to thins to )hi"h it is fitnessenhan"in for them to *e attra"ted. ust so,Dar)in arues, they )ill morally approve of a"tions )hi"h it is fitnessenhan"in for them toapprove. his )ould seem to imply either that evolution is an offtra"! pro"ess )ith respe"t toevaluative truth, or that evaluative truths are truths a*out )hat ma1imises reprodu"tive fitness. +fthis is riht, then the only alternative to moral s"epti"ism )ould, indeed, *e evolutionary ethi"s. 'F

    here is no 3ilvian *ride "onne"tin moral truth to pramati" su""ess and thus defendinmorality from evolutionary s!epti"ism. his is *e"ause "ontemporary evolutionary e1planations ofmorality, ?ust li!e Dar)in4s o)n e1planation, do not involve any adaptive advantaes produ"ed *ydete"tin and a"tin in a""ordan"e )ith o*?e"tive moral fa"ts. '6$ut Bahane notes that theassumption that moral truths "orrespond to o*?e"tive moral fa"ts is one that is 9uestioned *y many

    moral philosophers for independent reasons. he evolutionary s!epti"al arument aainst ethi"s)ould *e *etter stated as follo)s/

    'Bahane, JEvolutionary De*un!in Aruments.J Evolutionary aruments in support of a moral error theory4 have*een produ"ed *efore, of "ourse, e.. :. oy"e, JDar)inian Ethi"s and Error,J/iology and hilosophy 7F, no. F ,:use, JEvolutionary Ethi"s/ A Phoeni1 Arisen.J''5harles :o*ert Dar)in,The Descent of Man and %election in Relation to %e1, Ka"simile of the first edition ed., H.'FKor a modern version of Dar)in4s arument, see 3i"hael :use and Ed)ard O. Wilson, J3oral Philosophy as AppliedS"ien"e,Jhilosophy 67, no. 26 / 786.'6

    See, for e1ample, Elliot So*er and David Sloan Wilson,6nto =thers: The Evolution and sychology of 6nselfish/ehavior , 3att :idley,The =rigins of @irtue .

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    troops that mem*ers of their "ommunity )ould re"eive the prote"tion of the state, as indeed theydid in an imperial edi"t of the follo)in year. #is vi"tory )as due to so"ial solidarity rather thandivine intervention.

    he prominent theory of David Sloan Wilson sho)s the same la"! of "on"ern )ith the spe"ifi"

    "ontent of reliious *eliefs. On this a""ount, reliion evolved throuh a pro"ess of multilevelsele"tion. +ts evolution )as driven *y the *enefits )hi"h so"ial "ohesion and proso"ial *ehavior

    provide at the level of the roup.F0Nothin in this e1planation dis"riminates *et)een true and falsereliious *eliefs. 5onstantine4s vi"tory o""urred *e"ause his more predominantly 5hristian armyappro1imated a superoranism li!e an ant "olony slihtly more "losely that did the more

    predominantly paan army of 3a1entius, not *e"ause 5hristianity )as true and paanism false.

    5ontemporary theories )hi"h e1plain the evolution of reliion as a sideeffe"t are e9uallyundis"riminatin. he idea that reliious *elief is to a lare e1tent the result of mental adaptationsfor aen"y dete"tion has *een endorsed *y several leadin evolutionary theorists of reliion,in"ludin Pas"al $oyer, S"ott Atran and ustin &. $arrett. F7$roadly, these theorists suest that

    there are spe"iali=ed mental me"hanisms for the dete"tion of aen"y *ehind sinifi"ant events.hese have evolved *e"ause the dete"tion of aen"y V )ho did that and )hy-4 V has *een a "riti"altas! fa"in human *eins throuhout their evolution. :eliious *elief has *een ?o!inly des"ri*edas ta!in the universe personally4, and on this a""ount, that is pre"isely "orre"t.

    None of the "ontemporary evolutionary e1planations of reliious *eliefs hypothesi=es that those*eliefs are produ"ed *y a me"hanism that tra"!s truth. his may seem pu==lin, iven that )e havearued a*ove that the evolution of "onition is driven *y truthtra"!in. $ut the "ontradi"tion isonly an apparent one. he sideeffe"t e1planation of reliious *elief is "ompletely in line )ith themodels )e have s!et"hed a*ove. +f the aen"y dete"tion a""ount is "orre"t, then people *elieve insupernatural aents )hi"h do not e1ist for the same reason that *irds sometimes mista!e o*?e"ts

    passin overhead for raptors. hese *eliefs are type one errors and they are the pri"e of avoidinmore "ostly type t)o errors. he adaptive e1planations of reliion )or! some)hat differently. heyidentify a )ay in )hi"h a sophisti"ated "onitive system "ould evolve a positively sele"teddeparture from truthtra"!in. $ut this e1planation presumes that the underlyin "onitive systemhas evolved in the )ay )e s!et"hed a*ove, )ith truthtra"!in as its fundamental aim. his patternof dependen"y *et)een the t)o e1planations "annot *e reversed, any more than the e1planation ofthe pseudopenis and pseudos"rotum of female hyenasF2"ould *e turned into an e1planation of theevolution of the penis and s"rotum, )ith male, intromissive penises developin as a sideeffe"t&i!e the pseudopenis, reliious *eliefs are a spe"iali=ed se"ondary adaptation found in a smallnum*er of spe"ies and *ased on more a *asi" adaptation that "an *e found in very many spe"ies and

    )hi"h evolved for the same fundamental reason in all those spe"ies. +t is entirely "onsistent to aruethat penises evolved for intromission, *ut that pseudopenises evolved throuh mimi"ry. +n thesame manner, a sinle, interated a""ount of the evolution of "onition "an arue that the *asi"evolutionary dynami" that produ"ed "onition is truthtra"!in, *ut that "ertain, spe"iali=ed "lassesof *eliefs evolved as se"ondary adaptations for promotin so"ial solidarity.

    +ntention,JEvolution and Cognition 70, no. 7

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    +f a 3ilvian *ride "annot *e "onstru"ted lin!in the truth of reliious *eliefs to evolutionarysu""ess, then the alternative is to arue that the truth of reliious *eliefs is not a matter of theirtra"!in some state of affairs in the )orld. here have *een several attempts *y a"ademi"theoloians to pure reliion of its "laims a*out the supernatural, one of the *est !no)n *ein theSea of Kaith4 movement headed *y Don 5upitt.Fhe evolutionary theorist of reliion David Sloan

    Wilson has also suested that the theoloi"al *eliefs asso"iated )ith a reliious tradition may *emore or less epiphenomenal )ith respe"t to its fun"tionin as a so"ial institution and that they may

    *e per"eived *y the adherents of the faith as mere prea"her tal!4.F' #o)ever, li*eral theoloiansli!e 5upitt have usually *een per"eived as hereti"al *y ordinary *elievers. We are s!epti"al that thevast ma?ority of reliious *elievers "ould *e persuaded to a""ept a non"onitivist or a fi"tionalisttheoloy.

    :eliious *eliefs thus emere as pe"uliarly vulnera*le to evolutionary de*un!in aruments. hetruth of reliious *eliefs does seem to *e a matter of tra"!in some e1ternal state of affairs, so thatthe 9uestion of )hether evolution is an offtra"! pro"ess )ith respe"t to reliious *eliefs is one that"annot *e sidestepped. $ut the leadin evolutionary e1planations of these *eliefs all suest that

    they are produ"ed *y "onitive adaptations )hi"h are not desined to tra"! truth.

    +. )onclusion

    Evolutionary de*un!in aruments suest that the evolutionary oriins of our "onitive fa"ultiesshould undermine our "onfiden"e in the *eliefs )hi"h those fa"ulties produ"e. Perhapsunsurprisinly, it has turned out that the for"e of this s!epti"al arument depends on the spe"ifi""lass of *eliefs. We have arued that it has no for"e aainst "ommonsense, fa"tual *eliefs. +n this"onitive domain natural sele"tion )ill desin "onitive fa"ulties )hi"h tra"! truth in the sense that

    they o*tain as mu"h relevant truth as the oranism "an afford, and tolerate no more error that isneeded to o*tain it. his is enouh to *uild )hat )e have "alled a 3ilvian $ride4/ he"ommonsense fa"ts are related to the evolutionary su""ess of "ommonsense *eliefs in su"h a )aythat it is reasona*le to a""ept and a"t on "ommonsense *eliefs produ"ed *y our evolved "onitivefa"ulties.

    We have further arued that evolutionary s"epti"ism a*out s"ientifi" *eliefs is unsu""essful *e"ausethere are "ommonsense ?ustifi"ations of the pro"esses *y )hi"h )e arrive at our s"ientifi" *eliefs.

    Evolutionary de*un!in aruments have more for"e )hen applied to ethi"al *eliefs. Dra)in onBahane4s )or! )e have arued that evolutionary a""ounts of the oriins of moral intuitions should

    undermine "onfiden"e in those intuitions if moral *eliefs are iven a stronly realist interpretation.$ut non"onitivist moral philosophers, and perhaps some less am*itious moral realists, areunaffe"ted *y the evolutionary de*un!in arument, sin"e they re?e"t the idea that moral *eliefs arein the *usiness of tra"!in moral fa"ts.

    Kinally, )e have arued that reliious *eliefs emere as parti"ularly vulnera*le to evolutionaryde*un!in aruments, sin"e neither "lass of "ounterarument seems to *e via*le in that domain.5urrent evolutionary theory really does support the vie) that human *eins )ould have reliious

    *eliefs even if all reliious *eliefs )ere uniformly false.

    F

    Don 5upitt,"7ove 6s =nly %&y: The Religion of =rdinary *ife .F'David Sloan Wilson,Evolution for Everyone: Ho- Dar-in!s Theory Can Change the )ay )e Thin& "7out =ur *ives

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    $ut de*un!in is not disprovin. +f there are independent reasons for reliious *elief, their "oen"yis not removed *y the fa"t that reliious *eliefs have evolutionary e1planations. As Dar)in )rote toAsa Gray in the letter "ited a*ove, ;&et ea"h man hope *elieve )hat he "an.@

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    Kiure 7

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    #igure Caption

    Kiure 7. A sinal dete"tion pro*lem. Pro*a*ility

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    ,eferences