How and when do movements matter?

The complex effects of the air quality movement on air pollution policy and emissions, 1940-2001

J. Craig Jenkins – Ohio State University

Anna C. McCreery – Elevate Energy

American Sociological Association annual meeting, 25 Aug 2015, Chicago

Does the movement matter…

�For policy authority?

�For policy implementation?

�For real-world outcomes?

�Are there contingencies and contextual processes that modify the impact of the air quality movement?

Hypotheses

�Stronger air quality movement organization

�Effect(s) magnified when Democrats control the federal government

�Metric: Sierra Club membership

Hypotheses

�Institutional advocacy

�Protest actions

�Reduce emissions/improve

policy when opponents

control federal gov’t

�Backlash when allies are in power

�Metric: advocacy and protest actions

Hypotheses

�Media attention to air pollution:

�Creates political

pressure to reduce it

�Gives visibility to

movement activism

�Metric: Magazine

articles on air pollution/air quality

Hypotheses

�Congressional hearings on air pollution and air quality:

�Create political openings for institutional advocacy

�But also create openings for movement opponents

�Metric: count of Congressional hearings, in both houses

Controls

�Disposable income per capita

�And its squared term

�% of federal income taxes paid by corporations

Policy Authority Metric

�Coded federal legislation1 on 3 criteria:

�Enforcement powers (weighted double the other 2 criteria)

�Scope (broad or narrow)

�Whether $ was earmarked into the bill

�Yearly policy = positive laws - negative laws

1 Reitze, Arnold W. 2001. Air Pollution Control Law: Compliance and Enforcement. Washington D.C.: The Environmental Law Institute.

Air pollution control policy

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

1940

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

Policy Implementation

�Good policy needs funding for enforcement

�Metric:

�1940-1969: $ earmarked into legislation

�1970-2001: EPA funds for air pollution control

Air Pollution

�Index: Sulfur dioxide (SO2), Carbon Monoxide (CO), and Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs)

�Cronbach’s alpha=0.941

Air Pollution

-2.5

-2

-1.5

-1

-0.5

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

1940

1944

1948

1952

1956

1960

1964

1968

1972

1976

1980

1984

1988

1992

1996

2000

Sta

nd

ard

ize

d e

mis

sio

ns

Air pollution index CO SO2 VOCs

Methodology

�Annual time-series

�Prais-Winsten regression to control for 1st-order autoregressive disturbances

�All IVs lagged 1 year

Results: Policy Authority

Protest * Democratic Control

Magazine articles

CongressionalHearings

Policy Authority

-

+

-

Controls not included for simplicity

Results: Regulation Budget

Policy Implementation(Regulation budget)

Advocacy

Controls not included for simplicity

+

Results: Air Pollutant Emissions

Air PollutantEmissions

Regulation budget -

Controls not included for simplicity

Advocacy *Magazine articles

Advocacy *Congressional hearings

Protest *Congressional hearings

-

-

-

Conclusions

�Policy is volatile

�Clean Air Act is only a small part of the story

Conclusions

�Better policy ≠ movement success

Conclusions

�Context matters

�Air quality movement matters, but indirectly and only under favorable political circumstances

Acknowledgements

Colleagues

Dr. Robert Brulle

Dr. Jon Agnone

Dr. Jason Carmichael

Funding & Resources

Ohio State University Dept. of Sociology

The Fay Graduate Fellowship Fund in Environmental Sciences

NSF Grant #SES-0455215, “Civil Society & the Environment”

Appendix: Policy authority coding

Earmarked funds Point scale

None 0

<$20 million in real 2013 dollars 1

>$20 million in real 2013 dollars 2

Enforcement Powers Point scale

None 0

Tax incentives 2

Other enforcement 4

Improved enforcement 6-10

Scope Point scale

Very narrow 0

Narrow 1

Moderate 2

Broad 4-6

Very broad 8-10